REPORT TO THE DCI ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00311R000100410002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 20, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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REPORT TO THE DCI ON THE ORGANIZATION
OF CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
20 JANUARY 1969
*NSC Review Completed*
NRO and OSD review(s) completed.
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Summary and Index Page No.
Part I. The existing legal arrangements for coordination
of the foreign intelligence activities of the U. S.
Government.
.A. The nature and composition of the foreign intelli-
gence effort. 1,
B. Existing arrangements for the coordination of
intelligence activities.
Part II. The Central Intelligence Agency - its organization
and management.
A. The top management of CIA. 4.
B. The Directorates. 5.
Part III. Existing organization of CIA - general observations. 9.
Based originally on the WW II experience of OSS, the
organization of the Agency has changed and developed
to meet new circumstances and requirements. It has
been the subject of numerous reviews by distinguished
and competent individuals. Large areas of overlap of
responsibility are inevitable and no organizational
arrangement will achieve a totally clear-cut allocation
of authority. The effectiveness of CIA must depend in
large degree on the discipline, training and understanding
of its personnel, who must live with the organization and
make it work. The DDS&T is an essential component of
the Agency and should be continued substantially as it is
presently organized. While the inclusion of certain overt
collection and intelligence support responsibilities in the
DDI is not entirely logical, no change is recommended in
the composition of this component. Both the DDI and BNE
are essential. BNE is concerned with coordinated esti-
mates and DDI establishes the CIA position on substantive
matters. The present allocations of responsibility for
SIGINT within CIA are adequate. None of the arguments
for separating operational or other components from the
Agency have any validity.
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Part IV:, The Central Intelligence Agency - proposals for organi-
zational action.
A. Board of National Estimates. 21.
B. Information handling and computer facilities in CIA. 25.
C. Training. 26.
D. Personnel. 27.
E. Distribution of information attributable to counter-
intelligence activity. 27.
F. The National Photographic Interpretation Center. 28.
G. Research. 29.
Part V. The intelligence community - its present organization. 32.
Part VI. Organization of the community - general observations. 35.
A. Arrangements for the production and dissemination of 36.
substantive intelligence are satisfactory. Changes in
the procedures or innovations in techniques for pro-
viding the White House with current intelligence will
have to await decisions in the new administration con-
cerning its organization.
B. Machinery for allocating jurisdictional responsibility 38.
amongst the components of the community is adequate.
Directives expressing these allocations are issued as
appropriate by the National Security Council or the
Director of Central Intelligence.
C. The basic problem in resource management is to iden- 39.
tify the contribution made by individual activities or
systems to our over-all knowledge of a particular
subject and determine how much this contribution is
worth. Arrangements for the review of each of the
three major Defense Department intelligence programs
are adequate, although some reallocation of elements
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or items as between these three programs may be
desirable. The Target Oriented Display of intelli-
gence resources by category has helped to provide
officials responsible for the intelligence effort with
a better understanding of the totality of the resources
engaged in this effort. The recent establishment of the
National Intelligence Resources Board should provide
the DCI with authoritative advice concerning the real
need for particular resources or activities. A better
structure is needed in the Defense Department, however,
to exercise centralized control over all intelligence
activities conducted in the Defense Department.
Part VII,
The intelligence community - proposals for organizational
action.
A. Improvement of Defense Department organization
for management of intelligence resources.
43.
B. The DCI community staff.
45.
C. Enforcement of intelligence guidance.
46.
D. Tactical versus national intelligence resources.
47.
E. Early warning - the Watch Committee and the
National Indications Center.
50.
F. Coordination of espionage and counterintelligence
operations abroad.
51.
G. The need for a review of research and analysis
by outside contractors on technology.
52.
ANNEX A.
ANNEX B.
H. The need for managerial improvements in the NRO.
Early reviews of CIA.
Glossary.
53.
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Part I. The existing legal arrangements which govern the coordination
of the foreign intelligence activities of the U. S. Government.
A. The nature and composition of the foreign intelligence
A tendency has developed to talk about intelligence as though
it were a product to be produced, packaged and distributed in a process
comparable to the manufacture of shoes. Actually intelligence is a
service which is used and needed by a great many senior officials with
different responsibilities for planning the activities of various depart-
ments and making decisions at various levels of the Government and
military establishment.
The interests of policy makers at the national level of the
Government in certain kinds of information are usually similar and
often identical. Senior officials in the White House, the State Depart-
ment, the Defense Department, the military services and departments,
and the military commands all have a more or less equal interest in
important political events and economic developments; in evidence sug-
gesting an imminent attack on the United States or its allies and in the
strategic military capabilities of our adversaries. Some officials in
certain departments, however, have a peculiar and individual need for
information and analytical research on topics of little real concern to
others in the Government. Such, for example, are the obvious needs
of the Army for information, tailored to its own specifications, about
tank design and production in the Soviet Union or of the Director, AID,
for information about the economic requirements and potentialities of
particular sectors of a given country or geographic region.
The intelligence effort must be designed to service all its
customers. On the one hand there must be sufficient centralization of
authority over the activities of all agencies of Government with a man-
date or potential for the collection or evaluation of information to ensure
that the over-all effort is properly orchestrated and brought to bear on
the problems of those with a common responsibility for national security.
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On the other hand, the legitimate needs of departments, military com-
mands and senior officials for information directly responsive to their
parochial interests must be recognized and protected. Moreover,
there is no organizational arrangement conceivable under which all
elements of the Government which engage in the collection of intelligence,
or otherwise contribute to the intelligence process, could be consoli-
dated and financed under a single command. Ambassadors and foreign
service personnel collect and report information but clearly belong to
the State Department. Large military airfields and satellite launching
and recovery facilities are essential to reconnaissance from space but,
as a practical matter, are best administered by the Air Force. Naval
vessels serve as platforms for the collection of electronic intelligence,
which can be of national significance. Obviously, however, these ships
must remain under naval command.
For all these reasons, centralized focus and guidance to the
foreign intelligence effort of the Government must be provided through
coordination and cannot be based upon central managerial authority or
command. Quite obviously machinery adequate to ensure effective guid-
ance and coordination of the many diffuse and confusing activities that
combine to make up the total intelligence effort must be both strong and
flexible.
B. Existing arrangements for the coordination of intelligence
The National Security Act of 1947 created a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) with a Director of Central Intelligence "who shall be the
head thereof." The Act provides that "for the purpose of coordinating
the intelligence activities" of the Government the Agency shall ". . .
correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and
provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within
the Government . . . " The Act further expressly provides that the
departments and other agencies of the Government "shall continue to
collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence."
It charges CIA with advising the National Security Council on intelligence
matters; recommending measures for the coordination of intelligence
and performing such services of common concern or other functions as
the National Security Council may from time to time direct. The Act
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declares that the DCI shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
By establishing an agency with statutory authority to correlate
and evaluate all intelligence centrally and ensure its appropriate dissemi-
nation, the Congress obviously hoped to prevent a repetition of Pearl
Harbor. It was to be the Agency's business to see that everybody who
needed information affecting the national security should have it, and
have it promptly in evaluated form. It was a basic Congressional
objective to ensure that this is done. Otherwise the law preserves the
right of individual departments to satisfy their own departmental intelli-
gence needs and leaves (in effect) to the National Security Council the
function and authority of making such further adjustments in relationships
as may appear calculated to improve the intelligence effort or strengthen
its coordination.
The NSC, acting under this authority, has issued a number of
directives which, in the aggregate, have delineated the jurisdictional
scope of various components of the intelligence community and provided
a basis for centralized coordination of its activities. In brief these
directives allocate collection, production and other responsibilities
amongst the various components of the intelligence community and pro-
vide that "the DCI shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of
the Government in accordance with existing law and applicable National
Security Council directives." This personal role of the DCI has been
twice restated in letters issued respectively by President Kennedy on
16 January 1962 and President Johnson on 24 September 1965 which
both characterize the DCI as the principal intelligence officer of the
Government" and confirm his personal responsibility for the coordination
of the foreign intelligence effort as a whole.
Finally, by NSC directive the United States Intelligence Board
(USIB), with membership frorn the chief intelligence agencies of the
Government, has been created as advisory to the DCI with certain stated
responsibilities for the establishment of policy and requirements for
intelligence activities and a prescribed procedure for appeal to the NSC,
by dissenting members, from decisions of the DCI and USIB.
If, as appears inevitable, U. S. intelligence activities are to be
conducted as a coordinated rather than an integrated effort and are to
continue to consist of contributions from separate agencies acting on a
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cooperative basis in accordance with their respective missions and capa-
bilities, the present legal arrangements for effective guidance and
coordination seem about as strong and flexible as can be devised.
Part II. The Central Intelligence Agency - its organization and manage-
ment.
A. The top management of CIA.
As stated above, the National Security Act provides that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be the head of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. He is supported by a Deputy, also a statutory appointment,
who serves as an alter ego and as the occasion requires. While it is
possible and desirable for the Deputy Director to assume certain specific
responsibilities, such as Chairman of the newly created National Intelli-
gence Resources Board (NIRB),''` a permanent functional division of
authority as between him and the DCI is not practical. The attempt made
during the Kennedy administration, for example, to delegate substantially
all authority for management of the Agency to the Deputy Director did
not work very well and should not be repeated.
Apart from the statutory Deputy Director, a limited number of
other senior officials report directly to the DCI. One of these, the Deputy
to the Director for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE), is
concerned with the DCI`s responsibilities for the intelligence effort of the
Government at large. His staff and functions will be discussed in a later
chapter of this report.
The Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (BNE) also
reports immediately to the DCI and also could be described as performing
a community function. However, as the Board has long been regarded as
an integral part of CIA, and as it provides the mechanism through which
CIA performs a substantial part of its statutory responsibility for the
central evaluation of national intelligence, the Board will be treated in
the portion of this report that deals with CIA.
The offices of Executive Director and of Comptroller were cre-
ated in 1961 to assist the Director and Deputy Director in the management
of the Agency. In 1963 responsibility for the accounts and finances of the
At one time the Deputy Director was Chairman of the Watch Committee.
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Agency was transferred from the Comptroller to a Chief of Finance under
the Deputy for Support and the planning, programming and budgeting func-
tions then exercised by the Comptroller were merged with the other duties
of the Executive Director, who is now called the Executive Director-
Comptroller.
The General Counsel and his staff; a senior officer with a small
staff responsible for legislative liaison; another officer with an even
smaller staff responsible for dealing with the press; and the Inspector
General, who is also charged with auditing the Agency's accounts, all
report immediately to the DCI.
Finally, the practice of establishing task forces directly under
the DCI to handle important and complex problems has been used on a
limited basis. The most important example of this practice is the Special
Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs who was established in 1965 and will
presumably exist for the duration of the war.
The main business and functional responsibilities of the Agency
are otherwise carried out in four directorates under the supervision of
four Deputy Directors responsible to the DCI and his statutory Deputy.
No description of the top management of the Agency would be
complete without reference to the Director's regular morning staff meeting
which is attended by all these officials and which provides a daily oppor-
tunity for the candid discussion of problems of general interest to the
Agency and the provision of guidance to all elements concerned on matters
of policy.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) is responsible for
the production and publication of finished substantive intelligence other
than National Intelligence Estimates. The most important regular publi-
cations are various versions of the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB),
a daily summary of significant intelligence coverage of current develop-
ments produced in coordination with DIA and the Department of State,
and the President's Daily Brief (PDB) which is handtailored to the
specific needs of the President and has an extremely limited distri-
bution. The DDI supervises the CIA Operations Center which is manned
24 hours a day and serves as an alert mechanism for fast breaking
developments. It also is the channel for the CIA input into the White
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House Situation Room;, Similarly, the DDI provides Agency support for
the Chairman of the USIB Watch Committee and the National Indications
Center (NIC) in the field of strategic warning intelligence. In addition
the DDI produces periodic and ad hoc briefings, staff studies and memo-
randa on a wide variety of subjects both on demand from consumers and
in anticipation of the needs of the DCI.
Several of the DDI offices engage in longer range studies and in
depth research. Pursuant to NSCID 3, CIA coordinates the production
of basic intelligence which is factual intelligence resulting from the collation
of encyclopedic information of a more or less permanent nature. Basic
intelligence is published in the form of National Intelligence Surveys on a
country-by-country basis. Likewise, DCID 3/1 assigns CIA the responsi-
bility for the production of economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
More recently an Office of Strategic Research has been established to
concentrate on research relating to the production and deployment of
military hardware in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Both the economic and stra-
tegic research components provide a vital input into the production of
current intelligence, National Intelligence Estimates and staff memoranda
in support of the policy making levels of the Government.
The DDI is also responsible for several services of common con-
cern for the intelligence community. Chief among these is the National
Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) which processes the take from
the Government's photographic reconnaissance programs.
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vice (CRS) provides reference and translation facilities, maintains biographic
information, acquires publications, disseminates information and generally
conducts relations with other Government agencies for these purposes.
The Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) is responsible for the con-
duct of the Agency's clandestine operations, including espionage, counter-
intelligence and covert operations. NSCID 5 gives CIA the primary responsi-
bility for the conduct of espionage and clandestine counterintelligence
outside the U. S. and its possessions, and for the conduct of liaison with
foreign intelligence and security services. Espionage is directed toward
the acquisition of information through clandestine operations while counter-
intelligence is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign
intelligence activities in order to protect the security of the nation and its
personnel and installations abroad.
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Covert operations are conducted pursuant to a directive of the
National Security Council and are designed to discredit the prestige and
ideology of International Communism and reduce its control over any areas
of the world, and conversely to strengthen the orientation toward the U. S.
of the peoples of the free world. Covert operations are planned and executed
and projects are subject to policy approval by a top-level White House-State-
Defense committee.
mandate is the support of armed conflict by recognized military forces as
well as cover and deception for military operations. All major programs
Specifically excluded from the Agency's
CIA clandestine activities are conducted through field stations
under the command of a chief of station who has full responsibility for
matters within his assigned jurisdiction.
is generally obtained through interdepartmental coordination in Washington.
Moreover, the COS' right of direct communication on all matters, but
particularly for the prompt dissemination of intelligence, has been carefully
preserved.
While CIA has exclusive responsibility for the conduct of covert
operations abroad, other departments and agencies, primarily the military
services, are authorized to conduct espionage and counterintelligence
activities for departmental needs or for the security of commands and
installations. Since the DCI has the responsibility for coordinating clan-
destine activities abroad, the CIA chiefs of station have been designated
as DCI representatives for coordinating such activities within their respec-
tive jurisdictions, including the conduct of liaison with foreign intelligence
services.
The Deputy Director for Support (DDS) exists solely to provide
administrative services in support of the other parts of the Agency. Com-
munications, finance, logistics, medical services, training, personnel,
and security are the areas which encompass this Directorate's responsi-
bilities. Of these, communications is the most extensive and, in terms
of personnel strength, by far the largest.
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The Office of Communications provides staff communications
between headquarters and agency field stations as well as support for
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In the early stages of the development of the Clandestine Services,
a strong argument was made for the establishment of a support mechanism,
wholly within the Clandestine Services, which would be exclusively responsive
to its requirements and would assure the security of its operations. For
reasons of economy and efficiency in over-all management, however, it was
decided to effect a general consolidation of administrative support facilities
within a single directorate. It was realized that a totally centralized
support organization could not be fully responsive to the specialized needs
of the Clandestine Services. There has emerged therefore a support con-
cept whereby those services which can be performed most efficiently and
economically centrally are so performed. The support elements which
are detailed to overseas operations stations are subordinated to the DDP
chief of station while maintaining a staff relationship to their parent office
within the DDS. At the same time, the DDS is responsible for hiring,
training and supplying support specialists to all components at all levels
at Headquarters and in the field. This arrangement has worked very well
for some years and appears to be a satisfactory compromise between the
requirements of maximum efficiency and those of maximum security and
responsiveness to operational needs.
The Deputy Director for Science and Technology (DDS&T) was
established in 1962, (originally as the Deputy Director for Research)
because of the increasing reliance of. the national intelligence effort upon
technological resources and the consequent need for concentrated exploi-
tation of the Agency's capabilities in S&T fields. The new Directorate was
largely made up of S&T oriented components from the three existing Direc-
torates and its activities encompass collection, production and support.
The DDS&T is also responsible for conducting basic and applied research
and development. This includes responsibilities for liaison and contact
with the scientific community on intelligence matters involving S&T.
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The collection activities of the DDS&T involve primarily programs,
the management of which has been allocated to CIA and which are funded by
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). These include overhead photog-
raphy of denied areas, using both aircraft and highly sophisticated satellite
photographic systems, as well, as the collection of electronic intelligence
In the Office of Computer Services the DDS&T has a centralized
computer capability which provides automatic data processing support to
the other Directorates.
DDS&T also has an important research component concerned with
the design and development of new concepts and the conceptual improvement
of techniques and equipment for use by all components of the Agency. It
supports the requirements of the Clandestine Services for new conceptual
research calculated to improve concealment and listening devices and other
equipment useful in espionage operations. It also maintains a useful labora-
tory which works on methods to improve the Agency?s capabilities in the
automatic data handling field.
Part III. Existing organization of CIA - general observations.
CIA, as presently organized and functioning, is a highly complex
mechanism, originally shaped by the experience of OSS in World War II,
which has evolved through the administration of five Presidents and has
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served the needs of policy makers from the Czechoslovakian coup of
1948 through the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia this fall. Its organi-
zational pattern has been changed as experience in crises, from the
Blockade of Berlin to the most recent Arab-Israeli military conflict, has
suggested better arrangements for the collation, analysis and speedy
dissemination of information and better procedures for supporting the needs
of policy makers with evaluated intelligence. The structure appropriate
for the Agency has necessarily had to be determined with due regard for
the overwhelming impact which developments in science and technology
have had on the problems and capabilities, as well as the expense and
complexity, of the American intelligence effort over the past 20 years.
Since its creation in 1947 the organization and activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency have been the subject of eight full scale reviews
by committees and groups of distinguished individuals. Since 1956 the
affairs and organization of the Agency (and the community) have been sub-
ject to continuing inspection by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board and its predecessor, chaired successively by Dr. James Killian,
General John Hull, Mr. Clark Clifford and General Maxwell Taylor.
A striking feature of the organizational arrangement of CIA is
the very high degree of interdependence and overlap that inevitably exists
between the responsibilities and interests of different components in the
same activity or problem. Thus, a particular agent of the Agency may be
run by one area division of the Clandestine Services because his target is
Soviet Russia, but will be the concern of another area division because his
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of the Clandestine Services depending on whether his mission is counter-
intelligence, espionage or covert action. He will be of some interest to
elements of the Directorates of Intelligence and Science and Technology,
both of whom will be concerned to see that his potentialities for knowledge
and accessibility to intelligence targets of importance are fully exploited
and both of which may share in responsibility for the evaluation and dissemi-
nation of his reports. Operational control and manipulation of this agent
depends on the availability and efficiency of communications provided, in
part at least, under the authority of the Director of Support. The equipment
essential to his mission, concealment devices, secret inks, cameras and other
clandestine paraphernalia, are provided by a component of the DDP which,
however, is at least partially dependent on an element of DDS&T for the inven-
tion or conceptual design of new or improved devices. Some, at least, of the
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equipment which he uses will have been procured under contracts adminis-
tered by the Office of Logistics in DDS. The administrative problem of
ensuring appropriate guidance, support and exploitation for this agent is
immensely complicated by the essential requirement that all information
calculated to reveal his identity, mission or whereabouts must be strictly
compartmented and revealed only on the most limited possible basis of an
absolute need to know.
In every field of Agency activity examples can be found of the
difficulty, or futility, of trying to fix anything like exclusive responsibility
in one component for the performance of a particular function or the achieve-
ment of a particular operational or analytical objective. The need for
computers, automatic data handling facilities and communications support
permeates every element of the Agency. Every component depends to some
degree on and, on certain matters, must consult and defer to the Offices
of Security and Personnel. A National Intelligence Estimate, approved
by the Board of National Estimates, is likely to be based, in considerable
measure, on analytical findings supplied to ONE by various elements of
the DDI, DDS&T and the DDP.
Enough has been said to make clear that completely clear-cut
allocations of responsibility and organizational tidiness are simply not
attainable in an agency with such complex and interrelated operational,
analytical and administrative responsibilities. Obviously, every effort to
fix responsibility and establish commensurate authority for the accomplish-
ment of determinable results must be made. This is the cardinal purpose
of any organizational structure. On the other hand, it is essential at the
outset to understand that the efficient functioning of CIA will, in the final
analysis, depend upon the discipline, understanding and good sense of
the senior officials of the Agency. This presupposes a thorough under-
standing by supervisory personnel of the limits as well as the extent of
their authority and adequate indoctrination concerning the existence, poten-
tialities and responsibilities of other elements of the Agency in their
particular areas of immediate concern.
With these general observations in mind, a number of organi-
zational problems in the Agency will be briefly identified. Almost all of
these constitute organizational dilemmas which will never be solved to the
complete satisfaction of everybody. For the rrpst part the existing organi-
zational relationships have evolved over a considerable period of time and
represent practical adjustments which are workable.
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Probably the most important organizational development in the
past 15 years has been the creation of the Directorate for Science and
Technology. This Directorate was created (under a slightly different
name) to ensure the best possible analytical competence in the Agency to
work on substantive intelligence problems (Do the Soviets have an ABM
system?) and also the research and engineering competence necessary
to ensure adequate participation by the Agency in the design, development
and operation of new technical collection systems for use in clandestine
operations or in space. This latter competence is thought essential on
the theory that direct participation in the Government's overhead recon-
naissance program is necessary to permit the DCI to exercise some
practical control over the program and ensure the design of space systems
best suited to intelligence purposes. The military services, particularly
the Air Force, all have the facilities to develop technical collection systems.
The research, development and systems components of the military services
and departments function, however, at subordinate levels of the military
establishment and serve purposes other than intelligence and there is always
some danger that complex and expensive systems needed to collect photog-
raphy or electronic signals from space may be degraded by efforts to
adapt these systems to weapons or other nonintelligence missions. The
existence of a research and engineering capability in an agency exclusively
concerned with intelligence provides some safeguard against any such
tendency.
All of the responsibilities of the Directorate of Science and Tech-
nology could be performed by other Directorates and would fall naturally
into the collection or production charters of the DDP and DDI. The long
term interests of the Agency, however, seem best served by keeping sub-
stantially all of the present components of the present DDS&T together.
Combined they provide the solid core of expertise in science and technology
which seems an essential element of any modern and dynamic intelligence
service. Without them it would be difficult for any individual, no matter
how competent or articulate, who serves as the principal advisor to the
DCI on scientific and technical matters, to function effectively. The growing
importance of science and technology throughout the Government has resulted
in the establishment of offices such as DDR&E in the Defense Department
and the Science Advisor's position in the White House. Congressional com-
mittees are increasingly concerned with scientific and technological problems
and developments. The success of an intelligence service depends, among
other things, on its credibility -- its ability to communicate its conclusions
as well as on its operational efficiency and the skill and experience of its
analysts. The complex of components and activities which now support the
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DDS&T appears to be about the right mix needed to enable him to provide
the DCI with effective representation in the S&T field. Apart from some
awkwardness in bureaucratic relations which results from the separation
of the production responsibilities of OSI and FMSAC from DDI, no serious
impairment of the Agency's ability to perform its basic substantive and
operational missions seems to be threatened by the present arrangement.
An exception is the Office of Computer Services which does not
seem to be an essential ingredient of the DDS&T's charter and which, in
accordance with the proposal contained in the next section of this report,
should be transferred to the DDS.
Questions have been raised from time to time concerning the
activities which should properly be included in the DDI. As presently
constituted, the DDI includes a number of components concerned with
intelligence research and analysis in the broad area of the social sciences
which includes military matters. A number of other components in this
Directorate are concerned with processing and support. CRS, for example,
is essentially a registry, and NPIC does the photo interpreting for analysts
in the Pentagon as well as in the CIA. Some of the activities for which
the DDI is responsible would seem to have no particularly logical relation-
ship to his substantive mission. The administrative burdens inherent in
the overt collection activities of the Contact Offices I Istrike one
as incompatible with the responsibilities of a principal advisor to the
DCI on substantive problems of critical strategic importance. If some
or all of these activities were removed from the DDI, however, at least
some of them which appear to fall within the category of intelligence
support, such as NPIC and CRS, would probably have to be established in
a new directorate. No persuasive reasons have been advanced for the
relocation of these or other components, such asi Contact
Offices, to any existing directorate. Any dismemberment of the Direc-
torate of Intelligence would therefore appear likely to result in the
establishment of an additional directorate further complicating rather
than simplifying over-all managerial arrangements in the Agency. On
balance, it would seem that the Directorate of Intelligence should continue
to exist with substantially its present functional responsibilities, providing
certain analytical and support functions, and acting as the component
responsible for the production of intelligence in CIA.
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Recognition of the DDI as the official of the Agency to whom the
DCI looks as responsible for the production of Agency intelligence and
therefore for the establishment of the Agency position on substantive
intelligence matters has certain implications which should be thoroughly
understood. The first of these is that other components of the Agency,
including particularly OSI and FMSAC in DDS&T, must be required to
coordinate their substantive intelligence activities and procedures for
the dissemination of their product with the DDI. Existing arrangements
between the DDS&T and the DDI seem adequate to ensure this result. A
second implication of the existing arrangement is the fact that the DDT,
given his present responsibilities, is over committed with administrative
responsibilities for support and overt collection activities to which he can
only attend at the expense of his ability to concentrate full time on substan-
tive intelligence issues. This must simply be recognized as a fact of life.
A third complicating factor in any decision concerning the functions
appropriate for the DDI is the existence of the Board of National Estimates.
The DDI, as the official responsible for the substantive production activities
of the Agency, is properly regarded as the competent authority within CIA
on substantive intelligence matters. He represents the CIA view on the
significance of developments of intelligence interest. Parallel with him,
however, and reporting directly to the DCI, is the Chairman of the Board
of National Estimates, who is also concerned with substantive intelligence
judgements. The line dividing the responsibilities of these two officials
has never been drawn with satisfactory precision. As a practical matter,
however, coexistence between these individuals has been the rule in the
past and cooperation is not only desirable but clearly possible in the future.
Both functions and positions are essential to the intelligence effort and
both are needed to implement the Director's responsibility as the principal
intelligence officer of the Government, finally responsible for intelligence
judgements, and for the coordination of intelligence activities. Both
positions contribute to the implementation of the Agency's statutory
responsibility for the central collation, evaluation and dissemination of
intelligence affecting the national security.
The line between the product of the Board of National Estimates
and the product of the DDI would seem to be determined by what needs to be
coordinated as opposed to what can be disseminated as the product of the
Agency. This is not a very clear-cut line. A very large proportion of the
product of DDI in fact represents material which has been coordinated in
the sense that appropriate analysts in the State and Defense Departments
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have been consulted and have at least indicated no serious objection. The
daily Central Intelligence Bulletin is of course a coordinated publication.
DDI production on the whole generally represents essentially Agency views
on matters, including and with special emphasis on current developments.
The Board, on the other hand, as a result of many years of institutional
development, has emerged as a respected tribunal for the establishment of
a consensus or the formal identification of differences on subjects of very con-
siderable national importance. The importance of the Board's estimates,
particularly for the purpose of military planning and for their impact on the
huge military budgets can hardly be exaggerated. The Board of National Esti-
mates and its Chairman is therefore the DCVs instrumentality for achieving
coordinated community estimates, while the DDI is the official to whom the
Director looks for substantive and analytical conclusions from CIA.
It is possible that some changes in arrangements for staff support
for the Board and in its relations with policy makers, particularly in the
field of political estimates, would improve its effectiveness. Possibilities
along these lines are suggested in the next section of this report.
A problem area which has preoccupied the attention of managers
of the Agency over the past several years has been how best to regulate
its responsibilities in the so-called SIGINT field. Almost since its beginning
the Agency has been involved in one aspect or another of communications
intelligence activity. It has, for example, been a consumer of the product
of communications intelligence which has obviously contributed to the
Agency's output of studies, reports and estimates. It has also engaged in
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These various manifestations of what is collectively known as the
SIGINT mission of the Agency have proved a somewhat indigestible organi-
zational ingredient. The problem has been further complicated by the
existence of peculiar security arrangements which surround the dissemi-
nation of SIGINT material and the conduct of operational activity aimed at
the acquisition of SIGINT.
A further complicating factor has been the Director's responsi-
bility for over-all guidance to the community at large with regard to the
level of effort and expenditure appropriate for programs for the collection
of SIGINT under the jurisdiction of NSA and the NRO and, to a lesser degree,
DIA. It has therefore been necessary for him as head of CIA to develop
managerial controls over the conduct of SIGINT activities by the Agency
(both as a consumer and a contributor to the SIGINT effort) and also to
establish the advisory staff necessary to enable him to serve as coordinator
of the Government's SIGINT effort as a whole.
Present arrangements in the Agency for the conduct of the Agency
mission in this field are workable and should be confirmed. As part of its
Similarly the personnel employed in technical collection programs
(other than close support) aimed at the acquisition of emissions (other
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than those involved in communications intelligence) are trained, provided
and receive their technical guidance from DDS&T. It is essential that
the technical guidance and indoctrination of these individuals should con-
tinue to come from the appropriate element of S&T, and that the personnel
involved in these operations should be rotated in and out of offices of S&T
which provide the environment necessary to maintain their competence
and motivation.
It is also essential to recognize the paramount authority and
responsibility of the DDP for all activity conducted overseas which
includes the prerogative of consolidating all operational activity under
the cognizance and command of the station chief responsible for the area.
Control and management of the Agency's activities should be
accomplished as far as possible through the allocation of primary responsi-
bility for particular functions in one or another of the basic directorates
of the Agency and, as indicated earlier in this report, through adequate
indoctrination of supervisory personnel to ensure discipline, cooperative
attitudes and a thorough understanding of the respective missions of the
constituent elements of the Agency. Insofar as possible, the establishment
of a superstructure or managerial layer above the deputy directorate level
should be avoided. In the specific case of SIGINT activity, which affects
many echelons of many components under all directorates of the Agency,
some staff support and advice to the DCI, above the directorate level,
is necessary. At present this function is performed by a very senior
and highly qualified officer who has been designated as the "SIGINT Officer,
who is also responsible for certain assistance to the DCI in his community
capacity. During the tenure of this officer, no change in arrangements
for the oversight of SIGINT activity is necessary.
A requirement for a staff, under a senior staff officer, responsible
for SIGINT as a function in CIA will continue to exist. To an increasing
extent, however, problems involving the conduct of the Agency's SIGINT
activities will require the DCI' s attention in the context of community
problems and can best be resolved with help from advisors to the DCI
primarily concerned with his community (as distinguished from his Agency)
responsibilities.
These problems will turn on the guidance appropriate for particu-
lar SIGINT activities; on the priority to be accorded SIGINT as opposed to
other collection activity; on the legitimacy of the need for clandestine
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technical collection programs in CIA in the light of the requirements of
the Government as a whole for SIGINT, and the potentialities of NSA and
the military services for satisfying these requirements, and generally
on an evaluation of the product of SIGINT activity in terms of the political
and financial costs of acquiring and the risk of informational loss inherent
in foregoing the product. Solution of these problems will involve dealings
on a community wide basis with NSA, various elements of the Pentagon
and the State Department. Thus the SIGINT Officer's responsibilities
will tend to assume a community coloration which will overshadow his
concern with matters which are exclusively the parochial concern of CIA.
The line authority of the Directorates, with the over-all assistance of
such components as PPB and the Office of Security, should be applied to
cover most internal Agency problems and situations.
For these reasons the SIGINT Officer and his staff should be
located on the DCI's community staff (NIPE). From this position the
SIGINT Officer can, in addition to his strictly community activities,
function as the senior staff officer in CIA on the SIGINT activities of the
Agency. Such an arrangement is justified by the extremely close inter-
relationship existing as between Agency and community SIGINT responsi-
bilities. This suggests the necessity for one, single, over-all focal
point of staff responsibility for SIGINT matters, both community and
internal to the Agency. The alternative of two staff officers, one for
Agency and another for community matters, seems cumbersome, dupli-
cative and generally undesirable.
The information handling and related problem of computerized
and automatic data handling support involves standardization of equipment
and requires centralized management and guidance. Here again, with the
adjustment recommended in the next chapter of this report, the necessary
initiatives and controls in this area can be asserted through the line of
command and the existing staff structure (including specifically PPB),
with some additional support to the Director from his community staff.
The information handling procedures and facilities of the Agency play
such an essential role in the DCI' s coordinating and production responsi-
bilities that their effectiveness can not be judged in isolation from the
impact which they necessarily have on the rest of the community. The
progress of the Agency towards the establishment of a modern system,
capable of exploiting the most advanced techniques for information
handling, will continue to be a matter of concern to the Director's com-
munity staff. This staff can provide assurance that the Agency programs
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are proceeding in such a way as to promote progress in the community
as a whole or identify obstacles or problems, the resolution of which
would serve to facilitate such progress.
One final comment about the Director's personal staff may be
appropriate regarding the office of the Executive Director-Comptroller.
This office combines the planning and program review functions which
were formerly established by Mr. Mc Cone in the Comptroller's office,
and which are essential and are very effectively performed. The role
of the Executive Director is otherwise not all that clearly defined but
is obviously very useful in a number of capacities, some of them repre-
sentational. There appears so far to have been no particular disposition
on the part of any DCI, since the establishment of the Executive Director's
office, to attempt a formal delegation to it of managerial authority over
the Agency's affairs. There is much to be said for an informal and
flexible adjustment of responsibilities, on a somewhat ad hoc basis,
particularly in the representational field, as between the Director, Deputy
Director and Executive Director. It is possible, however, that additional
specific responsibilities could be assigned to the Executive Director. For
example, a case can be made, as recommended in Part IV. C. , for having
the Director of Training report to the Executive Director instead of to
the DDS. The case would be particularly strong if the DDS acquires the
additional burdens contemplated in the recommendation to transfer the
Office of Computer Services from DDS&T to him.
Some mention should be made of proposals to separate the DCI
from the Agency and establish him as an over-all coordinator in the
Executive Offices of the President where, it is sometimes alleged, he
could discharge his responsibilities as a coordinator more effectively.
Any such move would create substantial legal problems in view of the
provision of the National Security Act which expressly establishes the
DCI as the head of CIA. Moreover, as a practical matter, the whole
complex machinery which has been painfully built up around the person
of the DCI and which involves the Agency as a central mechanism for the
evaluation and dissemination of national intelligence would have to be
very substantially dismembered and refashioned in the event of such a
move. Also, as a minimum, in order to function efficiently as a coordi-
nator, the DCI would require a staff which is roughly equivalent in size
to the present DDI plus the Board of National Estimates, with appropriate
communications, administrative and computerized data handling support.
Obviously a staff of this size is too large to accommodate in the Executive
Offices. Without such a staff, it would be impossible for the individual
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who has been designated as the principal intelligence officer of the Govern-
ment to assess the significance of substantive intelligence or develop
anything like an informed opinion about the emphasis appropriate for
particular intelligence programs or activities.
A related question is the location of the Clandestine Services
of CIA. Here the immediate question is where else to put them. It is
unlikely that they could function effectively under the immediate control
of the State Department and it is doubtful whether the public interest
would be served by putting them under the Defense Department. In
either event neither department is likely to tolerate the establishment
of an espionage or covert action service in the other. CIA, on the other
hand, is appropriately staffed and otherwise possesses the facilities and
competence necessary to continue these operational functions under policy
controls which have been developed over a long period of time at the highest
levels of Government and which are thoroughly understood. No conceivable
benefit could be derived by the transfer of this function.
A further subsidiary question is the argument often made to the
effect that the covert action mission should be separated from the espionage
and counterintelligence responsibilities of CIA and located in some other
agency of the Government. The proposal to separate "operations" from
"intelligence" is sometimes based on an erroneous impression of British
practice in this respect. Actually British experience during the War,
when operations and secret intelligence operations were in fact separated,
proved in many respects calamitous and, if it is a precedent for anything,
proves the necessity of keeping these two covert functions of Government
as closely associated as possible. Covert action and clandestine collection
operations are inextricably connected. They use the same agents, They
need common support and communications mechanisms. They must be
orchestrated to serve a coherent purpose by individuals who thoroughly
understand the limitations as well as the potentialities of all clandestine
connections serving the U. S. within a given geographic area. Allocation
of covert action responsibility to some other agency of Government would
inevitably involve considerable duplication of effort, including the estab-
lishment of new training, personnel recruiting and fiscal arrangements,
facilities and procedures. Altogether, a decision to remove the covert
action charter from the Clandestine Services would be extremely unwise.
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Part IV. The Central Intelligence Agency proposals for organizational
action.
The Board of National Estimates has emerged as institutionally
essential to the production of coordinated National Intelligence Estimates.
The intelligence community at large has developed confidence in the
machinery and procedures which have evolved around the Board to sift
and assess conflicting evidence and views which more often than not
reflect intense departmental pressures, and in the capacity of the Board
to arrive at objective conclusions and judgements. Given the importance
of National Intelligence Estimates and the impact which they have on a
broad range of national security policy issues, and especially on military
force planning and the multibillion dollar military budgets, the importance
of preserving the Board as an impartial tribunal for the adjudication of
important intelligence issues can hardly be exaggerated.
The subject of estimates is included among the list of items
which appear to deserve some organizational action because the importance
of the estimating process would appear to justify consideration of even
relatively minor proposals to strengthen the Board. Some discussion of
the subject under the heading of "organizational action" is therefore included
even though no very substantial or revolutionary changes are proposed.
Three aspects of the Board will be considered. One is its com-
position. A second is the question of the size and location of its staff. A
third involves the problem of possible measures to improve the contri-
bution made by intelligence estimates to the decision making process in
the political field.
Composition.
There appears to be general agreement concerning the
composition appropriate for the Board. It should remain relatively small
and high level. Its membership should be limited to ten to twelve members,
including the Chairman. Of these, some should be professional intelligence
officers selected for their competence and maturity. Qualified officers
from the Clandestine Services should continue to be included in this cate-
gory. The Board should also continue to include individuals with experi-
ence in the military and foreign policy fields. The practice of including
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one or more distinguished retired Foreign Service Officers appears most
desirable. Qualified representation with appropriate military experience
is clearly essential. Conceivably, military or Foreign Service officers on
active service might be considered for membership on the Board, although
it is doubtful whether service on the Board is likely to be entirely compatible
with the status and loyalties of a senior officer of one of the military services.
Possibilities for introducing "outsiders" on a regular basis, primarily from
the universities, should be given very serious consideration. Moreover,
it appears to have been conceded for a long time that the Board membership
should include a scientist. The practical problem has been to find one.
This, however, should not prove impossible, and the availability of qualified
candidates should be once again explored. Consideration should be given to
the desirability of requiring that some at least of the positions on the Board
be rotated fairly frequently in order to ensure the introduction of new views.
Turnover in the Board's membership, however, should not be permitted to
be so broad or so rapid as seriously to erode the continuity of experience
which is one of the Board's important attributes.
Staff.
A more contentious issue is the question of what kind of a
staff the Board requires to support its estimating responsibilities. Earlier
surveys of the Agency (notably the Kirkpatrick, I I report of
April 1962) have recommended elimination of an independent ONE staff.
On balance, however, experience appears to justify the Board's need for a
staff of reasonable size to assist in the compilation of data and assembling
of views and in the actual drafting of estimates.
What is reasonable depends on a number of factors, some of
them rather intangible. Perhaps the most important of these is the personal
judgement of the Chairman of the Board who must have assurance, within
reasonable limits, that the staff assistance immediately available to the
Board is adequate. No claim has been made, nor would any be justified,
for anything larger than the present ONE staff. A question exists as to
whether it might not be somewhat smaller. Every effort should be made
to reduce and hold it to the minimum size necessary to provide Board
members with the assistance actually needed in the preparation and drafting
of estimates.
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The staff should be small. It should also constitute an elite.
Staff personnel should be selected on the basis of proved general and intel-
lectual competence and drafting ability. Normally the source of candidates
for staff positions will be other components of CIA. and the Board's require-
ments for qualified staff personnel should continue to be given a very high
priority. Efforts should be made to secure qualified personnel for service
with the staff on tours of duty from State and Defense.
A question remains as to whether and to what degree staff
personnel or staff sections of ONE should be experts or centers of expertise
on geographical or functional subjects. Staff assistants to the Board,
assigned to work on estimates, clearly require enough knowledge of the
subject matter of the estimate to prepare the first drafts of estimates and
have an informed and independent judgement concerning the validity of sub-
missions and comments from other components of the Agency and com-
munity. This presupposes a very considerable degree of expert competence
on the part of individual staff members. On the other hand, it is important
if possible to prevent and at least to minimize unhealthy competitive atti-
tudes between geographical or functional elements of ONE and comparable
units of other components of CIA. To the extent that two or more such
elements or units are concerned with identical areas or subjects, and come
to be regarded as conflicting centers of analytical expertise, a certain
amount of friction is probably inevitable. This, however, can be reduced
to tolerable levels by holding the size of the ONE staff to the essential
minimum; clarifying in certain areas the rather special and interagency
roles and character of the national estimating staff and process; reaffirming
the very high priority attached to this process and providing for the rotation
of staff personnel to other elements of CIA with reasonable frequency.
These and other measures should be adopted, emphasized or at least
examined with a view to making sure that ONE staff elements do not
become centers of needless bureaucratic conflict and antagonism.
There appears to be general agreement that the present
political estimates put out by the Board of National Estimates serve a
useful purpose in that they establish common assumptions throughout
the Government and therefore a common point of departure for discussion
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of policy matters. On the other hand, there is a general feeling that the
estimating process could be made more responsive than it now is to the
needs of policy makers for intelligence about specific situations and prob-
lems requiring decisions in particular geographic areas. The view has
been expressed by at least one former senior official of the Government
that the normal National Intelligence Estimate of political trends and
developments in a specific geographic area is too general to help very
much in the solution of specific policy problems. On the other hand, so
the criticism goes, these estimates are too abbreviated and formalized
to serve educational purposes by giving the policy maker a real feeling
for the various currents, pressures and factors at work in the area of
concern.
The intelligence input to decisions relating to political
situations in most geographic areas is normally effective enough for
practical purposes. Often it may be relatively invisible. The intelligence
assumptions of a given regional bureau are apt to be influenced by the
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Services usually establish effective working relationships at the Assistant
Secretary level through which intelligence judgements are fed into the
State Department. These relationships are important and care should be
taken to see that they are not disturbed. It would seem, however, that
components of the intelligence community responsible for the formulation
of coordinated, evaluated intelligence should play a more active role in
the decisions of what are now called the IRGs than now appears to be
generally the case.
No very definitive proposal as to how this should be accom-
plished.can be made until more is known about the organization of the new
administration. One possibility which should be explored, however, is the
practicability of making individual Board members available, as needed,
to work with and advise policy elements of the Government concerned
with regional problems and decisions. One criticism of the Board's pro-
cedures is that they isolate Board members from the discussions and
deliberations that go on at policy levels in the Government with the result
that political estimates tend to be produced in somewhat of a political
vacuum. It can at least be argued that Board members would benefit
from closer association with the policy making process.
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Arrangements calculated to give greater flexibility to
the Board's procedures and encourage more active participation by
Board members in policy discussions involve some risk of compromising
the Board's status as a detached tribunal. The statements which Board
members might make were they called upon to participate in discussions
of current problems would hardly constitute formally coordinated evalu-
ations. Committing the Board to participation in anything like this sort
of situation might tend further to confuse the respective roles of the
Board on the one hand and the DDI on the other. These respective roles,
however, are susceptible to practical delineation and some action designed
to involve the Board and its members more actively in the policy making
process as regards regional political problems should be considered.
As indicated above, any changes in the way estimates are
submitted will have to be tailored to changes in the decision making
machinery of the Government. Moreover, any gratuitous changes in the
process or machinery for producing National Intelligence Estimates
during the early stages of a new administration are likely to be disruptive
and confusing. A thorough review of the procedures for preparing political
estimates should be undertaken some time in the reasonably near future,
however, and it is recommended that such a review be initiated some time
in the summer or fall of this year.
B. Information handling and computer facilities in CIA.
Organizational changes to handle present and anticipated com-
puter support requirements of the Agency should be made at this time.
The Office of Computer Services (OCS), located within DDS&T, does not
appear appropriately positioned to maintain cognizance over and furnish
needed support to all of the Agency ADP activities or provide to top
Agency management the backup it needs to control this very expensive
and important function. Another factor to be considered is the increasing
interdependence of the Office of Communications (OC) and OCS and
the advisability of placing them under common management super-
vision within the DDS. This change is recommended with both com-
ponents functioning under an Assistant DDS with a very small technically
oriented management group. Other organizational solutions are possible
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but this arrangement appears the best. DDS&T would of course continue
to work on the development and adaptation of new computer and infor-
mation handling technology to meet Agency needs.
As a part of this OCS organizational change, the findings of
the Communications Study Group relating to the dissemination and distri-
bution of messages and documents should be considered. At present the
Agency dissemination/distribution function is not consolidated, centrally
controlled or automated.
logical focal point for the Agency dissemination distribution tunction may
be within the DDS, closely linked to and supported by the OC/OCS capa-
bility.
C. Training.
The training facilities and programs of the Agency have been
effectively administered under the over-all jurisdiction of the Deputy
Director for Support, and curricula have been developed which are
admirably suited to the professional development of career officers.
The importance of training to the future development and
indeed existence of the Agency can hardly be exaggerated and it is
essential that the facilities and faculty available for training should be
compatible with the high cultural and intellectual, as well as profes-
sional, standards which the Agency should seek to establish and maintain.
The Director of Training's authority and competence to provide
opportunities for extracurricular study by employees of the Agency as
well as to maintain the connections with universities and other academic
centers necessary to permit the conduct of individual research and study
projects by Agency personnel should be confirmed and emphasized.
With a view to underscoring the importance of the training
mission and the intellectual stimulus which it ought to represent, relo-
cation of the Director of Training immediately under the Executive
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Director-Comptroller is recommended. Such a change, while of no
immediate practical significance in view of the enlightened and construc-
tive attitude which has prevailed in the Directorate of Support towards
its training responsibilities, might have some long term value in estab-
lishing the importance of the role of training as a service of common
concern to the Agency as a whole.
How best to ensure recruitment of personnel of appropriate
caliber and suitable competence and educational qualifications is and
always will be the most important problem of any organization. The
problem has been complicated recently by the so-called "alienation" of
the universities, as well as by cutbacks and retrenchments in the scope
of Government and Agency activities and programs at home and abroad.
The career development program which has served efficiently to meet
the Agency's needs over a considerable time has had to be rather sub-
stantially readjusted to meet the constraints as well as the requirements
of the current situation. Obviously, recruiting will have to continue
through imaginative and energetically conducted programs which are
nevertheless very carefully tailored to the needs of individual components.
The problem at the moment is under active review in the Agency. It is,
however, of such importance as to warrant the establishment of a
special task force to consider all aspects of the problem of attracting
recruits of the highest quality and to develop clear-cut recommendations
for the personal consideration of the DCI. Such a group might well
consider the related questions of the rewards and incentives reasonably
available which are best calculated not only to attract new recruits but
also to retain those already on board. It would be desirable to consider
the inclusion in such a group of some distinguished individual with
experience in both Government and university life.
E. Distribution of information attributable to counter-
intelligence activity.
Determining the dissemination appropriate for counterintelli-
gence information presents difficulties. While not perhaps strictly an
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organizational problem, it is one which involves the interest of several
components of the Agency and appears of sufficient importance to warrant
some comment. The difficulty is created by the fact that distribution of
information attributable to agent operations in the counterintelligence field
has been strictly (and properly) limited because of the extreme sensitivity
involving many or most of these operations. The fact that information
derived from these operations may be considerably delayed in dissemi-
nation or, in many cases, not distributed at all, has created confusion
and been the basis of considerable misunderstanding in the community.
Certain categories of counterintelligence information (personalities,
attitudes, informal comments by agent sources both in the Communist
parties and in touch with orbit officers) are normally forwarded by the
field, if at all, in operational dispatches from which pertinent items are
only occasionally extracted for dissemination. A review should be initiated
of the procedures for the establishment of requirements for information
attributable to such operations and governing the dissemination of such
information as may be obtained from them. Moreover, arrangements
to ensure adequate participation in the exploitation of the potentialities
of CI operations by highly qualified political analysts from appropriate
elements of the DDI should be carefully examined with a view to ensuring
such participation at the earliest practicable moment.
F. National Photographic Interpretation Center.
As indicated in an earlier section of this report, NPIC seems
to be appropriately located in its present position under the DDI. It is
possible, however, that future developments will require some change
in its status in the Agency or conceivably its establishment as a quasi
independent element in the community. No recommendation for change
at this time is made and all present indications suggest that it would be
most unwise to consider a transfer of this facility at any time from the
immediate managerial and operational control of the DCI. Foreseeable
pressures to expand the workload of NPIC, however, may result in the
need for drastic changes in its composition and functions as a service
of common concern to the intelligence establishment as a whole. For
example, the possible impact of an arms control agreement and the
attendant requirements for coverage to assure compliance with the terms
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of any such agreement could have revolutionary implications as regards
the need for photographic interpretation capabilities. Another develop-
ment which could result in a substantial expansion of requirements for
photographic interpretation would be the emergence of a quick readout
system whether or not involving very high resolution photography. Either
or both of these developments could not only generate a need for an adminis-
trative restructuring of photographic support arrangements but also
necessitate a rather drastic re-examination of the existing procedures
for the establishment of requirements for photographic coverage and
stimulate additional concern for research and development in new tech-
niques and equipment calculated to simplify the problems of mass
photographic interpretation. A study of this situation has already been
initiated in the Agency. This study should be pushed to completion as
a preliminary to formal examination of the problem on a community-
wide basis.
There is a general impression that research facilities and
programs of CIA are inadequate, but how much and exactly what to do to
remedy this situation is not clear.
Criticisms are that research is diffused, lacks central control
and is overly short term in orientation. Lack of a solid research base,
particularly in areas of the political and social sciences, has allegedly
resulted in superficial judgements in certain areas and also a certain
lack of sensitivity to trends and developments of "cosmic" significance
such as the longer term but inevitable impact of the population explosion,
poverty, atmospheric contamination, the technological gap, etc., etc.
The Special Research Staff of the DDI has up to now concen-
trated mainly on what is essentially historical research on the causes
and evolutions of broad political and philosophical trends in Soviet and
Chinese affairs. In the main, the studies that have been produced have
tended to be long, detailed, thorough in using all sources, scholarly in
a diffident way and quite unique. At no other place in the Government or
in the academic world have all the sources at all classifications been
worked over together to glean the most that is knowable about important
developments in the closed Communist societies. The very completeness
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of these works, however, has tended to limit their readership to fellow
analysts in the intelligence community, and the problem has been to
secure a hearing for their findings by those who can make practical use
of them.
Future plans for the staff appear to call for papers which deal
with trends and forces with current and future implications and with other
areas as well as the Communist world, which will be shorter and will
have summaries for busy readers. They will attempt to take into account
the needs of operational units, such as the area divisions of DDP, as well
as those of the analytical community. In support of this new direction,
plans are being made for rotating DDP personnel into this research effort,
for using DDP stations abroad as bases for field study, and for DDP partici-
pation in drawing up terms of reference. In a test of this orientation, the
African Division of DDP proposed a list of 27 topics on which research in
depth would be helpful to it. The staff also expects to continue and increase
its support of the Board of National Estimates. It would therefore appear
that the Special Research Staff will be increasingly responsive to the needs
of the DDP and should also constitute a research facility of considerable
usefulness to the Board of National Estimates.
Research in support of operations has traditionally been conducted
for the DDP by various parts of DDI and DDS&T, especially the geographic
and environmental studies of the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelli-
gence (OBGI) and the personality studies of Biographic Register. In
addition, various chapters of the NIS series are useful to DDP. In the
main, research for operations as conducted outside DDP tends to be in
response to ad hoc requests, is usually fairly current and specific in
content and exploits some unique resource or expertise available within
the DDI or DDS&T.
Research for operations is also carried on within DDP on a
continuing and generally current project basis by case officers and
ro'ect officers themselves or by specialized groups, such as
25X1A FE Division or the research elements in the CA, FI
and CI Staffs.
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Agency or the community and does the work itself only if no one a se is
available.
Research in support of production is integral to individual
production efforts of such offices as Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI),
Office of Economic Research (OER) and Office of Strategic Research (OSR).
There is some reason to believe that pressures for current responses
and short-term or narrow-range analyses has made it increasingly diffi-
cult to extract analysts from the production cycle and let them work in
depth on some aspect of their speciality. This apparent lack of flexibility
is alleged to have operated against the accumulation of a broad research
base and exploration into fields which may be needed to deal with problems
in the future. It is charged by some that our present concentration on
current problems and production is eating up the research base developed
over the past decade or so without replacing it or restructuring it for
future needs. It is also charged that analysts are not made sufficiently
available for study in depth of new or better analytic techniques, of new
uses for new collection yields or for existing but only superficially
exploited information bases.
Research in the economic, scientific and technological areas
appears to be generally adequate for current needs, if not for future
requirements, given the resources available. More can perhaps be done
in depth and breadth, but for most purposes these areas are being covered
as part of the work of the Agency and of DIA. The behavioral areas may
well need greater attention. State, which once had responsibility in this
field, has reduced its commitments; a certain amount is done in connec-
tion with NIS production but mostly on the descriptive, expository level
with what appears to some as inadequate attention to analysis in depth;
work done in the academic world on the whole is not directly applicable
to intelligence uses and the pressures on OCI for current publication are
not generally compatible with very much in depth research. As more
and more countries and peoples become targets for analysis and operations,
lack of adequate effort in this field can have serious effects on applicable
intelligence appreciations.
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Whether or not what appear to be deficiencies in research in
the Agency can and should be cured by the allocation of additional "in
house?1 resources, by greater centralization of control over existing
facilities or by an expansion of arrangements for external research,
or a combination of all three, is not all that clear. A thorough review
of the problem by a competent study group is recommended.
Part V. The intelligence community - its present organization.
The intelligence community includes the Central Intelligence
Agency, the intelligence components of the Department of State, Defense
(Defense Intelligence Agency), Army, Navy and Air Force, the National
Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic
Energy Commission. To maintain the relationship necessary for a fully
coordinated intelligence community and to provide for an effective inte-
gration of and guidance to the national intelligence effort, the United States
Intelligence Board (USIB) was established by NSC directive. The Director
of Central Intelligence serves as Chairman with membership as noted
above except that the intelligence chiefs of the military departments
attend USIB meetings as observers.
USIB advises and assists the DCI in the discharge of his statutory
responsibilities for producing national intelligence and in carrying out
applicable directives for coordinating intelligence activities. On the sub-
stantive side it serves as the final coordinating authority for the production
of National Intelligence Estimates and for the weekly Watch Report on
strategic early warning. In providing guidance USIB is concerned with
the formulation of intelligence policies and with the establishment of
intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities. Decisions and recom-
mendations of the USIB are transmitted as appropriate by the DCI to the
departments and agencies concerned or, when higher approval is required,
to the President or the NSC. Basic recommendations on the national
intelligence effort as a whole, when approved, are generally issued as
National Security Council Intelligence Directives. Appeals to the NSC
from rulings by the DCI on matters coming before USIB are permitted.
An appeal by any individual or agency under the jurisdiction of the Secre-
tary of Defense can only be made, however, with his personal approval.
Actions by the USIB are divided about equally between those
taken in regular weekly meetings and those which can be accomplished
by circulation of memoranda for written or telephonic concurrence. The
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Much of the Board's work is carried out with the assistance of
or through a number of committees which have been established to main-
tain cognizance of the major sectors of the Board's responsibilities. The
Board of National Estimates in coordination with representatives of the
USIB principals submits drafts of National Intelligence Estimates for USIB
concurrence and DCI approval. The most important committees in the
field of collection and related processing are the SIGINT Committee dealing
with COMINT and ELINT matters, the Committee on Imagery Requirements
and Exploitation (COMIREX) dealing with overhead photography, and the
Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) dealing with major problems
and usually involving the application of all available systems to coverage in
a particular area.
Several committees are production oriented and serve as vehicles
for coordinating submissions to National Intelligence Estimates and require-
ments for collection guidance. These include the Economic Intelligence
Committee (EIC), the Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC), the Guided
Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) and the National Intelligence Survey
Committee (NIS). Major functional problems such as intelligence infor-
mation handling and security standards and practices are dealt with in
specially designated committees. Finally, the Watch Committee reviews
strategic warning intelligence indicative of a military threat involving the
security of the United States and reports to USIB weekly, or more often
as the situation may dictate.
Intelligence resources.
Board's activities are also about equally divided between consideration
of substantive national intelligence and of guidance to the intelligence
community.
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While the
USIB mechanism noted above sets intelligence requirements for the guidance
of the national effort, intelligence resources are actually managed through
four principal programs.
Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP).
The bulk of the communications intelligence (COMINT) and
electronics intelligence (ELINT) activities of the U. S. Government are
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centrally directed and mana ed under the CCP.
25X1A NSCID 6 designates the Secretary of
Defense as executive agent of the Government in the conduct of COMIN.T
and ELINT activities and the National Security Agency has been charged
as the operative arm of the Secretary of Defense in this area. The
Director, NSA is supervised by the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. Intelligence based
on NSA information is produced by CIA, DIA, State and the military
services. NSA is also responsible for the development of U. S. crypto-
graphic systems and communications security policy and procedures
for the Department of Defense.
National Reconnaissance Program (NRP).
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The National Reconnaissance Program encompasses all
projects for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic
information obtained through overflights of denied areas by both aircraft
and satellite vehicles. It is managed by the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) which is a separate agency of the Department of Defense.
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tary of the Air Force for R&D. 25X1A
An NRP Executive Committee consisting of the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DCI and the Special Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology provides policy guidance for the
NRP and recommends to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level
of effort for the NRP, including a consolidated budget.
The NRP is responsive directly and solely to intelligence
collection requirements and priorities established by USIB. Specific
projects are carried out by line elements of the Department of Defense,
primarily the Air Force, and by CIA. Intelligence from this source is
extremely important in the production of national intelligence, particu-
larly in assessing the strategic threat to the U. S.
Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP).
The Consolidated Intelligence Program consists of the
various programs and activities of DIA and of the military services which
involve collection and production of information and intelligence of primary
interest to military planning, operations and readiness but which also make
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major contributions to national intelligence.
25X1A Some of the larger programs in the CIP are mapping and
charting, peripheral reconnaissance (as distinct from overhead recon-
naissance which is conducted under the NRP), the Defense Attache System
and the Atomic Energy Detection System
25X1 The CIP is the direct responsi-
bility of the Director, DIA who reports to the Secretary of Defense through
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAP).
2:5X1 A
The CIA Program comprises the various activities of CIA
conducted under the line authority of the DCI.
CIA collects and produces information and intelligence of
primary interest in the development of policy, planning and day-to-day
operations at the top level of Government (including the Department of
Defense). It also has the exclusive responsibility for the conduct of covert
operations abroad. Details of CIA activities are set forth in the chapter
on CIA organization.
Each of these major programs is reviewed for the DCI by the
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE).
In addition there has recently been established a National Intelligence
Resources Board (NIRB) which is responsible for advising the DCI on the
need for particular resources, facilities or activities to fulfill the objec-
tives and priorities established by USIB.
Part VI. Organization of the community - general observations.
The organization of the intelligence community and its relation-
ship to the DCI's coordinating responsibility can logically be considered
under three headings:
A. The problem of coordinating the production and dissemi-
nation of substantive intelligence;
B. The machinery for the allocation of jurisdictional
responsibility amongst the components of the community; and
C. Provision of effective guidance and coordination for
the allocation and utilization of resources in the community.
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A. Production and dissemination of substantive intelligence.
The fundamental objective here is to make sure that policy
makers have:
1. Immediate knowledge of events as they occur with the
best possible appreciation of the validity of the source of infor-
mational coverage and as much evaluation of the significance of
the event as can be afforded on relatively short notice; and
2. Thoroughly evaluated estimates of situations, develop-
ments or trends of serious concern to policy makers which
reflect views of all components of the intelligence community
concerned. Subjects appropriate for such estimates are for
example, the military capabilities and probable objectives of
Soviet Russia; the probability of a recurrence of hostilities in
the Middle East; or the chances for an insurrection in some
important country or region of Latin America.
The task of providing appropriate echelons of Government with
coverage of current events is primarily the responsibility of the Office of
Current Intelligence in CIA which has an efficient mechanism for ensuring
that, time permitting, the daily and other periodic reporting on individual
items has the approval or dissents of other interested components of the
intelligence community. Where time does not permit coordination, the
published report will so indicate. The presence of CIA analysts in the
Situation Room in the White House and the organization of Operations
Centers in CIA and in State and Defense, plus the evolution of almost
instantaneous transmission facilities (including LDX) between these centers,
assures the means for very rapid exchange of information and views.
Obviously the form most appropriate for the dissemination of
current intelligence depends on the desires and organizational arrangements
of the consumers, particularly the White House. Considerable thought has
been given to ways of modernizing and improving facilities and techniques
for the immediate dissemination of current intelligence. Any specific changes
in existing procedures, however, will have to await decisions in the new
administration concerning the organization of the White House staff; the role
of the Situation Room, etc.
Further thought should be given to the problem of the proliferation
of publications originating with individual components of the intelligence
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community and disseminated throughout the Government. It would seem
desirable to limit to a minimum the number of bulletins and periodicals
produced as departmental intelligence by components of the intelligence
community which are given regular dissemination outside of the community.
Distribution, for example, of the SIGINT Summary put out by NSA and the
daily Intelligence Summary put out by DIA should be confined to the Defense
Department and to the intelligence components of USIB agencies.
In the meantime, as a preliminary step in an effort to get hold
of this problem, the Information Handling Committee staff has had under
development an Item Register which will maintain on magnetic tape a list
of titles and descriptions of intelligence publications. Some 1400 series
titles have been listed to date out of a suspected 7000. Individual agency
managers will be able to query this listing as a first step toward reduction
of duplicate and little-used reports. An in depth survey by USIB of this
field appears indicated.
The subject of formal intelligence estimates has been discussed
in the section of this report relating to the Board of National Estimates
in CIA.
Here it is worth stressing the importance of ensuring that all
agencies (State, DIA and the military services) which participate in the
estimating process are represented by individuals of the highest calibre
and qualifications. It is equally important that these representatives
should have direct access to the head of the agency they represent and be
in a position to speak authoritatively as well as competently for their
agencies during the course of discussion of a given estimate. In the past
considerable delay and confusion in the presentation of estimates to the
USIB has resulted from uncertainties concerning the ultimate or real
position, and the basis for the ultimate or real position, of participating
agencies (including, on occasion, that of the Director of Central Intelligence).
There remains a slightly gray area involving preparation and
dissemination of studies on very widely assorted subjects ranging from
studies of the Soviet submarine force to examinations of trends and develop-
ments in geographic areas of immediate political interest.
In the early stages of the development of the intelligence com-
munity, it was probably intended that the agency having primary responsi-
bility for a given subject should have a more or less exclusive franchise
for the analysis and production of studies on the subject for which they had
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been given primary responsibility. For example, the Department of State
was given primary responsibility for the production of political and socio-
logical intelligence on all countries, and the Department of Defense was
to produce military intelligence. Pursuant to this arrangement, depart-
mental intelligence services, such as INR in the State Department produce
studies within their areas of responsibility which are supplied to senior
officials in the Department of State and also given dissemination within
the community at large. Over the past few years, CIA has substantially
expanded its competence to produce studies on a number of topics which
are the primary responsibility of other agencies. The right of the Agency
to do this is very clearly established by the provisions of the appropriate
NSCID. Furthermore, although these studies are not subjected to formal
coordination, they do reflect the very close working relationships which
exists between analysts interested in given areas or subjects in CIA and
in the Departments of State and Defense. Obviously this practice, if
uncontrolled, could lead to serious friction and confusion. So far, however,
there has been no evidence of serious concern on the part of any of the
agencies affected by these studies and the USIB machinery is fully adequate
to provide for policing these arrangements and to permit the registration
of complaints by components who feel that they have been adversely affected.
Generally speaking, procedures for ensuring the coordination
of the production and dissemination of finished intelligence are working well.
B. The machinery for the allocation of responsibility amongst
the components of the community.
A second major problem in the coordination of the intelligence
effort as a whole involves the adequacy of procedures for the allocation
of basic jurisdictional responsibilities for the purpose of determining who
in the community is supposed to do what.
Jurisdictional allocations are made by directives emanating
from the National Security Council which, in the past, have established
the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence and USIB; allocated
collection and production responsibilities and established the basis for
program and the National Photographic Interpretation Center.
ample -
menting directives are issued by the Director of Central Intelligence
to clarify or particularize the provisions of National Security Directives
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and make detailed provision for the operational, substantive or administra-
tive responsibilities of individual components in a particular field.
One of the basic directives of the National Security Council
governs the conduct of U. S. espionage and counterintelligence activities
abroad. This directive authorizes the establishment of machinery for the
coordination of these operations under the authority of the DCI and his
representatives abroad. A clandestine collection effort to supportcthe
requirements of American military commands abroad has long been
recognized as desirable. Espionage operations run for this purpose are
the ultimate responsibility of the Director, DIA with whom the appropriate
elements of CIA ultimately deal on matters involving the coordination of
military espionage. These operations were, for the most part however,
actually controlled by the individual military commands overseas and
designed to support the immediate requirements and interests of individual
commands.
More recently, the Defense Department has embarked on a
national espionage program which involves the conduct of operations on
a worldwide scale under centralized direction in the U. S. for so-called
national objectives. The emergence of a very strong U. S. military espionage
effort, comparable to that conducted by the Soviet GRU, could be a compli-
cating factor and have an adverse effect on relations in the intelligence
community. So far the development of this national military capability
has been proceeding with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the DCI,
nor is any effort to curtail or limit the expansion of this effort thought
necessary or desirable.
On the other hand, the emergence of a strong military espionage
function re-enforces the need for adequate control and coordination of all
clandestine collection activities under central authority. As recommended
in the succeeding section of this report, steps should be taken to strengthen
and expand existing facilities and procedures for the coordination of this
type of action.
C. Resources management.
The DCI's chief responsibility in the field of resources manage-
ment is to ensure that the resources developed and used in the over-all
American intelligence effort produce information which is as responsive
as possible to the real needs of policy makers. The initial question is to
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determine what these needs actually are. Assuming that it is not too diffi-
cult to establish what we want to know in general about the capabilities
and intentions of other countries, the problem is nevertheless compli-
cated by the tangential nature of most of the data on which intelligence
analysts must rely for the answers to their specific questions. It is very
The essential question, therefore, is how much is enough, and how we can
refine and target the intelligence effort in a manner to ensure maximum
focus on the essential intelligence problems.
This objective of refining the priorities and objectives of the
intelligence effort as a whole has been achieved to some degree through
the USIB statements of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIOs).
These, however, are very broadly stated in terms of very general problems
and are not very helpful as guides to the targetting of complex collection
programs. There is general agreement that the facilities available to the
DCI and the community for planning the intelligence effort and establishing
priorities and objectives should be improved. Measures to strengthen the
DCI's staff for this purpose are discussed in the next section of this report.
The actual managerial structures which have evolved to review
and control the four national intelligence programs have improved immeasure-
ably over the past six years. The principal deficiency in the present arrange-
ments is that no mechanism exists for examining the totality of the three
large programs (the CCP, the CIP and the NRP) aggregating approximately
which are the managerial responsibility of the Secretary
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of Defense. Proposals designed to permit a consolidated review of intelli-
gence programs are contained in the next section of this report.
There are reasons for continuing to regard these three major
Defense Department programs as discrete entities. Due to their size and
complexity, each of them individually presents a formidable review problem.
Tradition and logic both support the need for independent review of SIGINT
as an activity of Government (CCP); of overhead reconnaissance of denied
areas (NRP), and of the conventional military activities conducted under
the over-all direction of DIA for essentially national purposes (CIP).
Some readjustments of the items and elements included in particular pro-
grams might profitably be made. All ELINT, for example, might be
reviewed in one program whereas now there is some concern for ELINT
in all three (and in the CIA program as well).
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charting might very well be excluded from the CIP on the grounds that
they do not constitute national intelligence. The reasons for excluding
certain other activities from any of these programs
a
or a particular percentage of the SR 71 project, for instance)
In any consideration of the composition appropriate for individual
programs, their individual relationship to USIB committees should be kept
in mind. The SIGINT Committee of USIB, for example, has a direct
responsibility for determining the need of the community for SIGINT. It
is important therefore that the costs, as well as the resources and poten-
tialities, of the SIGINT activities of the Government should be displayed
in such a way as to make it possible for the USIB to develop informed
guidance concerning the level of coverage desired in particular areas.
The JAEIC establishes the requirements for the activities of the Air Force
which should also continue to be
presented as a discrete element whether or not it continues to appear in
the CIP.
Finally, it is thought that some readjustment is possible in the
funding and administration of facilities and resources used by the military
services for essentially tactical purposes. A specific proposal in this area
is contained in the next section of this report.
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The type and depth of individual reviews may also require readjust-
ment. There is a question, for example, concerning the extent to which a
so-called zero base review is desirable, and so-called problem or issue
oriented review procedures should be emphasized where practical. More-
over, no review procedures are likely to be effective which do not provide
adequate time for study of individual problems by participants in the review.
Representatives of the DCI have been receiving proposed agendas and
program issues for discussion in the Executive Committee of the NRO less
than 48 hours before the time scheduled for the meeting. The time allowed
for discussion in individual items, some of them extremely complicated?
arising during the review of the CCP has been limited to a few minutes,
Correction of these deficiencies is essentially an administrative matter
within the competence of the Secretary of Defense.
In exercising his prerogatives in this connection, however, the
Secretary of Defense should be mindful of the interests and responsibilities
of the DCI to ensure effective guidance and coordination of the intelligence
effort as a whole. In the past, directives have been issued from the Office
of the Deputy Secretary of Defense providing for the allocation of Defense
Department intelligence resources, initiating program and manpower
reviews and authorizing the establishment of projects with no opportunity
afforded the DCI or his representatives to examine or assess the substantive
impact which changes in the allocation or level of resources are calculated
to have. One of the primary responsibilities of a Special Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense on Intelligence Resource Matters, if appointed
as recommended in the next section of this report, would be to keep the
DCI informed of all developments and proposed administrative action
involving national intelligence resources.
Two important steps have already been taken which will substan-
tially improve the coordination and help to rationalize the management of
intelligence activity in the Defense Department. One of these is a consoli-
dated presentation of all intelligence resources in categories designed to
show the totality of the intelligence effort allocated against geographic areas
(China, the Middle East, etc.) and functional categories (Soviet strategic
or ground forces, Chinese missile activity, etc. ). This is the so-called
Target Oriented Display (TOD) of intelligence resources.
A second important development in the resource field has been
the recent establishment of the National Intelligence Resources Board. The
purpose of this Board is to establish the basis for an independent judgement
by the DCI concerning the need for individual activities, programs or
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resources. The NIRB was not designed to play a part in the routine review
of programs. It was created to establish authoritative advice to the DCI
about the need for particular resources or activities in the light of such
factors as cost, alternative methods of acquiring comparable information
and the degree to which information from a given activity is required to
prevent a significant gap in our essential coverage. In this connection the
Board is authorized to draw on any or all components of the community
in order to establish the value of information attributable to a particular
activity balanced against the cost of that activity; as well as to assess the
risk to the national security of any decision to curtail or eliminate intelli-
gence coverage attributable to an existing project.
Part VII. The intelligence community - proposals for organizational action.
A. Improvement of Defense Department organization for
management of intelligence resources.
As indicated above, arrangements for supervision and approval
of the three major Defense Department programs (NRP; CCP; CIP) individu-
ally have improved very substantially. Some questions exist as to what
activities to include or exclude in individual programs. A later recom-
mendation of this report is concerned with the desirability of efforts to
identify and segregate, for programming purposes, those facilities which
serve essentially tactical purposes.
By far the most perplexing problem, so far unsolved, is how to
establish some sort of satisfactory procedure for centralized review and
supervision of the totality of Defense Department intelligence activity with
a view to ensuring that all three major programs are properly and efficiently
interrelated. At the moment the channels for control of all three programs
are entirely different. The Director, DIA, who is responsible for the CIP,
reports both to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
in effect to the former through the latter. The Director, NRO reports
directly to the Deputy Secretary. The Director, NSA reports through the
DDR&E.
The principal common ingredient in the review of these three
programs is the influence of the DCI who is represented in the review of
all three programs and who, usually with the help of USIB committees,
defines needs and requirements for the informational product of these
programs. The recently established NIRB will substantially strengthen
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the effectiveness and authority of the DCI's voice in connection with
individual program or project decisions. A better mechanism, however,
for centralized managerial control of Defense Department programs is
badly needed.
Because of the sensitivity and importance of intelligence
programs it is generally conceded that they must remain the personal
responsibility of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. What is lacking is a
competent and responsible staff, headed by a senior and qualified individual,
to advise the Deputy Secretary and to act as a point of contact for senior
officials of the Defense Department and the Government, particularly
the senior representatives of the DCI, on matters concerning the utilization
or development of resources for intelligence purposes.
Alternative suggestions for consolidating authority over Defense
Department intelligence activity have been made in the past. One idea is
to establish DIA as the Defense Department's agency for this purpose.
This has generally been discarded partly because of the ambiguities
inherent in the Director, DIA's dual allegiance to the Secretary and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Another solution proposed has been the creation of a full scale
Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. This measure, however, carries
the risk that such an office would inevitably develop into a center for
authoritative judgements on substantive intelligence matters in competition
(and potentially opposition) to those of DIA.
To a certain degree opposition to both proposals has been based
on a reluctance to encourage anything approximating a full delegation of
authority for intelligence matters by the Deputy Secretary. On the other
hand, experience has fully confirmed the manifest absurdity of an arrange-
ment under which the Deputy Secretary attempts to discharge all his
responsibilities in this field personally and without competent assistance.
Moreover, it would be equally undesirable to make intelligence staff
support to the Deputy Secretary a part time responsibility for an estab-
lished Assistant Secretary.
The practical answer to an organizational dilemma lies in the
establishment of an Assistant to the Deputy Secretary with a small staff
to advise on matters relating to the allocation, utilization and development
of resources. A senior official of proved competence with substantial
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experience in intelligence should be appointed to this position and should
be authorized to deal on a staff basis with all officials of the Defense
Department responsible for intelligence resource matters and with
authorized representatives of the DCI.
As a corollary, the line of command over all program directors
should be tidied up. The Director, NRO should be relieved of his responsi-
bilities as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for R&D and permitted to
concentrate full time on the complex, expensive and important problems of
national reconnaissance. The Director, NSA should no longer report to the
Deputy Secretary through DDR&E. The facilities of the latter, however,
should be appropriately utilized in connection with the staff review of all
R&D activity and project proposals throughout the intelligence community.
B. The DCI community staff.
It was an early conclusion of this report that no substantial change
is necessary in the staff arrangement through which the DCI exercises control
over CIA. The DCI's community staff (NIPE), on the other hand, should be
somewhat expanded and its mission clarified and confirmed. The basic pur-
pose of this staff is to support the DCPs responsibility for management,
coordination and guidance of community resources and activities. For, this
purpose the staff should have the authority necessary to deal with components
of CIA which can contribute to a full understanding of the need for particular
resources and also with the chairmen of USIB committees with resource
responsibilities, as well as other components of the community, It should
support the NIRB and continue to develop and be responsible for custody of
the TOD. It should continue to represent the DCI in the review of Defense
Department programs. The staff also should be specifically charged with
improving the over-all focus of intelligence activities; refining the priority
objectives and emphasis appropriate for the Government's over-all intelli-
gence effort and for long range planning. It should continue to have a com-
petence for systems and operations analysis and also perform such liaison
functions as appear appropriate, including maintenance of relationships
with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).
Specifically the staff should:
1. Have the authority to task that portion of the DDI
Information Requirements Staff concerned with the evaluation
of the product of intelligence operations.
2. Ultimately assume the community responsibilities of
the present SIGINT Officer and also the responsibility to support
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the DCI in his community capacity as a member of the NRO
Executive Committee (as distinguished from his responsibility
for CIA reconnaissance activities).
3. Maintain facilities and personnel necessary to:
(a) Provide staff support to the NIRB;
(b) Conduct systems analysis and evaluation functions;
(c) Continue custody, development and improvement of
the Target Oriented Display (TOD) of intelligence resources;
and
(d) Oversee information data handling activity which
has an impact on the DCI community responsibilities.
4. Include the chairmen of the following USIB committees:
(a) The Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC);
(b) The Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Com-
mittee (TSCC);
(c) The Information Handling Committee (IHC); and
(d) Ultimately the SIGINT Committee and the Committee
on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX).
5. Include one or more area coordinators concerned with
examining programs and activities on an area wide basis and
recommending specific improvements in individual programs
designed to strengthen intelligence coverage of important targets.
The area coordinators would undertake long term planning in
their particular areas.
C. Enforcement of intelligence guidance.
Some difficulty exists in implementing decisions of the DCI and
USIB guidance generally. It is obviously important that procedures should
exist to ensure that action follows a decision to expand, curtail or eliminate
intelligence coverage or activity. Appointment of a Special Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, recommended above, will provide the point of
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contact necessary to synchronize the authority of the Secretary of Defense
and the DCI for this purpose. Some mechanism or procedure, to be estab-
lished jointly by the proposed Special Assistant and representatives of the
DCI, for follow-up inspection and review to ensure compliance with decisions
affecting resources will be needed. Better arrangements are also needed
for centralized review and approval, including DCI coordination, of ad hoc
proposals for individual program changes which are submitted from time to
time throughout the program year.
D. Tactical versus national intelligence resources.
There is reason for concern about what appears to be a growing
practice by the services of appropriating intelligence resources programmed
and budgeted for in one or another of the major intelligence resource programs
and using them for direct tactical support or for other purposes of benefit to
only one service or a specified command. On the one hand, there is obviously
a legitimate need on the part of military commands for adequate intelligence
facilities immediately responsive to these tactical requirements. On the
other hand, the DCI and intelligence agencies are in danger of losing control
of resources for which they are supposed to budget and for the utilization
and coordination of which they are responsible.
The situation is confused by the difficulty of drawing a valid and
constant distinction between national intelligence resources and tactical
support resources. The same equipment, vehicles, and men can and do
serve both ends simultaneously or alternately in a large number of cases,
and tactical success is always of national importance. By changes in cri-
teria and definitions, by "temporary" orders or "concept papers," or by
progressive extensions of requirements for tactical support, resources
which were formerly considered national or strategic in character and
usefulness are shifted out of national intelligence programs or out of the
control of intelligence organizations and allocated to military control at
various echelons. Moreover, other resources needed to support the
transferred resources are often drawn along.
The primary area of intelligence activity affected is SIGINT,
especially ELINT. Tactical photo reconnaissance is more easily dis-
tinguished from reconnaissance undertaken for national requirements.
In most cases the differences are relatively clear, from the targets to
be covered to the vehicles and cameras used, to the locations of proces-
sing and readout. Human source collection and production is also quite
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distinct in tactical as against national uses from the types of information
sought to the kinds of intelligence produced.
In SIGINT, tactical COMINT represents a relatively small
diversion of resources out of the pool available for national or strategic
purposes. Furthermore, it is difficult and unproductive to separate
COMINT operations from the large data bases which are required to make
COMINT information intelligible and which are best maintained centrally
by national organizations. With COMINT the problem generally arises
when the services claim that increasing quantities of COMINT resources
are integral to clearly tactical operations like Airborne Radio Direction
Finding or Electronic Counter Measures and must therefore be assigned
to the exclusive control of the military element conducting those operations.
These claims are opposed by NSA as incompatible with its responsibility
and mandate to control all COMINT resources however used and wherever
located.
The problem of tactical versus national resources is more
sharply defined in the field of ELINT. This is partly because ELINT
collection equipment techniques and operations are virtually identical
with those of ARDF and ECM and partly because information derived from
ELINT collection is critical to successful ECM operations. Because of
the military doctrine of unity of command and the natural desire of tactical
commanders to control all the resources needed for their operations, it
is inevitable that attempts are made to take over ELINT operations, particu-
larly in active theaters, and thus extract from NSA's control resources
over which it claims authority by virtue of NSCID 6. The direct relevance
of these resources to military operations and the difficulty which NSA has
experienced in providing adequate technical guidance and support to ELINT
programs make these attempts understandable. The service cryptologic
agencies tend to share their individual service views and sharp jurisdic-
tional disputes develop with NSA.
The confusion and disagreement over the control of SIGINT
resources, particularly those which are ambivalently ELINT and ECM,
is likely to intensify with the implementation of the JCS Concept Paper on
Tactical Electronic Warfare Support (the TEWS Paper). In specifying
the nature and scope of Electronic Warfare operations, it describes the
dependence of EW on ELINT and COMINT information and support and
clearly implies the need for a considerable degree of control by tactical
commanders over both these sources in their areas of operation to assure
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operational success. The JCS have specifically directed reviews to
"insure that commanders are provided the resources, under their
operational control, which are needed to obtain timely and complete
information on (enemy intentions and capabilities). This review will
address the organization, training and operations of tactical SIGINT
support systems . . . and will encompass the development of a compre-
hensive concept for a theater tactical SIGINT system."
There is a clear need for measures to reduce the discord and
confusion which surrounds this problem of tactical versus national
intelligence resources. Criteria should be developed to give tactical
commanders operational control over resources directly necessary to
successful operations while recognizing that distinctions between
national and tactical support resources are largely artificial and sub-
ject to change as operational needs and levels of activity vary. Because
of this and because of the greater efficiency and avoidance of duplication
inherent in national or central management, application of these criteria
to specific resources should opt for national control in all marginal
cases.
The variety of uses, operational needs and system character-
istics make it necessary to examine each requirement for tactical support
resources on its particular merits, and this should be done by a technically
qualified group representing the Secretary of Defense, the DCI and other
interested parties, including the tactical forces affected. Where resources
are identified as national or predominantly national in character, they
should be included in the appropriate resource program and kept there;
resources identified as tactical or predominantly so should be removed
from the national intelligence resource inventories and included in the
general forces program and budget of the service involved. Tactical
resources, however, should be included in resource program reviews
as non-add items to permit visibility of all assets in a given collection
or processing system. Throughout the examination, the principle should
be observed that what matters in drawing distinctions is not the technical
character of the resource under study but the predominant use to which
it is put. Designations of resources as national or tactical should be
reviewed annually and changed as the conditions of use of various resources
change.
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E. Early warning -- the Watch Committee and the National
Indications Center (NIC).
In view of the manifest importance of the early warning mission
to the intelligence community, it is believed that the duties and responsi-
bilities of the Watch Committee should be reassessed and reaffirmed. At
the present time the activities of the Watch Committee are focused almost
entirely on the substantive requirements for the weekly Watch Report.
As outlined in DCID 1/5, the attention of the Watch Committee should be
directed also to the development and maintenance of improved systems
for the NIC, including automatic data processing systems, and to improve-
ment in substantive analysis techniques and computer application to these
improved techniques. The Strategic Warning Working Group (SWWG) an interagency group with membership from CIA, DIA, NSA and INR --
which functions under the chairmanship of a member of the DCI's personal
staff, will continue its examinations in this area. The Group feels, however,
that the development of improved facilities and procedures is a firm require-
ment if the NIC is to continue to function as originally intended and that this
development is properly, over the long run, the responsibility of the Watch
Committee. A small project team consisting of two or three experienced
analysts, assisted by computer-oriented engineers and mathematicians,
should be set up under the Watch. Committee with the goal of continuing
improvement of the NIC. This could be accomplished partially by outside
contract if an in-house capability does not exist.
If it is found that it is not feasible to accomplish an upgrading
of the NIC under present organizational arrangements, it is believed that
consideration should be given to a study directed towards the transfer of
the NIC as it is presently constituted, with all of its designated functions,
duties and responsibilities, to the Office of Current Intelligence, CIA.
The NIC function would continue to be carried out as a community service
with some manning to be provided by the community generally as is pro-
vided to the NIC at present but with support beyond this joint capability
to be provided by the CIA staff as required. The adoption of this proposal
also should result in some saving of personnel by combining certain of the
functions of OCI with those of the NIC. The assets of OCI, OCS and OC,
among others, would then be immediately available to the NIC and provide
it with better facilities for research. Substantive intelligence and staff sup-
port to the Watch Committee likewise could be expanded. An alternative
solution would be to transfer this function to DIA because of the originally
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intended close NMCC relationship. However, considering the community
aspects of the arrangement and the present capabilities of communications --
LDX, closed circuit TV, secure telephone, computer/ console capabilities,
etc. -- it is believed that the assignment of the function to CIA would be
more desirable.
F. The authority of the DCI for the coordination of espionage
and counterintelligence operations abroad.
As indicated in an earlier section of this report, plans are pro-
gressing for the expansion of military espionage operations controlled from
this country and conducted on a worldwide basis. This development would
appear to confirm a need which has been increasingly apparent over the
past several years for a somewhat more aggressive assertion of the DCIes
coordinating authority under NSCID 5. Heretofore, it has been the policy
of the DCI and the Agency to apply essentially negative criteria in decisions
to approve, veto or recommend the modification of operational proposals
submitted for coordination by the military services or commands. Operations
have been approved unless there was some showing that they involved some
significant and ascertainable danger of compromising an existing clandestine
operation or some serious risk of exposure or political embarrassment.
It would appear logical and, at this time, desirable for the DCI to require,
in addition to these essentially negative assurances, some positive evidence
of the value attributable or potentially attributable to proposed or going
espionage operations conducted by other agencies of the Government.
Before approval of a CIA operation, its potentialities as a source of signifi-
cant information are carefully assessed and operations are reviewed
periodically to confirm that they are producing information which justifies
their expense or risk. In the absence of a positive showing of productivity,
operations are vetoed or terminated. Some comparable approach to military
clandestine activity would appear justified. Given the potentialities for
serious embarrassment inherent in any espionage activity, it would seem
desirable for the DCI to establish the arrangements and facilities necessary
to evaluate military clandestine activities from the point of view of the
significance of the coverage anticipated or actually provided and to elimi-
nate non-productive operations as part of the coordinating process.
In establishing the mechanism necessary to implement this
responsibility, the DCI should be careful that judgements relating to the
relative value of the product of individual military operations are made by
some instrumentality which is not exclusively under the control of the DDP.
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G. The need for a review of research and analysis by
outside contractors on technology.
Among the scientific and technical elements of the intelligence
community there is a substantial amount of research and analysis in
direct support of intelligence production. In large measure this R&A
is carried out through external contracts with private research organi-
zations, laboratories or firms with expertise in specialized technical
fields. The bulk of these contracts are in support of the Foreign Tech-
nology Division of the Air Force, the Missile Intelligence Division of
the Army, the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center of the Navy,
OSI and FMSAC of CIA, and various elements of NSA. NASA and ACDA
also conduct some research in related fields. It has not been possible
to determine the precise amount of money involved in all of these con-
tracts but a conservative estimate would be some
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R&A by external contract is justified on the basis that the
necessary technical skills and equipment are not available within the
intelligence community. In addition, in certain instances the knowledge
which some outside firms acquire in research and development for the
production of U. S. weapons systems can be uniquely applied to the analysis
of foreign technology. In almost all cases the data which is analyzed in
these external contracts is provided from collection systems operated by
the intelligence community.
The principal problem in this area arises from the fact that
there is no effective coordination by the various elements undertaking
this research. Since much of the raw data is manifestly identical, it
would appear probable there is a considerable amount of duplication.
A cursory review of CIA contracts revealed some apparent overlap,
principally in telemetry analysis, which was explained by pointing out
that similar studies might be attacking the same problem from different
angles," or that a given subject was of sufficient national import to
warrant two or more independent approaches. The extent of any real dupli-
cation and the validity of the explanation or justification for it cannot be
ascertained without a detailed review of this entire field by technically
competent authorities. It is obvious, however, that, among the elements
conducting this research, there is a general unawareness of what other
research is going on in similar fields of interest. Under the circum-
stances, conditions certainly allow for an overlap of effort which, in view
of the total cost, could amount to a sizeable sum of money.
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Rather than establishing a centralized authority for the review
and coordination of all research and analysis in the S&T field, it would
appear that an adequate mechanism presently exists in the USIB com-
mittees, specifically GMAIC, SIC, and JAEIC, to effectively carry out
this function. A precedent already exists in the EIC which, in DCID 3/ 1,
is explicitly charged to 1'. . . review external research projects individually
involving more than five thousand dollars . . . in order to minimize the
duplication of effort and expense . . ." While the charters of GMAIC, SIC,
and JAEIC do not contain such precise language, it is the stated policy of
each that "unnecessary duplication and overlap (of studies) shall be avoided."
It would appear to be a simple matter for the DCI to direct each of these
committees to conduct a regular review of external research projects
similar to that carried out by the EIC. If such a procedure does not afford
an effective coordinating mechanism, it should become quickly apparent
to the respective committee chairmen who would then be in a position to
make appropriate remedial recommendations to the DCI.
H. Managerial arrangements of the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO).
The agreement of 11 August 1965 relating to the NRO was intended
to resolve a number of issues which had arisen over a period of years and
had been the cause of deep, and at times bitter, contention between CIA and
elements of the Defense Department, particularly the Air Force. Two
basic questions were at the seat of these disputes.
1. Should CIA continue to have a more or less independent
capacity to overfly denied areas with manned aircraft?
2. Should CIA continue to maintain independent facilities
for the design and development of new satellite reconnaissance
vehicles ?
The first question, whether CIA should continue to operate
manned reconnaissance aircraft, has been pretty well resolved in the
negative. CIA does continue to operate a limited number of U-2 aircraft.
Presumably it will continue to use these aircraft for the foreseeable future
in areas such as the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. With the
liquidation of OXCART, however, CIA has, for the time being at least,
lost the capacity to overfly territory which is defended with sophisticated
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weapons and strategic reconnaissance of this kind of denied area with
manned aircraft will hereafter be the responsibility of the Air Force.
The second question, whether CIA should continue as an active,
independent participant in the design, development and production of
space reconnaissance systems, was answered in the affirmative. Exactly
how CIA should participate, however, has presented a continuing problem,
and the organizational arrangements of the NRO should be reviewed from
time to time to determine whether they in fact ensure the best possible
individual contributions from CIA (and other contributing agencies) and
also efficient administration of the program as a whole.
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CIA representatives have argued plausibly that this division of
responsibility has proved awkward. CIA should have the authority, so
the argument goes, not just to design and develop a camera, but also to
oversee development of the immediately related equipment necessary for
the camera to function effectively in space. This equipment would normally
include the spacecraft and re-entry vehicles. Under the present arrange-
ment responsibility for producing an essential component -- the payload --
is divided. This has complicated managerial arrangements for supervising
production of the payload itself and is said to have caused confusion in the
exercise of responsibility for systems integration of the system as a whole.
is a continuing illustration of the dilemma which has
plagued attempts to resolve organizational arrangements in the NRO since
the decision in 1958 to authorize CIA to proceed with development of the
first CORONA system. Certain aspects of satellite operations necessarily
have to be the responsibility of the Air Force. These certainly include
control of launching facilities, recovery of payloads, etc. It is also
generally conceded that procurement of boosters should be an Air Force
responsibility. Given these Air Force responsibilities, the extent of CIA
participation, if any, in the development and integration of a satellite
system necessarily has to be somewhat artificially determined. During
the course of the negotiations leading up to the present NRO agreement,
CIA's record of leadership in the development of reconnaissance vehicles
(including the original U-2, improved versions of the U-2, the OXCART,
the original CORONA system, the various
new systems in the National Reconnaissance Program was desirable; that
it was important to keep alive and exploit the expertise which had developed
in CIA and that CIA should continue to contribute to the development of
new and improved systems. The only question was how this could best
be done within the overall framework of a nationally directed and inte-
grated reconnaissance program.
was generally conceded. All agreed that
competition between various agencies contributing to the development of
A strong effort was made to define the CIA contribution in terms
of responsibility for design and development of a payload. This would
have given CIA the authority to oversee contractors who produce a camera
system and other contractors who design space vehicles into which the
camera will fit. This entire package could then be given to the Air Force
whose responsibility it would be to see that it was properly fitted on to a
missile and fired into space.
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The NRO agreement, however, provides that CIA's contribution
will normally be limited to the production and delivery of the actual
sensor, in this case the camera.
In the future,
however, it would seem that an agency entrusted with the development of
a space sensor system should be charged with the development and produc-
tion of the total payload.
Another alleged deficiency is the lack of adequate arrangements
and controls in the NRO for rationalizing the allocation of research and
development funds and responsibility as between CIA and the Air Force.
The NRO agreement provides that a basic objective of the agreement is to
promote a vigorous research effort and that funds o' . . . shall be adequate
to ensure that a vigorous research and exploratory development effort is
achieved and maintained by the Department of Defense and CIA to design
and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requirements aimed at
the acquisition of intelligence data. This effort shall be carried out by
both CIA and DoD.'? In fact, however, the total amount of research money
allocated to CIA over the past three years has been I I as opposed
to allocated to the Air Force. 25X1A
It is claimed that the funds allocated to CIA are inadequate. It
is also alleged that such funds as are made available are parceled out in
incremental amounts after elaborate and protracted justifications. The
amounts allocated may in fact be too small and their ultimate availability
too uncertain to support an aggressive R&D effort which on occasion
requires commitments to contractors for comparatively extended periods
on a somewhat speculative basis.
Thought should be given to improving the mechanism as well as
the procedures for ensuring that allocations of responsibility and funds
for research in the NRO are equitable as between participating agencies,
provide a basis for controlled and coordinated competition, discourage
needless redundancy and ensure the availability of adequate amounts of
"seed money."
25X1 D
Another aspect of the National Reconnaissance Program requires
clarification. The NRO agreement provides that " . . . The NRP is a
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single program, national in character, to meet the intelligence needs of
the Government under a strong national leadership, for the development,
management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long
range for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic infor-
mation obtained through overflights . . ." (underscoring supplied).
Despite this injunction to include all resources engaged in overhead recon-
25X1A naissance in the NRP, neither Onor the SR 71 program are treated
as coming within the jurisdiction of the NRO. It is recognized that there
may be compelling reasons justifying their exclusion. One possible
reason, for example, might be the inflationary effect which their inclusion
would have on the "Black Budget" with attendant implications with respect
to the community's relations with Congress. On the other hand, there are
strong arguments why they should be incorporated in the inventory and
subject to the normal review procedures of the NRO. This matter should
be the subject of discussion in the Executive Committee of the NRO.
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 Approved For Release 2Q/7/ W.glA XP82M0031IR0001004I0002 ANNEX A.
5
Early Reviews of CIA
25X1A
25X1A
1. Hoover Commission Report - 1948.
2. Report to National Security Council on CIA - 1 January 1949.
3. President's Committee on International Information Activities -
William H. Jackson, Chairman
Robert Cutler
Gordon Gray
Barklie McKee Henry
John C. Hughes
C. D. Jackson
Roger M. Kyes
Sigurd Larmon
4. President's Special Study Group on Covert Activities of CIA -
30 September 1954,
J. H. Doolittle, Chairman
William B. Franke
Morris Hadley
William D. Pawley
May 1955.
Mark W. Clark, Chairman
Richard L. Conolly
Ernest F. Hollings
Henry Kearns
Edward V. Rickenbacker
Donald S. Russell
5. Hoover Commission Task Force Report on Intelligence Activities -
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6. DCI Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities -
15 December 1960.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Chairman
25X1A
25X1
President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad -
23 December 1960.
Mansfield D. Sprague, Chairman
George V. Allen
Allen W. Dulles
Gordon Gray
Karl G. Harr, Jr.
John N. Irwin, II
C. D. Jackson
Livingston T. Merchant
Philip D. Reed
8. DCI Working Group on Organization and Activities of CIA -
6 April 1962.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Chairman
25X1A
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 Tnp ? '~' ANNEX B.
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AMB Anti Ballistic Missile (System)
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ADP Automatic Data Processing
ARDF Airborne Radio Direction Finding
BNE Board of National Estimates
CA Covert Action Staff, DDP
CCP Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CCPC Critical Collection Problems Committee
CI Counter Intelligence Staff, DDP
CIB Central Intelligence Bulletin
CIP Consolidated Intelligence Program
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COS Chief of Station (CIA)
CRS Central Reference Service
DCID Director of Central Intelligence Directive
DDI Deputy Director for Intelligence
DDP Deputy Director for Plans
DDR&E Director of Defense Research and Engineering
DDS Deputy Director for Support
DDS&T Deputy Director for Science and Technology
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STATSPEC
25X1A
D IA
ECM
EIC
E LINT
FI
FMSAC
GMAIC
IDH S
IHC Information Handling Committee
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research
IRG Interdepartmental Regional Group
JAEIC Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
JOIC Joint Operations Intelligence Center
Far East Division, DDP
Foreign Intelligence Staff, DDP
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
Guided Missile and Astronautics Committee
Intelligence Data Handling System
Defense Intelligence Agency
Electronic Counter Measures
Economic Intelligence Committee
Electronic Intelligence
Long Distance Xerography
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Indications Center
National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Staff
National Intelligence Resources Board
NIS National Intelligence Survey
NASA
NIC
NIPE
NIRB
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NMCC National Military Command Center
NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NRP National Reconnaissance Program
NSA National Security Agency
NSCID National Security Council Intelligence Directive
OBGI Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence
OC Office of Communications
OCI Office of Current Intelligence
OCR Office of Central Registry
OCS Office of Computer Services
OER Office of Economic Research
ONE Office of National Estimates
OPPB Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting
OSI Office of Scientific Intelligence
OSR Office of Strategic Research
OSS Office of Strategic Services
PDB President's Daily Brief
25X1A
Scientific Intelligence Committee
Signals Intelligence
Target Oriented Display
United States Intelligence Board
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