COMMENT ON LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE'S MEMORANDUM 'AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF AND THE BRANCHES'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040030-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: April 21, 1947
• Content Type: MEMO

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~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 21 April 191.7
Subject: Comment on Ludwell L. ~ontaguess memorandum "Authority and
Responsibility of the Intelligence Staff and the Branches"
1. The effort of subject memorandum to persuade t~rat "the attempt
to distinguish between 'editorials and 'substantives functions is il-
lusory and misleading" sets up a false argument which is filled with
grave danger for. the Central Intelligence Group. While it is true
that there is a marginal zone in which editorial changes can be made
without seriously compromising the facts of a given study, editorial
changes which the Intelligence Staff has imposed in the past have lead
frequently to serious "substantive" errors..
2. From the viewpoint of intelligence production, the "substan-
tive" and the +seditorial" factors must be considered separately. The:
easiest way in which this matter can be approached is to recognize
that the security of the nation could be preserved by a piece of i~
tel.ligence that possessed the four essentials: 1. timeliness, 2.
correct information, 3. correct evaluation, ~.. intelli:gibila.ty.
Whether or not the document had editorial merit would be beside the
point. It could conceivably be quite ungrammatical.
3.aubject memorandum is in error in that it omits from considera-
tion the e7d stence and role'of the Chiefs of the Geographic Branches.
?~t; ~ 2~ssumes that intelligence is written by the ''specialists" in Office
of Re~oorts and Estimates, at one end of the scale, and that the
supreme authority, or as the memorandum puts it: "responsibility for
d~~ision whether and what to+'~ublish" should reside iri the Intelligence
staff, at the other end of the scale. This latter assumption is the.,
more interesting when it is realized that the duty of the Intelligence
Staff, as established on the functional. chart, is limited to the "co-
ordination and supervision" of Office of Reports and Estimates manu-
scripts. To extend "coordination and supervision" to include final
decision as to "whether and vrhat to publish" is a serious matter that
should be carefully investigated, since the latter poor, overriding
that of the Chiefs of the C,eographic Branches, and exercised by men
whose knowledge is admittedly limited, can lead to the complete nega-
tion of the work of_ the Geographic Branches.
~. .The support for the present proposition to enlarge the pourers
of the Intelligence Staff consists in large measure in the supposition
that the Staff is capable of exercising an "overall" view. One is in-
clined to yonder of vrhat that view consists as one is inclined to query
the personal qualifications, which the memorandum would have us believe
rn.ake i~t feasible for the Staff to exerc~ se such a vievr. It is obvious
from the memorandum that the Staff does not feel itself to be possessed
of special knowledge and it is doubtful that it would claim that it has
general knowledge not available to the Branch Chiefs. It is also obvi-
cus trat e St f cannot clairi any special knowledge of the tastes of
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the persons for whom intelligence studies are prepared by Cffice~ of Re-
ports and estimates.
5. The memorandum provides an escape clause in tizat it perruits
that controversies ghich cannot be resolved by the Staff and the
ttspecialists" can be referred to hig~~ar authority for "command decision".
This proposition raises a series of simple and fundamental questions:
9'.'h.o is to be believed in respect to a given piece of intelligence: The
Branch Chiefs, all of whocm are literate men, all of whom axe in daily
contact with the particular problems of their areas, all o~ whom by
reason of the number of countries vaith which their are professionally
concerned., as w?ll as by past experience, exercise the widest possible, ,
coherent overall viewpoints; or should it be the Intelligence Staff,
which has only general and necessarily supef~ficial information? Does
the Assistant Director wish to stake his reputation on the former or
on the latter type of authority? Should he be asked to settle an ar-;
gument over a given paper, is he not faced with the necessity of de- `
tiding the argument less on the basis of facts than on ,the relative
credibility of these two groups of men? IInder vrhat conditions could
he decide in favor of the Intelligence Staff in the face of a firm
clear contrary statement of a Geographic Branch Chief that the Intel-
ligence Staff position is correct?
6. Should such decisi.gns be reached in favor of the less informed
gxoup, there is no excuse for continuing the employment of Chiefs of
Gengrap hit Branches, and moreover, it may very shortly b ecame impos-
sible to retain vrithin the Geographic Branches self-respecting intel-
ligence personnel who have tk}e courage of their informed convictions.
7. In view of the great importance which attaches to these con-
siderations, it is strongly reco~r~nended that a committee be appointed
consisting of the Chiefs of the Geographic Branches, of the Intelli-
gence Staff, of the Basic Intelligence Staff and of the Planning Staff,
and that this corunittee shall within thirty days after its activation,
submit a report recommending means whereby the editorial and substan-
tive aspects of the v~ork in Office of Reports and. estimates can be de-
fined and adjusted into a productive system.
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