WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000100001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 24, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

24 May 1963
OCI No. 0281/63
Copy No. 80
WEEKLY SUMMARY
ARMY Reviews
Completed
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
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SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 23 May 1963)
FIDEL CASTRO'S TRAVELS
His visit to the USSR appears to be nearing its
end, but further travel plans remain uncertain.
MOSCOW AND THE OTTAWA NATO MEETING
The USSR is renewing warnings that creation of a
NATO nuclear force, which it charges is merely a
device for giving West Germany access to nuclear
weapons, will bring Soviet countermeasures.
PROLONGED DRIFT COMPLICATES POLISH PARTY PROBLEMS
Indecision and factional squabbling at top levels
have resulted in administrative confusion and de-
moralization below. The lack of economic
improvement has increased public dissatisfaction.
BULGARIA PROPOSES SWEEPING ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION 6
This reform, paralleling earlier changes in the
USSR and some of its other European satellites,
will give the party a larger role in the economy.
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SECRET
THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
MINORITIES CONTINUE TO RESIST CHINESE COMMUNIST RULE 7
Peiping's tactics for controlling restive minori-
ties have not been entirely effective in Sinkiang,
where fresh outbreaks have just been reported.
LIU SHAO-CHI COMPLETES SOUTHEAST ASIAN TOUR
In Hanoi, Communist China's chief of state was ap-
parently unable to shift the Vietnamese from their
delicate position of balance in the Sino-Soviet rift
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO NORTH KOREA
Disclosure of a surface-to-air missile site
indicates such aid continues
despite Pyongyang's pro-Peiping stance, although
Moscow may have lowered the overall aid level.
FIGHTING STEPS UP IN LAOS
The gulf between Souvanna and Souphannouvong is
widening, and Laos appears to be edging toward
MILITARY TIGHTEN CONTROL IN TURKEY
Col. Aydemir's unsuccessful coup attempt will
probably lead the military to assume a larger
role in government.
CHINESE NATIONALIST COUNTERATTACK PREPARATIONS
Forces are being improved, but a frontal assault
on the mainland does not yet appear imminent.
MOROCCO'S ROYALISTS WIN SLIM EDGE IN ELECTIONS
The royalist party won only a plurality, probably
because of King Hassan's lukewarm support.
EGYPT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ
Arrangements for a temporary truce between Nasir
and his Baathist antagonists may be in the offing.
Meanwhile, Baghdad is preparing to open new talks
with the Kurdish rebels.
SECRET
24 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
FRENCH COMMUNIST STUDENT UNION DEFIES THE PARTY
The union has adopted an "action program" based
on its own analysis of the French political scene
independent of the French Communist Party proper.
MEETING OF SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE DICTATORS
Their mid-May meeting reportedly covered a variety
of subjects, but both governments are thought to
be increasingly concerned about divergencies in
their policies toward their African dependencies.
Page
RESULTS OF NETHERLANDS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
Substantial gains by the Catholic People's Party
ensures continuation of present foreign and
defense policies.
THE SITUATION IN HAITI
Opposition forces failed to follow through on
threats to move against Duvalier when he celebrated
the second anniversary of his "reinauguration" for
a new unconstitutional six-year term on 22 May.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
INSURGENCY IN GUATEMALA 20
Guerrilla activity seems to. have abated, but sub-
versive bands continue to operate.
ARGENTINE PRE-ELECTORAL SITUATION
The government's efforts to ensure general elec-
tions on 7 July face new threats in Peronist plans
for a week of politically motivated labor demon-
BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT PURSUES EQUIVOCAL TACTICS 22
Goulart continues to play off pro-Communists against
their opponents in several fields in an apparent ef-
fort to strengthen his power position.
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NOO, SECRET W
Fidel Castro's visit to the
USSR, which has lasted almost
four weeks, appears to be nearly
over. He returned once again to
Moscow on 21 May after a one-day
visit to Kiev, and the mass rally
and receptions on 23 May prob-
ably mark the end of his stay.
Cuban press reports indicate he
will spend a few days "resting"
in the Crimea after his official
sendoff in Moscow.
As for his promised visit
to Algeria, the government there
had announced on 16 May that
Castro would arrive late this
month or in early June. Press
reports of 22 May allege, how-
ever, that Castro had sent an
emissary to Ethiopia to inform
Algerian Premier Ben Bella--in
Addis Ababa for the African "sum-
mit" meetings--that he would
postpone his visit because of
"tiredness and other commitments."
Castro nevertheless may still
go to Algeria before returning
to Cuba.
Swiss officials told the
US ambassador on 21 May that
they still consider it possible
Castro will visit Switzerland.
They state, however, that any
such visit will be treated
strictly as a "private affair."
SECRET
24 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET W
The Communist World
The USSR is maneuvering for
a stronger position from which
to attack the announcement re-
garding an Interallied Nuclear
Force expected from the NATO
ministerial conference in Ot-
tawa. A Soviet proposal deliv-
ed on 20 May to the US, Britain,
France, and 13 countries border-
ing the Mediterranean called
for a ban on nuclear and missile
weapons in the "entire Mediter-
ranean sea region." This scheme
is directed specifically against
the three US Polaris submarines
which are being assigned to
NATO.
In presenting the scheme
to Undersecretary Ball, Ambas-
sador Dobrynin stressed it
would prohibit seaborne as op-
posed to land-based missiles.
He explained that it would in-
clude seaports as bases for
nuclear-armed vessels but not
land-based nuclear weapons as
such.
Moscow clearly hopes this
new proposal will draw favorable
reactions from non-NATO Mediter-
ranean countries. The Soviet
notes warned that the presence
of Polaris submarines in the
Mediterranean would expose these
countries to "devastating mili-
tary action" and called for a
joint Soviet-Western guarantee
that the Mediterranean area
will be regarded, in case of
"military complications," as
outside the "sphere of the
application of nuclear arms."
Soviet propaganda suggests
that Moscow's main charge re-
garding decisions at Ottawa will
be that any form of NATO nuclear
force is merely a device for
giving West Germany access to
nuclear weapons. The USSR is
seeking to establish the impres-
sion that it will respond to
implementation of such a force
with vigorous countermeasures.
A 9 May Pravda article by
Marshal Malinovs'ky renewed warn-
ings contained in Soviet notes
of 5 February to Bonn and Paris:
that the USSR would regard West
German access to nuclear weapons,
regardless of the form, as a
"direct threat to its vital
interests and will be forced to
do everything necessary to en-
sure its security and that of
its allies." Malinovsky recalled
Moscow's notes of 8 April to
the Western powers which stated
that implementation of a NATO
nuclear force "would rule out
disarmament talks for at least
ten years." The Polish delegate
to the Geneva conference recently
conveyed similar warnings to
US officials.
The USSR dispatched new
notes to Bonn and Paris on 17
May criticizing their replies
to its notes of 5 February,
which had protested the French -
West German treaty signed in
January. The new notes charged
that after West German forces
join the NATO nuclear force,
Bonn's "next step" will be to
press for an independent nuclear
capability. Moscow warned
Paris that its policy of an
independent nuclear force is
"showing West Germany the short
cut to nuclear weapons."
Soviet propaganda and Khru-
shchev's recent interview with
the Swedish foreign minister
suggest that Moscow may also
revive earlier proposals for a
nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia
and for a "Baltic Sea of Peace."
SECRET
24 May 63
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SECRET The Communist World
PROLONGED DRIFT COMPLICATES POLISH PARTY PROBLEMS
Indecision and uncertainty
at top levels of the Polish
regime have lowered party leader
Gomulka's prestige in the party
and among the general public.
inadequate guidance from
Moscow have apparently brought
about a paralysis at top party
levels, which in turn has re-
sulted in administrative con-
fusion and demoralization at
lower levels. The situation is
complicated by the party's weak
control, particularly at the
local level, and by domestic
economic policies which have
left consumers angry and sullen.
Political infighting among
party leaders so far has not
been aimed at supplanting Go-
mulka, but rather at influencing
the formation and execution
of policy. One example of such
activities is the apparently
unsuccessful attempt of Stalinist
Deputy Premier Zenon Nowak to
supplant party secretary Ochab
as boss of Poland's agriculture,
and to institute a modified
version of Soviet-style agricul-
tural administration.
Gomulka has sought to pre-
vent disclosure of the intraparty
discords in order to avoid ex-
posing the party's weakness and
thus alarming the population.
Only three central committee
plenums have been held since
November 1961, and all were on
topics carefully calculated to
avoid controversy. A party con-
gress is due this year, but so far
no preparations have been noted.
There are recent indications
that hard-line groups may have
made the most of the situation.
One sign is the removal last
month of the relatively liberal
director of the party central
committee's Department of Science
and Education (he has not yet
been replaced). Another is the
announcement on 17 May that
two party cultural journals,
both liberal in orientation,
would suspend publication and
be replaced in June by a new
cultural weekly.
The Polish people have
apprehensively watched the
progress of the hard-liners
since Gomulka returned several
of them to positions of power
in 1959. They have been im-
pressed by the increased ef-
ficiency and ubiquity of the
secret police. They have been
disillusioned by the regime's
failure to maintain the prom-
ises of the October 1956 Revo-
lution and meet their expecta-
tions for a better life. In-
stead, for over a year the
standard of living has been
stagnant, and there is little
hope for improvement until at
least 1964. Tensions are
growing, especially in urban
areas
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BULGARIA PROPOSES SWEEPING ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION
A major reorganization of
economic administration is under
way in Bulgaria, generally par-
alleling earlier changes in the
Soviet Union and some of its
other European satellites. The
projected changes will give the
party a larger role in economic
management and control. The
reform is intended to adapt eco-
nomic management to the needs
of a rapidly developing economy
and to meet the bloc's planning
for economic integration. The
Politburo and the Council of
Ministers, meeting jointly on
22 May, took the first steps to
implement the proposals.
The reform calls for amal-
gamation of industrial enter-
prises producing similar or re-
lated goods. New agricultural
boards (apparently similar to
the Soviet "territorial, produc-
tion administrations") will be
established at the local level
under the jurisdiction of both
the Ministry of Agricultural
Production and the District
People's Councils. The boards
will be staffed by specialists
whose pay will. be directly linked
to production.
Government and party con-
trol functions will be brought
closer together by promoting
specialization by party members
in various economic fields. To
this end a new joint committee
for party and state control, as
in the Soviet Union, will be
attached to the party central
committee and to the Council
of Ministers.
The Bulgarian regime, like
other satellites, aims to
bring more realism into economic
planning by eliminating duplica-
tion of planning efforts, giving
local organs a greater voice in
the drafting of plans, and making
adequate provision in the plans
for contingencies.
Although the regime appar-
ently wants to fix responsibili-
ties more definitely and draw
clearer lines of authority in
the economic administration, ef-
forts to enlarge the role of
party members in management of
the economy could have the
opposite effect. A call for
mass participation in economic
planning and control through
production councils in factories
and farms also may create added
difficulties for enterprise
managers.
The Bulgarian reform, like
Khrushchev's recent reforms in
the Soviet Union, relies heavily
on political action by party
members to counter bureaucratic
tendencies in economic admin-
istration. While Bulgaria's
proposals call for improvement
of incentives, specific remedies
are not mentioned.
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~Mw SECRET 25X1 'The Communist World
25X1
MINORITIES CONTINUE TO RESIST CHINESE COMMUNIST RULE
Restive ethnic minorities
traditionally hostile to Chinese
rule continue to complicate the
Communist regime's problems of
controlling China's border regions
The most troubled area during the
past year has been Sinkiang. Hos-
tile nationality groups also exist
in Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and
Yunnan Province.
Similar disturbances were re-
ported last year from the Ili
Tacheng area . During
those uprisings possibly as many
as 70,000 Uighur and Kazakh tribes-
men fled across the Soviet border
and received sanctuary. At first
hesitant to take strong measures,
the Chinese in August 1962 closed
off the Sino-Soviet border and
increased the number of border
guards. They also began using
troops to disperse crowds demon-
strating against harsh living con-
ditions. Thereafter,
food rations were
increased, but security controls
were tightened.
These measures clearly did
not suffice. At a meeting of
public security forces in Sin-
kiang on 11 March, the need to
"safeguard frontier defense" and
"strengthen the solidarity among
different nationalities"was stressed.
Farther east,
a marauding band of nomads
began harassing Chinese rail-
road construction work early in
Peiping has used combina- 25X1
more in proportion to the civilian
population than in Sinkiang and
other areas of China.
tions of military force and eco-
nomic concessions in its efforts
to control the minorities. In
Tibet, it has relied primarily
on military force About 100,000
soldiers are stationed there, far
In northern Inner Mongolia,
on the other hand, a marked im-
provement in Sino-Mongol rela-
tions followed Chinese conces-
sions last year. The most impor-
tant single concession was the
withdrawal of large numbers of
Chinese settlers who had encroached
on Mongolian grazing lands. Other
reported concessions included an
increase.in food rations and a
halt in efforts to collectivize
the Mongols.
Mindful of possible political
effects in Southeast Asia, the Chi-
nese Communists have also been
cautious in their handling of minor-
ities in southern Yunnan Province,
who are ethnically related to pop-
ulation groups in Laos, Burma, and
the Chinese there have not pu-s-he
collectivization and have tolerated
infractions of criminal law by the
Thais.
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24 May.63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
Communist China's chief of
state Liu Shao-chi, accompanied
by Foreign Minister Chen Yi, has
completed a month-long swing
through Southeast Asia--his first
essay at personal diplomacy out-
side the bloc. He apparently
scored his greatest success in
Djakarta and made the least im-
pression in Burma. In Cambodia,
his visit was clouded by unprec-
edented security precautions
promptly by the discovery of a
Chinese Nationalist assassina-
tion plot.
In Hanoi, Liu made a strong
bid for more explicit support
in Peiping's dispute with Moscow.
He bore down hard on the impor-
tance of a militant, unrelenting
struggle against imperialism,
and alluded reprovingly to North
Vietnam's neutral stance in the
dispute.
The North Vietnamese were
only partially responsive to
Liu's efforts.
The joint statement which
Liu signed with Ho Chi Minh at
the end of the visit did con-
tain several important Chinese
positions. Without even a nod
to peaceful coexistence, the
two leaders affirmed the need
for a concerted Communist strug-
gle against imperialism. They
termed "modern revisionism" the
main danger to the international
Communist movement, pointing to
the Yugoslavs as the "concentrated
expression" of this danger. Al-
though Hanoi had used these for-
mulations independently before
Liu's visit, Peiping probably
considers it tactically useful
to have them restated over Ho's
signature before beginning its
bilateral negotiations with
Moscow.
The North Vietnamese clearly
shied, however, from a clear-
cut commitment to the Chinese
Communist side. In his parting
remarks, Ho pointedly placed
Vietnamese-Chinese friendship
on the level of relations with
"all other socialist countries
and all fraternal parties."
During Liu's stay, Hanoi speakers
persistently praised the USSR
in the same breath that they
praised China.
Hanoi's coverage of the
visit indicated that extensive
discussions were held on a wide
range of topics, doubtless in-
cluding future Communist strategy
in South Vietnam. During his
stay in Hanoi, Liu frequently
voiced Peiping's full support
for the Viet Cong insurrection.
The possibility that Liu of-
fered material as well as
moral support was suggested
by the inclusion in his en-
tourage of a top economic
planner.
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*40 SECRET loo
The North Korean military
defense program continues to
be bolstered by deliveries of
Soviet equipment, despite Pyong-
yang's vigorous support for
Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute. Aerial photography
disclosed an operational
surface-to-air missile site con-
sisting of six launch positions
16 miles southeast of Pyongyang.
From a purely military
viewpoint, the delivery of sur-
face-to-air missiles was a logi-
cal step in the development of
North Korea's air defense pro-
gram. Pyongyang's fully inte-
grated fighter interceptor sys-
tem, including over 300 MIG-15
(Fagot) and MIG-17 (Fresco) jet
aircraft, has only a limited
high-altitude intercept capa-
bility.
SECRET
24 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Despite the continuing evi-
dence of Soviet defensive arms
assistance to North Korea, Mos-
cow may have lowered the over-
all level of military aid, and
threatened its eventual termi-
nation as a form of pressure
on Pyongyang in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. This was implied in
a North Korean central commit-
tee statement last December
which hinted that Pyongyang
might have to go it alone
militarily.
The statement urged the
North Korean people to "arm
themselves," and called for an
immediate effort to strengthen
the country's "defense capacity,"
even at the expense of over-all
national economic development.
North Korean support for Peiping
in the Sino-Soviet dispute be-
came more open and vigorous
immediately thereafter at the
series of European party con-
gresses in December and January,
and has continued on this level
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*Wi SECRET
With the gulf between Pre-
mier Souvanna and Pathet Lao
leader Souphannouvong steadily
widening, Laos appears to be
edging toward resumption of
civil war.
Fighting has stepped up in
the Plaine des Jarres area fol-
lowing weeks of desultory skirm-
ishing and maneuvering. Fairly
heavy exchanges of artillery
and mortar fire are taking place
at Xieng Khouang town, Lat Houang,
and Lat Bouak.
An attack on Xieng Khouang
launched by combined neutralist
Lao army, and Meo elements has
met stiff resistance and appears
to have bogged down. Vientiane
communique6 describe the overall
situation in the area as critical.
General Phoumi dispatched
a fourth Lao army battalion
last week to support neutralist
commander Kong Le. Meo guer-
rillas are also intensifying
their efforts to interdict the
Communists' main supply line
from North Vietnam--Route 7--
and to block feeder roads in
the Plaine des Jarres complex.
The growing involvement of
Phoumi and Meo troops in so-
called "liberated territory" is
likely to touch off a Communist
reaction. Neutralist reports
indicate that a significant
buildup of Communist troops and
supplies is taking place both
in the Plaine des Jarres area
as well as along Routes 12 and
9 in south-central Laos. These
reports also state that sub-
stantial numbers of North Viet-
namese troops are involved.
While confirmation of this
latter aspect is lacking, the
introduction of additional
North Vietnamese would be likely
if.fighting escalates, particu-
larly if the Pathet Lao and
dissident neutralist forces
seemed threatened with serious
reverses.
Any resumption of Com-
munist aggression probably
would have the objectives of
ousting Kong Le from the Plaine
des Jarres and clearing up
pockets of neutralist and
rightist troops in other areas
removed from the principal
towns of the Mekong Valley.
The USSR is about to with-
draw its remaining pilots and
mechanics connected with the
ten aircraft it gave the Vien-
tiane government last December.
Although the agreement with
Laos envisaged the withdrawal
of Soviet personnel as Lao
technicians were trained--
and many of the Soviets have
phased out since February--
the windup of the mission
helps the USSR out of a del-
icate position with Peiping
and Hanoi, since the Soviet
air crews were being used
to support Kong Le and Phoumi
SECRET
24 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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*40 SECRET
The failure of retired Col.
Talat Avdemir's attempt on 20-21
May to overthrow the Inonu
regime in Turkey appears to
have demonstrated a high degree
of unity in the military estab-
lishment and should increase its
prestige. The military apparatus
thus will probably play an even
stronger role than before in the
country's political life, at
least until the civilian
government can demonstrate more
unity of purpose and sense of
direction than it has recently.
As a result of the coup
attempt, the military high
command has established tight
control over virtually every
aspect of civil and military
life. A "state of siege" has
been declared, military units
have been placed in a "readi-
ness alert" status, and martial
law has been instituted for at
least one month in the provinces
of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir.
Night curfews have been imposed
in the cities of Ankara and
Izmir, the press is subject to
censorship, and politicians
have been warned against making
any statements that would "tend
to confuse the public."
The military may use the
emergency to crack down on
other elements hostile to the
Inonu government, especially
the retired officers' associa-
tion, "Eminsu" and the extremist
wing of the 1ustice Party, the
major political opposition group.
Unless Prime Minister Inonu's
tripartite coalition begins to
demonstrate sufficient unity
and drive to make economic prog-
ress and to win public confi-
dence, the current controls
could be the first moves in re-
suming more direct military
control of the government.
Even before the Aydemir episode, the
military had been suggesting
that a national front government
might be established.
The abortive coup was an
even greater fiasco than Aydemir's
previous attempt to overthrow
the government in February 1962.
It was ill-timed and lacked any
significant support other than
from among students at the War
Academy in Ankara, which he
headed from 1960 to 1962.
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The Chinese Nationalists
are apparently accelerating
efforts to increase their am-
phibious lift capability. There
are no indications that they
intend to launch a frontal at-
tack on the mainland soon, how-
ever, and. the high pitch in
their preparations anticipated
for this spring has not material-
ized.
The Nationalists have prob-
ably completed about 60 of 110
LCMs (Landing Craft Mechanized)
begun late last year, and might
complete the remainder by Sep-
tember--earlier if reported nego-
tiations with Japanese ship-
builders are successful. These
110 craft could probably trans-
port about a division of lightly
armed men in ideal weather. In
late April, naval officials
ordered that all of the Nation-
alists' 22 LSTs (Landing Ship
Tanks) were to be made opera-
tional as soon as possible.
The Nationalists might at-
tempt large-scale action against
the mainland without informing
the US. Nationalist officers
have been secretive with US
advisers regarding recent air-
borne and amphibious exercises,
such as one in early May involv-
ing a paratroop regiment and
requiring almost all Nationalist
transport aircraft--a force
which could have been sent
against the mainland.
Key Nationalist officials,
however, probably understand
the seriousness of their defi-
ciencies for launching and
sustaining a counterattack, and
operations in the next few
months will probably continue
to be limited to small-scale
guerrilla and commando probes.
The royalist party appar-
ently won a sizable plurality
in Morocco's first parliamentary
election on 17 May, but not the
decisive majority expected. Re-
turns are still unofficial, but
the royalist Front for the De-
fense of Constitutional Institu-
tions (FDIC) seems to have won
69 of the 144 lower-house seats
at-stake, the conservative Is-
tiqlal 41, the leftist National
Union of Popular Forces (UNFP)
28, and independents 6.
King Hassan's lukewarm sup-
port for the FDIC may account
for its poor showin .
Even though creation of
the parliament in no way dimin-
ishes his near-absolute powers,
and his closest adviser, Ahmed
Reda Guedira,controls the FDIC,
he may have wished to avert an
overwhelming majority under
one group.
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Minister of Agriculture
and Interior Guedira was the
only winner among the seven cab-
inet ministers who sought elec-
tion. If the King relinquishes
the premiership, he is likely
to ask Guedira to head his gov-
ernment. The King, however,
would still retain a firm per-
sonal control over all govern-
mental activities--to the detri-
ment of administrative efficiency.
EGYPT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ
Although Egyptian propaganda
has continued to attack the
Syrian Baathist leadership, ar-
rangements for a temporary truce
may be in the offing. Nasir
made only a moderate, indirect
reference to his Baathist antag-
onists in Syria and Iraq in his
speech in Cairo on 20 May. Nasir
has been meeting with a Syrian
peace-making delegation that
arrived in Cairo last week end,
and he talked with Iraqi Presi-
dent Arif just prior to the 20
May speech.
A lasting reconciliation
between Nasir and the Baathists
still appears improbable. Nasir,
however, may believe that some
temporary compromise with them
is necessary on the ground that
continued intransigence on his
part would damage his image as
the champion of Arab unity.
Of the opposition parties,
the Istiglal apparently intends
to perpetuate the tension of
the pre-election period. It has
declared that it will take all
steps necessary "to clean up the
situation"--a reference to its
charges of pervasive corruption.
The Iraqi Government is pre-
paring to renew negotiations
on Kurdish autonomy, but both
government and rebel forces
continue also to prepare for
possible new hostilities. The
US Embassy believes the Kurds
will probably reject the gov-
ernment's offer of limited self-
government.
The regime apparently feels
its already slipping prestige
would suffer with any sign of
genuine concessions to the Kurds.
It also seems unrealistically
confident of its ability to
defeat any renewal of the Kurd-
ish insurrection, which was
largely responsible for the fall
of former Prime Minister Qasim.
The Kurds maintain that the
government is deliberately stall-
ing in order to build up its
armed strength for an assault on
rebel positions.
24 May 63
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Europe
The French Communist Party
(PCF) has taken retaliatory
action against the Union of
Communist Students (UEC) for
refusing to submit to party
discipline on a disputed pro-
gram of action. The defiance
of the UEC adds to the diffi-
culties of the PCF as it seeks
to adopt a less doctrinaire
position on some substantive
issues and at the same time to
strengthen internal discipline.
The conflict came into the
open when the National. Committee
of the 4,000-member UEC drew up
for discussion, at its February
National Congress a "program
of action" based on an independ-
ent analysis of the French
political scene. In the past,
the union had confined itself
to recommending ways of imple-
menting policy decisions taken
by the PCF leadership. When
the UEC refused to yield to
PCF pressures to postpone its
congress and withdraw the pro-
gram from circulation, the party
called for PCF federations to
apply pressure on the UEC at
local levels.
The UEC program, labeled
"revisionist" by the PCF, chal-
lenged the party's official
position on several crucial
points. After first denying the
PCF contention that students
have no "social unity" of their
own, the program criticized
the party for its failure to
carry out an adequate process
of "de-Stalinization."
Further, the program ques-
tioned the validity of the old-
fashioned appeal for a united
front of Communists, Socialists,
and Radicals. Labeling this a
"tactical alliance against
Gaullism" rather than a true
socialist grouping, the UEC
called for a genuine center-
left association with such
groups as the National Union of
French Students, the Unified
Socialist Party, and progressive
Catholics.
Finally, the program re-
fused to dismiss the Common
Market as a capitalist plot
and called for a more thorough
analysis of the EEC along the
flexible lines undertaken by
the Italian Communist Party.
The UEC congress approved
the program by a majority vote
and subsequently refused to
yield to the demands of the
PCF Political Bureau. Party
leaders made it clear at
this juncture that rejec-
tion of the party's demands
would be considered a new
and far-reaching attack on
the party leadership. Al-
though there has been no for-
mal break between the two
groups, the PCF has announced
it will bypass the UEC and
work directly with the stu-
dents, and has suspended
financial subsidies to the
UEC.
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\7A
Spanish and Portuguese Dependencies
in Africa
LIBYA I UAR
E.YYT)
REPUBLIC
OE THE Cl,~N
C;O
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Europe
MEETING OF SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE DICTATORS
The mid-May meeting of Spain's
Franco and Portugal's Salazar--the
first since June 1960--reportedly
took place in an atmosphere of
"perfect understanding." There is
reason to believe, however, that
both governments are increasingly
concerned over divergencies in
their African policies.
Portuguese Foreign Minister
Franco Nogueira, who was present
at the meeting, told Ambassador
Elbrick that a wide range of sub-
jects was discussed, and implied
that one main topic was Iberian
solidarity in dealing with inter-
national problems. Despite Franco
Nogueira's insistence to the
contrary, Elbrick concluded that
there were probably some snags.
The Spanish Foreign Ministry's
director general of political
affairs, who accompanied Franco,
implied to the US charge in Madrid
that the most lengthy talks were
on Africa. Differences over
African policy, he said, derived
from the much greater magnitude of
the problems confronting the
Portuguese. The official stated
that relations with the US, includ-
ing the question of bases in Spain
and the Azores, were also briefly
discussed.
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Salazar may have taken the
initiative in seeking this meeting,
as he is reported to have done un-
successfully in the spring of 1961
and in February 1962. Franco prob-
ably wanted to avoid a meeting in
view of the difficulty in recon-
ciling support of Salazar's African
policy with his own plan for pre-
paring Spain's African provinces
of Rio Muni and Fernando Po for
eventual self-government.
of the 1960 meeting.
Spanish officials have on
several occasions admonished the
Salazar regime to initiate some
liberal measures in its African
provinces as a means of reducing
Afro-Asian hostility in the UN,
where the Portuguese have been
seeking Spanish support. Almost
a year and a half ago Captain
General Munoz Grandes (since ap-
pointed vice president) said
Franco had sent him to tell`
Salazar that Portugal should
immediately institute meaningful
reforms both in Angola and at
home in order to ward off the dan-
ger of serious Communist penetration.
Participants in the recent
meeting remarked on Franco's ap-
parent good health and abundant
vitality. The Spaniards said 25X1
they found Salazar in much better
health and form than at the time
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I No"
PARTY STRENGTHS IN THE NETHERLANDS LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT
(SECOND CHAMBER)
POLITICAL REFORMED PARTY
(PROTESTANT) 3 1 3 )
REFORMED POLITICAL
UNION 1 8!
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RESULTS OF NETHERLANDS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
The substantial gains of the
Catholic People's Party (KVP)in the
Netherlands' 15 May parliamentary
elections ensures continuation of
the country's strong commitment to
the Atlantic Alliance. The KVP's
cabinet partners--the two princi-
pal Protestant parties and the
Liberals--lost a total of three
seats, but the present coalition
is likely to be reconstituted with
only a few changes of cabinet members.
There is considerable sentiment
in favor of retaining the popular
incumbent premier, Jan DeQuay, who
may be persuaded to stay on de-
spite an expressed intention to
step down and take a seat in the
upper house. There is also a
strong possibility that Foreign
Minister Luns, who greatly en-
hanced his position by opposing
De Gaulle's European policy, will
be asked to remain.
The gains registered by
the minuscule Communist and
Pacifist Socialist parties on the
extreme left do not markedly
.affect the existing power rela-
tionships in parliament. The
parties strongly committed to
existing foreign and defense pol-
icies control more than 130
of the 150 seats in the lower
house.
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Western Hemisphere 25X1
The regime of Haitian dic-
tator Duvalier staged an elab-
orate celebration on 22 May to
make the second anniversary of
his "reinauguration" for a new,
unconstitutional six-year term
as president. Opposition forces
inside Haiti had claimed on sev-
eral occasions that their ef-
forts to oust Duvalier would
reach a climax on that date.
However, they once again failed
to move--as they had a week
earlier when his legal term ex-
pired on 15 May.
Many thousands of peasants
were brought to the capital for
the 22 May celebrations. Some
who had reached the city by 20
May were targets that night of
bombing and gunfire attacks by
anti'-Duvalier terrorists--prob-
ably under the leadership of
Clement Barbot, whose small
group is the only one known now
to be operating inside Haiti.
An unknown number of casualties
resulted.
24 May 63
International support for
Duvalier has been notably lack-
ing since his legal term expired,
but few governments appear will-
ing to risk charges of interven-
tion by favoring strong action
against him. Most, if not all,
West European countries have
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CUBA
HAITI
Inlr~rnalior~al haundary
----- Ueparten.ent boundary
National capital
_.. FU~'parlr~nir~n t capilnl
kailrnarf
knaA
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indicated their intention of
continuing "normal" relations
with Haiti--a policy evidently
based primarily on the fact that
the Duvalier government contin-
ues in effective control.
French-Haitian relations--
traditionally close because of
cultural and historical ties
but cool and restrained under
Duvalier--apparently will con-
tinue unchanged despite specu-
lation that a recent letter to
Duvalier from De Gaulle presaged
closer ties. A copy of the let-
ter--replying to a Duvalier
note in March asking for eco-
nomic aid--was shown on 18 May
to Ambassador Thurston in Port-
au-Prince, who said it conveyed
a courteous but vaguely worded
answer to Duvalier's request.
The French ambassador in Haiti
refused permission to publish
De Gaulle's message in the local
newspapers, but this has not
prevented, the Duvalier-controlled
press from heralding it widely
as further "evidence of the es-
teem and prestige accorded
abroad" to Duvalier's "progres-
sive policies."
Venezuela and Costa Rica
suspended relations with Haiti
on 15 and 16 May, but other
Latin American states are post-
poning a decision at least un-
Western Hemisphere
til completion of the report of
the special five-nation OAS
commission which recently left
the island. The easing of the
Haitian-Dominican tension could
persuade some OAS members that
there is no further urgency,
however, and make it difficult
for the inter-American community
to pursue charges that the Du-
valier regime has violated ba-
sic human rights. Some states
--such as El Salvador, Argentina,
and Peru--are reluctant to break
with the Duvalier regime on
grounds of nonconstitutionality
because of their own illegal
changes of government within 25X1
the last year or so.
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Western Hemisphere
25X1
Guerrilla activity in
Guatemala seems to have abated,
but the government remains
concerned. It has been unable
to destroy the subversive groups
operating in the hinterlands and
apparently lacks solid infor-
mation about their size and
composition. Death sentences
were handed down by a military
court on 18 May against five
captured insurgents.
claimed guerrilla successes
against the military.
Secondary students, their
schools closed by the Peralta
government in response to stu-
dent poltical strikes, report-
edly aspire--like other dis-
gruntled groups--to join the
guerrillas. However, the gov-
ernment seems determined to
control the extremists among
students, who are Communist
led and often the catalyst. for
political violence in Guatemala.
On 19 May
Havana radio broadcast a
"clandestine communique of the
Guatemalan Rebel Movement"
which charged the Guatemalan
Army with the murder of ten
workers in Izabal Province and
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Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINE PRE-ELECTORAL SITUATION
The Argentine Government's
efforts to ensure that general
elections take place as scheduled.
on 7 July face new challenges
Peronist labor leaders
have scheduled a "week of pro-
test" beginning on 23 May and
ending with a 24-hour general
strike on 31 May. These po-
litical-ly motivated demonstra-
tions will be susceptible to
exploitation by groups which
want to block the elections
and might even constitute a
Peronist effort to sabotage
the elections.
The Peronists' intentions
remain obscure. They have
hitherto insisted that their
negotiations with the govern-
ment over the past year on the
terms for their participation
in the elections be kept secret.
publicly, they have denied that
any such negotiations were
taking place and have continued
to take an uncompromisingly
pro-Peron line. Their strategy
apparently has been to accept
certain limitations by the
government in order to gain
permission to participate,
then to rally support from other
parties which were hoping to
benefit from a front arrange-
ment with the Peronists, and--
backed by this support--to press
further for their own terms.
However, a decree published
on 17 May makes clear the gov-
ernment's determination to pre-
vent these maneuvers. It pro-
hibits the Peronists' party,
the Popular Union (UP), from
presenting candidates gor the
presidency, the vice,presi-
dency, or provincial governor-
ships, and limits them to con-
gressional, other provincial,
and municipal races. It
squelched the Peronists' hopes
of offering candidates for
governor in five provinces that
were open to them earlier.
Peron and certain of his
agents have dominated Peronist
and UP strategy thus far, but
if he now decides to try to
sabotage the elections, part of
the UP leadership may seek a
more independent course. The
seven-party front to which the
UP belongs--and whose formation
was encouraged by the government--
has not yet selected a presi-
dential candidate, as the 24
May deadline for inscription
approaches.
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Western Hemisphere
Brazilian President Gou-
lart continues to play off pro-
Communists against their oppo-
nents in several fields, in an
apparent effort to strengthen
his power position.
In organized labor Gou-
lart has agreed to help build
the non-Communist Workers'
Union Movement into a nation-
wide organization. This would
provide a competitor to the
Communist-dominated General
Workers' Command (CGT), in which
Goulart has lost some influence
in recent months. He probably
believes that he can best retain
a decisive voice in organized
labor activity by having rival
organizations.
Among the military, Gou-
.lart has tended to support the
extreme leftists around First
Army Commander Osvino Alves and,
by promotions and reassignments
to key posts, has given them
a position of strength dispro-
portionate to their small number.
Goulart took no public
part in a recent controversy
involving his leftist brother-
in-law, who delivered a public
address in Natal attacking the
commanding general of the Natal
garrison personall
The Goulart government's
attitude toward the United
States also shows equivocal
tendencies. Although most
overseas diplomatic posts con-
tinue to be held by pro-West-
ern officials, the government
is willing to appoint men
likely to favor the USSR over
the US to important positions
in international organizations.
Antonio Houaiss, a probable
Communist, is attached to
Brazil,'s UN mission. In mid-
April, Brazil appointed pro-
Communist Josue de Castro to
head its delegation to the
disarmament conference in
Geneva.
The government's attitude
toward the US aid program in
the impoverished Brazilian
northeast, however, has re-
cently become markedly more
cooperative than for some
time past.
24 May 63
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IJL aJi%.i. s Tim
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