CHECK LIST OF SUGGESTED PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS WHICH MAY BE TAKEN AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IN SUPPORT OF GOOD TREATMENT AND RELEASE OF US/UN POW'S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400160009-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: LIST

Approved For Release 19 jF8fiM)ft DP80 01065A000400160009-8
E C RIPT
TAB B PSYCHOLOGICAL ST13ATEGY BOARD
Washington, D.. C.
CHECK LIST OF SUGGESTED PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS
WHICH MAY BE TAKEN AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IN SUPPORT
OF GOOD TREATMENT AND RELEASE OF US/UN POW's
1. Immediate release of selected prisoners of war who do not desire to
return to Communist territory, especially prisoners of war held in
United Nations hospitals.
Removal of the above category of prisoners of war from the immediate
combat area under scrutiny of an International Board or Commission,
under either UN or Red Cross auspices with an accompanying request
to the Hostile Power to allow a similar Board or Commission to
supervise removal of sick and wounded POW's. (Article 1.11 of the
Geneva Convention on Treatment of Sick and Wounded Prisoners of War):
3. Renewed publicity through efforts of the International Red Cross to
inspect prisoner of war camps in Communist area. Refusal of such
inspection will be the signal for sustained psychological operations
designed to focus world opinion on Communist intransigeance,
Demonstrations, protests in the UN General Assembly, protests in
UN member nations' parliamentary bodies, newspaper campaigns citing
the number of days which have passed since request for permission has
been unanswered, publicity attendant upon flying inspection teams to
takeoff points, etc., invitations to neutral correspondents, various
international organizations to observe and report conditions in UN
prison camps.
5, Offering bounties for return of, or aiding escape of, US/UN
prisoners of war.
Organizations of guerrilla task forces to harass POW camps and
effect rescue of key personnel.
.sECUfrl ffiFORM4TION
672300o6
Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400160009-8
 SECURITY INFORMATION
a , N
Approved For Rel ase 1999L 9/275 elA.R?R80-01`9GSA000400160009-8
7. Intensification of escape and evasion measures.
8. Leaflet drops to Prison Camps'Areas containing messages for prison
authorities and/or prisoners. These messages should include offer of
bounty for release, aid and escape.
9. Leaflet campaign to combat areas on the subject, with appropriate
10. Balloon campaign with leaflets, provided technological limitations
can be solved.
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP80-01065A00040016000934'2 3 0.A-
 Approved For Rela a 1999/0I I IlkI:W#T-010f 1000400160009-8
territory, and `,crr:lin~.tion of hostilities. (Oppenheim,
3d edition, Vol, II, P. 195)
c. Article 118 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention
requires the repatriation of all prisoners of war upon
the cessation of hostilities.
d. There is, however, no restriction upon release without
repatriation prior to the cessation of hostilities. This
can be accomplished with or without parole. Under the
Convention the permissibility of parole is governed jointly
by the policy of the Detaining rower and thn policy of the
Power on which the prisoner depenrk, A;; ,.-ring the
Detaining Power offers parole, the conditions under which
the prisoner may accept parole are governed. by the rules
stated by his government at the beginning of hostilities.
The two hostile regimes have failed to impose any such
rules with respect to the Korean conflict, and enemy
prisoners may therefore accept parole if they wish. If
parole is permissable, then, by inference release without
parole is also permiss,iblo if the Detaining Power so
elects.
3. Policy Prior to CessEtion of Hostilities
a. It appears then that a policy of releasing prisoners of
war is feasible which does not require modification of the
Geneva Convention. This policy would entail the voluntary
release of prisoners of war p
riM to the cessation of
hostilities either with or without parole. To be
effective from the propaganda standpoint, such release
must include arrangements for the future welfare of those
persons,
TOP 4
Approved For Release 1999/091,Z1 S T - DP80-01065A000400160009-8 7230-
SECURITY INFORMATION
 . Approved For Relewee 199
M ItJ80-010000400160009-8
TOP SECRET
b. The wholesale release of enemy PCWle does not appear
desirable for the following reasons:
(1) It would considerably increase the risk of reprisals.
(2) It would pose difficult administrative problems of
screening and resettlement.
c. Selective release with or without p.-role would serve the
purpose of permitting publicity on the grar_ting of asylum,
without the disadvantages cited above,
4. Psychological Jig J cations of this pel -ly.
a, General
(1) In order to maintain its Position of raring for
prisoners of war according to the lotto' and spirit
of the Convention., the United States should notify
the Hostile Power of the unconditional release of such
prisoners of war.
b. SRecific a vant~ es
(1) It would re-enforce the principle of United Nations
asylum from -tyranny.
(2) The effectiveness of future United States psychological
warfare prograuns would be enhanced by the adoption of
this policy.
(3) It would obviate the disadvantage cited in the Joint
Chiefs of. Staff memorandum of 8 August of establishing
a precedent contrary to Articin: 118 of the Prisoner
of War Convention of 1949.
TOP SECRET
:SECURITY INFORMATION fifit
Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP80-01065A0004001600d 782 3 ?o"
 Approved For Reldee I 999/ IRlTYQNPOBl -0106A 000400160009-8
TOP SECRET
c. Specific Disadvantages of Recommended Policy
(1) The Hostile Power might impose deprivations on
US/UN prisoners of war as a retaliatory measure,
although this is much less likely in the case of
selective release than of wholesale release.
This might exert psychological pressure upon
Allied publics and US/UN troops, although it is
not predictable whether these psychological
effects would result in strengthening or weak-
ening of Allied morale. This disadvantage can
be in part offset to the extent that specific.
psychological actions by the U.S. (Sce TAB B)
effectively place the Hostile Power on the
defensive with respect to treatment of prisoners
tf war.
(2) The disadvantage cited in sub-paragraph 3d of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper (that UN action
might be used by the Coi- iuniste as a reason for
breaking off peace negotiations) is not considered
fundamental, inasmuch as political issues more
important to the interests of the Hostile Power
than the prisoner of war issue exist as agenda items.
6. Policy Upon Cessation of Hostilitios.
(a) Exchange of prisoners on aone-for-one basis is
subject to the disadvantage that the Communists
can impress Koreans and pas., then off as genuine
?p $s. This would enable them to retain a residue of
US/UN prisoners after all exchanges have boon made.
-4-
Approved For Release 19996SN/-:lgPA-WN80-01065A0004001600
WC 3 ?*,
TOP SECRET
 3i O-01 OUA000400160009-8
Approved For Relc a 1999401l l'1( J& 4
TOP SECRET
(b) Exchange of POW.'s on an all-for-all basis
offers' the best assurance of the protection and
return of US/UN prisoners of war. This should
be our announced policy.
Administratively, the return of MAN
prisoners of war can be accelerated by
exchanges of groups mixed in nationality,
on an approximate basis of one-to.-one.
Lack of good faith on the part of the
Communists can thus be detected early,
and propaganda designed to influence
their actions can be instituted.
Approved For Release 1999/ 1f OFAMMO-01065A000400160009 8723Q
TOP SECRET "j