CHINA UPGRADES ITS FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 31, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
25X1
25X1
Iq
NGA Review Completed
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
CHINA UPGRADES ITS FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
31 December 1984
Summarv
Concerned with the growing Soviet air threat along its
northern border, China over the past several years has been
attempting to upgrade the combat capabilities of its fighter
aircraft with Western hardware and technology. The Chinese
effort is specifically directed at improving the F-7 and F-8
fighters so that they can more effectively combat advanced Soviet
aircraft. The Chinese seek assistance in avionics and fire
control systems, air-to-air missiles, and jet engines.
If Beijing is successful in obtaining the necessary
technology and equipment for all of these areas, China would
significantly increase its ability to defend against attacking
Soviet bombers in a limited air war but still would not be able
to challenge Soviet air superiority in an all-out conflict. We
believe China already nas the ability to establish air
superiority over Taiwan if willing to accept heavy losses.
Modernized F-7s and F-8s, which challenge the qualitative
advantage of Taiwan's F-5Es, would reduce the cost of an air war.
Upgraded figher aircraft would also improve China's capabilities
against the Vietnamese Air Force, although in any conflict the
Chinese would sustain heavy losses from Hanoi's modern aircraft
and air defense systems.
This memorandum was prepared byl (China Division, Office of
East Asian Analysis. Information available as o ` 15 December was used in
its preparation. Comments and questions are welcome and may be directed to
Chief, Defense Issue Branch, OEA,
py 4
O .f 5cr
T
EA M 84-10247C
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
Adjusting Strategy to Meet the Soviet Threat
In response to the continuing buildup of Soviet forces opposite China,
Beijing over the past several years has embarked on a major campaign to
modernize its military forces--a campaign that is modifying China's
historical military philosophy of fighting the Soviet Union's qualitatively
superior forces with quantitative superiority. Over the past several
years, for example, the Chinese have developed new or modified existing
conventional weapons, including a wheeled amphibious vehicle, a portable
surface-to-air missile, an antiship missile, and an improved tank.*
In addition, they have developed more realistic training scenarios--
including combined arms operations--and are seeking to increase the level
of education of their troops.
Essential to a more aggressive defense of China's land borders is the
development of fighter aircraft able to counter Soviet warplanes on air
strikes and bombing missions and to provide air cover for ground forces.
In the three Soviet military districts that border China, the USSR has
based over 1,600 fighters, including some of their newest and most advanced
aircraft. While the Chinese have the numerical advantage--4,200 fighters
in their northern military regions--the Soviets have the qualitative edge
because of the sophistication of their radars, weapons systems, and
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER*
Air Defense Ground Attack Total
China 1,885 2,364 4,249
Soviet Union 725 905 1,630
*Fighter aircraft; reconnaissance or ECM aircraft not included.
engines. With their advanced radars and longer range air-to-air missiles,
Soviet pilots can detect Chinese aircraft and fire their missiles before
the Chinese pilots locate the Soviet aircraft. Because of the limited
range of Chinese airborne intercept radars, it is possible that a Chinese
pilot could be shot down without even knowing the enemy was in the area.
Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
In addition, older Chinese aircraft, because of less powerful engine
cannot obtain speed and altitude as quickly as the Soviet aircraft.
The Troubled F-8 Program
Recognizing these weaknesses, Beijing has authorized several
developmental and production programs aimed at replacing its large but
rapidly aging fleet of F-5 (MIG-17) and F-6 (MIG-19) fighters. A major
focus of these programs has been the F-8 FINBACK, China's indigenously
designed and produced high-speed, high-altitude interceptor. Research on
the F-8 began in the mid-1960s and, since series production began in 1982,
65 F-8s have been built, with 32 assigned to operational airbases in
northern China.
Although some of the aircraft have been deployed, the Chinese are still
trying to solve a number of serious problems--a heavy airframe,
underpowered engines, short engine life, and poor avionics. As a result,
the Chinese are now seeking Western technology and equipment that will
change the mission of the F-8 to an all-weather, day/night interceptor with
a look-down/shoot-down radar.
The Chinese are planning a three-phase upgrade for the F-8 to include
avionics modernization, purchase of a modern air-to-air missile, and the
development or purchase of a jet engine.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
Fuselage
Length (m)
12.2
Width (m)
1.2
Height (m)
1.6
Wing
Span (m)
7.2
Area (m 2)
23.0
Maximum takeoff
gross weight (kg)
8,210
Fuselage
Length (m) 16.8
Width (m) 2.1
Height (m) 1.9
Wing
Span (m) 9.4
Area (m 2) 42.3
Maximum takeoff
gross weight (kg) 17,300
Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
The Second Solution: An Improved F-7
While the Chinese are pushing ahead with plans to modify the F-8, they
are also using Western technology to upgrade the more widely deployed F-7.
The F-7, China's version of the Soviet MIG-21 Fishbed, is rapidly becoming
the mainstay of the Chinese Air Force. The delta wing, single-engine
aircraft's primary role is air defense, but it can also be used as a
fighter-bomber and in ground support. The Chinese currently have over 280
F-7s at 14 operational bases, schools, and flight test facilities. Sixty
percent of all operationally deployed F-7 aircraft are located in the
military regions along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese borders.
The Chinese have recently begun production of an improved F-7,
designated F-7-3 or F-7M, with upgraded avionics, greater fire power, and a
longer range.
upgraded aircraft include the addition of u s to increase
loiter time and an additional 30mm cannon.
According to Chinese sales brochures, Beijing is also putting more
powerful engines in the F-7-3. The new engine, the WP-7B, has more thrust
allowing for greater maximum speed and an increased climb rate.
Impact on the Air Balance Along China's Borders
The USSR will continue to hold a commanding lead in all aspects of air
power: aircraft, weaponry, avionics, electronic warfare, early warning,
communications, and pilot skills and proficiency. Once completed, however,
the program to upgrade the F-8 and F-7 will significantly increase China's
ability to defend against intruding Soviet aircraft. Nonetheless, the
upgrades China makes on its fighters will have an impact on the air balance
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
with the Soviet Union only if the modified aircraft are produced and
deployed in great numbers. If the modified aircraft are not deployed in
strength, Chinese interceptors would quickly yield air superiority to the
Soviet Union's air forces in any contested area.
The combined capability of upgraded F-7 and F-8 will give the Chinese a
Chinese not only in air defense, but would also provide Beijing with a
limited tactical projection capability.
Although we exp3ct the bulk of the improved aircraft to be deployed
opposite the Soviet border, they could also be brought to bear in any
conflict with Taiwan or Vietnam. In both cases, however, China's
quantitative advantage of currently deployed aircraft would allow it to
gain the upper hand in an air war and improved aircraft would serve mainly
to reduce the heavy price of conducting such operations.
The production and deployment of modernized F-7s and F-8s would reduce
the qualitative advantage currently enjoyed by Taiwan's F-5E fighters.
Beijing for several years, however, has had the ability to gain command
of the air over Taiwan if willing to take heavy losses, and improved
fighters would simply reduce the cost. Beijing probably still would lose a
prohibitive number of aircraft to Taiwan's ground-based air defenses unless
it corrected severe deficiencies in ground attack aircraft and
air-to-ground missiles.
China also has the quantitative edge over Vietnam in fighter aircraft.
The Vietnamese Air Force, comprised of MIG-21 Fishbeds and SU-17 Fitters,
can muster only 260 combat fighters compared with over 600 Chinese fighters
based in the two military regions bordering Vietnam. But nearly 90 percent
of the Chinese fighters are older F-5s and F-6s, which would suffer high
attrition rates in any conflict. Deployment of upgraded F-7s and F-8s to
the southern military regions would significantly improve the Chinese Air
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
Nevertheless, the
Chinese would still sustain heavy losses, both from Vietnam's more modern
aircraft and its well-integrated air defense system.
Closing the Gap: The Follow-on Improvements
Because any significant change in any of these air balances depends on
deployment in strength of the improved aircraft, we see the F-7 upgrade
program as the most efficient solution for improving the air balance along
the Sino-Soviet border over the short term. The Chengdu Plant, where the.
F-7 is manufactured, has the capacity to increase production from its
average of 10-12 aircraft per month up to 30. Many pilots and maintenance
personnel in the Air Force and Naval Air Force are already familiar with
the aircraft, and training time and costs could be held down. Moreover,
the Chinese can partially finance production of F-7s through foreign sales
of the aircraft.*
Despite these advantages, the F-7 alone is not capable of providing the
necessary defense of Chinese air space without extensive modifications that
in the long run would prove very costly.
As a result, we look for the Chinese to continue to examine Western
technology to upgrade the F-8 and to support development of a new
generation fighter. in addition to the equipment and technology now under
negotiation, we ex ect
hina will seek cockpit design technology--
including creature comforts for the pilot--as well as aircraft design,
electronics, and aircraft skin/finishing technology.
We have little information on the specific technologies the Chinese
might be seeking for the development of follow-on fighters. China acquired
copies of Soviet MIG-23 fighters from Egypt and US F-5 fighters from
Vietnam that it has undoubtedly exploited, but
Chinese engineers are still having problems developing modern fighter
air rames and engines. As a result, we doubt that a new model will reach
the prototype stage within the next five years or that a modern, advanced
fighter will reach production within the next 10 years. Until that time,
we expect China to strengthen its air defense by phasing out its F5s and
F-6s, gradually replacing them with improved F-7s and F-8s.
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bA1
Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
SUBJECT: China Upgrades Its Fighters Aircraft
EA M 84-10247C
DISTRIBUTION:
National Security Council
Copy 1 David Laux, Senior Assistant for China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Room
302 OEOB
Department of State
Copy 2 Chris Clarke, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
Copy 3 Donald M. Anderson, Director, Office of China Affairs, Room 4318
Copy 4 Jack Sontag, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
Copy 5 Charles Martin, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
Copy 6 Charles Kartman, Bureau of Political Military Affairs
Copy 7 William Duncan, Bureau of Political Military Affairs
Department of Defense
Copy 8
Copy 9
Copy 10
Copy 11
Copy 12
Copy 13
Copy 14 Commodore James D. Cossey, Director of East Asian and Pacific
Region, International Security Affairs, Room 4C839, Pentagon
Copy 15 Sergeant Charles Meyer, US Army, INSCOM/ITAC, Building*213
Copy 51 Lt. Colonel Larry Mitchel, AF/XOXXP Plans .& Operations, Pentagon
Copy 52 Captain Al Starnes JSI-3A
Copy 53
Copy 54
Copy 55
Copy 57
Copy 58
Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8
Central Intelligence Agency
Copy 17 Executive Director (.7E12)
Copy 18 DDI (7E44)
Copy 19 NIO/EA (7E62)
Copy 20
Copy 21
Copy 22
Copy 23 C/PES 7F2
Copy 24,NIC/Analytical Group (7E47)
Copy 25
Copy 26 CPAS/ILS (7G50)
Copy 27-31 CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
Copy 32-33 OCR/ISG (1H19)
Copy 34 C/OCR/ISG/EA(1H18)
Copy 35 C/SOVA/TF/N
Copy 36 C/SOVA/TWA ( E2
Copy 37 D/OEA (4F18L
Copy 38 C/OEA/NA (4643)
Copy 39 C/OEA/SE (4F38)
Copy 40 C/OEA/PROD (4G32)
Copy 41-42 C/OEA/CH (4G32)
Copy 43 C/OEA/CH/DOM (4G32)
Copy 44 C/OEA/CH/FOR (4G32)
Copy 45 C/OEA/CH/DEV (4G32)
Copy 46-50 C/OEA/CH/DEF (4G32)
Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302370001-8