CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 7, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
7 April 1952
OCI no, 5153
Copy No.
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
WNW p e n
7 3~}iX }~18 ~l. Lehi
State Dept. review completed
SECRET ARCHIVAL RECORD
SECURITY INFORMATION AG PLEASE r':; 7 _UU,N T0
1- jil`v ES, BLDG. r_
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
Committee positions are allotted at the World Economic
Conference: a massy ~n :scow repot s at t e
sessions of the World Economic Conference will be equally
divided between plenary meetings and committee meetings.
Three committees have been formed: International trade,
with Lange as chairman and vice chairmen from Great Britain,
the Soviet Union, Communist China and Italy; economic co-
operation, with Boyd-Orr as chairman and vice chairmen from
the Soviet Union and Pakistan; underdeveloped areas, with
the chairman from India and vice chairmen from France and
Italy.
British and French delegates are reported to have had
private meetings with Chinese Communist delegates,, (C Moscow
1587t 3 Apr 52 )
Comment: The organization of the conference into
commi ees is a concession to non-Communist criticism of
conference plans for mass meetings,
The committee on international trade, possibly the crux
of the whole conference, will be directed by an Orbit chair-
man and vice chairman, Western Europe is the best represented
of the non-Orbit areas on the committees, while the Middle
East, Latin America and Southeast Asia have apparently been
given no committee positions despite the interest shown in
these areas for the conference. This lends support to the
various estimates that Western Europe is the primary target
of the Soviet Union's economic counteroffensive.
The private meetings between French and British and
Chinese Communist delegates may be for the purpose of ex-
ploring trade possibilities between these countries recently
suggested by conference organizers in Moscow.
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2. Soviet retail price cuts offset by heavier taxes in
1952 : a massy n Moscow reports official estimates
a the people of the Soviet Union will save 28 billion
rubles in 1952 because of the reduction in retail prices
effected on 1 April. (C Moscow 1577, 2 Apr 52)
Comment, The alleged 28 billion savings is more than
canes a out by increases of 15.1 billion rubles in turnover
taxes, 4 billion rubles in direct taxes, and 9.1 billion
rubles in compulsory loans, which will amount to at least
28.2 billion rubles.
3. Finnish Premier regains unanimous support of his party:
Finnis ei `I`er a Konen as w rawn Is res gna on
following a unanimous vote of confidence accorded him on
2 April at a meeting of his political party, the Agrarians.
The Agrarian Party also fully approved Kekkonen?s economic
stabilization policy.
The US Legation in Helsinki comments that these develop-
ments appear to represent a sweeping repudiation of Kekkonen's
critics within his own party at least for the time being.
(R Helsinki 401, 3 Apr 52)
Comment: Well informed observers believed when
Kekkonen offered his resignation that it was merely a
tactic to bring his party back into line. During recent
months the Premier has suffered most criticism from his own
party group in the Finnish Diet.
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FAR EAST
Japanese Communists not under Chinese directio There
4a -----e t a t e inese ommun st Party exercises Communisty, according any
is no ev
the control direct coontrol over
known that nthe JapanesetandrChine Comm -
to CINCFE. It is rimarily for the exchange
nist Parties maintain liaison, p
propaganda, and there are indications l that the jcrosseeks and
values CCP approbation of its policies
notes, however, that the JCP has always beeendmore hiavilY
main-
influenced by the Soviet Communist Party,
tains direct liaison with Soviet representatives in Tokyo.
(S Tokyo 1208, 28 Feb 52)
Comment. The Cominform's criticism of the Japanese
1950, which forced a reversal of JCP
pro-
Communi~s --tts in January adherence to the Moscow pro~-
ppolicy, as well as a continuing
paganda line, amply demonstrates Soviet control over the enjoining
Peiping's success in September 1950, nowever, in eto unite,
indicates
the two opposing factions of the party
that the JCP is responsive to Chinese influence.
enn Korea reported
preparations for Commuiis o ores
enera.eri ive in K o
25X1 ~--~-~ ~r ommun~ g /
n moving southeast on
s
Two Chinese Communist armies beg
28 March from staging areas in east central Korea near the
39th Parallel, according to this report. Four additional
Chinese armies have also been aletedofor the
North Korean corps now in the ecast to participate
Comment, There are no firm
another1maJorhof fensivelin force in"?~'orea intend to launch however, that a limited ob-
jective the near future. It is possible,
offensive may be undertaken in eastern Korea, the
th pre apparent focal poiitdeofrabletheamounreporttedof NorptharKorationsean,twhere UN
forces hold a conon
Communist. MIG-15 flies photo mission over Seoul area, On
OY eou
2 AprT , a UN aircrt i in I e uwon are a,so t i fuel
served a Communist MIG-15 jetafighter with22 000mfeetto 17,000
tanks. The MIG dived from
ECRET
7 Apr 52
25X1
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SECRET
feet over Suwon airbase, then proceeded to Kimpo, another
important UN airfield- Over Kimpo, the enemy jet turned
toward Seoul, where it again dived to a lower altitude,
7. UNCURK. decides to observe South Korean elections: The
Unite Nations ommission or n eu ion an e a itation
in Korea (UNCURK) decided in late March to conduct a formal
observation of the local elections scheduled for 25 April and
10 May, according to Ambassador Muccioo South Korean officials
are being notified informally of the Commission's intention
but no invitation from the ROK is being requested.
Muccio comments that it is in the interest of the ROK to
have its elections held under international scrutiny,. The
Ambassador credits Cordier, a high UN official, and Plimsoll,
the Australian delegate, with responsibility both for this
decision and for putting new life in the Commission. (C
Pusan 966, 4 Apr 52)
Comment: This UNCURK action is the first result of a
concert effort to improve the calibre of the UN organization
which, since the outbreak of war, had gradually lost all
effectiveness. ROK failure to invite UNCURK to observe the
early 1952 by-election indicated the low ebb of UNCURK
influence.
Sa Peiping may agree to investigation of its BW charges: The
Indian m assa-r to Peiping as receive a mpression from
a Chinese Vice Foreign Minister that there is a "considerable
possibility" that the Chinese will agree to an impartial inter-
national investigation of their biological warfare charges.
Pannikar expected to discuss this subject with Peiping's
Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, on 5 or 7 April.
The Indian Foreign Office advised Pannikar that any
international investigative body should have full freedom to
undertake independent investigation in the localities concerned
as well as to review evidence submitted to it. (S New Delhi
3617, 4 Apr 52)
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25X19p reports on "American germ air raids" in China:
25X1 I new y arr ve at Hong ong rom 25X1
has supplied details on the alleged American germ air raids
.there on 5 and 8 March. During the alerts, a single search-
light played in one direction for two hours, while antiair-
craft batteries fired wildly in all directions. No planes
were heard or seen on either date,
On 9 March, hundreds of children wearing face masks and
equipped with fly swatters and bottles, and thousands of
soldiers were led out to collect insects, For days afterwards,
the police led people on insect hunts.
25X1 While is convinced that there
were no rai s, be s a es a many Chinese believe the
Communist BW charges. (C Hong Kong 2802,.2 Apr 52)
10. Desperate plight of Americans in China reported: The 25X1
25X1 Americanhs~ilenera n flora Kong repor s t at
in Shanghai telephone
company's Hong Kong o Tce an ec ared that the plight of
American businessmen was desperate. He was afraid, not so
much of jail, as of. "the other thin
The Consul General calls attention to an authentic report
from Tsingtao of the arrest of an American missionary on 7
March under circumstances indicating that the seizure might
be connected with the germ warfare propaganda campaign. (C
Hong Kong 2791, 3 Apr 52 )
Comment: All Western businessmen in China are subjected
to ex iTT nate financial demands as a condition for permis-
sion to leave the country. Over 200 Americans are still in
Communist China, nearly 40 of them under arrest.
114 Letourneau considered best man available for Indochina
post:~ ri ter Hea in argon a ieves t, at t e renc vern-
inent made the best possible choice in appointing Minister for
Associated States, Jean Letourneau, High Commissioner in Indo-
china. Heath explains that Letourneau has the personal
qualifications necessary for the post, is familar with the
situation, and has a "friendly understanding" of American
policy. (C Saigon 1935, 4 Apr 52)
Comment: Since Letourneau retains his position as a
memberoT'f e Pinay government, his new assignment may be
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interpreted as an indication of French determination to
push for a solution of the Indochina problem. The important
decisions on Indochina policy, however, which will still be
made in Paris, areapt to suffer by his absence from the
capital.
Letourneau's appointment is not being received with
much enthusiasm in Vietnams He has a rather low opinion of
the ability of the Vietnamese to maintain their independence,
and he is identified in the minds of many Vietnamese with
French equivocation on the subject of negotiations with the
Viet Minh.
12. French plan to reduce training program for Vietnamese
recruits- rent a ease o xe a in orme the mer can
Li"#ion in Saigon that the call-up of the fourth increment of
Vietnamese draftees under the two-month training program
will be postponed indefinitely. Lack of money and the need
to use the camp training cadres in the activation of regular
Vietnam Army units were given as the reasons.
The Legation considers the French decision evidence that
the mobilization program has proved less useful than antici-
pated and that it was designed principally forpsychological
purposes, (C Saigon 1931, 4 Apr 52)
Comment, This report indicates that the time and effort
expend ce the training program started last October, might
have been more advantageously employed if existing irregular
units had been transferred into regular army formations. These
irregulars number over 200,000.
13. Netherlands condemns Indonesian imprisonment of its
natioi Th a? ro-m e y s rung pressure in ar ament , a Dutch
For-eFg-n-'Uffice official has asserted that the nationals of no
other country in the "free world" have received as bad treat-
ment as the Dutch have in Indonesia. As of last November,
108 Dutchmen were under arrest and awaiting trial, about
half of whom had been detained longer than six months. Indo-
nesian Foreign Office promises of information have not been
forthcoming.
Attributing the situation to an "exaggerated Indonesian
conception of its newly won sovereignty," the Dutch official
stated that his government prefers not to take reprisals
which are allowable under international law. Privately, the
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Foreign Office admits that it probably will not submit the
problem to the Union Court of Arbitration, hoping that the
new Indonesian Government will be more effective in controlling
its local authorities, who ordered most of the arrests. (R
The Hague 1043, 2 Apr 52)
Comment: Parliamentary attacks, especially by the right-
wing - against the passivity of the Dutch Government's
policy toward Indonesia have been increasingly severe. A
specific target is expected to be the government's failure to
take action against Indonesia for its seizure of Dutch vessels
enroute to New Guinea.
With the appointment of the Sultan of Jogjakarta as
Indonesian Defense Minister, two serious difficulties -- the
lack of internal security and the absence of administrative
efficiency on a local level -- may be substantially ameliorated.
14. Ceylonese Government dissolves parliament and calls imme-
diate e~ect1otis o L0_r Doti ury 8 vernor enera o Cey on ,
pro ocf-aiinec` ssolution of parliament effective 8 April 1952
and set new elections for 28 April to 31 May 1952. The new
parliament will meet 10 June 1952, The Governor General
2
believes that the United National Party now in power will
retain its position by holding immediate elections, I
25X1C 0 says that the Akuressa by-elections, in solithern Ceylon,
will be cancelled. (S Colombo 558, 3 Apr; R FBIS, 4 Apr 52)
5X1 C
Comment- Before the recent death of popular Prime Minister
D. S. enanayake, the United National Party planned to delay
the elections as long as possible so that party forces could
consolidate their position. By calling parliamentary elections
at once, the party can take advantage of the personal popula-
rity and memory of the late Prime Minister whose aura now
falls about his son, Dudley Senanayake, the new Prime Minister,
Also, dissolution of parliament and timely elections may
discourage defections from the United National Party and
prevent leftist-Communist parties from gaining strength,
particularly in Akuressa -- the heart of Communist Party
influence in Ceylon. The Akuressa parliamentary seat became
vacant upon the death on 30 December 1951 of W. P. A,
Wickramasinghe, brother of the secretary-general of the Ceylon
Communist Party, and a supporter of that party.
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15, Iranian financial collapse not necessarily imminent: The
Iranian vernment, y resorting to vspecia .vises such as
indirect loans from the National Bank, floating an internal
loan, and transfer of uncommitted foreign exchange, has raised
sufficient funds to cover its salary and wage commitments for
the last two months of the Iranian year which ended on 20
March and will probably be able to meet its other year-end
obligations without unusual difficulty.
The Ministry of Finance is considering expansion of
the note issue and use of the gold note cover reserve. The
American Embassy believes that Prime Minister Mossadeq might
be able to persuade the Majlis to dilute the currency on the
basis of "patriotic expediency." Even without such Majlis
action, the Embassy believes it possible that the government
could carry on financially through May 1952, (C Tehran 3636,
24 Mar 52 )
Comment: In order to meet current financial obligations,
the Iranian-Government has improvised successfully for months.
It would be difficult to estimate the length of time it could
continue to function by reducing the government payroll and
facilities. However, the increasing financial and economic
deterioration has forced the government to consider the unpopu-
lar step of debasing the currency. The new Majlis, with its
strong National Front representation, might be amenable to
taking such a step as the only means of maintaining Iran's
freedom.
16. Egyptian King may be planning new government under present
Minister o-T nter of r~- Egyptian Minster o n error as
25X1C given "a strong implication" that
he and King Farouk are planning the Minister's accession to
power.
The Minister, Maraghi Bey, apparently expects the resig-
nation of Hilali, the postponement of elections, his own
accession to power on the basis of a strong program for social
reform, and, should the Anglo-Egyptian dispute still not be
settled, an ultimatum from Farouk giving the British 60 to 90
days to satisfy national aspirations, Should these not be
25X1C satisfied, concludes that "a national struggle
would be in under Maraghi's direction."
25X1A SECRET
25X1A
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ANOr
Comment" This is the first indication that the possible
resigna-.tia of the Hilali government might be followed by
something other than general chaos, Maraghi is considered
able and ambitious.
There have been rumors, termed "absolutely untrue" by
the Chief of the Royal thatcredencFarouektoisthesenot is
supporting Hilali. Lending
a report that Hilali has resisted royal
lnpressurertontakeiously
friends who
into his cabinet two of the King's
corrupt,
25X1
-
17. Egyptian parliamentary elections liikelyetogbee postponed
King ,rou~~ias s_ t ca egorica Y That th mentary elections now scheduled to take lace on 18 Ma will
be held
25X1
General in the Sudan for
the Legislative Assembly, The Foreign Minister, who considered
the act "provocative," seriously contemplated breaking off
talks with the British Ambassador.
Egyptian newspapers, though severely limited by censor-
ship, have unanimously accused Britain of extending its imper-
ialism and of a new move to separate the Sudan from Egypt
(S Cairo 1718, 3 Apr; C Cairo 1728, 4 Apr 52)
Comment" If the Governor General's action does not lead
to a complete breakdown in current preliminary Anglo-Egypt
talks, it will at least certainly harden the Hilali government
against making concessions on the Sudan and Suez issues.
19, British see less promising outlook in talks with Egypt:
The results the pre converse 05 D' a wean a Egyptian
Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador make the prospect
for agreement look less bright to the British Foreign Office.
The Foreign Office is agreeable to a formula that
in
specifically and publicly commit Egypt Lin
regional defense arrangement, but objects to the Egyp
SECRET
Comment,, There have been previous indications that
Farou wou postpone the 18 May election date.
n of
British J51-1 is overnor
188 EgYlPtdenounces
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*Ewe
phrasing, which would necessitate the removal of all British
military units from Egypt.
The British foreign Office
asoaebasistfoif ritain and r negotiationsEgyPt
can agree on a joint statement the Egyptian Prime Minister will agree to call off the elections
and perhaps suspend thetionA~nthedeituaotiondstandse
negotiations in a calm atmosphere.
now, Foreign Office offleagreementxwouldcbecomeouselesso
the elections, and a negotiated 2 and 4 Apr 52)
(S London 4384 and 4450,
Comment- The willingness of the Foreign
not ti a ns st on a public promise of Egyp ion from th the defense of the Middle Eso is toewhichtion
taken by the British Cabinet a for
only
British combat troops would
a commitment. Britain as a strategic necessity
lishment of joint air defenses in Egypt
A
ticis
face
eV
cr
axty,
20. Turkish Republican Party
is
e a
i
from mem ers zp- e ?ng
. oun e y eial At zed the aturk, party's program 26 March to 30 March and
critici's program and administration.
Former Prime Minister Gunaltay, emerging as the strongest and
strongly most popular figure among the Republican leaders, directly
lures an
dershipd
attacked the Secretary-GeaInonu1sflea
less openly criticized President.-General
The American Embassy believes that therRepublican9leader-
ship will attempt to hold the party age for
general elections. Fa~le~ti~esmwoeld rna.keeitsunlikelytthatt
time than in the 1950
the party could continue in its present form. (C Ankara 995,
1 Apr 52 )
Comment- The Democratic Party's continued popularity
has s mu a#ed dissnbe?adoptedebyethellatterainyitsreffortVer
the proper policy to as traditional
to return to power. The Republican Party's been
leaders,, such as Inonu, Nihat Erim and Kasim Gulek,
increasingly criticized by the younger, more liberal group
led by Gunaltay and CavidOral. Despitesthe recenthresignations who prote of several Republican deputies
that
mentality? of Inonu and his group, there is no rest evidence enough t
the dissension between the two groups is yet g
bring about dissolution of the party.
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WESTERN EUROPE
21 e Anti.-Communist French labor campaign suffers setback:
be dealt efforts towar col abortion among
A "severe blow'" may
the principal non-Communist French labor organizations by a
sharp split in the leadership of the rightist Independent Labor
Confederation, A failure to mend this split would benefit
considerably the Communist-led General Labor Confederation,
The moderate majority of the Independent Labor Confeder
ation's executive committee recently defied an attempt by the
mi_nori.ty and the organization's principal financial backer to
place ex?Vichyites in certain top positions. (S Paris 6055,
3 Apr 52 )
Comment: The Independent Labor Confederation seeks an
inter confederal grouping of non--Communist labor representatives,
The present leaders of Force Ouvriere, one of the two principal
non-Communist labor organizations in France, would be excluded
because of their un.aggressiveness and deep distrust of the
Catholic Labor Confederation,
22. Gaullists no longer considered a French opposition party:
The G aaiists can no longer be considered part of t ze parlia-
mentary opposition to the Pinay government, in the opinion of
the American Embassy in Paris. The Embassy sees in the strong
Gaullist support for Pinay's budgetary program evidence that
the RPF is badly divided and that its leaders are afraid to
call for opposition tactics at this time. (C Paris 6089,
3 Apr 52 )
Comment: In the past De Gaulle's strategy has permitted
his fo Lowers to support the government on specific measures
consonant with his own program, While De Gaulle is probably
wary of running counter to public opinion, in view of the
current interest in giving Pinay a chance, it is unlikely that
he has modified to any degree his basic opposition to co-
operation with "the parties,"
23. French leadership in agricultural pool planning weakened:
The T'nWYmg?vernment has greatly weakened France s leaders ip
in the planning for a European agricultural pool by supporting
the position of the French National Management Association,
which opposes the "green pool" because it would destroy the
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association's exploitation of cartels based on restricted
markets, The future French position will depend upon farm
leaders' ability to consolidate forces and overcome this
political opposition.
A high French Government official predicts that the
plenary "green pool" session, now due to open about 23 April,
will end without decision, but will appoint a committee of
experts to study problems and make recommendations, as was
done in the preliminary stages of the Schuman Plana (C Paris
6081, 3 Apr 52)
Comment: Non-Communist labor leaders have alleged that
Pinay, a conservative businessman himself, opposes all current
long-range economic plans such as the agricultural pool. His
government, moreover, has the support of deputies representing
conservative rural elements, apt to reflect the narrow opinions
of many French farmers rather than farm organizations which
fully appreciate the advantages of agricultural integration.
24. Netherlands regards continuance of European Payments
Union essential: T e etch Government consi ere the uro Penn
Payments 'U'nion essential for the preservation and expansion of
intra-European multilateral trade, which it holds is a necessary
basis for rearmament and for maintaining a standard of living
high enough to resist further Communist inroads. The possibility
of a return to bilateralism and quantitative restrictions is
considered real in view of the present low level of western
European gold reserves,
The functioning of the EPU indicates that its reserves
within the existing quota system are inadequate, and the
Netherlands regards these reserves, which provide for swings
in creditor-debtor positions, as the key to the importance of
the Payments Union. The Dutch feel that each EPU member should
contribute a fair share toward the proposed additional reserves
of 178 million dollars, (C The Hague TOMUS 184, 1 Apr 52)
25. American Embassy believes Irish budget proposals may
precipitate general election: The American mbassy in Dublin
elieve that t ere is a strong possibility of an early general
election in Ireland because of widespread hostile reaction
to price increases provided for in the budget which has been
presented to Parliament. To fill a 42-million-dollar gap
between estimated revenues and expenditures, the government
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has proposed higher taxes, lower subsidies on bread and flour,
and the elimination of subsidies on tea, sugar, and butter.
(R Dublin 153, 3 Apr 52)
Comment: So long as the De Valera government has to
depend upon the support of five independents to maintain its
parliamentary majority, there is the prospect of a general
election; but there is no indication of any clear-cut policy
differences between the two major parties.
The presentation of the "harshest budget in the history of
the state" follows conferences in London between Irish and
British Treasury officials on the necessity for improving the
sterling area's financial position. The Irish Government,
evidently impressed by the seriousness of the country's balance
of payments deficit last year, which was equivalent to 185
million dollars, has announced its intentions of also reducing
non-sterling imports, The Opposition, on the other hand, has
maintained consistently that there is no economic crisis, but
has made no clear statement of its own financial policy for
Ireland,
26, Norway insists on maintaining trade with Orbit: Officials
of the Norwegian Foreign Of ice and Ministry o ommerce insist
upon importing 275,000 metric tons of coal from Poland rather
than increasing coal shipments from the United States, While
Norway could finance increased imports of American coal in 1952,
the government argues that it cannot afford to use dollars
indefinitely to meet its coal deficit, particularly in view
of the uncertainty of US economic aid and its limited extent.
Norwegian officials believe that if they fail to reach an agree-
ment with Poland now it will be difficult to reopen negotiations
later, (S Oslo 865, 2 Apr 52)
Comment: Like Denmark, Norway hesitates for both political
and economic reasons to sever trade relations with eastern
Europe, Norwegian officials are currently willing to pay for
the Polish coal with 750 tons of aluminum.
27, Swedish Defense Minister proposes extended training period:
Swedish-Tefense ?Iinister NN sson as proposed that t e period
of conscription be extended from 10 to 13 months. Noncom-
missioned officers, officers, and those assigned to special
duty, would receive further instruction, (U FBIS, Stockholm,
2 Apr 52)
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Comment: As part of its postwar demobilization program,
Sweden , X48 reduced the period of compulsory military service
from 12 to 9 months. Subsequently the increasingly precarious
international scene stimulated a demand for more extensive
training and a token increase of one month was made in 1951.
The American Army Attache, however, considers an extension to
18 months as the minimum need of the Swedish Army.
LATIN AMERICA
28. Bolivian President appeals to President Truman on tin
issued resident Bal iv an as sent a persona letter to
Pre iris dent Truman asking his aid in obtaining a "remunerative"
price for Bolivian tin. The letter, friendly in tone, stressed
Bolivia's urgent need for a prompt solution of differences
impeding US-Bolivian negotiations.
Ballivian's action indicates that the junta is approaching
the end of its patience. Further unproductive sessions between
the negotiators can "break the camel's back," and result in a
wave of anti-US sentiment not only in Bolivia, but throughout
Latin America. (R La Paz Joint Weeka 13, 28 Mar 52)
Comment: Negotiations for a long-term US-Bolivian tin
contract have extended over a year, and the junta apparently
believes that Bolivia's strained political and economic
situation would not support another prolonged delay.
Thus far there is no evidence that Bolivia has prepared
to renew its campaign to mobilize Latin American support for
charging the United States with "economic aggression" under
article 16 of the Organization of American States. The
Bolivian Foreign Minister stated in March that his country
would consider taking the case before international organizations
only if the subsequent decision on the tin price should be un-
favorable.
29. Leftist opposition parties in Mexico sign campaign pact:
The Popu ar Party, the Federation of People's Parties, and the
Party of the Revolution have signed a pact to draft a "minimum
political platform for the present electoral campaign." Once
this has been approved by these three Mexican parties, they
will discuss the formulation of a list of congressional
candidates to be given joint support in the coming elections.
(R FBIS Radio, Mexico, 31 Mar 52)
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NNOW
Comment: The reputed "pact" suggests the possibility of
a woring arrangement between the pro-Communi t supporters of
Lombardo Toledano and those of the opportunistic
Henriquez Guzman, whose Federation of People''s Parties includes
both leftists and conservatives. Should the working ag
materialize, extreme leftists may be able to elect a few
congressional deputies. However, the coalition is unlikely to
threaten the political dominance of the administration party
(the Party of Revolutionary Institutions) which will undoubtedly
win most of the congressional seats and whose presidential
candidate, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, is virtually certain to be
elected.
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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
------------
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
7 April 1952
CIA No. 49606
Copy No.
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of
of all current reports in CIA
not represent a complete coverage or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments tCerepresent the
immediate views of the Office of Current
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
Japanese official reiterates views on future status of
Soviet Malssion IT -To y-6. In t e opinion o the Treaties
Bureau Chief o the Japanese Foreign Office, any attempt by
the Soviet Union to remain in Japan as an occupying power,
after the peace treaty becomes effective, would be contrary
to the 1945 Moscow Agreement which named SCAP Headquarters
as the sole organ of occupation control, The official also
told a Diet committee that the dissolution of SCAP would
leave the Soviet Mission no legal basis for remaining in
Japan, Admitting that Japan was unable to force its views
on the USSR, he contended that the state off aS/S rmistice be-
tween Japan and the USSR will continued
4 Apr 52 )
Commento' The provision in the Japanese Peace Treaty
requiring :ratification by a majority of the members of the
Far Eastern Commission was designed to prevent the USSR or
any other FEC member nation from inheriting the position of
SCAP,
The Japanese Government on 16 March indicated that if no
allied decision were forthcoming by the effective date of
the peace treaty regarding the status of the Soviet Mission
in Japan, the government would treat the Soviet personnel
as ordinary foreign nationals without diplomatic status.
20 United States urges Japan to modify its position in
the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations-. The Department o
Slate as requested t e American o itical Adviser in Tokyo
to inform the Japanese Government that its proposals at
the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations are inconsistent with
the commitments expressed in Yoshida?s 24 December letter
to Dulles, The Department points out that the Japanese
are committed to negotiate a treaty "in conformity with the
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principles set out in the multilateral treaty of peace," and,
in the view of the United States, the Japanese Government
should not attempt to exclude mention of these principles,
including that of Japan's obligation to pay reparations,
(S S/S to Tokyo 2646, 3 Apr 52)
Comment: Negotiations at Taipei are stalemated due to
Japan ~attempt to conclude a treaty which would not extend
"victor" status to the Chinese. China, for reasons of pres-
tige and its international legal status, cannot accept this
limitation.
3. Japanese to propose simplified treaty with Chinese
Nationalists: In an attemp to reso ve the impasse in the
:=Japanese treaty negotiations, Japan will propose that
certain controversial matters pertaining to the Chinese main-
land be dropped from the treaty now under negotiation. This
will permit an immediate resumption of full diplomatic rela-
tions between Japan and Formosa, leaving controversial sub-
stantive matters to be left for subsequent separate negotia-
iond (S S/S Tokyo 2123, 4 Apr 52)
Comment: It is noted that the Japanese have proposed
a sim7ila chnique in their negotiations with the Republic
of Korea, The Japanese undoubtedly feel that their bargain-
ing position vis-a-vis their former colonies will be con-
siderably strengthened after Japan regains its sovereignty.
The Chinese however, hoping for United States assistance,
are likely to hold out for whatever concessions can be gained
during the current negotiations,
4. Japanese urging Koreans to conclude limited treaty:
The Japanese are pressang t e Koreans to conclude agreements
on only three of the five issues currently under negotiation:
amity and basic "relations," the nationality of Korean resi-
dents in Japan and the transfer of vessels, according to
Acting US Political Adviser Bond in Tokyo. Fisheries and
claims would be deferred pending further "fact finding."
Wording of the documents covering the first three issues
is substantially agreed upon and thus the Koreans are ma-
neuvered into a corner as a result of the imminence of Ja-
panese sovereignty, which may force them to accept Japanese
proposals. Bond believes Japanese appreciation of this situ-
ation accounts for continued Japanese optimism on the out-
come of negotiations. (C Tokyo 211?3, 4 Apr 52)
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'Vo_l' r;~ RI T
Comments The South Korean.s9 sensitive to any slight
wag a e remain particularly touchy
in their international r ion of s9 Japanese superiority.
regards any mani.festasuperiority. While
not probable9 it is a remote possibility that the South
Korean government, enraged at being outmaneuvered by the
Japanese4 might withdraw indefinitely from the negotiations.
WESTERN EUROPE
5a British propose new financial agreement on airfielment
used by mera.can . Drees n En a dehensive agreement for
an more comp
sugges ' a new - of in En
financing the construct
use if?rceoaiin~andendeavorltadma?ntain
of the American air the concept of USAF-RAF partnership and to maximize dollar
receipts in 1952 and 1.9539 the British desire a " rephasing"
of their financial participation in the program.
Under the present agreements Britain was to share
equally in the cost of the 1951 slice, and the US waThtoebe
responsible for the entire cost of the 1952 sice. the
together with the proposed 1953 program, may reach
have yet
equivalent of 280 million dollars, but no payments
been madeo The British offeredcontrin of 49y
20 percent of all costs up S London 43729
million dollars. (TS London 42349 25 Mar;
1 Apr 52 )
Comments This offer represents a stnct policyUnited
change (frm two previous British suggestions that t
States assume the whole capital. cost as well as responsi?The
ields.
bility for the subsequent
then Ugnmightoagree torcontribute
American Embassy believes provided a method
as much as 25 percent of the total cost, p
can be worked out to maximize British dollar receipts in
1952 and 1953.
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