INFORMATION REQUESTED BY GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000500010108-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 108
• Publication Date: February 24, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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C NTFRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCWf
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
24FEB 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.
ATTENTION . Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
Executive Secretary
SUBJECT : Information Requested by General Maxwell Taylor
REFERENCE . Deputy Director for Intelligence memorandum to
Mr. Coyne, same subject, dated 15 Feb 1966
The attached report analyzes the extent to which China could
make up its grain deficiencies by occupying certain countries of
Southeast Asia. This completes our response to the questions
raised by General Taylor noted in the reference memorandum.
25X1
R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
"The Potential for Increased Food
Production in Continental South-
east Asia Under Chinese Communist
Control"
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23 February 1966
THE POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED FOOD PRODUCTION
IN CONTINENTAL SOUTHEAST ASIA UNDER CHINESE COMMUNIST CONTROL
Summary and Conclusions
The Southeast Asian "Rice Bowl" accounts for about one-half of the
world's exportable rice surplus; net exports from the region-totaled
about 3.3 million tons of milled rice in 1965.* Rice production in
the area has not reached its potential, however, and some improvement
could be achieved at relatively low cost within a few years. Assuming
a Communist Chinese takeover of the area, this limited improvement
would not enhance Communist China's food supplies significantly, while
the capital inputs required for substantial improvement appear to be
beyond China's capabilities, given her domestic requirements. Increased
labor inputs from a program of resettlement of Chinese farm laborers
could, in fact, prove counterproductive. Although production of some
other food crops could be expanded more dramatically than rice.,
achievable levels would remain relatively low, and expansion would
probably occur only at the expense of rice production.
* Milled rice tonnage is equivalent to 67.5 percent of paddy tonnage.
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The following analysis attempts by means of a hypothetical example
to show that potential expansion of food production in continental
Southeast Asia, under favorable conditions, would not justify a Chinese
Communist takeover of the area on economic grounds. The analysis has
been limited to four countries -- Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and South
? Vietnam -- normally the surplus rice producers of Southeast Asia.
Laos, although in the same area, has been excluded as of little eco-
nomic potential. It is assumed, in order to isolate the problem, that
China's control of the area could be asserted without cost, that no
damage to productive capacity would occur from such takeover, and that
the populace would not resist China's moderate efforts to expand food
production. Contrary, and more realistic, assumptions would strengthen
the conclusion. Realistically it is believed unlikely that China
could bring about any significant improvement in the food surplus of
these countries in the foreseeable future because of the social and
political disruptions implicit in a takeover and occupation. It is
possible, however, that the potential for a relatively small food in-
crease would provide China with a rationalization for a takeover that
it regarded as desirable on political grounds.
Rice
Rice has developed historically as the food staple of Southeast
Asian countries despite natural conditions that are less than ideal
for its growth. The traditional approach of farmers to its cultivation
and the absence of serious government programs to improve production
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have kept yields and output below achievable levels. Consequently
there is opportunity to increase production by increasing area and
yields through four means: (1) introduction of improved varieties,
(2) improved cultivation techniques, (3) expanded use of fertilizers,
and (4) improved water control. Maximum results can be achieved only
by introducing these improvements in combination, but favorable results
could be realized by applying only the first two methods, which are
relatively inexpensive. It is unlikely that Communist China would find
it expedient to attempt the necessary programs of improvements in these
four countries rather than devote its resources to improvements at home,
even under the assumed favorable conditions.
To provide a .benchmark of potential production of rice in the four
countries, the performance record of 196+/1965 (Table 1) has been re-
calculated (Table 2) on the basis of two key assumptions: (1) that
5-percent greater area had been devoted to rice production, and (2) that
25-percent greater yields per hectare had been achieved. The assump-
tions are generous but not inconceivable, given a concerted program of
information and the cooperation of a nonhostile populace. A 5-percent
increase in area could be achieved by expansion of cultivable area and
by double cropping on a moderate scale. Such an expansion would be less
than one-half the increase in area realized in these countries as a
group over the past decade but is about all that could be expected be-
cause of natural limitations. A 25-percent greater yield is feasible
with improved varieties and greater care in cultivation plus relatively
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inexpensive extension of water control. Although this is much greater
than has been achieved in the area in the past decade, the modest
efforts of the Thai government have helped that country realize a 19-
percent improvement in yield during the period. Under these assump-
tions the total production of paddy rice in these countries in 1965
would have been 31 percent, or 7.9 million metric tons, greater than
the 25.4 million tons actually grown.
Two considerations suggest that a takeover of these countries for
a food surplus of this magnitude would not be profitable for China.
In the first place, several years of effort would be required to
initiate the measures postulated, even under favorable conditions.
In the time required for a program to produce these results population
increases at present rates in these countries would absorb most of the
increase indicated, and accordingly an absolute increase in the area's
surplus of 7.9 million tons would require much more than the 31-percent
production increase postulated. In the second place, an increase of 7.9
million tons in the area's surplus, even if available now, would be a
relatively small contribution toward China's needs. This amount is equal
to 10 percent of China's 1965 rice production of about 80 million tons (of
which 900,000 tons on a paddy basis were exported) and constitutes only
4.5 percent of the more relevant total estimated food grain production
of about 175 million-tons. If all of the area's current surplus of 4.9
million tons of paddy rice were added to the 7.9 million potential in-
crease in production, the resultant 12.8 million tons would represent 7.3
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percent of China's present food grain production. This would be the
most optimistic estimate and is not likely to prove feasible. The
caloric contribution of this rice to China in percentage terms would be
approximately the same as the production percentages cited above.
Substantially greater increases in output could be achieved by
expanded use of fertilizer and improved water control. The Pa Mong
project of the Mekong :Basin development program, for example, is ex-
pected by itself to extend irrigation to 800,000 hectares in Thailand.
Such improvements, however, would require sizable capital investments,
and this fact would make the effort impractical for the Chinese to
attempt. Such investment as has occurred in these fields has employed
Free World assistance, which would be unavailable to the area under
Chinese domination.. China itself probably could not supply necessary
resources, and if they were available they could be more appropriately
invested to improve China's domestic food production.
A large-scale movement of Chinese to these countries is unlikely to
overcome the above limitations on production increases, as labor shortage
is not a significant problem in these countries. It might be easier
for Chinese laborers themselves to improve techniques on land now
farmed than to teach indigenous farmers, but this would only increase
the underemployment that presently exists among the local agricultural
population. If the Chinese were to attempt to cultivate additional
land, production would have to be extended to areas of lower quality
and yields would tend to decline. The outcome would be only slightly
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less negative if the Chinese were to take the best land for themselves
and drive the indigenous population to the marginal lands. As indi-
cated above, the primary barrier to significant increases in agricul-
tural production is capital investment, and the indigenous people, under
well-managed programs, could increase output to the degree feasible
without such investment. It is also noted that the Communist approach
has not markedly improved agricultural yields in other countries and
that native reaction to a large influx of Chinese would almost certainly
have an adverse effect on agricultural output. On balance it is be-
lieved more likely that production would be improved by Chinese manage-
ment of the area's present population than by the migration of Chinese
farmers. The most that China would be likely to gain from a migration
is slight temporary relief from her population pressures. This could
only occur at the expense of Southeast Asia's present per capita food
consumption and at the risk that the area for many years would fail to
produce the surplus that is feasible by other means.
Other Food Crops
The only other food grain of importance in these countries is
maize. Total production of maize exceeds one million tons, most-of
which is exported. Thailand is by far the most important producer of,
maize in the area and production is now more than five times the low
production of 1958. Such rapid expansion, however, is not likely to
continue; if a further rapid expansion were attempted in these countries,
it would likely be in part at the expense of rice expansion. One
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million tons is the equivalent of 1 percent of China's production of
food grains other than rice and 0.6 percent of China's total food
grains. The present production of maize and the assumed maximum rice
surplus potential of the area would account for 8 percent of China's
present food grain production. Data on production of other food
crops in this area and in China do not permit ready comparison, but
present and likely exports of other crops from these countries
constitute a negligible fraction of China's present requirements.
C IA/O RR
23 February 1966
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Table 1
Actual Production of Rice in Major Producing Countries
of Continental Southeast Asia
Crop Year 196+/65
Production
(1,000 Metric
Area
(1,000
Yield
(Kilograms
1965 Exports
(1,000 Metric
Tons Paddy Rice
Tons Paddy Rice)
Hectares
per Hectare)
Equivalent)
Burma
8,100
5,100
1,588
1,650
Thailand
9,625
5,995
1,606
2,700
Cambodia
2.2643
2,24o
1,180
900
South Vietnam
5,031
2,555
1,969
-350
Total
22J-322 .
15,89o
1,598
4
900
,
.3,300
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Hypothetical Production of Rice
in Major Producing Countries
of Continental Southeast Asia*
Crop Year 1964/65
Production
(1,000 Metric
Area
(1,000
Yield
(Kilograms
1965 Exports
(1,000 Metric
Tons Paddy Rice
Tons Paddy Rice
Hectares
per Hectare)
Equivalent)
Burma
10,630
5,355
1,985
41180
Thailand
12,640
6,295
2,008
5,715
Cambodia
3,469
2,352
1,475
1,726
South Vietnam
6,603
2,683
2,461
1,222
Total
33.3342
16 , 685
1
998
12
843
,
,
8.1669
Assumptions: 1 5-percent greater area than actual.
(2) 25-percent greater yield than actual.
(3) All. increases in production available as exportable
surplus.
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