A DISSENTING VIEW TO THE REPORT ON THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY THE HONORABLE DALE MILFORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000800100001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 30, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY THE HONORA,BT,E DALE MILFORD
January 30, 1976
I. FOREWORD
A. Divergence in Committee
The membership of the House Select Committee
on Intelligence was made up of individuals that possessed
very divergent political philosophies, views and opinions.
However, the hearing record will reflect that, early in
the life of the Committee, it split into two homogeneous
groups. While the members of the individual groups had
very similar views and opinions, the differences between
groups were vast and most often irreconcilable.. There-
fore the Committee's product is void of the usual compro-
mises that normally stem from legislative bodies.
The record will clearly reflect a 9 to 4 vote on
all significant issues. Partisanship was not a significant
factor, in that the Members of each party were present in
each of the two divergent groups.
While this dissenting view refers to the two di-
vergent Committee groups as the "Majority Bloc" and the
"Minority Bloc", it should be clearly understood that the
use of these terms is not intended, in any way, to be
associated with partisan politics.
B. Why a Dissenting View?
In view of the vast differences between the two
Committee blocs, the author felt compelled to draft a dis-
senting view. The House Select Committee on Intelligence
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was created by the full House to conduct an inquiry in-
to activities of all federal agencies involved in foreign
and domestic intelligence commonly called the "Intelligence
Community". The report signed by the Majority Bloc of
this Committee is so imbalanced, so damaging to our intel-
ligence gathering effort, and so destructive to our relations
with certain countries, as to make a mockery of the,ori-
ginal mission of the Committee.
If the Committee's purpose had been to abolish
the Intelligence Community, its report might have been
useful. Nowhere in the report can one find a single
positive remark on behalf of the Intelligence Community,
or the accounting of a single successful mission, or any
sort of an acknowledgment to the value of the Nation's
intelligence efforts. From the first page to the last,
the Committee report is filled with loaded editorial lang-
uage, unsubstantiated charges, and casually expressed
judgments -- all couched in negative terms. The language
of the report is glib rather than substantive; it is
filled with cheap shots rather than sober judgments.
The report unfairly castigates the intelligence
agencies, not just for alleged past abuses and wrong-doing,
but also for normal and legal practices that are carried
out under mandates of present laws. Many conclusions in
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the report are based on the testimony of former intel-
ligence community employees, some of them disgruntled;
authors of articles and books; newspaper accounts; staff
interviews which are a part of the files but not of the
record; and other sources of dubious value.
This dissent is an effort to point out deficien-
cies in the Committee Report; and to provide information
and conclusions which were not incorporated in the report
adopted by the majority of the Committee.
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A. The Work of the Committee
It is unfortunate that Committee efforts were
devoted in the most part to an examination of intelligence
failures over the past several years. There was no apparent
effort to look at the intelligence successes during those
years. Even worse, no one seems to have taken the time or
made an effort to look at the current capabilities of our
intelligence agencies, nor did anyone try to determine if
the errors and inadequacies of the past had been or were
being rectified. The Committee report is a most cogent
example of the oft used phrase "Monday morning quarter-
backing." It is couched in "Ivory Tower" terms which give
the impression that intelligence mistakes were so gross and
so fundamental that even the members of the young Committee
staff--with absolutely no experience in-intelligence matters--
could have easily foreseen the pitfalls and avoided the con-
sequences. Additionally, the report gives the impression
that the Committee feels that all intelligence effort must
be perfect, as if in real life the secrets of others can
invariably be penetrated. Examination of past errors in any
field of endeavor is useful for the lessons we learn. But
such examination is of little value unless it is compared to
the current status of the specialty, in an attempt to
determine if those past errors have been corrected. The
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Committee report reflects no such efforts but rather appears
to be a study in finger pointing, and even if it were fac-
tually accurate it serves little in the way of informing
the public as to the current activities of our intelligence
agencies and their present value to the nation.
B. Some of the Handicaps
This Committee and its members were handicapped
to some extent from the beginning because it is a Select
Committee. Members of a Select Committee serve on that
Committee in addition to service on their assigned standing
committees. There has been an additional handicap in serving
on the Select Committee on Intelligence. Many of the hear-
ings covered sensitive or classified material, and were held
in executive session. Many of the documents used by the
Committee were classified or sensitive, and these and ex-
ecutive session hearings records could only be reviewed and
studied by the Members in the Committee's offices. Thus the
members' normal times for doing "homework" were, of necessity,
eliminated.
The combination of demands on the individual Members'
time and the sensitive nature of the work creates an unparallel-
ed dependency on the work of the staff. In this instance the
dependence was entirely on the Committee's own staff, since
staff members of the individual Member's were not permitted
access to the Committees files or records, or permitted to
attend executive sessions.
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C. Individual Investigation
The highest service this Committee could have
rendered to our country would have been to examine U. S.
intelligence efforts as they exist today, objectively,
without any preconceived ideas, and to report to the nation
the findings of such an investigation. In such a task, it
would have been necessary to study the past, not only as a
means of understanding the present, but also by means of
constructive criticism to point out areas where improvement
might be possible. From the beginning it was apparent that
the major thrust of Committee efforts were going to be aimed
at examining the past with little work effort toward deter-
mining the current situation.
This writer decided that time and effort should
also be invested in a firsthand examination of the intelligence
community as it functions today. A special effort was made
to look personally at the intelligence process from the
beginning of the cycle to the end, through personal visits
to intelligence facilities both within the United States and
abroad. Every opportunity was taken to travel to areas
where the entire intelligence process is most active. During
these travels formal and informal meetings were held with our
intelligence officials at the top levels, and at the working
level. Meetings were held with our ambassadors and military
commanders who need and use intelligence on a daily basis,
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and with Heads of State and lower level officials of
foreign governments. At these meetings, frank questions
were asked about the intelligence process, about weaknesses
and deficiencies therein, about past intelligence failures
and subsequent remedial action. The intelligence needs of
our ambassadors and military commanders were examined first
hand, and their opinions on whether those needs were being
satisfied were solicited. The intelligence coordination
process was examined, particualrly at overseas installations
where accurate and timely intelligence is absolutely essential.
in addition, a close look was taken at the quantity of in-
telligence being produced and at its usefulness to people
who have an immediate need for early alert of items of intel-
ligence which are perishable, where to wait for raw intelligence
to be processed to its finished state would depreciate its
very nature.
The factfinding efforts conducted abroad were dup-
licated here at home. Visits and tours were made to as
many intelligence headquarters and facilities as possible.
Once again, working level people were involved, as well as
department heads and decision and policy makers. Some of
these meetings were formal briefings; many more of them were
kept completely informal -- "bull sessions", if you will,
over cups of coffee.
These officials were aware they were talking with
a Member of the Select Committee, and they had ample opportunity
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to express dissatisfaction with the intelligence process.
Because of the variances-in the tasks of the people involved,
marked disagreement and a lack of cooperation were antici-
pated. The experience was to the contrary. The sources
were forthcoming and frank, regardless of whether the person
was a producer or user of intelligence. But more important,
was the finding that by and large, the intelligence process
is functioning well and is of utmost value to our policy-
makers. This is not to say that no problem areas were found.
There were. But those found were recognized.by the principals
involved, and in almost every case, corrective efforts were
under way.
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III. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION
A. Nature of Intelligence
1.) Purpose
The Committee report is based on a funda-
mental misconception, that the primary purpose of the
nation's complex and sophisticated intelligence system
is to "predict" specific events. This is simplistic
nonsense. The primary purpose of intelligence is to
give the policy officer an understanding of foreign
leaders and events. One aspect of this, of course, is
to prevent surprise, to warn him of likely major events,
and the consequences that might ensue for the U.S., far
enough in advance for him to take action. The policy
officer should reasonably expect that intelligence will
put him in the context of events as they occur; that it
will help him understand the dynamics of a situation;
that it will lay out a range of possible outcomes, especial-
ly those that damage U.S. interests or present an oppor-
tunity to the U.S.; that it will seek by further collection
and analysis to narrow this range, to reduce many possibili-
ties to a few, and to rank them; and that it will of course
warn him at the earliest possible time that the likeli-
hood of a serious crisis is increasing.
The India-Pakistan War of December 1971
is an excellent example of the proper functioning of
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intelligence warning. CIA reported early in 1971 that the
victory of the East Pakistanis in a national election
would be unacceptable to West Pakistan and could provoke
a West Pakistani military crackdown in the East. it
warned of the Indian reaction to such a move, and pointed
out that Pakistan's internal crisis might well become an
international one. After the West Pakistanis cracked
down in March, it was able to assess the Indian reaction,
and by June to warn that events were moving toward war.
As the year progressed, it described Indian military
preparations and later the Indian military incursions
in the East that eventually precipitated war. At no
point did it forecast a specific date, but its customers
were fully aware of the imminence of war, of its causes,
of the role of the Soviet and Chinese, of the high proba-
bility of Indian victory and East Pakistani independence,
and of the International consequences that might flow
from the weakness of the new state of Bangladesh.
2.) Limitations of Intelligence
- While intelligence should warn policy
makers of likely major events which might bring adverse
consequences to the nation, it must not cry wolf too
often. It must not cover itself against-every eventuality
by providing a world-wide laundry list. It must have the
courage to limit itself to the important and the probable,
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and it must therefore have the courage occassionally
to be wrong.
Secretary Rusk put this very well when
he testified before the Senate Committee on Government
Operations on January 22nd:
Providence has not given us the ability
to pierce the fog of the future with accuracy.
I think that it would be unwise for us to score
an intelligence community by its ability to
predict with certainty what is going to happen.
The Soviets moved into Czechoslova-
kia on a certain Tuesday night in August, 1968.
I had some impression afterwards that they had
made that decision only three or four days be-
forehand.
If we had asked the intelligence community,
as we did a week before, as to whether they were
going to move into Czechoslovakia, there is no
way that the intelligence community could have
told us, because the Russians did not know.
We tend to call upon our intelligence com-
munity for information which is not present in
the real world. This is, in part, a very prac-
tical consideration. If we are going to hold
the intelligence cormnunity in the role of pro-
phet, they are going to flood policy offices
with all sorts of predictions; 98 percent never
happen at all, and it leaves the policy officer
with the job of trying to figure out which ones
are likely to be for real and which ones are not.
At best, the intelligence community can be
estimators on such things, and I hope we will not
impose upon them what might be called the Pearly
Harbor syndrome of forcing them to make predic-
tions all over the place, just to have a protec-
tive shield in case something goes wrong that
they had not anticipated.
It would, of course, be desirable if in-
telligence could go beyond warning of possible developments
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to prediction of specific ones. Often hard evidence
is available that makes this possible, as in CIA's pre-
cise warning of the date for the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus in 1974. But more often hard evidence is unob-
tainable, and in these cases it would be a disservice
for intelligence officers to make prediction rather than
warning their primary goal. The prediction would almost
never be exactly right, and often quite wrong. Such a
record would, to say the least, shake national confidence
in intelligence and destroy the usefulness of the very
important service it can render.
Major events usually occur as the result
of political decisions. These in turn result from the
actions of one man br the contentions of the few. Consis-
tently accurate prediction of such decisons is impossible:
a leader often does-not know himself what he will do, and
he seeks to keep his options open as long as possible.
The decision not yet made, the small group of colonels
plotting secretly against their government, the act on
impulse or on accidental opportunity -- all make political pre-
diction a game the intelligence officer is wise not to play.
For example, in 1968, our intelligence clearly warned
that the Soviets had made all the preparations necessary
to invade Czechoslavakia. As Secretary Rusk pointed out,
having made these preparations, the Politburo backed and
filled for three weeks befor?. deciding, a day or so before
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the event, to move. And even then the vote was close.
To have predicted the exact date of the invasion would
have been impossible prior to the date the final decision
was made. To have attempted to predict such a date be-
fore the decision was made would have been a disservice.
There is also the prediction which leads
to action which makes the prediction wrong. The Intel-
ligence Community last year warned of the imminent danger
of war between Greece and Turkey. The warning triggered
urgent and successful diplomatic efforts to head off
hostilities. Was the warning false? Of course not!
A further point that needs to be emphasized
is that the active collection of intelligence on an impend-
ing event, such as a coup d'etat, in order to make possible
a prediction of such an event, can lead to the unjustified
accusation that U.S. intelligence is actually fomenting
the coup d'etat. In short, political or diplomatic con-
siderations can require that the search for predicative
information be subordinated to larger policy considerations.
3.) Morality of Intelligence
It would be a disservice to the many dedi-
cated and patriotic people in the intelligence community
whose lives are devoted to their country not to say some-
thing about the moral aspects of intelligence. Intelligence
work -- by its very nature -- is a secret business, a
sometimes nasty business and a dangerous business. All
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three are facts of life, regardless of individual morals,
national standards, or international public opinion.
The Committee Report often criticizes
agencies within the Intelligence Community for operations
abroad that are not in keeping with the morals of this
nation and the political standards mandated by our Con-
stitution. Such criticism is unrealistic and naive. To
penalize our foreign intelligence officers and agents
by mandating that they should operate in the international
arena totally within the standards mandated by our Consti-
tution would be akin to tying a prize fighter's arms be-
fore sending him into the ring.
Every nation in this world has laws pro-
hibiting foreign espionage and covert activities. Para-
doxically, every nation in the world knows full well that
these activities are taking place within its boundaries.
All of this boils down to the necessity of having to
"fight fire with fire". Under these conditions, it hardly
makes sense for one to attack his own firemen. It would
seem that the more prudent action would quietly make sure
the fire fighters are under firm control. In-other words,
if they have done wrong, quietly and effectively "break
their heads". But, don't do it on the front pages of the
world where you destroy their ability to fight fires.
In this report Congress is officially
"announcing to the world that it is severely criticizing
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our CIA for actions in other countries that are identical
to those of our adversaries. Nowhere is there any evi-
dence that our adversaries are -- in any way -- lessening
their efforts in international intelligence or covert
activities. Our adversaries are well aware of the American
propensity for "fair play", our love of freedom, and the
openness of our society. They are not hindered by such
moral and operational restrictions and they make full use
of their knowledge of the propensities of our society in
their attempts to manipulate and even destroy our society.
Should our nation be abandoned to such objectives?
B. Improvements in Intelligence Procedures
By the standards of warning, of ensuring that the
President and the NSC are aware of potential developments
in time to respond, American intelligence has a steady
record of success. It has also failed on occasion and
will again. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973, for instance,
was a failure by any standard. But to judge any entity
strictly on its failures, without any mention of the re-
-lationsh.ip of those failures to the totality of effort
is absurd. Even the Committee made mistakes. It would
have been a much greater service to the Nation had the
Committee devoted a portion of its report to such a com-
parison. Had it done so, it would have found that intel-
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ligence failures are not'a major portion of total in-
telligence effort.
Had the Committee been interested in such an
exercise, it would also have found that even those fail-
ures were used by the intelligence community in an affirma-
tive way. During the course of the investigation, it be-
came evident that the' intelligence community investi-
gates its own system to determine where weaknesses lie
and to remedy them. The many charges incorporated into
the system demonstrate that the American intelligence is
viable and constantly improving. For example, during the
past three years, the following changes have been incor-
porated into the intelligence process:
1. New methods of technical collection, more
responsive to crisis requirements, have been developed.
2. The DCI has established the "Alert Memoran-
dum" as a mechanism for warning the national authorities
of potential serious problems.
3. The apparatus for "strategic warning" --
warning of Soviet military attack -- has been reorganized
and strengthened.
4. The Community has set up a program to develop
a single Community situation report for crisis situations.
5. The DCI has established a new daily publica-
tion designed to give the senior policy officer a broader
-coverage of critical intelligence.
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6. The DCI has established a comprehensive
system for assessing the intelligence produced against
the money spent to get it.
7. The Community has established a new mechanism,
the USIB Human Sources Committee, to provide better access
to information sources in the U.S. government outside the
intelligence agencies.
8. The DCI has established a group of National
Intelligence Officers whose functions include achieving
a better focus of intelligence assets on major national
problems and better communications among consumers, pro-
ducers and collectors.
9. New procedures have been established for
more rapid transmittal of critical intelligence.
10. An effort is under way to eliminate ex-
cessive compartmentation of information, and substantial
progress has already been made.
11. The operations centers of the various
agencies have been more closely linked by communications
systems and procedures that enable extremely rapid correla-
tion and evaluation of critical intelligence.
12. The National Security Agency has taken steps
to ensure that the meaning of the information it dissemi-
nates is not obscured by technical detail.
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13. There has been a considerable improvement
in informal substantive give and take among expert analysts
in the Community, both within and among disciplines.
14. The Community has developed more systematic
techniques for expressing analysts' judgments on the
probability of a given event. These techniques also
display for the policy officer the range of analysts'
individual judgments on these issues.
15. The Community has revamped its approach
to estimating Middle East military developments. It is
now not only identifying the strengths of the major an-
tagonists, but also trying to envisage various ways in
which a war might develop and be played out. This has
been especially helpful to contingency planners. (Inci-
dentally, major estimates of "next steps" in the Middle
East situation were produced at critical points during
the past two years; the Community is back on the mark
after the lapse of 1973).
The above recital is not comprehensive, nor can
it be fully specific if security is to be maintained.
Nevertheless, it demonstrates that the leadership of U.S.
intelligence is strong, innovative, and flexible. Above
all., it is willing, first, to be honest with itself about
its own mistakes, and second, to correct them. All the Com-
mittee has done in this report is to illustrate the first point.
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IV. COMMENTS ON THE MAJORITY REPORT
Throughout this dissent, references are made to errors,
bias, inaccuracies, questionable judgments, and other
faults in the Committee report. These references and
charges are not made lightly and without basis. They
are made from personal knowledge of the testimony in
both open hearing and executive session; executive session
Committee deliberations; papers and documents on file
with the Committee; and other material; This section
of the dissent contains some examples of basic faults
in the Committee report, and a discussion of the misuse
and misapplication of the intelligence community's own
"post mortem" studies,of completed operations, studies
designed by their very nature to find fault.
A. Inacuracies and Bias
With regard to the dispute over whether or not
the Committee could hear middle level State Department
personnel, (draft report pages 26-33) the Committee re-
port states that "Dr. Kissenger's order (Forbidding
these witnesses' appearance) was issued in spite of two
United States laws which protect and guarantee the right
of a federal employee to provide information to Congress".
This flat statement clearly reflects an interpretation
of the applicable laws. A strong case also can be made
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that the appearance of these middle level employees
is contrary to statute.
In the Committee Report section entitled "Decep-_
tive Budgets", much is made of the fact that the General.
Accounting office is "denied access to secret intelligence
budgets". What is not stated is that the law establishing
the Central Intelligence Agency forbids outside audit of
such funds. The question of whether or not the CIA's
internal auditing procedures are adequate is a valid
question, but the law must be changed before the GAO
can go in and find out.
The report questions the ability of the office
of Management and Budget to control effectively the
intelligence budget, and this question is valid. The
Report states (page 86), "Testimony before this Committee
revealed that only six OMB employees work full-time on
the foreign intelligence budget. Of these six, three are
former CIA employees." While the question is valid, the
innuendo is unnecessary. The fact is that many of the
OMB's analysts come from the Departments they analyze,
and are-so selected because their familiarity with the
subjects before them is of value to the OMB.
The report states (page 236) that Defense Intel-
ligence Agency officials "are ready to admit they cannot
match CIA" and that "even in military intelligence they
(CIA) are at least our equals." These Report quotations
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are out of context, and should accurately reflect the
DIA admission that it did not match CIA expertise in
Soviet defense spending, a CIA specialty; and that the
"at least our equals" applied only to a portion, and
not all, of military intelligence. This is not to enter
into the valid discussion of the value of the DIA, but
to point out that the issue is not here presented fairly.
On page 319 of the report is this allegation:
"For those who do join SWP (the Socialist Workers Party),
the chill is likely to spread to employers. The Committee
heard from one witness who termed the FBI's inquiries
about his employee, Bruce Bloy, who was an SWP member,
as 'presumptive, mysterious, and ... agressive'." There
is no mention in the. report of a letter in the Committee's
files clarifying that the inquiries attributed to the FBI
were in fact made by an employee of another Committee of
the U.S. House of Representatives.
Pages 124 through 126 of the report discuss CIA
dealings with educational institutions, citing President
Johnson's prohibition of covert assistance to these in-
stitutions. The report goes on to say, " . but the
Agency unilaterally reserved the right to, and does,
depart from the Presidential order when it has the need
to do so." This is a bit of semantics unfairly used.
The CIA does in fact use educational institutions for some
classified projects, but these are not "covert" and in
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all instances senior officials at the institutions are
aware they are dealing with the CIA. Whether this is right
or wrong, there is a distinct difference between "clas-
sified" and "covert".
* * * * * * * *
:As stated in the introduction to this section
of the dissent, these are only .a few examples of misuse
of source material. They are, however, sufficient to
be indicative of a hundred or more instances of misuse-
in the report and its myriad of footnotes.
B. The "Post-Mortems"
In the Committee report, much use is made of "Post-
Mortems" to substantiate charges that our intelligence
agencies have for the most part failed during times of
major world crisis. To use these "Post-Mortems" in such
fashion is unfair unless a balanced discussion of just
what a "post-mortem" is accompanies their use.
In order to understand the function of a post-
mortem, one must recognize the fact that no large and
complex business is or can be perfect. Even if this were
the case at any given time, changing times and circum-
stance would dictate a need for change. The Model-T Ford
would not adequately serve the needs of today's society.
Given the fact that imperfections are bound to exist,
proper managerial techniques call for a mechanism which will
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Now,
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point out the imperfections and make recommendations
for improvement.
This, then, is what the post-mortem is to the
intelligence community. It is a device formulated by
the Director of Central Intelligence to point up weak-
enesses in the overall intelligence performance after
a crisis. Since it is designed as a tool to improve
performance, it necessarily emphasizes weakenesses rather
than strengths. It is like a post-game review held by
the coaching staff of a football team. Whether you have
won or lost, a look at the film clips after the game will
point out missed blocks or inadequate pass patterns and
will hopefully strengthen the team for the next game.
Furthermore, the intelligence post-mortems were
created by the intelligence community itself, not by some
outside watchdog. It is a self-criticism device. As
such, it is laudatory and a refloection on how adequately
our intelligence agencies serve the nation.
To use such post-mortems to support allegations
of wrongdoing without setting forth the true nature of
the purpose of such a report is misleading and unfair in
the extreme. For example, on page 175 of the draft report,
the statement is made that, "The broader record suggests
... that the intelligence system faults have survived in-
tact." This simply is not true. The evidence reviewed
by the Committee does not support that statement.
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It is unfortunate that the majority has elected
to base its assessment of intelligence performance largely-
on these post-mortems. The logic of this is difficult
to see, for documents prepared for the specific purpose
of singling out faulty performance in those isolated in-
stances in which it fell short hardly form a sound basis
for judging the quality of performance overall. In iso-
lation from the broad context of intelligence, they give
a totally misleading impression of intelligence performance.
Their publication, moreover, has a "chilling effect" on
.the ability of the Community to conduct candid self-exam-
ination in the future.
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V. The Issue of Public Release of Classified Information
The most unfortuante aspect of the Committee report
deals with the unilateral release of classified information.
The Majority Bloc, while paying lip service to the principle
that some secrets in government are necessary, totally ig-
nored that principle in voting to release publicly its final
report. The damage to the intelligence efforts of this nation
and its foreign policy that will accrue as a result of such
a release will be devastating and lasting. Such a release
will not only violate the very charter of the Committee, but
also will abrogate an agreement reached with the President
of the United States, an agreement which the President be-
lieved was reached in good faith.
A. House Resolution 591.
The House of Representatives,'in establishing the
Select Committee, was concerned about the damage that might
result from a release, outside the Committee, of classified
information. For this reason, the House included in the
resolution which created the committee a provision aimed at
preventing such damage. Section 6(a) of House Resolution 591
provides: .- ~ I I ? .
"The select committee shall institute and carry
out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to
,prevent. . . the.. disclosure, outside the select committee,
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of any information which would adversely affect'the intelli-
gence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign
countries or the intelligence activities in foreign countries
of any other department-or agency of the Federal Government."
Any reading of the above section makes it clear that
it was designed to prevent the very disclosure the Committee
now proposes to publish.
Section 6(a)(2) applies to "any information which
would adversely affect the intelligence activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency in foreign countries or the
intelligence activities in foreign countries of any other
department or agency of the Federal Government." Since
the House has by the passage of the resolution ordered the
prevention of disclosures outside the Committee by vote of
the Select Committee or otherwise and since the President and
the Director of Central Intelligence and others maintain that
.the contents of the report "would adversely affect" such
activities, it is clear, even to a non-lawyer, that the
publication of such information in the report would be
contrary to the resolution establishing the Committee.
B. The Agreement With The President
1.. Background and Terms
Because of the numerous damaging leaks of classified
information during the early stages of the investigation, the
President decided that it was necessary.to restrict the nature
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arid amount of information the Committee could have access to.
This decision, had it not been reversed, would have severely
hampered the work of the Committee. In order to avoid'such
an impasse, the Committee reached an agreement with the.
President not to unilaterally release such information except
and until the following procedures were carried out:
(1) The appropriate Administrative Agency would
first be allowed to comment on the release. If the Agency
did not agree with declassification or public release, the
matter would be referred to the President.
(2) If the President did not agree to declassifi-
cation or public release, he would certify -- in writing --
that the information was vital to our National Security.
(3) Finally, if there was continued disagreement
with the President, the Committee reserved the right to
submit the matter to the Courts for a -final decision.
The Majority report clearly recognizes the existence
of the agreement at page 22 where it is stated that:
"the Committee agreed that for purposes of getting
the investigation underway again, future disputes (emphasis
added) would be referred to the President".
2. Observance Of The Agreement By The Committee.
It is the understanding of the writer that late on
Monday, 19 January a draft of the report was given to the CIA
for review. They were admonished not to make copies available
until the following day to other agencies. Their comments
were required to be obtained in 24 hours. Their comments
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were first restricted to classified material. Under such a
tight deadline an incomplete job resulted. Thereafter the
staff met with representatives of the CIA and other intelli-
gence agencies on the 22nd of January for a few hours. That
process has been reported to the writer as being a madcap
venture where the Committee Staff Director (with six months
of experience in handling classified material) ridiculed
and denied the arguments made by professionals from the
Intelligence Community. The Committee itself only heard
Executive Branch arguments as they were filtered through
the staff. The Executive Branch was not allowed to make its
own arguments before the Committee regarding classification.
Further it is apparent that the major thrust of those ar-
guments were not very adequately relayed to the Committee by
the staff.
The above procedure could hardly be described as
adequate compliance with the agreement. Subsequently, in
spite of the existence of a dispute, the Committee chose
unilaterally to release the final report to the public rather
than submit the dispute to the President and/or the courts
for a final determination as called for in the agreement.
As clearly reflected in the hearing record, this
agreement dealt with "unilateral declassification or public
release of information or documents bearing a security
classification". The Committee made this agreement in order
to resolve a dispute with the Administration that involved
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obtaining classified Administration documents and information.
After the documents and information were obtained
and after the hearings were completed, the Committee took
the position that the agreement was not binding on unilateral
releases of security information in the Committee's public
report. Since the Committee made no reservations about re-
leasing classified information in its final report, at the
time the agreement was executed, this appears to be a blatant
violation of a good faith agreement and is demeaning to the
Congress as a whole.
C. Leaks
It is felt that some mention should be made of the
appalling lack of security during the investigation. The
numerous unauthorized disclosures of classified information
reached such an extent that the Committee Chairman admitted
that the problem of leaks had reached the point where he felt
that a rapid end to the life of the Committee might have been
the only solution.
These leaks of information in some cases vitiated
even the meager accords reached between the agencies and the
Committee staff regarding the disclosure of classified in-
formation. One such leak prompted the Special Counsel to the
Director of Central Intelligence to write the Chairman.
"Furthermore, even the recipients of these leaks
are now indicating quite specifically the sources from
which they have received their information. The article
in today's New York Times by John Crewdson refers
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directly to sources within your Committee. In one
instance the Crewdson article deals with the purchase
of armored limousines for a foreign chief of state.
In our largely fruitless sessions with your staff,.
we had asked that any particular reference to the
chief of state or the dates on which the limousines
were purchased should be deleted. Your staff agreed
to do this. This agreement was totally academic, for
as Mr. Crewdson put it, ". . .the Agency obtained two
armored limousines for a third world leader whom
Committee sources identified as South Korean President
Park Chung Hee." (Emphasis added) There are two
other similar references to Committee sources in
the article which make it clear that they supplied
either fact or innuendo to Mr. Crewdson. These
references are but the latest in a series of leaks.
The pattern which they represent has become so clear
that I felt it necessary to call the matter to your
attention."
It is submitted that little comment is necessary
on the deplorable conduct described above.
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VI. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MAJORITY REPORT
A. Damage Resulting From Entire Investigation
and Report
If Congress permits this report to be published
in unclassified form, it will make available in one pack-
age -- with the seal of the United States -- a confirma-
tion of the piecemeal leaks of classified information
which have seeped out of the Select Committee investiga-
tion. There is no question that it will cause extensive
damage to our National effort to collect intelligence
vital to our National Security.
1.) Foreign Relations
Specifically, this report will cause the
United States to lose credibility with all other govern-
ments. Many of our allies already look upon such self-
flagellation as a form of madness. It will be difficult
PCC:c~n
for any foreign government, friendly intelligence service,
or individual, to cooperate with us in the future. Our
relationships depend upon the ability of both parties
to exercise discretion, confidentiality, and national
integrity in international relations.
The report will provide more fuel to the
fire in those countries where splinter groups are currently
demonstrating against the U.S. image and presence. it
? endangers safety and lives of Intelligence Agents abroad --
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both those actually engaged as intelligence collectors
as well as those who may be unfortunate enough to be in
the professions identified as being associated with intel-
ligence activities.
2.) On Intelligence Activities, Particularly Foreign
The report will have a damaging effect on
the intelligence profession. It is a slap in the face
for thousands of loyal and dedicated Americans serving in
the United States and overseas. The gathering of intel-
ligence, in many areas, is a dangerous task -- the safety
and lives of these people are being placed in jeopardy
needlessly.
As member(s) of Congress -- sworn to
represent and uphold the best interests of the U.S. --
and its citizens -- it is not possible in good conscience
to lend support to this abrogation of trust by disclosing
the information contained in this report.
Nowhere is there any evidence that our
adversaries are -- in any way -- lessening their efforts
in International Intelligence -- espionage -- or covert
activities. Hostile intelligence services will examine
this report -- study the weaknesses and strengths (of which
none of the latter are mentioned) of our Intelligence
knowledge and organization to exploit this to the fullest.
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B. The Credibility of Congress
One of the most disturbing aspects of the report
is the damage it does to the credibility of the Congress
in the eyes of the public and within the membership of
Congress itself.
The Select Committee conducted a lengthy and
well-publicized battle with the Executive branch to
gain access to witnesses, documents and papers necessary
to conduct properly the investigation the Committee was
assigned by the House. (This battle is described in ex-
cessive length and detail in the Committee report; in
fact, it is the sole subject of the first 81 pages of
the 338 page draft version of the report.) There were
extensive negotiations and finally subpoenas. With the
backing of the full House, the Committee won this battle,
and entered into the good faith agreement mentioned above.
Following this agreement, the necessary information and
material was made available to the Committee. This is
not to say this material was as free flowing as the Com-
mittee would have liked; nevertheless, it was forthcoming.
With the publication of this report, which contains
material the Committee received under its agreement with
the Executive, the majority of the Committee has made a
unilateral decision to violate this agreement. No matter
what reasons, justifications, or excuses are given, the
harsh fact remains that this report represents a violation
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of faith. The Majority Bloc of this Committee has put
the entire House of Representatives in the position of
being untrustworthy and irresponsible; a body not compe-
tent to receive state secrets; a body which cannot be trusted
to treat responsibly materials which require responsible
treatment.
C. Problems Created Which Will Interfere with
Establishing Effective Oversight
If Congress violates its agreement with the
President and Executive Branch regarding disclosure of
classified information, it nullifies any opportunity for
effective oversight and shared responsibility in foreign
affairs which was one of the major objectives of the HSC
investigation.
The seeds of distrust will have been sown by this
action. The Executive Branch will be reluctant to pro-
vide the Congress with sensitive security information it
requires for future oversight. The American people would
probably be sympathetic to, and support, this Executive
concern.
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 - III. RECOMMENDATIONS
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A. A HOUSE COQ MITTEE ON iQ
?l. The Select Committee recommends that there be
formed a standing Committee on Intelligence_of'the
House of Representatives. The Committee Membership
shall reflect a broad representation of political
and philosophical views.
a. No Member may serve more than three
consecutive terms on the Committee.
b. The Staff Director and Chief Counsel may
not serve more than six years, may-not be reappointed
to the staff, and may not be selected from a present
or former member of the staff.
c. Notwithstanding Rule XI(e) of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the_Committee shall
determine access to its records and files by other
Members of the House.
d. The Committee shall have the right to
release any information and documents in its possession
or control, and may consult with the executive branch
with regard to the release of classified material or
information.
e. Any Committee Member who shall release,
without authorization of the Committee, materials or
information obtained by the Committee shall be subject
to a recommendation by the Committee to the Democratic
Caucus or the Republican Conference that such Member
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be remove roan t{ e ommi ee , or
to the House that such Member be censured.
f. Any Committee Member desiring to 'release
classified materials or information notwithstanding
the disapproval of the Committee shall, upon petition
br one of the Membership of the House, be
entitled to inform the House in a secret session.
g. Any past or current member of the
Committee staff who shall release, without authoriza-
tion of =_.e Comittee, materials or information ob-
tained by the Committee shall be immediately termina-
ted from employment and shall be fully subject to
criminal and civil action, notwithstanding legislative
immunity.
h. The Committee shall be vested with
subpoena power and shall have the right to enforce
its subpoenas in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia or any other court of competent
jurisdiction, without authorization from the House.
The Committee staff shall be given statutory standing
to represent the Committee in any proceeding arising
from the issuance of a subpoena.
i. The Committee's jurisdiction. shall in-
clude all legislative and oversight functions relating
to all U.S. agencies and departments engaged in foreign
or domestic intelligence. The Committee shall have
exclusive jurisdiction for budget authorization for
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all intelligence activities and for all covert action
operations. All remaining oversight functions may
be concurrent with other Committees of the House.
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B. CONTROL AND RELEASE OF INFORMATION
1. The Select Committee recommends that any
Member of the House desiring to release classified
materials or information shall be entitled. to appear
before the Committee on Intelligence, which shall vote
on such Member's request. Notwithstanding the
Committee's disapproval, such Member shall, upon
petition of one-fifth of the Membership of the House,
be entitled to inform the House as to the materials
or information in a secret session.
2. The Select Committee recommends that any
Member of the House who releases classified materials
or information without obtaining a vote of the Committ-
ee on Intelligence or a secret session of the House
shall be subject to censure by the House and removal
from any Committee having access to classified infor-
mation.
3. The Select Committee recommends that the
United States Code be amended to provide criminal
sanctions for the unauthorized disclosure of informa-
tion tending to identify any U.S. intelligence officer,
such sanctions to apply regardless of intent to harm
the United States or aid a foreign nation.
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1. The Select Committee recommends that
activities involving direct or indirect attempts to
assassinate any individual shall be proscribed, except
in time of war.
2. The Select Committee recommends that as to
covert action by any U.S.. intelligence. component, the
following shall be required within 48 hours of initial
imolemen tation:
a. The Director of Central Intelligence
shall notify the Committee in writing, stating in
detail the nature, extent, purpose, and costs of the
operation.
b. The President shall certify in writing
to the Committee that such a covert action operation
is required to protect the national security of the
United States.
C. The Committee shall be provided with
duplicate originals of the written recommendations
of each member of the 40 Committee or its successor.
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~. The Select Committee recommends that the
existence of the National Security Agency should be
recognized by specific legislation and that such
legislation provide for civilian control of NSA.
Further, it is recommended that such legislation
specifically define the role of NSA with reference
to the -LQnitoring of communications of Americans.
E. DISCLOSURE OF BUDGET TOTALS
The Select Committee recommends that all
intelligence related items be included as intelli-
gence expenditures in the President`s-budget, and that..
there be disclosure of the total single sum budgeted
for each agency involved'in intelligence, or if such
an item is a part of portion of the budget of another
agency or department that it be separately identified
as a single item.
F. PROHIBITION OF FUND TRANSFERS
1. The Select Committee recommends that there be
appropriate legislation to prohibit any significant
transfer of funds or significant expenditures of
reserve or contingency funds in connection with
intelligence activities without specific approval of
the proposed Intelligence Committee.
G. DCI AS CABINET RANK
1. The Select Committee recommends that the
Office of Director of Central Intelligence be accorded
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C iron ve
subject to confirmation by the Senate. This office
shall have the following powers and duties:
a. The DCI shall be the chief foreign
intelligence officer of the United States, and shall
be responsible for the supervision and control of all
agencies of the United States engaged in foreign
intelligence.
b. The DCI shall be a Member of the
National Security Council.
c. The DCI may not hold a position or title
with respect to any other agencies of government.
d. The DCI shall, along with such other
duties, constitute an Office of Inspector General for
all of the foreign intelligence agencies, including
other agencies of government or branches of the
military which have foreign intelligence functions.
Such agencies shall have the obligation to report all
instances of misconduct or allegations of misconduct
to the DCI. This shall not constitute a limitation
upon the respective agencies reporting to the DCI
from maintaining their own Inspector General staff or
similar body.
e. The DCI shall have an adequate staff for
the purposes expressed herein and be responsible for
the national intelligence estimates and daily brief-
ings of the President.
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f. The DCI shall be responsible for the
preparation of the national intelligence estimates
and such reports shall be immediately supplied to the
appropriate committees of Congress.
All budget requests shall be prepared by
the agencies under the jurisdiction of the DCI.
to those parts of budget of the military services or
components of Department of Defense, they shall be
submitted as an independent part of such budgets to
the DCI.
h. The DCI shall be charged with the func-
tions.of coordinating foreign intelligence agencies
under its jurisdiction, the elimination of duplication,
the periodic evaluation of the performance and
efficiency of the agencies in question, and shall
report to Congress on the foregoing at least annually.
H. FULL GAO AUDIT AUTHORITY
1. The Select Committee recommends that the
General Accounting Office be empowered to conduct
a full and complete management as well as financial
audit of all intelligence agencies. There shall be no
limitation on the GAO in the performance of these
functions by any executive classification system, and
the audit function of GAO shall specifically apply
to those funds which presently may be expended on
certification of a Director of an Agency alone.
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i. The Select Committee recommends that the CIA
internal audit staff be increased and given complete
access to CIA financial records, and that overseas
stations be audited at least, annually. It is further
recommended that all procurement mechanisms be
subjected to annual comprehensive review.
J. FULL DISCLOSURE TO CONGRESS
1. The Select Committee recommends that existing
legislation (National Security Act of 1947, Sect.
102(d)(3)) restricting. the Directors and heads of
foreign intelligence agencies from providing full
information to Congress should be amended to exclude
Committees of Congress having appropriate jurisdiction.
K. NEW FOREIGN OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF NSC
1. The Select Committee recommends that the
National Security Act of 1947 be amended to provide
for the establishment of a permanent Foreign
Operations Subcommittee of the National Security
Council. The Subcommittee's jurisdiction, function
and composition shall be as follows:
a. The Subcommittee shall have sole
jurisdiction over all activities of U.S. foreign
intelligence agencies except those solely related'to
the gathering of intelligence.
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b. All recommendations o covert action
considered by the Subcommittee as described in "a"
above shall be specifically acted upon by all Members
of the Subcommittee and their respective positions
set forth in writing signed by each member.
c. The Subcommittee shall be chaired by
the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs and shall be composed of:
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs;
Director of Central Intelligence;
Under-Secretary of State for Political
Affairs;
Deputy Secretary of Defense;
Deputy Director for Intelligence of CIA;
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
L. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1. The Select Committee recommends that the
Defense Intelligence Agency be abolished and that its
functions be transferred to the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence and the CIA.
M. MEDIA
1. The Select Committee recommends that U.S.
intelligence agencies not use general circulation
journals of electronic media, or their employees or
stringers, for purposes of cover or information-
gathering.
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N. DETAILEES
1. The Select Committee. recommends that
intelligence agencies disclose the affiliation of
employees on detail to other government agencies or
departments to all immediate colleagues and superiors.
0. ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
1. The Select Committee recommends that the
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs be prohibited from holding any cabinet-level
position.
P. RESTRICTIONS ON POLICE TRAINING AND RELATIONSHIPS
1. The Select Committee recommends that no agency
of the United States. engaged principally in foreign or,
military intelligence, directly or indirectly engage
in the training or the supplying of domestic police
agencies of the United States, and that contracts
between police agencies of the United States and
foreign police agencies be limited to those circum-
stances which shall be required on account of internal
security or the normal requirements and functions of
such police agencies.
Q. RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
1. The Select Committee recommends that the intelligence
functions of the armed services of the United States
are limited solely to the gathering of intelligence
and such military services be specifically prohibited
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 19
~~rov e d F engaging AVMWRWpjpqIpjg
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within or without the United States.