BOLIVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000600260034-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: February 5, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2006/07/2V71300446R000600260034-1
5 February 1965
DCI BRIEFING
FOR THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
I> The prospect of national elections, scheduled by
the military junta for 30 May, has created a
period of constant maneuvering and plotting among
the country's political leaders and parties.
A. As yet there are no formal coalitions, but
major forces are polarizing on the right
and left, with former President Hernan Siles
clinging to a strategic position in the
center.
Junta President Rene Barrientos Ortuno will
probably be a presidential candidate but
refuses to resign his position on the junta
to conduct his election campaign. His sup-
porters have launched the Popular Christian
Movement as a political vehicle to promote
his election.
1. There are indications that Hernan Siles
and his supporters in the National Rev-
olutionary Movement will back Barrientos
as the candidate of the political center.
IK
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C. Extremist elements of the right and left
are moving toward positions of active op-
position to Barrientos. Their opposition
could take the form of violence and a tacti-
cal alliance of the left and right cannot
be discounted.
II. In the interim the junta faces problems which
will severely tax its ability to maintain stability.
A. The 35,000 armed tin miners are dominated,
either by outright Communists or by extreme
leftist ex-Vice President Juan Lechin. Un-
doubtedly they will be used by the left for
political purposes. Moreover, a round of
wage demands particularly on the part of
miners, factory workers, and teachers is ex-
pected during February. We foresee the pos-
sibility of strikes, demonstrations, and
violence if the junta is unable to meet
their demands. Although he believes him-
self popular in the mining regions, Bar-
rientos probably has little better prospect
of pacifying the miners than did President
Paz Estenssoro.
I 25X1
SEGRET
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B. Communists and other extreme leftists have
taken over some important labor and peasant
organizations formerly controlled by Paz.
Barrientos is also trying to consolidate
his labor and peasant support and would like
to split off union members from their na-
tional leaders. Sharp competition in the
labor field will probably increase politi-
cal hostilities.
C. Lawlessness continues to plague the country,
and violent armed clashes are likely to
erupt as political tensions increase dur-
ing the pre-electoral period.
D. The junta's ability to govern effectively
is hampered by the lack of qualified per-
sonnel experienced in the problems and
stresses of Bolivian politics. There is
the possibility that dissension will de-
velop within the junta over policy and the
military role in politics. Some senior mil-
itary officers are reportedly opposed to
Barrientos' political plans.
3P_J Ulm I'
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