CIA DEFENDED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000700490003-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 4, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 2, 1966
Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker,
among the many things that occupied
my attention on my recent trip to south-
east Asia was the caliber of CIA person-
nel who briefed me there. Prior to my
departure from Washington, I had re-
ceived detailed briefings from the CIA
to give me a better grasp of the problems
I would see in the area. The briefings
were conducted by men who were ob-
viously expert in their professions. The
Agency men in the field to whom I
talked were fully knowledgeable on their
subject and impressed me as truly very
competent representatives of this Gov-
ernment and of their profession.
Officers of U.S. Embassies to whom I
spoke and military commanders alike
assured me that the work of the CIA in
that part of the world was fully inte-
grated into the overall U.S, effort. The
Agency Is shouldering a full share of the
load as a member of the team. I have
watched them work for a number of
years. It is an Agency which has a tre-
mendous responsibility and I for one
certainly wonder at anyone who would
by word or written article leave the in-
ference that this Agency was less than
living up to their duty and responsibility
unless they had sufficient proof to do so.
There have been a .number of articles
T== lR 5-00149R( 7 4"03 Q-~,
i February 1966 !/
the Polaris: missile) can't prevent the flight
of a professional like Cline, how can he re-
store to his Agency the high morale It en-
joyed under former Directors Allen Dulles
and John McCone? --
Another factor lies behind Cline's decision:
his intimate'ties to McGeorge Bundy, who
Is quitting as President Johnson's top nation-
al security aid effective February 28.
With Bundy as the chief White House link
to CIA, he and Cline were In the thick of
supersecret operations during the Cuban
missile crisis. It was Cline who rushed
the first U-2 pictures of Soviet missiles in
Cuba to Bundy at the White House in Oc-
tober 1962. Bundy ran them upstairs to
President Kennedy.
CIA DEFENDED
I write in answer to Richard Brightson's
letter "Without the CIA" (December 23).
Having commenced a career as a professional
intelligence officer some 30 years ago and
served subsequently in ONI, OSS, Battle
Force Pacific, and finally more than a decade
as an official of the CIA, I feel strongly that
Mr. Brlghtson's attack on the competency
of CIA's Intelligence analysis and estimative
staff must be answered by someone not be-
mused by the tongue-In-cheek whimsies of
James Bond and "Uncle" and who has not
only read more than a short serialization of
"The Penkovsky Papers," but actually worked
with the original material.
As to "suspicious-looking sources" and Mr.
Brighteon's assumption. that the estimators
do not have access to the sources:
The information that flows Into the
analytical and estimative process comes from
a wide range of sources-all varieties of
published materials and foreign broadcasts
(65 foreign languages in daily use), pho-
tography, travel reports, Items of equipment,
etc., and, of course, clandestine agent reports.
The evaluation of these sources and the
material supplied is performed by experts,
and in the case of agent reports by those
written on the quality and performance case officers who are closest to the agent net
of the CIA and under leave to extend in question.. All reports are accurately rated
articles: -
(From the Washington (D,C.)
19661
CIA MORALE DROPS-CRACK
PROFESSIONAL QUrrs A Top
RECTOR IS CRITICIZED
Post, Jan. 9,
INTELLIGENCE
JOB AND Di-
Certain to impair declining morale in the
Central Intelligence Agency Is the unan-
nounced, unprecedented decision of a top-
flight professional intelligence man to resign
as Deputy Director for Intelligence to take
n lesser job.
Ray Cline has privately informed CIA Chief
William F. (Red) Raborn that he wants to
relinquish the Agency's fourth-highest post
and take a field job. in Europe. His decision
comes as Raborn-is under increasing Internal
CIA criticism for letting morale slip.
Although Cline disclaims unhappiness with
Raborn as a factor in his unusual departure,
colleagues think otherwise.
as to reliability of the source and as to the
credibility of the material. If the need
arises, there are not many cases where the
intelligence analyst cannot be put directly
in touch with the source.
As to the competence. of the analyst and
estimators-those "Individuals without an
immediate and intimate working knowledge
of the subject matter":
Within the Board of National Estimates
and its staff are prepared the periodic and
ad hoc estimates which go to the senior
policy level in State and Defense, to the
National Security Council, and to the Presi-
dent. Many of the men on the Board and
Its staff date their intelligence experience
from the early days of OSS, almost a quarter
century ago, others have come to the CIA
from the military intelligence services and
from the senior level of the academic corn-
In unity. Better, than 90 percent have ad-
vanced academic degrees in fields of history,
political science, or economics, directly
pertinent to their work.
About 7b percent (lave enhanced their area
More important, the departure of the crac
k and subject knowledge by residence overseas,
intelligence professional will leave a gaping In addition, the CIA for years has had in
hole in the Agency at the very time that in- 'operation a program of sending "analysts
ternal dissatisfaction with Raborn is highest. overseas on familiarization tours to compen-
The question asked In Washington is this: )late for lack of foreign residence. These all
If Raborn (justly, famed as the fatheat of are men of dedication- and highest compe-
tence, who have Individually devoted the ma-
jor portion of their mature lives to the study
of the area or subject with which they now
deal.
What new "more legitimate Information-
gathering operation," as suggested by Mr.
Brightson, could possibly acquire such a
wealth of talent and how long would it take?.'
Decades certainly.
Finally, perhaps I might suggest to Mr.
Brightson (and to others of like thinking)
that instead of James Bond, they read with
some attenion such authoritative books as
Allen Dulles "Craft of Intelligence" and
Sherman Kent's "Strategic Intelligence," be-
fore recommending abolition of the present
order and a possible return to the Intelligence
chaos of the pre-World War II era.
PnrLLrP G, STRONG.
HARTLAND, VT.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Star, Dec. 19,
1965]
REPLY TO CRITICISM . Or CIA
(By Carl T. Rowan)
Pity the poor old Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). It Is the perennial whipping
boy of columnists and Congressmen and of
just about every foreign dictator seeking to
divert attention from his own crookedness
or ineptitude.
As one who knows a bit about CIA (which
most of its critics decidedly do not), I get
a little sick of seeing it badgered and abused
by just about everybody capable of scratch-
ing out a sentence or calling a press confer-
ence.
Now this may be interpreted as my being
in favor of sin (which most people are), but
put me on record as saying CIA, does a pretty
darned good job of protecting not only U.S.
security but that of many weaker countries
all over the world as well.
True, it makes mistakes. Big ones. But
only at about the same rate that the State
Department, the Defense Department, the
White House or my old agency, the U.S. In-
formation Agency makes booboos.
And you'd be hard pressed to convince
me that CIA's ratio of incompetents Is any
higher than that of the U.S. Senate.
Those who leap to the firing line when
they discover it's always open season on CIA
seem to ignore one Inescapable fact: A good
Intelligence system has become as crucial
to national security as an army, or air force,
or an arsenal of powerful weapons.
The foreigners criticizing CIA most, (the
Russians, President Kwame Nkrumah of
Ghana, etc.) know this and nobody expends
more effort than they do trying to perfect,
their cloak-and-dagger operations.
What we ought not forget is that in many
critical situations these last few years, the
United States has been able to make the
correct decision to guarantee our security
because CIA had secured information that
our enemies thought we could not possibly
possess. The Cuban missiles crisis Is an ex-
ample.
Having said all this, t must concede that
CIA is at a critical point in Its history. Not
only is It scorned the world over, but the
standard device for discrediting the Peace
Corps, USIA and other American agencies is
to link them to the CIA.
During a recent tour of East Africa and
southeast Asia, it was made clear to me that
siieptoion and fear of the CIA has become
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FEB 4 1966
a sort of Achilles heel of American foreign
policy.
This may seem to Justify the attacks on
CIA in Congress and elsewhere but the truth
is just the opposite. The homegrown critics
are 100 times more to blame for the wild
and irrational foreign fear of CIA than is
the Agency Itself, --
A Ghana official recently was lamenting
the fact that the United States denied a food
request because Nkrumah published a book
attacking CIA and labeling just about every
American who ever put foot in Ghana as a
CIA spy.
"Are you surprised that Americans would
react unfavorably to this kind of attack?"
I asked.
"We are surprised that you would direct
your anger at us," said the Ghana envoy.
"Our President took practically everything
he wrote out of American books and other
publications."
At a dinner in Lusaka, the Vice President
of Zambia began conversation by asking me
to give him an appraisal of "The Invisible
Government," a book by two of my Journal-
istic colleagues about so-called CIA cloak-
and-dagger operations abroad.
I ducked the question by commenting:
"I only wish CIA were capable of half the
things for which It is blamed or praised."
Several Zambian cabinet members refused
to let me cluck, however, and I soon found
myself caur:ht in a wild discussion with
people who b,Meve fervently that CIA Is
In the business: of overthrowing and instal-
ling governments all over the world-without
the approval or knowledge of the Secretary
of State or the President.
I later learned that every top- and middle-
level Zambian official had been Instructed
to read "The Invisible Government," Andrew
Tally's book "The CIA," and Morris West's
new book, "The Ambassador."
I'm not naive enough to suggest that news-
men and authors stop writing about CIA.
Our society is naturally intolerant of secrecy
(which any good intelligence operation re-
quires), so the questioning and criticism
will go on.
But it would sure help If some of the
critics conceded that, whether we like clan-
destine Intelligence operations or not, they
are indispensable In thls'oraay. crooked,, bel-'r
Xt Noose world in which we live.
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