CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OCI No. 5157
Copy No. n u
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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C-11 I
11 April 1952
RETURN TO RRCHt ?ES It RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY 01M HSE
UR .'27-
.. =- .V -- HHx
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
1. The Soviet renewal of the German peace treaty proposal:
In its April note, the Sovi-e-f--Unioi for the first time
directly proposed four-power discussions of free all-German
elections and investigation of electoral conditions. The
East German Government made such a proposal last September
with Soviet support, and it was rejected by Chancellor
Adenauer.
The note does not point to any forthcoming concessions,
but instead reveals all the weaknesses of Russia's German
policy. As a result, it is not likely to deflect the West
German Government from its present course of Western in-
tegration.
The USSR has attempted to devise a new approach to ap-
peal to West Germany and to convince the Western powers.
that further negotiation would produce real concessions.
It has been unable to make effective proposals, however, for
fear of further weakening its hold on Germany.
The new proposal indicates that the USSR cannot agree
to free elections, which would result in the loss of East
Germany, fearing an ultimate westward orientation of a
unified Germany. Accordingly, the note only proposes that
the four powers discuss the question.
In answering the Western demand for UN investigation of
electoral conditions, the note suggests that such a check
could be carried out by a commission of the four occupying
powers, presumably operating under a Soviet veto threat,
but does not propose the setting up of such a commission.
The Soviet note essentially represents a legalistic
attempt to delay developments in the West without committing
the USSR. Accordingly, it specifies neither a date nor an
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agenda for such a meeting.
The failure of the USSR to clarify its earlier pro-
imressioninfluencethat
posal for a German army confirms the
offer was made primarily reaffirming the Oder-Neisse
among German nationalists. By
line, however, the USSR dGn~man opinion byeofferingttod
to make a drastic play for from Poland.
take the former German territories away
In a final attempt to appeal to West European and th the warning German opinion, the Soviet noteeobetween alunited Germany,
that the choice is now being mad
connoting peace, and a divided Germany carrying with it a
continuing threat of war in Europe. (S Factual data
based on S Moscow 1645; C Moscow 1644, 10 Apr 52)
EASTERN EUROPE
Possibility of high level Orbit mmeetiingmatlBudapest
2
.
discoun e e T e relatively low ra
personalities at the Liberation Day ceremonies in Budapest
on 4 April does not support rumors that a "Cominformed
meeting may have been held, although a gap
activities on 5 1pl~tlzer would
hand~,ethelpncaustime ion ofrhighhrank-
conference. On the all the ing military personalittostheorumor thatSatehighlllevelites
Albania lends credence taken placed
and economic talks may have
According to one unsubstantiated rumor, the Russian
high command is pushing the Satellites Binapheir7p9epara-
tions for a "big push in August."
L-2860, 8 Apr 52)
Comment: American Legation sources consistentlyihaver
discounted the probability of a Cominform meeting. S
rumors, which were never confirmed, circulated ins 1950 and
when the Liberation Day.fete wasfttO~ba~ddeby Voro
legations, in-
a much more impressive assembly o
cluding the so-called Cominform chief Suslov.
Although there may have been a high level military
meeting, the presence of ranking Satellite military per-
sonnel at Liberation ceremonies in the various Orbit coun-
tries is not unusual.
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FAR EAST
South Korea reserves right to veto "dishonorable armistice":
Ambassa or uCClo repor s t at t e area Imes on April quo-
that his government
ted a high-ranking ROK official as saying
would veto any armistice signed under "dishonorable" circumstances.
According to the official, the ROK attaches the greatest signifi-
cance to an armistice provision for the withdrawal of Chinese
Communist troops.
This statement is in line with previous South Korean criti-
cisms of the negotiations, according to Ambassador Mucci.. He
notes that the ROK has been relatively restrained in recent weeks.
(R Pusan 984, 10 Apr 52)
Comment: The tempo of South Korean criticism of the armis-
tice negotiations negotiations willlbeasuccessfullylconcluded.
rumors that the g
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Syrian Army Chief of Staff Shishakli visits Saudi Arabia: 11
I'll Syrian Army ae o a , to o is a Is vis ng
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-King Ibn Saud in Riyadh with the reported intention of streng-
thening Syrian-Saudi Arabian relations, Shishakli has expressed
his confidence of having successful talks with the Saudi Arabian
monarch during his first trip to Saudi Arabia since his coup
d'etat in Damascus last November. (S Damascus 574, 8 Apr;
R FBIS Ticker, Beirut, 9 Apr 52)
Comment: Shishakii's stop-over in Riyadh follows his
recent visit to Jordan and Lebanon. The Army Chief of Staff
probably has two specific objectives: to gain further Arab
support for the Syrian military regime, which is strongly op-
posed by the Iraqi Government; and to obtain a new loan from
King Ibn Saud to finance the purchase of arms and ammunition
which Syria is currently trying to acquire abroad. Ibn Saud
has long been a strong supporter of Syrian independence and
has opposed any plan which might unite Syria with the Hashe-
mite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan.
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7. Political support for French Premier Pinay is consolidated:
The Amer can E asst' in Paris reports that Premier Pinay's
favorable showing in the critical confidence vote on tax
amnesty consolidated his political support and gave him a
"clear mandate" to try out his economic program.
Pinay's support now runs roughly from a half-way point
in the centrist Popular Republican (MRP) ranks to a half-way
point within the RPF on the right. Although this is not a
majority in the Lssembly, it does afford fair stability,
because the deputies of the divided parties who disagree with
the Premier will abstain from voting rather than risk splitting
their parties. Furthermore, though many of the other supporting
deputies are highly skeptical of Pinay's program, they are
fearful of public reaction if they should topple his government
immediately.
This new coalition coheres, however, only on internal
issues,and until a comparable accord has been reached on
foreign policy, the formation of a stable right-center majority
cannot be claimed. (C Paris 6196, 9 Apr 52)
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Comment: Pinay's success in obtaining parliamentary
support for his "stability without sacrifice" program assures
him office tenure until late May when the Assembly reconvenes.
Although the prevailing climate of confidence in the government
has caused the franc to appreciate from 490 to 407 to the
dollar, close observers doubt that Pinay's program can avert
a collapse later in the year.
8. Communist influence reaffirmed in Air France,where new
strike threatens: .ir France fl g personnel regret t e
'premature' termination of their fruitless December strike and
contemplate another walkout after Easter, according to the
American Embassy in Paris.
The Embassy also reports that, in grievance-committee
elections held in late March, the Communist-dominated General-
Labor Confederation maintained its position as the most
influential union among ground crew personnel. (C Paris 6217,
9 Apr 52)
Comment: The December strike received little support
from French labor, which considers Air France personnel well
paid in comparison with other French workers. In view of
Premier Pinay's success in holding the price line, the proposed
strike may also be "premature."
Although the number of Air France personnel on whom the
Communist leadership can depend has been large, it is decreasing.
The number which supported the CGT in the elections is far
larger, however, and can be interpreted, as is the case in most
French industries, as a protest against the ineffectiveness of
non-Communist labor unions.
9. Austrian Minister of Interior warned about Communist
influence in police: The editor of a large independent news-
paper in a z urg has published an open letter to the Austrian
Minister of Interior warning of the necessity for minimizing
Communist infiltration into Austrian security forces. The
letter charges that recent investigations of officers denounced
by a Communist police official were used by a Communist police
inspector to gain access to top secret files of the Austrian
political police. Data so obtained, including loyalty files
of Salzburg police and reports of alleged CIC and police co-
operation in raiding local offices of the Communist Party,
were later published in Communist newspapers, including the
official organ of the Soviet occupation force. (II FBIS,
Salzburger Nachtrichten, 8 Apr 52)
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Comment: Since 1945, the-Socialist Minister of Interior
has mace -a considerable effort to purge from the police forces
the numerous Communists installed there by his Communist
predecessor in the provisional government. Despite the
dismissals and transfers of unreliables,to non-Soviet sectors,
his efforts have not been completely satisfactory.
10. Belgian trade union federations plan joint action to obtain
wage iner Meeting jointly for the first Time in a number
of years to "examine the situation," the Secretariats of the
Socialist and Social Christian trade union federations (the
FGTB and the CSC) insist that premiums to workers must come
from excess business profits. An FGTB leader states that
the adamant stand of employers against further wage increases
will probably make strikes necessary.
Any strike called by the FGTB unions would include miners,
metal workers and possibly cement and tramway workers. Although
the CSC has not yet committed itself to calling out the unions
it controls, the US Embassy in Brussels believes that. a strike
would bring CSC participation. (R Brussels 1487, 7 Apr 52)
Comment: Because the CSC supports the one-party Social
Christi~an government, it has not heretofore joined the FGTB
demands. Ii the government fails to back strong labor demands,
it is likely to lose the support of the CSC representatives
in Parliament essential to its slim parliamentary majority.
11. Communist official foresees violence in Italy:
25X1C a member o the Communist Party
Central Committee recently warned party officers in Milan not
to be surprised if Italy "suddenly resembles Egypt and Tunisia"
as a result of economic unrest, which, he predicted, would
result from Italy's adherence to NATO policies. He urged
the fomenting of general disturbances in every sector of the
economy prior to the local spring elections, as well as an
increase in clandestine activities in the labor field.
This party official reportedly declared that the Christian
Democrats are "heading toward ruin" and that the Communists
A "must be shown to be the strongest party in Italy."
25X1
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Comment: While there have been no widespread riots or
disturbances, the Communists for political reasons have stepped
up labor agitation during the past few weeks and have obtained
considerable support from workers with real economic grievances.
If present governmental pressure on industries to discharge
key Communist employees is effective, the Communists may be
forced to rely more on clandestine means.
According to American observers in Italy, the Christian
Democrats have lost considerable strength because of widespread
dissatisfaction with De Gasperi's policies. The Communists, as
well as the neo-Fascists, are expected to make substantial
gains in the local spring elections,
12. Norway reaches "favorable" trade accord with Poland: The
American mbassy at Oslo reports t at t e trade agreement
between Norway and Poland concluded on 8 April is "somewhat
better" from the strategic goods viewpoint than the proposal
originally submitted to COCOM, The Polish delegation made
"strenuous" efforts to purchase ships and to charter additional
vessels, but Norway refused and limited its maritime services
to railings from Poland to other Baltic ports and to Norway.
The Norwegians emphasize that they obtained a 60-percent
increase in the coal commitment 275,000 to 450,000 metric
tons -- by increasing their offers of rayon pulp to 2,000 tons,
and their promises of ferromanganese and ferrochrome to 250
and 200 tons. Norway will also export 150,000 tons of iron
ore, 15,000 tons of pyrites, and 750 tons of aluminum, (S
Oslo 887, 9 Apr 52)
Comment: Until a few days ago Norway appeared to be
having Ui ficuity in obtaining a promise of 275,000 tons of
coal. The unexpected relaxation by Poland without any undue
increase in offers of strategic goods is another strong indi-
cation that Polish coal is becoming available in greater
quantity.
The agreement also contains provisions for the delivery
of other goods such as herring from Norway and textiles and
sugar from Poland
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LATIN AMERICA
13,
Argentine n
ewspaper re
peats Communist
s'
biological warfare
propaganda: a
April ed
ition of mocr
ae
a state
that
telegrams receiv
have used bombs
the epidemic see
paper also alleg
ed from Eur
containing
ms to have
ed that the
ope "confirm t h
cholera germs i
spread to Chine
Stars and Stri
a
n K
se
pes
merican
orea, and
provinces
reported
troops
that
." The
on
9 February that
the US 65th
eggment ha3 u
sed 500 bacteriologi
cal
bombs to test th
eir effecti
veness in artil
lery bombardment.
(R Buenos Aires
689, 9 Apr
52)
Comment: Democracia is reportedly owned by Senora de
PeronThese accusations are representative of Argentina's
vitriolic anti-US campaign.
14. Three Chileans reportedly departed for the
Conference: Clotario Blest, President of the Government
employees Union, and Jorge Salazar, Director of the Semi-
government Employees Union, departed on 30 March for the
Moscow Economic Conference. The United States Embassy in
Santiago believes that these two and George Inascimento, who
reportedly departed earlier for Paris en route to Moscow,
will be the only individuals from Chile attending the conference.
Blest is popular in labor circles and heads numerous
Communist-front organizations, although he is not a party
member and is a Catholic. Salazar is a Radical Party member
with Marxist views. Inascimento, a Chilean publisher, is
considered pro-Communist.
Guillermo del Pedregal, a successful businessman and
Communist sympathizer, who apparently would have headed the
Chilean delegation, cancelled the trip because of business
reasons, and also because he is managing Ibanez del Campo's
presidential campaign in Chile. (Factual data from: C
Santiago unnumbered, 20 Mar and 2 Apr 52;
25X1A
15. Panama refuses diplomatic status to Soviet couriers: The
Panamanian Foreign Minister has told the Ambassador that
"the two Soviet couriers will not be accorded diplomatic
status for transiting Panama but may apply for ordinary consular
visas." The Ambassador comments that the Foreign Minister
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presumably intends to examine the Soviet pouches if the couriers
come through. (C Panama 877, 9 Apr 52)
Comment. Soviet couriers have customarily stopped in
Havana ox their way from Mexico to Venezuela. The USSR is now
attempting to establish a new courier route because of the
recent break in Soviet-Cuban relations
16. Prospects for bilateral military agreement with Uruguay
believe good; T e- TS km asst' in Montevideo be ieves t at
prospects for a.bilateral US-Uruguayan military assistance
agreement are good; it points out that Chiles signing of such
an agreement has had a helpful effect.
Ex-Foreign Minister Dominguez Campora,-presiding officer
of the Uruguayan delegation in the conversations, says, however,
that he must discuss the military plan with the six majority
members of the National Government Council, He intimated that
the plan might have to be discussed with the three minority
Herrerista Party members later, The US Embassy states that,
while this may be unavoidable, "it presents security problems
for the US Government." (S Montevideo 393, 9 Apr 52 )
Comment- While Dominguez has stated his understanding
that t ep an. may not be submitted to Congress under any
conditions, he has stated that Senate members of the minority
party propose to fight the "political agreement." The
Herrerista members of the National Government Council approved
the opening of conversations o
Ecuador, Peru, Cuba, Brazil and Chile have now signed
bilateral military assistance agreements with the United
States. No agreement could be reached with Mexico.
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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
11 April 1952
CIA No, 49610
Copy No. 4 U
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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TOP SECRET
THIS MAT ,IAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRA.N3MISSI.ON OR REVELATION OF WHICH,IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORI':T;D PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
SOUTH ASIA
1. Importance of Stalin-Radhakrishnan interview said to be
exaggerated: Secretary Ueneral a pa of the Indian Ministry
o External Affairs has told Ambassador Bowles that he believes
the importance of the 6 April interview between Premier Stalin
and Indian Ambassador Radhakrishnan in Moscow has been exag-
gerated out of all proportion. The Secretary General stated
that the conference had no implication beyond the obvious de-
sire of Stalin to convince India that the Soviet Union was
always ready to come to an understanding with the West. (S
S/S New Delhi 3694, 9 Apr 52)
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