DONOVAN AND THE CIA - A HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BY THOMAS F. TROY

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• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2000
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AND
DONOVAN T
HE CIA
A HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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This volume, though the product of official re-
search, is the work of the author alone, It must be
construed as personal only and not as constituting
the official position of the Director of Central
Intelligence or of the Central Intelligence Agency.
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To Liz, who
knows the story
behind this book.
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....................................................
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....................................................................................................:..................:.............................................
A HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THOMAS F. TROY
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William J. Donovan---"an activist, full of imagination and energy" (p. 92).
Roosevelt Library
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Table of Contents
Page
Preface ................................................................................................................ v
Preface to First Edition ...................................................................................... vii
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................ viii
Acknowledgments in First Edition .................................................................... ix
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................... Xi
List of Figures .................................................................................................... xui
List of Appendices ............................................................................................... xiv
List of Illustrations ............................................................................................ xv
Part One: Prewar-The COI Story
1. A Question of Paternity .................................................................................... 1
II. The Prewar U.S. Intelligence Services .............................................................. 3
1. A "National Intelligence Service" ................................................................ 3
2. The Intelligence Services, 1929-36 .............................................................. 5
3. Spying and Counterintelligence, 1936-39 ..................................................... 11
4. G-2 and ONI on the Eve of War ................................................................ 14
5.. Towards Clandestine Foreign Intelligence .................................................. 16
III. Col. William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan .............................................................. 23
1. A Look Backwards, 1883-1929 .................................................................... 23
2. Law and National Politics, 1929-37 ............................................................ 26
3. Foreign Trips and Foreign Affairs, 1935-39 .............................................. 27
4. Roosevelt's Emissary, July 1940 .................................................................. 29
5. Donovan in London ........................................................................................ 32
6. Donovan and Stephenson .............................................................................. 34
7. Roosevelt's Emissary a Second Time .......................................................... 36
IV. Establishment of the Coordinator of Information (COI) .................................. 43
1. The First Chance: A Joint Intelligence Committee .................................... 43
2. The Second Chance: Interagency Dissemination of Information .............. 44
3. The Third Chance: A Coordinator for a "Twilight Zone" ........................ 46
4. The IIC: Opposition to a Coordinator ........................................................ 49
5. Donovan's Adoption of an Intelligence Role .............................................. 52
6. "A Movement ... Fostered by Col. Donovan" .......................................... 55
7. A New Intelligence Chief ............................................................................ 59
8. Issuance of the COI Order of July 11, 1941 .............................................. 65
V. The First Six Months ........................................................................................ 73
1. Donovan's Task .............................................................................................. 73
2. Space, Money, and People ............................................................................ 74
3. British Advice and Assistance ...................................................................... 80
4. Empire-Building ............................................................................................ 84
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Page
5. Jurisdictional Conflicts .................................................................................. 94
6. Expansion and Consolidation ........................................................................ 104
7. Serving the President .................................................................................... I I I
Part Two: Wartime-The OSS Story
VI. From COI to OSS .............................................................................................. 117
1. A New Problem ............................................................................................ 117
2. South America Again .................................................................................... 118
3. The Budget Bureau Proposal ........................................................................ 120
4. At the White House ...................................................................................... 125
5. The JCS Angle .............................................................................................. 129
6. The Donovan-JCS Counterproposal .............................................................. 133
7. Back at the White House ............................................................................ 137
8. A Solution in Sight ........................................................................................ 145
9. Wrap-Up ........................................................................................................ 148
VII. Summer Skirmishes ............................................................................................ 155
1. The Military Take Over ................................................................................ 155
2. The JPWC Chairman .................................................................................... 159
3. The OSS Director .......................................................................................... 162
4. Issues: Control and Guerrillas ...................................................................... 165
5. More Issues: Militarization and Functions .................................................. 168
6. The TORCH Tinderbox ................................................................................ 172
7. The End of Skirmishing ................................................................................ 174
VIII. Mid-Winter Battles ........................................................................................... 179
1. Battle No. 1: Strong vs. Donovan ................................................................ 179
2. General McNarney's Compromise ................................................................ 184
3. JCS Endorsement of OSS ............................................................................ 187
4. Battle No. 2: Davis vs. Donovan .................................................................. 191
5. Walking Papers .............................................................................................. 197
6. The JCS to the Rescue ................................................................................ 199
7. P.S. 1-Another Revision ............................................................................ 204
8. P.S. 2-A Treaty with OWI ........................................................................ 207
IX. Donovan's Plan .................................................................................................... 209
1. Wartime Intelligence--Topsy ........................................................................ 209
2. A "Popgun" and Other Plans ...................................................................... 213
3. Genesis of Donovan's Plan ............................................................................ 217
4. Lobbying at the White House ...................................................................... 221
5. Donovan's Plan-Fat in the Fire .................................................................. 222
X. Up the JCS Ladder--Almost ............................................................................ 231
1. Two New Plans .............................................................................................. 231
2. Stalemate in the JIS ...................................................................................... 235
3. Debate in the JIC ........................................................................................... 238
4. The JIC Compromise .................................................................................... 248
5. Up to the JSSC ............................................................................................ 252
6. But Not to the JCS-Sabotage .................................................................... 255
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XI. OSS on the Offensive and Defensive .................................................................. 261
1. Another Attempt ............................................................................................ 261
2. The New President ........................................................................................ 265
3. Rebuffed ........................................................................................................ 268
4. Now What? .................................................................................................... 271
5. Assaulted Again ............................................................................................ 277
XII. The Abolition of OSS ........................................................................................ 287
1. A Last-Ditch Effort ...................................................................................... 287
2. Revival of JCS-1181/1 .................................................................................. 292
3. Budget Bureau Moves on OSS .................................................................... 295
4. A Pentagon Plan ............................................................................................ 297
5. A Rescue Attempt ........................................................................................ 300
6. Finis ................................................................................................................ 301
Part Three: Postwar-The CIA Story
XIII. A Question of Leadership .................................................................................. 305
1. State's Guide: The Bureau of the Budget .................................................. 305
2. State Takes the Lead .................................................................................... 309
3. Pressure from the Pentagon .......................................................................... 313
4. The Military Take the Lead ........................................................................ 319
XIV. Truman's NIA and CIG ...................................................................................... 325
1. State Gets a Plan .......................................................................................... 325
2. Deadlock, Revision, and Deadlock .............................................................. 329
1 The President Takes Over ............................................................................ 336
4.. A New Peacetime Intelligence System ........................................................ 340
XV. Progress and Problems ...................................................................................... 351
1. The Souers Administration .......................................................................... 351
2. Vandenberg's Transformation of CIG .......................................................... 359
3. Legislative Routes .......................................................................................... 365
4. "The President's Bill" .................................................................................... 371
XVI. The Establishment of CIA .................................................................................. 377
1. Easy Going in the Senate ............................................................................ 377
2. Worries and Fears in House Hearings ........................................................ 386
3. Out of Committee at Last ............................................................................ 393
4. Debate, Passage, Signature .......................................................................... 394
5. Paternity Reconsidered .................................................................................. 402
XVII. Epilogue: Years Later ........................................................................................ 411
Appendices .......................................................................................................... 417
Notes .................................................................................................................... 479
........................................................................................................
Bibliography 555
Index .................................................................................................................... 567
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Preface
As conceived, this history was aimed at satisfying the need of employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency, especially new or young professional ones, for a comprehensive and
detailed account of the agency's origin. It was completed in 1975, classified SECRET, and
reproduced in sets of two volumes each.
The security classification has recently been reviewed, and the manuscript, shorn of no
more than six typewritten pages of material, is now declassified. Thus released for leisurely
reading outside the office, and printed in one volume, this history should better serve its
original purpose.
It has, of course, been re-edited. For reasons of accuracy and clarity, and because of
changes in judgment, I have added or deleted some words, phrases, and a sentence or two in
the text. I have been permitted by the family of the late James Grafton Rogers to add a score
of lines from his unpublished diary. I have not felt it necessary to revise or rewrite this history,
although I know it would read differently here and there if it had been written at the end,
rather than the beginning, of the last several years of accusations, revelations, investigations,
and reforms that have centered on the CIA and American intelligence generally.
The work has not otherwise been revised. There are, consequently, three matters which
particularly need updating here as a result of additional research or recent developments.
The first of these is the unexpected decision of President Hoover in 1929 not to appoint
the then Colonel Donovan as Attorney General in the new administration. The text says
(p. 26) that the reason had "something to do with Donovan as a Catholic." It is clear from
Hoover's own handwritten statements, which I have reviewed at the Hoover Library in Iowa,
that the explanation is complex, personal, and even contradictory rather than simple as the
text suggests and as has hitherto been proposed.
While Hoover and Donovan were reputedly long-standing personal friends, the new
President felt for a variety of reasons touching Donovan-his "immaturity of mind,"
administrative inexperience, pressure tactics involving religion, philosophical and policy
differences on prohibition, and political liabilities agitating powerful senators-that Donovan
could not be brought into the Cabinet either as Attorney General or as Secretary of War, an
alternative position often considered open to him.
At the same time, however, Hoover offered Donovan, as a substitute, the governor-gen-
eralship of the Philippines, which was, wrote Hoover, "the greatest position at the disposal of
the President-greater than any Cabinet position"; but he felt he was doing so "at great per-
sonal risk in case through immaturity he (Donovan) should fail." Clearly this was a decision
which needs greater study than can be given here.
A second subject requiring comment is the role of Sir William S. Stephenson as Britain's
intelligence chief in the United States in World War II. His story was first told in H.
Montgomery Hyde's The Quiet Canadian or, in its American edition, Room 3603. It has been
recently retold, more successfully but not more reliably, in A Man Called INTREPID by the
homonymously-named William Stevenson. The story, an impressive and fascinating one, has
never been told, however, on the basis of publicly available primary sources, and consequently
many claims or details remain undocumented. Two of these need mention here.
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The first is the remarkable quotation attributed by author Stevenson to Donovan (p. 5
of A Man Called INTREPID) detailing the time, place, and subject of conversation of the
first meeting of Donovan and INTREPID---1916, England, and German military and
psychological weaknesses. This quotation directly contradicts the assertion made by Donovan
himself in 1944 (p. 36, infra) that he "did not know" INTREPID in July 1940 but "met him
only after [my] return" from London in August. How Donovan and INTREPID can be
reconciled on the latter's claim to a long-standing, pre-1940 acquaintanceship with Donovan
remains an open question.
Another controversial point is the equally, perhaps more, remarkable claim put forward
by author Stevenson that INTREPID regularly met with President Roosevelt in 1940-41 in
Washington not only clandestinely but also without the knowledge of any other American or
local British officials. Until evidence for this claim can be advanced it must be treated with
reservation. My own opinion is that whatever contact INTREPID had with Roosevelt prior
to Pearl Harbor went through either J. Edgar Hoover or FDR's personal friend 'Vincent
Astor.
A final subject for comment is the "leak" in 1945 to reporter Walter Trohan of the
Chicago Tribune of both the Donovan and the JCS plans for a postwar, peacetime central
intelligence organization (pp. 255-60, infra.). As for the identity of the culprit, Donovan's
suspicion fell immediately upon J. Edgar Hoover, and his suspicion has become the
conventional wisdom on the subject. As the text indicates, however, I had developed doubts
about Hoover's sole, if any, guilt in the matter. The pattern of similar leaks later in the year
suggested that elements in G-2 might well have been involved. Even so, I was not ready for
the revelation made to me, first in correspondence, then in face-to-face meetings, by Trohan
himself, when I was finally able to get in touch with him.
Who "leaked" the documents? Trohan says he was called by Steve Early, the
President's secretary, given the documents, and told that "FDR wanted the story out." How
this revelation can be squared with what I have written here about the Donovan-Roosevelt
relationship, how FDR's purpose, strategy, and tactics can be determined and assessed, also
requires more exploration than can be offered here. Suffice it to say that I think, and
Trohan agrees, that both history and fairness to Hoover require that Trohan's story at last
be put in the record.
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Preface to First Edition
The coupling "Donovan and CIA" in the title of this work is intended to focus attention
on a felt need of people interested in the origins of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Such people have never felt too sure as to the precise connection-if any-between the
man and the organization. They have known of course that his Office of Strategic Services
preceded CIA in time and left it a legacy of personnel, experience, techniques, principles,
and traditions. They have known that late in 1944 Donovan sent to President Roosevelt a
plan for the establishment of a permanent, peacetime central intelligence organization.
They have also known, however, that the OSS was abolished by President Truman on
September 20, 1945, that some salvageable parts were sent to the State and War
departments, and that Donovan went back to New York to the practice of law. They have
also known that four months later Truman, using the remains of OSS, created the Central
Intelligence Group and then eighteen months later he and Congress replaced that by the
present CIA.
What, then, asks the inquiring reader, was the connection between Donovan and CIA?
Was Donovan merely a testator leaving property to a distant and unrelated heir? Was OSS
anything more than a valuable precedent and example? Had Truman actually created a new
building out of old bricks? Or is there, asks the more perceptive reader, an organic-a
substantial, lineal-connection between Donovan and OSS? Is there, in fact, a "missing
link" which makes CIA not only a successor but also a descendant-a blood relative-of
OSS?
The thesis of this volume is that there is such a "missing link" * and that CIA
historically and substantively embodies Donovan's creative conception of a central intel-
ligence organization. What follows in these pages, then, is not a series of episodes in
intelligence history but a continuous narrative tracing the evolutionary development of CIA
as an integral element of the structure of the U.S. government.
* Those readers who cannot wait to discover that missing link may turn to p. 409 for a preliminary slaking of
their curiosity.
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Acknowledgments
Rather belatedly I acknowledge my indebtedness to Amb. Richard Helms, who, when
Director of Central Intelligence, yielded to Col. Lawrence K. White, Hugh T. Cunningham,
Lawrence R. Houston, and Walter L. Pforzheimer and authorized me to undertake some
research which has led--undoubtedly to the surprise of all of us-to the open publication of
this history.
This volume, in this edition, owes its existence immediately to Mr. James P. Hanrahan,
Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. It was his initiative that set the
publication process in motion, and it was his support that made available to me valuable
time for coordinating the elements of that process and especially for reviewing, editing,
indexing, and proofreading the entire work. I am much indebted to him.
Also at the Center and deserving of my thanks are several present and past associates
who helped me resolve many problems of fact, syntax, style, and punctuation. I think
particularly of George W. Allen, Paul H. Corscadden, James M. Dunn, and Richard Kovar.
Our secretaries, Patricia A. Herchenroder and Geraldine A. Simchick were unfailingly
cooperative. Kathleen F. Seroskie provided last-minute assistance with the index.
The entire manuscript was very carefully read by another colleague, Hayden B. Peake;
and portions of it were read by Lawrence R. Houston and Walter L. Pforzheimer, and by
Vernon E. Davis formerly of the JCS Historical Division. Shortly after it was written it was
also read in its entirety by Otto C. Doering, Jr., now deceased, and Thomas G. Belden, then
with the Intelligence Community Staff.
All of the people mentioned above made many valuable comments or suggestions for
change-not all of which I could or would accept-and hence whatever shortcomings are
contained here are mine alone.
For much help at the FBI and for many hours of enjoyable, profitable discussion of the
subject of this book I owe thanks to Lawrence McWilliams, now retired.
I am grateful to Thomas T. Thalken and Robert Wood, Director and Assistant
Director, respectively, of the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library in West Branch, Iowa, for
the pleasant hospitality they afforded me when I reviewed some Donovan papers in the
library.
I also thankfully acknowledge the permisson of Ranger Rogers, Lorna Rogers Hart,
and Hamilton Rogers-all of Denver, Colorado-to quote from the valuable unpublished
diary of their late father James Grafton Rogers, a diary which is in their possession and for
which they claim copyright.
The job of putting out this printed edition involved many persons in the Office of Logis-
tics, Printing and Photography Division. My thanks are extended to all of the production
personnel in that Division, especially to the members of the Composing Branch.
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Acknowledgments in First Edition
I recall with gratitude the large number of people who in one way or another have
given me their support in the research and writing of the pages that follow. Heading that list
are four men whose support was actually indispensable.
Three of these have served successively as CIA's Director of Training during the years
I have worked on this volume and on its predecessor, "COI and British Intelligence: An
Essay on Origins." In order of time they are John Richardson, Hugh T. Cunningham, and
Alfonso Rodriguez. The first helped me get started, the second provided what some called
"the Cunningham fellowship," and the third-beginning as Deputy Director of Training-
has steadily and generously encouraged me.
The fourth man at the head of the list is Mr. Walter L. Pforzheimer, former Curator of
CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection. He has been a friend to me when and where it
counted, as it so often did. His assistant, Mary Christine Flowers, has facilitated access to
many items in that valuable Collection.
I am also indebted for support or counsel to the following former Agency officials: Col.
L. K. White, Executive Director-Comptroller, Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel,
and Dr. Howard Ehrmann, Chief of Historical Staff. For permitting me to work on this
project, I am indebted to a succession of immediate supervisors: Burney B. Bennett,
Lawrence C. Bangs, John W. Morrison, and Donald E. Smith, who has helped bring this
work to completion.
I owe Caroline L. Pumphrey and Mary Ann Wilson much thanks for their assistance in
ferreting out OSS archival material. The typists who have worked on these many pages-
and my many corrections-are Jane Early, Bonnie Raye and her fine OTR/TAP staff of
Betty Tompkins, Mary Lou Ramey, Pamela Patchett, Millie Sullivan, Brenda Preston, and
Donna Lambdin. The art work-the cover, charts, illustrations-are the work of Thomas A.
Donlon, Jr., Chief of the OTR Visual Aids section, and William E. Miller of his staff.
I am very much indebted to the many people whom I have interviewed or with whom I
have corresponded. They are listed in my bibliography, but I must specifically mention a few
who have been notably helpful on many occasions: Mrs. William J. Donovan, Otto C.
Doering, Jr., of Donovan Leisure Newton and Irvine, and Sir William S. Stephenson.
Digging out material in numerous archives and libraries would not have been possible
without the knowledge, experience, and cooperation of such as the following: at
Washington's National Archives, Thomas Hohmann, William Cunliffe, John Taylor, and
William G. Lewis; at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, N.Y., Jerome V.
Deyo, Joseph W. Marshall, Robert H. Parks, and Paul McLaughlin; at the Naval History
Division in Washington, Dr. Dean C. Allard, Mrs. Kathleen M. Lloyd, and Mrs. Mae
Seaton; at the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, Philip D. Lagerquist; and Melvin
Margerum at the Office of Management and Budget in Washington.
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For access to the records of the Department of State, I am indebted to Dr. Arthur G.
Kogan. At the Pentagon I received assistance from Dr. Rudolph A. Winnacker in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense; and Wilber Hoare and Vernon E. Davis of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff provided much friendly advice and assistance.
The former Governor of New York, Nelson A. Rockefeller, gave me access to his
private papers and placed at my assistance Mr. John E. Lockwood of his staff and Dr.
Joseph W. Ernst, Archivist of the Rockefeller Family and Associates. For the text of
Donovan''s off-the-record speech to The Union League of Philadelphia, I am indebted to Mr.
Maxwell Whiteman, Archival Consultant of that organization.
Mely Becker, Cathy Adams, and Renee Perrin have helped me ready this volume, for
reproduction by the Printing and Photography Division of the Office of Logistics.
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Abbreviations
A-2 Army Air Forces Intelligence
AFHQ Allied Forces Headquarters, London
BEW Board of Economic Warfare
BSC British Security Coordination
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIAA Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
CICA Central Intelligence Coordinating Agency
CIG Central Intelligence Group
CIPA Central Intelligence Planning Agency
CIS Central Intelligence Service
CIS Central Intelligence Services (CIG)
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COI Coordinator of Information
CominCH Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
COS Chief of Staff
CRS Central Reports Staff, CIG
CWIP Committee on War Information Policy, OWI
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DDI(C Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
EBD Economic Defense Board
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information (or Intelligence) Service
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FEA Foreign Economic Administration
FID Federal Intelligence Directorate
FIS Foreign Information Service, COI
FN Foreign Nationalities Branch, COI
G-2 Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff
IAB Intelligence Advisory Board
IIC Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (or Conference)
IRIS Interim Research and Intelligence Service, State Department
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIA Joint Intelligence Agency
JIC Joint Intelligence Committee
JIS Joint Intelligence Staff
JPS Joint Staff Planners
JPWC Joint Psychological Warfare Committee
JSC Joint Security Control
JSSC Joint Strategic Survey Committee
MID Military Intelligence Division
MIS Military Intelligence Service
MI-6 Military Intelligence: Section 6 (U.K.)
MOI Ministry of Information, U.K.
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NDRC National Defense Research Council
NIA National Intelligence Authority
NSA National Security Act
NSC National Security Council
OCD Office of Civilian Defense
OCL Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, State Department
OEM Office of Emergency Management
OEM/DI Office of Emergency Management/ Division of Information
OFF Office of Facts and Figures
OGR Office of Government Reports
ON I Office of Naval Intelligence
OPD Operations Division, War Department General Staff
OPM Office of Production Management
ORE Office of Research and Evaluation (later Office of Reports and Estimates),
CIG
ORI Office of Research and Intelligence, State Department
OSS Office of Strategic Services
OWI Office of War Information
PG Planning Group, OSS
PW Psychological Warfare
PWE Political Warfare Executive, U.K.
R&A Research and Analysis, OSS
SA/B Special Activities/Bruce, COI
SA/G Special Activities/Goodfellow, COI
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
SI Secret Intelligence
SIS Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6), U.K.
SIS Special Intelligence Service, COI
SIS Special Intelligence Service, FBI
SIS Special Intelligence Service, ONI
SO Special Operations, OSS
SOE Special Operations Executive, U.K.
SOS Special Operations Service, COI
SSG Special Study Group, G-2
SSU Strategic Services Unit
WT War Trade Intelligence, State Department
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List of Figures
Figure Title Page
1 Sketch of COI as approved by President Roosevelt, June 18, 1941 ................ 60
2 COI on August 1, 1941-a contemporary rough sketch .................................. 89
3 COI late in August 1941-also a contemporary sketch .................................. 90
4 COI organizational chart, October 10, 1941 ...................................................... 93
5 Relationship of JPWC and OSS to JCS and supporting agencies, June 1942 157
6 OSS organizational chart, January 2, 1943 ...................................................... 193
7 OSS organizational chart, November 20, 1944 ................................................ 223
8 OSS organizational chart, June 1945 ................................................................ 279
9 State's "Preliminary Organization" of national intelligence, November 1945 327
10 State's revised "Preliminary Organization," December 3, 1945 ...................... 332
11 "Initial Organization" of CIG, February 8, 1946 ............................................ 354
12 Vandenberg's reorganization of CIG, July 20, 1946 ........................................ 364
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List of Appendices
Appendix Short Title and Date Page
A Letter from Donovan to Knox, April 26, 1941 ............................................. 417
B Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information,
June 10, 1941 ................................................................................................ 419
C Designating a Coordinator of Information, July 11, 1941 ............................ 423
D Executive Order 9128 (OWI), June 13, 1942 ............................................... 424
E Military Order of June 13, 1942 (OSS) ........................................................ 427
F JCS 67 (OSS), June 21, 1942 .......................................................................... 428
G JCS 68 (Reorganization of JPWC), June 21, 1942 ...................................... 429
H JCS 155/4/D (Functions of OSS), Dec. 23, 1942 ........................................ 431.
I Executive Order 9312 (OWI), Mar. 9, 1943 ................................................. 435
J JCS 155/7/D (Functions of OSS), April 4, 1943 ........................................ 436
K JCS 155/ l l /D (Functions of OSS), Oct. 27, 1943 ...................................... 439
L JIS 89 (Postwar Intelligence Policy), Oct. 23, 1944 ...................................... 443
M Donovan's Plan, Nov. 18, 1944 ..................................................................... 445
N JIS 96 (Proposed Intelligence Service), Dec. 9, 1944 .................................... 448
O JIS 96/1 (Proposed Intelligence Service), Dec. 9, 1944 ................................ 449
P JIC 239/5 (Proposed Intelligence Service), Jan. 1, 1945 .............................. 451
Q Donovan's Liquidation Plan for OSS and Statement of Principles,
Aug. 25, 1945 ...................................... 455
....................................
R JCS 1181/5 (Amended) (Establishment of a Central Intelligence Service) 459
S Executive Order 9621 (Abolition of OSiS), Sept. 20, 1945 .......................... 461
T Truman's Letter to Byrnes on Intelligence, Sept. 20, 1945 .......................... 463
U Truman's Directive on NEA and CIG, Jan. 22, 1946 .................................. 464
V National Security Act of 1947, Feb. 26, 1947 .............................................. 466
W H.R. 4214 (CIA), July 15, 1947 .................................................................... 467
X S.758 (CIA), July 21, 1947 .............................................................................. 469
Y National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, July 26, 1947 ................ 471
Z Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law 110, June 20, 1949 473
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List of Illustrations
Page
1. William J. Donovan-"an activist, full of imagination and energy" (p. 92) .. Frontispiece
2. Rear Adm. Walter S. Anderson, ONI director, who in 1940 established the
country's first World War II organization to "run secret agents" .................. 18
3. In 1940 at FDR's direction, J. Edgar Hoover, FBI director, established a "Special
Intelligence Service" for operations in the Western Hemisphere, particularly
......................................................................................................
Latin America 19
4. "Little Bill" Stephenson, Britain's wartime intelligence chief in the United States 35
5. Colonel Donovan, Roosevelt's Balkan emissary in 1941, at the Belgrade railroad
station .................................................................................................................... 38
6. Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, G-2 in 1940-41, warned General Marshall about "a 41
movement ... fostered by Colonel Donovan" ......................................................
7. Roosevelt and his one-man intelligence unit Vincent Astor (far right) taking off
on the latter's yacht Nourmahal, Feb. 4, 1933 ................................................ 48
8. Capt. (later Vice Adm.) Alan G. Kirk, ONI chief in 1941, joined Miles and Hoover
in an effort to forestall FDR's appointment of Donovan as COI .................... 50
9. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox was "disappointed" in 1941 that Roosevelt was
"not making better use of Bill Donovan's services" .......................................... 58
10. FDR authorizes establishment of COI-an unprecedented American service for
intelligence and special operations ...................................................................... 64
11. Col. Raymond E. Lee, attache in London, thought COI was the result of his advice
to Donovan. Lee is shown here as a brigadier general in charge of G-2, 1941-42 71
12. Rooms 246, 247, and 248 in Washington's State, War, Navy Building (now the
Executive Office Building) were the first home of Donovan as Coordinator of
Information ............................... 75
.............................................................................
13. An interwar airscape of Washington's Federal Triangle showing in the foreground 76
the Apex Building, which was Donovan's second COI home ..........................
14. Archibald MacLeish-poet, Librarian of Congress-helped Donovan organize
............................................................................
scholars for intelligence service 79
15. A G-2 caricature of a COI "professor" ................................................................ 86
16. Bolstering "domestic morale" was the job of OCD, whose chief, Mayor
LaGuardia, is shown here Sept. 29, 1941, with his assistant, Eleanor Roosevelt 96
17. Milo Perkins, executive director of EDB, contested the economic defense field with 99
Donovan ................................................................................................................
18. A bitter dispute with Nelson A. Rockefeller, youthful head of CIAA, eliminated
South America from Donovan's propaganda responsibility .............................. 101
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19. FDR puts his "O.K." on COI's first budget, Nov. 7, 1941 ................................ 112
20. On Nov. 7, 1941, FDR both excised "domestic morale" from COI's budget and
sent Donovan the above suggestion for domestic propaganda .......................... 114
21. Robert E. Sherwood (with Navy Secretary James A. Forrestal in 1945 in rear
right) was an early Donovan colleague who in 1942 collaborated in the
attempted "scattering" of COI ........................................................................ 127
22. As Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Brig. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith
supervised the reorganization of COI as OSS, a supporting agency of the the
JCS ...................................................................................................................... 135
23. Rear Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson (shown here as a vice admiral in 1945) was
ONI chief in 1942 during "The Case of the Famous Ninety Humpty-
Dumpties.. .............................................................................................................. 141
24. Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr.: "I understand that I am Public
Enemy No. I in the CC)I" ................................................................................. 144
25. Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, G-2 in 1942-44 and for OSS an implacable foe all
the while .............................................................................................................. 151
26. Rear Adm. Harold C. Train, ONI chief in 1942-43, requested studies from OSS in
order to keep it "occupied and out of the way of the Army and Navy" ........ 171
27. Secretary Stimson likened his position between Donovan and OWI chief Elmer
Davis (above, March 1943) as that of "an innocent bystander in the case of an
attempt by a procession of the Ancient and Honorable Order of Hibernians and
a procession of Orangemen to pass each other on the same street" ................ 198
28. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who saved OSS from extinction in February 1943, left
to right: Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff; Gen. Henry H. Arnold,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces; Brig. Gen. John R. Deane, Secretary;
Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval
Operations; and Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy (the President). They are shown here with their
advisors at the Allied Conference (QUADRANT) in Quebec, Canada, Aug. 14-
24, 1943 .............................................................................................................. 200
29. A chart of the FBI's "Plan for a [Postwar] World-Wide Secret Intelligence
[Service]., ................................................. ................ 225
........................................... ...
.
30. Col. Ludwell Lee Montague, G??2 spokesman in the JIS against Donovan's 1944
plan for a postwar intelligence agency. As a civilian, Montague subsequently
became a member of CIA's Board of National Estimates .............................. 232
31. Brig. Gen. John Magruder, OSS Deputy Director of Intelligence, represented
Donovan in the JIC debate on Dec. 22, 1944 .................................................. 240
32. Rear Adm. Hewlett Thebaud, ONI chief, who chaired the JIC debate on a
postwar agency ...................................................................................................... 241
33. Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, G-2 in 194446, thought Donovan's 1944 plan was
"excellent for Germany but [not for] the democratic setup we have in this
country ... " .................. 246
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34. As head of COI/OSS Donovan often met with newsmen (as depicted above) but
rarely, if ever, made any public statements ........................................................
257
35. Harold D. Smith, shown here on April 15, 1939, with FDR and Attorney General
Frank Murphy, receives his commission as Budget Bureau director. Smith
played a vital and not always sympathetic role in COI/OSS history ............
262
36. "The Kremlin"-the OSS name for the Administration (now the East) Building at
25th and E Streets in Washington. Donovan occupied the lower right hand
corner of the building ..........................................................................................
288
37. President Truman awards Donovan, for whom the President had no use, an Oak
Leaf Cluster for his Distinguished Service Medal, Jan. 11, 1946 ..................
345
38. Though anxious to return to St. Louis, Rear Adm. Sidney W. Souers served as the
country's first Director of Central Intelligence, Jan. 23 to June 10, 1946 ....
352
39. Boyish-looking Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg was the second Director of Central
Intelligence, June 10, 1946 to May 1, 1947 ......................................................
360
40. "An amiable Dutchman," Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, was the third
Director of Central Intelligence, May 1, 1947 to Oct. 7, 1950. He was the only
DCI who headed both CIG and CIA ................................................................
378
41. Lawrence R. Houston (shown here about 1972) was the principal drafter in CIG of
the CIA section of the National Security Act of 1947 ....................................
403
42. Clark Clifford (in a 1949 photograph) helped draft the National Security Act of
1947, which established the Central Intelligence Agency ................................
404
43. Shown here in his World War II uniform is Walter L. Pforzheimer, who kept daily
watch for CIG on the passage through Congress of the National Security Act of
1947 ........................................................................................................................
405
44. The original text of the National Security Act is preserved in the Diplomatic
Branch of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.-Stack 5 E 4, Row 12,
Compartment 4, Shelf 4 ......................................................................................
406
45. The 1947 act was first signed by Representative Martin and Senator Vandenberg.
It was then signed by President Truman in the cabin of his plane just prior to
taking off to see his dying mother ......................................................................
407
46. CIA's Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, looking east-northeast with the Potomac
River, Maryland, and the District of Columbia in the background ................
412
47. Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan; Coordinator of Information, July 11, 1941 to June
13, 1942; Director of Strategic Services, June 13, 1942 to Oct. 1, 1945; and the
"father" of the Central Intelligence Agency ......................................................
414
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Part One
PREWAR - THE COI STORY
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Chapter I
A QUESTION OF PATERNITY
The Central Intelligence Agency, like success, has many fathers. Among them are two
presidents, a handful of Army and Navy officers, a British intelligence official, and a civilian
soldier. Their claims, briefly sketched and assessed here, will introduce not only the hero of
this story and a few of the myriad characters who people its pages but will also uncover a
convenient place to begin-a coincidence in 1929.
Pearl Harbor is hardly a father, but something ought to be said preliminarily about its
significance in this matter. The Hoover Commission was not far wrong in 1955 when it de-
clared that
the CIA may well attribute its existence to the attack on Pearl Harbor and to the
postwar investigation into the part Intelligence or lack of Intelligence played in the
failure of our military forces to receive adequate and prompt warning of the
impending Japanese attack.'
Certainly after that event there were few, if any, people in this country who were not
convinced of the necessity for obtaining and utilizing whatever information would enable the
country's leaders to anticipate and forestall another power's hostile designs on the nation's
internal and external security. This unanimity of opinion was summed up with death and
disaster in the slogan "Remember Pearl Harbor!" It undoubtedly set the climate of opinion
which made the debate in the immediate postwar world about a permanent foreign
intelligence establishment a debate not about its necessity but about its powers and
functions. CIA's establishment in 1947 represented the public determination that Pearl
Harbor would not be repeated.
In 1939, however, long before this climate of opinion was fixed, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, according to former Amb. George S. Messersmith, had taken the "initiative" and
conceived "the original idea" that led to CIA.' Messersmith was referring to the Inter-
departmental Intelligence Committee (IIC) which was essentially a counterintelligence setup
with, however, nothing positive among its potentialities-as events will show. Roosevelt's
contribution, considerable indeed, will be seen to lie elsewhere, especially in his establish-
ment of the Coordinator of Information (COI) under the leadership of then Col. William J.
("Wild Bill") Donovan.
The other President to be credited with CIA is Harry S. Truman. Certainly his
Memoirs make it clear that he had no small idea of the role he played; it was his felt need
for coordinated intelligence that caused him to push the idea of a CIA and be the President
who signed it into law. His daughter Margaret, a score of years later, counted the agency
among her father's "proudest accomplishments."' As President his role was indispensable,
but it was not creative; the snowball had already grown large when he put his shoulder to it.
Claims for the military and naval officers are three. First, the Army's Col. Sidney F.
Mashbir has maintained that he and the Navy's Capt. the first draft Adm.) Ellis M. Zacharias
"at the direction of Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King ... prepared
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directives for what has since become the Central Intelligence Agency.' 1 4 So it may have
seemed to them; but, as events will show, that was understandable myopia. Second, another
rear admiral, C. M. Cooke, Jr., has been credited with the idea, the "major factor," that
started "the first official step to provide a unified war intelligence service." S This was his
proposal late in 1942 for the establishment of an "Office of War Intelligence." Cooke,
however, like Zacharias and Mashbir, was not in the mainstream of events but in military
backwaters. Third, Col. Ludwell L. Montague, later a civilian with CIA's Board of National
Estimates, traced the agency's origins not to Donovan's proposal in 1944, as he maintained
people frequently do, but "to the much more sophisticated doctrine of the Army G-2 Policy
Staff," especially as that doctrine was drafted by Montague himself.' While this subject will
be treated extensively later on, let it be maintained at the outset that Donovan forced the
Army and others to raise their sights much higher than they ever would have done under
their own powers.
The British claim for CIA fame has actually been expressed in terms of parentage.
William S. Stephenson, knighted by His Majesty King George VI for his intelligence labors
in the United States in World War II, has said that his organization "had a considerable
part in the upbringing" of Donovan's COI "of which it was in a sense the parent."' This
claim will be fully aired in these pages. It need only be said now that the Stephenson story, a
genuinely intriguing one, must be read in the light of the Donovan story.
The reader has by now surely suspected that the protagonist of this drama is the
civilian soldier, the Irish Catholic New Yorker, William J. Donovan, a colonel in the Great
War, a major general in World War II, and in between a lawyer, public official, public serv-
ant, and political figure. "It's a good thing," FDR told Colonel Donovan at 2:00 a.m. on
December 8, 1941, "that you got me started on this [intelligence agency]." It was Donovan
indeed who "got" the President "started," who served the country as its first chief of foreign
intelligence collection and coordination, and who, by his imagination, drive, and leadership,
compelled others to complete his building after he, like the Biblical cornerstone, had been
rejected.
Donovan was not the first, however, to perceive the need in the United States for a
central organization to coordinate the intelligence gathered and produced by the govern-
ment's various intelligence services. Fully a decade before Donovan became Coordinator of
Information, one John A. Gade, until today hardly known to history, had turned his
attention to the inadequacy of what now is called "the intelligence community" and had pre-
scribed a central intelligence organization as the remedy. Coincidentally enough, Gade, in
New York, was doing so at the very time, the spring of 1929, when Donovan was leaving
government service in Washington to start his Manhattan law firm. Gade wrote a seven
page, single spaced analysis and prescription that provide us with a convenient introduction
to the intelligence setup into which Donovan would barge eleven years later as the country's
first chief of central intelligence.
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Chapter II
THE :PREWAR U.S. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
John A. Gade, born in 1875, had been an architect, naval attache in Copenhagen in
1918-19, and a representative of the Department of State in the Baltic countries. In 1929 he
was with the New York banking firm of White, Weld & Company. What caused him at
that time to concern himself with intelligence is not known, but early in the spring he
broached to the Navy's district intelligence officer in Manhattan, Comdr. Glen Howell, a
proposal for "some sort of a central Intelligence Agency [sic], reporting directly to Mr.
[Pres. Herbert C.1 Hoover." Gade planned to present this idea to the President "at some
future time." '
On April 25, 1929, Gade and Commander Howell met at Governors Island with the
local Army intelligence officer, Maj. O. H. Saunders, and the three men read and discussed
the text of Gade's proposal.
1. A "NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE"
Gade described the "foreign information service" of the United States as "poorly and
inadequately informed," suffering from a lack of organization, and particularly lacking two
things, coordination of the various services and a "clearing house" in which all information,
regardless of its source, could be "classified, analyzed, compared, sifted and rendered
available" to those who needed it. True it was, he noted, that our foreign commercial,
military, and naval attaches were under instructions to exchange information believed to be
of value to one another, but, he said, such exchange was hindered by "differences in point of
view, petty jealousy and other obstacles," such as the fear of disclosure of confidential
sources. The services also suffered from a "sad" and "costly duplication of efforts," often in
the same embassy where the different attaches could be found "gathering news on the same
topic or situation."
In comparison with foreign countries "we were amateurs where they were past
masters." The World War had given us an unusual opportunity to see at work the British
and French "highly developed military and naval intelligence services" and "their far
reaching secret services." The United States learned much, made many valuable contacts,
but has now lost "most" of this gain. One thing Gade at least retained was appreciation for
the British intelligence system-at least as he understood it-which he now put forth as a
model for the reform of the American structure.
British "tentacles" reached out to every corner of the world; the system's "arms"
represented "an incredible number of responsible British citizens ... be they recognized gov-
ernment servants or not." Each government service-Navy, Army, Board of Trade, Home
Office, Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Secret Service-was "constantly informing" its
headquarters of interesting and important news. On receipt in London, the news was
"sifted," and "if deemed of possible national importance" was "forwarded" to a "liaison
officer functioning" between the department and "a Central Source, in constant touch with
the Chief Government Executive." Here at this "Source" were pieced together "all the bits
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of separate unintelligible or unlikely information." Such were, in Gade's terminology and in
his view, "the Wheel of British intelligence" and "the Central hub of the Wheel of
Information."
From "the Central hub" radiated, of course, "spokes," which terminated in the various
reporting "stations," government agency or private citizen. The "Wheel" turned as well in
peacetime, when it turned on trade, business, and economics, as in wartime when it was
easily and smoothly, so wrote Gade, expanded to meet the military emergency. In peace or
war the "Wheel of British intelligence" effected great economies in cost, involved only a "lit-
tle overlapping," and quickly checked "misdirected efforts." "Gum shoe methods," declared
this booster of British intelligence, "are frowned upon and discouraged."
An American wheel, he contended, would work just as effectively. Raw data would be
more profitably exploited; the chief executive would be better informed; law enforcement, for
instance, prohibition-remember this was 1929-would be strengthened. Mindful of whom
he was dealing with, Gade was additionally quick to point out that a national governmental
information service would not impair the functioning of the existing services; indeed, in
terms of morale, efficiency, and productivity these services would actually thrive by being
"constantly reacted upon by the Central hub of the Wheel of Information." Mindful of the
Congress and the public, Gade stressed that this Wheel would not be "an intricate national
secret service,"' which "the sentiment of every American of common sense bitterly opposed."
Gade laid out a procedure for researching his idea and getting it approved by the Presi-
dent, the Army and Navy, and. "the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department of State,
Commerce, and Justice." He thought that the State Department, "the senior service," was
the natural ultimate location for "the so-called `National Intelligence Service' " but that
temporarily it was better to let it function independently; such, he said, was found to be the
case in England. Since no funds were now available for operating this clearinghouse,
personnel could be borrowed from the services, and "certain particularly fitted persons"
might serve without pay. Perhaps these last included himself, for he would return to the at-
tache service in 1933 for six more years of overseas service, in Brussels and Lisbon, before
retiring at age sixty-five. For a chief of the service he again referred to his British model
where, he said, the "Chief Central Officer" is generally an admiral whose job was known to
none but the top people. Finally, and naturally, the service must eschew publicity.'
Now John Gade, whatever his merits as architect, banker and attache, was not, as far
as any record shows, any great authority on the merits and demerits of the American
intelligence service. He certainly had an overblown conception of the merits of the British
system, which 'was not, in fact, a nicely integrated system at all. Certainly also he had a
naive view of the extent to which the British, who had a long secret service record reaching
back to Queen Elizabeth's Sir Francis Walsingha.m, frowned upon "gum shoe methods."
Nevertheless, Gade was sufficiently experienced in the workings of several diverse and
often conflicting American intelligence services to spot a fundamental weakness. This
enabled him to be the first to perceive the need for some better organization of their activity.
Hence, he laid out in 1929, ahead of his time, the idea of a central intelligence agency. He
had fingered the problem, proposed a solution, and considered some of the arguments, but
his proposal would have no organic relationship to the discussion of the subject which would
come up ten years later. Gade impressed none of his contemporaries.
Both Commander Howell and Major Saunders immediately dispatched copies of
Gade's proposal to their superiors in Washington. In the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
Capt. H. C. Cccke, USN, noted that the proposal "seems very fine in theory., and might
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"the
work well in practice, but would slow up dissemination of information." In any case,
Central Office" could not replace naval intelligence, which must continue to deal not only
with its own but also the foreign attaches assigned to Washington. Cocke concluded, as
every intelligence service would henceforth similarly conclude about itself, that "ONI cannot
give up its duty of War Service Information." '
The proposal had a rougher review in the Military Intelligence Division (MID) where it
was doubted if Gade had any idea of the size of organization he was proposing; he had prob-
ably been reading about some "story book hero" whose intelligence activities enabled him to
save the country. Did he have any idea who would do the evaluating? Who would distribute
the information? Who would be responsible if an agency acted on incomplete or inaccurate
intelligence?
The questioner, a Colonel Cooper, admitted that there was "room for improvement in a
number of the governmental information services," but he saw the remedy "in evaluation ...
rather than consolidation." Each service should gather its own information, have it evaluated
by its own qualified people, and then distribute it; and if there were proper liaison
established among the services, there would be "little overlap." Under Gade's system, wrote
Cooper, there would have to be new sections "devoted to each of the using agencies (navy,
army, commerce, etc.)," and this would just be "additional overhead" without any
compensation. "I see nothing," he concluded, "to be gained and many difficulties to be
overcome." ?
He was not the only one who saw it that way. On May 9 his chief, Col. Stanley H.
Ford, returned his review with this scribbled conclusion: "File this ... I have talked to Maj.
Saunders and Capt. Johnson, O.N.I. and all seem to be in agreement with your comment." 5
Thus ended Gade's attempt to coordinate the product of the American intelligence
services. It failed, because the intelligence chiefs said no, and their negative reflected their
unwillingness to be coordinated. For them coordination meant consolidation, i.e., a merger, a
union, a combining into one; Colonel Cooper, it should be recalled, had seen the remedy "in
evaluation . . . rather than consolidation," which, incidentally, Gade had not proposed. It
would be the same no and the same fear of consolidation when, eleven years later, Donovan
broached substantially the same idea. But before we pick up Donovan, we must take a closer
look at those services which Gade proposed linking up in a "Wheel of Information."
2. THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, 1929-36
When this New Yorker envisioned "the Central hub of the Wheel of Information," he
dimly perceived the post-World War II "Director of Central Intelligence" and "the
intelligence community." In 1929, however, there was neither. There certainly was no
"hub," not even a president who, by any stretch of the imagination, thought of himself as
collecting, evaluating, coordinating, and synthesizing raw or finished intelligence systemati-
cally forwarded to him by agencies consciously fulfilling his informational requirements as
the prerequisite to policy-making. There was no intelligence community.
There were, in the fields of information and intelligence, only separate and uncoordi-
nated agencies, which must be viewed in the context of their time. Nineteen twenty-nine was
not the heyday of foreign affairs. The retiring President Calvin Coolidge had declared the
business of America was business, and appropriately enough he turned over the reins of gov-
ernment to his Secretary of Commerce, the newly elected President Hoover. The new
Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, began his term in March "with fewer worries about
American foreign relations than almost any of his predecessors." 6 Congress, reflecting the
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isolationism and pacifism of the country, had been stingy with funds for the national defense
establishment, and the Great Depression would soon cut budgets drastically. Nobody placed
any store in the systematic study of the capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities of foreign,
even hostile, powers. Indeed, there really was no such thing as "intelligence" as the product
of consciously directed and coordinated effort.
While the word had been used for centuries in the sense of information, news, the
obtaining of information, the agency for secret information, or a secret service, it was not
until 1921 that it showed up in The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, and then it did
so, like a leftover from the World War, under the entry of "military intelligence," a Literary
Digest piece on MID. Even this heading did not reappear until 1939, and it actually was not
until 1970 that "intelligence service" was used as a separate topical entry. "Intelligence
community" has not yet appeared. In the meantime, "spies," "espionage," and "secret
service" were annually chronicled, but such things seemed to be found, except in times of
war fever, in countries other than the United States.
In 1929 no U.S. agency conducted clandestine foreign intelligence operations abroad.
In 1929 no U.S. agency had foreign intelligence as its primary interest or activity, though
several were collecting information and intelligence abroad. In 1929 there was no adequate
machinery for liaison, for the sharing of the information collected in and about foreign
countries; too often, instead, cabinet secretaries almost ceremoniously had "the honor of
transmitting" to one another run-of-the-mill documents. In 1929 intelligence was neither a
profession nor a career; at best it was a one-time activity in an army or navy officer's serv-
ice. Hence, when closely scrutinized, the intelligence services, which Gade proposed to
coordinate, will be revealed as small, weak stepchildren of their parent organizations.
Actually the State Department, "the senior service," which Gade thought the logical
place for a "clearing house" of information, had no specific intelligence section or function
in 1929, and it would not get one until 1945 when it took over elements of the recently abol-
ished Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
State had had a "Division of Foreign Intelligence," but this, a new version in 1917 of
the earlier "Division of Information," was clearly a press office which distributed to
everybody-the department itself, the Congress, the state governors, universities, chambers
of commerce, and the domestic and foreign press-"items of any news value."
State had ,supported the code-breaking "Black Chamber." It was begun before the war
by H. O. Yardley, who was surprised to discover, shortly after joining the department as a
code clerk in 1913, the school boyishness of State's own codes and ciphers. It was then moved
to the War Department, more hospitable to the idea than State, and proved a wartime suc-
cess. It continued after the war, still with the military but largely financed by State. In 1929
State's Mr. Stimson was shocked by the discovery of the chamber within his own bailiwick,
albeit prudently located in New York City, and on that occasion struck his memorable blow
for gentlemanliness in foreign affairs. He closed up the chamber.
Gentlemen did not spy on one another either. Writing in 1967, George F. Kerman
recalled that the "suspicious Soviet mind'"' had labeled the Russian research section in the
Riga embassy, where he worked from 1931 to 1933, as a "sinister espionage center," but,
observed the former ambassador, "the United States Government had not yet advanced to
that level of sophistication." The section, said Kennan, "had no secret agents, and wanted
none," and was content to rely on "careful, scholarly analysis of information legitimately
available."' In 1929 State undoubtedly shared Gade's opposition to "an intricate national
secret service." As late as 1941 some officials in State were disturbed to learn that "in some
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manner" agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were obtaining in South
America copies of foreign official correspondence!
In 1929 State could look back, and not without some pride, on a long history of overtly
collecting information on foreign countries through the medium of a relatively large number
of diplomatic, consular, and special missions abroad. State had begun to do so almost one
hundred years before the Army and Navy established their intelligence departments and
sent attaches to foreign posts. While State's people were by no means all qualified, full-time,
careerists, ably assisted and fully operative, they at least were in the field and provided the
bulk of Washington's official foreign files.
Unfortunately, the information was not collected against any systematic requirements,
and "wide lacunae"' were found when World War II erupted. When collected, the
information was centered almost exclusively in the dominant geographical bureaus or
"desks," and was inadequately coordinated not only with other agencies but even with other
bureaus of State. Even so, the information was generally handled in the light of specific
events and problems and not analyzed in the light of basic developments and trends.
Writing in 1969, former Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson found the department, as
late as 1941, lacking any "ideas, plans, or methods for the painstaking and exhaustive
collection and correlation of foreign intelligence." 10 A competent student of the department
had observed in 1949 that "although a successful foreign policy requires a complete and ac-
curate knowledge of all pertinent facts ... ," State had "no centralized agency ... to per-
form this function" until OSS was liquidated."
Of the military members of the State-War-Navy triumvirate, the Navy was the first to
establish a separate foreign intelligence department. The new "Office of Naval Intelligence"
was organized in 1882, under the impact of such developments as the switch from wood to
steel and sail to steam in the construction of ships, to collect and record such information as
would be useful to the department in peace and war. Originally in the Bureau of Navigation,
it was moved three times in the next three decades before finally settling down in 1915 as
one of nine subdivisions in the newly-created Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
where it remained down to and throughout World War II.
At the outset collection was centered on detailed and technical data on the characteris-
tics of foreign navies, their ships and weapons, rather than on ship movements, their
dispositions, and the naval intentions of foreign powers. By the thirties, however, more
attention was being given to foreign naval strength and war capacity. Extensive work was
being done on the compilation of files and writing of monographs on naval science in foreign
countries, on the latter's commercial interests, and on all aspects of foreign navy organiza-
tion and operation.
ONI conceived its duty "merely to collect its information and to place it in readily us-
able form in the hands of those who can make use of it, leaving its evaluation and
conclusions to be drawn from it to be determined by the ultimate consumer." 12 ONI was "in
effect a post office," according to one naval historian." While this view appears, in the light
of the many studies and monographs produced by ONI, to be an oversimplification, it was
not until 1937 that evaluation was made an official ONI function, and even then many naval
officers outside ONI considered its personnel not qualified to evaluate intelligence.
The chief source of all of ONI's information was the attache system, which had been
established within a few months of ONI itself. The first attache was posted to London, and
others soon followed to other European capitals. Attaches acquired their information from
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the navy departments to which they were accredited, the naval and military officers with
whom they could associate, and from prominent political and industrial figures. The attaches
were expected to visit ships, dockyards, other government establishments, industrial plants,
and ports and to read all the relevant government releases, the newspapers, and journals.
Attaches were like the gentlemen in Mr. Stimson's State Department. In 1930, for
instance, they were informed that the Navy did not "countenance" the frequently quoted
assertion that a naval attache was a spy under the protection of international law. They were
instructed to shun the use of "dubious methods" in collecting information lest it bring a loss
of prestige to both them and the service. They were told that while espionage is necessary in
wartime there was no justification for the employment in peacetime of "secret agents." Still,
their instructions did not mean that the attache "must ignore the employment of agents
where they were required in investigations bearing on national defense and loyalty to one's
country"; but they were left, perhaps to their confusion, with the warning that in all cases
where zeal had led an individual into "questionable activities" his "reputation and career did
not profit." "
The attache system in the interwar period had problems. First, attaches were never
very numerous, perhaps eight to ten in all at one time, and it was even difficult to keep that
number in the field. Second, they were often spread thin, covering too many countries, as in
1923, for instance, when the attache in Berlin also covered Copenhagen, Oslo, Stockholm
and Helsinki.. Third, funds were often in short supply, so that in some cases, Havana and
Warsaw in the early twenties, attaches, because they were paid out of State's funds," were
practically employees of State. Fourth, ON] headquarters was not any better off.
Not the most prestigious division of the Navy, ONI was never very large; in 1931 total
personnel in Washington numbered eighteen officers, thirty-eight civilians, and a small
number of enlisted men; in 1934 there were twenty-four officers and a clerical force of
eighteen." The naval districts throughout the United States were always understaffed; their
personnel had too many nonintelligence functions, and they often were not qualified as
intelligence personnel. The Naval Intelligence Volunteer Service, established in 1925,
suffered all kinds of serious deficiencies. Finally, sections of ONI, espionage and censorship,
for instance, were inactive in peacetime. Indeed, in many respects ONI functioned primarily
as a nucleus for a wartime operation.
The Navy initiative in establishing ONI may well have been "the principal reason,"
according to a historian of Army intelligence, for the Army following suit in 1885 with the
establishment. of its own "Division of Military Information," which soon became the
Military Information Division (MID)." Not that the Army disdained intelligence, its
wartime collection, or having on hand a body of qualified intelligence personnel; it disdained
none of these; but there was much opposition to the establishment of a separate depart-
mental agency for the performance of military information duties. Such opposition persisted,
even after MID was established, so much so that the same historian, writing at the end of
the Korean war, could assert that "the most striking feature in regard to the progress of the
departmental military intelligence agency from . . . 1885 . . . seems to be that it was almost
constantly under attack and usually on the defensive." 18 As an aside, it might be noted here
that this long experience of constant insecurity could well have been a basic cause of the
bitter hostility that Army intelligence officials would offer Donovan, his intelligence
organization, and his postwar plans for a permanent American central intelligence
establishment..
The new-born Military Information Division had more growing pains than its Navy
counterpart. Originally established, seemingly tucked away, in the Military Reservations
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Division of the Miscellaneous Branch of the Adjutant General's Office, MID rose to some
prominence in 1903 when it became one of three divisions in the newly created General
Staff. Within five years the three divisions became two, and this meant MID was merged
with, literally buried in, the War College, and there it remained until 1917.
The Great War brought MID into greater prominence, albeit temporarily. Its
personnel, three people in 1916, a drop from a total of four in 1885, skyrocketed to 209 in
1917, and to 1,441 in 1918. So with funds; from zero in 1885 and amounts of one, three, ten,
and eleven thousand dollars annually for the next thirty years, the budget went to
$1,000,000 in 1918, and to $2,500,000 in 1919.19 Such mushrooming brought organizational
changes, which, because of MID's importance to this study, need to be noted here.
On February 12, 1918, MID became the "Military Intelligence Branch" of the
Executive Division of the five-part General Staff. On August 26 the branch rose to divisional
status as one of four divisions of the staff, and its chief was now the "Director of Military
Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff," and a brigadier general occupied the post. Intel-
ligence held on to this relatively lofty position until September 1921 and the reorganization,
once again, of the General Staff. A fifth division, War Plans, was added. Since there was no
legal authority for the assignment of a fifth general officer, one of the divisions had of neces-
sity to be headed by a colonel. The lot fell to the director of military intelligence, who, for
the better part of the next twenty years, was a colonel, inferior in rank to his colleagues on
the staff and often to a number of foreign. military attaches. This status was "an
embarrassment" 20 which was promptly extended throughout subordinate echelons of military
intelligence and handicapped the service for years afterwards.
Meanwhile some important changes in terminology had occurred. "Intelligence" had
appeared for the first time in Army use when it replaced "information" in the "Military
Intelligence Branch" established in 1918.21 This followed from the decision to base the
organization of the American intelligence system on that of the British with which it
expected to collaborate on the European battlefields. So also the continental army terms of
"espionage" and "counterespionage" appeared. From the British came "positive" and
"negative" intelligence, the former being concerned with the military, political, economic,
and social situation abroad, and the other with the discovery and suppression of enemy
activity in the United States. "Negative" intelligence would yield to "counterintelligence,"
but "positive intelligence" remains standard terminology. Also from the British came
"Military Intelligence, Section One (MI-1)" and "Military Intelligence, Section Two
(MI-2)" and so forth to denominate the functional units in military intelligence." From the
French, via General Pershing's headquarters, came the system of denominating staff
functions as "G-1," "G-2," etc. Hence the Army's intelligence chief became titled "Director
of Military Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2)." 23
MID, or G-2, as military intelligence was now popularly known, suffered a postwar de-
cline in funds, personnel, prestige, and governmental and public support. The personnel
roster gradually declined from ninety in 1922 to seventy-four in 1929; it hovered around the
figure until 1936 when it dropped to sixty-six, an interwar low. There was, of course, a cor-
responding decrease in funds; the Depression, coming on top of isloationism and pacifism,
saw to that. Within the War Department itself, intelligence, headed by a colonel, was
quickly recognized as not the quickest way to stars. Aspiring officers shunned the attache
system, which became the haven, with some notable exceptions, for wealthier officers who
were attracted to the social life of foreign military service.' Between the years 1919 and
1939, according to G-2, the Army itself did not fully understand the function, importance,
and scope of military intelligence in modern warfare. The prewar inadequacy of MID-data
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and records on subjects and regions--was "the direct result," wrote a wartime chief of
military intelligence who will figure prominently in these pages, Brig. Gen. George V.
Strong, "of the years of neglect of the Military Intelligence organization in our Army." 25
While John A. Gade was primarily concerned with coordinating the intelligence
produced by State, War, and Navy, the big three of foreign reporting, he knew his "Wheel
of Information." would pull in data from such agencies as Treasury, Post Office, Commerce,
Agriculture, Interior, and the FBI, for they also were spokes in a wheel.
Since the preceding century, Treasury had been sending people abroad on regular
assignment. The first agents had been sent to audit the collection of consular fees; others
were later sent to monitor the performance of the consuls in the issuance of consular
invoices. Medical officers overseas helped enforce the quarantine laws and regulations. Other
Treasury agents reported on counterfeiting, smuggling, the drug traffic, and income tax
evasion. Indeed, Treasury, with its Coast Guard, Secret Service, Narcotics Bureau, Customs,
Alcohol Tax and Internal Revenue services, was, in effect, in itself an intelligence
community which often did pick up :information pertinent to foreign affairs, but this was
only incidental to its major concentration on domestic affairs; and the information might or
might not be routed to all possible consumers.
Commerce, Agriculture, and Interior came into the foreign field long after Treasury. In
1927 Secretary of Commerce Hoover persuaded Congress to establish a separate foreign
commerce service in order to handle the current boom in American exports which
Commerce thought had become too much for the regular Foreign Service. In 1930
Agriculture succeeded in gaining authority from Congress to have its own agricultural
attaches stationed abroad. Finally, in 1935 even Interior's Bureau of Mines got in on the for-
eign act, when it too was allowed to have representatives abroad. This proliferation of
attaches abroad, reporting each to his own departmental headquarters and, admittedly, often
providing excellent coverage on specialized subjects, did nevertheless provoke confusion,
duplication of effort, and jurisdictional disputes within the diplomatic and consular
missions." This development only accentuated the lack of proper coordination of information
and intelligence in Washington.
The FBI had no foreign mandate until 1940; but because of its investigation of crime in
the United States, it inevitably acquired considerable amounts of information on persons,
organizations, and activities that had some real or suspected relationship to the foreign
interests or national security of the United States. The bureau apparently had some long-
standing liaison with British security officials, and it could be called upon by the State
Department to undertake some special investigations overseas, as it did in London in 1-940
when it took up the case of Tyler Kent's release of secret State cable traffic to pro-Nazi
groups.27 As with Treasury, perhaps even more so, this foreign activity was incidental to the
bureau's primary interest, the investigation of crime with an eye to prosecution and
conviction.
This last point about the FBI was equally true, mutatis rnutandis, of the other
information and intelligence services: they all pursued interests and fulfilled responsibilities
which were essentially the limited fields, respectively, of-their parent executive departments.
Moreover, they worked according to their own traditions, procedures, and styles and did so
with all the zealously guarded independence appropriate to those autonomous and coequal
cabinet offices. Hence, the individual departmental interests were served, albeit not always
satisfactorily; but, in classical fashion, the general interest, in the absence of a concerned
president or a coordination mechanism, was regularly neglected.
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Nothing-least of all the reform proposals of a private citizen, a New York banker-
would change this situation, even dent it, until Hitler, Pearl Harbor, and World War II
brought the intelligence services to the belated recognition of the need for strengthening and
reorganizing their capabilities.
This recognition began to dawn, oh so slowly, about 1936, when the country's attention
began to shift from the Depression to the possibility of war. The intelligence services-small
and, uncoordinated, neglected by their superiors, Congress, and the public-found them-
selves really worrying about foreign spies in their midst.
3. SPYING AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 1936-39
In 1936 the United States began to feel the effect of the intensification of spy activity
that had occurred after the rise of Hitler and the accompanying aggressiveness of Italy and
Japan. In March 1936 an ex-U.S. Navy officer, one H. T. Thompson, was accused of
stealing and selling naval secrets to a Japanese officer and was convicted and jailed in July.
In the same month another former naval officer, one J. S. Farnsworth, was arrested, and
subsequently convicted, on a similar charge, also involving a Japanese officer. Unsurpris-
ingly, the Navy warned the country that espionage always increased in times of naval
expansion. Rep. Samuel Dickstein had already warned the country against Communist and
Nazi spy activity, and at the end of the year Rep. J. Parnell Thomas urged action against
suspicious Japanese activity in the Panama Canal Zone.
For its part, the government, worried about the security of personnel, information, and
installations, began to take some protective measures. The FBI, at Roosevelt's request, began
to investigate activities of Communists and Nazis. G-2 and the Navy, always concerned
about Japanese activity in California and near the Mexican border, tightened security,
especially regarding photography and flying near militarily sensitive areas. In 1937 the
Navy's "estimate of the situation" particularly emphasized the need for counterintelligence
to protect fleet and naval shore establishments and industrial plants with a Navy-related in-
terest." Interestingly enough, the Navy cited the lack of a "central intelligence service as a
clearing house" as justification for pushing its counterintelligence program beyond the
traditional limit of matters having a "naval interest" into areas normally covered by other
departments.79
Then in 1938 spy activity in the United States broke out into an unprecedented rash:
the FBI handled 634 cases of espionage whereas in previous years the average of such cases
was thirty-five. Easily the most sensational of these, indeed it was the country's first major
espionage case, was the Rumrich case, which involved an Army deserter, Guenther Gustave
Rumrich, who was hooked up with a German spy ring targeted on U.S. military secrets.
This case would be especially instrumental in pushing the counterintelligence services toward
more cooperation in the fight against spies.
In this case, so many investigators-FBI, G-2, State Department security officers,
American and British postal authorities, and the New York police-were involved in the
detection and attempted apprehension of the eighteen persons who were finally indicted, that
fourteen of them managed successfully to become fugitives from justice. The FBI director
and the prosecuting attorney clashed at one point over responsibility for these escapes, and at
trial's end the court castigated the investigative agencies for the disappearance of so many
defendants.30 This fiasco provoked President Roosevelt to confer with the prosecutor,
announce the tightening of counterespionage activities as part of the military and naval
expansion, and then late in December 1938, to declare-somewhat prematurely, as events
would show--that the federal agencies were all coordinated."
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Actually it would be another six months before any coordination was definitely
achieved, and that would occur only after a major row among the investigating agencies.
According to W:hitehead's The FBI Storiv, President Roosevelt's approval of a $50,000
appropriation for the bureau's conduct of espionage investigations gave it, in the absence of
any similar funds for any other nonmilitary agency, primary responsibility in the civilian
field. Accordingly, the bureau and G-2 worked out, with the approval of ONI, a cooperative
program, which was approved in principle by the new Attorney General, Frank Murphy, and
then communicated on February 7, 1939, to other investigative agencies of the government.
This communication, however, "kicked up an immediate storm"; State and other depart-
ments concerned "balked." 32
At the storm's center was one of State's assistant secretaries, career ambassador
George S. Messersmith, who had recently played a major role in Roosevelt's consolidation of
the commercial and agricultural attaches into State's Foreign Service. Messersmith,
according to the Whitehead account, "called a conference of representatives from War,
Navy, Treasury, the Post Office, and Justice-but no one was invited from the FBI"-and
announced that Roosevelt had asked him to coordinate and control investigations of
subversion. War and Navy, says Whitehead, wanted the FBI as the coordinating agency, but
Messersmith, at a subsequent conference, wanted to divide espionage investigations among
the various agencies. Hoover, writing to Murphy, "waded into the scrap" denouncing
Messersmith's suggestion and arguing that espionage cases required "centralization of all
information ...:in one agency." 33 Murphy's biographer, writing of the Attorney General's
role in the matter, pictured the former Michigan governor as taking "charge of the nation's
internal security program" and asking the President to centralize all investigations involving
espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage in the FBI, G-2, and ONI. Murphy thereby
eliminated State? Treasury, and the Post Office from this field."
Messersmith saw the situation differently. Writing long after the event, he declared
that he was specifically called in by Secretary Hull and informed that the President had a
new task for him. Roosevelt was quoted by Hull as saying that he had been for a long time
concerned with the duplication of activities by MID, ONI, and the FBI; they were, in
Messersmith's recall of the conversation with Hull, "often following the same matter at the
same time and constantly crossing each. other's tracks"; and often getting into the same act
were "the Secret Service ... certain agents which we had in the Department of State,* and
the Treasury agents." The President found the duplication inefficient and costly and, in the
existing perilous circumstances, intolerable. What was needed, said the President, was the
coordination of the activities of these agencies, and he particularly stated he did not mean
the elimination of any of them.
Not only did Messersmith protest the assignment on grounds of health and overwork,
but he told Hull he was "extremely doubtful" that anything could be accomplished. This
was because in his experience there were no agencies in government more zealous in
protecting their preserves than these intelligence services; there were none more loath to
exchange information; they had their separate ways of working, would not disclose their
sources of information, and just did not. trust one another. To all of which Hull replied that
it was the President's desire that Messersmith get the heads of the agencies together.
So it was done. They were all invited to Messersmith's Georgetown home for dinner
and business. All appeared except the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover, a fact duly reported the next
* These seem never to have constituted a separate unit or service and have never been given adequate historical
treatment.
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day to Hull, and then to the President, who, according to the Ambassador, immediately got
the FBI director on the telephone and told him to be present at the next Georgetown dinner
or hand in his resignation! On the occasion of this meeting the President for the first time
personally explained to Messersmith his unhappiness with the duplication, his intention to
respect the present organization and work of each of the agencies involved, and his desire
that Messersmitth meet regularly with the intelligence chiefs, facilitate open discussion of
problems, effect an exchange of information, and, if necessary in case of a dispute or
difference of opinion, decide which agency should follow up on a particular matter. At the
next dinner, witth the FBI chief on hand, and thanks to Messersmith's tactful handling-
each chief was "closed up in his own box"-and Mrs. Messersmith's good dinner, the
gathering loosened up and agreed on the establishment of machinery for collaboration,
weekly meetings, and a flexible agenda.35
However accurate and complete these accounts of the Messersmith conferences, the
President did issue a confidential directive providing for coordination, at least self-
coordination, of the country's investigative agencies. This he did on June 26, 1939, in a con-
fidential message to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, Navy and Commerce, and to
the Attorney General and the Postmaster General. They were informed that all responsibil-
ity for the investigation of espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage cases was being
concentrated in the FBI, MID, and ONI and that the heads of these services were being di-
rected to function "as a committee to coordinate their activities." The others were directed
to stay out of these fields and immediately to turn over to the nearest FBI office any in-
formation they had on such cases.36 On September 6, after the outbreak of war in Europe, all
the other law enforcement officials in the United States were publicly requested similarly to
contact the FBI. Thus, the internal security field was limited to the two military services and
the civilian FBI.
Pursuant to the directive, the heads of FBI, MID, and ONI constituted themselves the
"Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC)," which commenced holding regular
meetings for the exchange of information and the discussion of such problems as the
members cared to raise." While the President's directive made no provision for State's
participation in the IIC, first George Messersmith and then, after his assignment as
ambassador to Cuba in 1940, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr. attended its
meetings as the members' friendly link with FDR. Certainly State's man never functioned as
the coordinator of the other three; these-and their successors-did their own coordinating.
Representatives of other agencies attended meetings when their interests were involved.
Both the June directive and the IIC constituted a small step forward in the limited field
of "negative" intelligence. While the directive was only a general statement which was
productive of numerous jurisdictional disputes and had to be supplemented by subsequent re-
visions, it did remain throughout the war as the basic document delimiting the areas of oper-
ations of the three agencies in regard to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and
subversion. While the IIC lacked, as a Bureau of the Budget study would note, a chairman,
powers to command anybody, and formal machinery for coordination," it did at least provide
for the voluntary exchange of information and served to bring the heads of the investigative
agencies together for mutual discussion.
Small as was this progress, both directive and committee figure importantly in this
story. First, they represent the nation's first modern peacetime coordination of the
intelligence services. Second, they embody the ideal-self-coordination by a committee-
which the services would henceforward trumpet as the answer to the problem of improving
their capabilities. Third, they laid the groundwork for the FBI's acquisition of a mandate for
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operations in South America, and hence, as will be shown, for conflict between Hoover's FBI
and Donovan's CO[ and OSS. Fourth, they played a role in the development of the country's
first feeble efforts soon to be taken in the field of foreign clandestine collection of both nega-
tive and positive intelligence.
4. G-2 AND ONI ON THE EVE OF WAR
However, apprehending spies was not the only problem confronting the intelligence
services, especially G-2 and ONI. Keeping up with what was happening in the worsening
international situation was considerably more challenging and difficult.
By the summer of 1939 the world was on the edge of war. The Japanese had sunk the
U.S. gunboat Panay in the Yangtze River in December 1937. The Germans had absorbed
Austria, in the Anschluss, in March 1938. The tense situation had seemed eased, in
September, with the Munich Agreement, but by the end of 1938 new fears had been created
by the Japanese proclamation of a "New Order" in the Far East. Germany had absorbed
Czechoslovakia in March 1939, and in August, less than a month after Roosevelt had
ordered the intelligence services to get organized against spying at home, the Nazis and
Soviets had signed their nonaggression pact.
On September 1 the Germans invaded Poland, and then quickly tumbling upon one an-
other in such fashion as to challenge men's knowledge, reference books, maps and files, came
such events as theentry of Soviet troops into Poland, the sinking of the Athenia, the German
use of magnetic mines, the establishment of a 300-mile safety zone in the Western
Hemisphere, the Battle of the River Platte, the expulsion of the USSR from the League of
Nations, concern for the defense of Malaya, British staff talks with the Turks at Aleppo,
and the debacle in Norway.
The Germans' 1940 spring offensive eventuated in the sudden collapse of France, the
Allies' material losses at. Dunkirk, and the frantic shoring up of beleaguered Britain. Many
diplomats and attaches had to leave their posts, and others had innumerable new problems
to handle; German psychological warfare was grinding out rumor after rumor; there was a
general worrying about new weapons of war. Normal sources of information were thus badly
disrupted or completely eliminated; new sources of misinformation were multiplied; and new
kinds of information became urgent necessities.
In G-2 a twenty-year old complaint had surfaced again in 1937. The chief, a colonel
among generals, Francis, H. Lincoln, urged the Army Chief of Staff, who also had other
problems, to press for an amendment of the National Defense Act of 1920 so that the G-2
could wear stars like the other heads of the General Staff divisions. Lincoln explained how
bad it was for an inferior G-2 to have to deal with a rear admiral in ONI and other U.S.
civilians and even foreign representatives who outranked him.39 Not until 1939, however, was
the complaint satisfied..
In 1938 the "disturbed international situation," wrote the head of MLD's foreign
intelligence branch, George V. Strong, placed a heavy burden on his branch, and its
"satisfactory functioning"' was "seriously handicapped," he reported, by a "shortage of funds
and lack of adequate clerical and stenographic personnel." This complaint was dutifully
forwarded to the Chief of Staff and incorporated in the next annual report,40 but personnel,
for instance, remained at an almost all-time low for the crucial years of 1937, 1938, and
1939. In those years headquarters personnel numbered sixty-nine; not since 1916, and
excepting 1936 when the figure was sixty-six, had a lower total been reached. In 1940 the
sixty-nine became eighty, the highest since 1923."'
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The attache system, unappreciated generally by the Army and somewhat detached from
other Army elements, because of "overzealous security policies," was only slightly better off
than it had been in 1922. Then there were thirty attaches in thirty overseas posts; in
subsequent years attaches were as few as twenty.42 At the outbreak of hostilities in 1939
there were thirty-four attaches and assistants, eleven of them in belligerent countries; by
June 1940 these figures increased to fifty-seven and twenty-eight, respectively, but, because
of the German advance, would soon drop to forty-eight and eighteen."
The shortage of personnel and funds, General Strong would write in 1943, did not per-
mit an intelligence coverage "much beyond the combat intelligence training in our skeleton
combat units and keeping track of the main military trends and developments in the
important world capitals." Gen. George C. Marshall, in 1945, would be less generous when
he would observe that "prior to entering the war we had little more than what a military
attache could learn at a dinner, more or less, over the coffee cups. . . . > 44
ONI had been calling since 1935 for an increase in funds for intelligence, but
expansion to meet the emergency had moved hardly faster than in G-2. Headquarters, which
in 1938 was considered well-organized and ready for expansion, had in September 1939 only
seven more officers than the eighteen officers and thirty-eight enlisted men and civilians it
had in 1931.45 The Naval Reserve was still deficient in 1938. By July 1939 two-thirds of the
naval districts had acted upon a directive outlining organizational and personnel needs.
The overseas establishment was described in 1938 as "woefully small": twenty-seven
officers, thirty civilians and enlisted personnel, and a small number of naval officers, twenty-
two student officers, for instance, on specialized duty. The estimate in that year called for an
expansion abroad, especially in the Far East, Central America, and the Pacific. By July
1939, however, there were only seventeen attache posts, of which nine were in Europe and
the rest in South America."
Even so, ONI considered itself to be in fairly good shape. Answering the question "Are
We Ready?" the Chairman of the Navy's General Board informed the Secretary of the
Navy on August 31, 1939, the day before Hitler launched the war, that "generally speaking,
the Naval Intelligence Service is approaching adequacy as deficiencies of funds and
personnel are being remedied." ' Six months later, with the continent reeling under the Nazi
blitzkrieg, the Director of ONI, Rear Adm. Walter S. Anderson, answering the same
question, informed the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Ernest J. King, that "generally
speaking, we are in a much better position now to meet any emergency than we were last
August." Writing less than two years before Pearl Harbor, Anderson noted
that the Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plans are considered sufficient
and effective, at home and abroad, to execute the task assigned Naval Intelligence
in basic War Plans. Given the personnel and material required for M-day we can
carry on. The present personnel situation in the Districts is favorable and
satisfactory. Additional personnel and funds are required here in ONI now and I
believe these will be forthcoming shortly. . . .48
There was at least one area in which the Navy considered itself unprepared. It had been
singled out back in August when Anderson wrote the report which formed the basis of the
General Board's reassurance to the Secretary about ONI's readiness. At that time, August 18,
Anderson, noising that ONI's service abroad consisted only of attache reports and such
material as was received from War, State, Commerce, some commercial concerns, and from
some reserve officers traveling abroad, warned that "a real undercover foreign intelligence
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service, equipped and able to carry on espionage, counterespionage, etc. does not exit."
When compared with the activities of foreign nations, this "lack on the part of ONI," said
the Director, is
a distinct weakness. Naval intelligence is spending nothing. The amount of
intelligence received is in direct ratio to the amount of money made available, and
spent in support of such undercover work. The lack of a real undercover
Intelligence Service, in the foreign field, is considered a serious defect that should
be remedied.49
When reported to the Secretary on August 31, this warning read:
... The network of information [from abroad] is good as far as it goes, but the in-
formation obtained consists primarily of that which foreign countries are willing to
release. More adequate coverage in the Foreign Field is considered essential,
especially undercover. Further study of this matter is being made.50
Now, on June 10, when reporting to King on how good things were, Admiral Anderson
again noted the lack of any "intelligence network abroad," but he confidently added-
Dunkirk evacuated, Mussolini declaring war on France, and four days from the fall of
Paris-that "when and if the need for `agents' appears, I believe we can handle the
situation." For some reason or other, perhaps it was the fall of Paris on June 14, the need
appeared very shortly, for within a week Anderson established an embryonic foreign
intelligence network, which, however, he himself admitted thirty years after the event,
"never got off the ground, because Donovan's outfit took it over.", In that same June
Anderson and his counterparts in the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee were
cautiously setting up another foreign intelligence network, which, however, was basically
oriented to "negative" intelligence. Since both these activities seem to have developed
together, their origins must be briefly unraveled together.
5. TOWARDS CLANDESTINE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
On May 21, 1940, about a year after the IIC had been established, Assistant Secretary
of State Berle was reported worried about the security of railroads, warehouses, utilities and
the like and as thinking the Army and FBI should make definite plans for their protection.
The G-2, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, thought there was need for a strict line of demarcation
among the activities of the three investigating agencies. Anderson's representative agreed
with the others that they had to meet again "to get something on paper." 52
About a week later both J. Edgar Hoover and General Miles brought forward proposals
for the coordination of activities. Basically there was agreement that the FBI should handle
investigations in subversion cases involving civilians in the United States and some of its ter-
ritories and that G-2 and ONI would handle those cases involving the military and naval
establishments, including civilians connected therewith, in the United States and in the
Panama Canal Zone, Panama, the Philippine Islands, Guam and American Samoa.
Uncertainty settled on the question of responsibility for cases originating in foreign
countries.
On this point Hoover pointed out that until recently the bureau had not extended its
activities into foreign countries. "He explained confidentially that upon the instructions of
the President the bureau was arranging to detail men to Mexico City and Havana but that
this was the limit of the bureau's operations in foreign countries." Discussion then followed
on the jurisdiction and operations of the military and naval attaches, with Admiral Anderson
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pointing out that naval attaches were never allowed to maintain "paid informants" in the
countries to which they were accredited. The conclusion was twofold: that a decision had to
be reached as to "the identity of the investigative agency" which should handle subversion
directed from abroad, and that Edward A. Tamm of the bureau would consult with Berle in
order to get that decision."
At their next meeting, June 3, they returned to Hoover's proposals for coordination.
Again, they had problems with foreign-directed espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and
subversion. They did agree, and they embodied this in the agreement they soon signed, that
the FBI would handle any foreign-directed cases upon the request of State, War, or Navy.
Even so, they had already "undertaken a discussion of a special intelligence service, possibly
to function at this time only in the Western Hemisphere." On this new topic, General Miles
said he did not want his attaches compromised. All agreed that trends in South America,
especially Colombia and Venezuela, should be watched closely. Berle said State would
happily cooperate if the Army and Navy wanted the FBI, which seemed the case, to
"establish a Special Intelligence Service on the east coast of South America." Anderson,
who frowned on paid informants, stated "the Navy would be not only glad but anxious to co-
operate in setting up a foreign intelligence service." The discussion ended appropriately
enough with the appointment of a subcommittee "to prepare a study of a proposed set-up for
a Special Intelligence Service." 54
The subcommittee, reporting June 6, proposed the selection of a "Chief of the Service"
with a satisfactory business cover to be located in a metropolitan industrial center,
preferably New York City, and to have assigned to him by the "governmental departments
subscribing to this agreement" highly qualified people who could "develop as sources of
information nationals of the country in which they are to operate." The government's
interest in this service should be zealously protected. There should be a "Technical
Committee" to administer the service and facilitate the flow and distribution of information
to and from the operatives as well as the subscribing agencies."
This report was approved by Berle, Hoover, Miles, and Anderson when they discussed
it on June 11. Miles had already received from Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles two
letters suggesting individuals whom the "Chief of the Service" might want to use. Anderson
thought the assignment of personnel and other detailed work on the service ought to be held
in abeyance pending approval of the idea by both the President and the Secretary of War.
Berle was expected to get FDR's consent .16
When this came, on June 24, it' contained a surprise. Talking on the telephone with
Berle, with Miles in the latter's office, President Roosevelt answered Berle's question about
the formation of a unit for foreign intelligence work by saying "he wished that the field
should be divided." He wanted the FBI, on the request of State, to "handle foreign
intelligence work in the Western Hemisphere," and he wanted G-2 and ONI to "cover the
rest of the world, as and when necessity" arose. This arrangement, he made clear, should not
supersede any existing intelligence work or preclude State from requesting the FBI, in
special circumstances, to conduct investigations outside this hemispheres'
With this go-ahead signal, a "Special Intelligence Service" was established under the
auspices of the FBI. All IIC members agreed to support it financially." Hoover placed in
charge of it his Assistant Director, Percy E. ("Sam") Foxworth and soon announced the bu-
reau would augment its undercover staffs in Mexico and Cuba but said he did not
contemplate sending intelligence officers to Canada or Greenland.59 Controversy soon
developed over an FBI official's description of the work of the SIS as "encyclopedic" in
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Rear Adm. Walter S. Anderson, ONI director, who in 1940 established the country's first
World War II organization to "run secret agents."
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In 1940 at FDR's direction, J. Edgar Hoover, FBI director, established a "Special Intelligence
Service" for operations in the Western Hemisphere, particularly Latin America.
Roosevelt Library
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character. Miles wanted it kept strictly to subversive matters and not, in effect, infringing
on what was being collected by his attaches. Anderson thought no restriction should be
placed on its operations. While Miles and Hoover would debate the matter by correspond-
ence into October, the conclusion of the IIC in July was that no restriction should be
placed on the SIS's operations but that primary emphasis should be put on subversive
activities.60
Meanwhile, on the day Berle announced the President's decision to the IIC, and after a
lengthy discussion of the necessity for extending government intelligence operations abroad,
Admiral Anderson "advised he was undertaking a program to send out retired officers to
seaports to get acquainted with shipping operations, industrial conditions, etc., in order to
have sources of information in time of emergency." 11 Apparently he was referring to the
action he had taken a week earlier, on June 17, when he virtually leap-frogged the IIC by
establishing within the Foreign Intelligence Branch of ONI his very own "Special
Intelligence Section" (SIS). He had placed in charge a retired officer and given him a
yeoman as an assistant. The first directive to the new SIS described it as "practically a new
field for ONI" and ordered a study of available literature on the subject, consultation with
other government agencies, and a study of fields of operations, personnel, requirements,
communications, and administration. The SIS, known in Navy terminology as "OP-16-F-9,"
was established "to obtain, train and run secret agents," and it was set up only seven days
after Admiral Anderson had advised the CNO that he could handle the situation when and
if the need for agents appeared .61
Thus by mid-June 1940, when France was falling and Britain seemed next to go, the
U.S. intelligence agencies had taken two small steps toward the initiation of the clandestine
collection of intelligence overseas. The U.S. had not one but two SISes.61 One, under the aus-
pices of the IIC and operated by the FBI, was restricted to the Western Hemipshere and
mainly sought counterintelligence but also picked up positive intelligence on request. The
other SIS, run by the Navy, was theoretically world-wide in scope; in fact, it had hardly a
score of people when, almost stillborn, it was taken over by Donovan over a year later.
Meanwhile, nothing beyond the IIC had been established to take care of that problem
of coordination with which John A. Gade had been concerned in 1929. Hardly anything was
even said on the subject. "Hardly" is used because of two fragmentary notes, which may, in
fact, have been just one.
First, in October 1940, according to Whitehead's The FBI Story, J. Edgar Hoover and
Robert H. Jackson, then Attorney General, "discussed a. proposal advanced by President
Roosevelt that Hoover take over the direction of all federal investigative and intelligence
agencies, coordinating their work from his FBI headquarters or from a special office."
Refusing, however, Hoover said that "that plan would be very good for today, but over the
years, it would be a mistake." 64 In view of the (late of this alleged proposal it is quite pos-
sible that it had some connection with the correspondence and controversy which Hoover
was then having with Gen. Sherman Miles over the scope of the work of the new SIS. Such
problems were often taken by Hoover to the President. It is idle, however, to speculate any
further since nothing ever came of the proposal, whatever it was.
Second, someone else had a similar suggestion, about the same time, about the FBI
playing such a coordination role. The someone--unknown, but judging from the proposal
itself, a Navy man-wrote a page and a half, dated it November 1, 1940, and entitled it
simply "Information."
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The writer began by contrasting the United States as "a `no snooping' nation" with
those other great powers which maintained "elaborate and expensive" organizations for the
acquisition, collation, and maintenance not only of military and naval information but also of
information about "natural resources, economics, industry and social characteristics." He
complained that the United States military and naval forces "at the beginning of every
hostile era" were "in great distress for the lack of information," and he concluded that basic
military necessities and present and future "mechanical and scientific developments" require
us to "change our passive efforts to positive action."
The writer said the U.S. should establish under the FBI "a Foreign Information
Bureau whose primary object would be to obtain complete information concerning foreign
countries." It should be run by a "Division Head," an experienced investigator, accountable
only to the Director of the FBI or to the President. It should be organized somewhat like
ONI though its subdivisions would follow not geographical areas but "world ethnological
classifications," and these units should be headed by Army and Navy officers who would
thereby be serving a "tour" in the information bureau. It should be under the FBI because
of that organization's "particular mission," the prior training of FBI personnel, and, frankly
because it would relieve the military and naval services of a source of possible
embarrassment.
In outlining its advantages, the writer argued that the proposed bureau would insure
the best possible information for all concerned, would insure "vitally essential coordinated
efforts by all Departments and a minimum of duplication," and would make all information
simultaneously available to every interested party. "In effect it would be a single central in-
formation source for all government activities." 66
The writer's page and a half, but not his identity, are all that remain of that particular
proposal.
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Chapter III
COL. WILLIAM J. ("WILD BILL") DONOVAN
By coincidence John A. Gade was in New York City drafting his proposal for a
"National Intelligence Service" just about the time William J. Donovan, the future chief of
such a service, was leaving the government in Washington to start a new career in
Manhattan.
In 1929 Donovan was leaving the Department of Justice where he had been an
assistant attorney general for five years under Harding and Coolidge. He was leaving
because the new President Hoover had, by all accounts, reneged on a promise to make him
Attorney General.'
At 46 Donovan could look back, if he were so inclined, on a career that had brought
him national and legendary fame and that offered him, despite the disappointment of the
hour, the promise of private advancement and public service in the early future.
1. A LOOK BACKWARDS, 1883-1929
Donovan was at birth, New Year's Day in 1883, an Irishman, a Catholic, a New
Yorker, and a Republican, and he would die in that status seventy-six years later on
February 8, 1959. His grandparents, both Irish Catholics, had emigrated from the old
country and settled in Buffalo, New York, in the predominantly Irish neighborhood of the
First Ward down by the waterfront. His parents, also Irish and Catholic, lived in the
grandparents' "big, high-stooped brick house at 74 Michigan Street." Their first born was
William, who added the name Joseph at Confirmation. There were eight other children, of
whom four died early of spinal meningitis. The home on Michigan Street was a center for
Irish immigrants, neighbors, and politics; "in our neck of the woods," recalled one member
of the family, "you were born and died a Republican." 2
Donovan's father never finished school; he played hookey instead and was finally
allowed by his father to go to work for the railroads and eventually wound up as a
superintendent. Having regretted not getting an education, he started building a library at
home before any children were born. When they. did come, they "grew up in the midst of
books."' The young William was an omnivorous reader, and he remained one throughout his
life-buying, reading, and collecting books, making notes of them in his diaries or journals,
and copying out pertinent facts and quotable lines. Young William Joseph attended the
Christian Brothers' School, and subsequently thought of becoming a priest, a Dominican,
but left that vocation to a younger brother, Vincent. Instead, William those the law.
Donovan went to Niagara University, then switched to Columbia, where he worked his
way through school, during the year as well as summers. He rowed on the second varsity
crew and earned his letter as quarterback on the 1904 team but did not distinguish himself
as a student. He graduated in 1905 and stayed at Columbia to get a law degree in 1907.
One of his classmates was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the Democratic Hudson Valley squire,
who in the 1932 campaign "referred condescendingly to `my old friend and classmate
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Bill Donovan,' " but Donovan said later he "always reminded people that Roosevelt never
knew me in law school." 4 One of Donovan's teachers was Harlan Stone, the future Supreme
Court justice.
Out of law school, the young Donovan returned to Buffalo and took up with the small
firm of Love & Keating. In 1912 he formed a partnership with Bradley Goodyear, and later
that year they joined the city's leading law firm which then became O'Brian Hamlin
Donovan & Goodyear. In 1914 he took himself a bride, Ruth Rumsey, the daughter of one
of the wealthiest and most prominent families in the city, and they would have a son David,
still living, and a daughter Patricia whose death in an automobile accident in 1940 was a
very great personal loss to her father.
Meanwhile, he had taken up-and it is not too far fetched to put it this way--another
bride, the military life. He did so in 1911 when he joined with others in Buffalo to organize
Troop I of the First New York Cavalry of the National Guard. Even though he had hardly
ridden a horse more than three or four times, he was, within six months, captain of the
troop.. The outbreak of war in 1914 saw him spending as much time as possible on military
duties. The war provided him with his first overseas service, though not as a soldier; in 1916
he was on the continent, in France, Germany, and Poland as a member of the Polish
Commission which had been established under the American War Relief Commission to
work with the belligerents in the distribution of food and clothing to the suffering population
of Poland. In London he worked with Herbert Hoover, who was then in charge of Belgian
relief. This association led to a close friendship, which turned sour, however, in 1929.
While he was in Europe, where he first saw war and its effects, his Troop I was called
up to serve on the Mexican border to curb the depredations on American lives and property
of the bandit leader Pancho Villa. He hurried home to join his men and serve 81/2 months
under Gen. John J. ("Black Jack") Pershing. It was at this time, according to his brother
Vincent, that he earned the soubriquet of "Wild Bill." Reportedly, his men, collapsing after
an exhausting ten-mile hike, heard their captain taunt them with "Look at me, I'm not even
panting. If I can take it, why can't you?" The answer, from somewhere in the ranks was:
"We ain't as wild as you, Bill." 6 So it stayed with him, and he liked it.
When the United States entered the World War, "Wild Bill" Donovan, then a major,
turned down a colonelcy in. the Twenty-seventh Division to join up with New York's
"Fighting Irish" of Civil War fame, the Sixty-ninth Regiment of the N.Y. National Guard,
which had been conducting a. vigorous recruiting campaign. The Sixty-ninth was drafted into
the Regular Army and was proud to be selected New York's representative in the newly
formed Forty-second Division, the "Rainbow Division," where it was redesignated the 165th
Regiment. It remained "the old Sixty-ninth," however, and for the better part of his twenty-
two months of service Donovan was the commander of its First Battalion. It was in that
capacity, a lieutenant colonel, that he saw combat, was several times wounded, and
demonstrated such outstanding qualities of leadership and moral courage that he emerged
from the war with "more medals than any other 42nd officer." 6 He received the
Distinguished Service Cross (1918), the Distinguished Service Medal (1922), and the Medal
of Honor (1923).* By war's end he was a colonel, in command of the 165th as it paraded
down Fifth Avenue to a ticker-tape welcome home, and henceforward known as "Col.
William J. ('Wild Bill') Donovan." He was always "Colonel" Donovan, at least until he
became "General" Donovan in World War 11; the press always spoke of him as "Wild Bill"
Donovan, and everybody knew of him simply as "Bill Donovan."
* He was awarded the National Security Medal in 1957. He was thus the first to receive the country's four
highest medals. In 1946 he was awarded the First Oak Leaf Cluster for the DSM he received in 1922.
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He was soon back overseas; indeed, he was and would remain a constant overseas
traveler, for pleasure, business, and for war. This time, 1919, it was a deferred honeymoon to
Japan which was interrupted by a request from the American ambassador in Tokyo to
journey to Siberia to report on events connected with the White Russian government of
Adm. Alexander Kolchak. Donovan traveled with Maj. Gen. William S. Graves, who
commanded the American troops sent there largely to help maintain internal order in the
area. Donovan spent two months in Siberia. Next year he spent almost six months in Europe
on business, most of it with a New York banker, Grayson M. P. Murphy.
The trip with Murphy provides an opportunity to stop and take a look at Donovan the
fact-finder and reporter. During the war, in the middle of combat, he had kept a diary, in
which he not only recorded events personal to him but also included his observations on sol-
diering, weapons, tactics, some mention of books he had read, thoughts that appealed to him,
and even a poem "To My Wife." The Siberian journal was less personal, more political and
sociological. Current events he never missed, but he dug deeper into the historical
background of peoples and societies; he was a keen observer of the socio-economic condition
of cities, troops, countryside; he cited dates, figures, sources, and always made a clear
distinction between his own opinion and what he was reporting. The Murphy trip resulted in
a full-sized volumn-over 200 single-spaced typewritten pages-of detailed reporting on
business and politics in almost a score of European countries. Two or three lines here cannot
'do justice to the wealth of material gathered daily by him in conversations with
businessmen, bankers, industrialists, members of governments, politicians, and other well-
placed personalities. These pages show him constantly reading reports, questioning special-
ists, observing conditions, summarizing conferences, studying languages, and always meet-
ing, talking, and dining with people.'
Back in the States, he was back at his Buffalo law firm, and soon took his first fling at
elective politics, as Republican candidate for lieutenant governor of New York in 1922. He
never did succeed in politics, not then, nor in 1932 when he ran for governor, nor in 1946
when he considered seeking the senatorial nomination. Defeated in 1922, he was then made
U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York and proceeded to let his sense of duty
get himself ostracized from Buffalo society by raiding, after due warning, his own club, the
prestigious Saturn Club, for violation of the Eighteenth Amendment. He was not a
WCTU'er, but duty, whether military or civil, always held a high place in his scale of
values.' In 1924 he moved to Washington when the new Attorney General, Harlan Stone, his
former teacher, professor of equity at Columbia, asked him to join the Department of Justice
as an assistant attorney general.
He ran the Criminal Division from August 1924 to March 1925; in that time he had
under him the young J. Edgar Hoover, but historians and biographers have shed no light on
that relationship which in the war years would develop into struggle and competition. From
March 1925 to March 1929 he handled the more important Anti-Trust Division, and in the
summer of 1928 he had been Acting Attorney General. One of the important cases he won
was the Supreme Court's upholding of convictions in the Trenton Potteries case in 1927. So
well had he performed in the five years in the department that he and everyone else expected
he would become Attorney General when Hoover took over.'
A bright political future had often been predicted for the now legendary Col. "Wild
Bill" Donovan. Fr. Duffy, chaplain of the Sixth-ninth, had told him that, if he lived, he
would go far and should go into politics. His young adjutant reported someone had said
Donovan would "be sure to be governor of New York." In 1925 a journalist, waxing
enthusiastic, described him as ". . ready and fit now, whether he should be called upon to
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die, to box Jack Dempsey, or to be President." Indeed, a former law partner, John Lord
O'Brian, declared: "Bill has a driving ambition. He won't be satisfied until he's the first
Catholic President of the United States," and President Roosevelt later observed that "if Bill
Donovan had been a Democrat, he'd be in my place today.
As it was in 1929, he was expected to be Attorney General, possibly Secretary of War.
All other talk about the cabinet, reported one commentator, was "nothing but gossip." It all
came to naught, however. When Donovan called upon the President-elect at his Georgetown
home, he was not asked to take either job. "We sat there rather embarrassed," reported
Donovan, "and finally he (Hoover) asked me what I thought of the governor-generalship of
the Philippines. I told him I wasn't interested. By that time it was becoming most
uncomfortable, and I left." 'Whatever the reason, sornething to do with Donovan as a
Catholic, the result was, according to Mrs. Donovan forty years later, "the greatest
disappointment in his life; he knew he could handle the job.""
2. LAW AND NATIONAL POLITICS, 1929-37
So Donovan left Washington and went to New York City where he established the law
firm which today is known as Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine. It stood for years at Two
Wall Street, in the heart of Manhattan's financial district, with the Stock Exchange, historic
Trinity Church, and the site of Washington's first inaugural less than the proverbial stone's
throw away, but in 1973 it moved uptown to 30 Rockefellow Plaza. The firm grew and pros-
pered. It became and remains large and diverse enough to handle, on a team basis, the
important and complicated legal cases spawned by corporate, financial, and industrial
America. It not only provided Donovan with a living, but it also gave him a platform for
speaking out on a wide range of legal, political, social and economic issues confronting the
country.
In his law practice, both paid and unpaid, he methodically resorted to the systematic
collection, evaluation, synthesis, and presentation to clients, courts and the public of vast
amounts of detailed, topically diverse, and complicated data. Especially illustrative of this
capacity are two anti-trust cases, the Appalachian Coals case of 1932 and the Madison Oil
trial, 1936-37. In the former, a successful defense of 135 coal companies charged with
violation of the anti-trust laws, Donovan undertook a vast factual analysis of competition
within the Appalachian and national coal industry and of the competition from the natural
gas and oil industries and then statistically and graphically presented this evidence in more
than ninety exhibits, almost triple those presented by the government. In the Madison case,
involving indictments against twenty-four of the largest oil companies, fifty-six of their
principal officers and three oil market journals for conspiracy to raise gasoline prices, the
Donovan firm conducted a very extensive factual investigation and field audit and then
devised a new system of indexing and cross-referencing some eighteen tons of documents
which had been subpoenaed by the government. While Donovan lost the case, many of the
corporate and individual defendants were acquitted.
As unpaid counsel in two other investigations, he further foreshadowed the work of re-
search and analysis that he introduced to the government as Coordinator of Information. In
the first of these, in 1929, he was counsel For the New York State Commission on Revision
of the Public Service Commissions Law, and as such he headed a team of his own lawyers
plus an outside engineer, public administrators, accountants, and economists and held forty-
three public hearings resulting in 2,830 pages of printed testimony by ninety-six witnesses.
In the second case, in 1929-:30, he was unpaid counsel for the Joint Commission of Bar Asso-
ciations which was set up in New York to investigate and report upon abuses and illegal and
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improper practices in bankruptcy cases. Assisted by a Yale Law School staff, Donovan
examined 1,000 court files of cases, took testimony from 4,000 witnesses, and issued a report
based upon twelve volumes of documents on bankruptcy administration throughout the
United States and abroad.12
In the meantime, he was putting down on paper, in various law journals, the fruit of his
experience in the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice and in his private and pub-
lic practice of the law. Articles written by him or in conjunction with colleagues appeared in
1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1936 and 1937 in the law reviews of, for instance, the American
Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association, and in such university law
reviews as those of Temple, Marquette, Cornell, and Harvard. He wrote on the anti-trust
laws, on their practical aspects, on consent decrees in the enforcement of the anti-trust laws,
and on the need for their revision. On constitutional law he wrote on the president's power of
removal and on the authority of states to deal jointly with social problems. Finally he
authored articles on such miscellaneous matters as the origin and development of radio law,
the Federal Trade Commission, and state compacts as a method of solving problems
common to several states.
At the same time he was speaking out publicly on these and other issues. He spoke to
the Women's University Club, and to the American Academy of Political and Social
Sciences on the regulation of public utilities. He lectured at New York University on the
desirability of drafting radio laws on an international basis. To other groups he spoke on the
limitations on oil production, the need for regional compacts, the need for a commerce court
and for state regulation of utilities.
Inevitably he returned to politics. In 1930 he proposed that the Republican Party stand
for the repeal of prohibition. In the same year he warned a Republican rally that
Democratic control of the Congress would be a disaster. In 1932 he was the choice of New
York Republicans to run against Herbert Lehman for governor. Once again defeated, in the
landslide that put FDR in office, he took up the Republican cudgels against Roosevelt and
the New Deal in speeches in defense of the Constitution, state governments, property rights,
and democracy. In the 1936 election Donovan was a principal source of support in New
York for an old friend, the Republican vice presidential candidate, Col. Frank Knox, who as
Secretary of the Navy in Roosevelt's coalition cabinet would play the major role in 1940 in
bringing Donovan back into the government. In 1937, however, Donovan won an important
case which had distinct political and anti-Roosevelt tones; this was Humphrey's Executors
vs. the United States in which Donovan persuaded the Supreme Court to reject Roosevelt's
claimed authority to dismiss without cause the head of an independent regulatory commis-
sion, in this case, the head of the Federal Trade Commission.
By the time Donovan was assailing the New Deal and challenging Roosevelt in the
Supreme Court he had already begun to move toward an identity of views with the President
on foreign affairs and thus begun the process which would bring him, an anti-New Deal
Republican, into the Roosevelt administration as Coordinator of Information. This process
had begun in the fall of 1935 when Donovan, like others in the country, began to shift his
attention from domestic to foreign affairs.
3. FOREIGN TRIPS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1935-39
In September 1935, Donovan, just back from one of his regular trips to England
and the continent, wrote the Army's Chief of Staff, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, a wartime
colleague in the Rainbow Division, that he was "impressed with the fact that this little
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adventure of Italy [into Ethiopia] may resolve itself ... into something that could include us
all." He further thought that "a close view of the situation at this time might help later." He
had already discussed with MacArthur, at the last reunion of the division, the possibility of
his going to Ethiopia, on the Italian side at MacArthur's suggestion, and now wanted advice
from the General on how to proceed in setting up the trip with the War Department in
Washington."
From the department, rather than from MacArthur who had just left the city for the
job in the Philippines which Donovan had turned down in 1929, Colonel Donovan received
encouragement "to go abroad and look over the situation along the Mediterranean." The
Deputy Chief of Staff considered Donovan's offer of service "thoroughly in accord with your
past record in the Army," and told Donovan that he was "most sympathetic with your desire
to get a look-in on this impending fracas." Unfortunately, he added, the Army had no funds
for such service on the part of a reserve officer, but to this Donovan replied that he had no
intention of having "any charge against the government at all."
By the end of the year Donovan was in Rome, meeting with Mussolini, and-to the
surprise of on-the-spot advisers-getting all the authorization he needed for the trip. He
traveled via Cairo, Luxor, and Khartoum to Ethiopia where he spent ten days visiting the
front, meeting with the commander-in-chief, General Badoglio, as well as corps, division,
and brigade commanders, inspecting battle positions, motor transport headquarters, a
hospital ship, and the S-81-"a huge bomber ... much like the new Boeing the [U.S.] Army
is getting out," and recording daily in his diary data and observations on such items as camp
layouts, the soldiers' diet and morale, the condition of army mules and horses, and Italian
military strategy and foreign policy. His return journey took him to Libya where he spent a
night in Benghazi with the Commissioner of the Province and had "several long talks" in
Tripoli with General Balbo. Before returning to Washington he met again with Mussolini,
reported to Amb. Hugh Wilson in Berlin, was prevented by the death of King George from
meeting in Geneva with Britain's new Foreign Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, and met with
top British officials in London.15 Back in Washington he reported to the War Department,
which officially commended him for a report "replete with pertinent and valuable
information" which the department "would have been unable to secure in any other way.
In rough fashion the Ethiopian trip set the pattern-on the spot observations and
consultations with top military and political figures-of overseas trips which he subsequently
made in 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1940-41. In 1937 in Germany he attended maneuvers of the
Reserve Artillery Officers, observed their training, and inspected new German tank and
artillery equipment. The next year he toured the defenses of Czechoslovakia, observed
conditions in the Balkans and Italy, and on his own obtained permission to visit the Spanish
front where he "met most of the Commanding Generals and discussed their methods with
them." He was with "the 4th Spanish Army in their attacks to regain the heights at the
Ebro River." Then he went to Nuremberg where he saw the German army in exercises and
maneuvers." 17 In 1939, "believing that war was imminent," and "anticipating the possibility
of attacks" in the Low Countries, Donovan surveyed conditions and discussed military and
economic problems in France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries.
Some idea of the impression he made and the reception he received comes from a British of-
ficial who reported of him that he " . . . is an active man, of attractive temperament, who has
visited Balbo in Libya, Mussolini in Rome and has many contacts in Berlin with the Foreign
Office and General Staff. He has just flown around Europe and renewed contacts,
particularly in Berlin. His main impression is that the German army, as he put it, is `set for
a fight' to achieve their aims at all costs." Donovan was quoted, however, as advising his
business friends to put their money against war, though he warned that Britain would have
"an exciting summer." 18
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Before he made his next trip overseas, a momentous trip to London in 1940, Donovan,
always the public speaker, had some important things to say to the American people about
the war that had just erupted. In November 1939 he warned the American Legion that
while Britain and France now only wanted American machines that did not mean that the
United States "was not going to contribute manpower at some time." He further warned
against giving foreign nations "the impression that under no circumstances will we fight."
Said Col. "Wild Bill" Donovan: "In an age of bullies, we cannot afford to be a sissy." Then
with a reference to those steps which the government was taking to curb spying in the
United States, Donovan advised the Legion not "to be a bunch of vigilantes" but to leave the
job where it belonged, with the government."'
Donovan had, from the point of view of this narrative, even more important advice to
give. That came on November 27 when he proposed the creation of a nation-wide
commission to investigate and report on the problems and desired direction of American
foreign and military policy. Discussing the topic "Is America Prepared for War?" the much-
traveled Donovan raised one by one those questions of America's defense which had been
provoked by the outbreak of hostilities. To meet these issues intelligently, said Donovan, the
American people must first understand them; and then he advanced his proposal which leads
so unmistakably to the research and analysis function in the future COI that it deserves to
be quoted at length:
To this end I should like to propose here tonight [before the Sons of Erin in New
York] the creation of a civilian body of representative citizens to make an
exhaustive study of the problems and to lay its findings and recommendations as
soon as possible before the President, the Congress, and the people of the United
States.
The group or committee making such a study should include, in addition to
civilians, representatives of all our military departments and of the Department of
State.
An inquiry into the underlying facts, the mobilization of these facts, and then an
interpretation of them, to my mind is the one effective way to inform and
enlighten public opinion. The great issues of our defense policy are now presented
to Congress piece-meal in terms of an appropriation for a specific purpose by a
particular bureau.
Recommendations by a commission such as I now propose would offer Congress an
integrated and comprehensive view from which to judge the isolated defense
problems on which they are asked to legislate.
This is what we need today-a whole view of preparedness by the whole body of
American citizens.20
Such pronouncements, coming from so famous a person as Donovan, who was clearly
no isolationist, had the effect of linking his name with a development that would soon make
him an overseas emissary of the President.
4. ROOSEVELT'S EMISSARY, JULY 1940
That development centered on the idea of a coalition cabinet 21 as a device for achieving
greater national unity in the face of the increasingly obvious peril from abroad. Just as the
British had broadened their government immediately after war erupted, so also, went the
suggestion, FDR should broaden his by taking in some Republicans. Actually Roosevelt had
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L
took note of Republ can suggestions for,the in fusion of
L. Ickes, Secretary of f the " (Henry Cabot)
some such Republicans as Herbert Hoover, Arthur H. Vandenberg, Young
Lodge," and "even (Thomas E.) Dewey," and tartly agreed that omission of the titular in 1936 leaders of the party, Alf Landon and Frank Knox, the candidates the 1940 provednthe
Republicans were only interested in building up a name
provoked Interestingly itthewasubjs of aocoalitiof Bill Decembethe 9f 11939uthe
White House comment
President's press secretary, Stephen T. Early, discounted rumor that novan would
knew
made Secretary of War in place of Secretary Harry o whom Early, "them everybody President will kkn a
Roosevelt wanted to unload. "I don't think it is likely," said
Republican as a member of a matter of a lengthy ,Suthe nday afternoon d
such review
such a proposal the next day, December 10, when he had
of the world situation, with Donovan's friend Frank Knox. but the publisher
On that occasion FDR asked Knox to become Secretary of the Navy,
unorthodox the Chicago More than likely, said Knox, he would beV"clas "classified from one end of the
unthydox move. M
"urged that President
country the other as a political in thel cabinet Arnold." In any case he
he particularly thought
" 24
man put "several Republicans"
ldebeWriting the President from
man be found for the who thatn` strong days
Chicago, Knox indicated i friend,
I have heard during the month even more rumors of your taking my good
Colonel William J. Donovan into your Cabinet as Secretary of War than I have
heard of your thinking of me in connection with a cabinet post. . . . I know Bill
Donovan very well and he is a very dear friend. He not only made a magnificent
record in the world war, but he has every decoration which the American
government can bestow for bravery under fire. Frankly, if your proposal con-
templated Donovan for the War Department and myself for the Navy, I think the
appointments could be put solely upon the basis of a nonpartisan, nonpolitical
measure of putting our national defense departments such a state of
preparedness as to protect the United States against any danger
25 to our that might come from the war in Europe or in Asia. .
This strong testimonial evoked from FDR his own appreciation of Donovan:
Bill Donovan is also an old friend of mine-we were in the [Columbia] law school , not together-and frankly, I should like to have him innth~ju tbi done h mlbyy Press
must eat
own ability, but also to repair in a sense the very gr
motive
two the question
Hoover the that to 1929. Here agin
off the armed for es
considered, and I
might be misunderstood in both parties."
In reply, Knox told the President that he was "delighted to learn that you, like myself,
hold Bill Donovan adirection." Roosevelt may understand the point you make concerning my
been fearful of putt ng two Republicans
suggestion n in that
"in charge of the armed forces," but that of course is just what he did six months
may
he made Knox and Stimson Secretaries of Navy and War, respectively. Also, Roosevelt t have wanted Donovan
ability
in that,direct onhe injustice done
he Cabinet because
actually of
him by Hoover, yet
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Actually it is very doubtful that Roosevelt and Donovan were anywhere near as close as
Knox and Donovan. Indeed, FDR and Donovan were not "close" in any personal sense of the
word. Neither the Roosevelt papers at Hyde Park nor the Donovan papers show any
the White House
significant contact between the two men prior to 1940. Likewise,
presidential diaries, which catalogue the names of the many people visiting, dining, and
overnighting at the executive mansion, show no entry for Donovan in 1940 or early 1941.
Furthermore, there seems to have been little in the personal and public lives the
much
that would have brought them together, and in Roosevelt's New Deal years, there was
to pit them against one another, as witness Humphrey's Executors vs. the United States.
More than likely the relationship between them in the prewar years was nothing more than
the friendliness that came easily to public men of common sense, geniality, and manners but
of different backgrounds and political views.
While Knox failed to get Donovan made Secretary of War, it was Knox who continued
to bring Donovan to FDR's attention. Hence it is important to see how Knox became
Secretary of the Navy. From the beginning, whenever FDR thought of a coalition cabinet,
he thought of Landon and Knox. An early meeting in September 1939 with both men, in the
company of others, ended with a liking for Knox but doubts about Landon. The liking for
Knox persisted throughout coming months, and so in May 1940 FDR tried again with
Landon. Once again the effort failed, foundering, as in the first instance, on Landon's fear of
the consequences of a coalition cabinet on the conduct of the 1940 elections and the health
the name of
of the two-party system in a war-threatened United States. Meanwhile,
Stimson, a more eminent but less partisan Republican, a servant of four Republican
presidents, was successfully suggested to the President by Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter and Grenville Clark, a prominent New York lawyer, as an ideal choice for the
War Department. So it was that on June 20 FDR announced the appointment of Knox and
Stimson.28
The only aspect of the appointment process that need detain us here is that which
involves Bill Donovan. Almost the first thought of Knox on hearing from the President was
to ask Donovan to serve as Under Secretary of the Navy. While the Colonel was unable, for
some unknown reason, to do so,29 he was on hand to meet the Chicago newsman when he
arrived in Washington for his meeting with the Senate Naval Affairs committee. They
immediately repaired to Donovan's Georgetown home-Knox, in fact moved in-where they
were joined by Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois for lunch, and the three then spent the after-
noon readying Knox for the hearings on his confirmation.30 Knox was confirmed by the
Senate on July 10 and was sworn in by the President on the eleventh.
Meanwhile, Donovan was called to the White House. "Being what I am [a Repub-
lican]," he said years later, "that was a very surprising invitation to me." At the White
House, where he found assembled the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, he was asked to
"go abroad, go to England," to learn about Britain's handling of the Fifth Column problem.
But who originated the idea of Donovan's taking a trip? According to a British version,
which we shall take up shortly, it was Britain's intelligence chief in this country, William S.
Stephenson. Chances are, however, that it was Knox who suggested, as he and his colleagues
worried about Britain, that his friend Donovan be asked to make a survey of the situation."
Whatever the origin of the journey, Donovan left New York on July 14, on a secret
mission to London as the official representative of the newly installed Secretary of the
Navy-whose sponsoring of this trip was almost his first official act-and as the unofficial
representative of the President of the United States.
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5. DONOVAN IN LONDON
Donovan was off on a fact-finding mission, ostensibly gathering information on the
Fifth Column, in reality seeking to determine the ability of Britain to survive the expected
German assault. The Low Countries had fallen, France had collapsed, the British had barely
managed to get off the beaches of Dunkirk, and now Britain looked to its home defenses. If
Britain fell, what happened to the Empire? To Africa? The Atlantic? South America? The
Panama Canal? The United States? For Washington's policymakers the questions were
deeply troubling, and the answers coming from Amb. Joseph P. Kennedy in London had pro-
vided little guidance to an administration that was less prepared than its representative to
write off the British.
While Donovan was accustomed to dealing with prominent people, this trip was like
none other he had ever taken; indeed, historians of the Roosevelt administration will have to
say whether FDR had ever before sent a private citizen on so important a mission. The
Colonel had discussed the trip at the White House. He had letters of introduction from
Knox, Hull, William S. Knudsen, James Forrestal, Clarence Dillon and John D. Biggers to
prominent Londoners. He also had a letter from Rear Admiral Anderson, then working on
the establishment of his SIS, to the head of Britain's ONI. The night before Donovan
departed from Washington for New York and London, he and Knox dined at the British
embassy with the Ambassador, Lord Lothian, and Minister Casey of Australia. Lothian and
Stephenson, ostensibly Britain's Passport Control Officer in New York, sent on to London
their own recommendations for giving Donovan full cooperation.
In the British capital Donovan saw everybody on both the British and American sides.
He met the King and Queen, dined with Churchill, had sessions with numerous British
ministers, the top army, navy, and air force officers, and many other prominent persons-
"an extraordinary list of well-posted people." " While it would be tedious in the extreme to
list all their names and titles, there are at least two who ought to be singled out because of
their connection with intelligence. One of these was the head of MI-6 or the British Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS), Cola (later Maj. Gen.) Stewart Menzies, whose name was
pronounced, to the dismay of many, as "Meng-cez," and who was known in the service,
according to a recent custom, simply as "C." Menzies, new to his job since November, was
in daily touch with Donovan, stressed British determination to fight and the need for the
destroyers but put most emphasis on ensuring that Donovan saw all the leading and relevant
personalities. The other intelligence official was the head of Britain's ONI, Rear Adm. John
H. Godfrey. Relations between the two men became and continued cordial. They met for an
evening's discussion at Godfrey's home the night before Donovan returned to the States and
went over a list of things that Donovan would take up in Washington."
On the American side Donovan did, despite statements to the contrary, meet and dine
with Ambassador Kennedy. He had much to do with the naval attache, Capt. Alan G. Kirk,
who handled the Navy's responsibilities for the Secretary's high-level representatives. He
met several times with the military attache, Col. Raymond E. Lee, who recorded in his
diary, a week after Donovan's arrival, that Donovan had come to learn about conscription
and to find out "what sort of legislation is required to successfully operate a counter-
espionage organization." 11
Thus armed and heralded, Donovan scurried about London and its environs visiting
every important government office and inspecting many of the military, naval, and air
installations then girding for the defense of the islands. His discussions ranged
encylopedically over the full gamut of military, political, economic, and social factors
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relevant to the country's defense. These included expansion and training of the army,
shipping problems, food production, conscription, the morale of the British population and
the very pressing need for destroyers, flying boats, bomb sights, pilots and the training of pi-
lots. He discussed such subjects as intelligence, propaganda, the organization of the
information ministry, subversion, and the Fifth Column. This last subject was the special
province of Edgar Ansel Mowrer, the Chicago News correspondent whom Knox had
commissioned to join Donovan in London. Donovan had gone to London to make a "brief
survey," but he covered the British waterfront in such comprehensive and detailed fashion
that a British observer was justified in having noted that his "real object" in coming was "to
collect as much information as would be useful in the event of America coming into the
war." 35
His task of collecting information, however, did not end when he departed Britain on
August 3. To nearly everybody he spoke to he had addressed a request for documents, a re-
port, a study, or answers to questions put forth in his own name or at the behest of some of-
ficial in Washington. Thus, he had asked for copies of training syllabi for various arms, for
copies of militia regulations, even for stories about RAF experiences. He had asked for
reports on the European food situation, on economic controls in Britain, and for reports on
such ministries as those of supply, information, and economic warfare. Back in Washington
he spent much time on correspondence collecting these documents and routing them to
consumers. The future "Coordinator of Information" was already at work.
On his return he was immediately wrapped up in.a fast round of briefings. He was with
Secretary Knox the morning after his arrival, and that evening he and Mowrer were Knox's
guests at a dinner which included Admirals Stark and Anderson, Assistant Secretary of War
Patterson, Gen. Sherman Miles, James Forrestal, and John O'Keefe, Knox's secretary and
friend of News days. On the next evening he was Secretary Stimson's dinner guest.
Meanwhile he was meeting with members of both houses of Congress and most of the
Cabinet. On August 9 he joined the President at the Hyde Park railroad station for a two-
day trip. To all of these people he told essentially the same story: that Britain could and
would survive, that British morale was high, that British equipment, however, was deficient,
and that much assistance was urgently needed from the United States. In particular he
pressed for the consummation of the exchange of destroyers for bases and pursued matters
related to flying boats, bombers, bomb sights, and pilots.
His report, he wrote Brendan Bracken in London, had a "healthy effect" on the mood
of his listeners. The mood, he later told a friend in London, had been one of "extreme
depression to which, he remarked sourly, Mr. Kennedy had himself largely contributed."
The friend noted that Donovan took credit, "without any self-conceit," for having been
"instrumental in giving impetus to the Destroyers-Bases Agreement, saying that he had been
at great pains in an interview with the President . . . to dwell upon our excellent prospects
of pulling through." Lord Lothian cabled London that Donovan "helped a lot." 36
He helped a lot in the public sector also. Before leaving for London he had testified be-
fore the Senate Military Affairs Committee in support of the conscription bill, and he
returned to that subject in the first radio address he delivered after his trip. He warned that
the crisis confronting the country did not permit the delaying of training men for battle until
after war had begun. The time for preparedness, he said, is now. On another subject, the
Fifth Column, he found that "the Administration was very anxious that something should be
said," and so " . . . at the instance of the President," Donovan added his name to that of
Edgar Ansel Mowrer as author of the series of articles on the Fifth Column which was
widely published in the press and reprinted in pamphlet form.37
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The London trip also had a "'healthy effect" on Donovan himself and on his stature in
'both Washington and London. For instance, for the first time in his life, the near legendary
war hero, "Wild Bill" Donovan, emerged as a man of "mystery" and a "secret envoy" of
FDR. Newsmen had been given little idea of what he had been up to; his trip was "one of
the mysteries of the Navy." 38 With future developments the President's "secret envoy"
would often be described as a "confidant," though he never really was in any personal sense.
Secondly, Washington officials were impressed by this much-traveled man. President
Roosevelt showed his respect, in effect, by asking him a few months later to take another
trip for him and the Navy. Thirdly, London, which hitherto had only seen Donovan as a
prominent traveler stopping in town for a few high-level talks, now discovered him as a
person of great talent, energy, and influence in Washington. Lord Lothian was even
authorized, late in November, "to drop a hint to U.S. authorities" that if Ambassador
Kennedy was not returning to London, the "appointment of Colonel Donovan would be
welcome." 39
So important were the trip arid. its aftermath that it is now time to stop and take a look
at, the man who claims to have engineered it and who would henceforward play an important
role in Donovan's life and the development of American intelligence, namely, Britain's
intelligence chief in New York, William S. Stephenson.'
6. DONOVAN AND STEPHENSON
Stephenson was one of several very influential but relatively unpublicized Britons sent
here to carry out important tasks other than those entrusted to the Ambassador, first Lord
Lothian, and then, upon his death, Lord Halifax. There was, for instance, Arthur Purvis, a
Scots Canadian like Stephenson, who handled the purchase of war supplies. There was Arthur
Salter for shipping, Noel F. Hall on economic warfare, and the Queen's brother, David
Bowes-Lyon, for British information in the United. States. Stephenson claims, however, to
,have been the only British representative personally chosen by the Prime Minister himself'.
Stephenson was, on the outbreak of war, at age forty-three, a man of many accomplish-
ments, much money, many influential friends, great initiative and energy. He had been a
flying ace in the World War, an amateur lightweight boxing champion of the world, a
successful inventor, an international industrialist and financier, a millionaire by age 30. His
interests in German steel production made him a supplier of information on this vital subject
to Winston Churchill in the late 1930s when he was inveighing in Parliament against the Nazi
danger. The war brought him requests from British intelligence to carry out missions in
Sweden, Finland, and the United States.
Only the last mission concerns us here. That apparently took place some time in April
1940 when he was asked by Menzies, the MI-6 chief, to go to Washington "to establish rela-
tions on the highest possible level between the British SIS and the U.S. Federal Bureau of
[nvestigation." He visited New York and California, and it is most likely, as he claims, that he
met with and worked out some kind of understanding with J. Edgar Hoover regarding
cooperation between Americans and the British in the uncovering of enemy plans for
espionage, sabotage, and subversion affecting what was shaping up as the allied defense effort.
According to Robert E. Sherwood., FDR's speech-writer as well as a playwright, "effectively
close cooperation" between the two services had been worked out "by Roosevelt's order and
despite State Department qualms." 41
On returning to London, Stephenson was asked, this time by Churchill himself, to take
the New York post of British Passport Control Officer in order to do everything possible "to
assure sufficient aid for Britain, to counter the enemy's subversive plans throughout the
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"Little Bill" Stephenson, Britain's wartime intelligence chief in the United
States.
Passport photo, 1942
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Western Hemisphere ... and eventually to bring the United States into the war." 42 He and
his wife arrived in New York harbor on June 21, 1940---a few days before the French
armistice, a day after FDR made the Knox and Stimson appointments.
Stephenson immediately renewed, so he claims, an old acquaintanceship with Donovan
and "instinctively" concentrated on him as the individual above all others who could help
him in the procurement of badly needed war supplies. Stephenson has recounted how he then
suggested to Donovan that he "pay a visit to Britain with the object of investigating
conditions at first hand and assessing for himself the British war efforts, its most urgent
requirements, and its potential chances of success." 43
More than likely Stephenson had had advance knowledge of the visit to London. It
surely would have been cleared with Churchill's personal representative, who had been sent
here to handle just such secret, sensitive matters. Stephenson claims that he "arranged" for
Donovan to be given "every opportunity to conduct his inquiries" and that consequently he
was received by the King, Churchill, and members of the British Cabinet. While Donovan
had his own and his government's access to high places, there is no reason to question the
importance of Stephenson's help in this regard. In 1944 when Donovan read an OSS
statement that "Lord Lothian ... arranged for Donovan to see Churchill himself," the
Colonel struck out Lothian's name and wrote "Bill Stephenson" in the margin.'
But did Bill Stephenson initiate the trip? Bill Donovan has said no, in a marginal note
written in 1944 when he was asked to comment on a British account of his relations with
Stephenson. Where the text spoke of the President sending Donovan to London "as a result"
of discussions between him and Stephenson, Donovan wrote: "Did not know S[tephenson]
then. I met him only after return." 45 There is other evidence to back up the negative on this
question. The conclusion here is that while it remains possible that Stephenson originated the
trip, it is more likely that his subsequently close connections with Donovan have understand-
ably caused him to push the line of collaboration farther back than the facts justify, to con-
vert, in other words, advance knowledge into inspiration of the trip. It is at the same time
just as likely that the new Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, just as "instinctively"
nominated his good friend and inveterate traveler, Bill Donovan, to take a trip which Knox,
a newspaperman, probably wanted to take for himself.
Regardless of the difference between the two men on this point, there is no question but
that, on Donovan's return to Washington, the two quickly became both collaborators and
friends. On August 8 Stephenson cabled London that Donovan was strongly urging the
British case on the exchange of bases for destroyers. On August 21 Stephenson advised
London that "Donovan believes you will have within a few days very favorable news." That
news came the next day when the Canadian announced that "the figure of fifty-four
destroyers had been agreed [on] by the President and forty-four were in commission for
delivery." 46 In "the autumn of 1940," as the next chapter will show, Donovan and
Stephenson spent much time discussing intelligence. Finally, in December, came the best
indication of their collaboration, Stephenson's role in Donovan's second trip as a Presidential
emissary.
7. ROOSEVELT'S EMISSARY A SECONI) TIME
Donovan has said that he was called to Washington on the first of December and, by
his own account, the President "asked me if I would go and make a strategic appreciation
from an economic, political, and military standpoint of the Mediterranean area."' 17
Stephenson has said that he had discussed with the Colonel the need for American
protection of the Atlantic convoys and that Donovan, easily persuaded, had pleaded the case
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with Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox, and because of their need for evidence, Donovan
proposed to pay another visit to London and go on to the Mediterranean.48 Knox, in fact,
talked with Lord Lothian, who then asked London on November 27, whether Donovan could
"pay a short visit to the Middle East front." Two days later Lord Halifax, in London, was
reporting that he had "learnt from a private source in the United States"-and to whom did
"private source" refer?-that Donovan proposed to pay a visit to England, "certain places in
the Mediterranean and to Casablanca and Dakar." 49 On the face of it, Stephenson's account
is more satisfying to the curious than Donovan's account of a presidential request out of the
blue.
Whatever the origin of the trip, the two men traveled together on the first leg of the
journey-and not by accident. The London government was informed that "Mr. Stephenson,
Passport Control Officer at New York, will be the fourth in the same plane to Lisbon and
both he and Colonel Donovan are most anxious that it should be arranged for them to travel
together from Lisbon to London." In London arrangements were made "to see that Mr.
Stephenson obtains accommodations on the Lisbon-London aeroplane with Colonel Dono-
van." Lisbon, in turn, was notified of the importance of the visitor who "is most friendly and
useful to this country. Stephenson, Passport Control Officer at New York, is accompanying
D[onovan]." so
British authorities were uniformly enthusiastic at the prospect of Donovan's return.
Duff Cooper minuted: "He is a close friend of mine.... I think he was very satisfied with
the arrangements we made on the last occasion." The Army Council considered his visit of
"the greatest importance from the point of view of Army supplies" from the United States.
Lord Lothian, in Washington, described Donovan as "one of our best and most influential
friends here with a great deal of influence both with the Service Departments and the
Administration." Stephenson, saying that Donovan had Knox "in his pocket" and had "more
influence with the President than Colonel House had with Mr. Wilson," cabled SIS that if
the Prime Minister "were to be completely frank with Colonel Donovan, the latter would
contribute very largely to our obtaining all that we want of the United States." 51
The travelers departed Baltimore for Bermuda on December 6; Donovan was off on
"another mysterious mission," said the New York Times.52 Because of the "waves of Horta"
in the Azores, the two men had to spend eight days in Bermuda where Stephenson must
have spent much time showing Donovan the intelligence operations that took place in that
vital air and water link between Europe and the Americas. All kinds of British authorities
checked the passengers, goods, publications, and mail that funneled through their hands.
Two days after arriving in London, Donovan dined at No. 10 Downing Street. The
Prime Minister had a "book" message sent to the Balkan-Mediterranean world notifying
everybody that Donovan should be afforded "every facility" for appraising the situation.
Stephenson, in effect, then turned Donovan over to other SIS authorities. The "book"
message indicated that Donovan's trip from London east would be financed by the British.
The Prime Minister additionally gave Donovan as a traveling companion "the best man in
the Cabinet Secretariat," Lt. Col. Vivian Dykes of the Royal Engineers."
Donovan and his new companion, who left a detailed diary of their journey," then took
off on what must be reckoned one of the most extended, varied, and important trips taken to
scenes of action by any American, certainly up to that time. Donovan had left on December
6; he did not return until March 18. In that time he traveled to Bermuda, Portugal, Britain,
and then went to Gibraltar and Malta, to Cairo, to the battlefield in Libya, back to Cairo
and to Athens, Sofia, Belgrade, then back to Greece and the Albanian front, next to
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Colonel Donovan, Roosevelt's Balkan emissary in 1941, at the Belgrade railroad station.
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Turkey, Cyprus and Palestine, back again to Cairo and soon to Baghdad, back to Cairo once
again, and then he took off on the homeward journey which still had him stopping at
Gibraltar, Malta, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, and back to England again before finally
heading for the States.
As befitting a representative of the President and one who had the full confidence of
the Prime Minister, he saw everybody, everybody that is, except Spain's General Franco,
who was "very busy," and General Maxime Weygand in North Africa, because the
Germans made it clear they did not want Donovan on French-controlled territory.
Otherwise, Donovan saw and talked at great length with King Farouk of Egypt, King
George and Premier Metaxas of Greece, King Boris of Bulgaria, Prince Regent Paul of
Yugoslavia, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Foreign Minister Suner in Spain, and Premier de
Valera in Ireland. He saw no end of British generals and admirals, including Wavell, Dill,
Wilson, Cunningham, and Tedder.
It was the Balkan world, along with the problem of supplies for Britain, and protection
of the supply line that preoccupied him, although all along the line he discussed local
problems and inspected local troops and facilities. In Greece, his talks with the leaders
covered Greek preparations, strategy, and tactics for the resistance the Greeks were
determined to offer to any German advance in their direction. In Athens, as elsewhere, he
communicated his own message that Britain was fighting, that America would support the
democracies, and that the President himself was being given "overwhelming support" 55 in
this regard. In Bulgaria and Yugoslavia he plumbed the imponderables of the critical Balkan
situation in an effort to assess local ability to withstand any German threat. It was this gen-
eral situation that brought on the high point of his trip, meetings in Cairo with the top Brit-
ish leaders-Eden, Dill and Wavell-as they wrestled with the question of whether and how
to help Greece resist a German onslaught.
Wherever he went he discussed whatever pertained to the winning of the war-
strategy, tactics, aircraft, ordnance, transportation, training, health, etc. This list includes
those subjects which would later be embodied in his plans for COI-intelligence, special op-
erations, psychological warfare, commandos, and guerrilla units. Even before departing
Britain, he had had a chance to get in on some of the training operations of a unit of
commandos at Plymouth, and in Libya he observed the operation of some long-range desert
patrols; on both of these he would later write an enthusiastic report to Secretary Knox. He
had frequent contact with personnel of the intelligence and special operations organizations.
His trip was being paid for by the British, and Dykes regularly contacted the appropriate
local official wherever they went." Clearly there were many meetings and many discussions
with British officials. It is not too much to conclude that Dykes and all these local Britishers
contributed significantly, at the bidding of Churchill, Stephenson, and Menzies, to
Donovan's enlightment on secret intellignce and special operations.
Back in London he briefed and was briefed. He was asked to go before the Joint Board
and discuss the hard decision to aid Greece. He went to lunch with the War Cabinet and
with the Chiefs of Staff. He was thoroughly briefed on the organization and operation of
SOE and visited some of its training establishments. With the director of censorship he dis-
cussed the problem of getting control of enemy communications. With Britain's home
security chief he went into the problem of frustrating Nazi efforts to subvert allied and neu-
tral seamen in American ports. As at the end of his first trip, he compiled a long list of
things to do on his return; there were plenty of people to see.
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He landed in New York on March 18. He immediately telephoned Secretary Knox, who
in turn just as quickly notified the White House. There is no record of what, pending a
meeting with FDR, Donovan told Knox, but presumably he gave the Secretary a quick
summation of the main points on his mind: the Greek situation, the food crisis in England,
the primacy of shipping, the question of U.S. policy on convoying. Did he say anything about
the need for better intelligence, special operations, propaganda, etc.?
The next morning the two men, scheduled for 15 minutes with the President, who was
about to depart on a cruise off the Florida waters, spent an hour with FDR and Harry
Hopkins. Again, there is no record of what Donovan told the President. There could have
been, as Sherwood said of meetings with FDR, much "wildly irrelevant" talk. Certainly
Donovan must have touched upon the Balkan situation and Britain's shipping problem. It
has been said by one who was close to Donovan at this time that he "suggested [to the Presi-
dent] the creation of a new agency" to carry out these five special functions: open, or white,
propaganda; secret, or black, psychological-political warfare; sabotage and guerrilla warfare;
special intelligence; and strategic planning."
On the afternoon of March 19 Donovan spent "an hour, or an hour and a half" with
Secretary Stimson, who found Donovan's report "very interesting." The two men "stood over
the map for a long time talking only in t' he way in which two old friends who are both
interested in military affairs can do it." Donovan's talk, noted Stimson, "did not develop
anything startlingly new," but "it was rather encouraging" to him, and the Secretary
recorded that Donovan looked "at the whole situation just as I do." 56
The next morning at Stimson's invitation, Donovan spoke "to the Officers of our
Department." In a typical traveler's report, re-living his arrivals and departures, Donovan
came down hard on the question of shipping-"the very dominant point"-and the necessity
for the United States to decide whether it was going to help protect British shipping or allow
its lend-lease supplies to go down the drain. On such things as special operations he had only
a few lines about commandos and the general fear spread by British parachutists in Italy."
On March 26, in a broadcast to the nation, he delivered a similar recital of his
Mediterranean travels; shipping again was his main point. He did stress that he had seen
with his "own eyes and at close hand" how the Nazi advance in southeast Europe had been
facilitated by "political sapping and disintegration." He pointed out that the German army
"was used not for fighting but for intimidation," and this was just as it was recorded "in our
schoolbooks, where we read that the soldiers of ancient days prepared for the taking of a city
by first undermining its walls." 60
As was the case of his first mission, this one also had a "healthy effect" on his stature
in Washington. There are two witnesses, one rejoicing and the other alarmed, to give
testimony on the point. The first is the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
who told his staff on the afternoon of the twentieth that
Donovan is the first man I have talked to that I would be willing to really back. I
saw what he did Mast summer . . . he has been for a week actually in the trenches
up in Albania. He was down in Libya when they took that last town, whatever the
last town was. He was with Wavell for over a week. He was with Eden in Cairo.
He has been twice in England. He has been in Spain and he has been in Portugal.
I think he knows more about the situation than anybody I have talked to by about
a thousand per cent. And he is not discouraged.61
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Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, G-2 in 1940-41, warned General Marshall about "a movement ...
fostered by Colonel Donovan."
U.S. Army, 1938
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The other was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles,
who had picked up an interesting report on Donovan's comings and goings. Just three weeks
after Donovan's return, General Miles, on April 8, worriedly wrote to the Chief of Staff,
General George C. Marshall:
In great confidence O.N.I. tells me that there is considerable reason to believe that
there is a movement on foot, fostered by Col. Donovan, to establish a super agency
controlling all intelligence. This would mean that such an agency, no doubt under
Col. Donovan, would collect, collate and possibly even evaluate all military
intelligence which we now gather from foreign countries. From the point of view of
the War Department, such a move would appear to be very disadvantageous, if not
calamitous."
This document is noteworthy. It is the first which categorically links Donovan's
ambition with the establishment and operation of a new American intelligence agency. As
such, Miles's memorandum. poses the questions as to just how Miles and the intelligence
chiefs reacted to this apparent threat to their independence and just how precisely it
happened that Donovan, soldier, lawyer, and public servant, had managed to become, as he
henceforward would be, the bete noire of the country's intelligence chiefs.
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Chapter IV
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COORDINATOR
OF INFORMATION (COI)
In the spring of 1941 the chief of G-2, Gen. Sherman Miles, muffed three opportunities
to improve the coordination of intelligence and thereby cleared the way for Roosevelt's
appointment of Donovan to undertake the job.
1. THE FIRST CHANCE: A JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
The first opportunity came on March 27 when the former military attache in London,
newly promoted to brigadier general, Raymond E. Lee, wrote at the request of General
Marshall a memorandum proposing the establishment of a "Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC)." Lee pointed out that his eight months of experience in London had seen the rapid
multiplication of "lines of information" between Britain and the United States. New lines
were paralleling the established avenues for the exchange of intelligence. For instance, he
said, he had learned that Churchill was sending "considerable information" directly to
Washington. Other data, he noted, had been sent through "the medium of observers" such
as Harry Hopkins, who had recently been in London, and Colonel Donovan. Still more
communications were passing between Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Aircraft Produc-
tion, and Treasury Secretary Morgenthau.
Experience had taught Lee that his requests in London for data and statistics had often
brought from the British government the reply that such information had already been
supplied to some department or other in Washington. He, of course, had no objection to the
flow of accurate information between London and Washington, but he did think that at
some point it ought all to be brought together so that the United States Government might
profitably use all the intelligence actually in its possession.
He therefore proposed the establishment "without delay" of a Joint Intelligence
Committee composed of representatives of five civilian and military departments: Army,
Navy, State, Treasury, and the Administrator of Export Control (ExCon), this last being the
government's early venture in economic warfare. This committee would meet daily for the
purpose of exchanging, collating and drawing conclusions from all vital information reaching
the government from any source or by any avenue. Gaps in information would thereby be
filled, and "the general conclusions" of such a committee would be "far more accurate and
authoritative" than those of any single department. Such a committee, Lee concluded, was
in his opinion "the only practicable means" for controlling and exploiting the flood of
information now coursing through uncoordinated channels.'
However, General Miles had "considerable doubts as to the practicability" of the
proposal. To be sure, he agreed that all information reaching the government ought to be
made available to all who needed it, and such, he pointed out, was "not the condition at
present." For instance, the information brought back by Hopkins was never made available
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to the War Department, "except perhaps fragmentarily through [his] conversations" with
General Marshall or Secretary Stimson. Also, the cables sent by Colonel Donovan during his
Mediterranean trip had never been seen in G-2; "there are many other instances of this."
Miles, however, was staggered by the "collossal" (sic) size of the organization that
Lee's JIC would require. His own division, he said, had approximately fifty-one officers and
fifty-six employees devoting full time to the collation and evaluation of "information from
abroad." Multiply that staff by five? It was too many. Miles feared that the five agencies
would be unable "to reach. joint conclusions from all the information at their disposal."
Furthermore, the five would have to make room for such others as the Maritime
Commission and the proposed office for the administration of lend-lease. Then also there
was the White House, without whose information the conclusions drawn by Lee's JIC
"might at times be disregarded." Finally, Miles doubted whether the government agencies
"would be willing to depend for the conclusions on the work of a joint committee." 2
That took care of Lee's JIC, the first opportunity in 1941 to control the information
flooding into Washington. Nothing more was heard of a JIC until June when the British
Military Mission in Washington established a local JIC as an extension of the same
organization in London. Then, "someone who knew about the British JIC," wrote Ludwell
L. Montague, a G-2 major at the time, "proposed the creation of a joint committee to
coordinate Army and Navy intelligence, in order to forestall intrusion into such privileged
matters by the President's Coordinator of Information, `Wild Bill' Donovan." ''
On July 14, three days after Donovan was officially in business, General Miles,
belatedly converted to the JIC idea, and his ONI counterpart, Captain Alan G. Kirk, who
had moved up the Navy ladder from his attache post in London, formally proposed the
establishment of such an organization. It was approved by the Secretary of War on
September 29 and on October 1 by the Secretary of the Navy. The Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC), however, was not officially activated until two days after Pearl Harbor,
because the Navy had trouble finding the office space it had promised the new committee.'
By that time the Army and Navy were six months late in getting into the field of
coordinating intelligence.
2. THE SECONI) CHANCE: INTERAGENCY DISSEMINATION OF INFOR-
MATION
Good soldier that he was, General Miles, when in April he rejected Lee's JIC, came up
with a counterproposal. Agreeing that something had to be done to "canalize independent
sources of information now reaching the Government," he proposed a study by the interested
agencies "on the directives necessary to insure that all this information is made available to
[them] for their individual collation and evaluation." To that end he suggested Secretary
Stimson circularize eight agencies asking them each to appoint a representative to meet for
the purpose of "drafting instructions to assure the prompt dissemination, under proper
safeguards of security," of the great quantity of information, particularly that from Great
Britain, which was reaching the government through various and independent channels.'
The first meeting, which took place May 5, was attended by representatives of the
Army, Navy, State, Commerce, the Maritime Commission, the Office of Production
Management (OPM:), the National Defense Research Council (NDRC), the Office of
Emergency Management (OEM), and the Office of the Administrator of Export Control.
Just what General Miles hoped to see come out of the meeting is not clear.
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Originally it was suggested that a committee of representatives be established to handle
questions from one another and to provide such information as was sought. When it was
quickly pointed out that this was "a large order," it was agreed that at the next meeting
each representative would bring both a "survey or chart showing the sources, channels, and
character of the information" his agency received from and about the British Empire and a
list of officials who could answer queries relative to such information-'
Nothing seems to have come from the surveys or charts, which, in any case, gave no
did not lead, according to State's
secrets away. In fact, the second meeting, on May 19,
representative, George A. Gordon, to any definite conclusion." Apparently it was Miles
who proposed that each of the agencies should set up "a clearing house" for answering other
agencies' queries, but many objected that in their agencies there was no access to the
information which was jealously controlled at higher echelons. Gordon "gathered" that G-2's
main object in calling the meetings was obtaining "additional and more expeditious
information from the other Government agencies represented at the meeting. In other words,
the discussions seemed to take on increasingly the aspect of a fishing expedition, and this
m go
view is held at least several to Under Secretary Sumner Wel esethat het
meetingng. ." Gordon, , therefore, recommended t
on record against the "clearing house" and in favor of leaving everything right where it was,
with the existing system of interdepartmental liaison, and leaving questions to be answered
to the four assistant secretaries, the four advisers, and the chiefs of divisions. "The higher
authorities" would thereby be spared the need to divulge their secrets to lesser officials and,
of course, other agencies.'
Despite this dash of cold water, General Miles, admitting that a single "clearing house"
for the entire government was not feasible, nevertheless prepared the first draft of an
agreement recommending that each agency set up an office or offices to handle the
exchange of important information. Gordon did not like the idea, and he was backed up by
Welles. In forwarding a second draft, Miles put some pressure on his colleagues by subtly
warning them that Donovan, though his name was not mentioned, was behind the "advocacy
of much more radical steps ... to correct the present lack of systematic liaison
that we older
various agencies." The new draft was a compromise, a proposal, in effect,
agencies-minus State-each establish "a single office" and that State and the newer
agencies-OEM, OPM, NDRC, Lend-Lease-"designate one or more offices" for exchang-
ing information.'
Miles led off a discussion of the draft by reporting that the Truman investigating
committee had the previous day raised a question about "the vast masses of information"
that apparently were lying unavailable in various agencies.
after the British patter) a Cents 1 Se-
cret much talk in Washington of "forming (somewhat
cret Bureau of Information, charged with the duty of receiving and disseminating all
and re "slow and scu"not mbersome particularly functions ? 9of that; it would
information between establish
be too difficult to at
If Miles was trying to push the others forward, he made little progress. State was
happy with the status quo. At the Treasury the Secretary handled all important information,
and "no change [was] necessary." That was also true of the Navy, which anyway "didn't
have a great deal of information to disseminate" to outsiders; otherwise Miles's plan was ed to give
wasvg~eharidglitapaorAg?cullture d'df think that
good. Commerce, OPM, and like
away. Commerce was unhappy t that
State should set up a "Central Information Department," but this idea "did not appear
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very well with Mr. Gordon." When it was all over for the day, little "was accomplished,"
according to the ExCon representative. ".It seemed to be the general consensus . . . that the
formation of a Central Department of Information would be a mistake"; in the older
departments the present system was satisfactory."
There was another meeting. Correspondence indicated that with minor changes Miles's
second draft was acceptable. The final draft was signed at the last meeting of the group on
July 7. After three drafts and four or five meetings one group of agencies agreed that each
would set up "a single office," and the others agreed to "designate one or more offices" for
the exchange of infori-nation. They also agreed on definitions for "Secret," "Confidential,"
and "Restricted." After so much labor, that was the mouse that came forth. The conferees
then turned their work over to their respective agencies to endorse and implement," and that
was the fate of the second chance to coordinate information.
3. THE THIRD CHANCE: A COORDINATOR FOR A "TWILIGHT ZONE"
The next episode, which will eventually take us back to Miles's worry about the
Donovan "movement," began. at a cabinet meeting on April 4. There came up for discussion,
noted Secretary Stimsort, "the conflict of the three intelligence agencies of the Government
. . . viz: MID, ONI, and FBI, and all parties to the discussion seemed to admit that a cer-
tain amount of twilight zone was inevitable and the problem was the solution of that without
friction." The President recalled that in France a joint board handled the "twilight zone," or
the area of jurisdictional conflict, between military intelligence and the "Surete," the civilian
prosecutory agency. He also stated that in Great Britain that same zone was presided over
by "a gentleman known as `Mr. X,' whose identity was kept a complete secret." Mr.
Roosevelt then asked the three American agencies to "confer as to the institution of a
similar solution for our country in case we got into war." 12
The "conflict" arose shortly after the IIC established a "Special Intelligence Service."
Disagreement broke out between General Miles and J. Edgar Hoover over the scope of the
work of the new SIS. Miles wanted it restricted to those subversive activities abroad that af-
fected the United States, but the FBI considered the work "encyclopedic" in character. The
disagreement was papered over with the understanding that "encyclopedic" it was but
emphasis should be placed on subversion, something, Miles said, that Army, Navy, and
State were not qualified to handle." The papering hardly survived the summer.
The first tear came in July when G-2, trying to gear up for the crisis that was already
enveloping the country, opened, as it had in the Great War, an office in New York. The
object was the gathering in New York of intelligence, especially on the Western Hemi-
sphere, from the many, large firms engaged in foreign trade. The office, located on Sixth
Avenue, was opened on July 30; beginning in September it was run by Maj. Frederick D.
Sharp. From August to October Miles and Hoover continued to disagree on, among other
things, the SIS function. Then on October 14 Stimson recorded in his diary that Miles had
come to him "with reports of trouble with Edgar Hoover, who seems to be a good deal of a
prima donna and has taken offense at some very innocent actions of Miles." 14
So that there would be "no misunderstanding," Sharp was told in November that his
primary purpose was the establishment of liaison with such firms in order to gather military,
political, economic, and geographic information and that he would not seek subversive
information nor initiate such investigations. Any such information that he or his contacts did
pick up should be passed on directly to the FBI. Clear as these instructions may seem in
print, they did not prevent a series of charges by the FBI that G-2 was violating the
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presidential directive of June 24. Illustrative of the "twilight zone" that was developing was
the FBI refusal to handle a case-suspicious items in the personal columns of the New York
Times-because Sharp's office had conducted a preliminary investigation before turning it
over to the FBI. It was ridiculous, Miles countered, to think that every unchecked lead had
to be given immediately to the FBI.16 So it went.
The second tear sundered the paper. About the end of January 1941 the FBI declared
that some business firms with an interest in Latin America had complained that they were
being asked for the same information by more than one U.S. agency. An IIC subcommittee
spent a meeting trying to draw a line of demarcation between the FBI and MID as far as
this South American activity was concerned. A subsequent procedural arrangement, having
Sharp clear his contacts through the FBI, was turned down by Miles, who then tried
unsuccessfully to arrange a meeting with Hoover. Another subcommittee drafted a
memorandum which laid out the current operations of MID, ONI, and the FBI in the
Western Hemisphere, and this was approved by Miles and sent to the FBI. Again Miles
endeavored to meet with Hoover.16
Then the "storm broke." On February 6 Hoover sent word to Miles that there was no
basis for a, discussion between them as long as MID persisted in violating the presidential
directive of June 1940. He stated that the bureau had been "embarrassed" by the activity of
G-2 in New York. The only decision to be made, he said, was whether G-2 was going to con-
tinue to operate in the field allotted to the SIS. Miles was further informed that when this
"storm broke," Hoover went to the Attorney General, Robert Jackson, and told him, that he,
Hoover, had never wanted the SIS assignment and that either MID or ONI could take it
over."
Within a week Secretary Stimson was recording that both he and Marshall were
"troubled" by the "trouble" that Hoover was making at the White House over General
Miles. "Hoover apparently," wrote Stimson, "instead of coming to me, goes to the White
House with his complaints and poisons the mind of the President and I am going to have a
show down to it if I know the reason why [sic]."
The next morning Marshall, "in great perturbation," went to Stimson saying he had
had a message from the White House asking for information as to who General Miles's
successor would be. Telling Marshall that he would handle the situation, Stimson "began to
hustle around" to get the facts. Marshall brought him Hoover's letter of charges against
G-2-"a very childish, petulant statement which seemed more like a spoiled child than a
responsible officer, calling attention to all sorts of little things which ought to have been the
subject of mutual collaboration and a telephone call rather than a formal letter." The same
letter had been sent to the Budget Bureau and, noted Stimson, "probably . . . to the Presi-
dent also." Stimson then contacted Jackson, who was very sympathetic, who found Hoover
"a difficult person," and who suggested that he and Stimson get together with Knox to dis-
cuss the situation. Later the same day they did meet and agree to "make another effort to
establish a proper collaboration and cooperation in a matter which was likely to be most seri-
ous and of public import at any time." So relieved was Stimson by this spirit of cooperation
that he looked forward with "more hope" to a meeting which he had apparently laid on with
the President."
Whether he ever met with FDR on the matter is not known. In any case, while the
three secretaries and their subordinates may have thought their new spirit of collaboration
would solve their problem of coordination, the President was now seized of the problem him-
self, and he proceeded to handle it in his own way. He turned to the wealthy Vincent
Astor-a boyhood friend, a sailing companion, a financial supporter, a fellow New Yorker
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establishment of the coordinator of information (coi)lIV
from Dutchess County. Also, Astor functioned as a one-man intelligence unit for the
President. As a naval intelligence reservist, Commander Astor had often coordinated his
yachting with ONI and FDR. Early in 1940 he was writing the President Sabout his
dealings with the FBI and the head of British intelligence in New York, Harold R.
Paget. In June Roosevelt informed the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm.
("Betty") Stark, that he had requested Astor "to coordinate the Intelligence work in the
New York area" and he wanted "great weight given his [Astor's] recommendation on the
selection of candidates because of his wide knowledge of men and affairs in connection
with general intelligence work." FDR then asked Stark to "pass this on to Walter
Anderson," the head of ONI.20
It is not possible to say what coordinating Astor did in New York, but shortly after the
Astor's job in
"storm broke" over Miles's head and Hoover hustled off to the White House,
New York was significantly upgraded; this was accomplished with a minimum of reference
Kirk of ONI and Berle of
to the heads of the intelligence agencies themselves. On March 8,
Captain D. J.
State apparently discussed the subject with the President's naval aide,
Callaghan. On March 12 a "draft" of the idea was sent to Callaghan, and two days later it
ruise,
was sent to FDR, who on the nineteenth, on the way to taking off on his Florida
telegraphed from North Carolina his approval of Kirk's memorandum appointing
"Area Controller for the New York Area." Astor's job was the coordination of all
intelligence and investigative activities undertaken in the New York area by the representa-
tives of State, War, Navy, and Justice. Astor would be a "clearing house for problems,"
would be consulted by the agencies' representatives, and would "assign priorities and
responsibility" for the various problems these representatives would lay before him?' All this
was done without consulting either Miles or Hoover, who now had the task of meeting with
Astor to work out the details of this new arrangement for the coordination of intelligence in
the New York area.
Such was "the conflict of the three intelligence agencies" which came up for discussion
at the cabinet meeting on April 4, just after FDR's return from ten days off the Florida
coast. When the President wanted the agencies to "confer" on the institution of something
comparable to the French "joint board" or Britain's "Mr. X" to settle jurisdictional disputes dina created by the intelligence national level "twilight zone,"
had' just he apparently wante such a established on thelo al level in
rN wt Yo k
intelligence on the nCity.
4. THE IIC: OPPOSITION TO A COORDINATOR
No sooner was General Miles informed through channels of FDR's request than he
consulted both ONI and the FBI. He then proposed to Marshall that Colonel Donovan be
recommended to the President "as the coordinator between the three intelligence agencies in
any conflict which may arise within the field of countersubversion (prevention of sabotage
and espionage)." It was in this context that he explained "in great confidence" what he had
learned from ONI about the "movement . . . fostered by Colonel Donovan, to establish a
super agency controlling all intelligence." He foresaw such an agency making a "calami-
tous" move into the field of military intelligence, and therefore he recommended that
Donovan's proposed role as coordinator be clearly limited to countersubversion cases. It was
only in this field, he added, that conflict among the three agencies was possible-thanks to
the 1940 agreement which, he noted, he had drafted and the Attorney General and the
Secretaries of War and Navy had approved.22
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Capt. (later Vice Adm.) Alan'",. Kirk, ONI chief in 1941, joined Miles and
Hoover in an effort to forestall FDR's appointment of Donovan as
Coordinator of Information.
U.S. Navy, National Archives
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establishment of the coordinator of information (coi)/IV f
hich
w
d
bmission to r the P esidentgelo t Donovan
h Along with this memorandu a ofMiles f cersofor sued
cou
have approved the three
' unandd Donovan would work.
was advised draft the instructions
was put forth as "a a referee in
the After intelligence chiefs initially Y out,
three
the
services oler all, it pointed
ent and had reduced the "twilight" zone as far as [it]iispossible to do
old delimitation agreem
soo, ," and hence their heir experience in this matter should be utilized in the drafting of te
instructions." Thus would Miles control Donovan.
For several weeks after these papers were written nothing plenty to keep haened. busy, Certainly
y
Miles, Hoover, and Kirk had, in the critical spring of 1941, pn go away. T
ur problem
dict n' would
certainly all three had reason hope a that particular
thad
which laid out in extenso
of Jurisdiction"
that end they y produced, on May 15 ly
how well the three agencies were collaborating and coor inat ng. They pushing were carefsecurityulIn
watching German, Italian, Soviet, and Japanese agents; maintaining close liaison
national defense plants, investigating all suspicions of sabotage, ma
with friendly intelligence services-especially the British-and were expanding
challenges. their pers most -
nel-but not at the expense of quality-to meet the increasing
important point, perhaps, was that the coordination was excellent: the intelligence chiefs met aily
existed
contact, and
the weekly, their " subordinates were in thedent re program ofsthelth eeoag ntcies was arri d out fielon
"Constant liaison" meant that
asis." So pleased were they of with this particlar it to the d;ocu
thisiHoovertdid
"a national, coordinated oordinated basis." at
their meeting on May 21 they decided to send a copy
the
for them the next day.24 unless
very They also agreed at that meeting o that a detriment coordinat tr,the swiftlandesecret "act on re-d to infrequent role of referee" would be "a
positive They
fieldhof
by sthei Presid nt furtherattemptfelt the enti eieve
reason a coordinator the Intelligence
intelligence." named could only h would
argelye"coh cohave een of military nand navallinta elligence-coordinator highly
undesirable "control at the collection oion
f
they
nsequen
undesident a state of
elt sffairsatter. Inethat case t shou d behdiscouraged" if worst caone me to worst,
President revived matter.
function should not extend to military intelligence, and his job description
the coordinator's ed the
ought to be limited to the role of "referee." 25 and nite
The intelligence chiefs then decided
worktunthey ad to send derh he President's 1939adirective and their
years'
statement of their attitude. Two
1940 agreement left them with four con hadipro,iv coorinatnarrowedion the
torily; the "inevitable 'twilight zone' .. [had] been gress
the r,sendces t had that f iieldhhe more
Third, for o o df inato
countersubversive field there was little need
would be a "positive detriment
suchtot sitref they responsibilities, "the rit would e difficult to keep the ordinator esultant super-Intelligence Agency would be fart too
cumbersome u other her activity; they failed,
cand complicated for effective service to the three Departments, they considered a
,
plication'" were if not not a "serious already clear, detriment to the
increased tempo of we " Fally, as complication' point
oord~mator "unnecessary,
National Service, while offering only negligible advantages.>> 26 was h That was May 29' the and President to owmanagethe n
ow affairs chiefs efficiently and
opportunity given them b by
fruitfully. In two months they had been unable to nip in the bud the Donovan "movement"
which had so alarmed General Miles.
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5. DONOVAN'S ADOPTION OF AN INTELLIGENCE ROLE
Colonel "Wild Bill" Donovan was, at the outset of the war, a hero in search of a role.
Had he wanted to, the Colonel could have kept himself fully occupied with his law business,
but he could not resist the pull of public affairs. By late 1935 these, as already noted, were
foreign affairs, and his subsequent European and African trips made him unusually well-
informed on the changing character of warfare. In December 1939 he was being discussed as
a possible Secretary of War. In the following spring he was taking time off from the law to
work on "Air Plattsburgs," the conscription legislation, and the preparation of Knox for his
Senate examination for the Navy job. Then came the first special mission to London.
Following that was work on the destroyers deal. He turned down a senatorial nomination
and an offer from Secretary Stimson to run an Army training camp. Then he was off to
Army posts for General Marshall and to Hawaii with Secretary Knox.
On the eve of departing with Stephenson for London he brought up with Stimson "the
question of his own fortunes after he got back in regard to a command post in the Army."
Stimson explained how the Twenty-seventh Division was closed to him because of the change
of conditions. "Donovan was very nice about that," noted the Secretary, "and said that what
he wanted more than anything else would be the toughest Division of the whole outfit...."
Three months later, in fact two days after Donovan had returned from his second
presidential mission, Morgenthau's staff heard that he was going take over th
multitudinous chores of the newly-appointed Lend-Lease Administrator ,oHarry Hopkins,
who had just taken off with FDR on that Florida cruise.' Other job possibilities would soon
open up, but by April 8 Donovan was being seriously pictured as scheming to establish and
run "a super agency controlling all" American intelligence.
How had the hero taken up with this intelligence role, just one of many possibile; roles
that had come his way? Was it all the work of the British and William Stephenson?
Certainly the record of Donovan's prewar activities and writings gives little indication of a
future career in secret intelligence and unconventional warfare.
He did tell a Budget Bureau historian in 1942 that "the idea [of COI] had been in the
back of his mind for some years.... He stated that he felt it was something the government
should have recognized long before it did." 28 One must interject here that "the idea" which
he had thought about "for some years" prior to the war must have been the government's
better handling of its information and intelligence rather than clandestine intelligence,
special operations, radio propaganda, guerrillas and commandos. These would only, it seems,
have been brought to mind by the growing threat and then imminence of war in the late
thirties.
The "some years" received a different formulation in 1943 when, recounting for some
Army and Navy officers the origins of OSS, he explained that "for something over twenty
years" he had been "going to wars in various
parts because he liked wars but because he felt that "we were bound to en ounterd no therhwar."
He said he had noted that, while Americans looked upon an army as something called upon
in time of an emergency, other nations used their armies as weapons in the service of their
political and economic philosophies. His experiences had "impressed" him with the
realization that "unless you were able to unmask the intention of your enemy, you were at a
tremendous disadvantage." That seemed obvious, he said, but it had been "completely
ignored" in this country. It was "in these circumstances," he declared, in the dawning
realization of the need to know the enemy's intention, that OSS had its origin."
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Allen Dulles, who joined COI shortly after Pearl Harbor, ran Donovan's OSS Swiss
nerve center in Bern, and made a career for himself as head of CIA, wrote that "in the thir-
ties" Donovan was "convinced . . . that what we now call `unconventional' or psychological
warfare would have a major place in the battles of the future." Surely Dulles referred to the
middle or late thirties. Dulles also wrote that "in the years before the outbreak of World
War II he [Donovan] was already at work studying military affairs and planning the type of
intelligence organization America would need as soon as we became a belligerent." 30
Perhaps Dulles is correct, but there is no evidence, and no apparent reasoning, to suggest
that Donovan was "planning" an intelligence organization "in the years" before September
1939.
Certainly, one must recall that as a battalion commander in the first World War
Donovan was familiar with military intelligence; one of his intelligence sergeants was the
poet Joyce Kilmer who was killed in battle at the side of "Wild Bill." Some time during the
war, it has been said, Donovan "had been training with British intelligence," probably
military intelligence." Certainly also, in "going to wars in various parts of the world,"
especially from 1935 on, he had been at least collecting basic and current intelligence on
military, political, economic, sociological, and technological events and trends. Also, one
must recall his speech after the outbreak of war wherein he proposed the establishment of a
commission of representative citizens to provide "a whole view of preparedness by the whole
body of American citizens."
In a single short sentence, however, Donovan himself has distinguished this early
connection with intelligence from what happened as a result of his trip to London in 1940.
Speaking after the war he recalled that he had had "two main objectives" in going to Lon-
don: to find out about the Fifth Column and "to learn whether the British were `falling on
their faces,' as everybody said." He recounted how he had talked to everybody, "asked a
million questions," and figured out what he could do to "give them life." He said that he
"got data from every quarter" and then "made my estimate" that the British could and
would fight and survive. "That," he declared, "was the real start of OSS." 32
Even so, there is but one scrap of evidence to show that "the idea" which had been
"in the back of his mind for some years" had achieved any organizational shape in his
thinking by mid-1940. That was his remark to Colonel Lee on July 23 that he wanted to
find out ". . . what sort of legislation [was] required successfully to operate a
counterespionage organization." 33 Donovan and Mowrer, in pursuit of the Fifth Column,
did ask for and receive copies of British laws and regulations on, for instance, the control
of "enemy aliens and dangerous persons"; and Donovan alone was given more sensitive
documents such as one on "Principal subjects recommended for attention by a Security
Service in war." Other, however, than recognizing that Donovan had sought information
on a myriad of topics, one can build little on Lee's brief entry.
Beyond this scrap, there is nothing to suggest, and Donovan himself never claimed, that
he returned from London with any idea of recommending the establishment of a new
American intelligence organization and/or finding a role for himself in such an organization.
"The real start of OSS" suggests, however, that both ideas were ripening. He was fifty-seven
years of age, a vigorous, imaginative, and personable man of affairs who had entry in
Washington, had impressed the British, and was now deep in Anglo-American problems and
consultations. It was at this point that Stephenson made his entrance.
Stephenson's specialty, recently acquired, was intelligence and special operations. He
had taken over the relatively small job of Passport Control Officer and was expanding it into
the much more far-flung British Security Coordination (BSC), which was soon mounting
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many offensive, clandestine, and illegal operations throughout the Western Hemisphere
against German, Italian, and Japanese personnel and interests. For these delicate operations,
which could not help but involve the United States, he needed not only the tacit permission
of American authorities but also their active collaboration. Neither the FBI nor G-2 and
ONI was prepared or able to provide that help; for this job Stephenson had a felt need for a
differently structured American organization.
This is the topic that Stephenson and Donovan had begun to spend so much time on in
1940, probably after the destroyers-bases deal had been consummated in September. There
is no better witness to this fact than Donovan himself; his testimony appears in that very
document in which he had written the marginal note on not meeting Stephenson until after
his return from London. A page later he penciled a large "No," underscored twice, on a
point that need not detain us here. But in between these marginalia are these lines: "Colonel
Donovan and Mr. Stephenson kept in close contact through the autumn of 1940. During this
period Mr. Stephenson continually pressed his 'view [italics added] that some extension of
American intelligence organization was going to be required if the U.S. Government were to
be adequately informed, whether under peacetime, non-belligerent or wartime conditions."
Surely General Donovan read and, having read, apparently found no fault with that view of
things.J4
After the death of Donovan in 1959 Stephenson, recounting the story of his rela-
tionship with COI and OSS, returned to the above subject with these lines: "from the
beginning ... I had discussed and argued [italics added] with him [Donovan] the necessity
for the United States Government to establish an agency for conducting ... secret activities
throughout the world--an agency with which I could collaborate fully by virtue of [its] being
patterned in the matter of coordination functions after my own organization. Early he
agreed in principle. . . ." 35
In 1944, in response to an OSS request, Stephenson's organization provided data
justifying an award that Donovan wanted the United States to grant "the quiet Canadian"
for his services to American intelligence. That data described Stephenson as Donovan's
"earliest collaborator," credited Stephenson's discussions with Donovan in 1940-41 as being
"largely instrumental in bringing about a clearer conception of the need for a properly
coordinated American intelligence service," declared Donovan's "keen interest" in improving
American intelligence "was stimulated by Mr. Stephenson," and stated that Donovan's
proposal for COI was "to a considerable extent based on his conversations with Mr.
Stephenson and his colleagues." 36
While most of this was incorporated in an early draft. of the award, it was considerably
"fudged" in the paper that Donovan sent to the President. That is, while Donovan twice
cited 1940 as the date of the inception of Stephenson's service to this country's intelligence
apparatus, he referred in a general manner to those contributions made before COI was
established but was specific in reference to contributions after that event. Hence he credited
Stephenson with making available to the U.S. "the extensive experience" of the British in
secret intelligence and special operations; without Stephenson's help, wrote Donovan, "it
would not have been possible to establish instrumentalities"for such purposes in this country
in time to aid the war effort; also Donovan credited Stephenson with contributing
"assistance and counsel" of "exceptionally meritorious character" at "every step in the
creation of these instrumentalities." On the other hand, after COI was established, noted
Donovan, Stephenson had loaned him British officers, opened billets in British schools to
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m anied Donovan to London, made censorship and other secret material
e facilities available. One enders whether Donovan felt
COI personnel, accompanied
counterespionage
assistan sometime in 1940, undoubtedly
indandelicacy made d in detailing Stephenson 's pre-COI
some available,
s
discussing, and arguing, begun 0 Off on another
Stephenson'"s pressing, for o to 9 Bill" Donovan and
continued late in that year `l'on to S be known as r the two o Billss, waling for "the vans and
trip and when the two men, so together in Bermu Bill," s of
"Little Bill" Stephenson-spdnc eight days ?? abate so they could continue their flight s to for three months with thn e` British in
Horta to the idea of COI]
of "
traveling at the expense British intelligence,
?`Wha When he returned," an interviewer wrote in 1942,
the Mediterranean. ? 38
was fairly well formulated in his mind. years, it had been dislodged
in the back of his mind for some
While the idea had been the trip to London and then brought to the foreground of his
and set in forward motion by
thinking by the head of British intelligence in this country.
(, "A MOVEMENT .FOSTERED BY COL. DONOVAN"
hout saying that Donovan-the
" it goes wit and to
ulated in Since it was "well the concernedhcitizen d-gave expression to it on his return,
alarm
advocate, the publicist, some-
doubtedly fostered" the )le ,movement"
Donovan was pushing so s. ed the that extent he undoubtedly ev so for himself
Miles's memorandum is reasonably but whether he was doingfrom a British
thing new and big in the field of intelligence, Additional evidence, to convince"
personally is something to be considered shortly.
historian of economic warfare, not only credited Donovan with having
Stimson of "the possibilities of economic him controlwarfare" ov ru ttal ad ictur ation
FDR, nox, and plans that would give, 39
Coloas preparing "far-reaching political and psychological warfare. 19 Donovan 's
Colonel
of economic warfare, secret service, and sought after rather than seeking
own accounts of his activity, however, portray him as over twenty
anything for himself. officers how "for something
In 1943, after telling those Army he said that after his Lon-
years" he had been "going to wars in varand ious Navy parts of the world," look into me
he "made a study with some British officers in the Middle East, [and] when his Lon-
don trip the
back I found that there US been a committee of the Cabinet with sub appointed
he said, had long neglected intelligence, and "so ..
k
version to and of defewar caugh situation. "? the U.S. had no experien u.re into it. They talked
war caught us unprepared
a Cabinet committee had been appointed to inquire
there was set up what was
against it. "S0 suggestions. As a result of that,
with me and I made certain et ? 40 Earlier in 1943 he had written tat thisreport committee
called the Coordinator of Information. and then "prepared
ut into effect by Presidential order.
accepted and p m" clear. Probably he meant the
ced "ertain se;comm n recomme dations which were "studied
c is not preside
Just what committee Donovan was referring to
to lunch,
cabinet officers who were asked the F the BI, G-2, President and on ONI. April 4 to Donovan find did a "rehaveferee" them for
over "the twilight zone" gusiness; this could have been the "consultation."
a common occasion for him to transact b to show that this group ever met and carried on any
Otherwise, there is practically nothing General Jackson did discuss the
business. In an informal manner Stimson and ovAtt en relations
improvement that had taken place in Miles-Hoover relations since the "storm broke" in
"the trouble between broee and
February. Also Stimson did tell the President in co Y
Hoover had a smoothed out," and the President concurred with Stimson's decision not to
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replace Miles.42 Finally, Stimson did nothing about the suggestion
" referee," and the President did not again return to
"re," committee"
st to make Donovan e
was not much. his question of A
Possibly Donovan referred to the committee which had been appointed Aril 4. The
in November 1940 to study "the question of a constructive campaign
United States and as -a defense against subversive and Fifth Colmnactby she The idea
had been proposed and initially for loyalty in the
terior, but was neglected throughout dthegwinter months. The committee rvr cke " The idea
y Y Harold Ickes, the Secretar?y of the In-
Knox, Jackson, and others---did meet several times. The President joined the
Out of them came the Office of Civilian Defense Ickes, Stimson,
LaGuardia. During those discussions Donovan was one of those prominen l noon d by.
the President as a likely man to head the organization.43 ty mentioned by
The only specific request that reached Donovan from any understandably enough, from Frank Knox, who sat on both committees.
from Donovan cabinet member came
intelligence a his first important written statement on the His re establishment of a new
genhy. The statement, dated April 26, 1941 (Appendix A),of ew
that Donovan was, indeed, pushing for a new agency which
intelligence activities. Appendix A), is clear evidence
would coordinate the nation's
Donovan began by acknowledging the Secretary's " ?
"the instrumentality through which the British suggestion that he briefl
foreign countries." .First, however government y describe
operation of a forei n , he laid down some basic gathers its igoverningn on
g n agency. pdnniples
"party exigencies." Such an agency should not be g omit olled the
Its head should be appointed by the president and be responsible to him
tion
alone. It should have its own funds, and these should be secret and spent solely tion of the President. It should not take over either "the home duties" of " 91 intelligence organizations of the Army and the at the discre-
work abroad, would coordinate all collection activity abroad, and the would FBI l the
and interpret for the President and others all the collection information would have sole charge of
classify
btainom whatever source it was
obtained. The head of the organization 'would probably want an advisory committee
consisting at least of assistant secretaries of State, Teasur
Second, Donovan reminded Knox that he was referring y' War' Navy, and Justice.
narrowly construed." He wanted the Secretary to "keep "only td"ntellige fact that work more
war was conducted on more fronts than battle fronts,'
dominate the whole field of communications. .
ron , that achcombatant sought modern
interception and hole ied o ? ? I mean these things t the
mmonly and erroneously called censorship) of mailandlcables;
the interception of radio communications; the use of propaganda Yespecially: the
lines; and the direction of active subversive operations in enemy Countries." He
all these factors he had obtained firsthand information "which Ito penetrate behind enemy
here. I refer to it now only because I feel that all of these activities shoul sander d in
relation to the necessity of setting up a think better not to set down
Finally, he outlined the British Secret Ssrvice.aThis' h d be considered in
had no legal standing, and depended on a yearly vote of funds storthe Foreign Henry VII,
"secret service purposes." He described the central organization, even Provided
it, and briefly discussed the operation of the overseas sections." oreign Office for
If these were the ideas, and they most likely were, that D a sketch of
return noised about--to Knox, to the President and Harry that, Donovan immediately upon his
picked up by ONI and relayed to General Miles, Hopkins-it
caused it is not surprising
him to worry
y
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about Donovan fostering "a movement . . . to establish a super agency controlling all
intelligence." If this particular document, with its British orientation, had made its way, sur-
reptitiously or not, to interested parties in, for instance, Knox's own Navy Department, other
warning signals would have been hoisted. After all, Miles, trying on June 4 to get an
improvement in the intra-governmental dissemination of information, warned that "there
was a considerable amount of talk going on in Washington of4forming (somewhat after th
British pattern) a Central Secret Bureau of .11
But did Donovan want the job of running such an organization as he proposed? First,
he would tell the President in June that he did not want it and would accept it only on cer-
tain conditions. Second, Donovan was a soldier who still looked forward to leading men in
combat: early in life he had taken the military as a bride, became a hero, spent years going
to wars, indicated to Stimson an interest in forming a commando unit-obviously with
himself in uniform-and in February 1942 would ask the President for a command. Third,
Donovan was a proud man who, said Otto ("Ole") C. Doering, Jr., a lifelong friend, "would
have pushed the idea of COI but would not have pushed himself for the job. 46
It is probable, as Stephenson claimed, that Donovan had to be talked into the job. A
few days after Donovan sent his memorandum to Knox, Stephenson cabled Menzies in
London that he had been "attempting to manoeuvre Donovan into accepting the job of co-
ordinating all U.S. intelligence." Stephenson had certainly had time and reason for pushing
the idea with Donovan. Stephenson also probably supplied, and even had written, some of
the information on the British Secret Service which Donovan sent to Secretary Knox .41
Donovan's employment situation, however, remained unclear throughout April and
May. There was, of course, no assurance that the idea of COI itself would ever be
implemented. There is no indication that the President was yet seized of this idea. He had
other problems on his mind, and some of the Cabinet thought he was not sufficiently seized
of these. Stimson and Jackson, when they agreed that Miles and Hoover were getting along
better, also agreed, along with Knox and Ickes, on "the general apprehension on our part
about the indecision and lack of leadership of the whole war movement-the whole crisis."
The President, with Britain's position worsening and the American people confused about
the future, seemed to do nothing. He had been on a cruise; he had then been incapacitated
by a lingering low-grade infection; if he was not ill, he was inaccessible except, grumbled
Ickes, to Harry Hopkins.41
Donovan's future was also tied up with other organizational uncertainties. FDR had
indicated on April 17 that Donovan was one of those he was considering for the job of head-
ing the "bureau for constructive counterespionage work." A month later Roosevelt was
thinking of Donovan heading "sort of a ballyhoo committee" under LaGuardia. As late as
June 2 FDR was offering Donovan a bond drive job 49
The uncertainty and indecision finally got the better of Frank Knox who, writing on
May 22 to Felix Frankfurter, FDR's one-man employment agency, complained "frankly and
privately" that he was "a little bit disappointed that the Administration is not making better
use of Bill Donovan's services." He said the Colonel had "made such tremendous sacrifices
and contributed in such an outstanding way, that it seems strange to me that some very
important job is not asigned to him." Knox had apparently already been pushing Donovan
for the COI or some other job, for he went on to say that he was "getting to be a little sen-
sitive about urging him because it looks as if I were trying to find something for him to do,
which is not the case. I am impelled," he averred, "solely by the conviction that his services
are of the highest possible value to the country in this crisis." 50
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Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox was "disappointed" in 1941 that Roosevelt was "not
making better use of Bill Donovan's services."
U.S. Navy, National Archives
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7. A NEW INTELLIGENCE CHIEF
By May 31 the prospect of a COI and of Donovan is involvement had taken shape. By
then Donovan had drafted his first formal recommendation of a new American intelligence
organization. It was entitled "Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic
Information" (Appendix B).51
In it Donovan laid out his argument, proceeding from general to particular, for a new
information service. The basic proposition was the interrelationship of strategy and
information: without the latter, strategy was helpless, and unless directed to strategy,
information was useless. The second proposition related the information required to "total
war," that is, "the commitment of all resources of a nation, moral as well as material";
Donovan particularly stressed the dependence of modern war on "the economic base." The
third proposition was the flat assertion that, despite the activity of the Army and Navy intel-
ligence units, the country did not have an "effective service" for developing that "accurate,
comprehensive, long-range information without which no strategic board can plan for the
future." The conclusion was the essentiality of "a central enemy intelligence organization
which would itself collect either directly or through existing departments of government, at
home and abroad, pertinent information" on the total resources and intentions of the enemy.
Such information, he maintained, should be analyzed not only by Army and Navy
officers but also by scholars, economists, psychologists, technicians and students of finance.
This service should be headed by a coordinator directly responsible to the President and
assisted by an advisory panel consisting of the heads of the FBI, MID, ONI, and other in-
terested government agencies. Donovan carefully pointed out that his chart of the
organization (Figure 1) showed that "the proposed centralized unit" would neither "displace
nor encroach" upon any of these other activities not specifically mentioned in his text,
namely, codes and ciphers, communications interceptions, and economic warfare materials.
Donovan discussed this draft "at length" with Knox. A copy was sent to Stimson whose
friend, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, said he wanted to discuss it with the
Secretary.52 While the military would have great trouble with this memorandum, others
began to endorse it. Donovan has been quoted as saying that he "talked to everybody who
would listen." 53 Undoubtedly Knox pushed it, and perhaps Frankfurter put in a good word.
Stephenson, of course, had already been "attempting to manoeuvre" Donovan into the
intelligence picture.
Another supporter had arrived from Britain on May 25. This was the British Director
of Naval Intelligence, Rear Adm. John H. Godfrey, whom Donovan had met in London in
1940 and who in New York actually stayed in Donovan's apartment. Godfrey, accompanied
by his aide, Comdr. Ian Fleming, of future James Bond fame, had come as representative of
all the British services with a special mission to press upon the U.S. the integration of the
U.S. intelligence services. Godfrey admitted later that he and Fleming "overrated at the
time their part in briefing and boosting Big Bill [Donovan] while underrating the skillful
preparatory work done by Little Bill Stephenson." 54
Still another supporter came from Britain. This was FDR's ambassador in London,
John G. Winant, the former governor of New Hampshire. An unpublished OSS history cites
Winant as one of those to whom Donovan talked about his plans. Winant is described
therein as "enthusiastic about the Colonel's proposals," and as going to the White House
and urging the President to adopt Donovan's plan and "make the Colonel himself responsible
for carrying it out." 55 Winant is also cited by Stephenson as one of those "avenues of influ-
ence at the White House" which he exploited; he described Winant as "most persistent and
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effective" in pushing the proposal. In this category Stephenson also placed Robert Sherwood,
who was at this time a very enthusiastic supporter of Donovan's project, and Vincent Astor
was listed as one "who kept the subject alive." 56
But this die was not yet cast, for at this time FDR and Morgenthau were actually talk-
ing about a different job for Donovan-Administrator for the State of New York for the
Defense Savings Program. On June 2 the Secretary told one of his subordinates, Harold
Graves, that the President, who had been in Hyde Park since May 29, "said try Donovan
first-but he doubted he would take it-and then ... [James A.] Farley second and third,
[Gerard] Swope." Morgenthau then told Graves: "I tell you what to do. You take Donovan
and if he turns you down, I'd like to do Farley myself." 51
Three days later Donovan was informed by mail that "the President has suggested that
we should draft you to serve" as Administrator. "This," said the Secretary, "would be a full-
time job," which he and the President agreed would present "an unusual opportunity for
public service in these critical times." In 1969 Stephenson observed that he could have
gotten "a dozen men on Wall Street to handle that job but only Donovan could handle the
COI job.'"' The bond job would hang fire for two weeks, much to the impatience of the Sec-
retary, for support was building up behind the COI job. Winant was at the White House on
June 3, 4, and 6 with, of course, many problems besides COI on his mind. By June 10 Dono-
van had added two paragraphs to his memorandum, one on the need for all departments to
have the same information on which economic warfare could be waged, and the other
stressing the psychological element in modern warfare and the vital importance of radio as a
weapon. On the night of the tenth Admiral Godfrey, at a White House dinner, met with the
President and endeavored to make "his point" about Donovan and intelligence. On the
eleventh, interestingly enough, Grace Tully sent word to General Watson that the President
wanted to see both Bill Donovan and lawyer Ben Cohen before the latter returned to
England. In view off' the role that Cohen would soon play, it is quite possible that this mes-
sage indicates that the President had by this time made up his mind to make Donovan his
coordinator of information."
Certainly that expectation was in the air in the week of waiting that lay ahead. On
June 13 Morgenthau, sweating about his bond job, told Graves that Donovan, who was
coming to see him, wanted "to tell me something about the President first." More revealing
is Sherwood's note to Harry Hopkins on the sixteenth: " . if Bill's appointment goes
through, I hope to get an appointment on his staff-and Bill says he wants me to work with
him." Also on the sixteenth Sherwood wrote Morgenthau that he was "waiting on the
anxious seat for materialization of the job [with Donovan] that I want most to do." Still on
the sixteenth, Sherwood, with Winant clearly in mind, wrote Donovan: "Yesterday evening
at your house was a wonderfully interesting one. I saw the Ambassador again today. He's a
honey. The latter had, in the meantime, on June 12 and 15, lunched with the President.59
On the seventeenth Morgenthau was telling his secretary, Mrs. Klotz, to remind him to
call up Donovan: "I want to have him give me a yes or no on whether he is going to take the
chairmanship in New York State. I am not going to wait any longer." At 9:10 that morning,
Donovan, in conversation with the Secretary, indicated that things had been hanging fire but
were reaching a climax:
Morgenthau: Hello.
Donovan: Good morning, Henry.
Morgenthau: Bill?
Donovan: Yeah.
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Morgenthau: I hope you won't think I'm unduly restless.
Donovan: Oh, no.
Morgenthau: But we have to get started in New York.
Donovan: Well, look Henry., I'm. down here today because I'm supposed to have a
date this morning.
Morgenthau: Uh uh.
Donovan: That's the reason you haven't heard from me.
Morgenthau: I see.
Donovan: I'll get hold of you just as soon as I get through, Henry.
Donovan: I sent word by Frank the other day because I thought that was the
quickest.
Morgenthau: Frank?
Donovan: Frank Knox.
Morgenthau: He didn't tell me anything.
Donovan: Oh, that God-I told him to tell you, but I haven't seen him yet.
Morgenthau: No, he never said anything.
Donovan: Well, I thought that. was the quickest way of getting to you.
Morgenthau: He must have forgot.
Donovan: I'm sorry, Henry, because I was trying to get that word to you.
Morgenthau: Good, well, you think between now and sunset?
Donovan: Oh, even if I don't. hear, I will call you.60
Donovan did not call Henry before or after sunset. Donovan clearly had other things on
his mind, and in any case his "date this morning" was put off until the next day, the
eighteenth. Then at 12:30, he, Knox, and Ben Cohen met with the President." What
transpired there and then must be reconstructed from bits and pieces provided by Donovan
and Cohen and from the President's action.
Donovan told Bill Stephenson that very day that he had accepted the appointment as
Coordinator of Information "after [a] long discussion wherein all points were agreed." He
would be the coordinator of all forms of intelligence including offensive operations, would
have the rank of major general, and would be responsible only to the President. Interestingly
enough, Stephenson, cabling this news to London, then quoted Donovan as "accus[ing] him
of having `intrigued and driven' him into [accepting the] appointment." Stephenson's own
comment on the day's news was, significantly enough, self-congratulatory: "You can imagine
how relieved I am after three months of battle and jockeying for positon in Washington that
our man is in a position of such importance to our efforts." 62
A week later other Britishers cabled the news to London. Reported Lord Halifax:
Donovan has been appointed "to supervise United States Intelligence Service and has been
promoted to Major-General . . . directly responsible to [the] President." Cabled the consul
general in New York: Donovan will "coordinate all security intelligence activities." In
London one official observed that Donovan "should prove a very good man from our point of
view," and another noted that his office had received "this good news already."
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Meanwhile, Donovan, moving into high gear and establishing new contacts at the
Treasury, told Morgenthau on the twentieth that the President had "accepted in totem" JsicJ
what he and the Secretary had earlier discussed. Two weeks later, at Stimson's office to iron
out problems we shall soon take up, Donovan agreed that his new job should be "essentially
and entirely civilian," that that had been his view from the beginning, and that he "had only
taken up the point of rank of Major General because the President had suggested it." 64 As
will be shown, it would be a long time before Donovan made major general.
Weeks later Donovan wrote a friend in London that he had told the President he did
not want the job and would accept it only on the condition that he would report only to the
President, that the President's secret funds would be available to him, and that all
departments of the government would be instructed to give him what he wanted. Much later
still, Donovan wrote FDR reminding him of the fact that both of them had agreed that there
would be nothing in writing, presumably about secret activities, especially about the use of
radio in the procurement of vitally needed information."
Ben Cohen, legal draftsman for the President, told his fellow draftsmen from the
Bureau of the Budget the next day that Colonel Donovan "had persuaded the President"
that the new office should be set up outside the framework of the Office of Emergency Man-
agement and that it should be set up by virtue of the President's authority as Commander-
in-Chief, that it would, thus, "have a military flavor." Cohen also relayed the news that the
President had "apparently been struck by the thought that Donovan might take the morale
job on temporarily . . . [and that he would] cooperate with LaGuardia on the morale and
propaganda aspects." 66
For his part the President had on the eighteenth scrawled on the cover sheet of
Donovan's memorandum of June 10 this message to the Acting Director of the Budget
Bureau, John B. Blandford, Jr.: "Please set this up cofdentially with Ben Cohen-
Military-not O.E.M. FDR." The "confidentially" probably referred to the use of secret
funds and vague language in laying out the new organization's purpose and functions.
"Military" meant that Donovan would be a major general. "Not O.E.M." meant that he
would not be bracketed with the numerous new war agencies under the O.E.M. umbrella but
would report directly to FDR.
While there would be much uncertainty, especially among Donovan's foes, as to just
what the President and the Colonel had agreed the latter would do, there is no doubt that
FDR had taken an unprecedented step. He had, first of all, authorized the establishment of
that "National Intelligence Service" which John A. Gade had proposed a dozen years
earlier. He had, secondly, authorized by indirection the use of those "gum shoe methods"
and that "intricate national secret service" which Gade found abhorrent to "the sentiment of
every American of common sense." Finally, he had done these things with almost no
consultation with and to the dismay of the existing intelligence and information agencies of
the government. There is also no doubt that Colonel Donovan proceeded to operate like a
man fully authorized not only to coordinate intelligence-to construct Gade's "Wheel of
Information" with its "Central Hub"-but also to conduct a whole range of operations-
psychological, political, or unconventional warfare. President and Colonel had thus taken a
giant step in the establishment of the country's pioneer organization for central intelligence
and special operations.
When the President's visitors left his office that afternoon, Knox returned to his office
to handle more Navy business, Cohen had the 934 words of Donovan's memorandum to put
into legal language, and Donovan had a Presidential mandate in hand, a headful of ideas,
and a list of people to consult.
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FDR authorizes establishment of COI-crn unprecedented American service for intelligence and
special operations.
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of the So preoccupied and hurried was he that he completely forgot about the Se who rya d the
Treasury. At 4:00 p.m. Morgenthau finally got hold of Donovan's secretary, "I he
Colonel had caught a 3:30 plane to New York. "Well," explained the secretary, guess
must have forgot about it today while he was here.. . . He must have forgot about it be-
cause I was with him all the time and almost until the time he got on the plane." Still want-
ing "a yes or a no," Morgenthau asked to have Donovan call him that night through the
Treasury office. Sometime that evening the Colonel "telephoned Mrs. Klotz" and told her he
"could not take the position" of the Administrator of the New York bond drive.67 Donovan
was not too hurried or preoccupied, however, to meet with Bill Stephenson, who that night
cabled London his account of the important accomplishment of the day.
8. ISSUANCE OF THE COI ORDER OF JULY 11, 1941
The next day Ben Cohen and a Budget Bureau trio of Blandford, William T. Stone,
and Bernard Gladieux started drafting the order establishing the proposed "Service of
Strategic Information." There is no need here to take up the various drafts and follow them
through the many changes that were made. Suffice it to separate those provisions which pre-
sented no problem from those which did the opposite. There was no difficulty with the
appointment of an advisory committee or with assuring Donovan-at least on paper-access
to data held by the other agencies; this was also largely true of the statement of the
of order, relationship to the
the name of the new service, btheestatuslof Donovan, and his
of
military.
Cohen, laying out for the Budget people the President's wishes, stressed that Donovan's
propaganda effort was directed abroad but that Donovan would cooperate with LaGuardia
on internal measures. He further stressed that Donovan's project would not hold up the im-
minent establishment of the Office of Economic Defense. He apparently left it to his co-
drafters to decide whether the order should be an executive order establishing the agency in
the Executive Office or a military order designating Colonel Donovan to perform the
necessary duties."
One of the Budget trio worked up a tentative outline of the service. There were three
functions: (1) to collect, review, analyze, interpret and correlate government information
bearing on national defense strategy; (2) to make available such information to the President
and others; and (3) to carry out, as requested by the President, "such supplementary
activities" as would be helpful in the securing of information not otherwise available to the
government. These functions were divided among six units, each headed by a director, and
each corresponding to a unit on Donovan's chart. "Supplementary activities" were described
as those which were not then being carried on but which would be carried on abroad, which
were calculated to assist friendly elements and "undermine hostile elements," and which
would necessarily have to be "conducted along unorthodox lines, but with the greatest
possible circumspection." 69
With this as a starter, the Budget men drafted two orders, one which established the
"Strategic Information Service" but did not mention Donovan, and the other which
designated "Colonel William J. Donovan" as the "Coordinator of Strategic Information."
There would be much playing around with Donovan's name and that of the new service.
They sent the latter order, a military one, to Cohen, who worked on it with Blandford. Their
revision began with the establishment of the new position and ended with the new line:
William J. Donovan, United States Army, is hereby designated as Coordinator...." The
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military, however, soon knocked out the "United States Army," as well as other military
aspects of the order. Indeed, it was stripped of its military character, contrary to FDR's
original directive.70
Trouble had been brewing in the Munitions Building on Constitution Avenue where
Secretary Stimson and General Marshall had adjoining offices. The G-2, General Miles, had
of course, been worried all spring by reports and rumors of Donovan's intelligence ambitions
and activities, but he apparently had never been able to engage the attention of these higher
officials on this particular problem. The first sign of interest at this echelon appeared on
June 3 when Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, obtaining a copy of Donovan's
memorandum of May 31, sent it on to the Secretary with a request for a chance to talk it
over with him. If they did so, nothing untoward developed. On June 20, when Knox told him
the President was going to appoint Donovan "as coordinator of all military, naval, and other
intelligence," Stimson commented that he "was inclined to favor it" because he "trusted
Donovan." Two days later Donovan talked with Stimson for two hours and explained his
plans. Stimson saw in them "a good chance of very useful service," and he was "particularly
glad that the President . . . landed on a man" for whom he had "such respect and con-
fidence" and with whom he thought the Army and Navy intelligence services could work "so
satisfactorily." "
Then Marshall came into the picture. On the twenty-fourth he brought up to Stimson
the appointment of Donovan, which had "evidently been worrying him very much and
making him extremely angry." Marshall, thought Stimson, had evidently gotten the project
"in the wrong end to," and saw behind it "an effort to supplant his responsibilities and
duties in direct connection with the Commander-in-Chief." Obviously trying to be a
middleman, Stimson thought there was some danger, especially if both men were not
"tactful and fair to each other," but he also thought "the proposition of checking up /sicJ the
Intelligence which we get . . . ought to be accomplished." He noted that Knox, with whom
he had discussed the plan, thought that it was "all wrong to be suspicious of it." 11
But the seed of suspicion had been planted, and the plant sprouted either that clay or
the next. While he still considered the project "very laudable and fruitful," Stimson doubted
that Donovan's way was "the right way to do it." So when Ben Cohen arrived with the draft
order for Stimson's examination, the Secretary "looked at it with care," worked the thing
out in his mind, and finally told Cohen:
That I thought it was such bad planning from the standpoint of military
administration that I should not favor it unless Donovan was kept in a purely
civilian capacity; that I disapproved wholly of having him made a Major General
simultaneously with this assumption of this position. . The proposed draft was
full of language treating the function as if it were a military one. I told Cohen that
this plainly resulted in giving the President two Chiefs of Staff; one, the regular
one and one, an irregular one, because no military man could go to the President
with military information without giving at the same time some views in the
nature of advice based upon that information. I told Cohen that I thought the
thing might be worked out if the Coordinator were kept purely as a civilian. I told
him also that I was a friend of Donovan's and that I sympathized with his ultimate
ambition to get into the fighting if fighting came and that I would have no
objection to recommending him at. that time as a Major General; but that I was
wholly against combining in his person the function of being a Major General and
being a Coordinator of Information.
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After that presentation, it is not surprising that Stimson was able to record that "Cohen
seemed to realize the strength of my argument and said he would go over it and take the
military phrases out." He also agreed, at the Secretary's suggestion, to add a paragraph to
the effect that nothing in the coordinator's duties and responsibilities would in any way
interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities of the regular military and naval advi-
sors of the President as their Commander-in-Chief. Later that morning Stimson commu-
nicated his new views to Knox, who proved "quite rampant on the subject" but then saw
Stimson's "point" and "cooled down." Even so, it must have been this news that provoked
the Navy chief to ask the President to send a reassuring letter about Donovan's job to the
cabinet secretaries whose departments had "their hackles up over the danger that somebody
is going to take something away from them." "
No hackles were higher than the Army's. Indeed, after Miles turned down Lee's
proposed JIC, after Miles's plan for improving the interdepartmental dissemination of
information got nowhere, and after the three intelligence services assured the President of
their competency, and after the President had okayed Donovan's plan for a "Service of
Strategic Information," Army authorities then hurriedly brought forward a new proposition.
They proposed the establishment of "an agency to coordinate the various governmental
sources of information." The military, they said "should handle it." They proposed to
establish under the Joint Board "a general Intelligence Service." [sic] A memorandum to
this effect was prepared for the President; it argued that only military men, judging all ele-
ments in the light of the entire strategic situation, could correctly evaluate the military
implications of economic and political factors. As for stopping Donovan, it was too late; the
proposal seems never to have reached the President.74
Meanwhile Cohen had set about trying to mollify Stimson and Marshall. A new draft
kept the order as a "Military Order," but eleven times Cohen struck the word "strategic"
from the document and replaced it by either "defense" or "national security." He changed
Donovan's title to "Coordinator of Defense Information" and related his activity to
"national security" rather than military strategy. He did retain the line that the coordinator
"shall perform his duties and responsibilities, which include those of a military character,
under the direction and supervision of the President as Commander-in-Chief . . . ," but he
added Stimson's guarantee that nothing in those duties would in any way interfere with the
work of the President's regular military and naval advisors. As we shall see, only this last
provision actually survived.
The Budget Bureau cleaned up the paper and on the twenty-seventh returned a copy to
Cohen and sent other copies to Stimson and Knox. In the letters to the secretaries,
Blandford said he understood that the drafts would be used "as a basis of discussion with
your associates . . . over the weekend." He hoped that the order could be put in final form
for the President when he returned from Hyde Park early the next week." He was, however,
disappointed.
For almost a week, Stimson, Marshall, and McCloy continued to chew over the subject.
On Monday, the thirtieth, when FDR returned to Washington, Stimson was noting that the
Donovan business was "a troublesome matter even with the best of luck. I am afraid of it."
That evening he told the President on the telephone that he had decided "it would be a great
mistake" to set up the COI with Donovan as a military man. As a civilian, yes, but Stimson
asked the President to do nothing about it until they had a chance to discuss it.76
The next morning Stimson had a long talk with Marshall-at least their third, possibly
the fourth-and his brief account leaves us with unsatisfied curiosity. He said he explained
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to the General "how important it was for his own-Marshall's-sake that there should not
be a sharp issue made on this." 77 Could this be a reference to the lately proposed "general
Intelligence Service" under the Joint Board'?
Stimson spent "a good deal of the-morning and afternoon" of the next day, July 2, talk-
ing over the matter with both Marshall and McCloy; he arranged to see Donovan the next
morning at 8:30 in order to "settle the thing one way or the other." It was surely bothering
him: "it is a terrible nuisance to have this thrown on me at this time but it is so important
that I have got to settle it in the right way."78
For a change, that was not going to be difficult. When Stimson and McCloy, but not
Marshall, met with Donovan, "everybody was fairminded." Donovan said he had picked up
the military aspect only because the President had suggested it. Either then or later in the
conversation, Stimson offered to recommend Donovan for major general any time he
"wanted to fight." Indeed, if Donovan wanted to do it now and give up COI, he could have
"one of the most difficult positions" in the army, namely, command of the Forty-fourth
Division. The Colonel admitted that he was interested in developing a theory of guerrilla
warfare but he preferred now to stay with the information job, "make something real out of
it," and then turn to fighting and a commission later.
Donovan also agreed to a "diagram" which Marshall had drawn up and which McCloy
had now brought forth; this set out "the :routine channels" for the passage of recommenda-
tions as to intelligence and information from Donovan through a host of military and naval
offices to the President. Even so, all agreed that Donovan should have access to the
President whenever he desired. it, because it was "necessary to his position and the
President's temperament and characteristics" would make it inevitable.79
Agreement at last. Later the same day Donovan met with Ben Cohen and the Budget
trio-Blandford, Stone, and Gladieux-to finish the paperwork. McCloy, however, was still
discussing the "final revised draft" with Stimson. The bureau had hoped to receive the paper
in the afternoon, clear it, and "send it immediately to Hyde Park." It came back later that
day, however, with significant changes. The "Military Order" was now just an "Order." So
also, the "Coordinator of Defense Information" lost "Defense." That officer was now in the
first instance to send his production not to the President but to the Joint Planning Division
of the Joint Board. Again, the COI would carry out his "supplementary activities" when re-
quested by the President and the two service secretaries. Again, the sentence about the COI
performing his duties "of a military character, under the President as Commander-in-Chief
was excised, and there was left only Stimson's guarantee against interference with the
President's military and naval advisors. In the last paragraph "Colonel William J. Donovan"
was designated "Coordinator of Defense /sic/ Information." 80
Donovan and the others went quickly to wort, on these changes. The "Order" was now
eliminated, so now there was no indication of what was being issued. They accepted
elimination of "Defense" from the title, excised. the reporting to the Joint Planning Division
and responding to the service secretaries' requests for supplementary activities, and accepted
McCloy's handling of the issue of military duties and noninterference with the advisors.
Finally, only "William J. Donovan" became COI. The job was clearly not military.
To that extent the Army had scored a victory. G-2, concerned for its existence and its
autonomy, and distrustful of civilian interference, had opposed the establishment of any
outside coordinator of the intelligence agencies. The Army high command, especially
General Marshall, undoubtedly, and perhaps understandably, viewed with utmost dismay
any such coordinator when that coordinator was a major general with direct access to the
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White House and when that major general was as strategy-oriented and bureaucratically
aggressive as Bill Donovan gave every indication of being. The Army was, in the final
analysis, profoundly opposed to giving any civilian, as the Army saw it, control over the
information and intelligence on which it had to wage military and naval campaigns and be
responsible for countless human lives and the nation's very security. The Army opposed
Donovan, but by its failure to put its own intelligence house in order, it had helped to make
him Coordinator of Information. With the drafting of the COI order completed, the Army
had managed to make the best of what, for it, was a most unwelcome innovation.
The wrap-up went quickly. Still on the third, Budget Director Harold D. Smith sent to
FDR both the finished product (Appendix C) and a proposed statement for the press. Smith
observed that since the appointment rested on the President's authority as Commander-in-
Chief, "it should be issued as a Military Order." Be that as it may, it appeared officially,
and so it appears today, simply as an undenominated presidential act "Designating a
Coordinator of Information." Smith also observed that the title, unlike the titles originally
suggested, was "vague . . . and not descriptive" of the work Donovan would do.81 Smith
would appreciate better in the weeks to come how vague the entire order was.
Completed on the third, the document sat in the President's in-box for a week.
Presumably the press of the presidential calendar accounted for the inactivity. In the
meantime there was public expectation of a forthcoming announcement. On July 6 the
Associated Press reported that Colonel Donovan was "slated for a big post"; the only clues
to its character were "the reports for some time that . . . Donovan would head a new anti-
spy agency." According to these reports, Donovan would "coordinate a staff of investigators"
in Justice, Treasury, State, and the military and naval departments. The rest of the article
tied the job in with spies, the FBI case load, and Donovan's own 1940 investigation of the
Fifth Column."
On July 9, the New York Times reported that Donovan would soon be named
"Coordinator of Intelligence Information"-a term that shows up nowhere in the drafting
process. The Times did accurately assess the job as "without precedent in the government's
operations," and said Donovan's duties were "sufficiently elastic to take in such future
possibilities as counter-espionage operations and, perhaps, direction of some economic
programs." His primary task, however, was taking other departments' reports and presenting
them to the President in unified and manageable form.S3
The next day, in the White House, Roosevelt told Smith that he had the "Executive
Order" before him and "intended to sign it shortly." He wanted Smith to get Donovan and
LaGuardia together "to iron out the problem with respect to radio broadcasting." 84 That
was no problem compared with the broadcasting problem involving Donovan and Nelson
Rockefeller that Smith and the President would have to iron out in October. In the morning
of the eleventh of July 1941 FDR approved the COI order, and the White House released
the first official word on the organization."
In his capacity as Coordinator of Information, "Mr. Donovan" was directed to "collect
and assemble information and data bearing on national security from the various depart-
ments . . . " and "to analyze and collate such materials for the use of the President and
such other officials as the President may designate." While "Mr. Donovan's" task was the
coordination and correlation of defense information, his work was not intended to "supersede
or duplicate, or to involve any direction of or interference with, the activities of the General
Staff, the regular intelligence services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or of other
existing departments and agencies."
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Left out of the public release, because the President's press secretary, Steve Early,
thought it not "clear to many" and likely to "lead to much questioning," was the statement
that "Mr. Donovan may from time to time be requested by the President to undertake
activities helpful in the securing of defense information not available to the Government
through existing departments and agencies." 86 Even without the warning, there was "much
questioning" within the government as to just what Donovan was supposed to be doing.
Of all the contemporary comments on the appointment perhaps the most interesting is
that recorded that very day in London by General Lee, recently returned to his attache post.
Deprecating the job as he had received it from press clippings and a G-2 friend, Col. Hayes
Kroner, namely, that Donovan had "absolute power to summon Sherman Miles, or anyone
else, and countermand the orders of the Secretary of War and of the Navy," Lee thought: it
all grew "out of the memorandum which I left with the Chief of Staff last March and that. is
what Hayes Kroner says." Getting what smug satisfaction he could out of that observation,
he went on to "hope . . . that Donovan really gets the idea, which is consolidating all intel-
ligence coming to the United States, and does not run off in pursuit of counterespionage and
anti-subversive work. That is only negative activity while the proper crystallization of all
intelligence is positive activity." B'
No one would ever accuse the new Coordinator of Information either of confusing
"negative" and "positive" activity or of neglecting the latter.
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Col. Raymond E. Lee, attache in London, thought COI was the result of his advice to Donovan.
Lee is shown here as a brigadier general in charge of G-2, 1941-42.
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Chapter V
THE FIRST SIX MONTHS
When Henry Morgenthau had said all those nice words about Donovan having seen
more of the war and knowing more about it than anyone else "by about a thousand per
cent" and still not being "discouraged," Harry Dexter White commented, to accompanying
laughter, "that is all good preparation for Washington." When pressed by the Secretary to
explain, White said he meant that Donovan "ought to be at home in all the fighting that is
going on." To which Morgenthau added: "Well, he is a fighter, don't worry." '
1. DONOVAN'S TASK
White had reference, of course, to the change that had come over Washington since the
preceding summer of 1940 when the switch from preoccupation with the New Deal to the
necessities of defense, and even preparation for war, had brought to town a whole host of
personalities and ordinary people, caught up for patriotic and other reasons, in the operation
and expansion of the national bureaucracy. Colonel Knox of the Chicago News and
venerable "Harry" Stimson were but two of the most prominent and, for political reasons,
most controversial. There were also such as Donald Nelson, the Sears Roebuck executive
who would head the War Production Board; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., the General Motors
and United States Steel executive who would hold several jobs in the war years; and another
GM executive, the immigrant William S. Knudsen, who headed the Office of Production
Management (OPM). Each of these, and innumerable more like them, also brought in his
train countless lower-level executives, lawyers, industrialists, administrators, and private
secretaries, as well as wives, children, and other relatives, who helped to increase the
pressure for "place," as well as for food and quarters, in the burgeoning town on the
Potomac.
All these people were involved in organizing the country, the people, the economy, and
the law for the purposes of defense and war. They wrestled with or produced new needs, new
tasks, new mandates, and, especially, new organizations. These last, numerous in New Deal
days, multiplied daily as defense took over. There was the Office of Emergency Manage-
ment, the Defense Plant Corporation, Nelson Rockefeller's Office for Coordination of
Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics, and Mayor
LaGuardia's Office of Civilian Defense. Before war's end there were 136 war agencies in the
executive branch of the government. This proliferation of organizations generated new
problems, struggles, rivalries, defeats, and victories. Harry Truman's famous remark about
getting out of the kitchen if one could not stand the heat applied to the Washington scene
into which Donovan confidently and aggressively strode in the spring of 1941.2
Donovan was ready for battle, both at home and abroad. As for the latter he had been
convinced for some time that the United States would have to enter the war. Late in 1939 he
had warned that the U.S. might have to send men to Europe. Early in 1941 he had the idea
of announcing that he was "personally ... tired of having a lot of cockneys and Australians
and British aristocrats do all the bloodletting." In May he wrote his erstwhile Balkan
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traveling companion, Colonel Dykes, that the American people were "still in turmoil,"
obviously over the question of whether and how to aid Britain. "We are rather miserable,"
he wrote. "We shrink from the inevitable."'
As for the domestic scene, Donovan, at fifty-eight, was no shrinking violet. He had sold
the President on a new organization; and even before his charter had been issued he had
enlisted the aid of prominent enthusiasts for vigorous action. "To work for Bill Donovan,"
wrote William D. Whitney, "would be preparing for actual warfare."' Donovan had brought
a new idea to Washington, and he was prepared to fight hard for it.
His basic idea was to beat the Germans at their own game: first, demoralize the enemy
and cripple his war-making machine, and then if necessary let the armed forces conquer
him. To accomplish the first part he saw that, he would need a constant flow of current in-
formation about the strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of the enemy and all his
works. This information, exhaustively studied so as to be most profitably exploited, he
planned to turn against the enemy through a continuous propaganda counteroffensive which
would be threaded together with a covertly-conducted campaign of subversion and sabotage.
Then would come the commandos, perhaps with himself in uniform, raiding, seizing, or
destroying as a softening-up prelude to a full-scale invasion.
Such a concept presupposed a multi-faceted organization which would collect informa-
tion, conduct research and analysis, coordinate information, print and broadcast propaganda,
mount special operations, inspire guerrilla action, and send commandos into battle. The
program was, at one and the same time, commonplace and unusual, academic and
operational, overt and covert, peaceful and forceful, legal and illegal. Donovan's task--his
synthesis of new and borrowed ideas--was, it seems fair to conclude, unprecedented in
American history.
Implementing it required him to move forward simultaneously on numerous salients of
a variegated front: to build, staff, finance, and administer a bureaucracy; to obtain practical
advice and guidance on propaganda, intelligence, and subversion and then define and assign
corresponding missions and tasks; to develop working relations with other government
agencies, especially the various intelligence services; and simultaneously, because his mission
was urgent, to produce results for the President. and be ready for the war which he felt
surely was on the way. His 1-asks he held in his hands as so many strings that he
simultaneously fingered; they must be taken here, however, a string at a time.
2. SPACE, MONEY, AND PEOPLE
When Donovan asked the Budget Bureau on July 3, to assign him someone who would
assist on budget, organization, space, and other general administrative matters, 6 it had no
reason to expect any unusual problems. It, like the public, had been led to expect that the
new organization would be a relatively small staff' which would simply digest and present to
the President in brief and orderly fashion the "scattered reports" which FDR often found
"hopelessly confusing." 6 The truth was that Donovan, impatiently readying for war, was an
empire-builder.
As such, he needed space. When he was not shuttling between New York and
Washington, especially on the afternoon and midnight. trains, he was operating, in
Manhattan, out of his office at Two Wall Street and his apartment at One Beekman Place,
and, in Washington, out of his firm's office in the Bowen Building on Fifteenth Street and
his residence in Georgetown at ]1647 30th Street, N.W. Donovan worked wherever he was,
and that included home, where meals were occasions for conferences, and his automobile,
when he was being chauffeured to and from the office.
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"t d
N }
d
it
0-
0 O
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An interwar airscape of the Federal Triangle showing in the foreground the Apex Building,
which was Donovan's second CC)I home.
U.S. Army Air Force, National Archives
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On July 11, when the order was made public, he moved into three rooms-Nos. 246,
247, and 248-in the old State-War-Navy Building, that architectural wonder next to the
White House. By July 30 he had some thirty-two rooms in the Apex Building, the flat-iron
building which lies at the foot of Capitol Hill. At the same time plans were under way to
house his researchers at the Library of Congress. In another month he had taken up
permanent headquarters in the "Foggy Bottom" section of town, down by the river, in the
old Public Health buildings; in time his people would occupy new temporary buildings-
"tempos"-and an old skating rink cheek by jowl to a brewery. In the meantime, like a
proper government agency, COI had acquired out-of-town offices in New York and had
plans for the West Coast, London, and elsewhere overseas.
Donovan also needed funds. Ben Cohen had estimated that COI's small staff could
manage on a budget of $1,454,700 for the first year, all of which would come from the
President's "Emergency Fund" of $100,000,000. Harold D. Smith, the Director of the
Budget, made $450,000 of this available to Donovan on July 21 so that he could "get
started." ' Little did Smith, much appreciated by the President for his budgetary
superintendency, guess that within two months Donovan would be asking for $10,000,000.
Donovan himself received no compensation, but he was entitled to receive "actual and
necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance" of
his duties. His office was later informed that the Colonel, in defraying such costs as official
entertaining, was not limited to a common $10 per diem. However, he was not permitted to
charge off against the government the cost of home telephone service used in official
business.' Donovan had always spent, and would continue to spend, much of his own money
on public service.
He needed people. Here too he had been drawing on his resources as head of Donovan
Leisure Newton and Lumbard, as the firm was then constituted. When he was off on public
business, the partners carried on. In New York his private secretary, Walter Berry, who had
been with him since the 1932 gubernatorial campaign, handled both his public and private
affairs. So also in Washington with Richard Mahar who ran the much smaller office in the
Bowen Building. It was Mahar who on June 18 had had to explain to the importunate Sec-
retary of the Treasury that the Colonel "must have forgot" to call about the bond job as he
had promised.' It was also Mahar who had carried a memorandum on the British
commandos to Stimson's office on July 3. But Donovan could not begin to rely on the firm
for COI's need not only for people to run the new organization as a government bureau but
also, and especially, to man the baker's dozen of major operations that were germinating in
Donovan's mind.
For administrative personnel it was probably his request to the Budget Bureau for an
assistant that brought him in mid-July, first on a loan basis, then on permanent status, the
Secretary of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Thomas G. Early. A lawyer, with a master's
degree in economics, Early built up the bureaucracy. By September 11 he was officially
executive officer in charge of an administrative structure sporting a budget and planning
officer, a business officer, and a personnel chief. The last named, James B. Opsata, had by
late August advertised for applications for clerical, stenographic, typing, and filing positions;
he was drawing personnel-looking for an upward move-from other agencies, and was
vice
recruiting some highly skilled and needed people, often without regard to the civil servms
registers. By September there were forty people on board, but, because of the pr
inherent in organizing "a completely new and radical government agency," 10 the forty were
subject to considerable uncertainty as far as status and pay were concerned.
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For his own operational people Donovan turned to his friends, associates, friends of
both, and to prominent and talented people recommended by the friends and associates.
Here it must be stressed that Donovan had no time to build slowly and from scratch, as from
a junior career trainee program which would eventually produce analysts, secret agents,
propagandists, saboteurs and commandos. Also, because of the intended secrecy of COI's
activity, Donovan felt a. special concern to establish the reliability of his employees. He had,
therefore, to begin with what was literally "ready, willing, and able" and at hand, and at the
outset these were generally men of stature and position within their own fields. He began
with his own milieu.
One of the first of these, one he could trust to "protect" him, to "keep the knives out of
his back," was a former law clerk of his in the anti-trust division of Justice, James R.
("Jimmy") Murphy, whom he called to the Apex Building "on a hot Friday afternoon" and
who for two weeks could not get back to his own office to close it up "for the duration." For
the rest of those formless days of that first summer, Murphy, with no fixed title, was an
executive assistant making appointments for the Colonel, interviewing applicants-eager to
work for the Donovan "brain bureau"-and handling the Colonel's increasingly voluminous
and sensitive correspondence. Murphy eventually headed the X-2 or counterespionage
branch of OSS."
Another friend from Justice days was William D. ("Bill") Whitney who, because of his
British connections, was picked by Donovan to set up his London office. Whitney was a
member of Oxford University, a barrister of Inner Temple, and had an English wife. On the
outbreak of the war he had joined the British army where he worked in intelligence, and
with an assist from Donovan he then switched to Averill Harriman's lend-lease mission in
London. From there he moved to COI, because the Harriman job had not been sufficiently
aimed at preparing for war..12
Another friend enlisted by Donovan 'was an old World War comrade, Col. G. Edward
("Ned") Buxton. The Colonel had been the famous Sergeant York's battalion commander; it
was Buxton, according to Donovan, "who converted York from a conscientious objector into
a good fighting man." A Rhode Island newspaperman and textile manufacturer, Buxton
gave Donovan yeoman service, chiefly as Assistant Director of OSS. "Ned" was, said one
colleague, "a bulwark of loyalty" who gave Donovan "freedom to move around the world ...
knowing that Buxton would never undercut him." 13
Even before he had recruited this trio of friends, he had turned to a pair of literary
lights, friends of the President, who would help him get started on two major units of COI,
radio and research. The first of these, probably his first recruit, and probably one he got
from FDR," was the 44-year old Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright Robert E. Sherwood,
who had recently become a valued presidential speech-writer. Enlisted by Donovan to run his
propaganda office, Sherwood was actually doing recruiting of his own even before Donovan
had obtained Roosevelt's authorization to set up COI. He had lined up for COI Edmond
Taylor, author of The Strategy of Terror, and Douglas Miller, who was on the verge of
becoming famous as the author of You Can't Do Business with Hitler. He would soon enlist
the services of the banker, versifier, and political writer, James P. Warburg, the Chicago
News correspondent Wallace R. Deuel, and the foreign editor of the New York Herald
Tribune, Joseph Barnes."
The second literary figure reached by Donovan was another dramatist, also poet and
professor, the 49-year old Archibald ("Archie") MacLeish, whom FDR had persuaded in
1939 to head up the Library of Congress. MacLeish, who never belonged to either COI or
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Archobald MacLeish-poet, Librarian of Congress-helped Donovan organize scholars for
intelIBgence service.
Library of Congress
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OSS, helped Donovan organize the unit of professors who gave COI and OSS their renown
as a "brain bureau." This bureau was initially headed by the Williams College professor and
president, Dr. James Phinney ("Fenny") Baxter, 3d, who soon had working for him an
outstanding staff of historians, political scientists, economists, and other social scientists.
Donovan also recruited recruiters. One of these, also an advisor on organizational
matters, was the pollster Elmo Roper, who may have been consulted by Donovan even before
July 11. Another was the president of the Sperry Corporation, Thomas A. Morgan, who sent
Donovan a list of nine eligible Navy men plus the admonition to "first select the topside men
and then have them assist you in selecting the juniors." "Archie" MacLeish, apparently
responding to a request, sent to Donovan a ]list, produced in the White House, of five
suggestions for the job of general counsel; heading the list, for what historical interest there
is in the fact, was Alger Hiss, described therein as the " `perfect lawyer,' if such there be in
government." 11
Once the recruiting process began, new names were quickly added. Among these was
the eldest son of the President, James, who years later thought his assignment had been
made by the Marine Corps at the request of his father who wanted him stationed in
Washington at that particular time." Another was the "brilliant" sister of Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter, Estelle Frankfurter, who was hired "to do digesting" and who,
said the man who hired her, "also knows Washington quite well and can be useful to us for
certain types of contacts." There was the diplomat John C. Wiley, most recently minister to
Latvia and Estonia, the Hawaiian businessman Atherton C. Richards who brought a
"fascinating" wife to "brighten the horizon" in Washington, and the Hollywood movie-
makers, John Ford and Merian C. Cooper, the latter of "King Kong" fame.1e
In all, Donovan, his recruiters, and his employment bureau had soon put on the payroll
six times as many people as Ben Cohen had thought in June that Donovan would require.
Cohen's figure was ninety-two plus "special agents and assistants as needed." By December
15 COI had 596 persons on its roster, and within a few weeks the figure had mounted to
670. While the Budget Bureau was contemplating for March 1942 a maximum of 631, COI
itself was aiming at 1,300. Even this figure was eclipsed: at the end of COI's first, its only,
year Donovan was a chief with 1,852 sub-chiefs and Indians under him."
3. BRITISH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE;
Making an organization out of these bricks and mortar was another job. While
Donovan took his own counsel, consulted numerous people, and inspected others' operations,
he drew heavily on the British for advice and assistance, especially in regard to propaganda,
intelligence, and special operations.
Unlike the Americans, who were still living largely off World War I experience, the
British were currently, daily, desperately, and often tragically grappling with new challenges
and responses in these specialized fields, as well as in other aspects of the "shooting war."
By the time Donovan was established as COI, the British had been at war nearly two years.
They had had fresh experience, at or in Dunkirk, Libya, Crete, the London "blitz," and
Atlantic naval warfare, with military, naval, and air intelligence. They had refined and
expanded joint intelligence. They had reorganized their domestic and imperial security
services and had commissioned William Stephenson to handle intelligence and special
operations in the Western Hemisphere. With their backs to the wall, they had been directed
by Churchill "to set Europe ablaze" with all kinds of propaganda, subversion, sabotage, and
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irregular warfare. All the while they had the educational effect of trial and error, failures,
fiascoes, faulty organization, and bureaucratic rivalries. They were, thus, in a position to
give some advice and assistance; they were eager to assist any who were on their side.
Britain's chief of naval intelligence, Admiral Godfrey, had made "his point" to FDR
about Donovan, had left behind his aide, Ian Fleming, to give the Americans further advice,
and then went home. He immediately began to send Donovan a steady stream of copies of
the same JIC publications which went to his representative, Capt. E. G. G. Hastings, R.N.,
on the British JIC in Washington. Writing like tutor to student, Godfrey pointed out to
Donovan that one of these publications was particularly interesting as "an example of how
these appreciations are built up." He noted that "the Junior Committee of the three services
draws out a draft which is submitted to the Directors" who then add some comments which
will then "be absorbed by the Committee and will take shape in the next draft." 20
Assuring Donovan of "my help in every way," Godfrey offered to send across the
Atlantic by "the quickest possible means" any expert Donovan needed. The Admiral thought
"the method of communication through `Little Bill' [Stephenson] . . . the best and certainly
the quickest," and he planned to send the JIC papers through that channel unless Donovan
found he was "receiving them quicker through Hastings & Co., Washington." Godfrey
reported, on July 20, that he had heard that day from Ian Fleming that Donovan was "get-
ting well into the saddle and completing . . . administrative arrangements" and hoped "to
start work with a skeleton staff about the middle of [August]." 21
Fleming had, of course, been trying to make his own contribution to this forward
movement. Indeed, after the war he claimed that he had written a "memorandum to Bill
[Donovan] on how to create an American Secret Service." 22 Such a memorandum, dated as
early as June 27, 1941, has survived, and interestingly enough, it contains a parenthetical
"See my previous memo," which, unfortunately, has not so far been discovered. The June 27
memo is worthy of extended reference inasmuch as it is the only extant, comprehensive, but
sketchy, outline-as seen by one man-of the organizational job that confronted Donovan in
that month.
Fleming urged the Colonel to make "an early attack on the inertia and opposition
which will meet you at every step"; otherwise, there was serious danger of his plans being
"still-born." Donovan was advised to move against the "opposition to your appointment," to
get good men, who "will not be going begging for much longer," and to get certain sections
of the organization started immediately "if they are to put up any kind of a show, should
America come into the war in a month's time." With that as a starter, Fleming then made
some suggestions on such practical matters as space, personnel, organization, and tactics.
Since COI would need considerable space which was "central, secure, and [had]
excellent communications," Fleming thought the ideal place was the "F.B.I. building," and
he, therefore, recommended that the Colonel "arrange" the matter with the Attorney
General and Mr. Hoover. For staff the Colonel would need for his "G.H.Q." a "first class
personal Chief of Staff, and first class secretary, adjutants to run your divisions," a
"Managing Editor," "heads of country sections," "liaison officers," and others down the
line. For personnel Fleming recommended John J. McCloy for the chief of staff. He said
Wallace Butterworth should head "Economic Intelligence; he is a `natural' in every respect
(quick action required)." He thought Henry Luce should organize "Foreign Propaganda";
planning should start immediately. A "good `sapper' " was needed for the sabotage job.
Then, "Mr. X for S.I.S. (I have no ideas)," and "a nominee of Mr. Hoover" should run
counterespionage. There were others.
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On the important subject of liaison with MI-6 in London Fleming had several
recommendations for developing collaboration between the two services; it is here that he
added "See my previous memo." What Fleming had written about Ango-American
collaboration between "secret agents" remains unknown.
Under the rubric of "diplomatic," Fleming urged Donovan to "enlist the full help of
State Department and F.B.I. by cajolery or other means," to "dragoon the War and Navy
Departments"-being prepared to "take action quickly" if Miles and Kirk "don't help,"-
and to "leave the question of intercept material alone for the time being." His last piece of
advice was "make an example of someone at an early date for indiscretion and continue to
act ruthlessly where lack of security is concerned." z3
Interesting as this document is, it was by no means a blueprint that Donovan followed.
Hardly any specific recommendation seems to have been acted upon by him. None of the
persons mentioned by Fleming for COI posts ever worked for Donovan. Some suggestions
were quite commonplace and unnecessary and some, e.g., about using space in the FBI
building, quite unrealistic. But it was all grist for Donovan's mill. He was one who invariably
consulted other people, asked. them to put. their ideas on paper, read it over and thought
about it, and then produced his own idea or plan.
Fleming, like Godfrey, soon left for London, and both left the field in the hands of Bill
Stephenson, as it had been for a year. Stephenson, unlike Admiral Godfrey, was no
occasional visitor to Donovan but was and remained throughout the war a frequent
associate, a British counterpart. Stephenson also had an aide, an intelligence professional,
Col. Charles H. ("Dick") Elliis, whom he had had detailed to him and brought to the United
States only a month after his own arrival. The Stephenson-Ellis duo, unlike the Godfrey-
Fleming pair, rendered really substantial assistance to Donovan not only in the formative
period of COI but also well into the OSS years.
Not only had Stephenson already made available to Donovan a description of the
structure and operation of the British SIS, but he now made available its people, facilities,
and intelligence. Stephenson has claimed that his "collaboration" with Donovan "began at
once," and Donovan affirmed in 1944, officially and formally, that "Mr. Stephenson helped
to plan the organization necessary to carry out the functions of the Coordinator." 14 This
collaboration, initiated probably in August 1940, entered a new stage on June 18, 1941, and,
after a brief trip to London by Stephenson early in July, was resumed at the end of the
month.
Stephenson returned to find Donovan, as Fleming put it, "getting well into the saddle."
In fact, Stephenson claims to have filed, though no documentation is at hand, a returning
traveler's assessment of Donovan's new organization. "On August 9, 1941, I rioted to
London," he said
that our friend's organization was rapidly taking shape, central offices in
Washington had been established and were functioning, understanding with the
Chiefs of Staff seemed satisfactory, and he [Donovan] felt confident of their
cooperation; he had several competent assistants; he had the beginnings of a
working apparatus in Washington and New York, and should be able to safeguard
secret documents.25
There is documentation for an exchange of correspondence between the two on August
11 and 14, an exchange which shows the character of the work the British envisaged for
themselves and COI in Latin. America. Donovan had sent to Stephenson for comment an un-
solicited proposal he had received for launching a democratic counteroffensive among
German-speaking peoples of South America. In return he received a memorandum, written
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by one, of Stephenson's people, which stated that while the White House was best equipped
to handle "constructive propaganda," it was felt that "the work of our Organization and
Colonel Donovan's also should be aimed at destroying the enemy organization in Latin
America," and in this work "completely ruthless tactics must be employed." 26
Evidence that collaboration between Stephenson and Donovan was close and steady is
found in the appearance of Stephenson's name thirty-six times on Donovan's calendar of
"Appointments and Telephone Calls" from August 18 to December 7, 1941.27
The size, scope and significance of Stephenson's contribution to COI can best be
appreciated by getting some idea of the organization run by Stephenson in the Western
Hemisphere. While Godfrey and Fleming had come here on official business, they had come
as representatives of British naval intelligence which maintained no significant American
establishment. Stephenson, however, had a very significant setup.
His organization, British Security Coordination," was headquartered in New York. In
March 1941 Assistant Secretary of State Berle notified Sumner Welles that BSC had, or
was about to have, district officers at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Charleston, New Orleans, Houston, San Francisco, Portland, and probably Seattle. In
addition, of course, BSC had representatives in Canada, Bermuda and other British
territories in the Western Hemisphere. Berle, no friend of Stephenson or British intelligence,
observed that while BSC's ostensible purpose was the protection of British shipping supplies, BSC was in fact, "rapidly evolving" into "a full size secret police and intelligence
service." Moreover, Berle said, the information collected-by "a very considerable number
of regularly employed secret agents and a much larger number of informants"-was not re-
stricted to that necessary to the protection of shipping but entered into "the whole field of
political, financial, and probably military intelligence." Moreover, BSC was not just an
extension of SIS but was in fact a service which integrated SIS, SOE, Censorship, Codes
and Cyphers, Security, Communications-in fact, nine secret distinct organizations. But in
the Western Hemisphere Stephenson ran them all.29
Stephenson was in an excellent position to give Donovan valuable advice and assistance.
First of all, he was sufficiently wealthy and well-placed to be able to give Donovan useful
personal advice on threading his way throughout British officialdom. Secondly, before
Donovan had been able to establish any independent sources of information, he regularly re-
ceived from Stephenson intelligence resulting from surveillance of Axis personnel, of ship
inspections at British ports, and of other covert sources. Typical of the procedure was the
pickup by British Security of a Nazi map, "purloined from a German courier," which
Stephenson turned over to Donovan who, in turn, gave it on October 21 to FDR who, then,
six days later, published it to the world as proof of "the Nazi design, not only against South
America but against the United States itself." 30 Thirdly, Stephenson made available to
Donovan all kinds of British experts, not the least of whom was Colonel Ellis, "without
whose assistance," according to David Bruce, COI's first effective secret intelligence chief,
"American intelligence could not have gotten off the ground in World War II." 31 Fourthly,
in September 1941 Stephenson arranged for one of Donovan's newest recruts, Lt. Col.
Robert A. Solborg, to attend an SOE training establishment so that he could return and
head up COI's Special Operations (SO) training and operational branch. Also later in 1941
Stephenson opened an SO school in Canada to which high priority was given COI
candidates. Additional evidence of Stephenson's assistance will be noted when we take up
Donovan's organization of his secret activities branch. Suffice it to conclude here with
Stephenson's modest disclaimer that he would not go quite so far as Donovan did when the
latter told "an inquiring editor of MacLean's Magazine ... that Bill Stephenson taught us
everything we ever knew about foreign intelligence operations." 32
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4. EMPIRE-BUILDING
Donovan had long since begun to build and organize his empire. He had looked out
upon vast stretches of government territory-information, intelligence, propaganda, morale,
espionage, counterespionage, subversion, military operations, strategic planning, and postwar
planning-as so much area that urgently needed organization, peopling, and exploitation. He
began with those areas which were mentioned, however vaguely in some cases, in his June 10
memorandum to the President.
The most important of these, because it was the ostensible raison d'etre of COI, and
because it was the only specific task, actually entrusted by the President's order of July 11,
ad
came an
1941, was the coordination of Donovan begannwhat analysis,
dissemination of data on
research and analysis,, or R & A.
For assistance he had turned, how is not known, to "'Archie" MacLeish at the Library
of Congress.33 By June 29, days before the order was issued, the two had extensively
canvassed the analytical and scholarly service which the Library could provide the
government's new intelligence unit, once "proper financing" was available. The Library was
ready, though it did not want to handle "confidential intelligence material," to organize and
manage a staff of experts-full time, part time, and on a fee basis-to provide translations,
background studies, research reports, and "analyses of policy issues over the whole area to
be covered by the intelligence service." MacLeish, reflecting on his two years on Capitol
Hill, wrote Donovan that "libraries have a much more important role to play than they have
played in the past in buttressing spot intelligence with the scholarly element," which is so
necessary to giving that intelligence depth, weight, focus, and perspective.34
While others at the Library, especially Ernest S. Griffith, the head of the Legislative
Reference Service, drew up charts of the proposed organization, wrote job descriptions, and
detailed how the service could supply the President with important memoranda in five to
nine days, Donovan and MacLeish worked out, but partially and seriously mishandled, the
larger policy issues, especially administration and location of the Library's service to COI.
By their agreement of July 30 the Library established within its physical territory, that
baroque building opposite the Capitol, a "Division of Special Information," which it
operated for the sole benefit of COI which, in turn, footed the bill for salaries, "major items
of furniture," and any "structural alterations or construction" required to house the division.
Thus, some of the scholars, lured to Washington by the prospect of patriotic and intellectual
labor on high secret matters of state, found themselves not only working as Library
employees but also in the Library at a considerable distance-a mile or two as it turned
out-from the center of power and secrecy at the other end of Constitution Avenue; and
they were "appalled." 35 It would take a year to straighten out the mess.
In any case, R & A was launched. To head itup and help it grow, for the Library unit
was just the beginning, Donovan selected Dr. Baxter, the Williams College president, who
then supervised the recruitment of suchscholars as Conyers Read, Walter L. Dorn, Robert
K. Gooch, Geroid Robinson, Sherman Kent, Walter L. Wright, Jr., and Preston E. James,
all of whom headed geographical desks in the Division of Special Information. Under
Donovan's direction Baxter set about organizing an even more prestigious group with R&A.
This was the Board of Analysts, a group of eight scholars headed by Baxter himself. Among
the other seven were a Harvard trio: historian William L. Langer, who also directed the Li-
brary's research group, economist Edward S. Mason, and Donald C. McKay, professor
French history; on a par with them were political scientist Joseph R. Hayden from the
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ed by diplomat John C
University of Michigan,
for Advanced Studies; eventually these weredjoinEdward Mead Earle from
Wiley. Next established, as the opportunities appeared and despite many difficulties, were
W e whose employeesalso profes-
sors, divisions-economics, geography, and psychology-,
were differently hired than those at the Library, were housed at the power center, and
were clearly not operating on the inter-disciplinary academic basis originally programmed
for R & A. All this added to the unit's growing pains.
The theory behind the structure was that the professors, especially those at the Library,
would marshal the scholarly resources of the country so that they could be brought to bear, and
of p along with
specialized untional researh, on the confrnhing the President. The professorsnwo dpfeede nt l theirof ndings oolDr.
and strategy ao g
and the ,
Baxter's analysts, this
the Coordinator of Information would have access
and the new ew secret information to which would report to Donovan himself, and he would give it all to the President. The system ac-
to become , but the Research
and the envy of other
its t mistakes early
tually never worked that
triumphed over Analysts
and Analysis eventually tri
government Branch ment departments. Donovan had carved out a brand new province when he thus
experience systematic of utilization,
the t country's historians, economists, social
organized the government's ad area first
language capability, ,
scientists, anthropologists, geographers, and psychologists.
In his June 10 memorandum Donovan had singled out a second area for exploitation, the d for better
but he was nowthe e near as cinformat on. While henemphasil zed the a psychological
management of government's
weapon" in nth st attack, modern
the l as"the defenses mof a nation" as ot important "another
r against singled r and spiritual
and d
warfare" he
contented himself pblandly stating that rao's erfection as a weapon on information, and that, once the information u
that was obtained,
that planning was dependent
"action could be carried out by appropriate agencies." What he referred to was psychologi-
cal warfare, and he was in a hurry to get it started.
He could even have moved in this direction before starting on R & A. At least as early
l
June 15, before anything wRobert Sherwood, who would activelnegotiations with y head this country's radio
Donovan was talking
two had a bitteero
choice falling out.
propaganda c r was not felicitous, for in less than a year point
of of Sherwood the mation
By then, little of eCOseemed I. The felicitous
held lint store a major 1 co frontat onnwth rNelson
Service (FIS)
the Office Washington
Rockefeller about Latin r,constant that battling
saw FIS become part York and
"crowds" of War
"crowds" of the the service, and the breakup
Information (OWI) and COI the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Even after the breakup
the battle would continue, disgracefully in the opinion of most observers.
Be all that as it may, on June 16, Sherwood, impatiently awaiting FDR's endorsement
becausese"Ilthohpe to getSherwood,
an
cawas even me through closer
that he, Sherwood, COI, wrote hendorsement who
that t n as though the whole thing
appointment tment on on his hoped the his staff." The same day, writing to Donovan tions
suggested
action
Edmond were sewed up, Miller auined s "t osmen who come first to forind for the work we discus ed."
Taylor and Douglas glas M Mill
Mowrer, H. advisory capacity, f such
He thought full use sho be " made, at least in an
ckerbocker,John L. 25
warfare directed against a "specific military objective.
At the first meeting of the committee Donovan, submitting his definition, said it
to the OWI to the JCS. After
immediately raised the question of with the a relatinship
bcommi tee, al o chaired uby
discussion, the meeting ended theatres of
Donovan, to work up a definition of the subject, a classification of areas (e.g.,
which prepthare plans
ththe e JPWC agencies
subjectf
s in
combat) for psychological papers were drateda h and of
such eh warfare. Many Many p pap lem, the,
before trying to clarify
w th OWIpro
com the next two table the matter and wait for a confused y the
agreed to ta tab
the field of propaganda planning and activity.21
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Meanwhile, the committee had begun to take up those projects which had been stymied
while the old JPWC lay in limbo. It also began to consider new projh were
springing from the fertile imagination of Colonel Donovan, who told GeneraltSmithc that he
rejected nothing and looked at everything.27 The work of the committee proceeded in these
mid-summer weeks calmly and cooperatively enough; but for reasons that will soon become
clear, meetings deteriorated into such "time-wasting discussions," according to Taylor," and
caused such neglect and stultification of the committee that Donovan was provoked to
demand its abolition. But more of that later.
3. THE OSS DIRECTOR
One of the more pressing items of business which Donovan, as the OSS Director, had
brought back from London was the enhancement of his small British station. It had been
opened the previous November by William Whitney, who, however, soon broke with
Donovan and eventually joined OWI only to leave that rather quickly also. After December
7 the small station found itself flooded with new business and new opportunities.
These had sprung from many sources. There was the Anglo-American conference on
strategy with its emphasis on subversion and the obvious implication for OSS work. There
was England's own plethora of intelligence, information, propaganda, and subversion
organizations with which OSS had to effect some liaison. There was need also for liaison
with Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had arrived in London to begin building the large
American headquarters that would eventually plan the invasion of North Africa and of
Europe. Finally, there were many representatives of European intelligence and resistance
groups who had much in common with OSS. For OSS to make its voice heard in this busy
British capital there was need for a larger organization and more prestigious leadership. For
the latter Donovan obtained the services of the distinguished diplomat and personal friend of
the President, William Phillips, who was then Ambassador to Italy.
When he received Donovan's offer, by cable in Rome, Phillips wrote FDR saying that
he would not accept the position without the President's approval. The rom re "delighted with the idea." Phillips and Donovan breakfasted at the latter's home on July 3s
1942, and Donovan laid out the OSS story. Phillips subsequently wrote that he "felt at once
drawn to the Colonel. His knowledge of world affairs, his contacts with the State and War
departments, his immense vitality and conviction that OSS would play an important role in
our military program convinced me that here was a man after my own heart...." 29
Phillips departed for London on July 18, but his new job had already come to the
watchful attention of OWI, which was also in the process of establishing and expanding its
own London office in order, inter alia, to deal with some of the same British and American
organizations and officials to whom OSS was drawn. The Phillips assignment was looked
upon in OWI circles as a direct threat to OWI's own position in London. It was this fear
which had sent Elmer Davis off to see the President on July 17. Donovan was able to dis-
abuse Davis of his fears; he explained that Phillips had been sent to London as the
representative of the OSS and that the President had given him the rank of minister so that
he could execute certain political functions which had no direct relationship to propaganda.3e
While this teapot tempest quickly subsided, it presaged future stormy days ahead for OSS
and OWI in London.
The big item Donovan brought back from London was, of course, an agreement with
the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Established in 1940 at Churchill's urging "'to set
Europe ablaze" by fostering and stimulating resistance and revolt in Axis-occupied Europe,
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SOE had set out to make contact and establish communications with resistance elements, to
supply them with radios, arms, propaganda, and demolition devices, to provide them with
training, guidance, and information, and to carry out acts of sabotage and subversion. With
British cooperation, Donovan's COI had begun preparatory work in this field even before
Pearl Harbor, and of course thereafter intensified it. By mid-1942 both organizations had
grown so large and active that "detailed arrangements" for effective collaboration had to be
worked out to prevent the two organizations from "getting thoroughly tangled up" in each
other's secret operations." For this reason Donovan had gone to London.
Negotiations there established two principles of which the first was full cooperation
between both organizations in London and in Washington. This would be effected by the
establishment by OSS and SOE in each other's capital of liaison sections, which would be
charged with representing views on policy, settling disputes, exchanging information,
coordinating production, demand, and supply of equipment, and exchanging operational and
technical intelligence and information on methods of training. The second principle was
cooperation and coordination in the field. To avoid the confusion resulting from the
operation of independent organizations in the same country, it was agreed in general that the
areas of the world would be divided into British or American areas run by SOE or OSS,
with the other service stationing a smaller mission or liaison staff subordinate to the
controlling agency.32
These few lines of summary hardly reveal the extent of planning and activity needed,
once Donovan was back in Washington, to begin to give effect to the agreement. The
agreement itself needed to be readied for submission to the JCS for approval, and this was
obtained on August 25. Meanwhile, establishment of the London and Washington liaison
staffs took place. Likewise, initial steps were taken to enlarge or reorganize existing field sta-
tions or establish new ones. Most importantly, Donovan, more intent than ever on conducting
sabotage operations, on creating, organizing, and equipping secret armies, and on organizing
active guerrilla forces, set his people to drafting plans and projects. All these papers now had
to go to the JPWC and run the gantlet of military men who had their own ideas about man-
power, equipment, and guerrilla operations. Differences soon began to appear.
On July 4 Donovan brought up with General Marshall the question of having,
according to the Chief of Staff, "a liaison officer for S.O.E. on the Staff of [Lord Louis]
Mountbatten [Britain's Chief of Combined Operations]." It can be assumed here that
Donovan, while in London, had discussed the matter with Mountbatten, who was present
when Donovan met with the War Cabinet. Marshall, soliciting the opinion of his OPD chief,
General Handy, wrote that Mountbatten was agreeable to the idea if he, Marshall, was also.
It was understood, said Marshall, that this liaison officer would confine his business entirely
to SOE matters. Donovan had apparently brought up another matter, for Marshall then
asked Handy "to give me a little memorandum on the question of Donovan's guerrilla
groups which I believe was disapproved." 31
OPD went to work on both items. Handy opposed Donovan's request for a liaison
officer. He said that JCS 67 and JCS 68 had been drafted with the intention of integrating
OSS into the military organization; but, he pointed out, the JPWC as of then, July 7, had
not yet met, the working subcommittee provided for in JCS 68 had, so far as the War
Department knew, not yet been organized, and therefore the procedure for handling such a
request was not operative. Handy then warned that any variance from this procedure would
"divorce" OSS activities from proper integration with the military, would nullify a portion of
JCS 68, and--worse still-would "establish the precedent for Col. Donovan to deal directly
with any military organization or activity." This was certainly "not desirable from the
standpoint of integrating OSS into the military organization." 31
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On the guerrilla issue, Handy said the project had been disapproved by both G-2 and
OPD. Furthermore, as far, as the War Department knew, no such groups existed, and the
OSS budget made no specific provision for any. There was, however, he noted, "an
unexplained item of over fifty million dollars" in a proposed OSS budget which "might
indicate plans for large guerrilla groups." He thought Donovan ought, in the first JPWC
meeting, to lay out all the subversive activities in which OSS was engaged.35 Conceivably
this suggestion gave rise to General Smith's request to Donovan on July 9 for an accounting
"in some detail" of all current and planned projects, an accounting, incidentally, which
Donovan provided in thirty-two printed pages on August 17.36
On July 11 Handy sent Marshall the "little memorandum" on Donovan's guerrillas.
This reviewed the story of Donovan's February proposal, picked up from the British, to
organize 2,000 Greeks, Poles, Yugoslavs, and others into guerrilla groups. Donovan had been
given 196 officers and enlisted men as instructors and had established some training camps,
but the Army definitely banned military status for guerrillas. Donovan reopened the issue in
May when he proposed the formation of guerrilla battalions with military status. This was
disapproved early in June, and Donovan was so informed by Secretary Stimson on July 8. As
of now, wrote Handy, Donovan had two camps in operation-one near Quantico, Va., and
the other near Hagerstown, Md., and he had 236 Army, Navy, and Marine personnel. "The
announced policy of the War Department," said the OPD chief, "is that the organization
will be trained to act as individual civilians rather than a military task force...." In other
words, Donovan would not have his "private army." 31
Handy and Smith, getting together on these liaison and guerrilla issues, advised against
the first. They pointed out that Mountbatten handled combined operations (including
guerrilla warfare) but not subversive activities; since Mountbatten already had an American
liaison officer on his staff, Donovan could work with him-through, of course, General
Eisenhower, the theater commander. As for the SOE liaison, they thought Donovan should
be authorized to designate an officer to be attached to Eisenhower's staff for that purpose.
On the guerrillas the two generals agreed that Donovan "should appreciate" that he would
train personnel, but they did not "wish him to direct operations in the field." 38
Interestingly enough, Marshall accepted the advice on the liaison issue but significantly
differed with his advisors on the guerrillas. Writing to Donovan on July 13 about "my
conception of the set-up and relationships" involving guerrillas, Marshall said they would be
trained, in Donovan's camps and by instructors furnished by the Army and Navy, "as
individuals" . . . and possibly as units for, guerrilla warfare," if they were desired by theater
commanders [emphasis added.]. He also said that theater commanders would control
subversive activities and guerrilla warfare; where there were no such officers, then Donovan.,
subject to the JCS, could directly control these activities.39 The issue was not completely
closed.
The next step, taken the next day, was a Marshall directive to General Smith to have
the JPWC submit recommendations on the OSS training and use of guerrillas. The
following (lay Donovan promised to give the JPWC the information it needed. The JPWC
minutes simply state that this new directive, known as JPWC 21/D[irective], was referred to
the subcommittee for consideration and report.40 Other military notes show that the situation
was getting complicated: there was another OSS matter that was being taken up by the JCS
structure--the memorandum of June 29 wherein G-2 had submitted its "suggested measures
for the control of O.S.S." It was easily seen that the two separate issues impinged upon one
another, and together they demonstrated "the necessity for a comprehensive directive to the
OSS." 41
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In short, a month after the JCS had quickly and formally taken over the OSS and
issued two directives to regulate its activities, Donovan and the military had begun to lock
horns on the status and function of OSS as a supporting agency of the JCS.
4. ISSUES: CONTROL AND GUERRILLAS
At hand were two issues-channels of control and guerrillas.
On the first issue Donovan's major antagonist was G-2's General Strong. Unlike his
predecessors, he was a worthy foe. General Miles had not been a forceful personality and
was fearful about getting involved in secret intelligence. General Lee held office too briefly
to have made any impact. Strong, however, took over when G-2 was reorganized and
expanded, and he clearly intended that military intelligence should yield nothing to the
civilians under Donovan. His "suggested measures" for controlling OSS manifested that
resolve.
His memorandum of June 29 would have put a strait jacket on OSS. Modified by the
JCS secretariat, the memorandum was forwarded to the Joint Staff Planners whose draft
directive markedly softened it. For instance, whereas Strong would have restricted OSS
contacts with the military to "only such contacts as may be necessary" to implement plans
already approved by the JCS, the JPS permitted such contacts prior to JCS approval but
only after their tentative approval by the JPWC or the JIC; after that, contacts should be
"frequent and informal." Also, whereas Strong would have forbidden contacts between OSS
and allied powers until after plans had been approved by the JCS, the planners only said
such contacts "should be avoided" prior to JCS approval of plans."
Whatever their differences, the JPS and G-2 agreed on the inadequacy of the original
directive, JCS 67. Coordination between OSS and other military agencies was considered
"unsatisfactory," and Colonel Donovan was described as writing "directly to any War
Department agency he desires, with resultant confusion...." Hence, the JPS sent their draft
directive to the Joint Chiefs. There, however, on July 14, it ran into difficulty and was re-
ferred back to G-2 and to ONI for "consideration and recommendation of any added
provisions which might be desirable from a military intelligence viewpoint."
Some of the difficulty could conceivably have been G-2 unhappiness with the JPS
revision of its June 29 recommendations. In any case, there was another aspect of the same
problem of control which had arisen in the examination of the subject. It was pointed out by
Colonel Onthank that the JPS draft, JCS 67/1, provided for proper channeling of OSS "spe-
cific" plans and of OSS contacts, but it left unresolved the handling of "general" plans, such
as those which covered more than one specific subject, project, or area, and included
administrative matters. Onthank was sure that the JCS did "not care to have their time
taken in examining and discussing such minor matters." Onthank proposed, in effect, that
all such matters be handled by the JPWC. This was now added to the reconsideration of
JCS 67/1.^^
On the second go-around G-2, supported by ONI, and the JPS could not reconcile their
differences. Hence, on July 30 the JPS directed that those differences be outlined for the
benefit of the JCS and that both draft directives be sent to them for their decision. That out-
line, presented in JCS 67/2, described the draft on the intelligence services, the "A"
proposal, as "designed to control in detail the operations of the O.S.S., both planning and
administrative," whereas the JPS proposal, "B," was "a much more general directive." In
particular, "A" was much more restrictive than "B" in regulating OSS contacts with the
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military departments and other government agencies. Also, "A" specifically limited OSS
functions to those laid down in JCS 67, whereas the JPS made no such restrictions. Again,
"A" directed that all plans, including those pertaining to the internal administration of OSS,
go through the JPWC to the Joint Chiefs, whereas "B" had left OSS internal administration
completely in JPWC hands."'
When the JCS took up these rival plans on August 4, it was asked whether or not
Donovan had been "consulted" on either of them, and the answer was that "Col. Donovan
states he can function efficiently under `B,' [but he] cannot operate under `A'." There was
additional discussion of details, and "B" was then adopted by the JCS and was ordered to be
redrafted. The new draft was finally approved on August. 11 and published on August: 14 as
JCS 67/4.46
While General Strong was bested in this skirmish, it cannot be accurately said that
Colonel Donovan triumphed. He was not hog-tied, but he was hobbled. First, his activities
were subject to close supervision by one or more of three committees-the JIC, the JPWC,
and the JPS, as well as, of course, of the JCS itself. Secondly, the JPWC was established as
the housekeeping authority for the OSS. Third, restrictions were placed on the OSS freedom
to make contacts with and commitments to other agencies and governments. Fourth, OSS
was subordinated in overseas theaters to the theater commanders, and finally all operations
of the OSS were made subject to JCS approval.
The provisions that really hurt were those that made the JPWC the OSS governing
board and subjected OSS to three committees.. These tiled up OSS, and the JPWC soon
became more concerned with internal OSS matters than running psychological warfare.
By the time JCS 67/4 was published, Donovan's second skirmish with the military, on
guerrillas, was nearing resolution. This time his antagonist was former Colonel, now
Brigadier General, Wedemeyer, chief of OPD's Strategy and Policy Group. Unlike the
Strong-Donovan relationship, there was nothing personal in Wedemeyer's opposition to OSS
on guerrillas. Professionally and institutionally he simply opposed Donovan's heading a
guerrilla army.
The issue, it will be recalled, was brought to the JPWC as a result of General
Marshall's request for a study of OSS schools and guerrilla training (JPWC 21/D). Donovan
basically wanted two things: first, authorization to establish and run a guerrilla group of sev-
eral battalions, subject to the JCS and the theater commanders, and second, specific military
status for the men involved. The War Department had permitted the use of millitary
personnel as instructors but remained opposed to the idea of guerrilla battalions with
military status and under OSS direction. When the Marshall request, which Donovan of
course had sparked, officially reached the JPWC, Donovan did not wait for his subcommit-
tee to "consider and report" on it. Instead he pre-empted the field by having two memoranda
of his own ready for the committee's consideration at their next meeting, July 22.
The first of these provided no difficulty. It was a request for 416 enlisted men and had
already been sent to the Adjutant General for action. The men were needed, explained
Donovan, to replace the WPA and CCC * men who were no longer available to run the
camps where Donovan's guerrilla schools had been established. He explained he already had
the "preliminary, basic, and advanced schools" operating but was precluded, because of the
manpower problem, from opening the "holding," parachute training, maritime, and
propaganda schools.47
Works Progress Administration and Civilian Conservation Corps, New Deal agencies for the unemployed.
1 66
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The second memorandum gave much difficulty; it was nothing less than a draft reply to
General Marshall. What it contained were Donovan's recommendations, which he wanted
the committee to forward to the JCS, that OSS be authorized to train guerrillas "as
individuals and units," and that subversive activities and guerrilla warfare be carried out
under the direction of either theater commanders, where such were established, or of OSS,
working with the JCS.48 What he was doing, of course, was building very effectively, as well
as explicitly, on the opening on both points which had been given him in Marshall's letter to
which the JPWC had to reply. While the committee would remain influenced by Marshall's
"conception of the set-up and relationships" on this issue, it was unhappy with Donovan's
submission for this particular draft reply. The subcommittee had not seen it, and the
committee members had had only two hours to look at it. Also there was some feeling that
Donovan's draft was not really responsive to Marshall's. directive and also that it contained
"several statements ... not ... in accord" with the desires of the Army Chief of Staff.
Action was held up pending receipt of the subcommittee's report.49
That arrived in time for the July 27 meeting, as did another Donovan paper-a study
of the training given the eight German saboteurs who had been captured, on Long Island on
June 28, before they could carry out their sabotage mission here. The two documents
stimulated considerable discussion of sabotage, guerrilla warfare, the types of individuals
best suited for such activities, the similarities and differences in training required by each,
the operation of OSS schools, the use of Army and Navy instructors, and liaison and
command problems. Donovan especially stressed the concept of training guerrilla units for
operations in those countries for which they had a language capability. In all this discussion,
however, the salient point was OSS direction in the field of guerrilla units. On this General
Wedemeyer noted that if the committee approved the training schedule laid out in the
subcommittee report it would thereby "have approved the organization by the O.S.S. of
militarized guerrilla units." The clear implication was that Wedemeyer was not going to
permit that. The paper was ordered redrafted and circulated for informal approval before
being sent to the JCS.S?
There was general agreement at the next meeting, on August 3, on the descriptive
portions of the report-subversive activities, types of individuals needed, training, etc. There
was also agreement on OSS, with Army and Navy instructors, continuing to train both
saboteurs and guerrillas. On the recommendations, however, General Wedemeyer was happy
with all but "those regarding guerrilla units." He wanted a proviso inserted, and it was so
ordered by the committee, that a further study of OSS training be undertaken and
submitted to the JCS.51 Agree but study the matter to death-that was Wedemeyer's
strategy.
When the report passed through the JPWC and then the JPS, the important
recommendation was that the JCS "accept in principle" OSS training of guerrillas as
individuals and units but that JPWC study the matter further. There was also a proviso
"that decisions as to establishment, organization, training and use of guerrilla units await
the study and report" which the JPWC would undertake. That was how the matter was
settled when the report and its recommendations were finally approved by the JCS on
August 18, 1942, and published on August 19 as JCS 83/1, "Functions of the Office of
Strategic Services-Organized Sabotage and Guerrilla Warfare. Donovan had won "in
principle," but the Army had yet to lose in practice.
Donovan had been stopped. Early in February he had proposed to Secretary Knox the
formation of "Special Service Troops" or "Yankee Raiders." Later that month he proposed
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the establishment of guerrilla units of 2,000 Greeks, Poles, Yugoslavs, and others. In May
he had proposed the organization of the "First Guerrilla Group" to consist of ten battalions
of language-based guerrilla companies.53 Each had been a proposal to capture "the spirit of
attack," which Donovan considered especially desirable at a time-1942-when the Allies
had lost so much, were on the defensive, and were looking for a way to gain some initiative.
What some critics derided as Donovan's "private army," he spoke of, first, as commandos,
and then as guerrillas. Try as he might, he would have to settle for less.
5. MORE ISSUES: MILITARIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
Donovan was described after the war as "an adventurer," who "loved war,"' had
absolutely no fear of danger or death, and who was always showing up on landing beaches,
even when he had been ordered not to do so.54 Certainly in 1942 he wanted to wear a
uniform and to lead troops, and he was accustomed to fights-on the battlefield, in the
courtroom, on the campaign trail, and in the bureaucratic arena. He was not discouraged by
losses, much less so by half-victories. He proceeded from where he was, and that is what he
did with regard to the training and use of saboteurs and guerrillas; and that brings us to two
more issues involving him and the military at this time--militarizationand the functions of
OSS.
Militarization was touched on in June when Captain Denebrink raised the possibility of
bringing Donovan's people into the Army Specialist Corp, which was really a way-actually
a short-lived way-of giving military status to skilled personnel who in every way remained
civilians. What really gave rise to the issue, however, was Donovan's need for real soldiers.
He had already sent many persons overseas on military and quasi-military missions, and
there were plenty of plans in the hopper for, for instance, dropping saboteurs, radio
operators, resistance organizers, and arms suppliers behind the enemy's lines. Then there
were the guerrilla units. More and more of the people he wanted had already been or would
be snatched up by the armed services, and like other recruiters he had to go to the military
with requests for personnel. With the additional but qualified impetus provided by the
passage of the JCS directive on guerrillas he asked the ICS on August 31 for an allotment
of commissioned and enlisted Army, Navy, and Marine personnel, and he introduced his re-
quest by stating that "because of the nature of the work of the Office of Strategic Services it
is desirable that it be as completely militarized as possible." 55
When this subject was referred to the JPWC, where it became JPWC 37, there was the
usual "need [for] more information." Wederneyer observed that G-1 would need to know the
exact duties and responsibilities of each officer requested, with supporting data of course.
Echoing this need, ONI's Admiral Train suggested the drafting of tables of organization to
show these facts. General Strong suggested a revision which would show the total of officers
already allocated plus those now being sought. Further action was deferred until the
information was provided by OSS.56
Meanwhile, a difficulty had arisen in a different quarter. Because of the overall
manpower needs of the Army, Secretary Stimson had just decreed that no more officers
would be detailed to nonmilitary agencies. Because of this, and without Marshall's
approval, said General Strong, he could not grant a requested allotment of forty additional
officers for OSS. Why not, he suggested to OSS, take steps at once to have OSS classified
as a military organization, or obtain an exemption from the order of the Secretary of
War? 57
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Actually., G-1 already had such an exemption in preparation, and OSS had begun, or
soon began, a study of its exact status. Two weeks later, on September 28, when General
Wedemeyer requested information on the desirability of "militarizing" the OSS, Donovan
said that as a result of recent study of the question, it was evident that OSS was already a
part of "the armed forces of the United States," and that it would be logical, following up on
question Whatever their
ere personnel
Wedemeyer's question, to commission WWedemeyer major
motives, Donovan, Strong,
It then went informally to General Marshall. It reached him through the new JCS
Secretary, Brig. Gen. John R. Deane, who ripened quickly into a supporter of OSS and a
friend of Donovan. Deane suggested to Marshall that Donovan's organization be given a
military status and that the present civilian officials be commissioned or absorbed in the
Army Specialist Corps. Deane's reason was, as Marshall understood it, that there was a lack
of confidence in OSS-clearly on the part of the military-and this both limited OSS's effi-
ciency as well as unnecessarily "prolonged the consideration of any proposal made by that
organization." Deane thought that if Donovan and his people were given military status,
either in the Army or the Navy, the situation would be clarified and "more valuable service
would be rendered." Relaying all this to Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, Marshall
said he sought a "common understanding" with him before bringing it up before "Admiral
Leahy and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.
King was cautious. He thought militarization "would merely make" OSS "an
extension" of General Strong's G-2. He opposed complete militarization, favored militarizing
"only those parts that are necessary." This might include Donovan himself and "a
minimized number of personnel." As far as the Navy was concerned, he was willing to as-
sign "a very limited" number of people as long as the performance of naval duties required
it. Even these recommendations were by no means "definite"; they were just the best he had
"to offer at this time.>> 60
They were, however, good enough for Marshall, who then sent to the new JCS
Secretary a letter which the latter, General Deane, clearly had prepared for Marshall's
signature. The letter asked the JPWC to make a study and submit recommendations
"leading toward at least a partial militarization" of the OSS. This should be carried out,
according to Marshall's guidelines, in such a way that only "the Chief of the O.S.S. and the
heads of all divisions and subdivisions" were in the military service, that the commissioning
of naval officers followed King's restrictions, and that those officers without command
function be brought into the Army Specialist Corps. Marshall further decreed that OSS
would be retained as an instrument of the JCS and not as a subagency of either the Army or
the Navy and that there would be no attempt to change the present functions of the OSS.
Finally, since Donovan was, personally involved, Marshall thought he ought to turn over the
chairmanship of the committee to either Strong or Train when the subject was under
consideration by the JPWC. That was October 10, and when transmitted to the JPWC, it
became JPWC 37/2/D.61
The subject, however, was soon overtaken by a new, more comprehensive directive
which also came from Marshall and did so at the instigation of General Deane. This officer
had come upon the JPWC scene just when the pent-up anger of OSS was ready to erupt.
Deane himself had discovered that every OSS proposal received "prolonged" consideration
by the military. Edmond Taylor had complained about "time-wasting discussions" in the
JPWC. James Grafton Rogers, who had been an Assistant Secretary of State under Henry
Stimson in the Hoover administration, had now replaced Taylor as Donovan's chief
psychological warrior. He had major problems with General Strong, who seemed to OSS to
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be a vicious but vigorous man intent on fighting everybody in OSS. The latter consequently
stood practically still and helpless as its program continually ran into roadblocks set up by
the Joint Planners, the JPWC, and the Joint Intelligence Committee.62
Such frustrations, and the problems that had produced them, had clearly provoked
Deane to examine closely into the situation. He could. find no place, excepting one, where the
functions of OSS were clearly defined; the exception was secret operations, and here he
found no conflict with any other agency. He told Marshall he thought there was some OSS
overlapping of the Army and Navy in the collection of intelligence, and he said there was
"an apparent overlap" with OWI in regard "to securing information." He told Marshall he
was "sold on O.S.S. and believe they have rendered 'valuable services." He said he had met
all Donovan's key subordinates and was convinced they had much to offer. Two steps, he
said, were essential to get maximum benefit from OSS. One was partial militarization, now
under study, and the other was "a clear definition of their functions." 63
A directive, submitted by Deane, signed by Marshall, and published as JPWC 45/D on
October 24, instructed the JPWC to make to the JCS recommendations which would
"clearly define the functions of the several branches" of OSS. In particular, Marshall
wanted three determinations: "a clear line of demarkation" between OSS research and that
of BEW; a clear definition, and the definite assignment to OSS, of those intelligence
functions which OSS could perform better than either G-2 or ONI; and the overlap, if any,
of OSS photographic activities with those of the Army, Navy, and OWL He wanted the
functions of other subsidiary activities "clearly defined," and "to make the study complete"
he wanted it to include the secret operations activities, which had "already been outlined in
J.C.S. 83/l."-
Thus were many issues brought to one. General Strong and Admiral Train agreed to
Donovan's invitation to visit: OSS and inspect its personnel and operations, but they wanted
other committee members to write the preliminary report. Strong complained that many
OSS functions were "direct duplications" of those performed by G-2 and ONI, but he and
the others agreed OSS should retain its espionage function. On another sore point,
evaluation of information, Donovan wanted Army and Navy officers added to his staff so as
to provide finished information as a basis for military planning; and whereas both the Navy
planner, Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, saw much merit in "a central analysis group" and Admiral
Train "agreed in part with the idea of a central intelligence agency," the latter "felt that
material should go to military organizations for final evaluation." 65
Outside the committee, Admiral Train complained to budget officer Hall about OSS
duplication not only of intelligence but also of communications, of cryptanalysis, and in the
purchase of badly needed special equipment? Even so, Hall commented that Train "was
more restrained in his comments than General Strong." The Admiral did admit that the JIC
and the JPWC, with the same service membership, confusedly handled the OSS problem;
also, fearful of OSS "wandering" into the service intelligence field, G-2 and ONI had
refused, said the Admiral, to give OSS operational intelligence. They had also requested
studies by OSS to keep it "occupied and out of the way of the Army and Navy. ...66
State Department's Adolf Berle, as hostile to OSS as Strong and Train, thought
Donovan's economic research ought to be integrated with that of BEW, and that its
intelligence work was "feeble" and really ought to be "returned" to MIS where it would
have been had Gen. Sherman Miles not been "afraid to organize a spy system." He also
opined that "if OSS were broken up," then Donovan, who he said was "somewhat estranged
from the White House," could be made a general and put in charge of guerrilla operations
under Army control.67
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Rear Adm. Harold C. Train, ONI chief in 1942-43, requested studies from OSS in order to
keep it "occupied and out of the way of the Army and Navy. . . .
U.S. Navy, National Archives
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Strong and Train madle their visit to OSS prior to November 1, but it proved to be
irrelevant. Almost the same would be true of Marshall's last two directives, JPWC 37/2/D
on militarization, and that on the functions of OSS (JPWC 45/D). The reason for this fate
lay in the expiration in the last week of October not of OSS itself but of its patience., for on
October 31 Donovan, provoked by certain psychological warfare aspects of the projected
North African landings, Operation TORCH, launched a frontal and full-scale assault on the
JPWC. The skirmishing that had been taking place-on channels of control, use of
guerrillas, militarization, OSS functions, and numerous other items of business-now gave
way to open conflict.
6. THE TORCH TINDERBOX
Donovan had been angered by three recent developments. First, however, some
background is needed.
TORCH was momentous, but it was also complicated and confusing. It was momen-
tous because it was the war's first largely American major offensive, and it could not afford
to be unsucessful. It was complicated because it was taking place on the territory of the
traditionally friendly French, and it t:herefiare had to be accomplished with a minimum of
violence and loss of life. It was confusing because it involved the governments in London and
Washington and General Eisenhower's Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) in London, and
it therefore required considerable collaboration, in utmost secrecy, of diverse and often
conflicting American, British, and Allied people and organizations.
Such collaboration in the field of psychological warfare and propaganda was difficult of
attainment for several reasons. First, the Army, transfixed on what psychological warriors
derided as "boom-boom" warfare, really had little use for PW. Second, whereas any man in
the street readily comprehended "psychological warfare," "propaganda," or even "political
warfare," the practitioners of those arts argued, often wrangled, over the meaning of such
terms in relation to the particular organizations they staffed. Third, such organizations,
American and British, not only fought among themselves but also sought defensive and
offensive alliances with their foreign counterparts or collaborators against their own
domestic foes. Fourth, the harnessing of these chargers had to take place in the theater
where AFHQ had to add its own PW outfit to the line-up and to recruit its own warriors.
Untoward developments were inevitable., The first was the appointment on August 15
of a Britisher, a Foreign Office representative, Mr. William H. B. Mack, as the official
responsible for transacting General Eisenhower's nonmilitary business with the political and
psychological warfare organizations of both Britain and the United States. Mack, who really
represented Britain's Political Warfare Executive (PWE), which dealt in propaganda to
enemy territory, was made chief of AFHQ's Political Section. No sooner did Donovan learn
of this appointment of a British propagandist to head psychological warfare activities of an
essentially and notably American operation than he protested to General Smith, Admiral
Leahy, and, in London in September, to General Eisenhower."
His objections became more insistent early in October when Mack, showing his PWE
colors, and showing PWE's natural affinity for OWI as an American counterpart, made
staff arrangements that clearly subordinated OSS to OW[. Mack's OSS staff man, Edmond
Taylor, subordinated to OWl's Percy Winner, immediately protested to Donovan that
Mack's actions represented "the climax of moves ... aimed at circumscribing or eliminating
the role of OSS in psychological warfare, and the putting of OWI in control of various
aspects which in Washington are considered as functions of JPWC or OSS." 69 Even worse
then that, Mack had, in the process, reduced psychological warfare to propaganda, which
was in the OSS view only one of the former's constituent elements.
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Carrying these objections to the JPWC, Donovan demanded, in effect, that Eisenhower
be instructed to place all psychological warfare planning and operations in the hands of an
American officer who would direct all PW agencies in the European theater in accordance
with policies approved by the JCS. Though General Strong argued that Eisenhower "should
not be told how to accomplish" his mission, the JPWC was moved at least to seek
clarification of the setup in London.'?
Meanwhile Donovan communicated his own strong feelings on the subject to General
Smith, now Eisenhower's assistant in London. From him Donovan received assurances that
ffective
all American interests would be protected by General Ei enhower who was in ehingtve
charge of all PW in his theater. Two days later, however, Eisenh cabled
that "we are now forming a combined Civil Affairs and Political Section" which would be
headed by State's Robert Murphy as soon as he arrived in London. There would be coequal
OWI and OSS subsections." As for Mr. Mack, he was "merely" the British Civil Liaison
Officer, who would not head any section. Mack, wrote Harry C. Butcher in My Three Years
with Eisenhower, "gracefully stepped aside."
While Donovan had reason to be pleased with the outcome-Ambassador "Billy"
Phillips in London thanked him for his "strong-arm help" in the fight "-he remained
and the OSShological
both the the
disturbed by the demonstrated eresultant neglect unerstanding of
warfare activities
This episode had hardly run its course when Donovan learned of, and was additionally
provoked by, a second development that provided fresh evidence of this incompre hisnsio nand
neglect. He learned of it, he complained, "only partially and indirectly."
undoubtedly, because it had been considered none of his business. It was the adoption in
London of a broad outline for joint American and British PW collaboration in a propaganda
plan for the forthcoming North African landings. For Donovan propaganda integrated with
t the American soldiers on potentially hostile
military operations-landing ne thousands
beaches-was hs JPWC.
Yet, he argued, the plan had been adopted without the "advantage of consideration" by
the JPWC, its working subcommittee, or OSS, and this despite the fact that these
organizations had been hard at work on psychological warfare for months and had developed
Africa, Australia, and China.
"an intimate knowledge" of PW incidents in Britain, "psychological warfare," as defined
Moreover, the plan made the egregious error of equating by the United States, with "political warfare," as defined by the British. Such an
identification was completely contrary to the definition of PW as accepted by the JPWC.
Such identification missed entirely the concept of intelligence and secret operations as
intrinsic parts of PW and accepted the PWE definition which involved "nothing but
acknowledged broadcasts and open statements. 11 75
This episode had barely commenced its course when it was overtaken by the final
development which was the most patent bypassing of the JPWC and, perhaps, because of the
role played by General Strong, a most galling neglect for Donovan personally to endure.
This event involved Strong as G-2, not as chairman of the JIC, not as a member of the
JPWC, but as one of the co-chairmen of a new committee of the JCS. This was Joint
Security Control (JSC).
Joint Security Control was the military's answer to the genuine need to institute special
measures to guarantee the security of TORCH as it involved the operations of civilian and
military agencies in the field of intelligence, propaganda, political warfare, and subversive
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activities. It was established in August; its senior officers were Strong from the Army and
Capt. George C. Dyer, from the Navy; their job was the coordination, from the angle of
security, of the TORCH-related activities of the civilians in State, BEW, OW I, and OSS.
Joint Security Control soon moved into a different field, however. On October 26,
1942, General Strong, responding to a request from Eisenhower for a propaganda plan for
South America, issued a directive to the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Nelson
Rockefeller, instructing hire on the integration of such a plan with CIAA's activities. Strong
subsequently defended his action primarily on the lack of time available for discussion of the
subject by the JPWC.76 From Donovan's point of view, however, the JSC action was a denial
of two JPWC functions; that of designating the executive agency to implement psychological
warfare plans, and that of providing liaison with other agencies on such plans.
Indeed, the JPWC had been so neglected in these events that it was not actually then
officially aware of the existence of TORCH! The committee's individual members had had
much to do with TORCI-[ in their various other capacities-and this included Donovan as
OSS chief--but as a committee the members did not become seized of the subject until five
days before D-day when, on November 3, they received from the Joint Chiefs a PW plan for
Italy for consideration and implementation. By that time, however, Donovan had excoriated
the JPWC.
7. THE END CIF SKIRMISHING
This excoriation was first drafted, on October 29, by James Grafton Rogers; he did
another draft on the 31st.. On that same day it was issued as JPWC 49, "Examination of
Recent Procedure in Psychological Warfare." On November 1, however, a correction, a
"corrigendum," was made in the text, and again the same day, a "revised corrigendum,"
replacing four pages by two, was issued.''' Different drafts of such documents were routine;
corrections of the formal document were something else. In this case, it is clear that cool
heads prevailed over hot ones, for the revisions and excisions removed the fiery anger of the
original.
The voided text charged that the JPWC had been "overwhelmed" by the task of
administering OSS and that it had become "the cockpit for jurisdictional disputes involving
O.S.S." The same text charged that OWI, CIAA, and BEW "resented" coordination by the
JPWC and that presidential directives "supported their attitude of independence." It
described PW planning and operations as "a highly skilled task involving foreign knowledge,
talent in public affairs, sensitivity to current intelligence and a knowledge of `black' or S.O.
procedures" which was "not characteristic of even the best soldiers, and [was] to some
degree ... inconsistent with their highest efficiency in their real task." None of this
appeared in the final text.
Also, whereas the voided text had concluded that PW was "in confusion," that. there
was "no unified opinion on policy," and that "the machinery set up by the directives [had]
been completely set aside," the final copy more diplomatically charged that PW
principles
and machinery were "not being carried out."' Also, the voided text said that if the U.S. takes
"an extensive part in modern warfare," then it must "start from the beginning" to build "a
workable and adequately staffed" planning and operational unit. Again, the final text more
coolly required that "a clear-cut understanding" relative to the PW functions of OSS and its
relations with other agencies "be definitely established."
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Even so, the indictment was comprehensive and severe: PW had "been thrown into
confusion" by a misconception of the phrase itself, by "a misreading" of FDR's directives,
by an "ignoring" of JCS directives, and by "a lack of centralization in one operational unit
of the products of various agencies." The indictment then reviewed and discussed the
definition of PW which had already been accepted by the JPWC and which included
"general propaganda services," operations such as rumor-spreading, and intelligence activ-
ities to serve these and other needs. Next the paper described the organization-the JPWC,
its Working Subcommittee, and the Advisory Committee-which had been set up by the
JCS to implement the principles of PW. Then it was shown how both principles had been be-
trayed and machinery neglected by both the JCS and the JSC. In conclusion, reform was
called "mandatory."
This indictment, JPWC 49, was hardly off the JCS press on October 31 when much of
it, and much other material that had been prepared for it, was incorporated in a new and
double-barreled assault that Donovan launched against the JPWC and the existing PW
situation. This new blast was JPWC 50, "Proposed New Directives of the Joint U.S. Chiefs
of Staff to the Office of Strategic Services." On the one hand, this JPWC 50 both described
and decried "the present situation," and on the other hand, it prescribed a solution.
The situation was depicted as organized confusion: the JPWC, OSS, OWI, BEW,
CIAA, and the State department were all so many horsemen galloping off madly in all
directions. The JPWC was so "encumbered" with OSS administrative details that both
JPWC and OSS had been "hindered" in their work; OSS was additionally "hampered" by
the necessity of having its papers and proposals passed upon by two or more committees. The
OWI-in lines that surely belittled it-handled "shortwave foreign broadcasts and other
publicly acknowledged printed matter abroad," stuff that was formerly part of COI's
"psychological warfare machinery" and that was now "an important but only fractional part
of a complex strategy ... deeply involving underground activities, economic measures, the
acts, announcements and behaviour of our widely dispersed armed forces, and a mass of
political maneuver." BEW had developed a separate economic intelligence asection, pamani rt pu-
lated economic pressure, economic favors, and preclusive buying-
or influences upon psychological warfare." CIAA manages "the whole of psychological
warfare in the Western Hemisphere"; it had successfully excluded OSS, OWI, BEW and
others from this area except for the fact that the FBI had counterespionage agents in South
America and that "G-2 has a recently organized branch of secret intelligence." Finally,
State, whose declarations "form the skeleton of the whole of psychological warfare," had
only limited "direct liaison with the strategical requirements" of PW. There was much
activity but "a lack of coordination and collaboration."
Donovan had a solution which would rock G-2 and ONI. It had three parts.
The first abolished the JPWC and replaced it by an OSS "Planning Group" which
would take charge of "joint intelligence, counter-intelligence and psychological warfare...."
It would be chaired by OSS, manned by OSS, State, and the military, and assisted by an
advisory committee of representatives of other agencies, but its establishment was "not
intended to interfere" with G-2 or ONI. Despite this disclaimer, its many functions included
"preparing and recommending plans for the coordination of the activities" of the govern-
ment's intelligence agencies. Finally, short of the JCS it had to reckon only with the Joint
Planners.
The second part once again defined PW and described the range of its operations and the
Joint
Army,
` Calculatedthe 1 ave no doubt in hey mind oSfta
U.S then u Ling psychologi cal."
c g
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Navy, OWI, BEW or anyone else as to who was running psychological warfare for the JCS,
this part detailed eight functions that the OSS, working under the JCS and with the Joint
Planners, would execute by itself and/'or in conjunction with other agencies and with
interested foreign nations. Thus, for instance, OSS would initiate, formulate, and develop
PW plans, coordinate other agencies' activities, be the channel of communication between
such agencies and the JCS, handle all matters pertaining to PW "in the field forces," and
conduct its own subversive operations.
The third part established a "Strategic Intelligence Service" which Donovan must have
known was. and even intended that it be., tantamount to throwing down the gauntlet to
General Strong and Admiral Train. The challenge was hardly veiled in two particular
paragraphs. One provided that the proposed SIS would assemble information from all
sources, including G-2 and ONI, and would provide research, analysis and integration of
information "in order to furnish strategic intelligence" for the use of the JCS and others.
Lest G-2 and ONI drag their feet, they were instructed, in the proposal "to place at the
disposal" of OSS such information as was required by OSS and "to prepare" for OSS
"special studies . . . as may be required for joint planning purposes." The other paragraph
provided for the detail to OSS of "specially qualified military, naval and air officers" so that
OSS could furnish the JCS with, inter alia, "a continuous flow of carefully appraised
intelligence studies accompanied by appropriate maps, charts, and supporting data.""
With theseproposals the scene was set. for battle, but before it began Donovan threw
another paper-JPWC 45/1--on the JPWC table. This was Donovan's answer to General
Marshall's request for a definition of the functions of OSS. The new paper both defended his
position as chief of R&A and secret intelligence and rebutted his foes in BEW and the
intelligence services.
He defended the original concept of R & A: a body of civilian and military experts,
with area knowledge and language capability, working on all available information to
produce the research, reports, and estimates necessary for the military's joint planniing and
conduct of operations. He said, however, that whereas he had access to published
information" European newspapers and periodicals, State Department cables and dispatches,
postal censorship intercepts, and data and reports from most civilian agencies of the
government, he had been "handicapped by . . . inability to get adequate disclosure of
military and naval intelligence." His agency was allowed "only within restricted limits" to
consult MIS and ONI materials. It had received only a "small number" of attache reports.
"Of operational intelligence---for example? cable and radio intercepts or air reconnaissance
photographs---virtually nothing" had been made available.
He tackled the G-2 and ONI position that whatever the competence of his research
people in nonmilitary fields they had no qualifications for appraising military or naval
intelligence. "In modern war," he argued, as he had done many times, "the traditional
distinctions between political., economic and military data have become blurred." The
situation required not only professional military and naval men working in their own
province but also professionals trained in other fields. Then he got to the point: "the marked
deficiency in the OSS intelligence service at this time is obvious; namely, a group of army,
navy and air officers to supplement the works [sic] of the civilian experts and to give the
combined work the military impress." He was saying that he had gotten soldiers for
sabotage but not for the production of finished research and estimates.
On that "line of demarkation" between R&A and BEW he admitted that it was "one
of the most persistent and difficult problems" of his research branch. He defended un-
waveringly his agency's need for economists, pointed confidently to their accomplishments,
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recounted efforts-some successful-to reach accord with BEW on sharing the work and
eliminating the duplication, and argued the superiority of his R&A over any other research
agency in meeting the special needs of the military services. He was not ready to permit
BEW to take over his Economics Division.
Much less was he ready to permit G-2 and ON] to take over secret intelligence. Even
assuming other agencies had possession of unvouchered funds in adequate amounts-which
they did not-there were seven considerations listed by Donovan which militated against the
military taking over the field. There is no need to elaborate on them-problems of unity of
direction, administration, personnel, cover, vulnerabilities, nature of intelligence, problems of
counterespionage-but there is need to emphasize that Donovan's lengthy argumentation of
his case clearly reflected a conviction, not totally unfounded as will be seen, that his S1 had
caught the military eye.79
The JPWC table was now crowded with papers concerning OSS, and since the reader
may be understandably confused by their variety-to say nothing of their JCS titling and
numbering system-it may be well to review them before passing on to the great debate that
would now take place in the JPWC meeting room in the Chiefs of Staff building on
Constitution Avenue.
Off to one side but very pertinent to the debate were those papers that had already
been approved: JCS 67, which established the basic functions of OSS; JCS 68 on the
reorganization of the JPWC; JCS 67/4, which marked out channels of control; and JCS
83/1 on saboteurs and guerrillas. Already under discussion by the committee before this
latest spate of papers from Donovan were: JPWC 37/2/D, which was Marshall's query on
the militarization of OSS; and JPWC 45/D, which was Marshall's directive on the functions
of OSS, and which was the immediate precipitant of the impending debate. Now in the
space of a few days Donovan had submitted three new papers: JPWC 49, a blast at the
JPWC, Joint Security Control, and even the JCS itself; JPWC 50, a provocative proposal for
reform; and finally JPWC 45/1, Donovan's response to Marshall's JPWC 45/D.
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Chapter VIII
MID-WINTER BATTLES
Immediately in contention was JPWC 50, which, abolishing the PW committee itself,
proposed to make OSS the dominant American agency for the conduct of PW planning and
operations and for the production of what is now termed "finished intelligence." I Whatever
the specific issues-functions, control, administration, etc.-the underlying issue was the
continued existence of OSS. Donovan and his colleagues had reached the point of
frustration, and the intelligence services still sought the "scattering" of OSS. The issue was
now in the hands, somewhat ominously, of military officers either hostile or relatively
indifferent to the fate of the OSS civilians.
1. BATTLE NO. 1: STRONG vs. DONOVAN
The hostile military, of course, were the G-2 and ONI chiefs, General Strong and
Admiral Train; the indifferent were the war plans representatives, General Wedemeyer and
Capt. H. L. Grosskopf. The BEW member, unconcerned with most of the issues, absented
himself from the meetings-these would be an unprecedented six in number-when JPWC
50 was under discussion. The other very notable absentee was Colonel Donovan, who
informed the committee on November 2, 1942, when the issue was first taken up, that since
the question had unfortunately become "in some measure controversial" and in order to
place the discussion upon "a more objective level" he would not be present but would let his
case be presented by Colonel Buxton, Gen. John J. Magruder, and Dr. Rogers.' General
Strong, no less a party to the controversy, felt no such compunction to send a substitute. In-
deed, he proved to be a tough antagonist.
This was evident at the first meeting when the opening positions of both parties were
laid out. General Strong took his stand on firm ground, namely the provisions of the original
OSS order of June 13. He read the order aloud and pointed out that OSS had been given
two functions: to "collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required" by the
JCS, and to "plan and operate such special services as may be directed" by the JCS. He said
later that there was "a difference between doing what the Joint Chiefs of Staff request and
in doing what the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not prohibit." It was a strong but a narrow po-
sition; and he would hold it as a Maginot line against the expansionism of OSS, which he
termed "a real jeopardy to the military and naval service."'
While Strong contented himself with laying out these two functions as the basis for the
ensuing discussion, the OSS representatives spoke at much greater length. "Ned" Buxton re-
viewed the history of the establishment of COI, emphasized "the basic idea" of a pool of
scholars at work on all information, reminded the group of the services' acceptance of COI
responsibility for foreign secret intelligence, and characterized the development of subversive
activities and PW as "a development of Colonel Donovan's own knowledge of military
developments and his sense of the needs of modern total war."'
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Rogers, a Yale law professor, went over the original idea "in greater detail" and then
contrasted the promise with the reality: progress was negligible since COI had been
transferred to the JCS; OSS was now "almost stopped in its tracks"; there were "signs of
dissolution of the organization"; there was general dissatisfaction; and OSS was "entangled
in two or three committees and the rivalries of several government agencies."
On the basic point of strategic information, he argued that the need for "a center of
information and intelligence for military purposes" had been growing since the last war.
Drawing on both military and nonmilitary information, such a center, he said, had to be
operated, in the U.S., as "a. separate civilian agency." On the other basic point of PW, he
reviewed both the dispersion among many agencies of various PW responsibilities and the
need for "an operating agency" and for "ann overall planning organization" which would
formulate broad principles, maintain close contact with military operations, and exercise day
to day supervision over the implementation of PW plans. Since neither of these basic needs
was presently being: met by OSS, the JCS had to decide, he said, whether to support OSS
effectively, split it up between OWI and G-2, "close out the O.S.S. and pick up the odds and
ends for inclusion in other activities," or "alter the top management." 6
His solution, already before the cornmittee in JPWC 50, was the first alternative:
liberate OSS so that it could operate under its directives. This solution began with a clearing
operation: abolish the JPWC so that OSS could report directly to the JCS through the Joint
Planners. Second was the twofold constructive work: establish in OSS a Planning Group,
add military and naval officers To it, and filet it be a joint medium for coordinating joint
intelligence, counterintelligence and psychological warfare; at the same time, organize "a
central information and intelligence agency in accordance with "the conception of the
President."' These were bold propositions,
The remainder of the discussion was taken up with exploratory questions and comments
from Strong, Train, Wedemeyer, and Grosskopf. Strong, zeroing in on his favorite subject,
asked first about civilians' evaluation of military intelligence and then about the reasons for
the abolition of the JPWC and the operation of the Planning Group. Train, asking about a
counterintelligence system, was told yes, OSS does plan to operate one but be assured there
was no intention of abolishing any such activities "in O.W.I.' or in G-2," or of running any
agents in the Western Hemisphere. Train was also reassured that OSS would have no power
beyond merely recommending plans for coordinating the activities of the government
intelligence agencies Wedemeyer and Grosskopf basically did balancing acts, seeing need
for progress but being cautious about the method.'
The second meeting, November 9, showed that the, preliminaries were over. The ONI
chief declared that the OSS proposal would make the Army and Navy intelligence agencies
"merely an adjunct of the O.S.S." Buxton countered by citing the proposal's guarantee that
no changes would be made in the operations or activities of those agencies. In rebuttal Train
cited another paragraph which he said ran counter to the guarantee and "reversed the
functions of O.S.S. as against O.N.I. and M.1.S." Strong chimed in with the observation
that this would leave the JCS dependent "upon information furnished by civilians," and that
this condition, contrary to what OSS had said, would not be corrected by militarization of
the agency.10
Strong and Train immediately returned to this relational problem at the start of the
third meeting, on November 10. The question posed so far by the discussion, said the
General, is this: does the committee want to recognize OSS as the intelligence channel to the
JCS and as coordinating and controlling ONE, MIS, and the intelligence activities of State,
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Treasury, the FBI, and others? Buxton agreed that the objective was the establishment of "a
central intelligence agency," but he disclaimed any attempt to "control" ONI and MIS.
That result, said Strong, would give the JCS two intelligence services: G-2 and ONI, and
OSS; it would be better, he observed, to "attach" OSS to either ONI or G-2, but this, coun-
tered Buxton, was "contrary to both Presidential and J.C.S. directives." 11
Back to fundamentals, Admiral Train questioned the basis on which OSS ever became
involved in intelligence; its directives, he said, gave it "control of espionage but not overall
coordination of intelligence." Buxton enlightened him on the fact that the orders setting up
both COI and OSS charged them with collecting and anaylzing information. This led to fur-
ther discussion of the Planning Group as well as to its denunciation by Strong and Train as
"unsound in premise" in that it eliminated the Army and Navy from the military evaluation
of intelligence. Can not OSS, asked Strong, operate through the JIC "on a par" with the
MIS, ONI, BEW, and others? 12
Then came the first statement of the deadlock that all must have seen coming. Strong
and Train said they were "unwilling to accept" the Planning Group. Captain Grosskopf,
seeking compromise, suggested making the OSS Planning Group a JPWC subcommittee.
General Wedemeyer, joining the meeting, had another suggestion for reorganizing the
JPWC. Nothing came of any of these words, however. Strong then submitted his own overall
proposal as an alternative to JPWC 50.13
This alternative, JPWC 50/1, was in fact a hardening of the Maginot. line. It provided
that OSS be established "as a non-militarized supporting agency" of the JCS "on a par"
with MIS and ONI. The agency's functions were the two laid down in the June 13 order.
OSS would send its PW plans through the JPWC and the JPS to the Joint Chiefs, and all
intelligence matters would go through the JIC and JPS. Further, the "special services" to be
performed by OSS were "limited" to "those specifically approved" by the JCS, and its
secret intelligence was "limited to espionage in places where such is directed by the J.C.S.
outside the Western Hemisphere." This alternative yielded nothing to OSS: the idea of "a
central intelligence agency" was rejected; OSS remained enmeshed in the tangles of the
three committees; and its functions were subjected to narrow and rigid interpretation."
Strong opened the fourth meeting, on November 14, with a statement of the choice now
to be made: accept JPWC 50 "in toto" or eliminate from the OSS "all functions which did
not fall into a strict interpretation" of the order of June 13. If there was "a middle course,"
he said, it could be embodied in recommendations. Such a middle course was now offered by
Colonel Buixton, who announced to the committee that Donovan was withdrawing JPWC 50
and replacing it by a substitute, JPWC 50/2. Buxton explained that Donovan still defended
the former but was withdrawing it in order "to obtain more uniformity of opinion and
harmony in the Committee." 11
The job of explaining the substitute was taken up by General Magruder, who had most
recently been concerned with the reorganization of the intelligence side of the OSS house.
Magruder said there were two essential points in the new proposal: first, the functions of the
present JPWC subcommittee were placed in the OSS; and second, administrative matters of
the OSS would henceforth be handled not by the JPWC but by the Secretary of the JCS.
The committee went to work on the new proposal which, like the original, also had three
parts. By the end of what must have been a lengthy afternoon, however, the committee
apparently had never gotten past the first part.
That was concerned with "Channels of Communication for the Office of Strategic
Services," and the discussion and the revision as agreed upon at the close of business
indicated that no progress toward compromise had actually been realized. Where OSS,
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seeking escape from committee rule, wanted to deal directly with the JCS Secretary, Strong,
backed by the committee., said it first had to go through the JIC-as did everybody else.
Where OSS, arguing emergencies necessitated direct communication, accepted the JIC as
the "normal" channel of communication to the JCS on the intelligence material it prepared,
the committee knocked out the "normal." Where OSS wanted to be the executive agency for
the implementation of PW plans, Strong, for a variety of reasons not spelled out, doubted
that the committee "desired to put control of planning and execution of psychological
warfare" in the OSS. 16
By afternoon's end Strong had rewritten the most controversial paragraph in Donovan's
compromise so that it affirmed that OSS was only "on a par" with MIS and ONI and would
operate through the same channels as they did. To which Magruder said OSS could not
agree inasmuch as it seemed to violate the sense of the basic OSS order placing it under the
direct jurisdiction of the JCS. Magruder argued that there were certain administrative
matters for which the Director of OSS reserved the right to deal directly with the JCS. Also,
Magruder argued that OSS had been designed "to serve a different echelon" than the Army
and the Navy; and, therefore, that it was not "desired to have O.S.S. placed on a par with
O.N.I. and M.I.S." Once again the deadlock was affirmed, and the sticking point was "on a
par." 17
These meetings of November 2, 9, 1 0, and 14 demonstrated the futility of additional
debate, and so Donovan ended it all with a letter on November 16. He noted there was a
"fundamental difference of opinion" among the committee members on the status of OSS
and said agreement appeared out of reach. "OSS cannot recede from its position," he
declared, "and it is apparent that other members ... will not recede from their positions."
He advised the committee he was withdrawing JPWC 50/2 as no longer serving a useful
purpose and returning to JPWC 50. He then suggested that in order to save time "the
respective positions, as formalized" in JPWC 50 and 50/1 (Strong's paper) be submitted to
the JCS for their determination." With this suggestion there was no disagreement in the
committee when the matter was made the first order of business at the fifth meeting, on
November 16.
Even so, this and another meeting the next day were consumed in the preparation of
the papers in the case for submission to the JCS. Majority and minority views would be pre-
pared; the papers had to be sent to the JIC; and since the whole debate had been
precipitated by Marshall's directive J.PWAWC 45/D on the functions of OSS, the formal
response had to be a reply to that directive. General Strong drafted the covering letter,
which included an OSS statement of its position.
That letter stated the majority belief that the "'basic difference" was a question of
whether the OSS was "an agency on a par with other intelligence agencies," operating for
intelligence under the JIC and for psychological warfare under the JPWC or whether it was
"under the sole control and direction" of the JCS and would be operated in accordance with
the provisions of JPWC 50. The majority said parity was "essential to teamwork and
efficient support of the military effort"; OSS said its solution was the only one which would
"not result in a minimization of its importance and a derogation of its possibilities of
service." Both agreed the problem could only be resolved by the JCS and that such
resolution was a prerequisite to a new directive to replace JCS 67, 67/4, 68, and 83/l."
The covering letter written by Strong also included the majority's point-by-point
response to the questions raised in Marshall's directive. On the requested "clear line of
demarkation" there was much discussion that went beyond the BEW-OSS problem, because
there was general agreement on the need for some improvement in the overall collection and
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analysis of information. Strong wanted to transfer R & A to his own MIS, or, apparently, at
least transfer the economists of R & A to BEW. Trying to be helpful, Captain Grosskopf
recommended combining all research units in OSS but under the direction of the JIC. While
Wedemeyer rejected this as making OSS a subcommittee of the JIC, Strong opposed it on
the ground that "the time has not yet arrived when all Government agencies could accept
direction from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to their intelligence activities." There would be, in
this time.
d a jority ladrt settle
other words, no "central intelligence agency" at
impractical the
for the unhelpful conclusion that "it appears to w a of
demarkation" between OSS and BEW.20
On the intelligence function, the majority found "a marked duplication of effort"
among OSS, ONI, and MIS, but they said OSS should definitely be assigned the function of
conducting, espionage "in enemy-controlled territory outside of the Western Hemisphere."
Who would conduct espionage elsewhere? G-2 perhaps? 21 On sabotage and guerrillas (JCS
83/1) the majority had no trouble, except-and it was a large exception--that "the training
and utilization of units to perform 2guerrilla activities can be better laend more satisfactorily
11
undertaken by the armed forces. No "private army. Happily
OSS of anybody else's photographic activities.
On other subsidiary functions of OSS the majority thought that the JIC ought to take
that the OSS Strategic
charge of coordinating all cartographic work, including that of OSS,
Service Command-the guerrilla vehicle-should be abolished, and that PW should be
tSecurity he last word Control. Strong implementation of PW TORCH
handled by the JWC and J JSC houlde Joint
experience
Donovan, who had already submitted his reply to Marshall's directive, now rebutted
these positions as well as the overall position taken by the majority. He minimized the
problem of a "clear line of demarkation": the JIC always specified either OSS or BEW to
do a particular study, and duplication elsewhere had been "lessened." He rejected the idea
that OSS espionage should be limited to "enemy-controlled" territory: intelligence services
generally maintained representatives in countries adjacent to such areas. He said the reasons
supporting JCS approval in principle of the guerrilla units were still valid. He denied any
cartographic duplication. Also, he rejected the ideas that the part-time JPWC could function
as a full-time planning committee and that Joint Security Control, set up as a security
mechanism, could implement and control operations."
On the larger issue of the status of OSS he repeated his contention that OSS was in a
different category than either the Army or the Navy. It was a military organization created
by the President, who had also created the JCS, was set up under the JCS, and was ordained
to serve that agency. Of all the civilian and military agencies involved only OSS was "an in-
strument of the JCS." However, OSS was concerned, he said, "not with status or with parity
but with function." 24
On that question, the real question he maintained, the record showed that OSS could
best perform those functions that it had always performed, that covered a hitherto
unoccupied field, and that encroached on no other agency's territory. These functions were
three: secret intelligence everywhere outside the Western Hemisphere., R & A, and "black"
propaganda and subversion. Finally, his JPWC 50, he argued, replied to Marshall's directive
and in the latter, and psychological
replaced the
and clearly hre was no conflict in intelligence
former there
JPWC.25
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When the reports, views, and rebuttals were all written, they were sent on to the JIC
where Strong, Train, and Buxton-now wearing other hats--were joined by Berle but not,
apparently, by the BEW member. They found a better way of handling the "clear line of
demarkation" request: they found "potential duplication" which could be avoided by the JIC
doing what it was already doing, namely, assigning to the appropriate agency the economic
study to be undertaken for the JCS. Otherwise, the JIC quickly accepted-OSS dissent-
ing-the JPWC majority view of the difference with OSS and passed all the papers--with
their JIC titles and numbers-on to the Joint Chiefs.26
The composite paper, JPWC 45/2 (or, if you will, JIC 59/1) was aptly described by the
JIC Secretary, as he passed it upward, as "a complex paper." It contained, for example,
"references to five distinct tabs or appendices marked `A'." To clarify the paper for the
heavily burdened Chiefs he submitted this outline, which may also help the reader of these
pages:
"Text (pp. 1-2)
Tab A (pp. 3-5)
Tab B (the remainder of the paper), containing
Text (pp. 6-8)
Appendix A, which is J.P.W.C. 50, containing
Text
Tab A
Tab B
Appendix B, which is Appendix A of
J.P.W.C. 5011
Appendix C, which is J.P.W.C. 45/1, containing
Text
Appendix A" 27
2. GENERAL McNARNEY''S COMPROMISE
The JCS, with the manifold problems of war on their hands, had no intention of
methodically digesting this ream of paper. The incentive was not there. They really were not
seized with the idea of psychological warfare. They did appreciate the need for a better
exploitation of intelligence, but this was an organizational problem--of which wartime
Washington had a superfluity---which was more tolerable, than soluble. Furthermore, they,
especially Marshall and King, were familiar enough with the conflict of personalities within
the JPWC and the JIC to see the need and value of straining the issues through another
sieve before they tackled such a "complex paper." In this regard it was probably Marshall
who took the initiative. He, more than King, was witness to the Donovan-Strong confronta-
tion, and as Chief of Staff he had considerable stake in the activities of both men.28 He had
informally remarked that he would have the problem handled by his deputy, Maj. Gen.
Joseph T. McNarney and Brigadier General Deane.
On November 16, when the JPWC was readying its papers for the JCS, General
Strong reported that it had been "intimated" that the Joint Chiefs would "appoint a
subcommittee of two members to consider the reports." 29 When the subcommittee was
appointed, however, the two turned out to be not McNarney and Deane but the former and
King's Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Adm. Frederick J. Horne. Actually this
subcommittee also included the Air Chief of Staff, General Arnold, who, subordinate to
Marshall, was really not involved in the problem and hence not active in its resolution.
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Of the two who were, it was really McNarney who began the work and was apparently
both the architect and the salesman of the compromise that was eventually worked out. The
compromise essentially gave both Strong and Donovan what each most wanted while
denying the latter his desired intelligence role; "persuading Colonel Donovan" to accept the
compromise, wrote JCS historian Vernon E. Davis, was for McNarney "undoubtedly a high
achievement in military statesmanship." 30
McNarney conceived the idea of de-emphasizing the OSS intelligence role in an effort
to appease Strong, and of emphasizing the PW role in order to keep Donovan occupied and
happy. In doing so, however, he ensured a more bitter confrontation between Donovan and
Elmer Davis of OWI.
The stalemated JPWC issue formally became a JCS matter on November 23, when the
papers were published as JCS 155.31 This is an important number in OSS history, and the
reader might as well get used to it; the series would extend to JCS 155111/D, published on
October 27, 1943.
On November 25, 1942, McNarney and his two colleagues were formally charged with
the study of JCS 155. Prior to this occasion McNarney, while aware of the issue and the
conflict of personalities, had had nothing to do with the PW situation. In taking it up he set
out, he recalled after the war,32 to resolve the recurring fight about intelligence. On his own
he turned out a first draft, on November 29, which concentrated on PW and restricted the
OSS intelligence role to the service of only its PW function. This he submitted to OPD
where it first went to General Wedemeyer for comment.
Where NcNarney's draft, emphasizing subversive activities as the OSS function, went
a long way toward satisfying Donovan on the training and use of guerrillas, General
Wedemeyer, remaining consistent on the issue, was flatly opposed to "giv[ing] Mr. Donovan
any military personnel for guerrilla or related activities." Where McNarney's draft included
propaganda and economic warfare as portions of psychological warfare, Wedemeyer quickly
warned that while this was sound in conception it was unrealistic in practice. The President,
he pointed out, had "made the decision that propaganda agencies will operate directly under
him," and therefore it was "necessary for us to accept the existing unsound organization and
try to set up the most effective operational agreements that we can induce Mr. Elmer Davis
of OWI and Colonel Donovan of OSS to accept." 33
Wedemeyer had other comments. He recommended the establishment, under military
control, of a central governmental agency to provide maps, charts, sketches, and illustrated
materials. On the integration of PW plans with military operations he urged the need for
careful "screening" of plans because "Donovan's boys are prolific writers and [will] flood us
with projects." He also urged caution on giving Joint Security Control too broad a power
over the timing of PW measures. Finally, he agreed with McNarney on giving OSS "only so
much intelligence responsibility (collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information) as
pertains to psychological warfare." That, he thought, was "sound and definitely should
indicate to MIS, ONI, and OSS the delineation of intelligence functions desired by the
powers that be." 34
Wedemeyer's boss, Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, while agreeing in general with
Wedemeyer, thought the "major fault" of McNarney's draft was the failure to state
specifically that in the theater of operations OSS would be entirely controlled by the theater
commander. He explained that "the failure to carry out this principle has been one of the
principal troubles with the OSS activities." Handy, also agreeing with Wedemeyer, thought
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giving Donovan control of guerrillas would "let ourselves in for possible legal complications
and undoubtedly for a lot of headaches." He also thought placing "propaganda and
economic warfare under the OSS" could not be done under existent executive orders."
Handy had one final point on a subject of incipient development. Referring to
"Intelligence and Intelligence Agencies," Handy said it was his belief that "all such agencies
should be coordinated under one head . . . an Army officer"; while the solution was not
"practicable now," it remained "the objective which we should seek." "
Undoubtedly he was referring to the proposed merger of Army and Navy intelligence
which was then under study and which was relatively independent of the current controversy
involving OSS, G-2, and ONI. This matter was related to those claims, which were referred
to in the Introduction to this study, and which were made by or for Admiral Zacharias,
Colonel Mashbir, and Admirals King and Cooke, to the paternity of the Central Intelligence
Agency. At the very time Handy was writing his comments, General Strong and Admiral
Train were preparing a paper on such a merger for Marshall and King at their direction.
The issue would come before the JCS on the same day they first took up JCS 155.
Having obtained the comments of OPD, General McNarney then coordinated his draft
with Admiral Horne, and. the two of the visisted OSS. They talked "with all OSS people
except Donovan." McNarney recalled that he had made a point of specifically riot meeting
with Donovan until he, McNarney, was "fairly clear as to what was going to be done."
McNarney then visited OSS alone, talked with General Magruder, and then revised his
original draft, which soon received I-lorrie's concurrence."
The draft was then ""read" to Strong, Train, and Donovan. The first two could not have
been too unhappy about it since none of their central concerns was disserved by it. True,
each had a fledgling psychological warfare section which would feel some effect from the
proposed directive, but neither activity ranked high among the intelligence activities that
were greatly expanded in both services after Pearl Harbor. On the other hand, when the
news circulated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were putting OSS in full charge of
psychological warfare there also circulated rumors that both Strong and Train were going to
be suspended for interfering; with OSS and were, noted Rogers, "unhappy." If they were un-
happy, it quite possibly was because the Chiefs, while protecting G-2 and ONI, were
unhappy with the performance of Strong and Train in the entire dispute; for example,
according to Wedemeyer after the war, Marshall at this time was "sore at Strong, who [had]
been complained about . . ." and was "momentarily tired of [the] whole G-2 relations with
P.W."'R In any case neither officer was suspended.
McNarney recalled that he had "called Donovan in to discuss the paper." 19 Unfortu-
nately for the reader, and the historian, there is no contemporary account of the "sales
pitch" that was made by the one or the "sales resistance" offered by the other. Donovan
must have been disappointed but not surprised and then finally pleased.
Donovan must have been disappointed, because the rejection of his proposal to run joint
intelligence, counterintelligence, and psychological warfare must have struck him as another
in the series of significant. setbacks he had suffered since being appointed Coordinator of
Information. First, he had never really functioned as Coordinator inasmuch as the Army and
Navy never gave him the information to coordinate. Second, his charter as government
propagandist was narrowed three times: painlessly the first time when he lost any domestic
responsibility, with some hurt when he lost South America to Nelson Rockefeller, and with
considerable loss of prestige when his Foreign Information Service was carried off' into an
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OWI captivity. Third, after he was made chief of the JCS PW program but given a vague
charter, he encountered only obstruction and frustration. Now when he-"imaginative,
energetic, and dissatisfied with routine restrictions," as McNarney described him 40-sought
to recover the core of both his original and second charters, he was being asked to settle for,
as it were, half of a loaf. "Persuading" him probably was a high act of statesmanship on
McNarney's part.
At the same time Donovan could not have been surprised by the Solomonic split down
the middle. Strong and Train had made it abundantly clear, not only in the JPWC debate
but also in the preceding months, that they were not going to see him set up as the
coordinator of their intelligence; and other military instinctively concurred in what all saw
and opposed as civilian evaluation of intelligence on which military operations would be
partly based. Donovan must have realized that, however much everybody agreed on the need
for "a central intelligence agency," there was only an outside chance that his idea would
materialize in December 1942.
On the other hand, McNarney was offering him a "big" half of a loaf, as modern
advertising would have it. Not only was he being offered full charge of what came to be
known as "the military program for psychological warfare," but he would also receive, if
McNarney could prevail, authority to train and operate guerrilla units. Additionally, in
giving Donovan this PW role, McNarney was offering what was most personally attractive
to Donovan, who fully appreciated the need for others coordinating intelligence but who for
himself preferred, as Sherwood had described it, something of "a special, secret and even
mysterious nature," that is, "special operations" and guerrilla warfare.
Donovan was probably reconciled to the inevitable and prepared to make the best of it.
There was more enthusiasm for the new setup among the OSS people who would play a role
in the new Planning Group. For them it meant close collaboration with the military and the
State Department in the planning and supervision of all psychological warfare. Even they,
however, because they were closer to the resentments and suspicions of OWl personnel,
expected strong opposition from that organization. Nevertheless, they felt that in a sense
they had been given responsibility for all nonmilitary warfare, under of course the ultimate
policy-making responsibility of the President and the Secretary of State."
For the challenging situation that confronted them, they felt that much credit was due
General McNarney and Admiral Horne, who stood as high in OSS estimation as Strong and
Train stood low.
3. JCS ENDORSEMENT OF OSS
When McNarney had obtained the concurrence of Donovan, Strong, and Train to his
draft directive, he sent it to the JCS where, as JCS 155/1/D, it became Item 4 on their
agenda for ]December 8. Admiral Horne, reviewing the drafting process, explained that one
of its main features was the elimination from OSS of "all responsibility regarding collection
and dissemination of information." General McNarney, concurring, said the main purpose
was "to de-emphasize the activities regarding intelligence and to emphasize ... psychological
warfare...." He said that the U.S. did not have any organization "charged definitely with
the preparation and implementation" of PW and with its careful integration with military
operations. He said OSS had "a number of superior men," who, given "complete
responsibility," would produce "excellent results." 42
At this point Admiral King inquired if the OSS PW unit, substantially the planning
group which Donovan had proposed in JPWC 50 as a joint medium to run joint intelligence,
counterintelligence, and psychological warfare, might not have a place in the proposed
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merger of Army and Navy intelligence. M.cNarney thought the two activities "'should be
completely divorced"; but he did admit that if the proposed merger--actually Item 7 on the
same JCS agenda-were consumated, then such OSS elements as cartography and. R & A
might be incorporated in the new organization. Horne agreed there were "a number of good
men ... whose services could be integrated into the over-all war effort.""
No action was taken on the item, however, because both King and Admiral Leahy had
stated earlier that they had not had enough time to study the matter. While the admirals
and other military then looked more closely at the document, some interested civilians were
also brought into the discussion. These were Nelson Rockefeller, Milo Perkins, and Elmer
Davis.
They apparently were involved because of the well-founded conviction on the part of
the JCS Secretary, General Deane, that their interests were affected by some provisions of
JCS 1 55/ l /D. They met., therefore, in Deane's office on Saturday, December 12, were
apparently given copies of the directive, and were invited to submit their comments.
Rockefeller only requested the insertion of his standard provision specifically excluding OSS
from the Western Hemisphere. Milo Perkins anticipated no difficulties, though he took the
precaution of submitting some clarification aimed at protecting BEW interests. Elmer Davis
alone had real problems."'
Basically they were two. First was the relation between OWI and OSS. He noted that
the directive gave OSS a charter for "the planning, development, coordination, and
execution of the military program for psychological warfare." He then noted that this
"military program" extended to planned as well as actual military operations, and so he rea-
soned that the "sphere of activity" for OSS appeared "to be pretty nearly world-wide." But,
he argued, the OSS Planning Group established by the directive to implement this
worldwide "military program" was slated to run, inter alia, the propaganda phase of the
program. The Planning Group, with no OWl member, planned propaganda, he said, and it
also exercised "supervision" over OWI's implementation of the plans. This, he concluded,
meant that. OWI was "dominated by OSS.45
The second problem was more fundamental. The JCS directive, he charged, simply
assigned to OSS some functions the President had assigned to OWI in Executive Order
9182. On the one hand, he said, PW, as defined in the directive, included propaganda, but
propaganda was clearly the field of OWI; he cited various provisions of his executive order
which showed that OWI had responsibility for developing overseas information programs,
for coordinating other agencies' activities, for policy-making in this field, and for conducting
Iiaision with foreign agencies. Clearly, he argued, when the President issued the OSS and
OWI orders, he did not give the same functions to two different agencies."
Davis concluded by saying that if the J[CS were not happy with OWI's work they were
free to recommend to the President either a redistribution of functions presently assigned
OWI or a replacement of himself by "somebody more efficient." Until such action was
taken, he intended to perform those duties which were entrusted to him by the President and
of which he could not be "relieved by any lesser authority." 4'
General Deane tried to oblige Davis; JCS 155/ ll /D was revised and sent back to him.
Having studied it "with great care," Davis replied on December 22. While he admitted some
satisfactory changes had been made, he nevertheless maintained they had been nullified by
the provisions left in the directive. As Davis saw it, OSS only had the functions of sabotage,
espionage, guerrilla warfare, counterespionage, and the maintenance of contact with
underground groups and with foreign nationality groups in the United States; it had nothing
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to do with propaganda, which belonged to OWI, or to economic warfare, which belonged to
BEW. From that point of view, OSS had nothing to do with other agencies and had,
therefore, no reason for either a Planning Group or an Advisory Board! 48 That cut the heart
out of the directive.
Not fully appreciated then was the basic difference between OSS and OWI as it had
developed in these first six months of their unhappy coexistence. It began with words. OSS
had been charged by the President with collecting and analyzing "strategic information" and
with conducting such "special services" as were requested by the JCS. The OWI had a man-
date from the President to do all sorts of things with "information" or "war information." In
neither of these presidential charters did the words "psychological warfare" or "propa-
ganda" appear; yet these terms, undefined to the general satisfaction of all, were constantly
invoked by the disputants.
However one defined the terms, everyone, including Davis, agreed that it was possible
to define "psychological warfare" so as to include "propaganda" as one of its constituent
elements. Evert if that were done, argued Davis, "propaganda" remained a totally distinct
and separable element-an absolute OWI monopoly, where films, radio, and press were
involved. He further argued that in this independent state "propaganda," i.e. OWI, went its
own way, effecting in consultation with other agencies whatever coordination with military
operations seemed necessary.
Donovan rejected both parts of the Davis argument. While admitting that the bulk of
"propaganda," especially domestic and general political overseas information programs, was
outside the OSS area of responsibility, Donovan insisted that there was a significant area of
"propaganda" activities involving pictures and words-rumors, whispering campaigns,
deception plans, "black" leaflets and radio stations-that partook more of the nature of
subversion, of "psychological warfare," of "special services" that were clearly an OSS area
than of the "information" and "war information" that belonged to OWI. Donovan also
argued that where military operations were involved, psychological warfare, including
propaganda, was subsidiary, had to be integrated with those operations, and could be so inte-
grated by a central coordinating body fully informed of the military's plans and operations.
That, he insisted, was the function of the proposed OSS Planning Group.
So stood the argument between the two men and organizations when, also on December
22, the JCS took up the matter for the second time. How aware the Chiefs themselves were
of the depth of Davis's hostility to the draft directive is not at all clear; in any case that
hostility remained as trouble stored up. The JCS, now that compromise had been effected
within the military establishment, was prepared to act.
Admiral Leahy, putting his weight behind the work of McNarney and Horne,
recommended that the words "complete and free" be omitted from a sentence stating that
G-2, ONI, and OSS "will provide for the complete and free interchange of information."
Seldom, thought the Admiral, did G-2 or ONI carry out such interchange with OSS. Even
so, said Admiral Horne, ONI is now doing it. Not so far as the Army was concerned, said
McNarney; it had been a one-way street, from OSS to MIS, "with no Army reciprocity";
and OSS needed the information.49 The words stayed in.
Admiral King had problems. Indeed, that day he had submitted to the JCS a
memorandum (JCS 155/3) that listed so many queries and objections that it is now difficult
to see how he could ever have agreed, as he did on December 22, with the draft before him.
For instance, he thought the Planning Group should be under the JCS, not OSS. He thought
the proposed directive was "unsatisfactory-even dangerous-unless it included a clear
definition of `psychological warfare.' " He was not clear on the reason for abolishing the
JPWC.50
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In the meeting itself King said he was not ready to accept the paper but he was not
clear on what to do about it. He thought the directive "set up a quasi-independent agency
and that this might `open the gates' for future complications." Both Horne an' McNarney
tried to re-assure him it was safe and necessary to go ahead. King then asked about the
meaning of "psychological warfare?" and "considerable discussion ensued." Perhaps, he
queried, "undercover warfare" better expressed the idea? "After further discussion" they
returned to the original phrase, which is still there. By now King was persuaded to accept
the document so that "it might be given a fair trial." s'
With that concurrence., and after six months of frustration and bureaucratic battling,
OSS was finally given ilts first and at that time definitive charter spelling out its functions,
duties, and channels of communication. This was JCS 155/4/D, "Functions of the Office of
Strategic Services," which was officially promulgated on December 23, 1942 (Appendix H).
The directive, abolishing the JPWiC., established the OSS Planning Group consisting of
OSS, Army, Navy, and State members, and an Advisory Group consisting of representatives
of BEW, OWI, CIAA, Treasury, and such others as seemed necessary.
The directive made OSS, an "operating agency" directed and supervised by the JCS,
responsible for "the planning, development, coordination, and execution of the military
program for psychological warfare"; the propaganda and economic phases of that "military
program" were limited to recommendations to the JCS as to the results desired. OSS was
additionally empowered to compile such political, psychological, sociological, and economic
information as was required for military operations. Of course it would have nothing to do
with the Western Hemisphere.
The directive spelled out eight duties: four in the PW field, three in special operations,
and one in R&A. OSS was authorized to work with other agencies in developing PW plans
and doctrine, to maintain liaison with such agencies, and to collect, evaluate, and
disseminate information needed in the execution of PW. In SO it was authorized to develop
weapons and procedures, train men, and conduct operations. R&A was authorized to prepare
certain sections of "Strategic Surveys" and to supply such maps, charts, and illustrations as
these surveys or the JCS otherwise required.
The directive spelled out, so it appeared, both the content of "the military program for
psychological warfare" and the manner of its implementation. The content was threefold:
propaganda under OWI, economic: warfare under BEW, and special operations--sabotage,
guerrilla warfare, contact with foreign groups in the U.S., and the conduct in enemy-
occupied or enemy-controlled territory of espionage, counterespionage, and of relations with
underground groups-all under OSS. The implementation-and here was the principal
storage place of trouble----lay with the Planning Group (PG) and the Advisory Committee,
both chaired by OSS. The PG, charged with insuring coordination of all PW operations with
military operations, submitted its work, first to the Director of OSS, and then through only
the Joint Staff Planners to the JCS. In organized theaters of operations OSS was placed un-
der the control of the theater commander; Joint Security Control was made responsible for
"the timing" of PW measures initiated in the United States.
Finally, the directive defined the intelligence and guerrilla warfare functions of OSS.
In the former field it was restricted to the needs of PW, the preparation "of assigned
portions of intelligence digests and such other data and visual presentation as may be
requested," and to espionage and counterespionage in enemy-held or controlled territory.
Just to make clear the limitations of this intelligence role, it was specifically stated that the
Joint Intelligence Committee would supply the JCS whatever "special information and
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compro
ence studies" they needed. On the guerrilla issue there el to be p ovided for guerrilla
clans g was
d
"
clause read: "unless otherwise specify f omente and authorize , personnel
nuclei of guerrilla units. rs, warfare will be limited to organizers,
the size of the guerrilla units envisaged by Donovan,
While this considerably whittled down giving military status to the smaller units which were
it nevertheless left open the way for dispatched to him a
authorized.
As if to forestall trouble with Elmer Davis, the JCS immediately ned G
reassurance about the operation of the Hl to tive. The explain cothat Ph
t
letter of r will inform you of
"will limit its activities with reference to propaganda the plan, they Will
results desired.... If the Joint Chiefs of Staff aff approve
representative of plan plan, they
and to as sit on execute far as t em.
propaganda aims included in the designate anda request that you
th OSS A was
vi-
you then, asked Admiral Leahy,Sz the JCS explanation,
sory Committee? As will be seen shortly,hich it had been typed.
concerned, was not worth the paper Meanwhile on December 23 and 24, General Marshall and Colonel Donovan ex-
s oy
six pass me?)without
nt
ed Christmas greetings. These indicated ouldrnothlet the holidayg that season ally
Chang
unhappiness had come to an end. Marshall coming
expressing gratitude for the cooperation and assistance Donovan had given him p
in the trying times of the past Marshall regretted that "after voluntarily com
ff particularly ad had the jurisdiction" of the Joint nt Chiefs had "arenderedvinvaluablelservice, p , eo would
"smoother wailing." He declared that OSS and he hoped that the new directive would
this very
with reference to the North African Campaign,
eliminate most, if not all, of D"I novan's recognize that difficulties. due to Donovan, your acknow intervention dgig the present
us a very
directive Marshall is a t a revolutionary and courageous document and that it imposes serious obligation.>, 53 Donovan, putting a in conformity with the new directive, and proceed at
was now ready to reorganize OSS,54 last to conduct psychological warfare on ad broad ad front. He could postpone the fight for
long to a later
"a central intelligence agency their reciprocally congratulatory letters,
war on Donovan and OSS. were Elmer
colleagues were declaring exchanging
andarshallhisand
4. BATTLE NO. 2: DAVIS vs. DONOVAN
Sherwood, rushed off to the
artial
On Christmas Eve 1942 Davis and his overseas chief,
White House to protest the new directive to the Preside t and sty de qu nd itsbut that
revocation. While there is no direct account of the discussion, there overnment's
they denounced it as a violation of thee President's order principle of establishing civilian OWI as control the of gpropagn the
as a violation of the President s own ~l to the seeciall i sign
unified information agency, and as a threat to subordinate OW to O. , ep
then very important North African theater of operations. They
terminated by the
sa udden to orrandum countermanding the JCS directive, but he refused at the time to do so. They
had to go away empty-handed, because their protest had been abruptly
announcement of the startling news of the assassination in Paris of the bitterly
linchpin of the "Darlan deal" which was
controversial Adm. Jean Francois Dar an, the
currently angering liberal opinion in both Britain and the United States.
Threats of resignation now thundered officials, theOrumorsrwent,sweand re read reverberated to submit
of
the public press. Elmer Davis and his top otheir resignations if the President did not repudiate the directive giving OSS supervision
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psychological warfare.
reported Milton Eisenhower, the general's brother and a top the Possibility Of ",
Y r mass resignation among the overseas staff together with
possibility of a Davis resignation." The press reported that resignations had been o official,
Sherwood, M a real d
, Mac-Leish, and Jloseph Barnes.
Hear a
morning radio broadcast, one State Department official said "she was an d aanted trent o by e she had told the Colonel when he wanted e engage several of these men originally t said g such an announcement on as sooner or later they wouild cause him trouble." In rnid-January 1943 Davis told ta hear it.. ., -
ference that if the occasion arose for him to say anything about alleged
con
OSS, he "could say quite a lot about it.' press c_
' '6 differences with
OWI's eruptive unhappiness provoked no sympathy either among most of the military
or in State. While the former generally cared little for OSS, they had just as little
OWI whose newsmen and propagandists, they of military security that they could not be trusted with military appreciation sec sec the
rets.
like State and the President, had accepted the Darlan arrangement,
~
whereby General Eisenhower, to save American lives, had made a politically mlit expedient but
very unpopular "deal" with the detested Vichy admiral; but the OWI r
gone off on their own denouncing the deal as a violation of all the principles
war was being fought. The military also liked the basic premise of JCS 15514113 V Mich the
operations, ought to be psychological ones, which were directly as directly controlled by the military as y tied into military
For its part, State found intolerable the OWI thesis that its Possible.
the President and not from that department. Also, State had experienced unhappiness of its own with the way Policy guidance came from
information received from State with scant wregard hfor maintaining consistco with U.S.
foreign fork office of OWI utilized
making
policy as promulgated by making by propagandists whether they w orkedsfore OWI or the for er observer U. not
surprising, then, that a man like Adolf Berle, who thought OWI "might policy-
directive, nevertheless discussed it with an OSS liaison man "in an CO!. COIIt is not
the new" i, have a easy"ain
OWI did get considerable s)m~pat y from the Bureau of the Budget , which entirely amiable
to get into the middle of the act in order to be the one to resolve it. Bureau
clearly tried
spent
Officials, hours on December 29 discussing with Milton Eisenhower both the overall impact new directive and the memorandum which OWI wanted the President to sign. They warned
aof the
Eisenhower that the memorandum did not really
BEW's research activities. Eisenhower agreed to discuss a They w "solve the problem" and that it "sold out"
and then take it up with the bureau representatives before resubmitting it to
They even managed later to obtain Eisenhowerr's greement?ssiblrevision with Sherwood
the President managed the bureau in to settle 's this agreement
the to regent.
gone too far on "get Elmer Davis to regard
issue Davis subsequently said he had
the matter with the President to turn it over to the Budget Bureau.5,
The busy Budget people with a legitimate interest in the expected budgetary
that would follow an OSS reorganization 7-r;ure 6), 4 to discuss the meaning of the directive. These budget officers concluded that changes
at
Donovan meant to expand his "black" ' rnet with Donovan and Deane on
areas now under the jurisdiction of Btpropaganda activities and his research "far into the
and that Deane "had no clean-cut
conception of what OSS would have to do dtoOimplement the directive.
The budgeteers also met with a high BEW ?59
much disturbed" b official who, the said, "did not appear m
m
Mil u the disturbed" by the dir h svef bur did now see the y
Possibility further duplication work.
a major negotiating role, soon reported that
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10,
e
I",
i
Z
e d
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Milo Perkins ,was becoming a little more disturbed about the OSS directive." 60 Of course,
both OWI and the Bureau of the Budget had their own reasons for fanning a little
discontent in the BEW, which had already accepted the new directive.
Davis saw Roosevelt on January 'i, apparently the first time since Christmas Eve.
According to Eisenhower's account of the meeting, "the President had told Mr. Davis in
most forceful language that he wanted OW1 to carry out all the responsibilities assigned to
it by the Executive Order." The President. was quoted as saying that he would take up the
matter with the JCS that evening, but as to whether this happened or not Eisenhower had no
news. The President, thought Eisenhower, would also buttress the OWI position in North
Africa by sending Robert Sherwood both as his own and as the OWI representative."
Nothing was said about the President issuing a countermand of the JCS directive.
Shortly after FDR left town on January 9, 1943, for the Casablanca conference., Davis
wrote General Deane that "the President had told me that he does not desire to change the
functions assigned" to OWI. Despite Admiral Leahy's letter of assurance of December 22,
said Davis, certain passages in JCS 155/4/D "appear to give a control over part of the
work" of OWI to OSS. Consequently, declared the OWE chief, everything in that document
that referred to his organization was "null and void." 62
Roosevelt had apparently been basically sympathic to the Davis protest, especially as it
centered on the question of civilian or military control of propaganda. Indeed, if one can
accept at face value an interested third-hand account of the Davis meeting with FDR, the
latter waxed eloquent in his support of O'WI. He was quoted as expressing confidence in
Davis, as crediting OWI with doing a "splendid job," and wanting it to "continue as it was."
fie reportedly said that OSS was designed for military PW and that OWE was "his principal
arm for psychological warfare in the civilian field"--a distinction which could not have been
as reassuring as OWI wanted. Roosevelt then made a statement which must have been
reassuring but must also have been surprising, for he declared that OSS, but not OWE,
would be finished when the war was ov11 61
FDR's distinction between the civilian and military fields would seem to indicate that
he saw some merit in the JCS directive, which, as far as is known, he had not yet seen. In
any case, Rogers was moved to write in his diary: "I suspect the Great White Father will not
repudiate Leahy and Marshall but [will] leave us to fight it out." 64 FDR was accustomed to
letting human nature take its course; and taking off as he was for some three weeks in North
Africa, he knew that the fight would go on.
The dispute had become public property as early as January 4, when threats of
resignation were broadcast. It was widely reported and discussed in the weeks he was gone.
Headlines reported: "Davis, Donovan Offices at Odds over Propaganda Jurisdiction," "War
Psychology Battle Carried to White House," "OWI-OSS Fight to Roosevelt," "OWI in
Tangle over Sherwood Trip to Africa," "Too much Quarreling in Propaganda Services," and
"U.S. Still Lacks Definite Program on Psychological Warfare." 65
These stories centered on the controversial directive, OWI-OSS rivalry, White House
involvement, and General Eisenhower's unhappiness with OWE in North Africa. The
reporters naturally obtained assistance from the disputants: OWI informed Ernest K.
Lindley of Newsweek that it was "prepared to make an issue in the press" of the dispute, but
Donovan and the JCS gave Lindley their side of the issue, and the result on January 25 was
a markedly pro-OSS story.66
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In general, the reporting accepted the necessity for PW and for the its infotegra such
with military operations, and on balance OSS, appearing
of a Post, the
coordination, emerged in a more favorable tshad gi enOhim almThe ost as Washington
g
Eisenhower's complaint that the propagandis
as the Germans, editorialized that JCSsin versed in
operations " l ketthe "well OSS was better qualified to
guide
hand to the glove." 67
Of course the battlewas not on Januaryv31. The next day Davis and Sherwood met withs
soon as the Roosevelt returned
rePresident t at at 2:45 2:45.68 8 Presumably they went over old ground, and presumably FDR exhibited
sympathy, but he clearly held off on a final decision.
ing
In a few days he had before him a lengthy memorandum who had
the urgency of resolving the issue and laying out "a suggested
never exhibited any tenderness for OSS, hammered out the theses that OSS and the JJ CS
were assuming "the responsibility for decisions which they are not authorizedfor equipp and
make," that these decisions involved "basic issues of foreign policy .
post-the
authoor informa
or the endecisions rested with a number of civilian agencies, and finally that none
from the JCS. His composed of high-ranking
PW authority
of these forth
so nking
t agencies could of its
solution tion was the establishment representatives" from State, the JCS, Treasury, BEW, Commerce, OWI, Censorship, Lend-be chaire d by
Lease, Argiculture, and Foreign Relief Rnipropagandan pol t~ ald and economic
State and would formulate "broad policies to gover superv ise
parate
warfare, and subversive "unified intelligence organization' out of " the
operations of OSS and d build a OSS could be "reconstituted as the
. activities" of ONI, MIS, and OSS; and, finally, 69
principal undercover operating agent for the JCS.
Smith had probably gotten his basic "suggested solution" from OWI's Milton Eisen-
hower. He had suggested to a Budget official that there be established an interagency some
policy lEisenhower
ike committee of chaired not State
ho determine overall psychological.
Coy y o the Budget Bureau
explained that OWI could be subject only to such a hat t sOWI ~swhichid opposed
illustrated this principle of independence by which upheld
collaboration with Vichy, could not be bound by State Department policy,
collaboration."
Certainly OWI's Elmer Davis was not going to have anything to do wit Daos svan's
Advisory Committee, which was supposed to advise the OSS Planning Group,
Jets noire. The PG's explained once again that the PG's functions were his. Rogers by`Dnow,
Feletter .,, bruary 11 Davis e
operating
Presidents forimplsupportication the Davis
upon fashion
Febbruaary 11, had the PG G organized
letter was that the OWI chief would
By this time also, Admiral Leahy, the President's representative on the JCS, began to on the take a more active interest in the matter. Having asked General Dea neef for
andu of and the
Donovan could present Cea smuch stronger case." 12
information Chiefs taf position"
information n that Colonel
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Deane's case disclaimed for the JCS any interest in formulating "National Policy"
for anything other than controlling in military theaters of operations those other a ; n or
activities which promoted or conflicted with the military defeat of the Axis. Getting tocthe
heart of the matter, Deane explained that OSS conducted PW minus "open propaganda and
economic warfare." Where the latter were needed, other agencies would be asked, through
the Advisory Committee and the JCS, to rmkake their contribution and to do so according to
their own plans and methods. In an effort to de-emphasize the OSS angle, Deane said that
in asking for such assistance it was the JCS, not the PG, which was "responsible for the
`line' adopted to achieve the military results desired." 73
On February 12 Leahy, and the other Chiefs, received another memorandum from
Deane, a recommendation for the promotion to major general of Col. William J. Donovan."
The triggering of this development could well have been Deane's doing. It was in line with
his eagerness to "militarize" OSS, and it was certainly related to the problem at hand.
The reader will recall both Donovan's original expectation of obtaining that military
rank upon taking up the COI job and the Army's subsequent frustration of that part. of the
program. A humorous version of the event had the Navy suggesting the colonel be made a
major general, the Army recommending him for admiral, and Donovan insisting "he be left
alone." More than likely he, though ready for soldiering, did see some advantage in dealing
as a civilian with the President. A year later, in 1942 when COI became OSS, Donovan told
General Wavell he had declined promotion and induction into the military because he felt
the generals and admirals would find it easier to deal with "citizen ...[than] with General
Donovan." In August, however, Rogers saw Donovan "as a knight-errant of war," who was
"spoiling for a general's star and a gun ?"s
By February 1943 Donovan seems to have become convinced that the success of OSS
as a JCS agency demanded both military status for the organization and military rank for
himself and his chief subordinates. Deane:'s plan for "militarizing" OSS surely had
Donovan's concurrence. Now on February 12 Deane thought promotion was "particularly opportune" for two reasons. First, "much friction and lack of cooperation eral
would be eliminated if the nonmilitary agencies realized that Donovan was "definitely
subject to the orders" of the JCS and "therefore not free to initiate any project he desires."
Second, such military rank would result in sufficient militarization of OSS to "inspire
confidence in it on the part of the Armed Services." 16
On that same day Leahy sent to the President a memorandum, on the "Militarization
of the Office of Strategic Services," in which he recommended the colonel for major general.
The justification was geared to the occasion: the JCS had provided for close integration of
OSS with military activities, many of its key personnel had already been brought into either
the Army or Navy, and the process of integration would be complete if the Director had
military rank commensurate with his responsibilities." Such integration, promised Leahy,
would minimize "the danger" of having OSS functions ... overlap and interfere with those
of other non-military war agencies." "
The President bought the promotion idea when he discussed it with Leahy on February
16, but he "indicated that he thought Colonel Donovan should first be nominated to the
grade of brigadier general with an early promotion to the grade of major general in view."
Why the partial loaf? Leahy had Marshall's necessary "O.K. GCM" on the recommenda-
tion. Possibly Secretary of War Stimson entered an objection.78 More than likely FDR's
reaction was a sign of that estrangement which had been spoken of by Berle in October and
owed something to the influence of Elmer Davis.
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5. WALKING PAPERS
Davis must have been in to see the President just before the latter took up Donovan's
promotion. On February 16 FDR sent Stimson a memorandum on a subject brought up by
Davis. On February 17 Davis told Marshall that "the President had instructed him" to
discuss the OSS-OWI North Africa situation with him. On February 18 the New York
Herald-Tribune printed a planted OWI story against OSS. These events show that Davis
had launched a new campaign at the White House to put Donovan in his place.
On the memorandum, Davis had asked the President to have Secretary Stimson recall
a World War I general to active duty to help integrate OWI propaganda with military
operations. In reply Stimson said no, unless the general, Maj. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan, was
also appointed OWI representative on Donovan's Advisory Committee. In communicating
this exchange to FDR, Stimson likened his position betwixt Davis and Donovan to that of an
"innocent bystander in the case of an attempt by a procession of the Ancient and Honorable
Order of Hibernians and a procession of Orangemen to pass each other on the same
street." 79
On the second item, an OWI trio-Davis, Sherwood, and Eisenhower-denied to
Marshall the existence of any OWI-OSS duplication in North Africa, protested the OSS
advisory committee, proclaimed their own willingness to work closely in psychological
warfare with the military services, and urged the formation of "a high-powered committee"
to set the propaganda line for OWI. Marshall, however, "could not make out exactly what
they wanted and, as a result," so he told the JCS, "the meeting was somewhat abortive."
On the third item, the Herald-Tribune headlined a story "Donovan Office Still Wants
Job of Propaganda." The lead sentence declared that OSS "has renewed its attempts to
wrest control [from the OWI] of American propaganda aimed abroad." The story said the
dispute originated with a JCS directive which was "reportedly written by Colonel Donovan,
[and] which in effect would have placed O.W.I.'s overseas branch under the O.S.S."
Suggesting the dispute had already been settled by the White House, the story nevertheless
reported that "the O.S.S. was continuing the struggle."
Donovan learned of the story from "Ned" Buxton, who reported it to him as "evidence
of what appears to be part of a program of public pressure." Donovan telephoned the
newspaper publisher, a friend, Mrs. Helen Rogers Reid, and drew from her the explanation
that it originated in the "Washington office of the O.W.I." and that because of "rather
hectic hours" that day she had not seen it until he called. She was full of "regrets for the
distress" caused him.82
The "public pressure" was now accompanied by some direct pressure. Davis, also on
February 18, took up the Nolan matter with Roosevelt at a White House luncheon. As a
witness in his behalf Davis asked Roosevelt to summon none other than Maj. Gen. George
V. Strong. The luncheon was at 1:00 p.m., and Davis and Strong met with FDR at 2:15. At
this second meeting FDR made clear that he wanted propaganda operations run as a civilian
activity under the OWI and that he wanted OSS transferred to the War Department. Strong
was then directed by FDR to draft an order to this effect for his signature.83
On February 19 Strong, surely with more joy than can be phrased, sent his draft to
Marshall. First, it transferred to OWI. all PW functions, including foreign propaganda,
assigned to OSS by the JCS directive or possibly implied in the original OSS order of June
13, 1942. Second, it assigned to OWI the job of coordinating all PW with military plans.
Third, it transferred OSS to the War Department.84
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Secretary Stimson likened his position between Donovan and OWI chief Elmer Davis
(above, March 11943) as that of "an innocent bystander in the case of an attempt by a
procession of the Ancient and Honorable Order of Hibernians and a procession of
Orangemen to pass each other on the same street."
Roosevelt Library
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Here it must be noted that never had Roosevelt come so close to deserting Donovan as
he had in this winter of 1943. According to Rogers, FDR was reportedly "disposed to
suppress Donovan and the O.S.S. as being too powerful and ambitious." There was also
suspicion, shared by Rogers, that FDR looked upon OSS as largely Republican in coloration
and therefore counted it among his political foes.85 Certainly abolition was the intended and
inescapable effect of Strong's memorandum to Marshall.
All this of course was quite out of channels: the G-2 chief, used by the OWI director,
was instructed by the President to draft an order abolishing a JCS agency! It was also
productive of much high-level scurrying, chattering, and rumoring, and all at a feverish pace.
Then, on February 20, the President issued Donovan his walking papers. That day
General McNarney called in Donovan and, in the confusion of who was doing what to
whom, gave him a garbled version of an offer of a brigadier-generalship if he would accept
the transfer of OSS to G-2, not just to the War Department, and the relinquishment to OWI
of all PW, not just foreign propaganda. Donovan was informed of White House thinking:
there was no such thing as a "military program for psychological warfare," as was laid out
in the proposed JCS directive; there was only psychological warfare, which had to be placed
in civilian hands. How much of this thinking was traceable to alleged Rooseveltian fear of
leaving propaganda, foreign or domestic, in the hands of the Republican OSS, especially on
the eve of the 1944 elections, is problematical." Certainly Roosevelt and his opposition had
an undisguised interest in keeping each other from exploiting the war and war agencies for
partisan political purpose. Whatever the motivation for the planned transfer, the walking
papers were being written.
"Bill [Donovan] and I agreed," wrote Rogers, that "we must resign. He is to write a
letter of protest, try to see the President as a last resort. We could neither of us live under
General Strong . . . O.S.S. would shrivel.""
The next day, February 21, Donovan called on the JCS Secretary, General Deane, who
told him "to sit tight and wait." Also, Donovan and Rogers "drafted a letter [of
resignation?] to the President but did not send it." On Washington's Birthday Donovan
ordered the drafting of letters soliciting JCS support of their continued supervision of OSS.
Meanwhile, at his behest, his liaison man with Stephenson and the FBI, Ernest Cuneo, long
a member of the Democratic Party's "palace guard," was-as Cuneo recalled-peppering
the White House staff with telephone calls to "take it [the abolition order] off!" the
President's desk or, at least, "put it at the bottom of the pile!" 88 Also, Donovan called on
Admiral Leahy who said the Chiefs "want[ed] no change"; he asked "to see the President"
on the twenty-third."
Writing, instead of seeing, the President that day, Donovan denied, "articles in the
press to the contrary [notwithstanding]," that OSS had any quarrel with OWI or had
"invaded the province of OWI." He denied duplicating OWI. in open propaganda, asserted
that OSS did not even have enough equipment to "operate in the field of black subversion-
an arena in which OWI has always disclaimed any interest." Saying he had heard a
suggestion about transferring OSS to the War Department, he warned that such a move
"would ... disrupt our usefulness." He reminded FDR of his recognition that "this work
could not live if it were buried in the machinery of a great department." Disrupting the OSS
service to the JCS would, he said, be "a valuable gift to the enemy.
6. THE JCS TO THE RESCUE
Meantime the JCS were organizing a rescue operation. Their discussion of the issue on
February 23 began with a query from Admiral Leahy as to why the order had to go to the
President "within the next few days." Because, answered Marshall, the situation is "highly
explosive." 91
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who saved OSS from extinction in February 1943, left to right
Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff; Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding
General, Army Air Forces; Brig. Gen. John R. Deane, Secretary; Adm. Ernest J. King,
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations; and Adm. William D.
Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy (the President).
They are shown here with their advisors at the Allied Conference (QUADRANT) in
Quebec, Canada, Aug. 14-24, 1943.
U.S. Army
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There followed a minor explosion in the JCS, and the fall-out hit only OWI. The
admirals had Davis in their sights. Admiral Edwards, particularly vocal, said OWI had
recently been "worrying" Admiral King about propaganda; Edwards called an OWI plan for
"a tremendous broadcasting station in Hawaii ... an unnecessary project," decribed OWI
people as "a nuisance to the theater commanders," and wanted OWI out of active theaters;
by contrast, he believed "that Colonel Donovan produces valuable results and that his
organization should be maintained." 92
So also Admiral Horne. He believed "the War and Navy Departments got less help
from O.W.I. than from any other government agency." When he learned of the latest flare-
up, he made an investigation, found that only OWI had refused to accept JCS 155/4/D, and
he "questioned why the Joint Chiefs of Staff should submit to Mr. Davis' views." He also
questioned turning over OSS to the War Department; he thought it should stay with the
JCS 93
So also Admiral Leahy. He too thought OSS should stay where it was. He thought the
President had not yet "reached a definite decision in this matter" and that the JCS ought to
tell him "exactly what they want." The only concern of the President is propaganda, he said.
He, Leahy, had much fault to find with the order under consideration; he particularly
disliked the phrase "propaganda warfare," because it gave a "warfare" function to OWI; he
wanted it made clear that propaganda emanating from a theater of operations was directly
under the theater commander's control. On rereading the order he wanted a statement
safeguarding the status and duties of OSS.94
The Army men, initially on the defensive because of the G-2 origin of the proposed or-
der, clearly shared the general sentiments of their Navy counterparts. McNarney explained
that the order called for the transfer of OSS to the War Department "lock, stock, and bar-
rel," and for that reason Donovan's functions were not spelled out. Marshall thought the or-
der should be redrafted. McNarney noted that propaganda was the only issue since "it
appeared that [OWI] desired to proselyte certain" of the OSS R & A personnel. Marshall
thought if the occasion offered itself Leahy should inform the President that he, Marshall,
did not think G-2 was the proper place for OSS.95
Obviously a greatly-changed order was in the making. There was even some thought
that OWI's interest in propaganda should be handled without an executive order. However,
when General Deane said the JCS should "have control of Mr. Davis in the field of
propaganda," Marshall said in that case an executive order was necessary. By now the
phrase defining the propaganda recognized as OWI's was "radio and press propaganda."
There was no readiness to turn PW over to OW196
The JCS now agreed on the substance of a new executive order which would protect
OWI, OSS, and themselves. They agreed that "radio and press propaganda and related
activities involving the dissemination of information should be functions solely" of OWI.
They also agreed, however, that foreign propaganda related to military plans and operations
should be subject to approval by the JCS and, as the case warranted, the theater
commander. Finally, they agreed on retaining control of OSS.97
The JCS secretariat worked rapidly. An executive order embodying these ideas and a
covering memorandum signed by Leahy were prepared the same day. The latter "divorced
[OSS] entirely from all propaganda activities," assigned these "solely" to OWI, claimed JCS
control of propaganda related to operations, and with high praise for OSS "strongly
recommended" that it remain under JCS jurisdiction."
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Leahy personally was working just as rapidly. He took the draft to Roosevelt,
apparently on the twenty-fourth, obtained his concurrence in principle, but was directed to
show it to OWI's Eisenhower. The latter made some changes, which Leahy considered
"inconsequential." Sending the amended draft to General Deane for concurrence by the
other Chiefs, Leahy, in his own hand, advised. Deane that ". . . speed in taking action may
prevent some sniping interference.""' It became Deane's first order of business.
Still on February 24, the draft order was sent by Leahy to Harold Smith with the
request that it be sent on to the Attorney General and then returned to him for presentation
to the President. Smith inserted the well-known line that the authority, functions and duties
of OWL "shall not extend to the Western Hemisphere.... " Attorney General Biddle, on
March 2, found the order legal but rather indefinite. He foresaw problems in the
administration of the order. Because of the subject matter--presumably unmentionables like
"black" propaganda, whispering campaigns, deception plans-he recognized that it was not
feasible "to draft the order in more definite larigua.ge." However, he thought OWI and OSS
ought to attempt a revision which would show more clearly how the order would operate in
actual practice.""'
On March 5 Smith sent to Admiral Leahy both the draft order and Biddle's letter and
added a memorandum of his own to the President. Smith agreed with Biddle on the
feasibility of spelling out all the responsibilities and relationships of the two agencies. The
solution lay in a revision of the JCS directive to OSS. This should define clearly the roll of
OSS in PW with foreign propaganda excluded therefrom; in fact, he thought the term
"psychological warfare" had been the cause of much trouble and ought to be dropped
entirely. Smith, therefore, recommended the President's approval of the order, subject to the
understanding that JCS 155/4/I) would be revised. Still left unresolved, however, was, he
said, the problem of attaining over-all coordination of propaganda, and of political,
economic, and military programs overseas.10'
The next day, with all the necessary concurrences in hand, Leahy sent the proposed
order to the President. Meanwhile, it was still a cliff-hanger. Washington was then full of
rumors of the likely resignation of such people as Donovan, Stimson, Hull, and Nelson. "Bill
Donovan troubles me," wrote Rogers. "He is so honest, so aggressive, so scattered, so
provocative. Day by day I see him getting near elimination because he excites anger. But he
has taught Washington the elements of modern warfare, and no one else has even tried." His
friends waited for days for the bad news. And frorri the opposite camp, General Strong, tell-
ing a Navy man of his involvement, said that. after he had made his report "there was a ter-
rific storm, and it ended up instead of psychological warfare as such being passed on to
OWI, the propaganda part of it. was passed on to OWI and psychological warfare as such
was retained in OSS. I haven't seen the Executive Order. The whole thing will simply add
fuel to the fire." 102
Donovan, waiting for a decision, was fueling his own fire. "In fine spirits and his best
imagination," recorded Rogers, he said "I asked the generals if we were guitar players to be
put in baggage or something to do with the war---U.S.O. or U.S.A.? [He] said the chiefs
knew little about O.S.S., and [their] deputies were responsible for our existence at all." 113
Two days later, March 9, FDR acted. He had General Watson check with Leahy and
Davis to see if the OSS-OWI problems had been straightened out. He also had Watson find
out from Marshall "the exact status" he was going to propose for OSS. FDR explained that
"I hate to put it directly under the Army, as I understand the problems between it and OWI
have been worked out." (Someone: other than Watson had apparently given him the answer
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McNarney, in the absence of Marshall.
to his first query.) The second was answered by osed to having the OSS put under
McNarney told Watson that Marshall "was strongly opp ryone concerned agreed the Army. He, McNarney, reported that "eve all propaganda activities aremoved] and [its]
104
under the Joint Chiefs as at present-with
activities solely confined to subversive ones.
Signed by FDR on March 9, 1943 the new order, Executive Order 9312, "Defining wthe
War
as of the
o
rma announced Foreign andtpromptly repOort d inf the press as antOWl vicory: s
on on the the tenth
clearcut. in Victory on Policies." The
Strengthens Hand of OWI" and "OW>Waorriot New
reality, as shown by the provisions, the first
Of the five sentences that settled the matter-or appeared to settle it--only
three had any new substance to them. The first, alle phbasis asesf of the
t the federal program of ro d of
that , OWI would "plan, develop, and execute the dissemination att
preor publication, ublication, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the news stories,
subjected or The second, operrations to both coordination with "the
forc;ign propaganda relating to of the JCS. Also
planning agencies of the War and Navy Departments" and to the approval
er command
thea
gave the
over under appreciated was the third s dap rogrhmcwhich would betexecu ed in his theater. The
inconsequentially
those parts of the foreign p
last two sentences protected Rockefeller's Rockefel150 South th extant nempire ecessarynd to make this order
modified the, OSS order of June 13, 1942,
effective." rst
to be
lack In assessing the import of Februnew aryol9 which fih d t liaised suchotadterrific storm.reOSS
o G-2.
much
was a e the Strong draft of War
Neither wneither abolished nor transferrcdotn ,t of OSS tDransfer red to OWI.1Nortwas OWI given
were "the psychological warfare military the "planning, development and execution of the
the job of for foreign coordinating
the psychological warfare." The last two w
order did contain Strong's pro is on dthat were
for foreign propaganda dand
program
even uin the order. eioHowever, e WI's
even used shencies of the services.
coordination with the military be acomplished through the planningtore agency.
On balance OSS remained firmly established as a JCS supp however, had
Looked at positively, the new order confirmed the principle-which, achieving never really been at issue-of civilian COnet FDR's omaainndrequirement~ Alsonit certainly
s concerned, and
guaranteed ac the off thereby
the was order definitely
sameOSme, however, domination
thefear
the independence of asavisfar as
to that extent it was a victory for strengthened the military-the planners, the JCS, and the theater commanders-in regard
its
to the integration of propaganda with actual and planned military operations; an by The
means with "the military program for psychological
silence it left OSS still n arged
OWI victory was by said about any OWI responsibility
Other issues were also left untouched. Nothing was
for either the "black" propaganda hitherto conducted by OSS or the operation of the OSS
"combat divisions" engaged in such propaganda. Nothing was said about the relation between
for psychological warfare."
OWI's foreign propaganda and the OSS "military program Nothing was said about OWI developing its own research gstaff to esund pecially its p o agenda,
instead of utilizing the analytical work done by political and Nothing
military perat ions. Mucha ema ned unresolved.
finally, was said about the activities, problem of and overall
e
economic warfare, subversive
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In OSS the gloom of three weeks earlier had'. disa
too unhappy with the new restriction; on their work; some felt thee war effort Ghadoupevenwas
served thereby. 106 There probably was some satisfaction at the obvious discomfort of OWI
b en
which was being heavily criticized by Congress, and whose Elmer Davis had invited Donovan
to lunch, a clear attempt to make a new start. Those OSS members who thought their days
numbered felt they had received a new lease on life. They still had a "military program for
psychological warfare," the JCS name, said Rogers, for our "basket of fa r
On March 15 Donovan did lunch with Elmer Davis and Milton Eisenhower "at their
request," as Donovan reported to General Deane. The two OWI officials were cooperative.
They wanted to exchange liaison men and offered to give "cover" to OSS men in such places
as OWl was established. Davis said he wanted OSS to take care of black pro a
propaganda behind enemy lines; he said he considered the OWl p t,a being and of
he was job as being the
conditioning of the mass mind, whereas OSS had to deal with the individual mind; he said
prepared to write OSS to this effect. He also spoke of the need of "tieiing up the
intent and purpose of black propaganda with ...
the possibility of OWI and OSS meeting in somhis ," e gkinda]ofragpl nnin g oup. spoken,
reporting this to Deane, said that he kept in mind throughout the conversation that OWI
had been told by the Budget office to reduce g group. Donovan,
some congressmen had said
personnel, would have to take a reduced budget, and that Robert Sherwood would have less to do
with foreign broadcasts; these would now be more ndirectly that in the of
Eisenhower."' Donovan';; mental notes referred to the manifold hands
Davis and
unconnected with OSS, which were currently troubling OWI.
pro
problems,
mostly
Donovan must have enjoyed the luncheon. It was obvious that Elmer Davis and Milton
Eisenhower were ready to cooperate with OSS and ready, perhaps, even to accept lead for the JCS. Twice recently Republican Senator Robert Taft had criticized Davis for
using radio time for his own advancement. the OSS
The JCS now moved to revise JCS 155/4/D. All they really did was insert a definition
of psychological warfare only to show it now did not include
ments. Thereafter that subject, as well as OWL, remained "nameless evermore" in the
ele-
ele-
revision, JCS 155/7/D, which was issued on April 4, 1943 (Appendix J). propaganda as This, in one llo1!' itsonovan's
, the
view, differed from the December text "principally in that it excluded propaganda
from the Psychological Warfare operations which this office is authorized to conduct." 109
In one sense OSS had been as much a victor as OWL in the recent struggle: for the first
time since Pearl Harbor the continued existence of COI or OSS in wartime was no longer in
doubt. After months of bitter, complicated, and high-level battling, Donovan had obtained
for his organization a secure position in the highest military echelon and a definite, detailed
charter for the conduct of psychological warfare. With major hostilities ended, OSS could
shift more of its attention from the
problems of existence to those of operations.
Even so, this phase of the story requires two postscripts. One, OSS was soon subjected
to a blistering attack launched against it by General Strong. Out of this came the final and
really definitive revision of the basic JCS dir?ective of December 1942. Two, OSS had yet to
make a formal peace with OWL, and it would take an additional, but mild,
accomplish that.
year to
7. P.S. I-ANOTHER REVISION
On June 12, 1943, Donovan sent the JCS for consideration and approval Basic Field Manual: Psychological Warfare." This was a formal statement of basic OSS
doctrine, operations, and a "Provisional
procedures in the PW field. It was promptly circulated to various
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War Department offices for comments and recommendations. The only reaction that need
concern us was an outpouring of thirty-four pages of denunciation by General Strong. He
began with a brief covering letter, which stated his belief that the manual "was prepared in
bad faith and with the purpose of extending the power of the O.S.S. wherever
practicable." 10
Calling OSS "a hydra-headed organization" which no one would dream of establishing
were he to set out afresh to plan the American organization for war, Strong blasted OSS,
under "an ambitious and imaginative Director" and having "large sums of money at its
command," for setting itself up "as a central intelligence and planning agency" for the
conduct of operations in a variety of fields. He said it had been "constantly at war with
other Government agencies," had sought to reduce G-2 and ONI "to the status of reporting
agencies and research bureaus for the O.S.S.," and though it had been cut down to size by
JCS 155/4/D, nevertheless, it took "as its charter of liberty"-as everybody knew-those
parts of its directive which lent themselves to broad construction and ignored the clear
restrictions placed on its activities."'
The "Manual" itself was just as objectionable as its authors. It was "devoid of
reference to moral considerations or standards" in that it proceeded on the assumption that
in a total war the U.S. had to take on "the ethical color of its enemies in all particulars." It
departed "from ordinary and well understood terminology" in conjuring up a definition of
psychological warfare which was so "synthetic and artificial" that it permitted OSS too
engage in any activity that caught its fancy. The whole document, fumed Strong,
lawyer's paper" in which words were used to accomplish unstated purposes without
appearing to do so. The JCS, he said, ought not to have to pore over such a "legalistic docu-
ment detecting little twists of phrases, or imagining how the O.S.S. lawyers" were going to
interpret the document at a later date.12
Under the proposed manual, said Strong, OSS was seeking to expand its activities and
their locale beyond all the restrictions laid down in its directive. The agency was making, he
warned, "another, and to date the most ambitious, attempt . . . to make itself the central
planning and intelligence agency of the armed services, with a goodly share in operations as
well." Moreover he accused OSS of making this attempt "through the medium of a `Field
Manual' " rather than through a revision of JCS 155/7/D which might reopen the entire
issue and thus risk loss of some of the gains made in that document. OSS, he said, ought to
forsake its penchant for "global" thinking, for the endless collection of vast amounts of
information on every conceivable subject, and concentrate instead, as it has not done, on the
"mundane, meticulous and dreary work" of espionage and counterespionage. Its model ought
to be the British SIS, which he termed "a very effective organization," whose officers
"function in the modest guise of passport officers at the Embassies." "'
Naturally his recommendations included disapproval of the Manual. That was the
starter He wanted OSS theater activities limited to espionage and counterespionage in
enemy.-occupied and controlled territories and its activities in neutral countries severely
limited. He wanted the JCS to restudy OSS, eliminate duplication, abolish or transfer some
of its sections, shift personnel, and issue a new directive so defining OSS duties as to prevent
any "excuse for ventures into unassigned fields."
Strong was requested by McNarney to produce some specific information as to the
efforts of OSS to extend its espionage and counterespionage activities beyond the limits set
out in JCS 155/7/D. Strong's answer, July 27, led off with a brief summary of recent
unhappy experiences with OSS in Spain, and then ticked off in evidence several OSS plans
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for the Western Mediterranean, the Middle! East, the European theater, as well as the
manual itself', and the reorganization plan approved by the JCS in January 1943.
Continuance of the expansionism of OSS into neutral areas, he warned, would "hold this
country up to ridicule by its amateurish and bungling attempts at sleuthing and bribery and
would disrupt the activities of the military attaches and the State Department." '"
Strong was also told to shorten the document if he wanted the JCS to look at it.
Reduced to three pages, it was sent to the Joint Planners. Here it can be said that whatever
the strength of language employed by Strong and however suspicious and distrustful he was
of Donovan and his OSS lawyers, General Strong did have a case, and it was recognized as
such by the Joint Planners. 'Their subcommittee made a careful textual analysis, what
Donovan might have tossed back at Strong as "a lawyer's paper," and concluded that the
Manual "appear[ed] to be at variance" with JCS I55/'7/D. They recommended, therefore,
either a rewriting of the manual or the submission of a request for whatever additional
authority was considered necessary."'
While Strong had tossed off a blockbuster, it fell with a great thud. A month after the
Joint Planners had made their report, Donovan submitted a proposed revision of JCS
155/7/D. His draft, he said, would bring, the basic directive into conformity with those
current procedures and practices of OSS which had been specifically authorized by the JCS
in the various plans that had been submitted to and approved by them."' While Strong had
taken his stand on a narrow and static interpretation of the basic directive, Donovan had
chosen to move forward with the war and the various requests and approvals he had received
from both the JCS and other parts of the armed services. The subsequent handling of his
proposed revision demonstrated that outside of Strong's office there was no hankering for a
reopening of the hostilities so lately brought to a halt.
In their five paragraphs on Donovan's draft, the JPS subcommittee had only one
substantive recommendation; and, all things considered, it was long overdue. They objected
to the continued "makeshift use of the term `psychological warfare.' " As used by OSS, they
said, it was at variance with the generally accepted meaning which equated it with
propaganda. Not only was the OSS use "misleading and confusing," but it was also at vari-
ance with the order of June 13, 1942, which spoke not of "psychological warfare" but only
of "special services." Hence they recommended substituting "strategic services," and so at
long last the work of the Office of Strategic Services was finally defined in terms of such
services. (Rogers puckishly defined OSS as " `the bargain basement' of the military services
... full of remnants and novelties, all underground.") The JPS had some other changes "in
the interest of clarity." They recommended approval.""
This came on October 26, 1943. The revised revision, JCS 15511 I /D was published on
October 27 (Appendix K). It contained nothing about "the military program for psychologi-
cal warfare," nothing about that awful phrase itself, and nothing about "propaganda"-
except for a footnote banishing it from hearing. It took nothing away from OSS; instead, it
broadened the geographical area in which OSS could conduct secret intelligence and secret
operations and for which it could carry on its R&A activities. It did introduce a new phrase,
"morale subversion," which had appeared early in the year with the reorganization of OSS
and the new concentration on PW. It covered three subjects-false rumors, "freedom
stations," false leaflets and false documents, etc.-which were now the substance of
negotiations with OW1. Thus, the last of the JCS 155 series.""
The Field Manual? It was published--thirty-two printed pages-December 1, 1943.120
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8. P.S. 2.-A TREATY WITH OWI
Meanwhile, the Donovan-Davis-Eisenhower luncheon had initiated an era of relatively
good feelings between the two agencies. Subordinates, discussing underground contacts and
"black" subversion, reached a draft agreement on April 8, 1943. Donovan considered it
"gratifying progress," but then he was momentarily dismayed to read in OWI's "Pacific
proposals" of plans for having propaganda agents in enemy territory, for training in covert
communications, the use of ciphers and secret inks, and for training in the use of small arms
and in close combat. He was quickly reassured by Davis that the proposals had been drawn
up some time ago and were now quite out of date. So they turned to the April 8
agreement.12'
Donovan had used the question of the "Pacific proposals" as an opportunity to
elaborate on the OSS position on the April agreement. He saw no conflict of jurisdiction but
hoped for understanding on both "a differentiation of functions" as well as mutual support
in planning and execution of functions. He recognized OWI's responsibility for the overall
federal program of disseminating information and the OSS obligation to provide OWI with
certain required materials for its propaganda service. He was also prepared to let OWI use
OSS agents for the distribution of leaflets and pamphlets in enemy territory. OSS, on the
other hand, had the job of "secret intelligence and the contact of underground movements,
organizing; revolt, etc." He now took great pains to clarify some confusion about "black"
propaganda and deception. Three things had been mixed up: (1) clandestine distribution of
propaganda; (2) military or strategic deception performed by the Army or Navy; and (3):
Falsification material for subversion, including freedom stations (which are really
deception stations) and leaflets which purport to be of enemy origin.
This is clearly an OSS function incidental to the organizing of subversive groups
within enemy or enemy-occupied territories because it seeks neither to inform nor
to convince but in reality to mislead.
I have tried to make clear to you that OSS had no means of carrying on
propaganda and did not wish to do so. The only thing remotely resembling
propaganda in which OSS is interested at all is in this category . . . on
falsification material. This resembles propaganda only superficially when on
occasion it may find it reasonable to implement its deceit by using the radio and
the printing press. And that resemblance exists only because such equipment may
be used for propaganda as well as for deception."'
In reply Davis admitted to agreeing with "much" of what Donovan had written. Davis
obviously wanted to make clear, however, that his directive gave him an absolute monoply on
government activities employing radio, press, leaflets, and related media, that there was in
that document no distinction between "official" and "clandestine," or between "black" and
"white" propaganda. So also, the term "federal" meant not "official" but on behalf of all
federal agencies, and "dissemination of information" also included "misinformation." 123
While Davis thus claimed all, he was, however, prepared "to delegate to OSS" certain
activities. He specified the dissemination of materials by agents in enemy territory and even
the preparation of such materials, if necessary, by those agents. He was also prepared to
cede to OSS the preparation of materials of purported enemy origin; as an example he sug-
gested a "forged handbill purporting to be signed by the German High Command
announcing that all former SA men are no longer eligible to be officers. . . . " 124
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His real difficulty, however, was with propaganda originating outside enemy territory
and purporting to come from underground groups. While such propaganda had not been
much used, it might become more important in the future and he cited reasons why OWI
could not "delegate" this function. Finally, lie was unhappy with a provision that seemed to
make "a no-man's land" out of the use of "clandestine radio"; while he did not "think
much" of the device, he said its use called for an OWI decision. Despite those differences,
Davis thought his and Donovan's views were not "far apart." 125
Donovan was not too happy with this response, but a draft reply indicated a willingness
to sign a limited agreement and to trust to a gentlemen's agreement to work together
cooperatively so that what could not be defined in theory could nevertheless be arrived at
through "mutual consent in actual practice." '26 That is not too far from what actually would
happen. Negotiations lapsed, but conflict did not ensue. Nobody wanted to go back to the
White House.
Meanwhile, the operations of both agencies had shifted more and more to the overseas
theaters, where the atmosphere was considerably different from that in Washington. The
theater commander was in control, and agencies and personnel tended to do and let the other
do what each could best accomplish. In October, for instance, Donovan was told that "Mr.
Davis had mentioned . . . what a pity it was that OWI and OSS in Washington could not
seem to cooperate with the same splendid spirit that was in evidence in the field." 127 The re-
porter of this comment, a new man in OSS, was himself the symbol of a factor facilitating
improvement even in Washington: the disappearance of some old faces, the arrival of some
new ones. Gone from the OWI scene were MacLeish and Whitney; Sherwood had less to do
with overseas activities; and in January 1944 OWI experienced a headline-gathering
upheaval which saw the forced resignations of three ox-COI men: Warburg, Barnes, and
.Johnson.
By the spring of 1944 the two agencies were ready for another try at peace-making.
Davis, at his request, and accompanied by a new top-level assistant, Edward Barrett, met
with Donovan on April 4 to initiate new negotiations. These were successfully concluded on
.June 16 when the two parties, in an exchange of letters., accepted eight principles for the co-
ordination of their work.12R
There had never been much trouble with the first two, that OWI was responsible for
disseminating official American propaganda which clearly emanated from American sources
outside enemy territory, and that OSS handled that propaganda actually or ostensibly
emanating from within enemy territory and provided it was not readily traceable to an
American source. The third held, on the one hand, that OSS would not run a black radio
station outside enemy territory without OW11 concurrence, and, on the other, that OWI
would maintain no agents or installations in enemy territory. The fourth took care; of the
confusion about propaganda and deception: both agencies agreed to inform the other of any
propaganda operations which might affect the other, and in particular it was recognized that
OSS, "under its military directives," might have to carry out propaganda which did not nec-
essarily reflect "official United States views." (At long last OSS had a recognized
propaganda role.) The remaining principles provided for coordination in "borderline cases,"
for direct liaison, and for sharing facilities and equipment wherever practicable.129
On June 17 Elmer Davis sent to Judge Rosenman at the White House "a copy of our
treaty with OSS," and on June 18 Davis, sending FDR his exchange of correspondence with
Donovan, wrote: "I am glad to tell you that. in all theaters there is a fine spirit of cooperation
between the two organizations." This had come slightly more than two years after both
organizations had been officially established.
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Chapter IX
DONOVAN'S PLAN
When OSS and OWI had signed their peace treaty in 1944, the OSS problem of
existence had long since concerned more the future than the present.
At the same time, OSS had not become-as Donovan had envisaged-the President's
"Coordinator of Information."
For Donovan the two problems, that of uncoordinated intelligence and that of the
postwar, peacetime status of American intelligence, and especially of OSS, were inseparable.
In tackling them he continued to meet stiff opposition from the other intelligence services.
1. WARTIME INTELLIGENCE-TOPSY
The first thing to be noted is that after Pearl Harbor the previously few, weak
intelligence services grew and multiplied. Old-line agencies saw their functions, organiza-
tional units, budgets, and personnel increase or multiply not only in Washington but also
throughout the country and overseas. Departments or agencies that had previously had no or
only a small intelligence unit or function now found themselves to be important collectors,
producers, and/or disseminators of military, political, social, economic, scientific, topo-
graphical, and other intelligence. New agencies, created to carry on such operations as
export control, freezing of foreign funds, propaganda, and alien property control, had
important ;intelligence functions.
On one occasion OSS compiled a list of forty intelligence units, of which ten were ma-
jor and had numerous internal units, and thirty were police and law enforcement units which
had become significant but secondary collectors of useful wartime intelligence. By the end of
the war G-2 was maintaining regular contact with twenty-four "key agencies." ' Addition-
ally there were many lesser agencies, interdepartmental committees, joint military agencies,
and ad hoc committees dealing with various intelligence matters.
The major units were both military and civilian: G-2, ONI, A-2 (Air Forces
intelligence), OSS, State, and the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA)-the old
Economic Defense Board. A notch below these in importance, as far as foreign intelligence
was concerned, were the FBI, the Marines, Coast Guard, OWI, CIAA, the Office of
Censorship, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
Within the military services there was a proliferation of joint agencies, with some
civilian participation, to handle joint Army and Navy problems, eliminate duplication, and
effect some economy and efficiency in the use of manpower and funds. Such were the Joint
Intelligence Collection Agencies, the Joint Intelligence Agency Reception Center, the Joint
Intelligence Property Agency, the Joint Intelligence Studies Publication Board, the Joint
Target Analysis Group, the Washington Document Center, the Joint Committee for
Assessment of the Japanese Oil Position, the Army-Navy Flak Intelligence Group, the War
Department Intelligence Collection Committee, and the Technical Industrial Intelligence
Committee. Less formal organizational arrangements were established to effect better
exploitation of, for instance, prisoner of war interrogations and captured enemy equipment.
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Civilian growth was also luxuriant. Treasury had a handful of enlarged or new
activities such as Foreign Funds Control,, Alien Property Custodian, and the Secret Service.
Justice had, along with the FBI, a War Division, and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, which was newly acquired from the Labor Department. The FCC had its Radio
Intelligence Division and its Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Interior, Labor, and
Commerce all had war intelligence functions. So also did such independent regulatory
agencies as the Maritime and Tariff commissions. Much intelligence was available in such
new agencies as the War Production Board, the War Shipping Administration, and the
Petroleum Administration for War. The Smithsonian Institution facilitated the exchange of
scienfitic and literary publications with foreign governments.
The second thing to be noted about these intelligence units is that they continued to
operate much as the prewar units had always operated, that is, independently and department-
ally. Practically speaking, they had no superior other than their own secretary, director, chief,
or chief of staff; their operative frame of reference was the largest department to which they
reported. Hence, they defined, identified, collected, processed, produced, and disseminated
intelligence as a function of their departmental requirements and procedures. Nonexecutive
agencies and agencies with intelligence units or functions could do no differently. Joint
agencies, departmental committees, and ad hoc committees had no other powers, principles,
and functions than were given them by departmental authorities.
Operating departmentally--a governmental virtue as far as it went-the intelligence
services tended toward an exaggerated self-sufficiency; seeking to satisfy fully their own
departmental requirements, they tended unduly to enlarge and expand their own activities
rather than effect. a more efficient and economical interrelationship with other agencies.
They also shared their intelligence, their resources, and their sources--when they (lid so-
largely only so far as necessity, interdepartmental politics, and personal and institutional
negotiating required or facilitated their doing so. As a substitute for coordination, they
resorted to liaison officers, reading panels, special committees, summaries of documents and
even such unofficial activities as the bootlegging of information, documents, and supplies.
The third noteworthy aspect of wartime intelligence was the persistence of well-
recognized and now gravely accentuated problems. Lack of coordination was the most
obvious. There was no central authority to define the intelligence mission of the U.S.
government: to identify the needs, to spot the "gaps," to coordinate operations, and to
produce national strategic, as opposed to departmental, intelligence. Next to the coordination
problem was that of duplication which resulted inevitably and obviously as a product of the
rapid and haphazard expansion and proliferation of so many agencies and functions. Other
problems centered on departmental bias, inadequate coverage, poorly trained personnel, a
predilection for counterintelligence, and a neglect of basic, as opposed to current,
intelligence.
Solving these problems took many forms. Apparently a most natural approach, amply
illustrated in this history, was combat, as between COI and CIAA, or between OSS and
G-2. Less severe cases of conflict, as between OSS and BEW, were handled by negotiations.
Good will and common sense did, however, exist, and hence cooperation was operative, often
even between agencies otherwise locked in battle. The prewar IIC was a cooperative venture.
Cooperation was also important to the JIC, which had considerably less formal authoritative
clout than its name might suggest.
Reorganization or reform, often directed by higher echelons, was a constant preoccupa-
tion of management. Certainly, OSS---growing, fighting for its life, ever expanding-had
many organizational reform movements and one near mutiny by senior officials in 1943.2
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G-2, said Gen. McNarney, "was always a headache for the War Department and was 1
war." In
Knox reorganized continuously "trying unsuccessfully
partment [sic]
reorganize throughout
Stimson that t he was 3 11 which was run riot....
Outside assistance, solicited or unsolicited, seemed always available from the Bureau of
the Budget. Donovan had been the recipient of such help-both kinds-in his difficulties
with CIAA, BEW, OCD, and OWL Early in the war the bureau, at the request of
its
McNarney, studied G-2 and offered some recommendations on reorganization
tdis time
relations with the FBI. In 1943 the bureau conducted alarger study, on the OmI
from both Army and Navy, of such topics as factory protection,
mission, and interdepartmental security coordination.' These activities gave the bureau a
conviction of special competency in the intelligence field and encouraged it to take a leading
role in the development of a postwar intelligence organization.
However often problems were, or appeared to be, solved, intelligence remained a
problem. Basically this was multiplicity crying out for some degree of unity. It was the prob-
lem which had caused John Gade to propose in 1929 "some sort of a central Intelligence
Agency," a "National Intelligence Service" modeled on Britain's reputed "Central hub of
the Wheel of Information." It was the same problem which prompted General Lee in March
1941 to propose the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Committee. This was the problem
which brought forth Donovan's recommendation of a "Strategic Information Service."
Though challenged, the intelligence services remained largely content with their uncoor-
dinated independence.
After Pearl Harbor and the lesson it taught about interservice coordin:,.tion, and with
the uncoordinated expansion of the intelligence field, the idea of coordinating or centralizing
intelligence gained some respectability and a few advocates and was even embodied in a few
proposals for change. The precise name-"Central Intelligence Agency"-appeared for the
first time in March 1942. Then, the Marine commandant proposed the establishment of such
an agency at Pearl Harbor to serve as "a clearing house" for the "Advanced Joint
Intelligence Centers" which at the same time he was proposing be established throughout
the Pacific. When set up, it was not, of course, a national strategic central intelligence orga-
nization, and it was not the "Central Intelligence Agency." It was only an "Intelligence
Center" for the Pacific.'
More noteworthy as an overall but unsuccessful effort to achieve service coordination
was the merger idea which bloomed and faded throughout 1942-43. It was first launched by
a trio whose claim to the paternity of CIA was mentioned at the outset of this work. Writing
in 1946 Admiral Zacharias, former Deputy Director of ON I, credited Fleet Adm. Ernest J.
King with prompting a discussion in mid-1942 that led him (Zacharias) and his friend Army
Col. Sidney Mashbir to spend their free time over a period of four months developing a plan
for a "Joint Intelligence Board." Renamed "Joint Intelligence Agency" by Admiral King, it
was enthusiastically supported by him but then, according to Zacharias, mysteriously
"pigeonholed because of unknown influences." Mashbir has described that plan as "the first
draft and implementing directives for what has since become the Central Intelligence
Agency." I
Before the pigeonholing took place, however, King had received another suggestion for
an even larger merger, this time of G-2, ONI, and OSS. It came from the Navy's Assistant
Chief of Plans, Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., whose proposal has been termed the "major factor"
in starting "the first official step to provide a unified war intelligence center." His proposal,
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largely borne of his familiarity with the heated discussion in the JPWC of OSS problems,
was the establishment of an "Office of War Intelligence" which would bring together G-2,
ONI, and OSS and thereby eliminate much duplication of activities.'
With these two proposals in hand, King suggested to Marshall on November 22, 1942,
that they both issue to their intelligence agencies identical directives ordering a survey of
ways and means of merging activities, so as to eliminate duplication. "I would expect this
survey," wrote King, "to lead in the direction of a unified intelligence agency which would
be called the Joint Intelligence Agency." King's suggestion was immediately approve by
Marshall, and the appropriate directives were sent to General Strong and Admiral Train.'
These two were then awaiting J( _'IS action on the proposed new directive for OSS. They
agreed on December 'i that they could not be "pantywaists"--Strong speaking-on the
matter of urging the incorporation of other intelligence agencies under a JIC controlled by
themselves; without such a setup, said Train, there would be "only half-baked efforts." 9 The
next day they submitted a joint response to King and Marshall urging the establishment of a
JIA which would include not only MIS and ONI but also "all intelligence functions of the
Office of Strategic Services, except the portion of its secret intelligence activities necessary
for the discharge of its special operations, as directed in the Military Order dated June 13,
1942.10 Strong was nothing if not persistent in his effort to control OSS, in particular, to re-
strict it to clandestine collection in enemy-controlled territory.
"Too general" was McNarney's evaluation of the Strong-Train memo when it was
taken up by the JCS on December 8---the same day the chiefs first considered the new OSS
charter. Admiral King, who had initiated. the merger study, now thought it was something
which could not be done forthwith, but must be worked out gradually, "step by step."
Admiral Horne thought the memorandum should be returned to its originators "for
preparation and submission of detailed steps" for effecting a merger. The JCS agreed in
conclusion that a JIA was an "ultimate objective" but one which should be "accomplished
gradually." "
The subject came up again three months later when Strong and Train, in a new
response to the JCS, reported on their efforts to merge activities. They submitted a draft
directive for the establishment of a JIA to collect, evaluate, and disseminate information for
the Army and Navy. This time Admiral Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff, fearing a
slowdown in the dissemination of vital information, opposed "the establishment of this new
agency." It was not a new agency, replied King; what was envisioned was the issuance of
parallel directives to MIS and ONI for "a merger of certain of their activities." He said that
for the past year he and Marshall "had encountered overlaps and wasted effort in the
various activities of M.I.S. and O.N.I." and that for months the two of them had discussed
this matter. He explained that the suggested JIA would be "common" to both MIS and
ONI and would be a "more useful tool" for the JCS than "the two existing agencies." While
this explanation may be slightly confusing to the modern reader, it satisfied Leahy who now
"`saw no objection" to the plan. However, Admiral Horne and General Arnold of the Air
Forces thought the matter should be studied further, and so it was ordered."
Before still another report could be made, however, other problems and recommenda-
tions were dooming the merger idea. First, about the future there was considerable
uncertainty arising from the simple fact that both G-2 and ONI were currently caught up in
the fits and starts of major reorganizations." Second, General McNarney made clear there
could be no genuine JIA without the prior establishment on the JCS level of an Operations
Division." 'Then it was proposed that the "amalgamation, insofar as is practicable" of
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dmembers.l To tth st pr po al
military, air, and naval intelligence OSplanned S amongdits civilian
of
Committee, which of f course ONI ONI's Train was ndatons including the merger of "the for ign in ell gen e function d such
sweeping recommendations,
MIS ." a that they were denounced by Train as con-
stituting and MIS .." with the R & A of OSS (+ .)
stituting "the virtual abolishment" of ONI. With this both the Army and the Navy agreed.16
For all practical purposes merger talk ended in June 1943. In November thed idea ofthea
into idea, hopper.
JIA was formally
military services themselves, had just been tossed larger
merger of the JIA.
No detailed steps that Zacharias- Mashbir-Kings project.' Nothing was ever said about
No more was heard of
Admiral Cooke's "Office of War Intelligence."
By mid-1943, then, the military and naval intelligence services, under various pressures,
ially
had merged some activities and established some joint agencies. Beyon ad these ssentgher
collaborative efforts of two or more independent agencies,
degree of unity. The other, largely civilian, intelligence agencies had not achieved even that
degree of integration.
2. A "POPGUN" AND OTHER PLANS e
better Whatever the failure of the intelligence services to agree on tht the bumeas wation
more
their business, there was general agreement, certainly by 1943, business
eserved important than had
ived.tIt additiona dy followed, as
been previously recognized. It followe that , and support than it had hitherto red
understanding, respect, the course the ylinteroven prospects considerations of the future status of intelligence
henceforward nextricabl
in the American government.
the Urirted
This new appreciation of intelligence
ewarsintemost lligenceesyst mend effortt in
recognition of the inadequacy
of great
of discove
government States. There had been
and p aces t There hadry been exasperation att being caught by
at France Pearl in 1940, the resistance of the
urpknowledge such significant p p
Embarrassment had
b eali
Russians ise i s 1941, and the attack of the Japanese of
lf
followed the
machinery, lthat the United independent 5oftthe military es abli hmentr for keepinglrit enot
having adequate re
British intelligence for much of thet information needed ins the
informed de of fn, for instance,
on, f is
conduct uct of of American affairs. The prewar setup was something to which no one wanted to
return.
This was true even of those military and naval personnel who had a personal,
argued asgearlynize
Joquo ante. One of the hn L. Riheldaffer, earliest
professional, ngaionaatComdr. status
need for change e was s a a naval officer, have d
emonstrated
most November 1942 ttf`rha prpostwarNintelligence servcetwhich will make use of all
clearly ly the necessity permanent
arnecgued "if should be made now "t No
sources of information."
collapse immediately after o the
was directlybiennial
inadequacy forcefully of argued
. less a personage than 7 the prewar Strong
Chief traceable to the
Chof Staff in 1943 that
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Army's neglect of that organization in the interwar period; obviously with an eye to G-2's
peacetime status he further contended "it should be insisted upon that, in times of peace,
however great may be the reduction in certain other military departments, a comprehensive
military intelligence organization must be carefully preserved and supported so its fruits will
be always available for the nation's interests." 17
Newcomers, military as well as civilian, often tended to be stronger advocates of a
better status for intelligence than did old-timers. Exposed to the vast, variegated, and
kaleidoscopic character of World War Il, new arrivals, talented and energetic spirits from
business and the universities, literally discovered intelligence; and they liked what they
found. They became seized with theoretical and
intelligence as a prerequisite to often fateful practical problems of obtaining vital
themselves applying old skills to a new field, earn learning new skills underr the pressureu of
necessity, and talking a new language, that of intelligence: collection, evaluation, correlation,
synthesis, coordination, and dissemination of intelligence and counterintell igence. For some
there was the exhilaration, as well as danger, of ciandestinity, of covert and special
operations-the fancied Mata Hari and E. Phillips Oppenheim life that came to be
associated, fairly and unfairly, with Donovan and his often derided "Oh-So-Secret" OSS.
Such people early and easily concluded that this newfound activity was no mere exciting fly-
by-night affair but was rather a valid and fascinating field of human knowledge: and action
and an unavoidable requirement of modern government and politics.
Old-timers and new faces not only agreed upon the abstract necessity of a more
effective intelligence system in peace as well as in war, but they also agreed that the
character of the emerging postwar world made it a very real practical necessity. While there
was much wartime talk of a new and better world to follow, there was just as much
realization that difficult and dangerous t:problems--the future of Germany, relations with the
Soviet Union, the demands of Asia and Africa, the task of reconstruction, the fate of
Europe's empires--were taking shape in various quarters around the world. All of these
problems were seen to impinge upon d~.S. interests and
policies, role in world politics, were all seen as becoming a l and these
l as well as
From this perspective of things to come, all early agreed on the need totpreserve land affairs.
build
upon the progress-the knowledge, the experience, the sources of information, the files, the
techniques, the body of experienced personnel--so far developed or realized in the course of
the war.
Perhaps the single most effective stimulus to thought about the present and future of
intelligence was the challenge presented by Donovan. He was a giant w p,
prestige, power, and push shook every rafter in the house of intelligence, tosthe del ghtr of
his followers and the anger of his foes. The Army had firmly resisted OSS, partly because
it distrusted the relatively undisciplined OSS organization, and
partly because it disliked
adding to the traditional armory of warfare the unorthodox methods of OSS. In April 1943
a columnist reported "the red hot story going around" is that Donovan "is not going to
stop at being" a brigadier general but will soon "be
promoted given such sweeping powers as to make all his rivals green around lieutenant general and
exaggerated the story, his initiatives--COi itself, his leadership ofthe Joint sPsycl of gical e ." 11 However
Warfare Committee, his bold JPWC plan to run PW and joint intelligence, his tendency to
pick up any task left undone--were either examples or threats to every intelligence-minded
person in Washington or the field. Friend and foe were thereby stimulated or compelled to
think new thoughts about the current and future organization of American intelligence.
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In fact, by mid-1943 when merger talks were failing, many factors had conspired to
prompt a few persons to speculate and draft plans for the future as well as the present of
intelligence. In May 1943 an Army officer, in a question-and-answer period, asked Donovan
if there was any thought of continuing the work of OSS after the war; "I'd like to know that
myself," replied the new brigadier general, "but ... I think we will have sense enough as a
people to continue it." 19 In July the Army set up a special planning division to consider the
needs of the postwar army; in November MID received its first postwar study assignment,
and in May 1944 there appeared a "Study on Organization of Military Intelligence in the
Post-War Period." This recommended the maintenance in peacetime of an "aggressive,
potent and thoroughly organized" military intelligence department.20
Meanwhile, that intelligence overseer, the Bureau of the Budget, had expanded the
study which had been requested of it by the Army and Navy in July 1943. In October the
project was made the "focal point" for bringing together all the information which could be
brought to bear "on a solution of some of the basic problems" in the intelligence field. The
new project covered British, German, and South American intelligence systems as well as
the conditions in many American agencies. Also in October there appeared a "Study of
Intelligence Activities" in which the author, George F. Schwarzwalder, listed six questions
about the intelligence needs of the country in peace and war. One of these concerned "the
organizational role between undercover and open collection" and wondered whether "the
public [would] support OSS? Support anything?"
This questioner, Schwarzwalder, developed into the bureau's specialist on the intel-
ligence problem. In February 1944 he worked with the Army on a complete reorganization
of G-2. About the same time he helped effect a transfer of some trade intelligence work
from FEA to the State Department. From at least then on he tried to get State to organize
its own intelligence work and ultimately to take the lead in effecting some better
coordination of all the intelligence agencies. While Schwarzwalder and others in the bureau
would observe, study, and talk about intelligence for the present and future, they had no
plan ready when Donovan sprang one on them in November.
Of more immediate substance was the study conducted by another civilian, Mr. Max
Ways of the Foreign Economic Administration. This study had its origin in a query to the
Army from the FEA Administrator, Mr. Leo T. Crowley, in March 1944.22 The chief
justification for elaborating here on the origin and course of that study is its subsequent role
in the next encounter in G-2's continuing battle with Donovan, this time over the latter's
November plan for a postwar intelligence organization.
Crowley's query, about the quality of the intelligence provided the Army by FEA,
prompted an Army official to assert that the "amalgamation" of all intelligence services
"under a single head in a national intelligence agency," as a solution to the problem of
duplication, "sometimes quadruplication," of activities, would be opposed by some of the
agencies concerned and, "therefore, was, at the present, unattainable." This exchange led to
further correspondence in June when Crowley raised with General McNarney the general
problem of coordination of the work of the intelligence services. McNarney sent the problem
to the JCS which then, in August, directed the JIC to study the matter.23
The JIC turned the matter over to its working group, the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS),
which like itself had its civilian members. One of these was Crowley's own representative,
Max Ways. Two months later Ways produced a paper on the "Post-War Intelligence policy
of the United States" (Appendix L). This asserted the inadequacy of both the prewar and
the existent systems for coordinating intelligence, and it detailed defects in the current
system. It then formulated "conclusions" or "general principles" relative to the future
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organization of U.S. intelligence. One of these asserted the necessity for the establishment--
and for the first time in a formal paper used the very name-of a "Central Intelligence
Agency" to produce national intelligence, coordinate the services, and conduct clandestine
intelligence operations. The paper was forward-looking but made little progress in the JIS.24
It was described as "heretical"' by the G-2 representative, Colonel Montague, mentioned in
Chapter I of this work. The JIC secretary, reporting on the Ways paper, observed that it
dealt with a long-range problem and hence the committee "wish[ed] to avoid a hasty
solution." In December Colonel Montague told the JIC that the JIS had been "tinkering"
with the subject since August.2ti
Actually Way's paper probably would never have gotten out of the JIS, much less
through the JIC to the JCS, had it not been for the Donovan initiative of November 18,
1944, to which we are coming, and which, unlike other proposals, precipitated. the first, ma-
jor governmental debate over a postwar intelligence system for the United States.
Meanwhile, in the Department of State another civilian, Mr. Francis H. Russell, was
struggling to bring another plan to the light of day. State had always been a sharp-eyed
observer of the intelligence cockpit, but it had not been until May 1944 that the department
had its first serious thoughts about entering that cockpit by setting up its own intelligence
organization. Near futile as these thoughts turned out to be, they deserve considleration here
because they also help prepare us for Donovan's plan.
Those thoughts had their :inception in the successful three-way collaboration of State,
FEA, and the Budget Bureau in that merger of FEA's trade intelligence work with State's.
So impressed was the bureau, especially its George Schwarzwalder, with the accomplishment
of State's Division of World Trade Intelligence (WT) in acquiring, filing, coordinating,
indexing, and utilizing trade intelligence material that it thought WT's methods, systems, as
well as services, could be profitably extended elsewhere in State. WT's chief, Francis
Russell, obviously encouraged by this recognition, eagerly took up the torch in May.
The British and Donovan led off his argumentation for innovative actions. Britain had
just debated and announced the establishment of a permanent intelligence branch in the
Foreign Office, and Russell cited the action as evidence of the need even in peacetime of "an
adequate intelligence service and an efficient organization of information." Then there were
"the activities of General Donovan and others concerning the establishment of a greatly
expanded foreign intelligence service in OSS." According to Russell, "discussions" looking
toward "a substantial enlargement" of the work of OSS in the postwar era were then
"taking place at a high level." The State Department, he pointedly remarked, "should in
peacetime be the center of foreign information for all governmental agencies," but this it
could not be unless the department's own intelligence house were organized.26 Clearly,
I)onovan's activities were as ominous for Russell as they were instructive.
In terms of organization State, said Russell, was less well-off than "any well-run large
newspaper." He quoted a high State official as saying that "the present methods of utilizing
information [in State] are as obsolete as the dodo bird." 27 Added to this organizational
deficiency was the prospective deterioration, as the war came to an end, of those valuable
wartime files which were developed both in State itself and in such agencies as FEA and
OSS. Russell, like others in the old-line agencies, had begun to cast covetous glances at the
files and personnel rosters of the agencies apparently fated to die.
As a way out of the informational disorder Russell proposed an "Office of Foreign
Intelligence," a new line office to be charged with a general intelligence function. It would
bring under one head the work of all those divisions-WT, Visa, Foreign Activity
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donovan's plan/ix
Correlation, some cartel units, and others-whose primary concern was foreign intelligence.
It would collect, centralize, and analyze information on foreign individuals, organizations,
firms, events, and movements. It would be a "fact-finding" and "fact-organizing" body
which, Russell assured the touchy geographic desks, would have nothing to do with
policymaking. Nor, we must point out, would it have anything to do with espionage, the
coordination of other intelligence agencies, or the production of national strategic intel-
ligence. In fact, it was a modest plan; a friendly critic, Schwarzwalder, called it "a
popgun." Z8
State "tinkered" with it for more than a year. Its necessity, composition, functions,
location, and status were worked over by departmental movers and shakers. It was restudied
and remodeled, named and renamed a dozen times, and the implementing departmental
order was drafted and redrafted. It was chewed over in Russell's own upper echelons, in
State's management circles, and in conversations with impatient Budget Bureau officers. It
was pushed "upstairs" where the thrashing continued and where "it" finally became a
"special assistant for research and intelligence." Even when that was established-at war's
end and out of the sheer necessity of digesting the juicy R &A morsel picked up from
OSS-nothing had really happened. State had not organized itself for intelligence and had
not taken the lead in organizing the potential intelligence community. In the words of Dean
Acheson, "the department muffled] its intelligence role." 29
A footnote to this brief account of the Russell plan suggests that it played a role in trig-
gering Donovan's own plan in November 1944. Some years after the event, an historian,
Arthur B. Darling, noted that "Donovan had among his papers" a copy of the September 30
draft of the Russell plan. Later still, Colonel Montague, then a civilian in CIA, wrote that
"in October 1944" a copy of this September draft "came into the possession" of Donovan,
who "quickly moved to forestall State" by submitting a proposal of his own.30 Is that the way
it happened? We shall see shortly.
3. GENESIS OF DONOVAN'S PLAN
For all their ability men like George Schwarzwalder, Max Ways, and Francis Russell
simply were not in the same league with General Donovan when it came to doing battle with
the potentates and princelings of the intelligence services. Such reformers lacked the
prerequisites-the power, personality, and program-to move the departmental mountains.
They could not even make a first-class issue out of the crying need for reform. They could
not get the ear of the man in the White House. This last was Donovan's trump card, and he
played it in the fall of 1944.
Donovan's thinking about a strong American intelligence system had always implicitly
conceived of it as a permanent need of the United States. It had been peacetime-albeit a
troubled time--when he urged the establishment of a Coordinator of Strategic Information.
The memorandum in which he had done so had sketched such a comprehensive reorganiza-
tion of the nation's production of intelligence that it could not possibly have been conceived
of as an emergency structure to be dismantled and junked when the crisis was turned. His
defense of COI and OSS in the Washington battles of 1941, 1942, and 1943 had rested on
such fundamental assertions about the need of the U.S. for finished intelligence as a
prerequisite to the conduct of foreign affairs that here again permanency of the effort was
elemental. No one could argue that Donovan was less sensitive to experience than Navy
Commander Rihheldaffer who in November 1942 declared "the experience of this war" had
demonstrated the need for immediately laying the groundwork for a permanent postwar
intelligence system.
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Donovan had had to fight so hard in those 1941-43 battles for the existence of COI and
OSS that it would have been foolishly impolitic, as well as premature in respect of the course
of the war, to have raised the issue: of the future at those times. On that subject his first
recorded statement was made in that question-and-answer period in May 1943, just two
months after he had faced the seemingly sure imminence of defeat at the hands of Gen.
George Strong. In that answer, given to an audience of Army officers-sure to spread the
word throughout every G-2 cubby-hole---Donovan announced in an almost indifferent way
his intention of fighting for the continuance of OSS in the postwar world. By coincidence-
or what have you--the; G-2 and ONII policy line on the matter was laid down just two weeks
later when Admiral Train declared "it should be noted that the Office of Strategic Services
is a wartime agency, and of transitory character, while the Naval and Military Services
/sicJ--have responsibilities which will continue permanently." "
For Donovan the question concerned not the objective but strategy, tactics, and timing.
By mid-1943, after Donovan's May statement, speculation about the future of intelligence
and OSS grew common in OSS circles. In June Elmo Roper was writing Donovan that. the
latter's success in building various intelligence units had demonstrated "the desirability of
such units as a permanent part of government." In July London subordinates, preparing
papers for Donovan's negotiations with G-2 and the British on the question of independent
operations in Europe, argued that the U.S. "needs an independent secret intelligence service
both now and after the war" and that the task of building one had to begin immediately." In
August an admiring general, a member of the OSS Planning Group, had informed Donovan
that "a mutual friend" had recommended to Admiral Leahy that Donovan be made
"Director of Intelligence," be put in charge of all government intelligence agencies and have
responsibility for all military, psychological, political, and economic intelligence, and its
"relation to the war and the peace which follows." 33
In September Donovan had his first opportunity to put a postwar plan on paper. He
was asked by Maj. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, to submit a
report on the possible permanent integration into the military establishment of OSS or a
similar organization. Conceivably the request had some connection with that study of the
postwar army which had recently been initiated. in any event Donovan returned to Smith in
a few days the impossibly titled "The Need in the United States on a Permanent Basis as an
Integral Part of Our Military Establishment of a Long-Range Strategic Intelligence
Organization with Attendant `Subversion' and `Deception of the Enemy' Functions." It had
two objectives of which the first was permanence for OSS. Proudly defending OSS, Donovan
described it as "a living organism" which could be "adapted to a permanent plain" or made
to serve as "a design for a new but similar agency."' He asserted the necessity of such a serv-
ice, the inadequacy of the prewar setup, and. the suitability of OSS to meet the
requirements.34
His second objective was equality with the armed services. He proposed that OSS, or
its replacement, be recognized in fact as the "Fourth Arm," the "Fourth" of the "Fighting
Services," and that it be given "a status equal to that of the Army, Navy, and Air Force."
He envisioned either four chiefs of staff,, one of whom was the "Chief of Staff, Strategic
Service"---all reporting to the secretary of a unified defense department---or a new
"Strategic Services" under JCS jurisdiction but headed by a civilian appointed by the
President. Were neither of these alternatives possible, then he recommended the strengthen-
ing of OSS by the addition of military and naval officers and by requiring G..2, A-2, and
ONI to "look to `Strategic Services' for over-all intelligence." 's
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"Fourth Arm" proposal had simply
p
a er. Its knew this and y seems to have happened to this p D
Nothing support outside OSS itself. m n's sights. surelBuried though
circles where it
no prospect at that time of any
could have put the idea forward at least a device aboOSS ut chief as the man to fear and fight noied c proposal musst have been o saw tebout in restricted Army
ce foes
may have been, the this time" a
fuele d the fires of those intelligen at th
"a mistake ?
now and in the future. Group turned down as 36 Even so, Donovan
In March 194 4 the OSS planning
the continuance of OSS after the w
1 that the JCS arrange as the outfit to watch. Francis
bruary; when ihe referred to "a
and Oa ton mind throughout the Fe
and OSS grew in the Washing he had partcular referred
i ,
had sounded year
work in the postwar era, a arentl echoing Russell
in State f SS own little aralarm tment official, pp en for the Government
substantial enlargement
William Langer, provided State's
Dr. al Se liam Service not only
South America. In June another State p urged the
apparent bid of OSS to b&t A international
,the
spoke of In July the OSS R
peacetime secret intelligence
as a whole. otentially useful ammunition when
A but also the need for a p
intelligence activists with p in
which would be independent of but work
establishment i n Staaome itmo o difi d OSS- Aug
obviously 3, I n ust a Donovan memorandum to
service- planning I intelligence services after the cessation
conjunction with both State and military.
dance forp a "non committal and innocuous"
General Marshall, requesting g u to recommend a postwar mission for cuou 38
rovoked the Army acknowledge a p twa Magruder, who had
of hostilities, p seem otherwise to "tacitly ence,
reply lest the st Dy Director for Intellig for a new intelligence
Also in August Donovan Is Deputy drafted his own plans
of coordination, When somehow cia rculated
of
i in OSS.
often pondered the he problems November idity, evoked nd even and which would be constructed OSS paroundr aoposal reinforced
system f
bility, stup out G-2, it was s on th grounds of ignorance, impra
denunciation on begun rocking; the boat of
Americanism." Donovan himself had a been
this time, howev rer, supposed to have en thin1pelled in this
e point, clearly
By o osals. Since he is appy one's curiosity a
intelligence with his of a State plan, it will help s of the event. As so often happens, direction by discovery to the unfolding
a small one, if close attention is paid
at least so everybody
more prosaic explanation seems likely. e was in sight-or
BY September 1944 the end of the war in Europ expectation of an
indent the expection Ardennes would be Forest. rudely frustrated by the
e to the more
thought; they did not know that their confident
the
caused official Washington to give ut thought
his country
ected German offensive in Dece
by o
imminent V-day in Europe government to a peacetime basis. Donovan, who was 01
"a strong
on September A in the cap18lo
reconversion of the g ember 14, was informed of the new
reconversion
from August 5 to Sept who warned functions, and
Louis Ream, ht to be cut back in residential lto
administrative officer, et? that OSS oug ?`izide l letter t war
feeling in the Bureau olate Ream brought to his chief' la tte fo o the p ion of war
operation. A few days him to make p and the
personnel to a peace footing," adaptation
time Ream
Budget Director Harold Smith telling uirements?" At the same
11 the "reduction of structure to e to peacetime Teq report on the military and civilian
agencies, peacetime
0
the administrative stur days after V-Day in Europe.
reminded Donovan that tSSW anety days at r V- y the President's lettero wanted personnel required by O sent Donovan a copy of fans and
On September 23 Smith formally days a statement of his p
reconversion and requested him to submit within thirty
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"all ... Proposed actions .
as the case ? _ ? necessary to convert from a
immediate ad raY be. our days war to a
~ustments" later Donovan! promised to peace is s pans -for
week in September, then and for the period following
r
make a Donovan clean the defeat ofe Smithth his plans "
State. had
major proposal ,bout the future ofYOSS
, both
the obligation and the Opportunity 1 lay the last
to
To that extent he t needed he no ii'npetus from
As a matter of fact, on Sept ember 26-four came into Donovan'; on Se s em bs
page statement on four days before the date of the State document
either "The Basis for Donovan or someone else in
service, a oanent
said the statement, is ~P'ern
World-wide Intelli encOSS drafted a one-
an
participation in international inevitable g Service. '
Producing intelli affairs." consequence of the U.S Such a
?;ence about Tlhis service, polic
makeshift set-up- IJ S "national interests and charged w defense i " th
a sub 1 of active
was at hand: " or a part of some other department. substantial Such must not be
An interesting , be secured b a service,
said the statement
.
statement which alterations implementing" the functions Of O 4z
i its typed in the ?docttrrr
n ent now occurred. Donovan written around form is untitled and "
consistent with the Oct.
new , statemment ent in dictated" ;t longer
, different g to a pencilled
earlier , appeared Then this qui
accor was changed the under date of in subhe o old tithe titl w to
Service." next day to read October 5
substitution of change involved "The Basis for but with the .
The This
11 the insertion of , a Permanent U.S. Foreign Intellig nce
Ufor "World-wide" forei n?
fore "intelligence"
sort of he and the
a United Nations intelligence setsitp?, ? someone g get thebeidea t
How does one explain referred to "a
ing impossible about plain the combination of the old title and the
detail, forcefulness a~onovan having c,ontposed both texts new text? -, Don'Ovan
however, that ar?,umentation _? though the secoTirdere is is knoth ely
til 'n?re clearly his st
retained the original e had taken
bs e? It to its
clearly Now is there a c someone hanCeethatf State's Se Sepntiall
to more likely,
not initiating seems the September 's
it , and
subsequent alteration? 26 draft___ p tuber 30 draft--
draft and becorrrat is it possible that warned
integrated, flexible, independent research unit capable of looking at national intelligence organized State
possib
integrally and serving the lentire department.
id ailof State Department
would negatet "would
intelligence,"
subjectResearch and
leadership in government-wideas intelligence." a definitive t organ zat o Office
to n," r
Intelligence be set up, proposed, est.44
whatever changes experience might sugg
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Thus was that problem posed for resolution by the Secretary, who had returned to
Washington at noon on December 29 but was thoroughly tied up with briefing the President,
the public, and the press on his two-week visit to Moscow.
The military had also been anticipating Byrnes's return. At the end of the meeting on
December 27 Patterson had instructed General Craig to confer with both McCormack and
Major Correa of the Navy Department to see if they "could produce an agreed plan by the
time Mr. Byrnes returns from Moscow." 45
Subsequently Patterson had turned over the whole matter to a new Assistant Secretary
of War, Howard Peterson, and had stated his readiness to accept State's plan provided, first,
that State created machinery comparable to the responsibilities it was undertaking, and
second, that State appoint a deputy to handle the department's internal intelligence
organization and thus free McCormack to handle the interdepartmental problem. He hardly
needed to specify that State had also to make certain basic changes in the plan itself.4"
Patterson must surely have coordinated his osition, Forrestal, but there is no documentation on the point." Behind bothllmenrwere departments
which were impatient to implement the JCS plan in one form or another. Both secretaries
had put their stamps of approval on that plan. Neither of them, and no one in their
departments, liked the McCormack plan. They would accept it, greatly modified of course,
but they would do so only because, as Craig said, something was better than nothing. They
wanted action immediately, and they both knew Byrnes was scheduled to depart Wash-
ington, this time for London, just a few days after he returned from Moscow.
There had been drafted for them what appears to be a last final offer, a significant
alteration of Patterson's earlier hedged acceptance of State's plan. There is in the files a
memorandum, in finished form, prepared for signature of both War and Navy secretaries
and addressed to Byrnes. It was clearly written after December 15 and could not have been
written after January 6; it was probably prepared at the very end of December for Byrnes'
consideration during his end-of-the.-year stopover in Washington. Even if not sent, it has
value as an illustration of the drive of the services to get as much as they could and to get it
immediately. They did not want State's plan; they would accept a modified War Department
plan; they would settle for a modified JCS plan. Their offer prefigured the January
settlement.
First, the memorandum stated that the secretaries could not accept the State
Department plan, even with the modifications of December 15, because it failed to provide
for "a centralized executive organization" responsible only to the NI
`actively
assisted" by the services' A and intelligence chiefs, and because it did not provide for "centralized
performance" of the functions of synthesis and espionage. At the same time the memoran-
dum recognized that the War Department plan was considered by State as "inadvisable,"
because it provided for the establishment of an independent agency, separate from the three
departments. Hence, the memorandum offered the concept of a central dependent agency
entrusted, however, with both operating and coordinating functions. The proposal called for
housing the organization in State for administrative purposes, staffing it with
personnel
drawn from the three departments, and placing at its head a State Department official
unless "the President, in view of his known and acute interest in this subject, [might] wish
himself to select the chief executive." In that case both Army and Navy were ready to make
a man available. The proposal also accepted deletion of the provisions relating to the
independence of the agency and of its budget. In summary, the memorandum held out for
the operating functions, for a less than desirable central organization, and also for a chance
to head it with a military man.41
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As for the means of achieving this arrangement, the memorandum offered Byrnes his
choice of either the JCS or the State plan with those modifications of one or the other which
would be acceptable to all three departments. However, in the event Byrnes chose a
modification of the State plan, then the service secretaries warned they would "feel obliged
to advise the President" that that alternative was in their opinion "much less desirable" than
their own proposal. In short, the burden of the right choice lay with the Secretary of State,
and the President would be informed accordingly."
The President had already become more actively involved with the problem, and his
interest inevitably increased the pressure on both Byrnes and McCormack. In his first
months in office Truman had made a few simple statements to Harold Smith about the
intelligence problem. On September 20 he had ordered the abolition of OSS and the
charting of a new course of development. Other than expressing a felt need for a clearer
picture of world events and less paper to read, however, the President had rarely become
involved with any of the problems of intelligence that have been covered in this narrative.
The situation soon began to change.
Most immediately important was the obvious fact that little was being accomplished to
effect the new development he had authorized. Then, Marshall's congressional testimony on
October 18 made intelligence a public issue. On October 31 Harold Smith sent the President
a progress report but also indicated probable need for a new directive. Early in November
Truman and Leahy, probably on Leahy's initiative, discussed the situation. Sometime
thereafter Truman discussed it with Byrnes, and had even laid on a conference, subsequently
postponed, to resolve the matter. On November 28 Smith complained to him that the
situation had been "royally bitched up." A few days later Admiral Inglis was reporting his
understanding that "the President has been pressing Secretary Byrnes to
olsubmit his pl mackan."
Then, in a manner that could not have escaped Truman's attention,
had publicly, but discreetly to be sure, aired a policy dispute within the President's
administration.
The evidence suggests that until the end of December the problem of intelligence was
one which others took to the President. By December 27, however, the problem had so
crystallized that the President felt compelled to inject himself directly into the matter. He
had asked his advisor, Comdr. Clark Clifford, a fellow Missourian, to get the papers on the
subject. On December 27 Admiral Souers sent Clifford, "as you have requested," copies of
the State Department and the JCS plans and a "detailed comparison" of them. In Souers's
handwriting on the memorandum there appears this note: "Comdr. Clifford asked for my
recommendations at the request of the President."
Why Souers? While another Missourian, a St. Louis businessman, Souers was not on
that date personally known to Truman. The latter then knew the name of Souers as that of
"a pillar of the Democratic party in St. Louis" and knew of him also "as an officer who had
played an important role in the development of the JCS plan and was high in the confidence
of Adm. Leahy and Sec. Forrestal." 51 Years later Souers said he had been able to do much
constructive work on the intelligence problem "with a close personal friend of mine who was
on the personal staff of President Truman. This could have been fellow Missourian
Commo. James K. Vardaman, a St. Louis banker who was then the President's naval aide.
More than likely, however, it was fellow Missourian Clark Clifford, who was soon working
with Souers on the JCS plan. In either case, Souers, who had just been made ONI's deputy
director, and who was familiar with the previous year's struggle over the Donovan plan,
could easily have been put forward to Truman by Clifford, Vardaman, Leahy, or Forrestal
as the man to consult on the relative merits of the disputed plans.
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Souers sent to the President the JCS plan as approved on September 19, not that plan
as amended by the Lovett board. He had probably done so on his own and not as a result of
a specific request from Truman, who hardly knew the difference between the two. The
unamended plan. had the formal JCS stamp of approval on it; it had been endorsed by the
Eberstadt report; and its provisions for an interdepartmental rather than an independent
budget suited the Navy. The plan also had the support of both service secretaries. It was the
logical plan for Souers to send forward.
In his "detailed comparison" Souers indicated that all the merits were on the side of
the JCS plan: it promised unbiased intelligence, which was derived from all sources and
approved by all three departments; it would better serve the President, who would appoint
the director, and who would receive summaries and estimates approved by all departments;
it established a central intelligence agency, which was not controlled by any one department;
and the plan contemplated "a full partnership between the three departments, created and
operated in the free spirit of cooperation, and with a feeling of full share of responsibility for
iits success." By contrast., wrote Souers, McCormack had made it clear over the radio and in
various talks to Army and Navy officers that the Secretary of State or his representative
"should determine the character of the intelligence furnished the President." Should the
McCormack plan be adopted, wrote Souers, it would inevitably be looked upon as "a State
Department intelligence system, riot an inter-governmental system." Additionally the plan
lacked the beneficial effect of the many months of full discussion that had been given to the
JCS plan."
Souers disavowed any personal bias in the matter. "As you know," he wrote to Clifford,
my interest in this subject is wholly objective as I am not a candidate for the job of Direc-
tor and couldn't accept even if it were offered me." "' How did Clifford "know" a.ll that, if
the two of them had not already discussed the possibility, and if Souers had not indicated, as
he recalled later, that he "was eager to get back to his business in St. Louis"? Who had
raised the possibility that Souers might be a good man for the job? Clifford himself? Leahy?
Forrestal? Vardaman? It is interesting to recall that only a month earlier the only name that
came to the minds of the three secretaries as a possible director was that of the former OSS
official, Allen Dulles. Now, the Navy had an admiral in mind, the deputy director cif ONI.
The President now had the two rival plans before him. One was as simple as the other
was complex. The .JCS plan prescribed an authority directing an agency which was assisted
by a board. State's plan called for one or two authorities directing an interdepartmental staff
which, assisted by two advisory groups, directed numerous committees. "My inclination,"
wrote Truman years later, "was to favor the plan worked out by the Army and Navy, with
the aid of Admiral Souers.. "" That inclination could have followed quickly upon any
perusal of the two plans. No matter how soon after December 27 he adopted this position,
however, he had first to take it up with Byrnes before he did anything about it. Therefore,
he, like Colonel McCormack and Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal, was waiting for the
returning traveler in order to dispose of the intelligence problem.
4. A NEW PEACETIME INTEI.LIGE.'vCE SYSTEM
McCormack's internal problem was apparently the first of the intelligence problems
that Byrnes disposed of on his return. On January 4, 1946, McCormack, in a telephone con-
versation with Harold Smith, reported that he was "making progress" with the Navy-
remarkable, if really true--but not with the Army. McCormack then asked Smith if he
"had gotten in touch with Secretary of State Byrnes on `our local problem.' " The local
problem was most certainly the future of his proposed permanent Office of Research and
Intelligence. Unfortunately for McCormack, Smith's answer was in the negative!'
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Indeed, before Smith could reach the Secretary, Byrnes had disposed of the problem.
On Saturday, January 5, he took up Donald Russell's recommendation to set up ORI
temporarily but transfer it in three months to the geographic and functional desks. Since the
interim organization had to be terminated immediately, wrote Byrnes, and since his
imminent departure for London left too little time to give the subject "the consideration it
should receive," he was letting McCormack have his ORI "temporarily upon the express
understanding that the final decision" on its "ultimate location" would be made by March 1,
1946.51 He took the easy way out; he postponed a decision. McCormack's position vis-a-vis
the services was thus additionally undermined.
On Sunday Byrnes met at Washington's Shoreham Hotel with Forrestal and Army
Under Secretary Kenneth Royall. Secretary Forrestal is reported to have told Byrnes:
"Jimmy, we like you, but we don't like your plan. Just think what might happen if another
William Jennings Bryan were to succeed you in the State Department. True or not, the
story correctly pictured the situation. The War and Navy departments simply did not feel
safe in entrusting intelligence to the Department of State. They felt it was their province and
that only they could really handle the job. Secretaries Forrestal and Royall were clear and
united on the issue as they confronted the Secretary of State.
That Secretary must have been inwardly split. On the one hand, his official position
obligated him to defend and advance State's traditional role as the senior foreign affairs
service. As the civilian head of a civilian service Byrnes was fully aware of the military-civil-
ian aspects of the intelligence problem. As spokesman for the department Byrnes had the
concrete responsibility of arguing persuasively for his department's proposal. On the other
hand, Byrnes probably had little stomach for a fight. The two secretaries had undoubtedly
indicated their liking for him but their dislike for his plan. He probably found the latest
version of that plan too reminiscent of the Budget Bureau plan, which he had so disliked in
November. He knew his own department was badly split on the intelligence issue. Since he
was leaving town the next day, he had little time to argue or give the matter "the
consideration it should receive"-and the points at issue in both plans were numerous and
complicated.
Most importantly, it is quite possible, even likely, that Byrnes and the service
secretaries had already been informed of Truman's preference in the matter and had really
been convened at the Shoreham to give effect to it. When Truman recalled his "inclination
... to favor" the JCS plan, he immediately added that he had been "ready to put it into
effect." 5''
That readiness was put forth clearly in an unaddressed and unsigned memorandum
entitled "Central Intelligence Agency." The memorandum declared that "my purpose in
establishing a Central Intelligence Agency is the coordination of existing intelligence
agencies . . . ," and it further declared that "it is my desire that without further delay" the
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy prepare for "my consideration" a draft directive
covering certain essentials. These had clearly been lifted from the JCS plan. The "my" in
the memorandum could only refer to the President. The message was clear. Unfortunately,
the only copy of the memorandum available is an undated carbon, which bears an added
pencilled date of "January 7, 1946"-the day after the Shoreham meeting. If the date is
erroneous, as is quite probable, then it is equally probable that that message had been
communicated to the Shoreham conferees in time for their meeting. If the date is correct,
then the memorandum was unnecessary, because on January 6 the three secretaries did
exactly as the memorandum directed them to do.bo
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Put another way, on January 6 Byrnes surrendered either voluntarily or at presidential
direction. On the one hand, Byrnes did not win acceptance of the State plan, modified or
unmodified; on the other hand, he accepted the JCS plan-the one perused by Truman-
almost unmodified. Actually there were precisely four changes, enough perhaps to save
departmental face and ease departmental pain; nine words were deleted, and ten words and
the letter "s" were added.
The deleted words eliminated from the NIA a representative of the JCS. McCormack
had argued cogently against another military man on the NIA and against a member who,
unlike a cabinet officer, had no final authority of his own. The military had no difficulty
with McCormack's objection and had been quite prepared to yield to him. With the three
cabinet officers constituting the NIA there was a certain symmetry of rank, authority, and
departmental responsibility."
With the addition of siix words, underscored in the following quotation, CIA was
authorized to "accomplish the synthesis and evaluation of departmental intelligence relating
to the national security and other information collected by it...." The first two words
suited the military fine, and the next four represented an easy concession to State's interest
in giving the organization a scope broader than that of "national security." The addition of
the letter "s" in the provision relative to CIA's relations with other agencies pluralized the
agency's "planning function," but to what purpose or effect this was done is not evident.62
Finally, the underscored words in "funds and personnel" meant that the departments
participating in the NIA. would make people as well as money available to the NIA." State,
and the Budget Bureau, had opposed the establishment of a new agency with its own funds
and the right to hire and fire its own people; what State and the bureau wanted was a kind
of voluntary self-help project where people an loan from the various departments worked co-
operatively in a common enterprise. The additional "and personnel" could only have been a
move in this direction, and to that extent it was the only modification of the JCS plan that
was a positive victory for State. At. least State had not had to accept the War Department
plan with its independent budget!
This January 6 agreement offered less than earlier proposals for a CIA. Donovan had
proposed the establishment of a strong independent agency reporting to the President,
advised by the services, and performing numerous functions. This idea had been strongly
opposed by the military, who wanted really to do very little about the subject other than
think about it later. Under prodding, however, they finally accepted the idea of a new
agency performing several functions but controlled by the departments and their intelligence
services. State and the Budges. Bureau opposed a new agency, wanted self-coordination,
reserved the production of national intelligence to State, and paid little regard to the
performance of certain central functions, such as espionage, of interest to both Donovan and
the services. What the three departments had accepted on January 6, then, was a slightly
diluted military or JCS plan. It was considerably less than Donovan advocated, less than the
military had come to support. Would it be further diluted or strengthened from here on in?
Under a covering letter of January 7 the secretaries sent their recommendation to the
President. That recommendation, as JCS 1 181 /5, had been approved by the Joint Chiefs in
September and forwarded, via. their service secretaries, to Secretary of State Byrnes for
transmittal to the President. At long last, it seems, and amended once again, that directive
officially went to the President."
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Ironically enough, the covering letter was drafted by Colonel McCormack, who could
not have been happy either with the outcome of the Shoreham meeting or the writing of the
letter. It was the official response to the President's letter of September 20 to the Secretary
of State. He and his fellow secretaries informed the President that pursuant to that letter
they had constituted themselves "an interdepartmental group" to formulate a plan for his
approval "for a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all federal
agencies concerned with that type of activity." They noted that their draft directive provided
that the N1[A, the DCI, and the IAB would submit for his approval "a basic organization
plan." 65 McCormack, as he wrote those lines, must have contemplated the drafting of that
plan as an opportunity for molding the JCS plan more to State's liking.
An earlier opportunity soon appeared, however. Before Byrnes left for London, Harold
Smith managed to obtain "a brief appointment" with him. Smith then learned "about a pro-
n
posed Exeuctive Order disposing of the matter of the organization of intelligence ascher1es in
the Government." Returning to his office, Smith "talked to [L.W.] Hoel
Schwarzwalder ... who gave him a copy of the proposed Order." (Was that the directive
finished by the secretaries and forwarded by State on that same day, January 7?)
the form of the order, Smith on the next day telephoned Matt Connelly, Truman's secretary,
and asked him "to tell the President not to sign" the order. Connelly called the next day,
January 9, to say that "a meeting on intelligence, called by the President, was about to be
held." Smith immediately left for the White House.66 Someone had once again slipped into
that "fort" and had "prematurely" taken the President's time.
When Truman had written of his readiness to put the JCS plan into effect, he had gone
on to say that Harold Smith had "urged postponement so that the people in his bureau could
make a thorough analysis of it." Smith made his pitch on January 9. Present were the Presi-
dent, Leahy, Judge Rosenman, General Vaughan and Commodore Vardaman (the Presi-
dent's military and naval aides, respectively), and several persons from the Navy Depart-
ment. Smith observed that War and State "were not represented," and we are all left
wondering why that was so.67
"the implication of most
From Smith's account only two major points were made. One,
of the statements made at the meeting was that intelligence could not be handled in the
State Department because that department was too weak." Two, Smith "took the part of the
devil's advocate." He was worried about the expense, tolerable in war but not with a
peacetime budget of $25,000,000,000, that resulted from several departments, badly
organized, duplicating one another's work. Contrary to a rejoinder from Leahy, Smith said
he was not just thinking about money but about organization. The proposed system was bad
organization and bad administration. He said he had listened to many discussions on
intelligence, was much interested in the subject, but was also much concerned because there
was so little understanding of the subject. "I am not so sure," he concluded, with his self-
confidence intact, "that we are not approaching the subject of intelligence in the most
unintelligent fashion." 68
Somewhere in the discussion Truman, according to his account, interjected a concilia-
tory note:
`Harold,' I said, turning to Smith, `I know you have expert intelligence men in
your office, but I like this plan. If your people can make it better, that's all right.
But I have been waiting to do this for a long time [since their first discussion on
with lAd26, 1945?]. So you appoint miral Souers, get the people ofrom the Department of Justice, and let's get
it done.' 69
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Two days hater, January 11, 19416,, there took place off stage center-although in
Truman's office--a ceremony worth noting here. At 12:45 Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan
was ushered in to receive for his OSS services an Oak Leaf Cluster for the Distinguished
Service Medal awarded him for his World War I battlefield exploits. According to the
President's calendar, Donovan, "when asked what guests he wished to invite, expressed [thel
wish to come alone." The citation credited him with anticipating the need for secret
intelligence, research and analysis, and the conduct of unorthodox methods of warfare in
support of military operations. (Someone had neglected to mention propaganda.) He was
credited with giving "valuable service in the field of intelligence and special operations" to
theater commanders, the JCS, State Department, and other government agencies. He had
contributed "in a high degree" to the success of military operations.70
The medal was the work of Judge Rosenman. Donovan's unaccompanied appearance
may have been due to the fact, as he wrote Rosenman, that he "was not aware that any time
had been fixed until telephoned by the White Hou,se...... Donovan also said that "the
President told me that he was working on a central intelligence agency and that he would
like to have my views before any decision is made." That was polite nonsense, of course; and
both men must have known it. Nevertheless? Donovan told Rosenman of his willingness to
help and of his hope that Rosenman "would take a personal interest in the kind of
organization" to be established. With no less but with more justified self-confidence than
that possessed by the Budget chief, Donovan observed that it had been his duty in the last
five years to give considerable attention to the problem and that he, "more than most men,
perhaps," knew the "dangers and pitfalls that must be avoided." In reply the Judge said he
thought that the President had discussed the problem with Donovan." Can anyone not
imagine the alarm that would have been rung in the Pentagon had it been reported that
Donovan had been called in to help rejii,gger the JCS plan!
Truman, having settled on a plan for a permanent peacetime intelligence system, gave
the job of putting it in final shape to Clark Clifford and Admiral Souers, who were directed
to coordinate their work with the Budget Bureau and Attorney General Tom Clark. Their
first draft, a proposed executive order made as early as January 8, made a significant
change: to the NIA was added "an additional representative of the President of the United
States." 71 The origin of the change is not known. In December 1944 a JIC draft had
included the Chief of Staff to the President, but this was changed back to a representative of
the JCS; so it remained until the secretarial meeting at the Shoreham. Whatever the origin
of this latest change, it must have been considered acceptable to Truman himself. It
certainly had the effect of directly involving the President in the work of the NIA and
thereby of enhancing its stature. It was a significant move in the direction of Donovan who
had always argued for an intelligence system serving presidential and national, not only
departmental, needs.
On January 12 this draft was changed twice. First, whereas it had been left to the NIA
to establish the CIA, the CIA was now declared established. That thereby eliminated the en-
tire paragraph laying out the first duty of the NIA as the
organizational plan for the implementation of the order. Stylistically, the word "synthes si"
was replaced by "correlation,"' because Truman allegedly had told Souers that "[expletive
deleted], you can't say `synthesize'; that sounds too much like making bathtub whiskey!
However, another contemporary account credits the change to "the mere preference of Latin
to Greek." Laughlingly disagreeing years later, Clark Clifford said Truman probably had
trouble pronouncing "synthesis" !73
By January 18 the proposed order had been changed considerably, and obviously the
changes had come from the Budget Bureau, State, and the Attorney General. Those
changes, further diluting the JCS plan, remained substantially unaltered in the document as
it would be issued on January 22.
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President Truman awards Donovan, for whom the President had no use, an Oak Leaf
Cluster for his Distinguished Service Medal, Jan. 11, 1946.
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In the meantime the document was polished, coordinated, and readied for the
President's signature. Copies were prepared for dispatch to the three secretaries; other copies
were prepared for the Attorney General, the Postmaster General, and the secretaries of
Treasury, Interior, and Commerce, all of whom had some interest in the business. On
January 21 Harold Smith apologized to the President for the way he had "tackled the sub-
ject" in the President's office. Smith pointed out that he was in the position of "being objec-
tive and impersonal about the subject," and at the same time had "wanted to smoke the
situation out" and make the President "aware of the facts" as he saw them. No need to
worry, the President reassured him; as a matter of fact Truman thought the order would be
"a lot better as a result of the argument." Though ready for signature and release that day,
the order was held back, because the President's press secretary, Charles Ross, thought that
the State of the Union message, going to Congress that day, would get all the attention."
On Tuesday, January 22, 1946, President Truman signed the new directive 75 on the
coordination of federal foreign intelligence activities and released the document to the public
(Appendix U). It. was no longer an unaddressed executive order; since January 18 it had
become a presidential letter addressed specifically to the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy-and in response to their letter of January 7, 1946. As such it was immediately and pri-
marily concerned with the activities of just those three departments, and it was therefore
unlike the JCS plan which assigned the NIA comprehensive and unclear authority over all
government intelligence agencies having intelligence functions related to the national security.
The three secretaries were informed that. the President wanted "all federal foreign
intelligence activities to be planned, developed, and coordinated" so as to accomplish "the
intelligence mission related to the national security." For that purpose the three of them, and
another person to be named by the President as his personal representative, were designated
the National Intelligence Authority. That body was once again a four-man team of three
cabinet officers and a presidential representative.
In an important concession to State and Harold Smith, the second paragraph embodied
a novel concept which introduced a somewhat confusing aspect, in theory at least, to the sta-
tus and function of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The paragraph created a
headless body and a bodyless head! It created a "Central Intelligence Group" (CIG) to work
"under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence." The CIG was not "headed" by
the DCI; nor was the DCI the: "head" of the CIG. CIG worked "under [his] direction." Se-
mantics? Someone's mistake? Sloppy drafting? Hardly in all three cases. Before explaining,
let it be noted that this "group" was constituted of such persons and utilized such facilities
as the three secretaries, within the limits of their funds, made available.
The paragraph established not an agency with a head and a body, as was sought by the
military men in the Pentagon, but something closer to that executive secretariat-that body
of pooled departmental personnel -that was sought by State and the Budget Bureau. That
executive secretary, that DCI, directed the work of the people who were assigned to him, but
they were not his people to hire, train, assign, reassign, diirect, supervise, retire, or fire; they
were simply on loan to him. They were a "group" distinct from him but "collectively"
organized to help him discharge his responsibilities to the NIA. "Group," not "agency,"
characterized the rather loose arrangement. anticipated, namely, a body of persons "collec-
tively" organized, assigned and withdrawn, and working under the DCI's "direction." It was
a State and Budget Bureau concept.
That the DCI and CIG went their connected and yet separate ways showed tip also in
the third paragraph where the Functions to be performed were made the responsibility of the
DCI rather than of the CIG, or as might have seemed more natural, of the CIG headed by
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the DCI. Those functions were practically unchanged from the text of JCS 1181/5 except
that they were now the DCI's functions and except that they more narrowly pertained to
the three departments. The only significant change was the omission of even a euphemism
for espionage, a word no one wanted to put on paper. The JCS plan had called it "the direct
procurement of intelligence"; the January 18 draft had spoken of "the direct procurement
of intelligence outside the continental limits of the United States." The final text subsumed
the idea, for reasons of delicacy, under the umbrella of "services of common concern," of
which it had long been recognized as one of the most important. Also, CIG's performance of
. other functions and duties related to intelligence" was further limited to intelligence
"affecting the national security," a qualification already used five times in the directive.
Of course the uncontroverted anti-gestapo provision was retained. However, where the
CIA was denied by the JCS any "police or law enforcement function," the CIG was
additionally denied "internal security functions." Also, the directive withheld any right to
make "investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions,
except as provided by law and Presidential directives." Undoubtedly these changes
represented a Justice Department contribution.76 Another uncontroverted provision, the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, was retained. Other provisions need no
special mention here.
The .ICS had their plan, but it had been diluted by State and the Budget Bureau. In
place of an independent agency there was an interdepartmental group of borrowed people
subsisting on financial handouts and utilizing such borrowed facilities as might be offered
them. There was, however, a DCI-appointed by the President, responsible to the NIA, and a
nonvoting member thereof-and he did have that trinity of functions-coordination, produc-
tion and operation-sought by the military. Most importantly, the thing had been established
and put in operation; and, whatever the theoretical and structural defects, those on the scene
were happy. What would happen to it was probably anybody's guess at the time. Both the
military and the civilians could probably foresee many opportunities for change.
The first opportunity to influence future growth fell to the military when on January 23
Truman made his new friend, Admiral Souers, the first Director of Central Intelligence.
Souers had wanted to return to St. Louis but had been prevailed upon by the President to
stay for at least six months in order to get the organization started. Souers had been picked
because of his acceptability to Truman and also because he had been backed by Admiral
Leahy as the man most familiar with the background of the problem." No thought had
apparently been given to the appointment of a civilian; after all it was basically a military
plan, and it was natural that an officer be the initial head. The choice of an admiral rather
than a general was an interservice matter that could henceforward be nicely handled on a
rhythmically alternating basis.
Also on January 23 President Truman announced the appointment of Admiral Leahy
as his personal representative on the NIA. On that day, he, Admiral Souers, and the three
secretaries were the only five persons definitely holding positions in the new federal foreign
intelligence system. It was "year zero" again, although not necessarily so from Truman's
point of view.
It probably did not occur to Truman then or subsequently to think that the same or a
better organization could have been established sooner than it was and without the period of
trial and error that had taken place and would take place before the CIG yielded place to
CIA. Certainly it did not occur to him that OSS itself should have been somehow revamped
and perpetuated as the nucleus of the new situation. Nor did he show any interest in
implementing the Donovan plan of 1944; and indeed as far as Truman's thought on the
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subject at the time can be ascertained, he could not-in the face of strong opposition -have
found it acceptable. Nor did _t occur to him, as far as is known, that the JCS plan of
September 19, 1945, could dust as easily have been implemented then as to have to be put
through another four months of argument and modification. The directive of January 22,
1946, hardly seems a big improvement over JCS 1181/5.
Truman then and ;later was proud of ~,vhat he had done. He had not contributed much
to the formulation of the idea of a central intelligence organization. He had his own felt
needs. He had chosen the JCS over the State plan, but probably most any President would
have done the same. Truman's real contribution to the NIA-CIG establishment was his
insistence that it be done. He made the choice between the two plans and then directed that
his preference be implemented.
In his State of the Union message on January 21, 1946, Truman had rather passingly
referred to intelligence when he noted that "a few wartime activities, for example, the ...
foreign intelligence services ... have become part of our regular government establishment."
That reference to the incorporation of OSS elements into the State and War departments
was an unprecedented public presidential recognition of the status of intelligence in the
American government. A few days after the issuance of his directive--a notable document
simply as an elaboration of a country's intelligence structure-he described the new setup as
"a practical program" which, he thought., would work "for the best interests of the
Government." He called it "a necessary arrangement" to get information together for those
who needed it for policy making.. He could not say, however, whether there would or would
not have been a Pearl Harbor had there been a NIA-CIG setup."
What Truman had done was publicize intelligence. Roosevelt seems never to have made
a public reference to intelligence, though he believed very much in it. By contrast Truman
had issued two important official documents on intelligence, mentioned it in a State of the
Union message, and otherwise discussed it publicly within the first nine months of his
presidency. To that extent Truman had helped give intelligence a new status in American
life.
Truman's letter to the secretaries received a good press. The New York Times
described the NIA and the DCI as "a clearing house" for all the government's foreign intel-
ligence activities and reported the interpretation of the "services of common concern" as
meaning that the DCI would "operate his own staff for `top secret' missions." Describing the
plan as a modification of the Donovan plan, the paper said it differed in several important
particulars, notably in that it placed the CIta and DCI under the secretaries instead of the
President and that it made the organization responsible for funds to the departments rather
than to Congress.7?
Editorially the Washington Star called the President's action "a forward-looking step
toward correcting a serious weakness in our national security setup in time of peace." The
military analyst, George Fielding Eliot, said it was a "necessity of survival" for the U.S. to
"provide itself with this means of getting at the facts and judging the trends of events."
Another military columnist, Hanson Baldwin, hailed Truman's 'act as one of "the most
important basic developments in the national defense picture since the end of the war."
Time magazine noted indelicately that the President had "put the U.S. in the business of
international espionage"; while the bulk of the work of the new organization was concerned
with "vast, non-secret facts," observed Time, "the U.S. is also going to join, after all these
years, in the game of spying on the neighbors. Harry Truman did not say so, but that is the
idea." Nor did the idea escape the rest of the country; on March 21 the Gallup pollsters
reported that seventy-seven percent of those queried thought Congress "should provide
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money to maintain a large force of secret agents who would operate throughout the world to
keep us informed of what other nations are doing." A lonely dissenter, in the days when the
Russian atomic espionage case was breaking in Canada, was Henry Wallace, then Secretary
of Commerce, who characterized as "hellish" the system of secret agents to gather military
information and urged its replacement by open above-board dealings in international
affairs."
Time further observed that Truman's letter had also "ended, for a while at least, a bit-
ter, home-grown feud." The magazine recalled that the three major departments had agreed
on the need for espionage and better coordination of intelligence but disagreed on the means.
The fight, said Time, centered around "mild, determined" General Donovan who had set
things in motion early in 1941. Skipping quickly from 1941 to 1944, Time said Donovan had
proposed an overall information agency, provided with funds by Congress, advised by the
departments of State, War, and Navy but not answerable to them, and headed by an overall
director reporting directly to the President. The departments were "dead set against the kind
of independence which Donovan proposed," and the opposition became "so bitter that
someone even slipped his memorandum to the Patterson-McCormick press," which "howled"
about "a `spy director,' " a U.S. gestapo, somehow under the control of the sister of Justice
Frankfurter. Time noted that "Donovan had been careful to say that the agency should have
no police power either at home or abroad. But the furor had its effect. In the end Donovan's
idea of an independent agency went down the drain." 82
Time reported that Donovan, back in Manhattan practicing law, "did not mourn too
loudly the kicking around his original plan had got. Any kind of intelligence coordinating
agency, he argued, was a realistic step in a confused and dangerous world," 83 In April, how-
ever, Donovan went public. He denounced the NIA as "a good debating society but a poor
administer]tng instrument." His principal objection, he said, was the board's divided
authority and responsibility; it was "too open to the twisting and interpreting of informa-
tion" by the three secretaries. On another occasion he ridiculed the subordination of the DCI
to "a committee" of secretaries who had "their own jobs to do, running their own
departments." Intelligence, he said, was "an all-time job," which ought to be independent of
the people it serves so that it was not "slanted or distorted" by the views of the people direct-
ing operations. He also denounced the system whereby the DCI was dependent on the
departments for his funds, his facilities, and his personnel. "To be effective," he maintained,
"an intelligence agency should be on a basis of equality with other agencies and responsible
to the same ultimate authority as they are." 84
That, of course, was the status which Donovan had always sought for intelligence and
which was considerably more substantial than the recognition Truman had accorded it on
January 22: a part-time committee and a DCI running an organization of borrowed people,
funds, and facilities.
On that January day President Truman had thought he had disposed of the intelligence
problem. He thought implementation of his order was all that lay ahead. He had yet to rec-
oncile himself to the drive within his own government to establish an independent, unified
Central Intelligence Agency.
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Chapter XV
PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS
Between Roosevelt and Truman there was this difference in their handling of the
intelligence problem: when FDR set up COI, he, unlike Truman when the latter established
the NIA and CIG, knew what he was doing.
Roosevelt, readying for the worst in 1941, was prepared to entertain almost any
suggestion from Donovan for the conduct of operations in intelligence and political warfare;
for FDR COI was an open-ended proposition. Truman, by contrast, was quite prepared to let
the three secretaries run their intelligence departments as they saw fit, provided their
collaboration gave him what little he wanted from them, namely, a daily summary of
important information. Beyond this personal service he had no interest in the system; for him
it was ordained to be, when established, a closed book. How unrealistic was his expectation
became evident in the short administration of his first Director of Central Intelligence, his
new friend Rear Adm. Sidney W. Souers.
1. THE SOUERS ADMINISTRATION
Souers was in a markedly different situation than was Colonel Donovan, as each set
about the job of establishing an intelligence organization. Donovan was implementing his
own idea, was subordinate only to the President, had money to hire people, rent space, buy
equipment., and finance operations, and was the master in his own house. Souers served
others' ideas, had several bosses, had neither money nor people of his own, and literally had
no "house," or organization, of his own in which to be master. Donovan, though eager to get
into service with troops when the opportunity presented itself, was nevertheless an eager
activator who was prepared to pick up any job left lying around, and who feared not to shake
up anybody or any department when the situation warranted it. Souers, impatient to get
back to business in St. Louis, aimed to carry out instructions and to get along with the
military and civilian brass who were close at hand. Souers trod lightly.
Above him as DCI was an impressive constellation, the National Intelligence Authority
consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy-Byrnes, Patterson, and Forrestal-
and the personal repesentative of the President, Fleet Admiral Leahy. The secretaries had
contact with the President on departmental matters, and Leahy was Truman's voice on
intelligence. The NIA bossed Souers, even as he sat among them as a nonvoting member.
During his four and a half months as DCI, they met three times as the NIA and issued him
three directives. They were in charge; he had no independent authority.
Beside him was the less prestigious but nonetheless potent Intelligence Advisory Board
(IAB). Its regular members were the heads of the four departmental intelligence services of
State, War, Navy, and the Air Forces. Initially these four were: State's Colonel
McCormack, Army's new replacement for Bissell as G-2, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg,
ONI's Rear Adm. Inglis, Souers's recent boss, and A-2's Brig. Gen. George C. McDonald.
On occasion, when invited by the DCI because of the subject matter, the FBI chief or his
representative joined the IAB meeting. These service chiefs clearly had an immediate and
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Though anxious to return to St. Louis, Rear Adrri. Sidney W. Souers served as the country's first
Director of Central Intelligence, Jan. 23 to June 10, 1946.
Central Intelligence Agency
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concrete stake in the activities of the new intelligence setup. Ostensibly an advisory body,
they were treated by Souers as a coequal partner in the new business. As the NIA gave
Souers his directives, the IAB gave him his people, money, and facilities. The board met five
times while Souers was DCI; they had no difficulty with him.
Souers's position among all these powerful people was not enviable. The President,
having picked him for the job, wanted his daily bulletin. The NIA members, having hassled
over the character and function of the new setup, wanted it to function quickly and
smoothly. The IAB members, watching their vested interests, had their individual and
collective views on what the DCI and the CIG should or should not do. Thus directed and
watched, Souers-technically assigned to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy-had to
go hat in hand, as practically his first official act, to the departmental chiefs for the loan on
January 25, 1946, of two persons each to help him get started.'
Among the first to come on board were Colonel Montague, who had moved from G-2
to State, and Col. James S. Lay, Jr., who had also gone to State from his position as sec-
retary to the JIC. More than the other six who joined Souers, Montague and Lay were
familiar with the long struggle over the Donovan plan, the evolution of the JCS plan, and
the struggle between McCormack and the military, and they were, therefore, called upon to
write for Souers the first two directives which the NIA issued to him as the basic guidelines
for the construction and operation of the new CIG. These directives, discussed in the first
NIA and IAB meetings in the first week of February, were officially promulgated on
February 8, 1946.2
The first directive underscored the triumph registered by Harold Smith and Colonel
McCormack in the drafting of Truman's letter of January 22. Whereas that instrument had
declared that persons assigned by the departments should "collectively form a Central
Intelligence Group," the new document specified that the CIG should be "considered,
organized and operated as a cooperative interdepartmental activity, with adequate and
equitable participation" by State, War, Navy, and the Air Forces. CIG was clearly no
independent; agency; it was not even a group; it was "a cooperative interdepartmental
activity" which was managed by the DCI but staffed with departmental people, financed
with departmental funds, and occupied departmental facilities. The remainder of the
directive, laying out the policies and procedures governing the CIG, specified the close
relationship between the DCI and the IAB in the organization and operation of the CIG.'
The second directive, constituting and activating CIG, laid out the main offices,
specified two pressing tasks, and provided initial authorization for personnel. Since the new
organization had been established to perform basically three functions-coordination,
production, and operations-it was now given a separate office for each of those functions
(Figure 11). Hence, there was a Central Reports Staff (CRS) to produce "strategic and
national policy intelligence," a Central Planning Staff (CPS) to plan for the coordination of
intelligence activities, and a Central Intelligence Services (CIS) to be "such operating
agencies" as the Authority might later establish.'
The first task was the "producton of daily summaries containing factual statements of
the significant developments in the field of intelligence and operations related to the national
security and to foreign events for the use of the President, the members of this Authority,"
and for ten other high military officials and Colonel McCormack as Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State. Spelling out this task had occasioned the first disagreement in the NIA.
Secretary of State Byrnes, jealously guarding State's role as the reporter of foreign affairs to
the President, had held up issuance of the directive until he could personally get assurance
from Truman that he only wanted "factual statements" from the CIG. The second task was
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"a survey of existing facilities for collection of foreign intelligence information, and
submission of appropriate recommendations," in other words, advice on what to do with the
Strategic Services Unit.'
As for personnel, the four departments were called upon to make 165 persons available
to Souers: fourty-three from State, seventy-nine from the Army (including twelve from the
Air Forces), and forty-three from the Navy. Of this total sixty-one were assigned to CRS,
forty to CPS, and the remainder to an Administrative Section; CIS had no authorization.
Ten days later Admiral Souers announced his first interim appointments; these included
three assistant directors, one for each of his three principal offices: Ludwell L. Montague,
now "Mr. Montague," headed the Reports Staff; Capt. W. B. Goggins, USN, took over the
Planning Staff; and Brig. Gen. Louis J. Fortier headed "Operational Services," a new name
for the "Central Intelligence Services." 6 Souers and his new staff had offices in what was
then known as the "New War Department Building," at Twenty-first and Virginia avenues,
but is now know as "New State." CIG-with directives, a structure, people, and tasks-was
in business.
The first order of business was the production of a daily summary for the President.
Truman wanted Souers, so the latter understood him, "to go through the dispatch traffic and
make a digest of significant developments." Admiral Leahy said the President wanted "a
single summary" each day of the significant information available to State, War, and Navy.
All the President wanted from CIG, wrote Montague, whose CRS had this producton job,
was "a single, all-sufficient daily summary of current information." Byrnes made sure it
contained no comment or interpretation.'
The first issue of the "Daily Summary" appeared on February 13, five days after the
activation of CIG. Truman wanted it at 8:00 a.m., but Montague claimed to have persuaded
Souers to persuade the President to receive it at noon on the ground that a midday paper,
reporting on the Eastern Hemisphere, carried the day's news, not that of the day before; in
July, however, Arthur Krock reported in the New York Times that Truman received his bul-
letin "at eight fifteen every weekday morning." B
On that occasion Krock praised the new system-with its "integrated," "clarified," and
"correlate[d]" secret information-as much better than anything available to earlier
presidents, including Roosevelt. Less impressed than Krock was White House staffer George
Elsey who wrote of Krock's column:
This is of course a very great exaggeration. The morning summary is not an
`evaluated' job at all; it is just a synopsis of Army, Navy, and State dispatches.
This gives too much credit to the C.I.G.'s work-and ignores the fact that the
President was receiving the same quantity and the same type of info[rmation]
before the CIG from his Map Room and the Sec[retary] of State.'
Even so, Truman years later was happy with "the new intelligence arrangement" and
his "daily digest" of foreign information. "Here, at last," he wrote with reference to this
daily publication and to information received from State, Army, and Navy, "a coordinated
method had been worked out, and a practical way had been found for keeping the President
informed as to what was known and what was going on." 10
After the daily bulletin came a "Weekly Summary." Montague claimed to have
launched it as a circumvention of the prohibition against interpretation in the daily report.
On March 26 Souers informed the IAB that his Reports Staff had worked up several
practice issues but that he needed two or three seasoned intelligence officers with specialized
experience to work on the publication. On June 7, a few days before he resigned as DCI,
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Sowers circulated copies of a trial issue. Its appearance alarmed the new IAB member from
State, the former chief of R & A of OSS, Dr. Langer, who had replaced McCormack. Now
guarding State's territory, Langer doubted whether CIG was as well qualified as the
departments to write interpretative articles and whether CIG had anything to add to either
the daily summary or what other departments had produced."
Souers and Montague sought to assure Langer of their honest endeavor to put events
"into perspective" without. infringing upon departmental responsibilities. General Van-
denberg thought that CIG could safely proceed with its weekly but that State might check it
carefully for any distortion of views. Lacking support from other IAB members, who thought
"a good beginning" had been made, Langer yielded.' The first issue appeared June 14, four
days after Sowers left his post. The weekly was delivered to the White House at noon on
Saturdays so it could go aboard the Mayflower for Truman's weekend cruise. Arthur Krock
liked the weekly as much is the daily. Montague, however, thought the weekly
"undistinguished," and said it had no copy fit to print and was produced by incompetent
analysts; though its founder, lie sought unsuccessfully to abolish it."
For both him and Admiral Souers the real job in the production of national intelligence
was the writing of estimates of the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries as they
affected the national security of the United States. For Montague, who had had considerable
experience with JIC estimates, that was the professional job. For Souers it was CIG's
"primary function." '? Unfortunately CIG had too few people to do the job. Hence, in
Souers's term of office no national estimates were produced.
Nor was anything accomplished, though the subject was raised, on another aspect of
the production job, namely, research and analysis. The subject was not raised, however, by
Souers, who, knowing and sharing the military's interest in the reunification in CIG of the
OSS elements of R & A and SSU, had an interest in doing so. It was raised rather by the
member, Colonel McCormack, who had no such interest because he had no desire to yield
his R & A toanybody-CIG or the departmental desks in State. McCormack, however, had
a problem, and he needed help.
A House Appropriations subcommittee had just completely wiped out his fiscal 1947
budget request for $4,150,136, and the action seemed likely to be supported by the full
committee. Such a cut not only endangered McCormack's Office of Research and
Intelligence but also State's contribution to the support of CIG-$330,000. Hence,
McCormack wanted the IAB to ask the NIA to issue a statement in support of State's
budget. Under questioning McCormack admitted-what everyone knew-that "there was
some difference of opinion within the Department ... as to the organization and even the
need for intelligence activities"in State. That. admission provided an opening for several to
suggest the transferal of R & A to CIG. The suggestion, made several times, brought no
other rejoinder from McCormack than the further admission of belief that Secretary Byrnes
had "not yet formulated a definite opinion" as to the future of intelligence in State. While
not unsympathetic, the IAB felt able to do no more than recommend that Souers take up
with Byrnes both the budget matter and the possible transfer of R & A.15
It was too late, however; on that very day, April 8, the full committee axed
McCormack's budget That action, reflecting congressional involvement with both
McCormack's battle with State's desk officers and with the issue of the security of personnel
in State, was not lost upon Byrnes, who now had no trouble making up his mind about the
future of State's intelligence. On April 22 the axe fell on ORI; its R & A people were turned
over to the geographic offices, and the rump was reconstituted as the "Office of Intelligence
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Coordination and Liaison (OCL)"-from IRIS to ORI to OCL in six hard months.
collapsthat e
Naturally McCormack resigned, within twenty-four hours." The
to ened the way
, who
CIG to develop its own research and analysis group, but s
had a real zest for the job.
So much for CIG's performance under Souers in the field of production. While he had
termed the writing of estimates as the group's "primary function," the matter of coordina-
tion had historically been the major consideration of those who had sought improvement in
the government's management of its intelligence activities. Not surprisingly then, Souers had
begun receiving, four days after activation of CIG, "numerous suggestions or recommenda-
tions for studies leading to the effective coordination of Federal intelligence activities." Also,
CIG had initiated some studies on its own. All these studies, reported Souers to the IAB,
dealt with problems which were now only partially solved, or were badly served by existent
machinery, or now needed new solutions in light of new circumstances."
Souers could have categorized his problems more realistically-and candidly-as those the for which coordination was or was not sought by the various IABmembers.
To the
uninvolved the word "coordination" connoted rationality, efficiency, and necessity.
potential objects of coordination, however, to the intelligence departments with their vested
interests-responsibilities, tasks, budgets, personnel, operations-the word raised the specter
of tyranny. To them, coordinator came too close to controller. They feared the rise of any
outside superior who could, if he wished, even abolish their organization. Consequently,
when they sought coordination, they sought not dictation of their structure or function but
assistance with their problems.
Their problems were considerable. Because of the wartime development and expansion
of intelligence they-individually and/or collectively-had acquired needs, functions, and
resources which were not essential to their basic missions but which needed somehow to be
serviced, performed, or utilized. There was a multitude of such war-born problems, and the
departments were quite eager to get assistance and to shift burdens. These they readily
sought to turn over to CIG or through CIG to someone else. Hence, the problems that went
early to CIG were either unavoidable ones, like the fate of SSU, or such noninflammatory
ones as the disposition of State's photographic intelligence file.
Among the twenty-five studies listed by Souers as underway in CIG the two most
noteworthy related to SSU and FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service), both of which
fell under the rubric of "operational services." Other studies, in various stages, were
concerned with the acquisition of foreign publications, disposition of files of the U.S.
Strategic Bombing Survey, coverage of the foreign language press in the United States,
coordination of geographical and related intelligence, utilization of private research in the
social sciences, and the exploitation of American business concerns as sources of foreign
intelligence.' The last occasioned some slight difficulty in August when the FBI momentar-
ily considered it a possible violation of the bar against any "investigations" by CIG in the
United States. When Hoover was assured the exploitation had nothing to do with subversive
groups of interest to the FBI but only concerned overt collection from Americans with
foreign business interests, he withdrew his objections." As coordinator, Souers raised no
hackles.
So much for coordination. While G-2 had strongly opposed any coordinating agency
also engaging in operations, especially clandestine collection, CIG had been authorized by
the President to "perform ... services of common concern." Despite G-2's objections, the
JCS and the military secretaries had always assumed that CIG would conduct espionage as
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well as perform many other less controversial "services of common concern." Espionage and
one of these noncontroversial tasks, namely, foreign broadcasting, were the two most
pressing problems confronting CIG.
What to do with SSU? Absorb it into G-2, liquidate it, or transfer it to CIG? The first
alternative had been ruled out by the highest authorities as not serving the interests of the
government as a whole. The second was considered contrary to the best interests of the
United States in a world in which a nuclear Pearl Harbor loomed possible. The third was the
only viable course of action.20 Surveying the situation, called for in NIA Directive No. 1, was
actually ordered by CIG's first directive., which was issued February 19. It established a
survey group under the leadership of General Fortier, who just the day before had been
named head of CIE's Operational Services,.' On the basis of that survey the NIA on April 2
ordered Souers as DCI to take over the direction and disposition of SSU. Because of the
inherent limitations of CIG as a "cooperative interdepartmental activity" with no powers,
people, money, or facilities of its own, Souers had to continue to run SSU as a War
Department operation. General Magruder, never happy with the post-OSS miseries of his
intelligence directorate, took the change of events as the occasion to retire; he was replaced
by Col. William W. Quinn on April 2.22 CIG, with a grasp on centralized espionage and
counterespionage, tackled the challenging problem of transforming an old security
organization into a new one. The problem at least had a solution, although Souers admitted
it was "only a stop-gap measure." 23
A similar solution was necessarily applied to the pressing problem of what to do with
HIS. The monitoring of foreign broadcasts had been initiated in 1939 with the
establishment of the Princeton Listening Center as a pioneer research project for the study
of Axis radio propaganda. The Center was talken over in 1941 and greatly expanded by the
Federal Communications Commission, which operated it throughout the war.24
At war's end the FCC was asked by the War Department not to liquidate the FBi1S but
rather to turn it over to the department pending action by State, where it seemed to the
military to belong. Transfer was effected December 30, 1945. In February General
Vandenberg, representing the War Department, requested Admiral Souers to assume
responsibility for advising the NIA on the proper disposition of the service. The War
Department reasoned that in peacetime the FBIS
political, economic, and social in character and, heprod wou be ess and more
nce,cwoulddinterest other departments
more than itself. The military thought State, with an obvious interest, should operate it or
CIG should take it over as a service of common concern.2.5
In the difficult spring of 1946, State, however interested it was in FBIS, was in no
position to take on a new intelligence burden. CIG was interested, but Souers had to stress--
what everyone knew--that CIG was not an independent agency and was not empowered to
sign contracts, and that it could not accept a transfer of funds from the War Department for
direct administration of FBIS because CltGG was not an authorized disbursing agency.
Consequently Souers"s solution was continued administration-liquidation and reorgani-
zation-by the War Department under, however, direction from the DCI. This provisional
solution was approved by the NIA on July 8.26
When Souers wrote his ;progress report on June 7, and resigned June 10, he could
report production of a daily bulletin, the imminent appearance of a weekly, initiation of a
score of studies, and interim solutions to two pressing problems; he could also report of
course that CIG had been organized. It was not an impressive record, but the time had been
short, the tasks many and challenging, the resources few, and the problems fundamental.
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Souers had been in office only 107 days. Of the 165 people assigned to him he had on
board less than half, only seventy-one; by any standard of comparison even 165 employees-
had he had them all-were few indeed; CIG as "a cooperative interdepartmental activity"
was dwarfed by G-2, ONI, SSU, and ORI; the FBIS had 274 people. More fundamental,
perhaps, were the administrative, budgetary, and legal difficulties which, as he reported, p "presented real problems." First, CIG had not obtained necessary not been ndb ee s hrl,
because departmental budgets had been cut. Second, CIG had to e
personnel directly from civilian life and had been entangled in "complications" in obtaining
people from the departments. Third, without appropriate legislation CIG had not been able
to negotiate contracts, such as were required for the monitoring of foreign broadcasts.27
Souers recommended that the NIA and CIG "obtain enabling legislation and an
independent budget as soon as possible, either as part of a new national defense organization
or as a separate agency." These were essential to the conduct of centralized operations and
to the development, support, coordination, and direction of "an adequate Federal intelligence
program for the national security." Experience had confirmed what Donovan had been the
first to proclaim, namely, that the intelligence task required a central agency with
independent powers.
Three days after issuing his report Souers took leave of the IAB with the usual remarks
of farewell. In reply, the new DCI, General Vandenberg, uttered the commonplace "hope
that the work of Central Intelligence should be maintained at the standard set by Admiral
Souers." 29 Even as he uttered the words Vandenberg knew-and perhaps the others did
set standard or establish and opwas to
than Souers the
also , however much he ru anh ent rely different CIG might
2. VANDENBERG'S TRANSFORMATION OF CIG
Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg was one of World War II's "flyboys." At 47 he
o and
boyish-looking, handsome, popularly known as "Van," nicknamed "Spark Plug,"
definitely on the way up the Air Forces ladder. A West Point graduate, he had had much
flying experience in the interwar period, and during the war he had held many top staff and
command positions. He had been Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force in Europe in
1944, and in July 1945 had been appointed Assistant Chief of Air Staff of AAF
Headquarters. In January 1946 he replaced Bissell as the Army intelligence chief.
Vandenberg had been much decorated for staff and operational work in the air
campaigns over North Africa, Sicily, and France. He was known for his skill in developing
"good teamwork" in the various interagency assignments he had been given." He was known
for his "boldness, enthusiasm and charm and his airman's broad view of the world." As
s
successor to Souers, it was said, he would need all these attributes "to make a a anpuzzle ythings some
as yet rootless organization," which was "administratively . . ? 32
of the international puzzles it [was] supposed to unscramble." Souers apparently had much to do with Vandenberg's selection as the second DCI.
Looking among the members of the IAB he considered Vandenberg a better selection than
Inglis, not for any personal reason, but because he was the nephew of the powerful Republican
foreign affairs chieftain, Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg, whose support for eventual legislation to
establish CIG was desired. At the same time, however, it must be pointed out that a general,
not another admiral, seemed next in line. Vandenberg, aspiring to become chief of staff of the
prospectively independent Air Force, had no interest in the DCI job but was persuaded to take
it on as a way of making himself better known to the President and the prospective secretary
of a unified defense organization, Navy Secretary Forrestal.33
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Boyish-looking Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg was the second Director of Central Intelligence,
June 10, 1946 to May 1, 1947.
Central Intelligence Agency
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As IAB member Vandenberg was conversant with both the progress and the problems had the
fold
outlined by Souers in his report of June 7. As reorganizing it, andngettinglit andenberghed legislativelthree-
as an
intention of enlarging CIG,
independent agency. He had no intention of continuing the organization as a small
"cooperative interdepartmental activity" in which he and the IAB were co-partners.
Nor did he lose time in inaugurating his new regime. He who had arrived in CIG with
"a reputation as a chopper of dead wood" brought his own people with him. Unlike Souers e
enberg
departments
four
who had had borrow
om the Pentagonra staff of Army co onelstheadedtbyeCol. Edwin K
brought with him
Wright. Seven years later, wrote an historian of the period, "CIA still echoed with talk of
the colonels who arrived with General Vandenberg and took over from others who for one
reason or another did not measure up to his standards.
These colonels, recalled Ludwell Montague, who was writing from personal experience,
immediately "closeted themselves in a back room and, without consulting anyone, drew up
plans for a. CIA that would be self-sufficient in every aspect of intelligence activity." They
consulted, said Montague, no one who [like himself] had been "through the debates of ` 1944
d
46." When their goal had been achieved, continued Montague,
discover a wasteful duplication of effort and would coordinate the departmental agencies
right out of existence." Montague even claimed that Vandenberg himself later told him that
"this was his purpose"; Montague wondered "whether Donovan had been coaching him, or
whether it was his own idea." Thus, continued Montague, "CIA would become the single
intelligence service" that he and his military colleagues on the JIS had "warned against" in
JIC 239/2.35
Whatever Vandenberg's, as well as Donovan's, ultimate goal was,36 Vandenberg and his
colonels, ten days after he took office, produced a draft NIA directive designed greatly to
enhance his organization and his power. The draft was a proposed redefinition of the DCI's
second directive stated in President's letter of January 22 and then
functions which had first
restated in the NIA's
Vandenberg's proposal authorized him as DCI to undertake any research and analysis
which he thought required to produce the necessary strategic and national policy inal
research intelligence. His redefinition, wat orienting CIG to considerable ould have included the centra izationgin CIG oft e
instead d of of just digesting others' cables,
"existing [R & A] organizations of the State, War and Navy Departments, including their
funds, personnel and facilities. . . .37 The proposal produced "turmoil" in the IAB.11
The "turmoil," for which Vandenberg expressed regret at the next IAB meeting, on June
28, 1946, was especially strong in State where Dr. Langer spotted possible infringement upon
the responsibilities of State and its research divisions. He wanted, he said, to make CIG "a
real going concern," but he thought the language of Vandenberg's redefinition was "rather
loose in places and would subsequently give rise to suspicions." He felt it went beyond the
authorization in the President's letter of January 22. He doubted the necessity for CIG to
specifically analysis." If CIG departments o take upltthee workld not do the job,
undertake "extensive research
he thought, they could
Vandenberg backed off: he was not trying to usurp anyone's functions; he only wanted
to get the people necessary to help the three departments do their job; he wanted to find out
where their work stopped, where there were gaps and deficiencies, where he could help; he L
eahy "wanted only enough experts wto find ith whom he had discussed histconc pitaag red w t dhim~
Secretaries of War and Navy,
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Finally, after much discussion he and Langer agreed on "finding the holes." They agreed on
CIG's undertaking such research and analysis as were necessary to determine which
intelligence functions were being inadequately performed or not all.
basis of those determinations the DCI, with the approval the per to me On the
members of the IAB, could then centralize such R & A as could be better performed
centrally." Though forced to retreat, Vandenberg had won enough of a victory to "augment"
CIG and undertake some R & A. It was a good beginning.
Vandenberg's proposed redefinition also touched his function as coordinator. In the
President's letter he had been authorized only to "plan for the coordination" of departmental
activities and to "recommend" to the NIA needed policies and objectives. No provision was
made, he said, for an executive agent responsible for coordinating and supervising such
activities so as to ensure implementation of agreed upon policies and objectives. He,
therefore, now proposed that he be "directed to act as the executive agent" of the NIA in
coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security. This
too was reworded: the JAB eliminated "executive" so that the DCI was only the "agent" of
the NIA; but the directive, when finally issued as NIA No. 5 on July 8, only decreed that
the DCI would "act for this Authority" in coordinating foreign intelligence activities. The
diminution clearly reflected the President"s view, as expressed by Admiral Leahy, that
"agent" implied unwarranted freedom for the DCI, whereas Truman held the three
secretaries as "primarily responsible for coordination of intelligence activities."" Even so,
Vandenberg now had authority to "act"' as well as plan and recommend.
The new directive, an important restatement of the original directive and of the
President's letter, also specifically authorized the DCI to conduct two services of common
concern, namely, the monitoring of foreign broadcasts and the conduct of espionage and
counterespionage abroad. The first enabled him to take over the FBIS, and the second gave
him the SSU and the FBI's SIS. Since neither the President's letter nor the original
directive had used such words :is "espionage" and "counterespionage," this new directive
became the first official American document specifically authorizing such activities in
peacetime. The language of the authorization-"all organized Federal espionage and
counterespionage" abroad. was designed to safeguard both domestic FBI operations and
"incidental operations" run by the military services for their own purposes."
With this new directive in hand Vandenberg on July 17 aired his plans and problems at
his first official meeting with the NIA. He told them lie had three problems: money, the
authority to spend it, and the authority to hire and fire; and the only solution was legislation
establishing CIG as an agency. Secretaries Burnes and Patterson showed understanding of his
problems but gave a cool reception to his solution. Byrnes mistakenly thought the NIA had
been specifically designed to obviate the need for an independent budget. Patterson, agreeing,
and forgetting that he had once favored an independent budget, said the NIA had been
"designed to conceal, for security reasons, the amount of money being spent on central
intelligence." Patterson opposed a separate budget lest it "expose ... intelligence operations."
Byrnes thought they "could riot afford to make such disclosures in this country." 43
More receptive than these two was Admiral Leahy who said he had always understood
that CIG would "eventually broaden its scope" and who was now "about convinced" that. it
should try to obtain its own appropriations. He reported, however, that President Truman
thought it inadvisable to try in the present Congress to obtain legislation giving an
independent budget and status to CIG; Truman thought they might ready a draft for
submission to the next Congress, in 1947. Truman, who had thus made a shift of policy,
thought in the meantime Vandenberg should be given as much assistance as possible."'
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Byrnes and Patterson led the search for solutions. Patterson thought Vandenberg's
administrative problems could be worked out under existing arrangements. Byrnes thought
the problem was finding a way for the departments to give CIG the money it needed. Van-
denberg objected that present arrangements meant that too many people in too many
departments knew too much about CIG personnel. Leahy contributed the suggestion that
security of personnel actions could be preserved if each department gave CIG the money it
needed, but Vandenberg objected that this procedure still required defending three separate
appropriations acts before Congress. Even with funds from the departments, he pointed out,
it would require disbursing and authenticating officers in all three departments, plus the nec-
essary accounting organization in CIG-four fiscal operations, he remarked, where one
should suffice. More fundamental was the problem of actually getting the money from the
departments; for instance, State had only given $178,000 of the $330,000 requested for the
NIA. So it went: suggestion and objection. It was finally agreed that Byrnes would take up
the problem with the Bureau of the Budget in the hope of getting at least an interim
solution.45
By this time General Vandenberg had enlightened the NIA on how he was reorganiz-
ing CIG and how he planned to "augment" it. He had $12,000,000 but needed another
$10,000,000. CIG, he said, had undertaken certain new functions and was expanding some
existing ones; he, who had inherited an organization with an authorized strength of 165, now
proposed to have about 1,900 people in secret intelligence and a total of nearly 3,000 by the
end of the fiscal year. Langer was "impressed with the imposing size of the proposed
organization." Vandenberg said there was "a clear need for additional appropriations for
intelligence in view of changing conditions." During the war, he said, much information was
handed to American intelligence agencies "on a silver platter"; to get the same kind of
information now meant having "intelligence agents all over the world." Patterson agreed.46
Vandenberg brought out a new chart (Figure 12) to show how he had reorganized CIG.
The original tripartite organization had now become quadripartite with a few more boxes in
the superstructure. The Central Planning Staff, not working out, was abolished. The Central
Reports Staff, to be greatly enlarged, was renamed the Office of Research and Evaluation
(ORE), but was soon renamed again, at the request of State, the Office of Reports and Es-
timates, still ORE.47 Operational Services, growing big with SSU and FBIS, was reorganized
as the Office of Special Operations (OSO). The Office of Collection (OC) and the Office of
Dissemination (OD) were new creations.
In the superstructure the only noteworthy innovation was the "Interdepartmental
Coordination and Planning Staff (ICAPS)," which, said Vandenberg, was on "a skeleton
basis" because of the need for additional personnel.48 ICAPS was designed to improve
Vandenberg's dealings with the IAB, which had been antagonized by the DCI's abrupt
break with Souers's concept of CIG as a small "cooperative interdepartmental activity." The
relationship between the DCI and the departmental intelligence chiefs, however, remained a
problem-institutional as well as personal-after Vandenberg departed from CIG, and even
after CIA was established.49
Vandenberg, reporting on CIG's activities, said he was taking over the FBIS and "all
clandestine foreign intelligence activities." These, on which he did not elaborate, included
not only SSU but also two other activities which had troubled Donovan and were now
troubling Vandenberg. The first was a G-2 clandestine activity, the "Frenchy" Grombach
unit, which was begun in 1942 during General Strong's tenure as G-2, and which was
operated, in Donovan's opinion, in violation of the OSS charter for clandestine activities
abroad.50 The unit's operators stoutly resisted CIG's takeover and took their case to the press
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and the Congress in the spring of 1947. The second activity was the FBI's Latin American vetousness which
proved
HIS, which Hoover to make jealously d w d guarded activity. Donovan's
takeover of these two activitieand
to be had hoped
li be troublesome colonels, was talked about H in CIA, and apparently in the FBI also, for
like Vandenberg 's s cyears afterwards.51 mero s
Comm oveHer t d ua
Vandenberg also reported that he was ~i W ar ~ and requests"
functions currently being performed by State
exchange security.
Dand ciphers epartment to the their
War codes
A of
r that CIG warcentralize
the 1Z concern handling of the of
Another example e
information with the British.52
Vandenberg was clearly in a hurry to make CIG, as he said, "an effective and efficient
organization." His "greatest interest," he said, "was in getting C.I.G. into operation by
whatever means possible. He felt that time was of the essence during this critical period." 53
That he meant what he said was already clear to both the NIA and the IAB, but it was
dramatically demonstrated just a week later when CIG published its first national estimate.
It had been requested by President Truman on Friday uly morning, Julye 19f 1946, and
ovee
wanted it delivered to him at noon on Tuesday, 23. concern
iet
unexpectedly strange Soviet behavior, Truman wanted an estimate of world-wide Sov
the
capabilities and intentions. The requirement was given to Montague, wh spent
drafting,
weekend-till 11:00 p.m. on Saturday and 3:00 a.m. on Monday-reading,
consulting, and coordinating at the working level. Montague delivered his paper to an
"immensely pleased" Vandenberg, who, in turn, delivered it-"Soviet Foreign and Military
Policy" (ORE-1) to the President on schedule.54 There was, however, a fly in the ointment.
Vandenberg had failed-he later alleged lack of time-to obtain the personal
concurence of each member of the IAB. The failure was noted by Admiral Inglis, who was
not prepared to let it become a precedent. The issue, which involved months of debate with
Vandenberg, and then with his successor, was the extent and character of departmental
participation in the DCI's production of national estimates. The issue was coeval with the
relationship between a central agency and the departmental services. Donovan had sought in
vain to get. assigned to OSS enough military experts to work with his own R &.oA expg tsI to
produce the best intelligence possible. In the present controversy, Inglis,
practice, wanted a system of voting by the IAB's members. He and Vandenberg finally com-
promised on a system of departmental representatives assigned to CIG, but the system was
never effectively implemented." The issue was not finally resolved until 1950 when CIA,
under Gen. Walter Bedell Smith as DCI, established the Office of National Estimates.
Vandenberg's ORE-1, coming on top of his colonels, his expansionism, and redefinition
activity" nto a doubt that he intended to transform the small "cooperative
large, vigorous, independent central intelligence agency.interdepart-
mental Forthis he
needed legislation.
3. LEGISLATIVE ROUTES
Citing the need for enabling legislation, Admiral Souers had stated in his progress
report that it could be obtained "either as part of a new national defense organization or as
a separate agency." Of the two possibilities the former was more real than the latter, and
because the problem military eInelligence had become, as Truman saidninlhis State of
placed d it in a subordinate Positon
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the Union message in January 1946, "part of our regular government establishment" but
that "part" had not been clearly defined as military or civilian. Intelligence had not been
sufficiently distinguished from military and naval intelligence to be handled on its merits.
Intelligence, in the sense of information about one's foes, was as old as personal and
group competition and conflict. Historically, rulers had often sought not only to deny to
others information about themselves, their lands, and their peoples but had also sought by
overt and clandestine means to obtain such information about their domestic and foreign
foes. Circumspection was the watchword in the withholding or acquisition of foreign
information.
The practitioners and architects of European diplomacy, beginning with the Italian
Renaissance states, wrestled with the twin problems of withholding and acquiring
information, in the context of a notably vital interstatal life. So numerous were those states
and so voluminous and complicated was their business with one another that they were
constrained to make persistent efforts to devise open, honorable, and acceptable standards
procedures for the management of that business. Ambassadors were g
and radually
recognized as having legitimate functions of representation and reporting, but these officials
were carefully watched lest they stray into forbidden areas, which, of course, they very often
did. Where the ambassador's function, open and honorable, ended, that of the spy,
illegitimate and reprobated, began. In both cases, however, the totality of information
gathered was handled with the traditional circumspection. Monarchs did not proclaim that
the gathering of foreign intelligence was part of their regular government establishment.
The first break with this pretense took place not in the diplomatic but in the military
field. Diplomacy, a notably peace-oriented activity, presupposed a rational and honorable
intercourse which doctrinally disowned espionage, despite numerous and well-known actual
falls from grace. Warfare, taking over when diplomacy failed, legitimized the otherwise
illegitimate, so that international ethics and law judged as reprehensible peacetime but not
wartime espionage. This toehold on legitimacy was enlarged in the nineteenth century,
especially after the Franco-Prussian War, when the rise of modern warfare--standing
massed armies, technologically equipped and drawing on a nation's total resources--led all
states openly and avowedly---if not clandestinely--to gather intelligence on the armies and
navies of real and potential foes.. Hence there developed the "military attache," and the
departments of "military intelligence" and "`naval intelligence" became accepted features of
the regular government establishments of the world. "Intelligence" thus became a feature
and a function of the military; it had no such recognized association with the civilian side of
life and government.
Donovan was perhaps the first to break with this tradition. When he wrote his letter to
Secretary Knox, three months before COI was established, he clearly conceived of the need
for transcending the traditional narrow concept of military and naval intelligence as largely
restricted to armies and navies. Thus, he thought the advisory committee of the new service
ought to consist of representatives not just of War and Navy but also of State, Treasury,
Justice, and others. When in 1941 he wrote his memorandum on a "Service of Strategic
Information," he stressed the political, economic, and psychological, as well as military and
naval, character of modern warfare, and he called for the employment not only of military
and naval analysts but also of specialized researchers in science, technology, economics,
finance, and psychology. When C'OI was established, it was not Donovan but Roosevelt who,
thinking traditionally, suggested it be set up under Donovan as a major general. In
Donovan's thinking, however, C'OI was a civilian enterprise, though it presupposed and
utilized such as G-2 and ONI.
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report
Likewise, when in November d that it be established ~n the E forOfficea
peacetime agency, he clearly
the militrecognize that in wartime its ary and subject to JCS control, operations in
other-
President, had be civilian
the
coord coordinated with character.
military other-
weoon ad to aining civilian
wise he he saw it ht in peace and t the war as th foreigni telligencesthinstrument for at was pert nenttto the nat nal security
and military departments policies, and interests of the United States.
the military succeeded in getting
When his plan was rejected and the OSS abolished,
plan, plan endorsed the the NIA Secretary of was not totally mil taryb in y tcha acterr but recognized,
establishing dr ee NIState and
, the primacy of yspeet the weight o pressure
only beccau eeState was n unequal to State,
influence ested with the Bureu of the
military, a
Army and
role. ohe wy weight ly with
rlWith relatively strong military and naval military tary ratherpunderstandably assum d that
Navy officers successively heading CIG, s, w the organization, caive however confused its civilian or military title Admiral Souersuga eatosthath ect on of the
theirs. Indicative of the thinking was
Eberstadt report report which dealt with the postwar intelligence situation: "Military Intelligence."
Whatever the status of intelligence, the military, once they got behind the idea of an in-
Powers authorizion for it. The need
1941 at
dependent CIA, recognized the early need to tt War legislative
flowed and the Independent
floweinitially from the provisions of the First Offices Appropriation Act of 1945.56 Subsequently, those practical necessities detailed by
and to the powers tr of ac
Co central
Vandenberg the specific NIA accentuated tipti pointed
Congress ress o of a bill concerned with the character, func
agency, and that at was was the route which Vandenberg chose in the first month of his tenure as
DCI.
d already been suggested by Admiral
h
a
In the meantime, however, an alternative route
embarked upon by those who were primarily
and, in fact, had already been
cothe country's ordination withnthe
Souers aconcerned with much larger
an military of
militarry roblemof the reorganization r d
services. In that ersetives
Force, compared
limiting with
naval
mino side of govvernmhe Army andeNavy,aes ablish ng arseparateconsideration
proposals for merging had been aviation, and overs sal problemsloe f oscientif the c r search, m litary procurement, and rmil tary
with less con rtrains p
education and training. President, w it of th was felttbyr many the its NIA re e tabl hadbyalready been
could easily be handled as part of the larger national defense reorganization.
could by the
Back in 1943 efforts to merge G-2 and ONI were not the only and f ul but also had to
give way to consideration of a larger merger,
Actually this larger idea was also an old idea; the nation had commenced its military history
though it was really an army
under the Constitution with a unified Department of War,
of of the
affair inasmuch as a ndvwOtconsidered necessary. The arrtmentdepredations
Pir 98
in 17
Pirates, howeve owever, caused Co gre to establish a sepaat Dp
Since that time the two services had gone their independent ways.
Sad experience in the Spanish-American War brought about the e tablishrs ent idly n u1 sed
of the Joint Board. Faulty organization and lack of top support, pain replaced,
they meantime
World War I. , Its b British inspir d interwar St ff ins 19was 42 Inlessl
as we have seen, by the e
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numerous factors-economy, the rise of the airmen, the need for comprehensive administra-
tive reform in the executive branch--gave rise to considerable agitation for unification.
Between 1921 and 1945 over fifty bills and resolutions calling for unified organization had
been introduced into Congress." None of these had any effect, however, until November
1943 when Army Chief of Staff George Marshall broke with the Army's traditional anti-
unification policy and proposed to the JCS the creation for the postwar world of a single
Department of War---in broad principle a return to 1789.
Out of Marshall's proposal came the Richardson committee, a military board, which
spent a year-May 1944 to April 1945----researching and preparing a split recommendation
to the JCS. In turn the JCS could not reach agreement, and so in October 1945 they sent to
the President the Richardson report and their four sets of individual views!56 Meanwhile, the
unification idea had been taken up anew by Congress, by the Woodrum committee, that is,
the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy. It conducted hearings in April and
May 1944. It studied the Army's McNarney plan, which the Navy opposed, and in .rune re-
ported the time was not ripe for considering detailed legislation."
In May 1945 a Navy patron, Sen. David I. Walsh, Democrat of Massachusetts,
suggested to Forrestal that the Navy stop merely opposing Army and come up with a viable alternative. Walsh su g Y proposals for c a thorough
study of the problerrm. He introduced the idea that perhaps a that
h
"Council the y on nNationalDefens ,"
modeled after the British Committee of Imperial Defense, might offer a suitable alternative
to the Army's single department proposal. Taking readily to the idea, Forrestal commis-
sioned the former chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to
carry out the study. Given a staff of thirty persons, including Admiral Souers, Eberstadt
turned in his report on September 25. It called for a coordinate rather than a unified
organization of the armed services, and it thereby set the Navy in constructive opposition to
the Army. Of particular interest to this narrative is the support given by the Eberstadt
report to the idea of a "Council on National Defense," the germinal National Security
Council (NSC) of the National Security Act of 1947, and to the idea of a CIA, which the re-
port took over from the JCS and endorsed on its own.6'
In October when the Eberstadt report was published and when the JCS submitted the
Richardson committee report, Congress had once again taken up the issue. The Senate
Committee on Military Affairs began hearings on two unification bills, brought forth a new
proposal, the Collins plan, from the Army, and generally manifested sympathy for
unification. In December President Truman sent to Congress a lengthy special message
outlining his solution to the problem, and after a few incidental references to intelligence de-
clared that "the development of a coordinated, government-wide intelligence system is in
process.6" Of course at that particular moment the Pentagon and the State Department were
debating the McCormack plan.
In April 1946 the Senate Military Affairs Committee
the Thmas-lill-
Austin bill (S.2044). It called for an NSC, a single military departmentt,, a single secretary,
and a single chief of staff; it also called for four assistant secretaries of defense, one of whom
would handle intelligence, and for a CIA very much along the lines of the JCS plan (118 115)
rather than of the CIG, which was just getting started. The bill was supported by the Presi-
dent and the Army but opposed by the Navy. Hence, on July 17-the very day General
Vandenberg had his heart-to-heart discussion of his problems with the NIA--Truman
informed the Senate leadership that he was postponing further consideration of unification
legislation until the next Congress .12
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it was in this legislative context that Admiral Souers had seen the possibility of
obtaining enabling legislation and an independent budget for CIG either as part of a new
national orgization or as a
that his letter of January 22 had completed the processiof
many bigger ger things, ,
developing a "coordinated, government-wide intelligence system." Souers knew also that
Truman, following the lead of Harold Smith and Secretary Byrnes, had established CIG not
as an independent agency but as "a cooperative interdepartmental activity." Souers was not
prepared to seek more than minimum legislation authorizing CIG to perform certain legal
and administrative functions; nor was he ready to push for a change of policy establishing
CIG as a separate agency. It is clear, however, that General Vandenberg felt no timidity
about recommending a change in Truman's policy.
Vandenberg was thoroughly familiar with the shortcomings of CIG and was fully in
favor of a fundamental revamping of the setup. He was also thoroughly familiar with tthe he
current struggle over unification. By the time he had become DCI, Navy opposition
Thomas-Hill-Austin bill had been well publicized in hearings of the Senate Committee on
Naval Affairs, headed by Senator Congress. Walsh.
The situation was propitious for pushing fort the bill
was separate
wnot t going to get through
legislation for CIG.
As early as June 13, three days after he took over from Souers, Vandenberg received a me
asmoutlined nn tthe he
o from his Genvala tthority ofwCIG. "R Summarizing that oauf
"administrative Y
President's letter, Houston characterized it as "purely a coordination function with no
substance or authority to act on its own responsibility in other than an advisory and
directing capacity." Thus, said Houston, CIG had no power to take personnel actions, certify
payrolls and vouchers, authorize travel, procure supplies directly for itself or enter into
contracts. To add urgency to this pitiable situation, Houston pointed out that under existing
not furnish even unvouchered to CIG personnel and supplies to CIG
law the departments, could could
and it was "que paid for
out of vouchered funds." It was a strong case for legislation; and coupled with Vandenberg 's
plan for "augmenting" CIG, it was adequate reason for immediate action.
Within a month Vandenberg had commissione dItt itprtoepaTruman ration sf "A BillCor the
Establishment of A Central Intelligence Agency," Spec,
Clark Clifford, and received back a lengthy list of queries and corrections. Clifford found
the language in several places "difficult to follow and unnecessarily repetitious." He
foreign
criticized the failure to define and distinguish such terms as " heintellig nationalence," "foreign
intelligence
intelligence," "intelligence relating to the national security," an " mission." He thought there were serious omissions, such as the failure to specify the NIA's
functions and duties. In some respects he considered the bill "self-contradictory." In
conclusion he observed that his comments went to the wording of the bill and that there
were certain questions of policy about which he felt "considerable concern." He was
reserving, comment on those unless requested to give it.64 The tone was not encouraging.
On July 16 Houston, who with his deputy John S. Warner had drafted the bill,
explained to Vandenberg-surely he knew it-that it had been drafted "on short notice as a
basis for discussion of the points involved." Houston said there had been "no opportunity for
review by draftsmanship experts," and he therefore accepted Clifford's remarks as helpful
editing if the bill should be used in its present form. Houston yielded to Clifford on some
points and rebutted him on others.61
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That same clay Houston and James Lay, secretary to the NIA and the IAB, went to see
Clifford in his White House office. Clifford pointed out, recorded his assistant. Comdr.
George M. Elsey, "that ir. was not the President's original intention that a new agency be
created." Clifford remarked that "it appeared that the proposed bill was departing from the
President's intention by establishing a separate and sizeable government agency." He also
remarked that "the President had intended that his letter of' 22 January 1946 would provide
a workable plan for the Central Intelligence Group." Had experience, queried Clifford,
shown that "the plan outlined in the President's letter was not workable"? 66
Yes, that was so, said Houston and Lay. They spelled out the administrative difficulties
CIG had experienced as "a step-child of three separate departments." Enabling legislation
was needed, they said, so that CIG could operate as "an integrated organization." Also,
experience showed that CIG should become "an operating agency with a large staff of
intelligence /sic/ experts." ?'
Lengthy discussion produced agreement on the need for altering "the original concept"
of CIG. It should not remain "a small planning staff" but should become "a legally
established, fairly sizeable, operating agency." Clark Clifford said he would discuss this new
concept with both Leahy and the President. 66
The conferees then considered Clifford's earlier critique of the bill. In Elsey's account,
Houston and Lay "agreed that all of Mr. Clifford's points were well taken" and that they
would be incorporated in a rewriting of the bill. Elsey added for the record unflattering re-
marks on--as he saw it-the thoughtlessness and "scissors-and-paste method" with which
Houston and Lay had drafted the bill and drawn upon other
intelligence documents. "They had failed to grasp the essential point," said he, "thattthe Na-
tional Intelligence Authority should be a planning group and the Central Intelligence
Agency an operating group." n9 Elsey, the newest authority on the reorganization of
intelligence, was apparently not happy with abandonment of "the original concept" of CIG.
Clifford had a final admonition: the proposed bill would excite o
and thought were not given to the choice of words." Undoubtedly noddingion "if great care
representatives agreed to prepare a new bill and submit it to Clifford assent, the CIG
That was July 16; whether Clifford was able in the next twenty-four hours to discuss
the CIG problem with Leahy and Truman is problematic. In any case, Leahy, unlike Byrnes
and Patterson, seemed not disturbed by the idea when Vandenberg told the NIA on July 17,
as has been recounted, that CIG had to be set up as an agency by enabling legislation.
Leahy reported that Truman thought nothing could be accomplished in Congress at the time
but that a draft of a bill might she readied for consideration by the next Congress. Some time
that same day Truman told the Senate Majority Leader, Alben Barkley, that he was putting
off further consideration of unification legislation. In view of Truman's involvement with
that legislation, which included a section on CIA, he quite likely envisioned the CIG need as
being disposed of in an omnibus military reorganization bill.
That bill had caused much controversy among the military. On May 31 the Secretaries
of War and Navy had informed Truman of their agreement on eight basic points, which
included a Central Intelligence Agency, and their continuing disagreement on four others.
On June 15 Truman gave his position on the four controverted a department, the number of miilitar points- tingle moftare
y services, responsibility for aviation, and dthe role of the
Marines-and spoke of all twelve points as "the basic principles that should form the
framework of the program for integration." That same day he also informed the chairmen of
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the four congressional committees on military and naval affairs of the importance he placed
on these twelve points." The services, however, took another half year before they reached
agreement.
As indicated, a CIA was not an element of controversy. Truman had told the
congressmen that "an organization along these lines, established by Executive Order,"
already existed. Actually the organization proposed in the reorganization bill and favored by
the service secretaries was much closer to the CIA of the JCS plan than it was to Truman's
CIG. Also CIG was established by a presidential letter, not by an executive order.72 As a
noncontroversial item-at least in the context of high-level consideration of it-the CIA
section was one of the agreed-upon points which Truman was now urged by some to
implement immediately by executive order.
Truman, however, rejected the advice, apparently on the ground that a partial solution
might endanger attainment of the whole program. To get the whole loaf Truman announced
on September 10 that a new bill, "the doctrine of the administration," would be drafted in
his own office by Clifford and Leahy. Clifford, calling it "the President's Bill," and trying to
allay Navy fears of Army domination, declared it "would not be written in the War
Department or anywhere else." Clifford hoped to have a draft ready by the end of October
for submission first to the Army and Navy and then to representatives of the various
congressional committees." In this perspective, where the White House had the difficult
problem of getting generals and admirals to agree on a fundamental reorganization of their
services, the legislative problem of the CIG must have seemed to Clifford, who thought that
matter had been settled in January, an unwelcome detail.
Meanwhile, CIG had not hurried to submit a rewritten bill of its own. It had been told
to plan for the next Congress; the present Congress had adjourned; unification was being
argued by the Army, Navy, Air Forces, and the Marines; and Clifford was just beginning
work on "the President's Bill." CIG had received some temporary assistance on its
administrative and financial problems when, working with the Budget Bureau, the Treasury,
and the Comptroller General-especially the latter's General Counsel, Lyle Fisher-it
persuaded the NIA to establish a "working fund" for its use.74 As DCI, Vandenberg had
plenty of problems to occupy him: reorganization of CIG, the takeover from the FBI in
South America, acquisition of foreign publications, relations with his IAB, exploitation of
American bussinessmen with overseas connections, the relationship with the JCS, the status
of atomic energy intelligence, and, of course, the absorption of SSU and FBIS.
Not, then, until the end of November 1946 did CIG return seriously to the text of its
bill. Then the head of the Legislative Liaison Branch, Walter L. Pforzheimer, sent
Vandenberg a new draft and a comparison of it with the points made by Clifford on July 12.
Every effort had been made to accommodate Truman's advisor. The draft was more detailed
and comprehensive than the earlier one. Its main provisions included a declaration of policy,
the functions of
a set of intelligence definitions, the organization of the NIA, CIA, and IAB,
the CIA, and the much-desired legal, administrative, and financial authorities. On Decem-
ber 2 it was sent to the White House, where it received less attention than did the July
submission."
4. "THE PRESIDENT'S BILL"
On January 8, 1947, Vandenberg discussed with Clifford the need for establishing the
NIA and CIG on a statutory basis. Vandenberg said that since June, when he had first
submitted a bill, he had had the understanding that the White House favored such
legislation. He said he had also been led to believe that the President might include a
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recommendation along that line in his State of the Union message. Such a recommendation,
said Clifford, had been included in early drafts of the message but was later dropped
because both Leahy and the President "felt that it was undesirable and unnecessary to bring
this matter to the attention of the Congress at the present." Vandenberg, saying he thought
the NIA favored such legislation, said he would lay the matter before the NIA and report its
decision to Clifford. Such was the conversation as reported by Commander Elsey."
Leahy and Truman could well have thought early in the New Year that the time was
not ripe for CIG legislation. After all, the military services had not yet reached agreement
on their differences. Indeed throughout November and December they had become so
bitterly divided over the issue that the matter had caused concern among top civilian and
military leaders. In that context the CIG issue was untimely, but if that were the situation,
why could not Clifford say so? Or was there some other reason that was best not put in
words? In any case, what was the duration of "the present"? Clifford apparently had no
constructive suggestions to make to Vandenberg.
The time was unripe, and the administration was unenthusiastic. An additional factor
accounting for the administration's reluctance to send the matter to Congress could have
been the controversy just publicly aired on December 17 when the House Committee on
Military Affairs published a report endorsing legislation for CIG but attacking what it
considered as CIG's usurpation of the field of "secret intelligence, a highly intricate,
involved, hazardous, hidden, ruthless operation competitive to the nth degree." " The report
had been written, though the fact was not announced, by Lt. Col. Peter Vischer," a former
G-2 officer in sympathy with the G-2 or "Frenchy" Grombach unit, which was then bitterly
resisting CIG's takeover of its activities. The group was taking its case to Congress and the
public.
The House report did support an independent budget and status for CIG but stoutly
insisted that as a coordinating agency CIG should not also conduct operations, especially se-
cret operations. Vischer had the Grombach activity in mind. The doctrinal line propounded
by Vischer, and earlier propounded in vain by General Bissell, held that such operations had
to be conducted on the departmental level, near the people they served, and that if such
operations had to compete with those run by the coordinating agency they would be
coordinated right out of existence.
Numerous newspapers, columnists, and editorialists gave great play to the report's
major recommendations--the need for intelligence, for centralization, for status, for an
Army intelligence corps, and especially for espionage. The New York Times ran a typical
headline: "House Group Urges Espionage Corps." The Washington Times-Herald editorial-
ized: "it is time to crop our hit-or-miss, by-guess-by-God, methods of finding out what goes
on militarily in this fermenting and hate-ridden world, and to get ourselves at least as
efficient a spy system as any other nation has." 79 Press coverage was good publicity for
peacetime espionage and also for legislation for CIG. At the same time, however, the airing
of the issue revealed to the administration the growing bitterness of some in G-2 and the
Congress toward CIG. The prospect. of controversy over CIG legislation could not have been
good news to Clifford, Leahy, and Truman.
In any case, Vandenberg did not lay the matter before the NIA, at least not in any
official meeting. The three did not meet again until February 12, by which time much had
happened. The first ray of harmony between the services had suddenly appeared just a few
days before the Vandenberg-Clifford meeting. Then a week later solid sunshine appeared.
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The War and Navy secretaries informed Truman that their departments had resolved their
differences "within the scope and the spirit" of the President's stated position, and on the
same day, January 16, Truman happily acknowledged this good news.80 His staff and the
military representatives went to work on January 20 to put the agreement into legal
language.
For the White House the principal drafter was now Mr. Charles S. Murphy,
Administrative Assistant to the President, although Clifford continued to look in on many
drafting sessions. Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad represented the Army, and Vice Adm. Forrest
P. Sherman, Deputy CNO for Operations, spoke for the Navy. They had a complex piece of
legislation to draft. There were twenty-five different sections. They dealt with the
establishment, character, and function of such as the National Defense Establishment, the
departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, a War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Joint Staff, a Munitions Board, a Research and Development Board, the National
Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources
Board. There was also a host of technical provisions. The character of the job ensured the
appearance of problems, controversies, and changes as the drafting proceeded.
With an Army-Navy agreement at hand and the way thus open for the President's leg-
islative program, there was new hope for legislation for CIG. A draft of that had been sent
to Clifford on December 2; he and Vandenberg had discussed the subject somewhat
inconclusively on January 8. On January 22 CIG received from the White House the "First
Rough Draft of the proposed bill for merger of the Armed Forces." 81 The section on CIA
was a surprising reversal for Vandenberg, Houston and Pforzheimer. It bore no resemblance
to either of the two drafts that CIG had submitted to Clifford in July and December. In
fact, it had been lifted, one might almost say in "scissors and paste method," from the
Thomas-Hill-Austin bill, which had died in committee in mid-summer.
That bill had been written in the spring of 1946 when CIG was not yet two months old,
when Souers had not yet written his one and only progress report, and when CIG had not
yet addressed itself to its legislative needs. The bill's drafters drew only on the amended JCS
plan and the President's letter of January 22. They provided for the establishment of a
Central Intelligence Agency with a director, to be appointed from civilian or military life by
the President, and to be paid $12,000 per year. They added sixteen lines, out of a total of
eighty-three, making certain that any military man who became DCI would not suffer any
diminution of his military benefits. They forgot, or rejected, the IAB. They said nothing
about funds. They rearranged some paragraphs and modified some language, but the result
reflected none of CIG's experience."
This bill was incorporated almost word for word in the "First Rough Draft" received
from the White House. The only substantive omission was the provision for the appointment
of a DCI "from civilian or military life." When analyzed by Pforzheimer on January 23, it
was judged unsatisfactory from CIG's point of view. For instance, neither the title of the bill
nor the declaration of policy made any reference to the centralizing of intelligence. There
were no definitions. No provision was made for the DCI as a nonvoting member of the
Council of National Defense, the proposed successor to the National Intelligence Authority.
The CIA was not "specifically" created, and its relation to the council was unclear. The
statement of functions was "extremely loose and lacking in detail." Nowhere did the bill
provide for the authorities-special procurement authorities, authorization for transfers
between appropriations, certain special personnel practices, the right to exchange funds,
etc.-which CIG considered essential to the operations of the new agency.S3
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At 10:00 a.m. that January 23 Vandenberg, Houston, and Pforzhcimer met at the
White House with Murphy, Sherman, and Norstad. Murphy stated that the subject was new
to him inasmuch as he had "first entered the picture" on January 20. He explained that he
had not even known that a proposed CIG enabling act had been submitted to Clifford's
office. Murphy then suggested, and all agreed, that the CIG draft be substituted for the
original text as an initial working basis. 'here followed some give and take on a few major
items. Vandenberg failed to have the DCI included as a nonvoting member of the council."
He was also worried about getting policy guidance from the council inasmuch as it had
so many more members than the NIA, with which Vandenberg indicated he had had
difficulties enough. Whereas the NIA had. four members, the council was slated to have six
or more. Vandenberg was assured, however., that the intent of the act was that CIA would
operate independently and would come under the council only on such specific measures as
the council might direct. It would not be necessary "for the agency to ask continual approval
from the Council." 85 The interpretation offered the prospect of liberation from that control
by a committee which Donovan had considered a major vice of the NIA-CIG setup.
By 5:00 p.m. Houston and Pforzhe:irrier had revised the intelligence section of the
White House draft and had copies delivered to Sherman and Norstad, and at 5:15 p.m.
Pforzheirner personally delivered a copy to Murphy at the White House. Murphy then
suggested adding a paragraph providing for the dissolution of the NIA and CIG and for the
transfer of its personnel, property, and records to the new agency. That was acceptable to
CIG.86
On January 25 surprise was again the order of the day for the CIG officials. Then
Murphy announced that all but the barest mention of CIA would be omitted from the
proposed legislation. The drafting committee reportedly thought the material submitted by
CIG was too controversial and might hinder the passage of the merger legislation. It was
feared that other agencies might object to the substantive portions of the CIG draft. It was
felt that Congress might have trouble with the general authorities requested but that CIG
could justify them in their own bill if they had time for such a presentation. It was further
felt that CIG might not have time, in the course of the prospective hearings on the merger
bill, to make its case for its specific section.87
This unsettling news prompted Pforzheimer to ask Murphy whether CIG could submit
its own enabling act as a companion measure to the larger bill. Murphy could not comment
inasmuch as his responsibility extended to the merger bill only. In the absence of
Vandenberg, Colonel Wright asked Admiral Leahy whether Murphy's position granted CIG
"a green light" to go ahead on its own legislation. The Admiral "was inclined to agree," but
thought CIG should let the second White House draft go through.88
That draft had reduced 220 lines to 23. It had three parts. It began with a CIA, a
director, his appointment from civilian or military life by the President with the Senate's
approval, and a salary of $15,000. It omitted, probably inadvertently, protection for a DCI's
military status. Next it declared that "subject to existing law" and the direction of the
proposed NSC, the CIA should "perform foreign intelligence functions related'. to the
national security." Finally, reducing everything to a few lines, and exploiting Murphy's late
afternoon suggestion, it declared that effective with the appointment of the first director
under the new act the functions of the NIA were transferred to the NSC and the functions
of the DCI and the functions, personnel, property, and records of the CIG were transferred
respectively to the new DCI and CIA."' It was but the barest mention.
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Of course CIG felt constrained to make some modifications. On January 27 Colonel
Wright asked Murphy to include provision for a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence hrase
ting
exis
sub
meaningless toDC to eliminate sign to the DCI"as ajnonvot ng member of the NSC. Murphy, inute pn and
to specifically designate suggested eliminating entirely the section
conversation n with Pforzheimer on January 27, sbeginning with "subject n wanted NSC membership for the $14,000
to and promised strong support for nonvoting
to $12,000, C G
concurred with both the proposed elimination of functions and the salary reduction.
did not
The third draft, handed by Murphy to thate they Aon January 28, rmy and Navyhhadvseen fit to
embody the CIG requests. Murphy
$14,000 his the recommendations. They had reduced the ground, among others, that in all probability therincumbent f would be a0mili-
r officer, They had eliminated the position f deputy d rectorf asf of the Army chie staff
tary o0 naval
or the chief ief of nl operations. being
t naval a
too controversial. They thought it unnecessary to name the DCI as the intelligence advisor of
the NSC because it was inherent
uin the nder the position.
counc should sit oon the council. The daft as
law that the head of an agency
pocketbook.9 thirty-five, and thereby protected
and lines,
lengthened bmilitarytiDCI'sf fourteen
the prospective
Murphy had no objection to CIG voicing its protest to Clifford, who would be going
CIG
should, tibe
over the final version 28thm made three the committee argu d that the
Clifford on January 28,
designated the nonvoting intelligence advisor to the NSC to make clear he bore the same w
limited relationship freedom the council ord the CIA ands herefore sugge ed specif coauthorizati on
necessary y fcyom of of operation
for the agency to "coordinate" foreign intelligence activities and to "operate
directore n order
where appropriate. Third, it continued to insist upon the need for a deputy
to provide for continuity of held in the absence of fthetddirector. It concurred in granting
him $12,000 per year
That memorandum ended CIG's input to the drafting of "the President's Bill," but the
drafting committee spent another month readying it for Congress. When finished and sent
V) must have been a disappointment Security Act of 1947," its
Truman to the Congress
intelligence CIG. None of the
section (Appendix
points argued for on January 28 had been yielded. The director's salary stayed at $14,000. that Omitted was theprovision
rovsion-four een of the section's ith thirty-thr elliitary nes llproviding for
point there was only provision-fourteen
the possible appointment of a military man and the safeguarding of his interests in that
event. The military intended, but Congress would attack on this point, that the DCI be one
of them. Congress would
ending brevity of the CIA
which had become the heart of the bill. The very
NIA and and C CI
section invited attack from suspicious congressmen.
More important than the vulnerability of any specific provision, however, was the very
fact of the submission to Congress of a bill to establish an agency to carry out, among other
functions, peacetime espionage and counterespionage. In the history of government had any
such thing ever been done before? Had any ruler, constitutional or
otherwiise fv r sought
public endorsement of the open, permanent, peacetime
British for over a century had playfully labeled "the great game?" 93
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To be accurate of course, the issue had been muted. First, the intelligence section was
but a part of a much larger bill, which press and public thought of as aimed at resolving
interservice struggle and improving the nation's military organization for national security.
Second, the language of the intelligence section, pursuant to "the rules of the game," nver
spoke of such disowned activities as espionage and counterespionage. Even so, and minor as
it was, the intelligence section was there in print for all to read, and anyone who was
involved or interested in the subject knew it included those activities. The subject was now
before Congress.
Most important, however, was the fact that the American people were now given their
first specific opportunity to express themselves corporately on the necessit
rnent
of establishing federal foreign intelligence activities as 11 part of our regular and govevcrnmeot
establishment." 94
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Chapter XVI
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIA
In January 1947 the portrait of State's "Jimmy" Byrnes had graced the cover of Time
as its "man of the year." Said the magazine: "a nervous nation found a firm and patient
voice." ' The next day, January 7, the voice was gone from Foggy Bottom, chiefly because
the owner was in poor health. To replace him the President chose the soldier's soldier,
General Marshall, who thereby also became a member of the NIA.
Byrnes's departure was quickly followed by that of his law partner Donald Russell, who
nine months earlier had engineered the downfall of the McCormack plan, the resignation of
the Colonel himself, and the implementation of "the Russell plan" for the organization of
State's intelligence. Russell, however, could hardly have been out of the building when his
plan was readied to follow him. On February 5 Marshall, reversing Byrnes and dumping the
Russell plan, ordered the geographic desks to disgorge themselves of their research divisions
and return them to State's rump central intelligence office where Acheson and McCormack
had wanted them in the first place.' At last State had a unified central intelligence office of
its own. In charge was an ex-OSS man, Col. William A. Eddy, who had distinguished
himself in I)onovan's North African operations, and who had replaced Dr. Langer, who in
turn had succeeded McCormack.' Turnover in intelligence!
The process was also taking place in CIG. Souers had served in 1946 from January to
June when he was replaced by Vandenberg. Seven months later, on February 27, 1947-the
day after Truman sent his bill to Congress-it was reported that Vandenberg would be
replaced about May 1 by another admiral, Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter. Tall, slim,
"Hilly" Hillenkoetter was "an amiable Dutchman," 4 who had been wounded at Pearl
Harbor and who was then serving his third tour in Paris as naval attache or assistant naval
attache. He had also headed that intelligence office in the Pacific which had originally been
denominated the "Central Intelligence Agency." I While his appointment had not yet been
officially announced, the report was reliable, was accepted as such by reporters and
commentators, and provoked criticism both of heading CIG with a military man and of
rotating the job between admirals and generals.' Moreover, the report, preceding the actual
announcement by two months, would prove embarrassing both to Hillenkoetter and Navy
Secretary Forrestal.
1. EASY GOING IN THE SENATE
"The President's Bill" was now before the first Republican-controlled Congress since
the election of Roosevelt in 1932. It was the Congress which Truman would label in his 1948
election campaign as "the do-nothing Congress." It had before it the usual variety of
legislation of which the unification bill was one of the least controversial. The bill had the
backing, so Truman informed Congress, of the Secretaries of War and Navy and of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. This support was expected to weigh heavily with the various service
partisans in the Congress and also effectively counterbalance the opposition known to exist
among many military and naval officers. Furthermore, the public, while unstirred by the
issue, thought both wartime experience and Cold War prospects proved the need for better
organization for national security.
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"An amiable Dutchman," Rear .Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, was the third Director of Central
Intelligence, May 1, 1947 to Oct. 7, 1950. He was the only DCI who headed both CIG and
CIA.
Central Intelligence Agency
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As indicated previously, the unification bill was a comprehensive piece of legislation of
which the CIA portion was but a part. The bill had three titles and twenty-seven sections.
Title I created the National Defense Establishment, a Secretary of National Defense and
three coequal departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Also created were the
United States Air Force, a War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Munitions Board, and a ional Research and Development Board. Title II, under the heading Coordination for Natd the
Security, provided for a National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency,
National Security Resources Board. Title III, Miscellaneous, included compensation,
advisory committees, transfer of funds, and authorization for appropriations.
Sent to Congress on February 26, the bill was quickly referred to different committees
in Senate and House. Pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1946 the separate Military
Affairs and Naval Affairs committees of both houses had been slated for merging into new
Armed Services committees. In the House an unsuccessful effort had been made to block the
merger pending the actual consolidation of the military services themselves. In both houses
there was some uncertainty, inherent in the law itself, as to whether the bill belonged to the
Armed Services committee or to the new Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments, whose scope extended to all proposed legislation dealing with reorganization in
the executive branch.
Committee
In the House the Republican leadership decided not to send the bill the Expenditures
on Armed Services, though it had just fought to establish it, but to Committee. This committee was chaired by Republican Clare E. Hoffman, whom Newsweek
described as a "testy ... irascible ... New Deal-hating Michigander."' On February 28 he
introduced the bill in Congress as H.R. 2319, and the bill was immediately referred to his
committee. Therein hearings were initiated on April 2, and on and off for three months the
bill's intelligence provisions were critically scrutinized, especially by defenders of G-2 and
the FBI and by those who feared establishment of a military dictatorship or a gestapo.
Meanwhile, in the Senate there had been more of a tussle over committee assignment.
The President pro tem, Arthur H. Vandenberg, also of Michigan, and also uncle to CIG's
General Vandenberg, had referred the measure to the new Committee on Armed Services
but was challenged by the Expenditures Committee. The latter was expected to be more hos-
pitable to opponents of the bill than was the Armed Services Committee. Senator
Vandenberg, sticking to his decision, was upheld by the Senate on March 3. The chairman
on March 18two weeks before then
and opened Republican
the Armed
hearings Chan
measure s as S.758 Committee,
introduced the House did so.
In anticipation of the hearings, Senator Elbert D. Thomas (D. Utah), whose unification
bill (S.2044) had died in committee in 1946, made a major address on the subject in the Sen-
ate. He laid considerable stress on the proven need for a central intelligence system, for "the
most efficient intelligence system that can be devised." He said there was no returning to the
prewar system wherein State, War, and Navy went their separate ways. The system
established by Truman in 1946 needed to be implemented by legislation. That setup, he
thought, should logically be "placed in the framework of any agency [the proposed NSC]
that might be set up to coordinate military and foreign policies." 8
In the Senate hearings Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson started off the parade of
witnesses but neither said or provoked anything significant on intelligence. Gen. Carl
Spaatz, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, assured Republican Sen. Styles
Bridges of New Hampshire that "a centralized intelligence system" did not imply the end of
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Army intelligence. Bridges also had "some question regarding the personnel in centralized
intelligence today," and while he had "great respect" for General Vandenberg, he had heard
disquieting rumors about some of CIG's people and their activities. Having made his point
about security, Bridges returned for more reassurance that the Army, Navy, and the new
Air Force would each have its "own intelligence." 9
Admiral Sherman, displaying a chart of the proposed system, provoked Sen. Millard E.
Tydings (D., Md.) to worry about the lack of "any line running" from the CIA-"cer-
tainly ... one of the most important ... functions set forth in the bill"--to the Army, Navy,
and Air Force. Tydings referred to the fact that the CIA was connected on the chart only
with the NSC and the President. To Tydings the agency looked "pretty well set aside,"
whereas he thought it ought to have "a closer tie-in with the three services." Sherman,
alleging "a defect in the diagram," offered to have "a line of collaboration and service"
drawn in on any new chart. That pleased Tydings, who thought the CIA was designed not to
advise the President but "'the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." He still feared,
however, that CIA. appeared to the layman "more or less detached, rather than an integral
part of the three services." 11 The point was f'undamental, and the attitude was an echo of the
services' argument.
Sen. Harry Flood Byrd immediately interjected with another basic point, one that
would recur frequently in both Senate and House. Was it the intent, asked Byrd, that the
DCI be a military man? No, sir, said Admiral Sherman, co-drafter of the bill; the language
is permissive, and then protective of the status of any military occupant of the post. Could a
civilian be appointed? Yes. Then why not make it clear'? Said Byrd, "The way it is worded is
certainly persuasive, if not definitely controlling." Explaining that the point had been made
before, Sherman thought the situation could be clarified if provision were made for the
DCI's appointment "from military or civilian life." "
Tydings, still troubled by the chart, blurted out, "Admiral, that is an awfully short bit
of explanation, under the caption `Central Intelligence Agency,' the way it is set up here,
separately, to be appointed by the President, and superseding the services now run by the
Army and the Navy, ..." f sac] Aside from the Senator's misconception about the
supersession of G-2 and ONI, he had a point on the shortness of the CIA section. Why not
add an amendment, he asked, making clear that the CIA serves the services and the JCS
and is not left "hanging up 1:he-e on a limb all off to itself?" There is "a void" in the bill,
added Tydings.'2
The Admiral then gave Tydings the news that CIG legislation was of such scope and
importance that it was considered too much for the present bill. The drafters felt, after con-
sultation with General Vandenberg, that the unification bill could only show the relationship
of CIA to the NSC and leave to separate legislation "the task of a full and thorough devel-
opment" of the CIA. Then may we assume!, asked Tydings, that a separate bill will come
along during this session of congress? Yes. "How about that, General Vandenberg?" The
enabling act was prepared, said the General, "but we do not want to submit that until we
have reason for it." "
Sen. Leverett Saltonstall (R., Mass.) then pointed out that the bill did provide for the
transfer of the NIA and CIG functions to the NSC and CIA respectively. Tydings thought a
separate bill was better than the vague language of the current bill. Admiral Sherman
suggested the desirability of inserting in the record the President's letter of January 22,
1946. The committee chairman, Chan Gurney, said Vandenberg could bring it with him
when he testified." The point thus raised would come up as often as that about the military
or civilian status of the DCI.
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General Vandenberg, in his testimony given in executive session on April 29, presented
the case for legislative enactment of the President's directive. He cited the inadequacy of the
country's prewar intelligence, the prewar hostility of the American people to espionage and
Intelligence generally, the post-Pearl Harbor better understanding of the subject, and the
current need for a strong intelligence system. He reviewed the expansion, popularity, and
inadequacies of wartime intelligence. He paid tribute to OSS but admitted it had had some
shortcomings. He noted the forced American dependence upon British intelligence and
warned against it as a long-term proposition. He cited the needs revealed by Pearl Harbor:
for centralization, for allocation of responsibility, for dissemination, for evaluation, and for
exploitation of all sources of information. Inserting the President's directive into the record,
he gave its background and its main provisions and recited the usual assurances and
guarantees against interference with other intelligence departments and against the estab-
lishment of a gestapo. In describing the IAB, he said nothing about his unhappiness with
that body or with its elimination from the current draft of the CIG enabling act. He
elaborated on what he called three of "the components of any successful intelligence
organization," namely, the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence. He
briefly mentioned performing such services of common concern as the monitoring of foreign
broadcasts."
In his testimony as inserted in the public record-and most of it was-there was not in-
cluded his clear assertion of the need to conduct clandestine operations and to centralize
them in one agency. Such operations, he said in executive session, had been "over-
dramatized" and "unfortunately over-publicized," but he thought "we should frankly
acknowledge the need for and provide" for such collection. Centralization of such operations,
he said, was a lesson learned from history and recent experience-notably British success
and the failures of Germany, Italy, and Japan. These remarks were classified, but the public
could easily conclude from his unclassified text that the prewar feeling that there was
something Un-American about espionage and even about intelligence in general no longer
held true.16
The press cetainly understood the message. The Washington Post contrasted Van-
denberg's recall of the unfavorable prewar attitude toward espionage and intelligence with
the wartime discovery of the "immense gaps in our knowledge." The contrast clearly implied
a change of attitude. Accentuating the contrast, the New York Times reported that
Vandenberg "sharply rapped" the prewar feeling. Subsequent experience, continued the
paper's account, showed the need for the United States to become "self-sufficient" in
intelligence."
Of course the senators had many questions for Vandenberg. Unfortunately the answers
are not available. Even so the questions are worthy of note insofar as they indicate senatorial
attitudes and concerns about intelligence. Hence, he took up the following: Does CIG need
legislation? Why would not an executive order suffice? What benefits, other than stability,
are expected from the bill? Has CIG taken over the duties of OSS? Why should there be
intelligence received from twenty-three different agencies? How does CIG's collection of
intelligence differ from that of State, War, and Navy? 11 The senators-ten were present-
had no great problems with intelligence, and Vandenberg should have had no difficulty
answering their queries.
Writing as a private citizen, Allen W. Dulles, who had emerged from OSS experience
as perhaps the country's outstanding case officer, was openly critical of the bill. All it set up,
he said, was "a coordinating agency for . . . G-2, A-2, ONI." What was needed was rec-
ognition of the political, social, and scientific, as well as military and naval, character of
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modern intelligence., especially in peacetime. It was essentially a civilian ent:e; prise and
should be under civilian leadership. Lamenting the "constant changes in the chiefs of the
military intelligence services," he warned against continuing the practice in the CIG, which,
he noted, had already had three different directors "in the space of I short year." The job
called for permanence and continuity. Hence, he recommended long-term tenure for an
essentially civilian DCI.
Dulles was also critical of having the CIA report to such a large body NSC; it had at least six members and could have more. Also, since it includedrno ro lyea
a
new defense secretary but also Army,, Navy, and Air Force secretaries, it was obviously
largely military in character. Dulles thought it more practical for the agency to report to a
smaller body--a mini-NSC--chaired by the Secretary of State and including the Secretary
of National Defense and the President's representative. Dulles was also critical of the
"overweighting" of the draft legislation on the side of the military departments as contrasted
with the State Department, which he thought more likely to be more deeply concerned with
the day-by-day operations of the agency than any other department, including the defense
establishment. The fact, he said, that the proposed setup appears "in a bill for our National
Defense Establishment should not blind us to the realities of the situation." Almost casually,
he mentioned the agency's "own secret and over[t] intelligence operations" but strongly
recommended the reintegration of R & A, now in State, with CIA.2?
More critical still was the Reserve Officers Association. Strongly favoring a CIA, the
association was just as strong in its conviction that the entire CIA section of the bill should
be "fundamentally changed" and redrafted, The group, which seems to have "very closely
followed" a letter sent it by General Donovan, acknowledged the departmental services as
"the backbone of our intelligence system" but nevertheless insisted that the CIA should be
independent of them and administratively responsible not to the NSC but "only to the
President." It should be headed by a civilian, be advised by a board of the chiefs of the intel-
ligence services, have its own budget and personnel, and have as functions the coordination
of intelligence activities, the production of national estimates, and the
services of common concern (collection by "special means" and counterintelligence)."of
Donovan had been openly contemptuous of Truman's intelligence system. In April 1946
he declared that the country had had in wartime "the makings" of a real intelligence service
but had chosen to disband it and dissipate its assets. In its place, he said, the country now
had "a director of an intelligence group reporting to a committee called an intelligence
authority" composed of officials busy with their own affairs of state. The new system, he
alleged in September, in Life magazine, could not possibly work, because it violated the pre-
cepts of intelligence handed down by experience and common sense. In October he described
the disbanded OSS as "a real intelligence service," and he said, "we haven't got one now."
The only kind of system for us, he declared, was "a centralized, impartial, independent
agency that is qualified to meet. the atomic age." In January 1947 he said the country had
not a central intelligence service but a joint service controlled by the three secretaries, and
he warned that until the country had a proper service it could never unmask the enemy's
intention and never have an effective foreign policy.22 Each of these and other statements
made by Donovan was promptly and generally favorably reported on by the news media.
For whatever reason--la.ck of invitation, private business, personal unwillingness-
Donovan did not appear before the Senate committee, nor did any statement from him
appear in the public record. Writing to Senator Gurney, however, he denounced the CIA
provision for not only perpetuating "the existing evil" of subordinating intelligence to three
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secretaries but also for "intensifying" it by putting it under six or more officials. "How," he
asked, "can there be any efficient organization with such a setup?" Intelligence, he said, had
always been the "Orphan Annie" of the services; to be effective it had to have parity of
status, which it could never achieve if the present system were frozen into law. The only
solution, he declared, was to have the agency report for administration and direction to the
Secretary of National Defense but "advise with" the NSC on the type and kind of
information needed.23
The head of the agency, he further declared, should be a civilian, for the same reasons
advanced for making the proposed national defense secretary a civilian. "When strategy was
narrowly defined, as in the 18th century, as `the art of military command, of projecting and
directing a campaign,' " said Donovan, "it was natural that the military should assume the
dominant position in intelligence." With the increasing complexity of war, however, strategy
was concerned with such nonmilitary factors as economics, politics, morale, psychology, and
technology. Intelligence, said Donovan, was "no longer confined to war," but-and here
rests the core of Donovan's contribution to intelligence-it had become "an essential of
statecraft." As such it could not be confined within the control of any one service.' He was
arguing for the independence of "intelligence," of long-range or strategic intelligence, as the
key to national defense.
He considered it "a strange footnote" to American history that, except for George
Washington's preoccupation with intelligence and irregular war, neither State, nor War, nor
Navy had ever organized a system of intelligence. Now, "when we are attempting to remedy
this lack," he said, "we should be certain to do it right." 25
Two weeks later, in another letter to Gurney, he warned that trouble and delay
encountered by the unification bill generally were giving "emphasis to the erroneous
impression" that a proper central intelligence system was "an integral part of military
unification." Strategic intelligence, he repeated, was "not confined to the military but has a
broader over-all base." He, therefore, thought it desirable to take the intelligence proposal
out of the bill and deal with it on its merits, free from the controversial service questions
which had recently come to the fore. Such action would not hurt G-2 or ONI, which were
inherent parts of their respective services, and which would be unhurt by a central unit. The
strategic intelligence feature, he repeated again, was "new." Why distort it by involving it in
other problems? 26
Adequate information lay at the threshold of foreign policy, he declared, just as he
had declared in 1941 in his memorandum on COI that strategy without information was
helpless and that information, unless directed to strategy, was useless. Why not start
there? Why not set up a proper intelligence system on its own? Why not have the head of
it report directly to the President, at least until Congress can make up its mind as to
whether there is some other way of giving an intelligence organization "parity of position"
with other departments? Z'
So "strongly" did Donovan feel the necessity of the country's knowing the facts vital to
national security that he thought it might be necessary "to bring the whole subject out into
the open." He thought that there was "a great deal of bunk" about intelligence and that too
often the word "security" was improperly employed "to cover either the stupidity or the
designs of those who would like to exercise dominion over it." In such a case it was not
foreign nations but Americans who were deceived. If the issue could not be properly solved
without debate, then "let's have the debate." 28
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A few days later Senator Gurney, discussing these letters with Pforzheimer, said that
Donovan "had been very active on the Hill in opposition to Section 202" and had talked
with him and with others 21 Donovan and his old OSS colleagues had, indeed, been active.
Colonel Buxton was busily writing letters, holding meetings, and drumming up support--
especially among fellow-New Englanders. Charles Cheston, the Philadelphian, had met with
Gurney, submitted a statement to his committee, discussed some disputed points with
Vandenberg's successor, Admiral Hillenkoetter, and reported on these discussions to
Gurney.JO Despite criticism of OSS, Donovan had emerged from the war with enhanced
prestige not only as a national figure but as an authoritative voice on intelligence matters.
Pforzheimer., commenting on Donovan's suggestion that the agency be placed under the
Secretary of National Defense, pointed out the unfairness to the State Department of this
arrangement. So placing C:[A, he also pointed out, would put the agency in "the military
establishment, which was not the design at all." 31 His comment singled out an element of
ambiguity in Donovan's position on the agency's chain of command.
Fundamentally that position rested on two principles: reporting to an individual, not a
committee, and parity of position with other departments in whatever reporting arrangement
was devised. From the beginning Donovan had recommended reporting to the President, or
to "a general manager" iin the executive office, or-as in his 1943 plan for a postwar
organization-the secretary of a unified defense department in which intelligence was
recognized as a coequal "fourth arm" of the services. In his 1944 plan he had once again
returned to reporting to the President. The 'Truman system of having the DCI report to the
three secretaries struck Donovan as ineffectual; subordinating the DCI to an enlarged NSC
"intensified the evil." As between an individual or a committee Donovan always chose the
former.
Where the ambiguity appears is in his willingness to subordinate the intelligence chief,
albeit in a "parity of position," to a secretary of a unified defense department, as in his 1943
plan, or to a secretary of national defense, as in the proposed legislation of 1947. That
willingness seemed to slight State and was inconsistent with Donovan's firm belief that
intelligence transcended any one departmental interest--military, naval, or diplomatic--and
could not be confined within any one department, even a defense department. Some partial
explanation for his 1947 position, as expressed to Gurney, may lie in the not uncommon
conception of the proposed secretary of national defense as "a super-secretary" somehow
uniquely responsible to the President for national defense. Even so, there remained an
apparent derogation of the authority of the State Department.
Pforzheimer, commenting on Donovan's other suggestion that Section 202 be deleted
from the bill, said he saw no harm in passing that section, as it merely gave legislative status
to CIG's present existence. Of course it was that: status which Donovan particularly
abominated--as he saw it, a dissipated OSS, living on borrowed resources, controlled by
three secretaries, and lacking the imagination, energy, and capability to produce the
intelligence that was the key to national defense. Giving that existence legislative foundation
merely froze "evil" in perpetuity. Pforzheimer added that "if General Donovan and his
associates wished to make a fight on our detailed functions," they could do so when the
enabling legislation was considered.12 Donovan had already answered that objection: if we
are going to do it right, let us do it right now.
Gurney's committee had by this time, May 26, received other testimony on intelligence
and gone into executive session to consider amendments and report out a bill. On May 7
New York's Republican Rep. Walter G. Andrews, appearing before the committee, called a
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spade a spade; saying that CIA's powers ought to be spelled out as they had been in the old
S.2044 and noting the "enormous" potentialities of the agency, he declared that it was "a
great and dangerous departure for the American people to establish by law a `spy agency,'
which is what this Agency will actually be." He wanted the agency's powers, and
particularly the restrictions thereon, reintroduced into the bill. On May 9, the last day of the
hearings, the committee received a written denunciation of the entire bill from the National
Council for Prevention of War. Warning that the government was fast moving "in the
direction of an imperialist military dictatorship," the council said the proposed CIA was
"free to become a Gestapo at home and a universal spy system abroad." The council also
noted the absence of the restrictions contained in 5.2044.33
The committee went into executive session on May 20. Before it were not only many
amendments but even an entirely new bill, one drafted by one of its members and one of the
Senate's few anti-unification die-hards, Republican Sen. Edward V. Robertson of Wyoming.
He too wanted the functions and restrictions of S.2044 incorporated in a rewritten CIA sec-
tion.'" Worthy of note is the fact that while many people wanted the functions of the agency
spelled out, no one ever questioned or quarreled about the functions. They were simply
accepted.
The committee had no serious difficulty reaching agreement on an amended bill and
report.35 On June 4 the bill (S.758) was unanimously approved by a 12-0 vote, with
Robertson and others reserving their right to offer amendments when the bill came up
before the Senate. On June 5 the revised bill was reported to the floor of the Senate.
Among the changes was the addition of the President to the National Security Council
so that the council now had a membership of seven plus any the President might later name.
His inclusion had been part of the original Eberstadt recommendation, but it was not part of
"the President's Bill" that went to the Congress. His reintroduction, while it had the
disadvantage of further enlarging the council, had the compensative value of greatly
enhancing the stature of that body. From the point of view of CIA, it meant that the agency
had a direct--but not quite private-link with the President. That was more than G-2 or
ONI had been willing to grant a central intelligence chief. The link had the potential of
striking a compromise between Donovan's plan, which subordinated the DCI solely to the
President, and the JCS plan, which stopped him at the secretarial level. The compromise
amounted to an American version of the "King in Council." It offered the DCI more
authority and freedom than perhaps the military and Donovan realized at the time.
Another change was the reversal of Titles I and II so that "Coordination for National
Security" now preceded a renamed "The National Security Organization," headed by a
"Secretary of National Security," who was now less the super secretary the Navy had
vigorously opposed. The reversal eliminated grounds for the possible misconception that the
overall security structure was subordinate to the defense establishment and its secretary.
In the CIA section there was only one change other than the renumbering-from 202 to
102-necessitated by the reversal of titles. The change provided for the appointment of the
DCI "from the armed services or from civilian life." Nothing was done about adding functions
and restrictions as embodied in 5.2044. Such addition had been considered unnecessary
inasmuch as they had been presumably carried over by the President's letter. The committee's
report specifically noted that CIA would continue to perform the duties assigned by that
directive umtil such time as permanent legislation was provided by Congress.36
While the bill had made progress, and while the Senate Republicans had placed the bill
on the "must legislation" agenda in the middle of May, the prospect for passage had become
cloudy by that time. Truman and the Republicans in both houses were quarreling. The
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Republicans, eager to find a New Deal scandal to outdo Teapot Dome, had trouble
controlling their investigative committees, one of which was Hoffman's Expenditures
Committee. The House Republican leadership seemed intent on shelving controversial
legislation until the next year. Unification was one that appeared bottled up. By June 5 it
was certainly having a difficult time in Hoffman's committee.
2. WORRIES AND FEARS IN HOUSE HEARINGS
The bill had started out with the blessings of the President, the War and Navy
secretaries, the Joint Chiefs, and important figures in the Congress. However, many military
and naval officers, who felt. some inhibitions about publicly testifying in opposition to a bill
endorsed by their civil and military superiors, had numerous objections to one or other
provisions of the bill. Thus, naval officers feared loss of independence to the Army and loss
of much naval air if an Air Force were established. Marines feared drastic reduction in size
and function at the hands of the Army. These and other views and fears had their echoes in
Congress, where there was also considerable uneasiness with the apparent growth of the
power of the military in American life.
Most of this sentiment. was given greater outlet in the House hearings, which began on
April 2, than in the Senate hearings, which had begun two weeks earlier. As for the CIA
provisions, no one.absolutely opposed either the establishment of the agency or the conduct
of espionage by the United States, but there was considerably more questioning and
complaining about those provisions, or-----more exactly-the lack thereof, than was taking
place in the Senate hearing room.
This scrutiny of intelligence had begun smoothly enough with the appearance of the
chief administration spokesmen for the bill. In his prepared statement, Secretary Patterson
mentioned, almost in passing, that the CIA took the place of the existing CIG. He
incorrectly referred to the agency as one of several "interservice ties" and "joint agencies,"
but no one picked. him up on it-probably because no one noticed it. That he knew there was
more to it than that was made evident when he later explained the location of the CIA under
the NSC as necessitated by the importance of the State Department in the intelligence
picture."
Secretary Forrestal was queried as to how far the President could go in naming
additional members of the NSC. The questioner, Rep. J. Caleb Boggs (R., Del.) thought
intelligence was "one of the most important provisions" of the bill, and he, therefore, had
"some fears" as to how far CIA's information might be spread. Getting some reassurance
about the President's concern for such things, Boggs moved quickly to suggest that the DCI
:should be a member of the council. Forrestal opposed such membership as productive of an
oversized body and as unnecessary in view of the likely close collaboration of the DCI with
the NSC as a practical working arrangement.38
The questioning became barbed when Rep. Fred E. Busbey, an Illinoisan Republican
who had served in G-2, complained to Forrestal that he had read in a Paris paper an article
about CIG and about Vandenberg's replacement as DCI but that he had not seen a similar
release in any American paper. Headlined in France-Soir "The United States Creates a
Secret Service in Time of Peace," the article announced the departure from France of the
U.S. naval attache, Admiral Hillenkoetter, to take up the CIG post to which he had just
been appointed. The article said CIG would control "all foreign secret intelligence" and
would "operate and coordinate" other services of State, War, and Navy.
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Had there been such a release, asked Busbey, who was the President and Treasurer of
Fred E. Busbey & Co., securities? Not that the Secretary knew; the story, partly correct and
partly incorrect, continued Forrestal, could have been pieced together from publicly
available information about CIG. Busbey knew how inaccuracies occasionally did creep into
newspaper articles."
The point to which Busbey had reference, however, was accurate, and Forrestal
certainly knew it, and Busbey and everybody interested in the subject had taken it for
granted: that Vandenberg was being replaced by Hillenkoetter. Prior to the French account,
which appeared March 31, there had been reports in at least two American papers that
Vandenberg would leave and would probably be succeeded by Hillenkoetter. It was not,
however, until May 1, a week after Busbey asked his question, that Truman announced the
change.40
Busbey, dropping that line for the moment, wondered if there were any foundation for
the "rumors" that had "come" to him that the CIA was "contemplating operational
activities." Forrestal surely knew that Busbey was voicing that G-2 hostility to CIG
operations which had been publicly expressed in the recent House report on intelligence.
Well, the Secretary would not like to go into the details of CIG's operations but would
prefer to leave that topic to General Vandenberg. Of course, continued Forrestal, the
question pointed up one of the difficulties of intelligence: the U.S. certainly needed
"machinery for collecting accurate information," but "by the nature of its objectives"
intelligence "ought not to have publicity." Exactly, jumped in Busbey; that was why he
"thought the appearance of the article in [France-Soir] was very bad." 41
The article was brought up a week later, also in barbed fashion, when Hillenkoetter
accompanied Vandenberg to the Senate hearing. Then, Senator Bridges reportedly said that
the article "had created an unfortunate feeling in his mind regarding the Admiral." The
latter stated he had given out no such interview and presumed that the information had been
forwarded to Paris by the French naval attache .42 According to Drew Pearson's column,
Hillenkoetter was asked by Bridges if he thought "we should have as head of our very secret
intelligence a man who let the news of his appointment leak out?" An "obviously perturbed"
Hillenkoetter said he had read the news in the French newspapers before he had heard about
it from the Navy Department. He said he later learned the newspapers had gotten their
information from "the French Secret Service, and the French Secret Service seems to find
out everything." 43 Perhaps they do, but that service and/or French journalists had probably
picked up the news in the American papers, and routinely transmitted it to Paris where, by
error or taken in conjunction with Hillenkoetter's actual departure, it was put in the past
aded the
DCI in story
rather than the
oneshortyear
those tense. Whatever in the appointment tof the third French
embarrassment of future
[actually a year and a half].
Busbey's questioning put the administration spokesmen clearly and uncomfortably on
the defensive as far as the CIA section of the bill was concerned. The pressure would grow.
Why a military man for DCI? Why was the section so brief and unenlightening? What
was the guarantee against establishing a gestapo? On Busbey's question about operations,
the subject was so sensitive that the committee had to go into executive session. The first
three of these four major questions were thrashed over with almost every witness who
appeared.
The provision permitting a military man to be DCI caught everyone's attention, if only
because it occupied seventeen of the forty lines of the House text of the bill. Of course it
really attracted attention because the text seemed so clearly to ordain a military occupant of
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the post. Rep. James W. Wadsworth (R., N.Y.), actually one of the bill's strongest
supporters, was the first to doubt the wisdom of having "a strictly military professional
man" as the director of intelligence. It was "only discretionary," explained Secretary
Patterson, who said the provision was necessary to remove a disqualification under a statute
of 1870 attaching to Army and Navy officers taking other work with the government."
His technical explanation left many skeptics unchanged. Ohio's Republican Rep.
Clarence J. Brown, while admitting he might be "overly suspicious," nevertheless feared the
military were getting too much influence in nonmilitary matters, including the C11A. Brown,
a newspaper publisher, thought a uniform enhanced a feeling of power and authority and
thereby heightened the possibility of the bill creating a gestapo, another of his fears; he
thought a civilian should have the job. A Marine general, appearing in opposition, thought a
civilian DCI ought to be made mandatory; Marines had been quick to note the language
specifically permitted a commissioned Army, Navy, or Air Force officer to be DCI but was
silent on a Marine officer---a neglect that Marines spotted elsewhere in the bill.45
The DCI's military status was particularly vulnerable because of the rapid turnover in
the job. Souers and Vandenberg, between them, had served from January 1946 to May
1947, and Hillenkoetter had Just taken over-three chiefs in one short year. Representative
Busbey, arguing for stability and continuity in the job, thought it should be held by someone
as long as he showed he could handle it., the way Hoover ran the FBI. A spokesman for
Navy reserve officers said many doubted that CIA would amount to anything if the DCI job
became a tour of duty for an officer who moved from it to commanding a ship at sea or a
regiment; the agency needed continuity in its direction, he said.46
Appearing for the bill, General Eisenhower suggested the services should agree on a
three-year term for the DCI; that was an improvement over the existing track record, but it
did not begin to measure up to the Hoover record, which many advanced as a desirable
norm. Eisenhower defended the choice of a military man on the grounds that the right civil-
ian was hard to find. The eminent scientist Dr. Vannevar Bush, bothered by the parade of
"three chiefs in succession," preferred a civilian DCI but noted that the job required "a
strange combination of talents" and regretted that the country had "no national training
ground-for ability of that sort." 41
In analyzing the language, both sides had to recognize that another military man had
just taken over the DCI post and was expected to continue to occupy it. At a minimum the
bill had to provide for that situation. At the same time the military clearly felt that only
their profession provided the natural pool for the development of future occupants of the
post, and they certainly felt they had a vested interest in having military men in the job. On
the other hand, the House committee remained disturbed by the obvious bias for a military
man and felt that neither Patterson's technical explanation nor Eisenhower's stipulated term
reached the point of their uneasiness. The committee was not prepared to accept permanent
military control of the job.
The second question, on the functions of the CIA, was just as obvious as that ion the
status of the DCI, and it proved more disturbing. The case against it was initially posed by
Ohio's Clarence Brown, who repeatedly returned to the attack; he told Forrestal on April 25:
... the functions are set up nowhere that I have knowledge of in the statutory law
of the land, and your statute refers back to some Federal Register of February 5, or
some other date, and some directive issued by the President of the United States,
under what I still think is questionable authority. Nobody can tell from that statute,
from this bill, if enacted into law,, what power or authority this fellow had.4"
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Brown did not like the idea of establishing an intelligence the DChtcouldspecifying its
functions and limitations. As he read the bill in front of him, go "
income tax reports" or
"as fine asfo eign military i and naval intelligence,, set p asotcould,
its
d
country ought to have but since it was a "very great departure from what we have done in the past," he wante
scope and authority spelled out, not" vaguely referred to in a parenthetical "(11
Fed.Reg.1337,1339, February 5,
To begin with, Brown did not like executive orders, one of which he mistakenly took the
President's letter to be. They could be changed in two minutes; at other t times he said pthey en. stroke of could be changed in three seconds, anytime, overnight,
issued
but they were been
had the force of law, directives
pa made by the
past not know, nhd~ad knew, how many of 77,000; they such
few years. He had
executive.
Brown was by no means alone in his opinions. Chairman Hoffman thought that "if we much
experience , he
as being opposed
are going to fix anything ands cod had
said, , being pilloried ied by by other cog es he had then
to national defense because, having given the President some authority,
ined in
expression than Hofan o B own observed that "the creation of an I ell genceaAgency
without th han tioffm
take. sAto its functions nother Republican, Pnnsylvania'stMit Mitchell Jenkins, noting gtthe a rather was being ak
wahout any asked to limitations
bill's lack of any specific reference to Truman's 1946 order, said the agency's functions subj
ect " by
"should be more accurately
entative Judd of M nnesota tthoughtt thesb ll s intelligence changeection
executive order. Repp s S1
needed "more careful explanation than almost any other part of the bill." Other witnesses were no less concerned or hostile than the congressmen. The Marine
general, Merritt A. Edson, said the functions and powers of CIA should be "carefully
delineated and circumscribed." The spokesman for the naval reserve officers, John P.
Bracken, when questioned by Brown about his preference for basing the CIA on a agency's
E Ellis M. Congress should
onstate sideredethe entire a congressional statute, CIA section iin d equ , ate
presidential order ion and functions." Admiral said
Ass lheawas c"to oncerned, it ddi transfer
it did not CIA g at d and efis efficient organizationgo far
awell-intere
Cl.G functions to CIA; but as far as presently constituted, CIG, he charged, could not
possibly "meet the needs of the Nation," thrust as it had been into a position of world lead-
ership. lie wanted something specific but also something much better.53
No witness, except administration spokesman, defended the section as written. Sec-nce the
. Secretary Patters n, submittingra cCIA would come opy of Truman's letter, oaid that
retary Forrestal bill explained
present bifwas was passed.
CIA functions had been stated in the bill by reference to Truman's directive. It was call Admiral Sherman's understanding sthatt letter and make it permanent until suchrtime as theyCoreferre ngre s
to ... that it it would ld freeze
passed an adequate organic law for the Central Intelligence Agency." He called it "a stop-
gap device." However, vYe r, if the congressmen do hehed to make doubly certain of this fact, he
thought "eight
t
Both Sherman and General Norstad explained the background
wanted to de Lion. "It
was not the Central Intelligence Group, " said Sherman, legislation until a later time." It was he and Norstad who thought the inclusion of the CIA's
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functions would produce a demand for elaborating the functions of all the agencies involved
in the act and would, therefore, produce "a very bulky volume." Norstad further explained
that the details of the CIG legislation were of such scope and importance that he and others
felt they could not be satisfactorily handled in the unification bil1.`s
As with the status of the DCI, the explanations did not satisfy. As drafted, the bill
declared that the functions, of the NIA and the DCI and the functions,
personnel, propertr',
and records of CIG were transferred to the NSC, the new DCI, and the CIA, respectively.
The bill was silent, however, on such other elements of the President's 1946 letter as the
membership of the NIA, the role of the LAB, and the limitations on CIG's activities.
Presumably every word of the President"s letter was carried over into the proposed
legislation. On the face of it., t certainly did not read that way. Changes were unavoidable.
Meanwhile, CIG enabling legislation had been much talked about in the hearings but
had not yet been submitted. When the drafters of the unification bill had replaced the CIG
text by a few lines of reference to the Federal Register, CIG thought it had been given "a
green light" to proceed on its own. Hence, there a
whil
e
substantially faithful to earlier drafts, this one showedaaedislike ford the size ofrthe e ford the
NSC and recommended in its place, as far as the CIA would be affected, a smaller council
consisting of the secretaries of State and National Defense and the President's representa-
tive, with the DCI as an additional nonvoting member.
When this draft, or news of it, reached the White House, the reaction was chilly.
"C.I.G. is up to its old tricks again," George Elsey reported to Clark Clifford. "'It has
submitted `informally'," he wrote, "the draft of a proposed bill to be submitted to Congress
very similar to the two previous drafts which Vandenberg has sent to you in recent months
and which you filed without further action." [emphasis added] He reported that George
Schwarzwalder of the Budget Bureau had called for guidance on the matter. Elsey said he
suggested that C.I.G. be informed that there was no necessity for such legislation in view of
11 the sections concerning intelligence which are included
Bureau, reported Elsey? in the Unification Bill." TLe Budget
concurred with that suggestion and would so inform CIG.`6
Just why and for how long the White House intended to bar the introduction of
separate CIA legislation is riot clear. From the administration's point of view there were
understandable political reasons for withholding additional and controversial legislation. On
the other hand the White House staff had apparently not taken easily to CIG's pressure for
a break with the concept of the organization as laid out in the President's letter and as
envisioned by the President, Harold Smith, and the State Department. Whatever the
motivation, the White House had soon to reckon with congressional dissatisfaction with the
CIA section as drafted. As early as April I Admiral Sherman and General Vandenberg
were publicly assuring Senator Tydings that a separate bill was ready for submission at the
appropriate time. In the House hearings there was talk not only of including that bill with
the National Security Act but also of taking it up first.
CIG's Walter Pforzheimer, the legislative liaison chief, naturally reported to Vanden-
berg, and then Hillenkoetter, on the course of the hearings, especially in the House, and on
the questioning as it affected vital concerns of CIG. Accordingly, the March 10 draft was
successively revised on April 9, June 9, 16, and 28. On June 12 Pforzheimer had assured
Ohio's Brown that "we would wish to place our bill in the hopper after the bill on unification
had passed." Brown, who had once admitted to being "overly suspicious" about the growth
of military power, said CIG "might conveniently `forget' to do so." 51 Meanwhile, the fate
and character of that CIA bill was largely dependent on the hearings before the
Fxpenditures Committee, hearings which by mid-June were still going strong.
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The suspicious Brown, when he made his remark about "forgetting," had immediately in
mind the weakness of executive orders, the turnover of military directors, the vagueness on
functions, and the need for writing into the bill adequate safeguards against potential abuses.
All these had frequently been raised in relationship to the third major question that dominated
the House hearings, namely, the fear of establishing a gestapo. Germany's secret state police,
which operated at home and abroad, had become for Americans perhaps the most abhorred of
all Nazi institutions. That such an infernal machine might be constructed by some future dic-
tatorial DCI-not of course a Souers, a Vandenberg, or a Hillenkoetter-on the foundation of
a foreign intelligence agency, built by Americans for Americans, was a possibility that
troubled many in and out of Congress. Walter Trohan had written effectively, however
unfairly, when he had coupled Donovan's postwar plan with that hated institution.
The fear had been well-expressed by Brown, who had first raised it on April 25. He
foresaw a military DCI-bad enough from his point of view-who possessed undefined
powers and suffered no limitations, and who was thereby enabled to carry on domestic and
foreign investigations that might serve the purposes of national security but might equally
well infringe upon the rights of all American citizens." The specter could only be banished
from his mind by legislative definition of the agency's powers and limitations.
Basically the administration spokesmen did not disagree with Brown and others who
shared his view. A ban on domestic police functions had been accepted as a matter of course
long before Congress had ever taken up the issue. It had been included in Donovan's plan, in
the JCS plan, and in Truman's letter of 1946. Admiral Sherman thought, undoubtedly quite
honestly, that that letter's provision against CIG's exercise of police, law enforcement, and
internal security functions had been effectively carried over into the proposed bill; and in any
case he assured Representative Harness that if that were not the case the deficiency "could
be rectified with very few words." " Finally, there was no draft of a separate CIA enabling
act that did not contain the provision, and CIG was ready to insert it in the unification bill.
The administration had other reasons for thinking the gestapo fear groundless. All
knew, as the President's letter made clear, that the agency was solely concerned with foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence related to the national security, and that correlatively it
had no interest in or responsibility for domestic security or policing. Dr. Bush, who saw "no
danger" of CIA becoming a gestapo, also pragmatically suggested that the FBI was an
effective obstacle to the agency "get[ting] beyond control" and becoming "an improper
affair." 60
Another reason, a constitutional lawyer's reason, was well brought out by Rep. John W.
McCormack, Democrat of Massachusetts, in his questioning of General Edson. The latter
categorically declared in his prepared statement that the bill "open[ed] the door toward a
potential gestapo or NKVD. ..." Pressed by McCormack, Edson said CIA should have
broad powers as a clearing agency for intelligence but that "in police powers ... it should be
quite restricted." What did Edson mean by "police powers?" He was thinking "of such
things as Secret Service, largely powers which are now performed by the FBI." You mean,
interjected Henry J. Latham (Rep., N.Y.) "snooping on civilians?" Yes. "Did you think,"
asked McCormack, "that this [CIA] will take over the FBI or the Secret Service or any of
those agencies?" You cannot tell from this legislation, said Edson, what the agency was
going to do. "It has no power to do it," replied McCormack; "under this bill there is no
power to do that, General." Explaining his questioning, the Massachusetts Democrat said he
was trying to see what in the General's position was "based on fear." Having shown that the
agency had no police powers, McCormack said he hoped Edson's "fears would be
dissipated." 61
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Based on fear or fact, the gestapo specter required a more effective counterforce than
an unexpressed carry-over from a presidential directive which some insisted-quite
unreasonably, the administration thought---could be rewritten at any time regardless of
congressional action.
On June 27, when the Senate Armed Services Committee had already reported out a
revised bill, the Hoffman committee went into executive session to consider Representative
Busbey's query about the "rumors" he had heard about CIG's operational activities. The
rumors, elevated to the status of reliable reports, received considerable press attention in
mid-May. The New York Times reported that the NIA had compelled the liquidation of two
government. undercover services and supplanted them by its own secret intelligence system.
Liquidated, according to the account, were a world-wide secret intelligence network
conducted by the War Department and the FBI's service in Latin America. Officials
familiar with the changes, ran the account, criticized them for replacing two wartimie-tested
organizations by a new network. The Army network, continued the Times, was said to have
made "an important contribution" to wartime intelligence." The paper probably obtained
the core of its report, especially about the hitherto unknown Army unit, from one or more of
the witnesses who appeared before Hoffman's committee on June 27.
CIG was clearly disturbed by the numerous newspaper articles alleging its usurpation
of various departmental functions and its expulsion of established organizations from the
operational field. The new DCI, Admiral Hillenkoetter, asked the NIA at the meeting on
June 26 to sign a. letter of explanation, which he had prepared, for dispatch to Repre-
sentative Hoffman. The letter declared that they, the NIA, had, pursuant to the President's
January directive, authorized the CIG to conduct all organized Federal espionage and
counterespionage operations outside the United States. Patterson, Forrestal, Leahy, and
General Marshall, who had recently become Secretary of State, had no problem with the
letter. Forrestal was assured by Admiral Hillenkoetter that the official policy had been
endorsed by General Donovan. J. Edgar Hoover, as well as the present heads of ONI and
G-2, Admiral Inglis and Maj. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin. Undoubtedly both this news and
the letter were delivered by CIG to Hoffman ahead of the bearing on June 27.63
At issue was centralization of clandestine collection of intelligence in the CIG rather
than decentralization in departmental services. For CIG General Vandenberg explained that
centralization had been recommended to the NIA by the IAB because of CIG's clear
authorization to perform certain services of common concern. Centralization, he argued, was
also more economical, efficient, and secure. Other witnesses, opposing centralization,
defended the record of departmental services and the efficiency and security of their
operations. Additionally they argued that while the country needed an evaluating and
coordinating agency such an agency should not also be an operating, or collecting, agency
lest it grow too powerful and absorb or destroy the other services.' Both sides had their pros
and cons, but the testimony of Vandenberg, a former G-2 chief and now DCI, and the letter
from the NIA apparently carried the clay with the committee.
The hearings, which had begun on April 2, promised to go on much longer when on
June 23 Secretary of the Navy Forrestal issued a general message lifting Navy restrictions
on the appearance of naval personnel before congressional committees. The message,
removing what many had considered a convenient gag on Navy and Marine opponents of the
bill, encouraged many officers to offer testimony. As of June 24, ten more days of hearings
had been scheduled; among those listed was General Donovan. The list had barely been
typed, however, when the committee voted to end the hearings on July 1; the chairman pro-
tested, but the gag was reimposed.
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3. OUT OF COMMITTEE AT LAST
Unhappy as he was with the gag, Hoffman was even unhappier with the entire bill. He
had been opposed to it from the beginning but had recognized the determination of his
committee majority to report out a bill. Hence when they turned to that business, Hoffman
introduced a new bill (H.R. 3979) to make "a bitter dose of medicine of doubtful value ...
less distasteful, less harmful by every conceivable device and provision." b The new bill had
been drafted by Marine General Edson. Its intelligence provisions reflected the concerns that
had been voiced throughout the hearings. The DCI was appointed simply "from civilian
life," and the provision protecting a military man's benefits was eliminated; the DCI's salary
was reduced to $12,000, one-fourth less than that assigned the head of the National Security
Resources Board. The bill, spelling out the agency's functions, made no mention of
operations or services of common concern. Of course, the anti-gestapo provision was inserted.
From the point of view of CIG the bill was objectionable.66
The entire bill was much worked over by the subcommittee to which the mark-up of a
bill had been assigned on June 25. This subcommittee consisted of Hoffman's three fellow-
Republicans-Wadsworth and Latham of New York, and George H. Bender of Ohio-and
the Democratic minority of McCormack of Massachusetts, Carter Manasco of Alabama,
and Chet Holifield of California. The combination of the three Democrats, who were
generally pledged to the administration's bill, and Wadsworth, a House veteran and a strong
supporter of the measure, gave the bill a 4-3 edge in the subcommittee. All were influenced
to some extent by the Navy and Marine opposition that had swollen in the last two weeks of
the hearings. On July 12 they approved their revised unification bill.
When announced to the press, it was reported that it was with the CIA provisions that
the subcommittee had made its major changes in the measure as already passed by the
Senate itself. Chairman Hoffman announced that his group had added a provision which
was intended to prevent the creation of a gestapo. Hoffman also said he would call the full
committee together in an effort to rush the measure to the floor of the House.67 Adjournment
fever was rising, and the bills were piling up.
The full committee met on July 15, made some more changes, and reported out a bill.
What had started out in the House as H.R. 2319 had been replaced by H.R. 3979,
Hoffman's substitute, and had now become a revision numbered H.R. 4214. Substantively,
reported the New York Herald Tribune, the House made five changes in the measure as
passed by the Senate, and one of these affected the DCI. So that he could not establish a
gestapo, reported the paper, his representatives "would have ono law enforcement powers,
other than [!] police, subpoena and internal security powers. Of course the DCI was
denied all those powers!
In fact there were other changes in the text of the intelligence section (Appendix W),
and many of these reflected the concerns that had been voiced throughout the hearings. The
DCI was appointed "from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or from
individuals in civilian life." His salary was raised to $14,000, the same as that now given to
the Chairman of the Resources Board, $500 less than that of the defense secretary. The DCI
was not made a nonvoting member of the NSC.
Retaining protection for the military privileges and benefits of any military DCI, the
committee also added a new section, Sec. 105(b)1(B), denying him exercise of military
authority over any military units or personnel other than such as he might rightly exercise as
the DCL The House committee made sure he did not become a military dictator.
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The committee spelled out the agency's functions. In doing so, it borrowed heavily from
Truman's letter of January 22, 1946. It really only rewrote and shifted paragraphs around,
added one new function, and ascribed all the functions not to the DCI but to the CIA. The
new functions, really implicit in the President's letter, and a partial substitute for not being a
nonvoting NSC member, was that of advising the council on the government's intelligence
activities. Otherwise the agency was directed to make recommendations on coordination,
produce and disseminate finished intelligence, perform services of common concern, and
perform such other functions affecting national security as the NSC might direct.
As expected, there were explicit limitations on CIA's activities. The agency had "no po-
lice, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions"; all but "subpoena"
had been taken over from the President's letter. The director was made responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Interestingly
enough, the committee did not retain the letter's paragraph nine banning investigations in
the United States; on that paragraph's first test in the IAB, which, incidentally, was
nowhere mentioned in H.R. 4214, that provision had been recognized by the FBI as too
broad.
The bill included, at CIG's request, another new provision, Sec. 105(c). The CIG had
been embarrassed by questions of, for instance, security, loyalty, alcoholism, and homosex-
uality that had been raised about some of the personnel it had acquired along with the For-
eign Broadcast Intelligence Service,, The DCI felt he needed the authority, in the interests of
security, to have "the right to fire at will," despite usual Civil Service requirements.61 The
new section therefore authorized him, in his discretion, to terminate the employment of any
person when he deemed it advisable in the interests of the United States.
The unification bill, with its CIA section, had at last been reported out of the
House committee; the next stage in congressional consideration was debate in the House
itself.
4. DEBATE, PASSAGE, SIGNATURE
That debate, a lengthy and spirited one, took place against the background of extensive
newspaper discussion of intelligence and only slight discussion in the Senate.
In the spring of 1947 the. reader of at least the metropolitan press had access to steady
coverage of intelligence and its organization within the American government. The air was
full of news of the investigation of Pearl Harbor, the abolition of OSS, the establishment of
the NIA and CIG, the discovery of Soviet spying in Canada, and ominous developments in
the Cold War. In that atmosphere certain ideas on intelligence became commonplace.
First, intelligence was recognized as a necessity in peace as well as in war. It was more
than military and naval intelligence, which were long viewed as wartime necessities but only
departmental holding operations in peace; rather was intelligence now seen as the broadest
and yet most specific kind of information continuously needed in the conduct of national af-
fairs. Second, the subject required a much more effective organization and more support
than the armed services and the country as a. whole had ever provided in the past. Third, the
traditional services needed to be coordinated so that intelligence on hand was not wasted but
was available to those who needed it in the national interest; a coordinator was a necessity.
Fourth, espionage was also a necessity. The country, so righteous before the war, had
changed its mind on this subject as readily as had Mr. Stimson. In 1929, "when the world
was striving with good will for lasting peace, and ...all the nations were parties"' to the
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effort, Stimson, then Secretary of State, banned the reading of other nations' codes and
closed the Black Chamber. In World War II, however, "the situation was different," and
Stimson suffered no qualms of conscience. The national flip-flop was reported by the
Christian Science Monitor: "it is generally agreed that a good intelligence service is the first
line of military defense today. `Aha!' says the average American. `Spies!' Yes, spies-such as
all the major nations of the world maintain in order to know what the others are up to.
There is no use being coy about the subject." 70 Henry Wallace had called spying "hellish,"
but few Americans seemed to agree with him. None in the Congress voiced that sentiment.
So accepted were these ideas that none was argued when intelligence became a subject
of national legislation in 1947. What little discussion and controversy there was centered on
those points that were simultaneously being aired vigorously in the House hearings. That
airing, both in and out of Congress, had been aided and abetted by two events, the
appointment of Admiral Hillenkoetter to succeed Vandenberg, and the other-more a
campaign than an event-a combined assault on CIG undertaken by some G-2 and press
elements.
While Truman had not announced the appointment of Hillenkoetter until May 1, the
likelihood of the appointment was common talk throughout March and April. The
imminence of still another new DCI in so short a time was bad enough; but when that
change was seen in the light of the proposed legislation's marked preference for a military
DCI, the resulting opposition to a continued rapid turnover of generals and admirals was
considerable. The opposition reflected a consensus that the job was essentially civilian in
character, that only a civilian could bring to the job the element of permanence that seemed
needed. The public and the Pentagon approached this problem from opposite ends: the public
much preferred a civilian but had to accept the current military incumbent and the
theoretical possibility that the best man might be a military man; the Pentagon much
preferred a military man but in view of the opposition had to leave the door open to a civil-
ian simply as a practical necessity. The Pentagon was definitely on the defensive on the
issue.
The assault on CIG had been touched off by the revelation of the liquidation of the G-2
clandestine unit and the FBI's SIS in Latin America. The assault was taken up with great
vigor by the McCormick-Patterson press, especially by reporter Walter Trohan and
columnist John O'Donnell. The latter wrote on June 12 of "a furious behind-the-scenes
battle" in which the espionage experts of G-2 were fighting a life-and-death struggle against
the efforts of CIG to absorb them and set up "a super-duper gestapo-OSS cloak-and-
dagger organization." On June 15 Trohan, combining his interpretation and leaked
information, charged that "CIG secretly creates U.S. `Gestapo' of 1,500 agents." CIG, he
wrote, had "forced" the War Department to liquidate its "worldwide secret intelligence
work" and had "effected the disbanding" of the FBI's "extensive undercover system in
South America." A week later he reported the agency intended to spend over $12,000,000
annually on the salaries of over 1,500 "super spies" in the U.S. and abroad. On June 24
O'Donnell reported that "this week some of our deeply disturbed professional spies are
arguing their case behind closed doors against the present Central Intelligence Group which
is by way of becoming a super-duper peacetime cloak and dagger office of strategic services
setup." CIG was basically accused of using the phrase "services of common concern" as a
device for making itself an operating as well as a coordinating and evaluating agency. For
this and other reasons the Chicago Tribune editorialized on June 23 that Congress "should
kill this dangerous excrescence upon government." 71 It was such publicity that had prompted
Hillenkoetter to ask the NIA to send Clare Hoffman a letter of explanation.
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Despite this assault there had been discussion but no debate in the public press. Both
the McCormack-Patterson press and General Donovan had been opposed, for quite opposite
reasons, to the proposed CIA, but in the face of presidential, departmental, and congres-
sional support behind the unification bill, neither had been able to muster enough opposition
to generate: a lengthy, detailed controversy over the major points of the bill's intelligence sec-
tion. The proposed CIA was generally considered very necessary, long overdue, and, while
not perfect, capable of improvement in the light of experience.
In the Senate likewise there was no debate. The Armed Services Committee had
reported out the bill on June 5. It was laid before the Senate on July 2, when Senator
Gurney made a long speech in its defense. Quite in passing he referred to the CIA as filling
"a long-recognized demand for accurate information upon which important decisions,
relating to foreign. and military policy, can. be based." On July 7 Senator Robertson of Wyo-
rning attacked the entire bill for creating "a. vast military empire" which would exercise un-
paralleled power over the military establishment and "untrammeled power over the entire
social and economic structure of the Nation." He described CIA, under a military DCI
possessing vaguely defined ;Functions, as "an invaluable asset to militarism." Returning to
the attack on July 9, he repeated the need to spell out the agency's functions and to make a
civilian DCI mandatory. The nearest thing to an answer to Robertson, who seemed more tol-
erated than rebutted, was the speech of Sen. Raymond E. Baldwin (D., Conn.) who asserted
the demonstrated need for a CIA, and who said it could be headed by a civilian if the Presi-
dent so desired.72
Robertson, a die-hard, had filed some twenty-five arnmendments to the bill. He offered
three of these; but. after they were rejected by voice vote, he gave up. Shortly thereafter, on
July 9, the amended S.758 was passed by voice vote and sent to the House. it will be
remembered that the original bill had only been amended so as to have the DCI appointed
"from the armed services or from civilian life."
Ten days later, July 19, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole on
the State of the Union for consideration of the bill (H.R.4214), as reported out, of the
Expenditures Committee. With Francis Case (R., S. Dak.) in the chair, and with a
maximum of five hours set for debate, Representative Wadsworth of New York opened the
argument for the bill. Hedescribed CIA as "a gathering point for information coming from
all over the world through all kinds of channels concerning the potential strength of other
nations and their political intentions." There was "nothing secret about that," he said; all
nations did "the same thing." He assured the House the agency was subject to the National
Security Council and did "not act independently." It. was, he said, something the country
had never had but now recognized as a permanent necessity."
The first opposition came from Busbey of Illinois. While he too favored the establish-
ment of CIA, he had two major worries. He wanted it made clear, when the time came for
amendments, that there was no possibility of the agency's "going into the records and books
of the FBI," because the bureau was riot concerned, he said, with foreign intelligence.
Second, he wanted the agency barred from the collection of intelligence and restricted to
evaluating, correlating, and disseminating intelligence.,,
Walter Judd of Minnesota was also concerned. While he said there could be "no
difference of opinion" about the "need and. importance" of CIA, he said there was "a wide
difference of opinion" as to the handling of intelligence. His first problem was the collection
of intelligence, but on this subject he evidenced some confusion. According to him "the
practice presently established" provided for all collection, as well as correlation, evaluation,
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he pferred having and dissemination, being done
but alslo permit the CIA to h ve its other own separate collection
collection, which was then tinguish clandestine and t r in all r f
continue to collect intelligence centralized e i His Ccon IG, i rom nonclandestine fcollection,cwhich current practice, the proposed bill,
the bill as written
po nt.
ri all what. he himself preferred on this particular words,
did and r pro vi ive de
his
from
d dequate
point What Judd was not confused
concern, about, of military control oflthe agency. He thought a
He also military
wanted ton"monly aker sure that
civilian view, was his other cbecame as DCI "the wisest course," refe ably, reigning accept
becam ame a civilian by retiring or,
this powerful Agency and especially its secret or clandestine collection activities can never
come under control of, military men or organizations." A. Wh
it speakers, also favoed a
e Harness of Indiana, like the he other
first proposedr he hadinow ,conic fo achad had
"some fear and doubt about " It was, he explained, "a bold departure from
"as essential to our national l security.
American tradition." The had ofrp before ace as fans announ d rted and tf x d,policy ,7 a. 11 of
secret and strategic information
gthose who were pressing so hard for a civilian as DCL oal, but the "prolonged hearings and executive sessions of that
Harness ptook refer hat as with
co did not e ne beefer that as a
a
cou committee behind closed dor country had had little a peer en en nthisifie d and most olfthe
d t
found. After all, he said, the the
few ew experienced ed and qualified men available geswere tapo, land he prferredna clv lean butiwheee
want to be misunderstood: he too opposed a with a good answer: "no attempt has been
could one be found? Hours later, Busbey came up
made to find a civilian.""
spoke of the
W. J. Bryan Dorn (D., S. Car.), strongly supporting the bill in its entirety, scountry's prewar "woeful lack
was ~a?comicncharacMost
ref tothoughttheAdolfpoteHitlential power
Editorialists the newspapers and peop
the through
Pacific, the winter tJapan c
"coming could not survive three
thought observation aton posts" in last
"corning back from m Washington was stunned when Paris fell in 1940. People
weeks of war with this country.
Am r can
that t mtack were marshalling Ito edestroysummarized,
thought Mussolini was bluffing, those forced
the "total lack of knowledge
democracy." He wanted the gentlemen of the House to realize that CIA was "a very
important part" of the bill.79 problems,
Unlike Dorn, Rep. Ralph E. Church (R., Ill.) found in the bill many p
including the intelligence section. Not that he was opposed either to intelligence or a CIA.
Pearl Harbor, he said, proved the national backwardness of the somcoun e emps finis lligence uwork; pon
indeed for him it was "somewhat reassuring" to have d
however, feared an American
intelligence as an element of national security. He too,
military gestapo, and he did not think the amended bill provided adequate guarantees on f the
agency
was that score. Seeing no reason for a that military qua qualified since
civilian could." foe d for the job ao
purely military," he was confident out
h still
a Hi of oliwn fenia ar of one, and proclaim ng his ownlzeal a for c vil libert e st e
againft
ship. Protesting his written
protect
upon the
the believed and the committee aof a domesticpol ce force."iHe wanted "toe impresinvasion of
minds nd the subpoena na
mndof the Members" that the work of the agency was "strictly" confined to "the field of
secret foreign intelligence-what is known as clandestine intelligence."
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When five hours of debate had ended, and the bill was opened to amendment, fully half
of the next two to three hours was taken up with amendments of the CIA Portion (Sec. 105),
and almost all of this time was devoted to consideration of two amendments by Judd of
Minnesota.
His first amendment was aimed at making the DCI a civilian. He proposed the
elimination of those thirty-four lines, Sec. 105(b), which both freed any military officer from
military control and denied to him exercise of military powers other than such as he was
entitled to as director; in their place he proposed a requirement that any military appointee
be ineligible for the job unless he had first either resigned his commission or retired from his
service.82
The bill, as written, he said, aimed at the same objectives as did he, but he said that it
did not go far enough. It sounded fine, he said, "but all of us, being human beings, surely
know that if a one-star general is Director of Intelligence, and a two-star general or a three-
star general talks to him, it is wholly unrealistic to imagine that they will not have influence
over him, despite the law."' He wanted that one-star general to become a civilian--in fact,
not just in law-so that he would have "no divided loyalties," so that he would! "`not be
standing with one foot in the civilian trough and one foot in the military trough." Judd
wanted any man who took the DCI job to take it as Allen Dulles had recommended to the
committee, namely, as if he were going into the monastery. "He ought to take it," said Judd,
"as J. Edgar Hoover has taken the FBI job-make it his life's work." 83
Pressed by Harness as to what difference it really made as to whether an officer was or
was not retired, Judd admitted that of course his heart might still be with his branch of serv-
ice but his "organic connection" would be broken. As the bill was written, continued Judd, a
military man always had the option of returning to his service; to do that, Judd pointed out,
he had "to keep his bridges intact, his military fences in good repair." Judd wanted none of
that."
Alabama's Carter Manasco, a strong supporter of the entire bill and former chairman
of the Expenditures Committee, rose in opposition to the amendment. Perhaps the long day
had begun to weary him, or perhaps the long months listening to the same fear about a ge-
stapo and a military dictatorship had begun to take its toll; he did not address himself to the
merits of the amendment. Instead he declared that the section on central intelligence had
been given more study by the subcommittee and the full committee than any other section of
the bill, that it had been a most difficult section to write, and that the section as written ade-
quately protected the position that was basically shared by all, despite their differing ideas
on it. He started to discuss the merits of the case; but then mindful of the secret sworn tes-
timony he had heard and fearing to divulge something that might give comfort to some
potential enemy, he invoked "the patriotism" of men like Wadsworth, McCormack,
Holifield, Latham, and Hoffman as a guarantee that they had worked out language barring
the building of "a so-called military hierarchy." 85
Holifield, Bushey, and McCormack then spent much time arguing both the relative
merits of the bill as rewritten and Judd's amendment. Holifield and McCormack made it
quite clear that they too preferred a civilian but, confronted with a rear admiral as DCI,
they felt they had to protect both the integrity of the position, as freed from military control,
and the military benefits that both Hillenkoetter and his family had a right to expect and to
have defended. They thought their bill the best practical method of protecting both the
position and Hillenkoetter. Busboy thought the Judd amendment was adequate on both
scores and had the additional advantage of ending the rapid turnover of admirals and
generals and of working toward permanence in the occupation of the post.96
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Then up stood Ohio's Clarence Brown to end the debate, to cut the gordian knot:
eliminate fifty-two lines, and replace them by only three words! He offered a substitute
amendment: have the DCI appointed "from civilian life." That ended any argument, he said.
That was fine with him, said Judd. He had been "trying to go halfway between requiring
that the man to be appointed be wholly a civilian, and giving a chance for men now in the
military service to take the job as civilians, but without losing their retirement rights."
Brown would have no truck with a halfway measure; the only important thing, he said once
again, was I'he people's fear of a military government and a gestapo; the CIA needed, he
said, to be put in charge of a civilian like J. Edgar Hoover.87
Under questioning Brown explained that his substitute amendment required a military
man not just to retire but to resign from the service. A retired officer, he explained, could
always be called back into the service, whereas one who had resigned was no longer under
the control or the direction of the military. Judd, falling in quickly with Brown, thought the
right man for the job would not mind resigning and sacrificing his retirement rights, though
Judd had been striving to protect those rights. He pointed out that the salary of $14,000 was
"far above" the DCI's salary as an officer. Brown said that under his amendment one did
not have to figure out what commission an officer should have when he retired or what
perquisites he should have, and so on. His amendment, he said, was "a very simple solution"
to such problems. That it was; and, time for discussion having expired, Brown's substitute
for Judd's amendment was put to the vote, and it carried." The House had clearly opted for
a civilian.
Judd's second amendment, aimed at protecting the FBI, was less controversial and less
complicated. Judd proposed a slight rewording of Sec. 105(b), which covered the DCI's
access to the government's intelligence and intelligence operations. To the extent
recommended by the NSC and approved by the President, said that section, such
intelligence operations "of the departments and other agencies" as related to national
security were "open[ed] to the inspection" of the DCI, and such intelligence as related to the
national security and was possessed by those "departments and other agencies" was made
available to the DCI. Judd moved to strike the words "and other agencies" from the first
half of the section so that the DCI would have no right of "inspection" of the FBI.89
The Minnesotan explained that any FBI information relating to national security had
to be made available to the DCI for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination, but his
amendment, he said, denied the DCI "the right to go down into and inspect the intelligence
operations of agencies like the FBI as he would of the departments." He thought the DCI
ought not to be given the "power to reach into the operations of J. Edgar Hoover and the
FBI, which are in the domestic field." He thought the DCI should not go into the FBI and
find out "who their agents are, what and where their nets are, how they operate, and thus
destroy their effectiveness." 90
Judd said yes, when Busbey asked him if he understood the bill as written gave the
DCI "the right, the power, and the authority to go down and inspect any records of the FBI
which deal with internal security." Not only its records, said Judd, but also its operations, its
activities, and its agents. Judd assured Manasco of Alabama that under his amendment the
FBI would still have to make available to the DCI any information it had relative to national
security. Holifield thought the DCI's need for the approval of both the NSC and the
President was adequate guarantee against infringement on FBI territory. Judd, supported by
Busbey and Representative Thomas of the House Un-American Activities Committee,
thought the FBI operations "should be protected beyond question." The Committee of the
Whole also agreed with Judd; the motion was carried."
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Another amendment of the intelligence section was offered by Rep. W. Sterling Cole
(R., N.Y.), a strong opponent of the bill. Cole wanted to make certain that the intelligence
disseminated by the CIA was the evaluated as well as the original unevaluated intelligence.
His auditors obviously thought his motion nitpicking. If the language of the bill, said
Holifield, did not provide for that, then he did "not understand any of the language."
Hoffman impatiently noted that if the members "go over this bill and change every comma
and period and put it [sic] three words down or three words ahead," they would be there all
night. Cole had already admitted his amendment was "not of great importance." Agreeing
with him, the House rejected it, and that ended any further discussion of the CIA section of
the bill.92
After eight hours of debate of the bill and amendments, the Committee rose, and its
chairman, Representative Case, reported to the Speaker of the House, who had now resumed
the chair, that the Committee of the Whole had considered H.R.4214, made sundry
amendments, and recommended that the bill as amended (Appendix X) be passed. By voice
vote it was done. The House then immediately took up the Senate version (S.758), which had
been passed on July 9; and, having replaced everything after the enacting clause by its own
bill's provisions, the House passed that measure also.
That was Saturday evening, July 19. When reported the next morning, great
prominence was given the CIA section. Even after passage, it was reported, some House
members feared that a military dictatorship, a gestapo, or an OGPU, could rise from the
unification of the armed forces and related civilian agencies. "Attention and suspicion,"
reported the New York Times, "centered upon the proposed central intelligence agency."
Hence, the agency's director was required to be either "a civilian or a service man entirely
cut loose from the armed forces and `their influence.' " Also, the committee took
"precautions against the intelligence service being employed on `internal' matters such as a
gestapo or OGPLJ," and so it wrote the bill "to deprive the agency of police or subpoena
powers and put in other restrictions." Finally, the bill gave the agency access to the files of
such as the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission but barred "burrowing into [their] op-
erations and methods." Representative Wadsworth, whose opening description and defense
of the agency were reported, was credited with opposition to "restrictions which would
cripple the work of the intelligence agency." 93
The House bill, fundamentally similar to the Senate bill, had now to go to a joint con-
ference to iron out differences. On CIA these were considerable. First, on the DCI, the
House required that he be a civilian and be paid $14,000 yearly; the Senate provided for
appointment from military or civilian life and salary of $12,000. Second, the House spelled
out the functions of the agency, whereas the Senate only referred to their location in the
Federal Register. Third, the House also spelled out limitations on the agency, whereas the
Senate, though making reference to the Register, said nothing explicit about them. Fourth,
the House had added two new paragraphs, one on the DCI's "right to fire at will" and the
other on the inspection of other departments' and agencies' intelligence operations relating to
national security and access to whatever intelligence they possessed on that subject.
As far as CIG was concerned, either bill was acceptable but the House bill was
preferred. It gave the DCI an extra- $2,000, which was considered "more in keeping with the
relative importance of the position within the national security structure." It gave the
director unusual power to fire any employee, and it delineated the functions of the agency
"more clearly" than did the President's original directive. Of course the CIG was most
anxious to change the House requirement on a civilian DCI. The provision was considered
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"an unfortunate restriction" on the President's appointment power. The necessity for Senate
confirmation was considered adequate guarantee of a proper selection. Had the limitation
been in effect during the war, it was pointed out, Colonel Donovan, as an interwar reserve
officer, could not have been appointed head of OSS. The likelihood that the DCI-the
unpublicized head of a small organization concerned with foreign intelligence-could or
would establish a military dictatorship or a gestapo was judged "an excessive interpretation
of the facts." 94
The resolution of differences was taken up by conferees of both houses on July 21. The
Senate stood firm on permitting a military man to be DCI if the President should so decide;
the language agreed upon was that of the House bill as reported out of committee and before
it was amended on July 19; hence, the DCI was appointed "from among the commissioned
officers of the armed services or from among individuals in civilian life." Sections
guaranteeing his freedom from military control, nonexercise of military power, and
enjoyment of his military benefits were of course included. His salary was kept at the
House's $14,000.95
The Senate had no difficulty accepting a delineation of the agency's functions and
restrictions thereon or the director's right to terminate a person's employment. On Judd's
amendment protecting the FBI against CIA inspection there was considerable rewriting.
First, omitted was any power to inspect the intelligence operations of any department or
agency. Second, only intelligence in those organizations was open to inspection. Third, the
FBI was directed to make available to the DCI, upon his specific written request, such intel-
ligence as related to the national security and was possessed by the bureau. All departments
and agencies were thereby protected against CIA inspection, and the FBI, having to respond
only to a written request, was considerably more protected than others when it came to
releasing intelligence to the agency, and then it had only to provide intelligence which was
"essential" to the national security. The conferees finished their work on July 24.96
As soon as this compromise bill, which was really the House bill (H.R.4214) under its
Senate number (S.758), was agreed upon, it was immediately sent to the Senate and quickly
accepted there by voice vote. When it was taken up in the House the next day, July 25,
Clare Hoffman explained his reluctant support of the whole measure simply as "the lesser of
two evils." The Congress was determined to have a unification bill, and so he had yielded to
political force majeure. On CIA, Hoffman explained that the Senate conferees had "flatly
refused" to accept the Judd-Brown amendment. Though they made certain other conces-
sions, he said, "they stood pat" on that amendment. He described the point as one of the
"three more important points in the legislation as it went to conference"; the other two pro-
tected the Marines against being reduced to "the status of a police force" and safeguarded
naval aviation for the Navy.97
McCormack reminded the House that the Expenditures Committee had definitely
favored a civilian DCI but had yielded to the practicalities of the situation and had written
in originally a provision guaranteeing that any military occupant of the post held it as
essentially a civilian position. McCormack also reminded his colleagues that the compromise
took care of the immediate situation and that they would have another chance at the issue
when CIG's, or CIA's, enabling legislation came before the House. He had of course
opposed the Judd-Brown amendment when it was proposed. Judd thought not requiring a
civilian as DCI was a mistake, but on the whole he was satisfied; 98 the compromise was, in
fact, closer to his "halfway" measure. Clarence Brown had nothing to say about the
rejection of his "very simple solution."
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Indeed, nothing more remained to be said on the bill. The Senate had quickly passed it,
and the House was as eager as the Senate to adjourn. When Judd had spoken and
McCormack uttered final words of congratulation to both houses on a job well done,
Hoffman moved the question to a vote, and it carried by voice vote.
That was Friday evening, and on Saturday, July 26, 1947, the bill was hurriedly
readied for congressional signatures and delivery to the President for his signature. Truman
was ready to sign it, because he was in a hurry to submit his nomination of Secretary
Forrestal as the first Secretary of Defense and get it approved by the Senate before
adjournment.
Truman's readiness to sign became impatience when he received word from Grandview,
Missouri, of the deathbed illness of his 94-year old mother, Martha Ellen Truman. Truman's
plane, the Sacred Cow, was put on standby. Its departure was delayed one hour. When the
bill was signed by Senator Vandenberg as President pro tem of the Senate and by Speaker of
the House Joseph W. Martin, .Jr., of Massachusetts, it was rushed under police escort to the
President who was "tight- lipped" as he waited by the plane. He signed the measure in the
cabin of the plane, submitted the Forrestal nomination immediately thereafter--and was
happy to have it quickly approved---and took off for Missouri. His mother died before he
could reach her.99
Thus, Congress passed and the President signed into law the National Security Act of
1947, or Public Law 253 (Appendix Y). Insofar as its intelligence provisions are concerned, it
was pioneer legislation. Never before had the country, through its constitutional procedures,
accorded such formal recognition to the importance of intelligence both in peace and war.
Never before had the country established an independent agency of government to give
substance to the recognition. Never before: had the country officially, albeit tacitly,
authorized the conduct of foreign, peacetime espionage and counterespionage and "such
other" intelligence-related activities as the NSC might direct. It might also be claimed that
never before had this or any country so publicly and candidly enacted a law on such a deli-
cate subject.
The law established a Central Intelligence Agency "under" an NSC, which was headed
by the President. At the head of the CIA the law placed a Director of Central Intelligence,
who was appointed by the President, and who, whether military man or civilian, would serve
as a civilian. He was also given unusual authority to terminate any person's employment by
the agency and was given qualified access to the intelligence of other departments and
agencies. The agency was given five functions: to advise the NSC, to make recommendations
on coordination, to produce national intelligence, to perform services of common concern,
and to perform such other functions and duties as the NSC might direct. The agency was
denied any police or internal security functions, was obligated to protect its sources and
methods, and had to recognize the right of other departments and agencies to collect,
produce, and disseminate departmental intelligence.
As established, CIA was considerably stronger than the old CIG. The former was an
independent agency which had lost all trace of the thinking-"a cooperative, inter-
departmental activity"-which was characteristic of the State Department and the Bureau
of the Budget. Gone also was the separation of DCI and CIG, for under the new
dispensation the DCI "headed" the CIA, and thus head and body were organically
connected to one another..
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Lawrence R. Houston (shown here about 1972) was the principal drafter in CIG of the CIA
section of the National Security Act of 1947.
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Clark Clifford (in a 1949 photograph) helped draft the Na'rional Security Act of 1947, which
established the Central Intelligence Agency.
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Shown here in his World War II uniform is Walter L. Pforzheimer, who kept daily watch for
CIG on the passage through Congress of the National Security Act of 1947.
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#1 810110 f ongrsu of the InU4d I$~ of *oft
at qdl l(ru sitcom
Bran call hold at the Ciq d palhilrgtm as Friday. tlr third
day Of J6raanry. one rho wml niece 6taakad and larq iia a
AN ACT
'ro promote thle national security by providing for a Secretary of
Ikfense; for P Sational Military Emablishment; fora Department
of the :Artily, a Department of the Savyr and a Ikpartment of the
Air k'orae; and for the ooorclinatioo of the activities of the National
Military Eetabliishment with other departments and agencies of the
Oolmrnrnent eonrenled with the nallonal security.
[PUBLIC LAWS
[CHAPTER 3
Be i6 enadtrd by Me Senate and Rouse of Reprwentatieer of to
(0rilyd.Clnh?a o f .I merira in Crur~n-~~ n..rrnrblad,
911naT _La
That thin Act ,toy he cited ^s the "National Security Act of 1947".
TABLE OF CONTE.NT9
8- 2. Lkrlamti.. Of polky.
T"- I-CO oINAry, roc NATIONAL 8N ca rr
S.r. 101. \ntlunal H. rIt Conrail.
Bee. 10_, l'entni Iatelaaeoee Agency
Bee 101 Natloaal SeeaNty R ,ooear Board.
Tiri.? 11:-pn. NATIONAL alrr.rr.ur lttTAauasrnXT
Btr. 201. N.tlonal L11114ry Fitabllebment.
8- sm. M retie) oe IMforue.
W+.209 Military Atnlntnnee to the &eretary.
8w'.204. (bill.,. perso incl.
S. 203. DoIN-1 eat of the Awry.
B".'. 90d. Dep.rtmemt of the Navy.
Bra'. 201. Department of tb. Air Force.
Bea'. 900. U.Ited Stitt,. Air Force.
see. 200. Elfertive dam of tranafem.
S. 210. War Correll.
&,.211. Jolat Chk . Of Std!.
Bre.21& J.dnt ataf.
0ec,211. Nmnlone Byrd.
Dec. Zia Eeaeereh and Oevelnpn.nt Board.
Tyne !II-Y1eL'Ol)Naeaa
Bec. 101. CoerpaoYtlta Of Bacretarlw
ter.90! Under Smnre[arbr and Aa 1.tant Sern9rla
e e. SOg. Advlrlry Ooontittew and pemmnN,
ere, 004. /taroe d tmnfen4 civilian praetaid
B.305, Bartel; pe.,hkaa
Sec,109? Te .r of Ibade,
Arc. SM. AatborWtioa for nppeeprtata,.a
Sec Not Dalnltk[n
Oft. J(q. Bep.r,MIII .
Bn?, 110.. EBectlve data.
Bec.111. Bottea.toa t. tW F.*.1d.acy.
The original text of the National Security Act is preserved in the
Diplomatic Branch of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.-Stack
5 E 4, Row 12, Compartment At, Shelf 4.
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Src. 310. (a) The first sentence of section 202 (a) and sections 1,
2, 307, 308, 309, and 310 shall take effect immediately upon the enact-
ment of this Act.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), the provisions of this Act
shall take effect on whichever of the following days is the earlier:
The day after the day upon which the Secretary of Defense first
appointed takes office, or the sixtieth day after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act.
Sno. 311. Paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of section 1 of the Act
entitled "An Act to provide for the performance of the duties of the
office of President in case of the removal, resignation, death, or in-
ability both of the President and Vice President", approved July 18,
1947, is amended by striking out "Secretary of War" and inserting in
lieu thereof "Secretary of Defense", and by striking out "Secretary of
the Navy,".
President of she Senate pro temporo.
The 1947 act was first signed by Representative Martin and Senator
Vandenberg. It was then signed by President Truman in the cabin of his
plane just prior to taking off to see his dying mother.
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Gone also was the military sandwich. which was elemental to the JCS plan. In the first
place, the NSC was riot just a renamed NIA. For one thing it was headed by the President;
for another its area of responsibility was considerably different from and larger than just
intelligence; and for another it was a much larger body.'?? These factors provided the DCI
with outside control but also offered him considerably more freedom of action than had ever
been envisioned under the .JCS plan or experienced under the NIA system. In the second
place, the new legislation made no provision for art IAB or board of service intelligence
chiefs who would operate, in effect, as a rein on the DCI. While the DCI still had to reckon
with those chiefs as a practical necessity of interagency cooperation, he henceforward did so
from a much stronger legal position than he had hitherto enjoyed.'?'
There was still another source of independence for the DCL Congress had amply
asserted its hostility not only to the rapid turnover of military occupants of the post of DCI
but also and primarily to the very conception of the job as essentially military in character.
Hence, while reluctantly accepting the de facto situation of Admiral Hillenkoetter's
occupancy of the post, Congress had inserted provisions aimed both at freeing the DCI from
military control and also at preventing an overly ambitious DCI from becoming another
military "man on horseback." The sentiment and the provisions meant that Congress wanted
CIA headed by a civilian serving on a long-term basis and exercising his functions in an
essentially civilian status, free from undue military influence as well as departmental
control. Such thinking was foreign to the JCS plan, which contemplated an admiral or a
general serving a tour of duty as an "independent" DCI and then returning to ships or
troops. Such thinking was additionally a break with the actual practice that had quickly
taken root in CIG.
In spelling out the functions of the agency, Congress had basically rewritten the
provisions of the President's letter of January 1946, and of the JCS plan. It had thereby
accepted the basic conception of Donovan and the JIS civilians that an independent
central agency should be entrusted with a variety of functions. In particular, Congress
accepted the agency as a coordinating, producing, and operating agency. It also knew it
was authorizing foreign espionage and counterespionage, and it certainly provided
considerable freedom of action in additionally authorizing "such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the national security" as the NSC might direct.
At the same time., Congress was aware of the pioneer character of the legislation and
fearful of spawning a gestapo, and it labored mightily-more mightily than the situation
warranted--to spell out restrictions on CIA's domestic activities and thereby to
circumscribe its independence.
CIG had not obtained all it wanted. The DCI was not made a nonvoting member of the
National Security Council. The new agency was not given those important legal and
technical authorizations whose absence had hobbled the CIG administrations of Souers,
Vandenberg, and Hillenkoetter. Instead it had to wait two more years before the situation
was remedied by the passage of the "Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949," or Public
Law 110 (Appendix Z). The new agency had to wait until 1953 before it was given statutory
authority for the additionall post of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DX-.I). A
stipulation forbidding the simultaneous holding of both posts by commissioned officers of the
armed services opened the way to a civilian-military compromise whereby the agency has
been headed generally by a long-term civilian DCI and a short-term military DDCI and less
often by a military chief and a civilian deputy.10" CIG, despite some disappointments, was
satisfied with the law.
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That law was a return, organically and lineally, to the JCS plan; to the JCS plan as it
had evolved in response to the Donovan plan; to the JCS plan undiluted by Budget Bureau
and State Department hostility to a new agency; to the JCS plan strengthened, however, by
the Lovett board's advocacy of an independent budget; to the JCS plan broadened and
liberalized-from the CIA point of view-by the establishment of the Navy's (Eberstadt's)
presidentially-headed NSC; to the JCS plan shorn of the IAB.
Substantively and ultimately, however, that 1947 law was a return to the Donovan plan
itself; to the Donovan plan with its fundamental assertion of the high status of peacetime
intelligence; to the Donovan plan with its provocative proposal for a new, strong, central
agency; to the Donovan plan with its ideas of an agency headed by a civilian, serving the
President, and performing diverse functions. Yes, to the Donovan plan with its restrictions
on CIA's domestic activities.
In 1944 that Donovan plan had been rejected by the JIS civilians, who were
simultaneously provoked into translating their own conclusions regarding a new central
intelligence agency into a plan for such an agency. Their plan was the "missing link"
between OSS and CIA, which was referred to in the first Preface of this work. That plan,
drafted by their OSS member, closely approximating the Donovan plan, and weathering stiff
military blasts, ultimately triumphed as JCS 1181/5. But when that JCS plan later emerged
from almost two years of modifications, testing, and rewriting, it resembled the Donovan
proposal as much as the JIS counterproposal, which it had sparked. Where the two were
brought together was in the NSC where the DCI found a channel to the President, as
Donovan wanted, and where the departmental secretaries had some authority vis-a-vis the
DCI-as the JIS civilians wanted. Thus were the twin principles of independence and
control reconciled.
Clearly, many forces and persons had played a role in the shaping of the CIA section of
the 1947 act. First, too little attention has been paid to the impact in the prewar years of
Nazism on traditional American attitudes toward intelligence, espionage, and special
operations. It must be stressed, therefore, that six months before Pearl Harbor President
Roosevelt established an American organization for the conduct of just such activities.
Second, the Hoover commission was very close to the truth in 1955 when it concluded that
the CIA might "well attribute its existence to the attack on Pearl Harbor." The memory of
that surprise attack, which resulted in the greatest naval disaster in the country's history,
also constituted a general American resolve to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent
a recurrence. Third, in the early Cold War years the combination of atomic warfare and
Soviet hostility generated fears that intensified concern for national security. In short, fifteen
years of living in a troubled international world convinced Americans of the need for early,
full, and accurate knowledge of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of the great
and small powers of the world. In 1947 no one doubted the need for intelligence. The
American people were certainly ready for CIA.
As noted at the outset of this work, President Truman had no small idea of his
responsibility for the establishment of CIA. He, indeed, had made the choice of the JCS
over the State or McCormack plan, but that was an easy choice; otherwise Truman
contributed little, if anything, to the theory and structure of CIA. True, he had established
the NIA and the CIG and had provided the executive push that passage of the 1947 act
required, but in the circumstances he did no more, and probably did less, than Roosevelt
would have done. While Roosevelt might not have accepted the Donovan plan, he might very
well have accepted the JCS plan and immediately implemented it by executive order and/or
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provided for its submisson to Congress. It seems unlikely that FDR would have wasted much
time on the "cooperative interdepartmental activity" established by Truman in January
1946. Truman deserves some credit but not as much as he has given himself.
Congress certainly thought in 9941 that it had contributed significantly to the
soundness of the act when it insisted upon spelling out both the functions of and the
restrictions on the agency, In both cases, however, it had done nothing more than what CIG
was most anxious to do and everybody else quite prepared to do. It had become much
exercised by the gestapo fright months, even years, after everybody else had disposed of the
issue. No one objected to spelling out the agency's functions. That Congress had its way in
both cases was a demonstration of congressional prerogative, not a manifestation of superior
congressional wisdom, prescience, or integrity. If anything, after all that had gone before,
Congress might be faulted for not doing any original thinking on either functions or
prohibitions. Where Congress did make a contribution, however, was in its strong assertion
of the essentially civilian character of the new agency.
While Ludwell L. Montague has admitted that there would have been no CIA without
Donovan's "initiative," he has also asserted that the agency is based not on the Donovan
plan but on "the much more sophisticated doctrine of the Army G-2 Policy Staff" and on
the agreement reached in the JIS and in the JIC when the latter endorsed JIC 239/5, the
forerunner of JCS 1181/5.' As asserted earlier, however, Montague slighted the JIS
civilians, overlooked their borrowing from Donovan, and trippingly passed over the painful
process whereby the milita.r.y finally acepted JIC 239/5-a decent response to Donovan. It
was Donovan's "initiative" that produced the CIA, but it was also Donovan's thinking,
largely shared in by the JLS civilians, which finally compelled the military to think thoughts
they never dared think. before. Without Donovan's plan, it is fairly questionable whether the
military would have progressed beyond their original proposal, written by Montague himself,
for separate interservice coordinating, operating, and producing agencies. Good or bad, that
was not CIA or the beginning of CIA.
While the name "Central Intelligence Agency" was not of Donovan's devisiing, those
three words concisely and accurately summarize Donovan's contribution to the theory and
structure of CIA. More than any other person, it was Donovan who singled out "the stuff"
of "intelligence" as an essentially new fiend of human knowledge and activity. He perceived
it as an "essential of statecraft," as a correlate of war and diplomacy, as a permanent,
peacetime requirement of government. He sought to give it status in the modern world.
Secondly, it was Donovan who recognized that the appropriate status for intelligence was
independence and that such independence required the establishment of an "agency" free of
any other department of government. Such an agency, he held, had to possess, under the
Constitution, internal unity and strength. Thirdly, it was Donovan, who recognized from the
beginning-in April 1941--that the agency's position in the American government was
"central" to the government's older and necessary departmental intelligence agencies. He
sought to serve not just a departmental but also a national need. He conceived a "Central
Intelligence Agency" as giving an intelligible shape and new purpose to the activities of
relatively unconnected departments of government.
Donovan probably did not know of John Gade, who had been taken with "the Wheel of
British intelligence," with its "ventral hub," and the "spokes" that radiated from the center.
Had Donovan known of that image, he undoubtedly would have seized upon it as an apt
expression of his own conceotion for the structuring of American intelligence. That
structuring was a CIA al. the center of what today is called "the intelligence community." It
was an American wheel of intelligence.
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Chapter XVII
EPILOGUE: YEARS LATER
Despite, some questioning and criticism of particular activities, the new CIA generally
significant break in what the agency might call these these~"good old
enjoyed es its Peearly years a rhaps the first good
days" cin days" came am 1963-in the wake of unfavorable publicity generated by the U-2 and Bay of
Pigs operations. CIA was publicly castigated by-of all people-former President Truman
for, as we shall see, fundamental unfaithfulness to the assignment which he claimed he had
given it.' While Truman's attack was welcomed by many of the agency's critics, notably
those who had agitated for tighter congressional t with cpress, ontrol the aagency, it nd government. nt perceptible
position
impact on the agency's strong
Damage was done by the revelation in Ramparts magazine in 1967 of the agency's
involvement in national student affairs. Nothing had the impact, however, of another attack
which came in 1974-in the wake of the Watergate and Vietnam affairs-when the New
York Times published such a serious charge of agency violations of its charter 2 that
unprecedented presidential and congressional investigations quickly followed. There was such
a steady stream of press and TV stories of charges, revelations, and suspicions of the
agency's domestic and foreign operations that increased demands for tighter control were
supplemented by demands for new legislation and revision of the Act of 1947 and even for
the very abolition of the agency. This publicity, beyond the scope of this work, provoked a
widespread fundamental reconsideration of both the CIA legislation of 1947 and the very
purpose and functions of the agency.
President Truman, in his attack, asserted that the agency, "this quiet intelligence arm
of the President," had been so diverted from the "original assignment" he had given it that
it had become "a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue." That assignment had
been the collection of intelligence reports from all sources and their conveyance to the
President in their " `natural raw' state and in as comprehensive a volume" as he could
s
handle nk free va ng" Instead of sticking to its mission, saidtTruman, the agency
"own wn thinking and d evalualuati ng..
had become "an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the Government" and,
contrary to his expectations, had been "injected into peacetime cloak and dagger
operations." 9
That Truman wanted CIA as the President's intelligence arm is undeniable. That he
wanted the unslanted raw data so he could be his own analyst is not an unreasonable
reconstruction of his conception of the purpose of CIA. That he "never had any thought,"
when he established CIA, that it "would be injected into peacetime cloak and dagger
operations" depends upon the meaning of "cloak and dagger operations." The term certainly is
applicable, but not restricted, to espionage and counterespionage; and if Truman did not know
CIA would be involved in such operations, then he was perhaps the only otherwise informed
person in Washington who was so culpably ignorant of the agency's purpose. The term also
covers, of course, covert action or subversive operations, and it is probably these Truman had at g mindand later here
in conjunction rwith1dtherpostWatergate/Vietnamnint rest inrocovertund
considered
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CIA's Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, looking east-northeast with the Potomac River,
Maryland, and the District of Columbia in the background.
Central Intelligence Agency
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What must be clearly stressed now is that Truman's reconstruction of the agency's
"original assignment" is one of those "ex parte presentations" that he and Harold Smith
abhorred. While he signed the bill into law, he was not the sole expositor of the law's
objectives. Numerous other persons, including congressmen, had at least from 1944 on so
worked upon, argued about, worded, and interpreted the CIA provisions that were signed
into law that it had a departmental and legislative richness about which the President was
basically but understandably ill-informed. If he did not know the agency was given
coordinating, evaluating, and operating functions, that was his, not the law's failure. For
him, defining the "original assignment" of CIA as the presentation to the President of raw
intelligence for his analysis was defining most inadequately, if not erroneously.
The post-Watergate/Vietnam attack on the agency centered initially on alleged, and
to some extent admitted and confirmed, violations of the statutory ban on domestic
intelligence activities. Some of these violations, though often understandable and even
defensible in the context of their occurrence, and though not uncommon when viewed in
the perspective of American institutional history, were nevertheless intolerable lapses from
the standards of the nation's accepted political morality. Such was testing drugs on
unwitting subjects. They were also, however, more the lapses of men in their existential
situations than the fault of the law.
Other violations had more complex roots. These lay not in the fundamental distinction
between domestic and foreign, which is-in grand outline-perfectly intelligible to all, but
in the inherent complexity of secret intelligence operations, which do not readily lend
themselves to absolute compartmentation in such simple categories. Between domestic and
foreign is a "twilight zone," the like of which bothered FDR, the FBI, G-2 and ONI in
1941, and which is by no means unknown in American life where jurisdictional
uncertainties and disputes abound, even in the presence of agreement on basic principles.
While there has been much controversy over the facts of CIA's few domestic
activities, there has been no controversy over the fundamental principle of the exclusion of
the agency from the conduct of such operations. That principle was first laid down by
Donovan when he sketched for Frank Knox the basic principles underlying the
construction of an American intelligence system. The principle was subsequently and
consistently affirmed by those who otherwise debated the intelligence issue with Donovan.
Those who drafted, approved, and signed the National Security Act 1947 were confident
they had adequately translated the principle into legal language. They certainly had taken
great pains to do so.
Much more complex still is the issue of covert operations, which so exercised Harry
Truman. It is quite likely true that on July 26, 1947, when he signed the act, he had no
thought of the new agency conducting subversive operations against foreign governments.
As far as evidence goes, no one did. The subject had been raised in Donovan's 1944 plan,
which specifically listed "subversive operations abroad" as one of the functions of the
proposed agency. General Magruder, noting that such operations and intelligence were
commonly accepted "as ancillary to each other," interpreted the provision as providing for
the peacetime "study of such operations," so that "when war again threatens" they "may
be quickly developed and enemy activities of the same nature circumvented." When the
JIS civilians examined the Donovan plan, they rejected the proposal with the simple
observation that such activities did "not appear to be an appropriate function of a central
intelligence service." ? They did not specify for whom it was "an appropriate function."
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Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information, July 11, 1941 to June 13,
1942; Director of Strategic Services, June 13, 1942 to Oct. 1, 1945; and the "father" of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Central Intelligence Agency
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The issue was never raised in the controversy over the Donovan plan, the development
of JIC 1181/5, or the establishment of the NIA and CIG. Nor was it raised in the months
of consideration given the 1947 act, and what the congressmen might have thought about it,
had it been raised, must remain an open question.' Yet, in all this history another Donovan
proposal-that the new agency should perform "such other functions and duties relating to
intelligence as the President from time to time may direct"-was always accepted by all
concerned with never a single question as to what it meant. The language of the provision
clearly left considerable room for contingency and necessity, and the new CIA-with an
OSS tradition behind it, with OSS personnel in its ranks, and engaged in the Cold War-
proved an apt instrument for the conduct of covert operations when the situation invited
them. It did so shortly, in the Italian elections, for instance, in the presidency of Harry
Truman, who readily approved them,' but, of course, never publicized them.
When in 1963 Truman raised the issue of covert action, he did so in general terms, and
nothing really happened. In the post-Watergate/Vietnam era, however, the issue was raised
not only in general fashion but also with specific and often sensational reference to
individual persons, countries, and foreign situations with the result that it became a subject
of significant congressional and public inquiry. Questions, far transcending the scope of these
pages, centered on the desirability, necessity, feasibility, institutionalization, morality,
legality, and admissibility of political actions which had hitherto been universally practiced
but hushed up, according to "the rules of the game." As in the story of the little boy and the
emperor's clothes, the truth was finally admitted and the question brought into the open. It
has been left for a new generation of citizens and officials-intelligence officers,
diplomatists, military men, lawmakers, ethicists, and political theorists among others-to
rationalize the fact.
Finally, the issue of covert action has raised a question about the fundamental
character of CIA which takes us back to the early pages of this volume when Donovan
incorporated in the Coordinator of Information a multitude of tasks which he sought to weld
into "a fist." It was said of him that "he picked up any job left lying around." The tradition
was continued in CIA and was expected of the agency by others. Over the years the agency's
many tasks have fluctuated in number in the light of demands and experiences. At the same
time there has often been argument about the number and variety of tasks the agency could
best handle. The Donovan conception of a multi-faceted organization was implemented by
him in 1941, confirmed by the legislation of 1947, and additionally confirmed by decades of
experience. How that idea survives the present examination of CIA is for the future
historian to record.
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APPENDICES
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[Letter from Donovan to Knox, April 26, 1941]
[The following is an excerpt.]
Following your suggestion I am telling you briefly of the instrumentality through which
the British Government gathers its information in foreign countries.
I think it should be read with these considerations in mind. Intelligence operations
should not be controlled by party exigencies. It is one of the most vital means of national de-
fense. As such it should be headed by someone appointed by the President directly
responsiible to him and to no one else. It should have a fund solely for the purpose of foreign
investigation and the expenditures under this fund should be secret and made solely at the
discretion of the President.
It should not take over the home duties now performed by the F.B.I., nor the
intelligence organizations of the Army and the Navy.
Its functions would be:
(1) to have sole charge of intelligence work abroad,
(2) to coordinate the activities of military and naval attaches and others in the
collection of information abroad,
(3) to classify and interpret all information from whatever source obtained to be
available for the President and for such of the services as he would designate.
So operating, proper directions could be given to the gathering of information, the
various departmental intelligence organizations could operate freely, and proper coordination
of these efforts would be ensured.
As to the organization itself, it seems to me that the appointee of the President would
wish to set up an Advisory Committee consisting at least of Assistant Secretaries of State,
Treasury, War, Navy and Justice and perhaps a junior permanent committee to make
certain of the full cooperation of all departments.
I have referred only to intelligence work, more narrowly construed. But I believe you
should keep this fact in mind. Modern war operates on more fronts than battle fronts. Each
combatant seeks to dominate the whole field of communications. No defense system is
effective unless it recognizes and deals with this fact. I mean these things especially: the
interception and inspection (commonly and erroneously called censorship) of mail and cables;
the interception of radio communication; the use of propaganda to penetrate behind enemy
lines; the direction of active subversive operations in enemy countries.
On all of these various factors I have obtained first hand information which I think
better not to set down here. I refer to it now only because I feel that all of these activities
should be considered in relation to the necessity of setting up a Coordinator.
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Let me now come back to British Secret Service. It is set up and operates as follows:
The chief organization for the collection and reporting of information is S.I.S.
(frequently but wrongly referred to as the Intelligence Service). This had its organization un-
der Henry VII. It has no legal standing, being dependent on a yearly vote in the House of
Commons of funds "for secret service purposes," which is appropriated for the Foreign
Office. .. .
lif you wish me to talk with you more in detail let me know.
Sincerely,
honorable Frank Knox
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.
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APPENDIX B
MEMORANDUM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICE OF
STRATEGIC INFORMATION
Strategy, without information upon which it can rely, is helpless. Likewise, information
is useless unless it is intelligently directed to the strategic purpose. Modern warfare depends
upon the economic base-on the supply of raw materials, on the capacity and performance
of the industrial plant, on the scope of agricultural production and upon the character and
efficacy of communications. Strategic reserves will determine the strength of the attack and
the resistance of the defense. Steel and gasoline constitute these reserves as much as do men
and powder. The width and depth of terrain occupied by the present day army exacts thn
equally wide and deep network of operative lines. The "depth of strategy" depends
"depth of armament."
The commitment of all resources of a nation, moral as well as material, constitutes
what is called total war. To anticipate enemy intention as to the mobilization and
employment of these forces is a difficult task. General von Vernhardi says, "We must try, by
correctly foreseeing what is coming, to anticipate developments and thereby to gain an
advantage which our opponents cannot overcome on the field of battle. That is what the fu-
ture expects us to do."
Although we are facing imminent peril, we are lacking in effective service for
analyzing, comprehending, and appraising such information as we might obtain (or in some
cases have obtained), relative to the intention of potential enemies and the limit of the
economic and military resources of those enemies. Our mechanism of collecting information
is inadequate. It is true we have intelligence units in the Army and Navy. We can assume
that through these units our fighting services can obtain technical information in time of
peace, have available immediate operational information in time of war, and on certain
occasions obtain "spot" news as to enemy movements. But these services cannot, out of the
very nature of things, obtain that accurate, comprehensive, long-range information without
which no strategic board can plan for the future. And we have arrived at the moment when
there must be plans laid down for the spring of 1942.
We have, scattered throughout the various departments of our government, documents
and memoranda concerning military and naval and air and economic potentials of the Axis
which, if gathered together and studied in detail by carefully selected trained minds, with a
knowledge both of the related languages and technique, would yield valuable and often
decisive results.
Critical analysis of this information is as presently important for our supply program as
if we were actually engaged in armed conflict. It is unimaginable that Germany would
engage in a $7 billion supply program without first studying in detail the productive capacity
of her actual and potential enemies. It is because she does exactly this that she displays such
a mastery in the secrecy, timing, and effectiveness of her attacks.
Even if we participate to no greater extent than we do now, it is essential that we set up
a central enemy intelligence organization which would itself collect either directly or
their toops pertinent and their people information
through existing and stt home rength of and
nd
concerning
potential enemies, the character their relations with their neighbors or allies.
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For example, in the economic field there are many weapons that can be used against
the enemy. But in our government these weapons are distributed through several different
departments. How and when to use them is of vital interest not only to the Commander-in-
Chief but to each of the departments concerned. All departments should have the same
information upon which economic warfare could be determined.
To analyze and interpret such information by applying to it not only the experience of
Army and Naval [sic] officers, but also of specialized trained research officials in the relative
[related?] scientific fields (including technological, economic, financial and psychological
scholars), is of determining influence in modern warfare.
Such analysis and interpretation must be done with immediacy and speedily
transmitted to the intelligence; services of those departments which, in some cases, would
have been supplying the essential raw materials of information.
But there is another element in modern warfare, and that is the psychological attack
against the moral and spiritual defenses of a. nation. In this attack the most powerful weapon
is radio. The use of radio as a weapon, though effectively employed by Germany, is still to
be perfected. But this perfection can be realized only by planning, and planning is dependent
upon accurate information. From this information action could be carried out by appropriate
agencies.
The mechanism of this service to the various departments should be under the direction
of a Coordinator of Strategic Information who would be responsible directly to the
President. This Coordinator could be assisted by an advisory panel consisting of the Director
of FBI, the Directors of the Army and Navy Intelligence Service[s], with corresponding
officials from other governmental departments principally concerned.
The attached chart shows the allocation of and the interrelation between the general
duties to be discharged under the appropriate directors, Much of the personnel would be
drawn from the Army and Navy and other departments of the government, and it will be
seen from this chart that the proposed centralized unit will neither displace nor encroach
upon the FBI, Army and Navy Intelligence, or any other department of the government.
The basic purpose of this Service of Strategic Information is to constitute a means by
which the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and his Strategic Board would have available
accurate and complete enemy intelligence reports upon which military operational decisions
could be based.
Washington, D.C.
June 10, 1941
William J. Donovan
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The chart on the reverse side is the
same as Fig. 1, it is reprinted here
because it originally appeared as an
attachment to Donovan's "Memo-
randum of Establishment of Service
of Strategic Information," which is
Appendix B.]
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APPENDIX C
DESIGNATING A COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
1. There is hereby established the position of Coordinator of Information, with
authority to collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national
security; to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data
available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the
President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such
supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national
security not now available to the Government.
2. The several departments and agencies of the government shall make available to the
Coordinator of Information all and any such information and data relating to national
security as the Coordinator, with the approval of the President, may from time to time
request.
3. The Coordinator of Information may appoint such committees, consisting of
appropriate representatives of the various departments and agencies of the Government, as
he may deem necessary to assist him in the performance of his functions.
4. Nothing in the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator of Information shall in
any way interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities of the regular military and
naval advisers of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
5. Within the limits of such funds as may be allocated to the Coordinator of
Information by the President, the Coordinator may employ necessary personnel and make
provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services.
6. William J. Donovan is hereby designated as Coordinator of Information.
(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt
THE WHITE HOUSE
July It, 1941
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EXECUTIVE ORDER 9182
CONSOLIDATING CERTAIN WAR INFORMATION FUNCTIONS
INTO AN OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
In recognition of the right of the American people and of all other peoples opposing the
Axis aggressors to be truthfully informed about the common war effort, and by virtue of the
authority vested in me by the Constitution, by the First War Powers Act, 1941, and as
President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it is hereby
ordered as follows:
1. The following agencies, powers, and duties are transferred and consolidated into an
Office of War Information which is hereby established within the Office for Emergency
Management in the Executive Office of the President:
a. The Office of Facts and Figures and its powers and duties.
b. The Office of Government Reports and its powers and duties.
c. The powers and. duties of the Coordinator of Information relating to the
gathering of public information and its dissemination abroad, including, but not limited
to, all powers and duties now assigned to the Foreign Information Service, Outpost,
Publications, and Pictorial Branches of the Coordinator of Information.
d. The powers and duties of the Division of Information of the Office for
Emergency Management relating to the dissemination of general public information on
the war effort, except as provided in paragraph 10.
2. At the head of the Office of War Information shall be a Director appointed by the
President. The Director shall discharge and perform his functions and duties under the
direction and supervision of the President. The Director may exercise his powers, authorities,
and duties through such officials or agencies and in such manner as he may determine.
3. There is established within the Office of War Information a Committee on War In-
formation Policy consisting of the Director as Chairman, representatives of the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Joint Psychological Warfare
Committee, and of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and such other members as
the Director, with the approval of the President, may determine. The Committee on War
Information Policy shall formulate basic policies and plans on war information, and shall ad-
vise with respect to the development of coordinated war information programs.
4. Consistent with the war information policies of the President and with the foreign
policy of the United States, and after consultation with the Committee on War Information
Policy, the Director shall perform the following functions and duties:
a. Formulate and carry out, through the use of press, radio, motion picture, and
other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate the development of an
informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress
of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the Government.
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b. Coordinate the war informational activities of all Federal departments and
curate and consistent flow of war information
agencies for the purpose of assuring an ac
to the public and the world at large.
c. Obtain, study, and analyze information concerning the war effort and advise the the most
public informationadequatelyas a d a curately
agencies concerned effective means of keeping such
appropriate
informed.
d. Review, clear, and approve all proposed radio and motion picture programs
sponsored by Federal departments and agencies; and serve as the central point of
clearance and contact for the radio broadcasting and motion picture industries,
respectively, in their relationships with Federal departments and agencies concerning
such Government programs.
e. Maintain liaison with the information agencies of the United Nations for the
purpose of relating the Government's information programs and facilities to those of
such nations.
f. Perform such other functions and duties relating to war information as the
President may from time to time determine. issue
concerning
such dire
r in 5. The Director is oauthorized to
to carry out cthe spu pose of his Order,a and such
agencies. may
d
may deem necessary pp ing
epartments
Federal
severa
upon
estab ishs by shall be regulation dthe types and classesl of informat on programs and releases which
shall require shall clearance and approval by his office prior to dissemination. The Director may
require the curtailment or elimination of any Federal information service, program, or
release which he deems to be wasteful or not directly related to the prosecution of the war
effort.
6. The authority, functions, and duties of the Director shall not extend to the Western
Hemisphere exclusive of the United States and Canada.
7. The formulation and carrying out of informational programs relating exclusively to
re-
authorized aand agencies, but such informational programs shall conformt
with with such departments ion.
main o
the tDirec or,eupon his
several the en s formulated oof the Government shall make available Informa
departments and agencies be necessary to the performance of his functions
requetmsmquest, such information and data as may
and duties.
8. The Director of the Office of War Information and the Director of Censorship shall
collaborate in the performance of information for will notf facilitating
prompt a aid to the
prompt and full dissemination of all available
enemy.
9. The Director of the Office of War Information and the Defense Communications
Board shall collaborate in the performance of their respective functions for the purpose of
facilitating the broadcast of war information to the people abroad.
10. The functions of the Division of Information of the Office for Emergency tion services relating to
the Management with respect nstituentoagencies f of press and the Of icefloraEmergency Mangement are
specific activities o and the Division of Information is
transferred to those constituent agencies, respectively,
accordingly abolished.
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11. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the Office of War
Information, the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provisi for the
necessary supplies, facilities, and services. He may provide for the internal management and
organization of the Office of War Information in such manner as he may determine.
12. All records, contracts, and property (including office equipment) of the several
agencies and all records, contracts, and property used primarily in the administration of any
powers and duties transferred or consolidated by this Order, and all personnel used in the
administration of such agencies, powers, and duties (including officers whose chief duties
relate to such administration) are transferred to the Office of War Information, for use in
the administration of the agencies, powers, and duties transferred or consolidated by this
order; provided, that any personnel transferred to the Office of War Information by this Or-
der, found by the Director of the Office of War Information to be in excess of the personnel
necessary for the administration of the powers and duties transferred to the Office of War
Informationove nme t ervice, or eseparated dfrom uer the existing procedure to other positions in the
13. So much of the unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds
available for the use of any agency in the exercise of any power or duty transferred or
consolidated by this order ear for the use of the head of any agency in the exercise of any
power or duty so transferred or consolidated, as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget
with the approval of the, President shall determine, shall be transferred to the Office of War
Information, for use in connection with the exercise of powers or duties so transferred or
consolidated. In determining the amount to be transferred, the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget may include an amount to provide for the liquidation of obligations incurred against
such appropriations, allocations, or other funds prior to the transfer or consolidation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
June 13, 1942.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
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APPENDIX E
MILITARY ORDER OF JUNE 13, 1942
Office of Strategic Services nited
s and By virtue of the authority Navy of theUnie dtStates,eitUis orde ed as follows
Commander-in-Chief of
of War Information
1. The
office of n information activities transferred to the Offfi e Order
on of the UnitediStattes iJoint Chiefs of
exclusive Order of Services, d hereby transferred d 1942, shall to the jurisdiction hereafter
Servviesces, , and is s Y
Staff.
2. The Office of Strategic Services shall perform the following duties:
a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
b. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the United States
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Strategic 3. At the head of the by the President and who halllpebe a rform h scduties under the
Services who o shall be appointed direction and supervision of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. William J. Donovan is hereby appointed as Director of Strategic Services.
5. The Order of July 11, 1941, is hereby revoked.
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Commander-in-Chief
THE WHITE HOUSE
June 13, 1942.
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APPENDIX F
JCS 67
June 21, 1942
Approved June 23, 1942
Office of Strategic Services
1. Under a Military Order approved by the Commander in Chief on June 13, 1942, the
Office of Strategic Services is transferred to the jurisdiction of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of
Staff, and Colonel William J. Donovan is named as Director of Strategic Services.
2. The functions of the Office of Strategic Services will be:
a. To prepare such intelligence studies and such research as may be called for by
the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff, the Military Intelligence Division of the War
Department General Staff, and the Office of Naval Intelligence, operating normally
through the Joint U.S. Intelligence Committee.
b. Under direction of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff to prepare plans for and to
execute subversive activities.
c. To operate and train an organization for the collection of information through
espionage, and to furnish the Joint U.S.. Chiefs of Staff, and such agencies of the War
and Navy Departments as the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff may designate, such
information as they may request.
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APPENDIX G
JCS 68
June 21, 1942
Approved June 23, 1942
REORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE COMMITTEE
1. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee is hereby constituted to consist of:
a. The Committee, composed of the following members:
(1) The Director of Strategic Services, Chairman; and
(2) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, W.D.G.S.
(3) The Director, Office of Naval Intelligence
(4) Chief of Operations Division, W.D.G.S.
(5) Chief of Plans Division, Office of COMINCH or their representatives.
b. A working subcommittee consisting of one representative from each of the
following: Military Intelligence Division, W.D.G.S., Operations Division, W.D.G.S.,
Office of Naval Intelligence, Plans Division of Office COMINCH, and Office of
Strategic Services. The necessary personnel for the subcommittee will be furnished as
required by the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S., and the Office of Strategic
Services.
c. An Advisory committee of representatives from:
(1) State Department
(2) Board of Economic Warfare
(3) Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
(4) Office of War Information
and from time to time representatives of such other Government agencies as may be
called upon to serve.
d. The J.P.W.C. representative of the Chief of the Plans Division, Office of
COMINCH, or of the Chief of the Operations Division, W.D.G.S., shall be the
representative of the J.P.W.C. to serve on the Committee on War Information Policy,
pursuant to Executive Order 9182, June 13, 1942.
2. The duties of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee shall be:
a. In conjunction with subordinate agencies of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff and
the State Department or other existing U.S. Government agencies, to initiate,
formulate, and develop plans for psychological warfare.
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b. Under the direction of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff, to coordinate psychologi-
cal warfare activities of other U.S. Governmental agencies, and to collaborate with
interested nations to the end that all psychological warfare is in accord with strategy
approved by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff.
c. To designate the executive agencies for implementing approved psychological
warfare plans.
d. To submit psychological warfare plans to the J.C.S. through the Joint Staff
Planners.
3. The subcommittee of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee shall be con-
stituted as a working committee. Its duties shall be:
a. To prepare whatever plans are directed by the Joint Psychological Warfare
Committee.
b. To maintain liaison with all other Government agencies engaged in like work.
c. To establish and maintain liaison with military representatives in the U.S. of
the United Nations as are engaged in psychological warfare activities.
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APPENDIX H
JCS 155/4/D
December 23, 1942
Approved December 22,1942
DIRECTIVE
FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
AUTHORITY
1. )By Military Order dated June 13, 1942, the Office of Strategic Services was
established as an operating agency of the Government under the direction and supervision of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
FUNCTIONS
2. The Office of Strategic Services is designated as the agency of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff charged in general with:
(a) The planning, development, coordination, and execution of the military pro-
gram for psychological warfare. The propaganda and economic warfare phases included
in any plan for psychological warfare will be limited to recommendations to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as to the results desired.
(b) The compilation of such political, psychological, sociological, and economic
information as may be required for military operations.
(c) The jurisdiction of the Office of Strategic Services in relation to the above shall
not extend to or include the Western Hemisphere.
SPECIFIC DUTIES
3. The following duties are specifically assigned to the Office of Strategic Services:
(a) In consultation with other interested Government agencies, the initiation,
formulation, and development of plans for psychological warfare in furtherance of
actual or planned military operations.
(b) In cooperation with other interested government agencies, the development of
psychological warfare doctrine.
(c) The progressive and orderly development of operating procedure and the
characteristics of special weapons and special equipment for special operations not
assigned or pertinent to other Government agencies.
(d) The organization, equipment, and training of such individuals or organizations
as may be required for special operations not assigned to other Government agencies.
(e) The conduct of special operations not assigned to other Government agencies or
under the direct control of Theater or Area Commanders.
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(f) The maintenance of liaison with all other Government agencies engaged in
psychological warfare activities.
(g) The collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information required for the
execution of psychological warfare.
(h) The preparation of Population and Social Conditions, Political, and Economic
Sections of Strategic Surveys, together with such maps, charts, and appendices as may
be required to accompany these sections. In addition, the preparation of such maps,
charts, and illustrations as may be requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War
and Navy Departments.
PROPAGANDA
4. Propaganda operations included within the military program for psychological
warfare will be planned and executed by the Office of War Information upon request from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such requests will indicate the results desired and ask for reports
of progress from the Office of War Information.
ECONOMIC 'WARFARE
5. Economic warfare operations included within the military program for psychological
warfare will be planned and executed by the Board of Economic Warfare upon request of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such requests will indicate the results desired and ask for reports
of progress from the Board of Economic Warfare.
CONTROL BY THEATER COMMANDERS
6. Psychological warfare operations within organized theaters or areas are subject to
direct control by the Commander concerned.
CONDUCT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FUNCTIONS
7. Psychological warfare functions assigned to the Office of Strategic Services will be
conducted in strict accordance with the following:
(a) The military program for psychological warfare is restricted to operations
conducted in direct support of actual or planned military operations and includes the
following:
(1) Propaganda under the Office of War Information. (See paragraph! 4.)
(2) Economic warfare under the Board of Economic Warfare. (See para-
graph 5.)
(3) Special operations under the Office of Strategic Services.
a. Sabotage.
b. Espionage in enemy-occupied or controlled territory.
c. Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare.
d. Counter-espionage in enemy-occupied or controlled territory.
e. Contact with underground groups in enemy-occupied or controlled
territory.
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f. Contact with foreign nationality groups in the United States to aid in
the collection of essential information for the execution of psychological
warfare operations in consultation with the State Department.
(b) Psychological warfare operations are supplementary to and must be co-
ordinated with military operations. To insure this, a Planning Group to act as a Joint
medium shall be set up in the Office of Strategic Services for supervising and
coordinating the planning and execution of the military program for psychological
warfare. The Office of Strategic Services Planning Group shall consist of:
(1) One member appointed by the Secretary of State, two members appointed
by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, two members appointed by the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations and four members, including the
Chairman, appointed by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services.
(2) The members of the Office of Strategic Services Planning Group shall be
available for full-time duty and shall be free from other assigned duties.
(3) An advisory committee comprising representatives from the Board of
Economic Warfare, Office of War Information, Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs, Treasury Department, and from time to time representatives of such other
Government agencies as may be called upon to serve, shall be set up to serve with
the Planning Group either as individual members or as a committee when
requested by the Chairman of the Group to consider matters affecting the
respective agencies represented on the Committee. Members of the Advisory
Committee will advise the Planning Committee as to how their respective agencies
can be of assistance in insuring the success of psychological warfare plans.
(4) All major projects and plans for psychological warfare will be integrated
with military and naval programs by the Office of Strategic Services Planning
Group and, after approval by the Director of Strategic Services, submitted to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners for final approval.
(c) Unless otherwise specifically authorized, personnel to be provided for guerrilla
warfare will be limited to organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei of guerrilla
units.
(d) Within organized theaters or areas, officers and agents of the Office of
Strategic Services will be under the direct control of the commander concerned, who
will be informed of all plans or projects to be carried out within the theater or area, and
their current status. They will not engage in any activity which has not been approved
by the commander concerned.
(e) The timing of psychological warfare measures initiated in the United States is
subject to the direction of Security Control.
ABOLITION OF JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE
8. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee is hereby abolished.
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
9. (a) It is the mission of the United States Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare
such special information and intelligence studies as may be required by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
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(b) Intelligence functions of the Office of Strategic Services are restricted to those
necessary for the planning and execution of the military program for psychologi-
cal warfare, and for the preparation of assigned portions of intelligence digests
and such other data and visual presentation as may be requested.
(c) The intelligence collecting activities of the Office of Strategic Services are those
described in paragraphs 7(a)(3).
(d) The Military Intelligence Service, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Office of
Strategic Services will provide for the complete and free interchange of informa-
tion, evaluated as to creditability of source, required for the execution of their
respective missions.
REORGANIZATION
10. The Office of Strategic Services will submit for the approval of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff the necessary reorganization to carry out the provisions of this directive.
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APPENDIX I
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9312
DEFINING THE FOREIGN INFORMATION ACTIVITIES OF THE
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Title I of the First War Powers
Act, 1941, approved December 18, 1941 (Public Law 354-77th Congress), and as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and as President of the United States, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
1. The Office of War Information will plan, develop, and execute all phases of the
federal program of radio, press, publication, and related foreign propaganda activities
involving the dissemination of information. The program for foreign propaganda in areas of
actual or projected military operations will be coordinated with military plans through the
planning agencies of the War and Navy Departments, and shall be subject to the approval of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Parts of the foreign propaganda program which are to be executed
in a theater of military operations will be subject to the control of the theater commander.
The authority, functions and duties of the Office of War Information shall not extend to the
Western Hemisphere, exclusive of the United States and Canada.
2. The military order of June 13, 1942, establishing the Office of Strategic Services, is
hereby modified to the extent necessary to make this order effective.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
THE WHITE HOUSE
March 9, 1943
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JCS 155/7/D
April 4, 1943
DIRECTIVE
FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
AUTHORITY
1. By Military Order dated June 13, 1942, as amended by Executive Order March 9,
1943, the Office of Strategic Services was established as an operating agency of the
Government under the direction and supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFINITION
2. As used in this directive, psychological warfare includes all measures, except
propaganda, taken to enforce our will upon the enemy by means other than military action,
as may be applied in support of actual or planned military operations.
FUNCTIONS
3. The Office of Strategic Services is designated as the agency of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff charged in general with:
(a) The planning., development, coordination, and execution of the military pro-
gram for psychological warfare. The economic warfare phases included in any plan for
psychological warfare will be limited to recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
to the results desired.
(b) The compilation of such political, psychological, sociological, and economic
information as may be :required for military operations.
(c) The jurisdiction of the Office of Strategic Services in relation to the above shall
not extend to or include the Western Hemisphere.
SPECIFIC DUTIES
4. The following duties are specifically assigned to the Office of Strategic Services:
(a) In consultation with the War and Navy Departments and interested United
States Government agencies, the initiation, formulation, and development of plans for
psychological warfare in furtherance of actual or planned military operations.
(b) In cooperation with the War and Navy Departments and interested United
States Government agencies, the development of psychological warfare doctrine.
(c) The progressive and orderly development of operating procedure and the
characteristics of special weapons and special equipment for special operations not
assigned or pertinent to other United States Government agencies. The characteristics
having been so established, will be presented to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, War
Department General Staff, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations for transmittal to
the appropriate supply service for development.
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(d) The organization, equipment, and training of such individuals or organizations
as may be required for special operations not assigned to other Government agencies.
(e) The conduct of special operations not assigned to other Government agencies or
under the direct control of Theater or Area Commanders.
(f) The maintenance of liaison with all other Government agencies engaged in
psychological warfare activities.
(g) The collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information required for the
execution of psychological warfare.
(h) The preparation of Population and Social Conditions, Political, and Economic
Sections of Strategic Surveys, together with such maps, charts, and appendices as may
be required to accompany these sections. In addition, the preparation of such maps,
charts, and illustrations as may be requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War
and Navy Departments.
ECONOMIC WARFARE
5. Economic warfare operations included within the military program for psychological
warfare will be planned and executed by the Board of Economic Warfare upon request of
the Joint, Chiefs of Staff. Such requests will indicate the results desired and ask for reports
of progress from the Board of Economic Warfare.
CONTROL BY THEATER COMMANDERS
6. Psychological warfare operations within organized theaters or areas are subject to
direct control by the Commander concerned. Within organized theaters or areas, officers
and agents of the Office of Strategic Services will be under the direct control of the
commander concerned, who will be informed of all plans or projects to be carried out within
the theater or area, and their current status. They will not engage in any activity which has
not been approved by the commander concerned.
CONDUCT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FUNCTIONS
7. Psychological warfare functions assigned to the Office of Strategic Services will be
conducted in strict accordance with the following:
(a) The military program for psychological warfare is restricted to operations
conducted in direct support of actual or planned military operations and includes the
following:
(1) Economic warfare under the Board of Economic Warfare.
(2) Special operations under the Office of Strategic Services.
a. Sabotage.
b. Espionage in enemy-occupied or controlled territory.
c. Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare. Personnel to be
provided for guerrilla warfare will be limited to organizers, fomenters, and
operational nuclei of guerrilla units.
d. Counter-espionage in enemy-occupied or controlled territory.
e. Contact with underground groups in enemy-occupied territory.
f. Contact with foreign nationality groups in the United States to aid in
the collection of essential information for the execution of psychological
warfare operations in consultation with the State Department.
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(3) Intelligence functions of the Office of Strategic Services are restricted to
those necessary for the planning and execution of the military program for
psychological warfare, and for the preparation of assigned portions of intelligence
digests and such other data and visual presentation as may be requested.
(b) Psychological warfare operations are supplementary to and must be co-
ordinated with military operations. To insure this, a Planning Group to act as a joint
medium shall be set up in the Office of Strategic Services for supervising and
coordinating the planning and execution of the military program for psychological
warfare. The Office of Strategic Services Planning Group shall consist of:
(1) One member appointed by the Secretary of State, two members appointed
by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, two members appointed by the Commander in
Chief', U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval operations, and four members, including the
Chairman, appointed by tl Director of the Office of Strategic Services.
(2) The members of the Office of Strategic Services Planning Group shall be
available for full-time duty and shall be free from other assigned duties.
(3) An advisory committee comprising representatives from the Board of
Economic Warfare, Office of War Information, Coordinator of Enter-American
Affairs, Treasury Department, and from time to time representatives of such other
Government agencies as may be called upon to serve, shall be set up to serve with
the Planning Group either as individual members or as a committee when
requested by the Chairman of the Group to consider matters affecting the
respective agencies represented on the Committee. Members of the Adviisory
Committee will advise the Planning Committee as to how their respective agencies
can be of assistance in insuring the success of psychological warfare p,'lans.
(4) All major projects and plans for psychological warfare will be integrated
with military and naval programs by the Office of Strategic Services Planning
Group and, after approval by the Director of Strategic Services, submitted to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners for final approval,
SECURITY CONTROL
8. The timing of psychological warfare measures initiated in the United States is
subject to the direction of Security Control.
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
9. (a) It is the mission of the United. States Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare
such special information and intelligence studies as may be required by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
(b) The Military Intelligence Service, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Office: of
Strategic Services will provide for the complete and free interchange of information,
evaluated as to creditability of source, required for the execution of their respective missions.
PROCUREMENT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS EQUIPMENT
10. Special operations equipment for the Office of Strategic Services will be procured
in accordance with the provisions of J.C.S. 165/1, approved by the Joint Deputy Chiefs of
Staff, December 26, 1942.
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APPENDIX K
JCS 155/11/D
October 27, 1943
Approved October 26, 1943
DIRECTIVE
FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
1. AUTHORITY
By Military Order of the Commander in Chief, dated 13 June 1942, as amended by
Presidential Executive Order of 9 March 1943, the Office of Strategic Services was
established as an operating agency of the Government under the direction and supervision of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. FUNCTIONS
The Office of Strategic Services is designated as the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
charged with the functions and duties described hereinafter in paragraphs 3 to 10, inclusive.
3. SECRET INTELLIGENCE
a. The Office of Strategic Services is authorized to:
(1) Collect secret intelligence in all areas other than the Western Hemisphere
by means of espionage and counter-espionage, and evaluate and disseminate such
intelligence to authorized agencies. In the Western Hemisphere, bases already
established by the Office of Strategic Services in Santiago, Chile, and Buenos
Aires, Argentina, may be used as points of exit and entry for the purpose of
facilitating operations in Europe and Asia, but not for the purpose of conducting
operations in South America. The Office of Strategic Services is authorized to have
its transient agents from Europe or Asia touching points in the Western Hemi-
sphere transmit information through facilities of the Military Intelligence Service
and of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
(2) Establish and maintain direct liaison with Allied secret intelligence
agencies.
(3) Obtain information from underground groups by direct contact or other
means.
(4) Establish and maintain direct liaison with military and naval counter-
intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other government agencies
engaged in counter-intelligence.
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4. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
The Office of Strategic Services will (1) furnish essential intelligence for the planning
and execution of approved strategic services' * operations; and (2) furnish such intelligence as
is requested by agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the armed services and other authorized
Government agencies. To accomplish the foregoing no geographical restriction is placed on
the research and analysis functions of the Office of Strategic Services, and the following spe-
cific activities will be performed;
a. Accumulation, evaluation arid analysis of political, psychological, sociological,
economic, topographic and military information required for the above.
b. Preparation of such studies embracing the foregoing factors as may be required.
c. Preparation of the assigned sections of Joint Army and Navy [ntelliigence
Studies (JANIS), together with such maps, charts and appendices as may be required to
accompany these sections.
d. Preparation of such maps, charts and illustrations as may be requested by the
agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and authorized agencies of the War and Navy
Departments.
5. SECRET OPERATIONS
The secret operations included in this paragraph will be conducted within enemy
countries and enemy occupied or controlled countries, and from bases within other areas,
including neutral areas, where action or counter-action may be effective against the enemy
a. Morale Subversion
The Office of Strategic Services is responsible for the execution of all forms of
morale subversion by diiverse means including:
False rumors, "freedom stations," false leaflets and false documents, the
organization and support of fifth column activities by grants, trained personnel and
supplies and the use of agents, all for the purpose of creating confusion, division
and undermining the morale of the enemy.
b. Physical Subversion
The Office of Strategic Services is responsible for the execution of approved
special operations including:
(1) Sabotage.
(2) Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare. Personnel to be provided
for guerrilla warfare will be limited to organizers, fomenters and operational
nuclei.
(3) Direct contact with and support of underground resistance groups.
(4) The conduct: of special operations not assigned to other Government
agencies and not under the direct control of the theater or area commanders.
* Mused in this directive, the term "strategic services" includes all measures (except those pertaining, to the
Federal program of radio, press, publication and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of
information) taken to enforce our will upon the enemy by means other than military action, as may be applied in
support of actual or planned military operations or in futherance of the war effort.
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(5) The organization, equipment and training of such individuals or or-
ganizations as may be required for special operations not assigned to other
Government agencies.
6. STRATEGIC SERVICES-PLANNING, EXECUTION, DOCTRINE AND TRAINING
The Office of Strategic Services is charged with:
a. The planning, development and execution of strategic services for the Joint
Chief's of Staff and the development of doctrine covering such services.
b. The training of personnel for strategic services.
7. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
The Office of Strategic Services will be responsible for the progressive and orderly
development of operating procedure and the characteristics of special weapons and special
equipment for special operations not assigned or pertinent to other U.S. Government
agencies. When approved by the Office of Scientific Research and Development, such
special weapons and special equipment may be developed by the Office of Strategic Services
in collaboration with the Office of Scientific Research and Development. The characteristics
having been so established will be presented to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, War
Department General Staff and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations for transmittal to the
appropriate supply agency for further development or procurement. Weapons, equipment
and supplies for the Office of Strategic Services will be programmed and procured in
accordance with the pertinent Joint Chiefs of Staff directives and current Army and Navy
instructions based thereon.
8. CONTACT WITH FOREIGN NATIONALITY GROUPS
The Office of Strategic Services is authorized, in consultation with the Department of
State, to maintain contact with foreign nationality groups and individuals in the United
States for the purpose of obtaining information.
9. COMMUNICATIONS
The Office of Strategic Services shall be responsible for the planning, organization and
operation of essential communications required for field and training activities in connection
with approved projects. Existing communication facilities will be utilized wherever possible.
The programming and procurement of communications equipment will be made only after
approval therefore has been secured from the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-4, War
Department General Staff, or the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, depending on which
service has primary interest in the particular type of communications equipment under
consideration.
10. LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCIES
The Office of Strategic Services is authorized to maintain liaison with other interested
Government agencies.
11. COORDINATION OF STRATEGIC SERVICES PROGRAMS
Strategic services programs are supplementary to and must be coordinated with
military programs. To insure this, a planning group to act as a joint medium shall be set up
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in the Office of Strategic Services for supervising and coordinating the planning and
execution of the strategic services programs. The Office of Strategic Services Planning
Group shall consist of:
a. One member appointed by the Secretary of State, two members appointed by
the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, two members appointed by the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and four members, including the Chairman,
appointed by the Director of Strategic Services.
b. The members of the Office of Strategic Services Planning Group shall be
available for full-time duty and shall be free from other assigned duties.
c. An Advisory Committee comprising representatives from the Office of Eco-
nomic Warfare, Coordinator of Inter-American affairs, Treasury Department and from
time to time representatives of such other Government agencies as may be called upon
to serve, shall be set up to serve with the Planning Group, either as individual members
or as a committee when requested by the Chairman of the Group, to consider matters
affecting the respective agencies represented on the Committee. Members of the
Advisory Committee will advise the Planning Group as to how their respective agencies
can be of assistance in insuring the success of strategic services plans.
d. All major projects and plans for strategic services will include measures for
political, cultural and economic pressures to be applied. In the case of economic
pressures the projects and plans will indicate only the results desired from the Office of
Economic Warfare.
e. All major projects and plans for strategic services will be integrated with
military and naval programs by the Office of Strategic Services Planning Group and,
after approval by the Director of Strategic Services, submitted to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff through the Joint Staff Planners for final approval.
12. GENERAL PROVISIONS
a. Interchange of Information
The Military Intelligence Services, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the
Intelligence Service, Office of Strategic Services, will provide for the complete and free
interchange of information, evaluated as to creditability of source, required for the
execution of their respective missions.
b. Security Control
The timing of strategic services measures initiated in the United States is subject
to the direction of Security Control.
c. Control by Theater Commanders
All activities within organized theaters or areas are subject to direct control by the
commander concerned who is authorized to utilize the organization and facilities of the
Office of Strategic Services in his theater or area in any manner and to the maximum
extent desired by him.
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APPENDIX L
October 23, 1944
Post-War Intelligence Policy of the United States
[The following is an excerpt.]
11. On the basis of the discussion and definitions above, the following conclusions have
been formulated as general principles which should govern U.S. intelligence operations:
a. Protection of the national security and advancement of the vital national
interest require the creation of a Central Intelligence Agency.
b. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency should be appointed by the
President and should be responsible to a Board composed of the Secretaries of State,
War and Navy.
c. The Central Intelligence Agency should be responsible for:
(1) National policy intelligence.
(2) Coordination of departmental operating intelligence.
(3) Clandestine intelligence operations.
d. The chief functions of the Central Intelligence Agency as to national policy
intelligence are:
(1) Evaluation and synthesis of departmental intelligence on various subjects
affecting problems relating to the over-all security and vital national interests of
the United States.
(2) Dissemination of national policy intelligence to the President and to
appropriate departments and agencies.
e. The chief functions involved in coordination of departmental operating intel-
ligence are:
(1) Determination of the operating intelligence responsibilities of the various
departments and agencies in the light of the requirements of national policy
intelligence and of the intelligence needs of other departments and agencies.
(2) Continuing review of such assignments in the light of changes in other
countries and changes in the intelligence requirements of the United States.
(3) Elimination of unnecessary duplication.
(4) Special attention to scientific and technical intelligence where the assist-
ance of private citizens, associations and corporations can, within the limits of
security, be of value to intelligence operations.
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f. The Central Intelligence Agency may, from time to time, delegate to depart-
ments or agencies responsibility for clandestine intelligence operations, but in such cases
should supervise such operations closely.
g. Responsibility for departmental operating intelligence should remain in the
departments and agencies.
h. However, the intelligence required for departmental operations will not be the
sole criterion in determining the scope and nature of the intelligence operation of a
department's intelligence (`unctions. The requirements of national policy intelligence will
also be taken into account, under the principle stated in e(1) above. These requirements,
as defined by the Central Intelligence Agency, will modify or extend the intelligence
operations of various departments and. agencies.
i. To the extent that intelligence can be made available each department or
agency will be assured of, either through its own intelligence or that of other
departments, receiving the intelligence it needs for its operation.
12. From these general principles of intelligence operations certain secondary principles
may be adduced. Among these are:
a. Procurement of iinformation, except by clandestine methods or in special
[sic] should be carried out by the existing departments and agencies, not by
the Central Intelligence Agency.
b. Evaluation must be performed at all levels and by all intelligence agencies,
including C.I.A.
c. Synthesis must be performed by all agencies, except that synthesis of intel-
ligence affecting national policy and cutting across departmental lines shall be carried
out by C.[.A'`only.
d. Dissemination of intelligence outside of the originating governmental depart-
ment or agency will be coordinated and supervised by the central agency with a view to
ensuring that all departments, agencies, and personnel receive the intelligence required
for their official duties within the limits of security. Internal dissemination within any
governmental department and agency will be determined by that department or agency
subject only to the security restrictions imposed (by the appropriate governmental
security agency).
e. National policies and procedures in the procurement, training, and supervision
of intelligence personnel will be established by the central agency. A national
intelligence corps composed of personnel drawn from and serving their respective
governmental departments and agencies will be organized, trained, and coordinated by
the central agency. Also, the central agency may call upon the various departments and
agencies to furnish appropriate specialized personnel for its operations.
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APPENDIX M
[Donovan's Plan]
November 18, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Pursuant to your note of 31 October 1944 1 have given consideration to the
organization of an intelligence service for the post-war period.
In the early days of the war, when the demands upon intelligence services were mainly
in and for military operations, the OSS was placed under the direction of the JCS.
Once our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally pressing for information
that will aid us in solving the problems of peace.
This will require two things:
1. That intelligence control be returned to the supervision of the President.
2. The establishment of a central authority reporting directly to you, with responsibil-
ity to frame intelligence objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material re-
quired by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and strategy.
I attach in the form of a draft directive (Tab A) the means by which I think this could
be realized without difficulty or loss of time. You will note that coordination and
centralization are placed at the policy level but operational intelligence (that pertaining
primarily to Department action) remains within the existing agencies concerned. The
creation of a central authority thus would not conflict with or limit necessary intelligence
functions within the Army, Navy, Department of State and other agencies.
In accordance with your wish, this is set up as a permanent long-range plan. But you
may want to consider whether this (or part of it) should be done now, by executive or legisla-
tive action. There are common sense reasons why you may desire to lay the keel of the ship
at once.
The immediate revision and coordination of our present intelligence system would
effect substantial economies and aid in the more efficient and speedy termination of the war.
Information important to the national defense, being gathered now by certain
Departments and agencies, is not being used to full advantage in the war. Coordination at
the strategy level would prevent waste, and avoid the present confusion that leads to waste
and unnecessary duplication.
Though in the midst of war, we are also in a period of transition which, before we are
aware, will take us into the tumult of rehabilitation. An adequate and orderly intelligence
system will contribute to informed decisions.
We have now in the Government the trained and specialized personnel needed for the
task. This talent should not be dispersed.
William J. Donovan
Director
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SUBSTANTIVE AUTHORITY NECESSARY IN ESTABLISHMENT OF A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENC]E SERVICE
In order to coordinate and centralize the policies and actions of the Government
relating to intelligence:
1. There is established in the Executive Office of the President a central intelligence
service, to be known as the at the head of which shall be a Director
appointed by the President. The Director shall discharge and perform his functions and
duties under the direction and supervision of the President. Subject to the approval of the
President, the Director may exercise his powers, authorities and duties through such officials
or agencies and in such manner as he may determine.
2. There is established in the
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of theoNavvy,a and osuch rother
members as the President may subsequently appoint. The Board shall advise and assist
the Director with respect to the formulation of basic policies and plans of the
3. Subject to the direction and control of the President, and with any necessary advice
and assistance from the other Departments and agencies of the Government, the
shall perform the following functions and duties:
(a) Coordination of the functions of all intelligence agencies of the Government,
and the establishment of such policies and objectives as will assure the integration of
national intelligence efforts;
(b) Collection either directly or through existing Government Departments and
agencies, of pertinent information, including military, economic, political and scientific,
concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign nations, with particular
reference to the effect such matters may have upon the national security, policies and
interests of the United States;
(c) Final evaluation, synthesis and dissemination within the Government of the
intelligence required to enable the Government to determine policies with respect to
national planning and security in peace and war, and the advancement of broad
national policy;
(d) Procurement, training and supervision of its intelligence personnel;
(e) Subversive operations abroad;
(1) Determination of policies for and coordination of facilities essential to the
collection of information under subparagraph "(b)" hereof; and
(g) Such other functions and duties relating to intelligence as the President from
time to time may direct.
4. The shall have no police or law-enforcement functions,
either at home or abroad.
5. Subject to Paragraph 3 hereof, existing intelligence agencies within the Government
shall collect, evaluate, synthesize and disseminate departmental operating intelligence,
herein defined as intelligence required by such agencies in the actual performance of their
functions and duties.
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6. The Director shall be authorized to call upon Departments and agencies of the
Government to furnish appropriate specialists for such supervisory and functional positions
within the as may be required.
7. All Government Departments and agencies shall make available to the Director such
intelligence materials as the Director, with the approval of the President, from time to time
may request.
8. The shall operate under an independent budget.
9. In time of war or unlimited national emergency, all programs of the
in areas of actual or projected military operations shall be coordi-
nated with military plans and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Parts of such programs which are to be executed in a theater of military operations shall be
subject to the control of the Theater Commander.
10. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the
the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provision
for necessary supplies, facilities and services. The Director shall be assigned, upon the
approval of the President, such military and naval personnel as may be required in the
performance of the functions and duties of the The Director may
provide for the internal organization and management of the in such
manner as he may determine.
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JIS 96
December 9, 19444
Proposed Establishment of a Central
Intelligence Service
The following is an excerpt.]
DIRECTIVE REGARDING THE COORDINATION OF
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
In order to provide for the efficient coordination of all Federal intelligence activities re-
lated to the national security:
1. The Secretaries of State, War, arid the Navy, acting jointly, are charged with
responsibility for theefficient coordination of all Federal intelligence activities related to the
national security.
2. To assist them in thus task they shall establish a Federal Intelligence Directorate
(FID) consisting of a civilian Director appointed by the Secretary of State, two Deputy
Directors, one a general officer appointed by the Secretary of War, the other a flag officer
appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, and such other personnel, detailed from those
departments, as may be required to assist the Secretaries in their joint functions of
coordination. The Directorate shall conduct such inspections of Federal Intelligence
activities as they deem necessary (desirable) and are charged with intelligence planning
relating to the national security, but shall have no administrative or operating functions.
3. They shall also establish, separately from the Federal Intelligence Directorate, a
Joint Intelligence Service [JIS], constituted as they may direct, for the performance of such
intelligence operations of common concern as they may assign to it.
4. The Joint Intelligence Committee I[JIC], under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will
continue, for the time being, 1:o be responsible for the synthesis of departmental intelligence
at the strategic level in the form of joint intelligence estimates.
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APPENDIX 0
JIS 96/1
December 9, 1944
Proposed Establishment of a Central
Intelligence Service
[The following is an excerpt.]
In order to coordinate and centralize the policies and actions of the Government
relating to intelligence:
1. There is established a central intelligence service, to be known as the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by the
President.
2. The Director shall be responsible to a board composed of the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and in time of war, a representative of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subject to the approval of this board the Director will have the powers,
authority, and duties herein granted, to be exercised through such officials or agencies and
in such manner as he may determine.
3. Subject to the direction and control of this board, and with any necessary advice
from other Departments and agencies of the Government, the Central Intelligence Agency
shall perform the following functions and duties:
a. Coordination of the functions of all intelligence agencies of the Government,
and the establishment of such policies and objectives as will assure the integration of
national intelligence efforts;
b. Collection directly of clandestine intelligence or intelligence required in special
circumstances;
c. Collection from existing Government Departments and agencies, of pertinent
information, including military, economic, political, and scientific concerning the
capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign nations, with particular reference to the
effect such matters have upon the national security and interests of the United States;
d. Final evaluation, final synthesis, and dissemination within the Government of
the intelligence required to enable the Government to determine policies with respect to
national security in peace and war, and the advancement of the national security;
e. Procurement, training, and supervision of its own intelligence personnel, with
the cooperation of the Departments of State, War, and Navy;
f. Determination of policies for and coordination of facilities essential to the
collection of information under subparagraphs a through and including e hereof; and
g. Such other functions and duties relating to intelligence as the President, or the
Board may from time to time direct.
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4. The Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police or law-enforcement functions,
either at home or abroad.
5. Subject to paragraph 3 hereof, existing intelligence agencies within the Government
shall collect, evaluate, synthesize, and disseminate departmental operating intelligence,
herein defined as intelligence required by such agencies in the performance of their duties
and functions.
6. The Director shall be authorized to call upon Departments and agencies of the
government to furnish appropriate specialists for such supervisory and functional positions
within the Central Intelligence Agency as may be required.
7. All Government Departments and agencies shall make available to the Director such
intelligence material as the Director from time to time may request for the performance of
his functions.
8. The Central Intelligence Agency shall operate under an independent budget.
9. In time of war or unlimited national emergency, all programs of the Central
Intelligence Agency in areas of actual or projected military operations shall be coordinated
with military plans and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Parts of
such programs which are to be executed in a theater of military operations shall in addition
be subject to the control of the theater commander.
10. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provision for
necessary supplies, facilities, and services. The Director shall be assigned, upon the approval
of the board, such military and naval personnel as may be required in the performance of
the functions and duties of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Director may provide for
the internal organization and management of the Central Intelligence Agency in such
manner as he may determine.
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JIC 239/5
January 1, 1945
PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee
THE PROBLEM
1. To prepare recommendations regarding J.C.S. 1181 for submission through the
Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
DISCUSSION
2. In the enclosure to J.C.S. 1181 the Director of Strategic Services recommends to the
President the early establishment, in the Executive Office of the President, of a central
intelligence service. This proposal had been referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
recommendation to the President.
3. The considerations supporting our conclusions and recommendations are sum-
marized in the draft letter to the President attached as Appendix.
CONCLUSIONS
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should not recommend the adoption of the specific
proposals contained in the Appendix to J.C.S. 1181.
5. Their response to the President should be accompanied by a constructive
counterproposal.
RECOMMENDATION
6. We recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reply to the President substantially as
in the draft in the Appendix.
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Appendix
i)ruft
LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
The Memorandum of the Director of Strategic Services, dated 18 November 1'944, on
the establishment of a central intelligence service was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for comment and recommendation. The matter has received careful study and consideration.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize, as does the Director of Strategic Services, the
desirability of (a) further coordination of intelligence activities related to the national
security; (b) the unification of such activities of common concern ascan be more efficiently
conducted by a common agency; and (c) the synthesis of departmental intelligence on the
strategic and national policy level. They consider that, these three functions may well be
more effectively carried on in a common intelligence agency, provided that suitable
conditions of responsibility to the departments primarily concerned with national security are
maintained. They believe, however, that the specific proposal to these ends made. by the
Director of Strategic Services in the Appendix to the subject Memorandum is open to
objections. Notably, the language used would appear to grant to the proposed agency power
to control the operations of departmental intelligence agencies without responsibility to the
heads of the departments concerned, thus violating the integrity of the chain of command.
Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot recommend the adoption of the draft
directive of the Director of Strategic Services.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff append hereto (Annex) an alternative draft which, they
believe, retains the merits of the Director's proposals while obviating the objections thereto.
They recommend early issuance of the appended draft directive.
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Appendix
Draft
DIRECTIVE REGARDING THE COORDINATION OF
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
In order to provide for the development and coordination of intelligence activities
related to the national security:
1. A National Intelligence Authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and
the Navy, and a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is hereby established and
charged with responsibility for such over-all intelligence planning and development, and such
inspection and coordination of all Federal intelligence activities, as to assure the most
effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security.
2. To assist it in that task the National Intelligence Authority shall establish a Central
Intelligence Agency headed by a Director who shall be appointed or removed by the
President on the recommendation of the National Intelligence Authority. The Director shall
be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority and shall sit as a non-voting member
thereof.
3. The Director shall be advised by a Board consisting of the heads of the principal
military and civilian intelligence agencies having functions related to the national security,
as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.
4. Subject to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the
Central Intelligence Agency shall:
a. Accomplish the synthesis of departmental intelligence relating to the national
security and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting
strategic and national policy intelligence.
b. Plan for the coordination of the activities of all intelligence agencies of the
Government having functions related to the national security, and recommend to the
National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objec-
tives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence
mission.
c. Perform, for the benefit of departmental intelligence agencies, such services of
common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more
efficiently accomplished by a common agency, including the direct procurement of
intelligence.
d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence as the National
Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct.
5. The Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police or law-enforcement functions.
6. Subject to coordination by the National Intelligence Authority, the existing
intelligence agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, synthesize, and
disseminate departmental operating intelligence, herein defined as that intelligence required
by the several departments and independent agencies for the performance of their proper
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functions. Such departmental operating intelligence as designated by the National Intel-
ligence Authority shall be freely available to the Central Intelligence Agency for synthesis.
As approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of the departmental
intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Central Intelligence Agency in
connection with its planning function.
7. The National Intelligence Authority shall have an independent budget upon which
the Central Intelligence Agency shall be dependent for budgetary support. The National
Intelligence Authority budget shall also be available for other intelligence activities as the
National Intelligence Authority may direct. Within the limits of the funds made available to
him, the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provision for necessary
supplies, facilities, and services. With the approval of the National Intelligence Authority, he
may call upon departments and independent agencies to furnish such specialists as may be
required for supervisory and functional positions in the Central Intelligence Agency,
including the assignment of military and naval personnel.
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APPENDIX Q
[Donovan's OSS Liquidation Plans
and Statement of Principles]
Mr. Harold D. Smith, Director
Bureau of the Budget
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C.
My Dear Mr. Smith:
In answer to your communication of August 23, 1945, in reference to further reduction
of personnel, we are working under what is in effect a liquidation budget. Within its
provisions we have taken steps to terminate many of our operational (as distinct from
intelligence) activities and to reduce the remaining parts to a size consistent with present ob-
ligations in the Far East, in the occupation of Germany and Austria, and in the maintenance
of missions in the Middle East and on the Asiatic and European continents.
As our liquidation proceeds it will become increasingly difficult to exercise our
functions so that we have found it necessary to set up a liquidating committee with
procedures and controls to provide for the gradual elimination of our services in step with
the orderly reduction of personnel.
It is our estimate, however, with the strictest economy of manpower and of funds the
effectiveness of OSS as a War Agency will end as of January 1, or at the latest February 1,
1946, at which time liquidation should be completed. At that point I wish to return to pri-
vate life. Therefore, in considering the disposition to be made of the assets created by OSS, I
speak as a private citizen concerned with the future of his country.
In our Government today there is no permanent agency to take over the functions
which OSS will have then ceased to perform. These functions while carried on as incident to
the war are in reality essential in the effective discharge by this nation of its responsibilities
in the organization and maintenance of the peace.
Since last November, I have pointed out the immediate necessity of setting up such an
agency to take over the valuable assets created by OSS. Among these assets was the
establishment for the first time in our nation's history of a foreign secret intelligence service
which reported information as seen through American eyes. As an integral and inseparable
part of this service there is a group of specialists to analyze and evaluate the material for
presentation to those who determine national policy.
It is not easy to set up a modern intelligence system. It is more difficult to do so in time
of peace than in time of war.
It is important therefore that it be done before the War Agency has disappeared so that
profit may be made of its experience and "know how" in deciding how the new agency may
best be conducted.
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I have already submitted a plan for the establishment of a centralized system.
However, the discussion of that proposal indicated the need of an agreement upon certain
fundamental principles before a detailed plan is formulated. If those concerned could agree
upon the principles within which such a system should be established, acceptance of a
common plan would be more easily achieved.
Accordingly, I attach a statement of principles, the soundness of which I believe has
been established by study and by practical experience.
Sincerely,
William J. Donovan
Director
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Principles.-The Soundness Of Which It Is Believed Has Been Established By, Our Own
Experience And A First-Hand Study Of Other Nations-Which Should Govern The
Establishment Of A Centralized United States Foreign Intelligence System.
The formulation of national policy both in its political and military aspects is
influenced and determined by knowledge (or ignorance) of the aims, capabilities, intentions
and policies of other nations.
All major powers except the United States have had for a long time past permanent
worldwide intelligence services, reporting directly to the highest echelons of their Govern-
ments. Prior to the present war, the United States had no foreign secret intelligence service.
It never has had and does not now have a coordinated intelligence system.
The defects and dangers of this situation have been generally recognized. Adherence to
the following would remedy this defect in peace as well as war so that American policy could
be based upon information obtained through its own sources on foreign intentions,
capabilities and developments as seen and interpreted by Americans.
1. That each Department of Government should have its own intelligence bureau for
the collection and processing of such informational material as it finds necessary in the
actual performance of its functions and duties. Such a bureau should be under the sole con-
trol of the Department head and should not be encroached upon or impaired by the
functions granted any other Governmental intelligence agency. Because secret intelligence
covers all fields and because of possible embarrassment, no executive department should be
permitted to engage in secret intelligence but in a proper case call upon the central agency
for service.
2. That in addition to the intelligence unit for each Department there should be
established a national centralized foreign intelligence agency which should have the
authority:
a. To serve all Departments of the Government.
b. To procure and obtain political, economic, psychological, sociological, military
and other information which may bear upon the national interest and which has been
collected by the different Governmental Departments or agencies.
c. To collect when necessary supplemental information either at its own instance
or at the request of any Governmental Department by open or secret means from other
and various sources.
d. To integrate, analyze, process and disseminate, to authorized Governmental
agencies and officials, intelligence in the form of strategic interpretive studies.
3. That such an agency should be prohibited from carrying on clandestine activities
within the United States and should be forbidden the exercise of any police functions either
at home or abroad.
4. That since the nature of its work requires it to have status it should be independent
of any Department of the Government (since it is obliged to serve all and must be free of the
natural bias of an operating Department). It should be under a Director, appointed by the
President, and be administered under Presidential direction, or in the event of a General
Manager being appointed, should be established in the Executive Office of the President,
under his direction.
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5. That subject to the approval of the President or the General Manager, the policy of
such a service should be determined by the Director with the advice and assistance of a
Board on which the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Treasury should be represented.
6. That this agency, as the sole agency for secret intelligence, should be authorized, in
the foreign field only, to carry on services such as espionage, counterespionage and those spe-
cial operations (including morale and psychological) designed to anticipate and counter any
attempted penetration and subversion of our national security by enemy action.
7. That such a service should have an independent budget granted directly by the
Congress.
8. That it should be authorized to have its own system of codes and should be
furnished facilities by Departments of Government proper and necessary for the perform-
ance of its duties.
9. That such a service should include in its staff specialists (within Governmental
Departments, civil and military, and in private life) professionally trained in analysis of
information and possessing a high degree of linguistic, regional or functional competence, to
analyze, coordinate and evaluate incoming information, to make special intelligence reports,
and to provide guidance for the collecting branches of the agency.
10. That in time of war or unlimited national emergency, all programs of such agency
in areas of actual and projected military operations shall be coordinated with military plans,
and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or if there be a
consolidation of the armed services, under the supreme commander. Parts of such programs
which are to be executed in the theater of military operations shall be subject to control of
the military commander.
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APPENDIX R
JCS 1181/5 (Amended) Sept. 18, 1945
Establishment of a Central Intelligence
Service upon Liquidation of O.S.S.
DIRECTIVE REGARDING THE COORDINATION
OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
In order to provide for the development and coordination of intelligence activities
related to the national security:
1. A National Intelligence Authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War and
the Navy, and a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is hereby established and charged
with responsibility for such over-all intelligence planning and development, and such
inspection and coordination of all Federal intelligence activities, as to assure the most
effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security.
2. To assist it in that task the National Intelligence Authority shall establish a Central
Intelligence Agency headed by a Director who shall be appointed or removed by the
President on the recommendation of the National Intelligence Agency. The Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority and
shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.
3. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be advised by an Intelligence
Advisory Board consisting of the heads of the principal military and civilian intelligence
agencies having functions related to the national security, as determined by the National
Intelligence Authority.
4. The first duty of the National Intelligence Authority, assisted by the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Advisory Board, shall be to prepare and
submit to the president for his approval a basic organizational plan for implementing this
directive in accordance with the concept set forth in the following paragraphs. This plan
should include drafts of all necessary legislation.
5. Subject to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the
Central Intelligence Agency shall:
a. Accomplish the synthesis of departmental intelligence relating to the national
security and the appropriate dissemination within the government and of the resulting
strategic and national policy intelligence.
b. Plan for the coordination of the activities of all intelligence agencies of the
government having functions related to the national security, and recommend to the
National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objec-
tives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence
mission.
c. Perform, for the benefit of departmental intelligence agencies, such services of
common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more
efficiently accomplished by a common agency, including the direct procurement of
intelligence.
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d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence as the National
Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct.
6. The Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police or law enforcement functions.
7. Subject to coordination by the National Intelligence Authority, the existing
intelligence agencies of the government shall continue to collect, evaluate, synthesize, and
disseminate departmental operating intelligence, herein defined as that intelligence required
by the several departments and independent agencies for the performance of their proper
functions. Such departmental operating intelligence as designated by the National Intel-
ligence Authority shall be freely available to the Central Intelligence Agency for synthesis.
As approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of the departmental
intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Central Intelligence Agency in
connection with its planning function. In the interpretation of this paragraph, the National
Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Agency will be responsible for fully
protecting intelligence sources and methods which, due to their nature, have a direct and
highly important bearing on military operations.
8. Funds for the National Intelligence Authority shall be provided by the departments
participating in the National Intelligence Authority in amount and proportions to be agreed
upon by the members of the Authority. Within the limits of the funds made available to
him, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may employ necessary personnel and
make provision for necessary supplies, facilities and services. With the approval of the
National Intelligence Authority, he may call upon departments and independent agencies to
furnish such specialists as may be required for supervisory and functional positions in the
Central Intelligence Agency, including the assignment of military and naval personnel.
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APPENDIX S
TERMINATION OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
AND DISPOSITION OF ITS FUNCTIONS
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and Statutes, including
Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, and as President of the United States and Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. There are transferred to and consolidated in an Interim Research and Intelligence
Service, which is hereby established in the Department of State, (a) the functions of the Re-
search and Analysis Branch and of the Presentation Branch of the Office of Strategic
Services (provided for by the Military Order of June 13, 1942), excluding such functions per-
formed within the countries of Germany and Austria, and (b) those other functions of the
Office of Strategic Services (hereinafter referred to as the Office) which relate to the
functions of the said Branches transferred by this paragraph. The functions of the Director
of Strategic Services and of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, relating to the functions
transferred to the Service by this paragraph, are transferred to the Secretary of State. The
personnel, property, and records of the said Branches, except such thereof as is located in
Germany and Austria, and so much of the other personnel, property, and records of the
Office and of the funds of the Office as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall deter-
mine to relate primarily to the functions transferred by this paragraph, are transferred to the
said service. Military personnel now on duty in connection with the activities transferred by
this paragraph may, subject to applicable law and to the extent mutually agreeable to the
Secretary of State and to the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, as the case
may be, continue on such duty in the Department of State.
2. The Interim Research and Intelligence Service shall be abolished as of the close of
business December 31, 1945, and the Secretary of State shall provide for winding up its
affairs. Pending such abolition, (a) the Secretary of State may transfer from the said Service
to such agencies of the Department of State as he shall designate any function of the
Service, (b) the Secretary may curtail the activities carried on by the Service, (c) the head of
the Service, who shall be designated by the Secretary, shall be responsible to the Secretary
or to such other officer of the Department of State as the Secretary shall direct, and (d) the
Service shall, except as otherwise provided in this order, be administered as an organiza-
tional entity in the Department of State.
3. All functions of the Office not transferred by paragraph 1 of this order, together
with all personnel, records, property, and funds of the Office not so transferred, are
transferred to the Department of War; and the Office, including the office of the Director of
Strategic Services, is terminated. The functions of the Director of Strategic Services and of
the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, relating to the functions transferred by this
paragraph, are transferred to the Secretary of War. Naval personnel on duty with the Office
in connection with the activities transferred by this paragraph may, subject to applicable law
and to the extent mutually agreeable to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy, continue on such duty in the Department of War. The Secretary of War shall,
whenever he deems it compatible with the national interest, discontinue any activity
transferred by this paragraph and wind up all affairs relating thereto.
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4. Such further measures and dispositions as may be determined by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget to be necessary to effectuate the transfer or redistribution of functions
provided for in this order shall be carried out in such manner as the Director may direct and
by such agencies as he may designate.
5. All provisions of prior orders of the President which are in conflict with this order
are amended accordingly.
6. This order shall, except as otherwise specifically provided, be effective as of the
opening of business October 1, 1945.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 20, 1945.
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APPENDIX T
[Letter from President Truman to Secretary Byrnes
Concerning the Development of a Foreign
Intelligence Program. September 20, 1945.]
My Dear Mr. Secretary:
I have today signed an Executive order which provides for the transfer to the State
Department of the functions, personnel, and other resources of the Research and Analysis
Branch and the Presentation Branch of the Office of Strategic Services. The order also
transfers the remaining activities of the Office of Strategic Services to the War Department
and abolishes that Office. These changes become effective October 1, 1945.
The above transfer to the State Department will provide you with resources which we
have agreed you will need to aid in the development of our foreign policy, and will assure
that pertinent experience accumulated during the war will be preserved and used in meeting
the problems of the peace. Those readjustments and reductions which are required in order
to gear the transferred activities and resources into State Department operations should be
made as soon as practicable.
I particularly desire that you take the lead in developing a comprehensive and
coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of
activity. This should be done through the creation of an interdepartmental group, heading up
under the State Department, which would formulate plans for my approval. This procedure
will permit the planning of complete coverage of the foreign intelligence field and the
assigning and controlling of operations in such manner that the needs of both the individual
agencies and the Government as a whole will be met with maximum effectiveness.
Harry S. Truman
[The Honorable, The Secretary of State]
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[Truman's Directive Establishing the NIA
and the CIG, January 22, 1946]
To the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy:
1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelligence activities be
planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the
intelligence mission related to the national security. I hereby designate you, together with
another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National
Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.
2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from time to time
assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments, which persons shall
collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and shall., under the direction of a Director of
Central Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central
Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence
Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.
3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National
Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:
a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the
national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the
resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made
of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments.
b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of
your Departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National
Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will
assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common
concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally.
d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from
time to time direct.
4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be exercised under
this directive.
5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of your Department as may
be designated by the National. Intelligence Authority shall be freely available to the Director
of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent approved
by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of said intelligence agencies shall be
open to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence in connection with planning
functions.
6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall continue to collect,
evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence.
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7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory
Board consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian
intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to national security, as
determined by the National Intelligence Authority.
8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential directives, other departments and
agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence
information relating to the national security as is in their possession, and as the Director of
Central Intelligence may from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the National
Intelligence Authority.
9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside
the continental limits of the United States and its possessions, except as provided by law and
Presidential directives.
10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources
and methods.
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appendices
[The National Security Act of 1947 as sent to
Congress by Truman on February 26, 1947.]
[The following is an excerpt.]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 202. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central
Intelligence Agency, with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof,
to be appointed by the President. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of
$14,000 a year.
(b) Any commissioned officer of the United States Army, the United States Navy, or
the United States Air Force may be appointed to the office of Director; and his appointment
to, acceptance of, and service in, such office shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or
grade he may occupy or hold in the United States Army, the United States Navy, or the
United States Air Force, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to
or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer on
the active list shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay and
allowances payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be
paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at
a rate equal to the amount by which $14,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay
and allowances.
(c) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office-
(1) The functions of the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337,
1339, February 5, 1946) are transferred to the National Security Council, and such
Authority shall cease to exist.
(2) The functions of the Director of Central Intelligence and the functions,
personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to
the Director of Central Intelligence appointed under this Act and to the Central
Intelligence Agency, respectively, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended
balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be
made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made
available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.
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[H.R. 4214, July 15, 1947.]
[The following is an excerpt.]
Si;c. 105. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a
Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head
thereof. The Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or from
among individuals in civilian life. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of
$14,000 a year.
(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director then-
(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be subject to no
supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would
be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the
Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air
Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and
(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions
(other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director)
with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the
Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any
branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel
(military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of Director of a
commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office,
shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed
services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of
any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving in
the office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case
may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be
paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at
a rate equal to the amount by which $14,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay
and allowances.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat.
555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his
discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he
shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but
such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept
employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for
such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government
departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the
Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council-
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(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intel-
ligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national
security;
(2) to make recommendations to the President through the National Security
Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and
agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and
provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government
using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency
shall have no police, subpena [sic], law-enforcement powers, or internal-security
functions: Provided further, That the responsibility and authority of the departments
and other agencies of the Government to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate
departmental intelligence shall not be affected by this section: And provided further,
That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional
services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.
(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the
President, such intelligence operations of the departments and other agencies of the
Government as relate to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director
of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is
possessed by such departments and other agencies shall be made available to the Director of
Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination.
(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office-
(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5,
1946) shall cease to exist; and
(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are
transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist.
Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or
authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall. be
authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.
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APPENDIX X
Is. 758, July 21, 1947.1
[The following is an excerpt.]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 105. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a
Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head
thereof. The Director shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of
$14,000 a year.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat.
555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his
discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he
shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but.
such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept
employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for
such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.
(c) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government
departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the
Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council-
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intel-
ligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national
security;
(2) to make recommendations to the President through the National Security
Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and
agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and
provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government
using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency
shall have no police, subpena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions:
Provided further, That the responsibility and authority of the departments and other
agencies of the Government to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate depart-
mental intelligence shall not be affected by this section: And provided further, That the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional
services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.
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(d) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the
President, such intelligence operations of the departments of the Government as relate to the
national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and
such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and
other agencies of the Government shall be made available to the Director of Central
Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination.
(e) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office-
(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5,
1946) shall cease to exist; and
(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are
transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist.
Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or
authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be
authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.
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APPENDIX V
The National Security Act of 1947,
Public Law 253, July 26, 1947.
[The following is an excerpt.]
SEC. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a
Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head
thereof. The Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or from
among individuals in civilian life. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of
$14,000 a year.
(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director then-
(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be subject to no
supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would
be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the
Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air
Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and
(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions
(other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director)
with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the
Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any
branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel
(military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of Director of a
commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office,
shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed
services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of
any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving in
the office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case
may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be
paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at
a rate equal to the amount by which $14,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay
and allowances.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat.
555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his
discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he
shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but
such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept
employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for
such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.
(cl) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government
departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the
Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council-
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(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intel-
ligence activities of the Government de, artments and agencies as relate to national
security;
(2) to make recommendations to the President through the National Security
Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and
agencies of the Government. as relate to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security., and
provide for the dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where
appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no
police, subpena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided
further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to
collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided
further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional
services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.
(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the
President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as
hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the
Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and
is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as
hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for
correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided however, That upon the written request
of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation,
evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.
(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office-
(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1.337, 1339, February 5,
1946) .shall cease to exist; and
(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are
transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist.
Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or
authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be
authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 310. (a) The first sentence of section 202 (a) and sections 1, 2, 307, 308, 309, and
310 shall take effect immediately upon enactment of this Act.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), the provisions of this Act shall take effect on
whichever of the following days is the earlier: The day after the day upon which the
Secretary of Defense first appointed takes office, or the sixtieth day after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
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APPENDIX Z
The Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949, Public Law 10, June 20, 1949
of Central and l for othegency, purposesestablished pursuant to
AN ACT A To provide for the administration of the
section 102, National Security
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 1. That when used in this Act, the term-
(a) "Agency" means the Central Intelligence Agency;
(b) "Director" means the Director of Central Intelligence; comm
council (c) "Government agency" means any wholly or executive
pat l yo ned Eby helUn ted St tes
independent establishment, , corporation ervice, office which is instrumentality establishment, in the execut vesbranch of the
officer, authority, , administration, or
Government; and
(d) "Continental United States" means the States and the district of Columbia.
SEAL OF OFFICE made SEC. 2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall cause a seal of office approve, and judic for
the Central Intelligence Agency, of such design as the President shall anotice shall be taken thereof.
PROCUREMENT AUTHORITIES
SEC. 3. (a) In the performance of its functions the Central lIntelligenc ~SAg(e cy 0s
authorized to exercise the authorities contained in sections 2 c 1 , (2),
(12), (15), (17), and sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 of the Armed Services Procurement Act of
1947 (Public Law 413, Eightieth Congress, second session). section,
term (b) In the exercise of the authorities
orf he Executive of the
the DeputybDi tectorion
"Agency head" shall mean Agency. of this section to be
(c) The determinations and decisions provided in subsection (a)
made es the agency
classes of purchases aor con racto and shall individual finapurhases lcExceptn
with as provided in
withh respect to cthsses
subsection (d) of this section, the Agency head is authorized to delegate his powers provided
officals of his lAgency.
officer cers decisions
in this section, including the making of
and subject to his direction, to any
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(d) The Power of the Agency head to, make the determinations or decisions specified in
paragraphs (12) and (15) of section 2(c) and section 5(a) of the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 1947 shall not be delegable. Each determination or decision required
b
by paragraphs
(12) and (15) of section 2(c), by section 4 or by section 5(a) of the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947, shall be based upon written findings made by the official making
such determinations, which findings shall be final and shall be available within the Agency
for a period of at least six years following the date of the determination.
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
SEC. 4. (a) Any officer or employee of the Agency-may be assigned or detailed for spe-
cial instruction, research, or training, at or with domestic or foreign
public or private
institutions; trade, labor, agricultural, or scientific associations; courses or training programs
under the National Military Establishment; or commercial firms.
(b) The Agency shall, under such regulations as the Director may prescribe, pay the tu-
ition and other expenses of officers and employees of the Agency assigned or detailed in
accordance with provisions of subsection (a) of this
section
allowances to which such officers and employees may be ,otherwiseaddition
ntitled.e pay and
TRAVEL, ALLOWANCES? AND RELATED EXPENSES
SEC. 5. (a) Under such regulations as the respect to its officers and employees assigned Dtoector may prescribe, the Aoutsid the
continental United States, its territories, and possessions, sh permanent-duty
sh-duty stations outside the
al]-
(1XA) pay the travel expenses of officers and employees of the Agency including
expenses incurred while traveling pursuant to orders issued by accordance with the provisions of section 5(aX3) with regard to the grantinngrect
leave; home
(B) pay the travel expenses of members of the family of an officer or employee of
the Agency when proceeding to or returning from his post of duty; accompanying him
on authorized home leave; or otherwise traveling in accordance with authority granted
pursuant to the terms of this or any other Act;
(C) pay the cost of transporting the furniture and household and personal effects
of an officer or employee of the Agency to his successive posts of duty and, on the ter-his dist nt, or, upon rretirement1S tosidence at
placer where appointment or to a point not more
will reside;
(D) pay the cost of storing the furniture and household and personal effects of an
officer or employee of the Agency who is absent under orders from his usual post of
duty, or who is assigned to a post to which, because of emergency conditions, he cannot
take or at which he is unable to use, his furniture and household and personal effects;
(E) pay the cost of storing the furniture and household and personal effects of an
officer or employee of the Agency on first arrival at a post for a period not in excess of
three months after such first arrival at such post or until the establishment of residence
quarters., whichever shall be shorter;
(F) pay the travel expenses and transportation casts incident to the removal of the
members of the family of an officer or employee of the Agency and his furniture and
household and personal effects, including automobiles, from a post at which, because of
the prevalence of disturbed conditions, there is imminent danger to life and property,
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and the return of such persons, furniture, and effects to such post upon the cessation of
such conditions; or to such other post as may in the meantime have become the post to
which such officer or employee has been assigned.
(2) Charge expenses in connection with travel of personnel, their dependents, and
transportation of their household goods and personal effects, involving a change of
permanent station, to the appropriation for the fiscal year current when any part of
either the travel or transportation pertaining to the transfer being pursuant to
previously issued travel and transfer orders, notwithstanding the fact that such travel or
transportation may not all be effected during such fiscal year, or the travel and transfer
orders may have been issued during the prior fiscal year.
(3XA) Order to the United States or its Territories and possessions on leave
provided for in 5 U.S.C. 30, 30a, 30b, or as such sections may hereafter be amended,
every officer and employee of the Agency who was a resident of the United States or its
Territories and possessions at time of employment, upon completion of two years'
continuous service abroad, or as soon as possible thereafter: Provided, That such officer
or employee has accrued to his credit at the time of such order, annual leave sufficient
to carry him in a pay status while in the United States for at least a thirty-day period.
(B) While in the continental United States on leave, the service of any officer or
employee shall not be available for work or duties except in the Agency or for training
or for reorientation for work; and the time of such work or duty shall not be counted as
leave.
(C) Where an officer or employee on leave returns to the United States or its
Territories and possessions, leave of absence granted shall be exclusive of the time
actually and necessarily occupied in going to and from the United States or its
Territories and possessions, and such time as may be necessarily occupied in awaiting
transportation.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, transport for or on behalf of
an officer or employee of the Agency, a privately owned automobile in any case where
it shall be determined that water, rail, or air transportation of the automobile is
necessary or expedient for any part or of all the distance between points of origin and
destination, and pay the costs of such transportation.
(5XA) In the event of illness or injury requiring the hospitalization of an officer or
full time employee of the Agency, not the result of vicious habits, intemperance, or mis-
conduct on his part, incurred while on assignment abroad, in a locality where there
does not exist a suitable hospital or clinic, pay the travel expenses of such officer or em-
ployee by whatever means he shall deem appropriate and without regard to the
Standardized Government Travel Regulations and section 10 of the Act of March 3,
1933 (47 Stat. 1516; 5 U.S.C. 73b), to the nearest locality where a suitable hospital or
clinic exists and on his recovery pay for the travel expenses of his return to his post of
duty. If the officer or employee is too ill to travel unattended, the Director may also
pay the travel expenses of an attendant;
(B) Establish a first-aid station and provide for the services of a nurse at a post at
which, in his opinion, sufficient personnel is employed to warrant such a station:
Provided, That, in his opinion, it is not feasible to utilize an existing facility;
(C) In the event of illness or injury requiring hospitalization of an officer or full
time employee of the Agency, not the result of vicious habits, intemperance, or
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misconduct on his part, incurred in the line of duty while such person is assigned
abroad, pay for the cost of the treatment. of such illness or injury at a suitable hospital
or clinic;
(D) Provide for the periodic physical examination of officers and employees of the
Agency and for the cost of administering inoculations or vaccinations to such officers or
employees.
(6) Pay the costs of preparing and transporting the remains of an officer or
employee of the Agency or a member of his family who may die while in travel status
or abroad, to his home or official station, or to such other place as the Director may
determine be the appropriate place of interment, provided that in no case shall the ex-
pense payable be greater than the amount which would have been payable had the des-
tination been the home or official station.
(7) Pay the costs of travel of new appointees and their dependents, and the
transportation of their household goods and personal effects, from places of actual
residence in foreign countries at time of appointment to places of employment and
return to their actual residences at the time of appointment or a point not more distant:
Provided, That such appointees agree in writing to remain with the United States
Government for a period of not less than twelve months from the time of appointment.
Violation of such agreement for personal convenience of an employee or because
of separation for misconduct will bar such return payments and, if determined by the
Director or his designee to be in the best interests of the United States, any money
expended by the United States on account of such travel and transportation shall be
considered as a debt due by the individual concerned to the United States.
(b) In accordance with such regulations as the President may prescribe and notwith-
standing the provisions of section 1765 of the Revised Statutes (5 U.S.C. 70), the Director is
authorized to grant to any officer or employee of the Agency allowances in accordance with
the provisions of section 901(1) and 901(2) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.
GENERAL AUTHORITIES
SEC. 6. In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency is
authorized to---
(a) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be
approved by the Bureau of the Budget, for the performance of any of the functions or activ-
ities authorized under sections 102 and 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public
Law 253, Eightieth Congress), and any other Government agency is authorized to transfer to
or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law limiting or
prohibiting transfers between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance
with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of this Act
without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
(b) Exchange funds without regard to section 3651 Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 543);
(c) Reimburse other Government agencies for services of personnel assigned to the
Agency, and such other Government agencies are hereby authorized, without regard to
provisions of law to the contrary, so to assign or detail any officer or employee for duty with
the Agency;
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(d) Authorize couriers and guards designated by the Director to carry firearms when
engaged in transportation of confidential documents and materials affecting the national
defense and security;
(e) Make alterations, improvements, and repairs on premises rented by the Agency, and
pay rent therefor without regard to limitations on expenditures contained in the Act of June
30, 1932, as amended: Provided, That in each case the Director shall certify that exception
from such limitations is necessary to the successful performance of the Agency's functions or
to the security of its activities.
SEC. 7. In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the
United States and in order further to implement the proviso of section 102(dX3) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress, first session) that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of
sections 1 and 2, chapter 95 of the Act of August 28, 1935 (49 Stat. 956, 957; 5 U.S.C. 654),
and the provisions of any other law which require the publication or disclosure of the
organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by
the Agency: Provided, That in furtherance of this section, the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget shall make no reports to the Congress in connection with the Agency under section
607, title VI, chapter 212 of the Act of June 30, 1945, as amended (5 U.S.C. 947(b)).
SEC. 8. Whenever the Director, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of
Immigration shall determine that the entry of a particular alien into the United States for
permanent residence is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of
the national intelligence mission, such alien and his immediate family shall be given entry
into the United States for permanent residence without regard to their inadmissibility under
the immigration or any other laws and regulations, or to the failure to comply with such
laws and regulations pertaining to admissibility: Provided, That the number of aliens and
members of their immediate families entering the United States under the authority of this
section shall in no case exceed one hundred persons in any one fiscal year.
SEC. 9. The Director is authorized to establish and fix the compensation for not more
than three positions in the professional and scientific field, within the Agency, each such po-
sition being established to effectuate those scientific intelligence functions relating to
national security, which require the services of specially qualified scientific or professional
personnel: Provided, That the rates of compensation for positions established pursuant to the
provisions of this section shall not be less than $10,000 per annum nor more than $15,000
per annum, and shall be subject to the approval of the Civil Service Commission.
APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 10. (a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, sums made available to the
Agency by appropriation or otherwise may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out
its functions, including-
(1) personal services, including personal services without regard to limitations on
types of persons to be employed, and rent at the seat of government and elsewhere;
health-service program as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 150); rental of news-reporting
services; purchase or rental and operation of photographic, reproduction, cryptographic,
duplication and printing machines, equipment and devices, and radio-receiving and
radio-sending equipment and devices, including telegraph and teletype equipment;
purchase, maintenance, operations, repair, and hire of passenger motor vehicles, and
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appendices
aircraft and vessels of all kinds; subject to policies established by the Director,
transportation of officers and employees of the Agency in Government-owned auto-
motive equipment between their domiciles and places of employment, where such
personnel are engaged in work which makes such transportation necessary, and
transportation in. such equipment, to and from school, of children of Agency personnel
who have quarters for themselves and their families at isolated stations outside the
continental United States where adequate public or private transportation is not
available; printing and binding; purchase, maintenance, and cleaning of firearms,
including purchase, storage, and maintenance of ammunition; subject to policies
established by the Director, expenses of travel in connection with, and expenses incident
to attendance at meetings of professional, technical, scientific, and other similar
organizations when such attendance would be a benefit in the conduct of the work of
the Agency; association and library dues; payment of premiums or costs of surety bonds
for officers or employees without regard to the provisions of 61 Stat. 646; 6 U.S.C. 14;
payment of claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.; acquisition of necessary land and the clearing
of such land; construction of buildings and facilities without regard to 36 Stat. 099; 40
U.S.C. 259, 267; repair, rental, operation, and maintenance of buildings, utilities,
facilities, and appurtenances; and
(2) supplies, equipment, and personnel and contractual services otherwise author-
ized by law and regulations, when approved by the Director.
(b) The sum made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the pro-
visions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for ob-
jects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be
accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be
deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.
SEPARABILITY OF PROVISIONS
SEC. 11. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person
or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such
provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not
be affected thereby.
SHORT TITLE
SEC. 12. This Act may be cited as the "Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949."
Approved June 20, 1949.
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NOTES
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NOTES
Many of the following notes are introduced by security
classifications. These were on the documents when they were
consulted by the author and are not necessarily the current
classifications.
These classifications are C, S, and TS for CONFIDENTIAL,
SECRET, and TOP SECRET, respectively. A classification such
as "TS dg S" means that the document was downgraded from
TOP SECRET to SECRET. "UNK, " short for "unknown, " means
the document was not originally classified but was handled as
such and may be properly classifiable today.
I. U.S. [Hoover] Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government (1953-1955), Intelligence Activities, Letter from Chairman [of the] Commis-
sion . . . Transmitting its Report on . . . (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 30.
2. "Request of Pres. Roosevelt . . . ," [n.d.] Papers of George S. Messersmith
(University of Delaware Library, Newark, Del.), Memoirs, box 9, vol. 3, folder 5. The
content of this document indicates it was written in the mid-1950s. These Papers will be
cited hereafter as Messersmith Papers.
3. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1953 (N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1956), pp. 58-62. Margaret Truman [Daniels], Harry S. Truman (N.Y.: Morrow,
1973), P. 332.
4. Sidney F. Mashbir, I Was An American Spy (N.Y.: Vantage, 1953), p. 348.
5. (S dg U) U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval History Division, "Office of Naval
Intelligence," vol. 2, p. 87. Cooke's proposal was embodied in a memo to Adm. Ernest J.
King, Nov. 21, 1942. This work, consisting of 4 vols., will be cited hereafter as ONI History.
6. (S) Ludwell L. Montague, "General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central
Intelligence, October 1950-February 1953," typescript (CIA, Wash., D.C., July 1971), p. 32.
7. Sir William S. Stephenson, "Early Days of O.S.S. (COI)," typescript (author's files,
c. 1959-1961), p. 12.
8. (UNK) "Notes from WJD [William J. Donovan]-April 5th [19]/49," Papers of
William J. Donovan (CIA, Wash., D.C.), job 66-595, box 1, folder 22. These Papers will be
cited hereafter as Donovan Papers. The "notes," clearly of an interview with Donovan, are
identified only as "given presumably to Vanden Heuvel"; they will be cited hereafter by
their original title.
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1. (UNK) Maj. 0. H. Saunders to Col. Stanley H. Ford, April 23, 1929, Records of
the Military Intelligence Division, Records of the War Department General and Special
Staffs, Record Group 165 (U.S. National Archives, Wash., D.C.), item 9944-ZZ-6/ 1. These
Records will be cited hereafter as RG 165 MID.
2. (UNK) [John A. Gade], untitled memo [n.d.], Records of the Office of Naval
Intelligence, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Record Group 38 (U.S.
National Archives, Wash., D.C.), Job 3679, box 66, exhibit 20751. These Records will be
cited hereafter as RG 38 ONI. For autobiographical data on Gade, see his All My Born
Days: Experiences of a Naval Intelligence Officer in Europe (N.Y.: Scribner's, 1942); the
book, however, has nothing on the subject under consideration here.
3. (UNK) Memo, H. C. Cocke to Captain Johnson, May 9, 1929, RG 38 ONI, job
3679, box 66, exhibiit 20751.
4. (UNK) Memo, "C" [Col. Cooper] to Col. Ford [n.d.], RG 165 MID, item 9944-
ZZ-6/3.
5. (UNK) Cooper from SHF [Col. Stanley H. Ford], May 9, 1929, ibid.
6. Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson
Foreign Policy, 19291-1933 (New Haven: Yale, 1957), p. 19.
7. George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 48.
8. (UNK) Memo, Philip W. Bonsai to Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Mar. 21, 1941, General
Records of the Department of State, Record'. Group 59 (U.S. National Archives, Wash.,
D.C.), File 811.20210/29. These Records will be cited hereafter as RG 59 State.
9. Charles Thayer, Diplomat (N Y.: Harper, 1959), p. 165.
10. Dean G. Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department
(N.Y.: Norton, 1969), p. 16.
11. Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State.: A History of Its Organization,
Procedure, and Personnel (N.Y..: MacMillan, 1949), p. 80.
12. (UNK) Cmdr. W. C. 1. Stiles, "Naval Organization," a lecture delivered at the
Army War College, Sept. 12, 1929, RG .38 ONI, job 2125, box 66, file on "Naval
Organization."
13. Rear Adm. Julius Augustus Furer., Administration of the Navy Department in
World War II (Washington: GPO, 1959), p. 119.
14. (UNK) "Instructions for Naval. Attaches," RG 38 ONI, job 2125, box 90, exhibit
20868.
15. ONI History, pt. 5, p. 523.
16. Ibid., pt. 2, p. 28, for 1931 figures; pt. 4, p. 177, for 1934 figures.
17. (S) Bruce W. Bidwell, "History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department
of the Army General Staff," 8 pts., typescript (Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S.
Department of the Army, Wash., D.C.)., pt. 8, ch. 2, p. 1. This work will be cited hereafter
as Bidwell History.
18. Ibid.
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notes for pages 9-13
19. (UNK) "Headquarters Personnel and Funds Used in Military Intelligence Activ-
ities, 1885-1944," George W. Auxier, "Historical Manuscript File: Materials on the History
of Military Intelligence in the U.S., 1884-1944" (Office of the Chief of Military History,
U.S. Department of the Army, Wash., D.C.), exhibit "B." This File will be cited hereafter
as Auxier File.
20. Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff' Prewar Plans and Preparations 3ch. 2 p3:
GPO, 1950), p. 70; the remainder of the sentence is from Bidwell History, pt.
21. (UNK) Auxier File, pt. 1, "Outline of Developments."
22. (S) Bidwell History, pt. 2, ch. 13, pp. 3, 12.
23. Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 61-62. The "G" derives from the "G" in the British
"General Staff," according to Powe, Marc B. and Wilson, Edward E., "The Evolution of
American Military Intelligence" (Fort Huachuca, Arizona: U.S. Army Intelligence Center
and School, 1973), p. 15.
24. (S) Bidwell History, pt. 3, ch. 32, p. 8.
25. For lack of Army understanding, see (UNK) Auxier File, pt. 2, "History of the
Organization, 1885-1939." Strong's memo to Chief of Staff, May 9, 1943, is in Auxier File,
pt. 3, Exhibits and Documents.
26. W. Wendell Blancke, The Foreign Service of the United States (N.Y.: Praeger,
1969), p. 21.
27. Don Whitehead, The FBI Story.' A Report to the People (N.Y.: Random House,
1956), p. 158. On the Kent affair State originally asked for assistance from G-2 but turned
to the FBI when the former doubted it could "guarantee service," Breckinridge Long, The
War Diary of Breckinridge Long: Selections from the years 1939-1944, ed. Fred L. Israel
(Lincoln, Neb.: Univ. of Neb., 1966), pp. 100-101.
28. ONI History, pt. 2, p. 24.
29. Ibid., pt. 4, p. 351.
30. New York Times, Dec. 3, 1938, 1:3.
31. Ibid., Dec. 10, 1938, 1:2.
32. Whitehead, The FBI Story, p. 165.
33. Ibid.
34. Richard D. Lunt, The High Ministry of Government: The Political Career of
Frank Murphy (Detroit: Wayne State Univ., 1965), p. 206.
35. "Request of Pres. Roosevelt ... ," Messersmith Papers. This note also covers the
next two paragraphs.
36. Memo, Roosevelt to Secretary of State [et al.], June 26, 1939, Records of the
Office of Strategic Services (CIA, Wash., D.C.) Director's files, operation 232 (Sands file).
These Records will be cited hereafter as OSS Records. The shortened form for this citation
is OSS Records, Dir-Op-232 (Sands file); and such form will be used for all future citations
from these records.
37, (C) "Notes from G-2 Conferences with FBI, Dec. 1939-May 28, 1940," and
"Notes on Conferences of Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference," RG 165 MID
(hereafter cited as IIC Notes, RG 165 MID).
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notes for pages 13-22
38. "A Proposal for the Creation of an Inter-Departmental Security Coordination,"
Records of the Bureau of the Budget, Record Group 51 (U.S. National Archives, Wash.,
D.C.), Project 217, box 182. These Records will be cited hereafter as RG 51 BOB.
39. (UNK) Memo, Col. F. H. Lincoln to COS, June 19, 1937, Auxier File.
40. The letter and its handling are cited in (S) Bidwell History, pt. 3, ch. 20, pp. 30-31.
41. (S) Bidwell History, pt. 3, ch. 32, pp. 3-4.
42. Ibid., ch. 30, pp. 4, 18.
43. (UNK) Gen. Sherman Miles, "Summary of Present System of Collecting Military
Information from Abroad" I'c. May 8, 1941], RG 165 MID, box 3733, file 10560-990/1.
44. (UNK) Memo, Geri. George V. Strong to COS, May 9, 1943, Auxier File, pt. 3,
Exhibits and Documents. Marshall's observation is in New York Times, Oct. 19, 1945, 3:1.
45. ONiI History, pt. 2, p. 28.
46. Ibid., pt. 5, pp. 523-24; pt. 2, p. 25; pt. 5, pp. 721, 665, 667.
47. Memo, Chairman, General Board, to Secretary of the Navy, Aug. 31, 1939, on
"Are We Ready?" ONI History, Supplement, app. C to pt. 1. This memo was prepared by
Rear Adm. Walter S. Anderson, Director of ONI (DNI).
48. Memo, DNI (AndersonI to Adm. King, June 10, 1940, on "Are We Ready?," ibid.,
app. 0 to pt. 2.
49. Memo, Chief of Naval Operations, Aug. 18, 1939, ibid., pt. 5, p. 525.
50. N. 47, supra.
51. N. 48, supra. Author's interview, Feb. 12, 1968.
52. (C) Minutes, IIC Meeting, May 21, 1940, IIC Notes, RG 165 MID, no.
9794-186A/ 1.
53. (C) Minutes, IIC Meeting, May 31, 1940, ibid., no. 9794-186A/2.
54. (C) Minutes, IIC Meeting, June 3, 1940, ibid., no. 9794-186A/3.
55. (C) "Special Intelligence Service," June 6, 1940, ibid., no. 9794-186A/4.
56. Ibid.
57. (S) Memo, Berle to Miles, Anderson, and Hoover, June 24, 1940, ibid., no. 9794-
186B(2,7).
58. (C) Minutes, IIC Meeting, June 25, 1940, ibid., no. 9794-186A/6.
59. (C) Minutes, IIC Meeting, July 2, 1940, ibid., no. 9794-186A/7.
60. (C) Minutes, HC Meeting, July 26, 1940, ibid., no. 9794-186A/12. The Miles-
Iioover correspondence is found in no. 9794-186B.
61. N. 58, supra.
X62. ONI History, pt. 7, pp, 1,49-853; these pages provide an account of the origin and
activity of this Navy SIS. It was activated by "Memorandum Number One" from the
Foreign Intelligence Branch to the Special Intelligence Section, RG 38 ONI, job 3679, box
25, folder Op-16-F-9.
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63. Actually there was a third SIS: The "Signal Intelligence Service" in the Army's
Signal Corps. It was created to carry on Yardley's work after Yardley was dismissed in
1929.
64. Whitehead, The FBI Story, pp. 169-70.
65. [?], "Information" [n.d.], RG 38 ONI, job 3679, box 16, folder "Information,
Collection of."
1. O. G. Villard, "Jew and Gentile in New York," Nation, vol. 135, no. 3511 (Oct. 19,
1932), p. 345. Harris Gaylord Warren, Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression (N.Y.: Ox-
ford, 1959), p. 54.
2. Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 13-14; the family
member quoted is Donovan's brother, Rev. Vincent Donovan, O.P.
3. Ibid., p. 15.
4. Ibid., p. 75; also (UNK) "Notes from WJD-April 5th/49," Donovan Papers.
5. Ford, Donovan, p. 12. For another account of the origin of the nickname, see J. F.
Deegan's letter to the New York Times, Nov. 30, 1956, 22:7. Deegan says members of the
69th Regiment transferred the name of a famous Detroit baseball pitcher to their
commanding officer.
6. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 1, 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1970), p. 166.
7. The World War I diary, the Siberian journal, and the account of the Murphy trip
are separate items in the Donovan Papers.
8. (UNK) "Notes from WJD-April 5th/49." Donovan says that he warned "all the
members that he had to uphold the law he was hired to uphold," and that he himself stayed
away from the club.
9. "About Men and Women: Leaders of the Present Day," Review of Reviews, vol. 79,
no. 2 (Feb., 1929), pp. 120, 122; Henry F. Pringle, "Exit `Wild Bill': Portrait of William J.
Donovan,"Outlook, vol. 151, no. 1 (Jan. 9, 1929), pp. 47, 75.
10. Fr. Duffy is quoted in Donovan's World War I diary, see n. 7 supra, under date of
Mar. 25, 1918. The adjutant's report and O'Brian's declaration are in Ford, Donovan, pp. 40
and 71, respectively. For the 1925 journalist, see "'Wild Bill' Donovan, War-Time and
Peace-Time Fighter," Literary Digest, vol. 85, no. 6 (May 9, 1925), p. 56; the journalist
quoted therein is Hugh Fullerton of the Chicago Tribune.
11. "Nothing but Gossip" is in Pringle, n. 9 supra. The Hoover story is in Ford,
Donovan, p. 72. Mrs. Donovan made the remark in an interview with the author on Mar. 6,
1972.
12. For the material on the Appalachian Coals case, the Madison Oil trial, and
Donovan's work as unpaid counsel in 1929-1930, I am indebted to a lifelong friend and law
partner of Donovan's, Mr. Otto C. Doering, Jr., who gave me a copy of the memo on the
subject he had originally prepared for Corey Ford.
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13. Donovan to MacArthur, Sept. 17, 1935; Donovan to Gen. George [S.] Simonds,
Sept. 20, 1935; both in. 201 file, Donovan, William J., The Adjutant General's Office (TAG)
(Federal Records Center, St. Louis). This file will be cited hereafter as TAG 201 Donovan.
14. The department's reply is Capt. T. J. Davis to Donovan, Sept. 19, 1935; the
Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Simonds, replied to Donovan Sept. 30, 1935, and Donovan
replied to him Oct. 2, 1935; all ibid.
15. On his Ethiopian trip Donovan kept a diary, whiich is among the Donovan Papers.
For the unsuccessful attempt to meet with Eden, see Hugh R. Wilson, Diplomat Between
Wars (N.Y.: Longmans, Green, 1941), p. 324. In his diary for Jan. 16, 1936, Donovan wrote
that Wilson "wanted me to talk with Eden, but I thought it was a mistake to go to Eden's
hotel"-a suggestion of political indelicacy for a recent guest of Mussolini's to be seen
publicly visiting the enemy, Mr. Eden.
16. The commendation was signed by Maj. Gen. Geo. S. Simonds, Feb. 24, 1936, TAG
201 Donovan.
17. The overseas trips are covered in Donovan to Gen. Hugh A. Drum, Oct. 16, 1940,
TAG 201 Donovan.
18. (UNK) R. E. Buller, memo of conversation, July 10, 1939, Foreign Office Papers
and Telegrams, 1940-42, Records