COMMUNIST STATMENTS REGARDING INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010076-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 76
• Publication Date: February 15, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
OCI No. 0504/66
Copy No. 40
COMMUNIST STATEMENTS REGARDING INTERVENTION
IN VIETNAM AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS
15 February 1966
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SECRET
GROUP 1
E.cludd ho.. ouromotic
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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 Approv 10076-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, A. C.
15 February 1966
MEMORANDUM
Attached is a compilation of Communist
statements on possible direct military inter-
vention in the Vietnam situation, and.: on pos-
sible negotiations toward a settlement:, received
since our biweekly report (OCI No. 1057/66)
issued 1 February 1966.
Appro
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USSR Moscow's position on the
subject of negotiations
has not changed in the
last two weeks.
China Peking has blasted the:.;
US move to take the Viet-
nam problem to the UN, and
has reiterated its opposi-
tion to any negotiated
settlement except on the
Communist terms.
DRY Hanoi's standard posi-
tion of a settlement of
the Vietnam war was ex-
pounded in a letter to
the socialist countries
and other nations in-
terested in the Vietnam
war. In his letter, Ho
restated Hanoi's deter-
mination to continue the
war until a settlement
can be reached on Com-
munist terms. He also
attempted to counter the
recent US peace moves %,
INTERVENTION
The Soviet Union's public
expressions of support for
the DRY have given no indi-
cation of change in Moscow's
position.
The Chinese are continuing
their generalized public
statements of support for
Vietnam, which continue
to imply that Peking will
not take the lead in pro-
voking a war with the US.
Chinese private and public
statements emphasize that
the possibility of a US
attack on China is in-
creasing with the escala4:
tion of the war in Viet-
nam but Peking probably
does not regard war with
the US as likely at least
this summer.
There have been no signi-
ficant statements by the
North Vietnamese during
this period on the subject
on intervention.
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NEGOTIATIONS
DRY with the claim that they
Cotit'd were all a "trick" de-
signed to cover up fur-
ther American "aggres-
sive action" in South
Vietnam.
In addition, recent
statements from Hanoi
while restating the four-
point solution to the war
have laid heavy emphasis
on the role of the Front
in any settlement. They
have pointed out that re-
cognition of the Front and
its programme is a "very
important"=part of the
four-point settlement
and as such must be
recognized by the US.
NFLSV The Liberation Front has There have been no signi-
over the past two weeks ficant statements by the
.offered only the standard Liberation Front during
reiteration of its posi- this period on the subject
tion on,settling the war, of intervention.
It has praised President Ho
Chi Minh's letter and re-
iterated its determination
to continue the war until
a settlement can be achieved
on Communist terms.
App
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Selected Soviet References to Intervention I-1
Selected Chinese Communist References to
Intervention 1-3
COMMUNIST STATEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS IN VIETNAM
Selected Soviet References to Negotiations N-1
Selected Chinese Communist References to
Negotiations N-2
Selected North Vietnamese References to
Negotiations N-4
Selected Liberation Front References to
Negotiations N-8
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COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM
Selected Soviet Statements on Intervention
Selected Soviet Selected Soviet
Pu is tatements Priva e a ements
31 January 1966: An Izvestia
commentator reiterated ire
standard Soviet line that, "the
Soviet people have always ren-
dered and will go on rendering
assistance to the fraternal
people of Vietnam."
31 January 1966: A Soviet Govern-
ment statement on the US resum-
tion of bombing repeated the
Soviet pledge that, "true to its
internationalist duty the Soviet
Union will continue giving the
DRV the necessary aid and sup-
port."
1 February 1966: Soviet Presi-
dent Podgorny, in reply to Ho
Chi Minh's message of 24 January,
stated, "the Soviet Union will
continue rendering assistance to
the fraternal DRV in strengthening
its defense capacity."
The Soviet Union's public ex-
pressions of support for the
DRV have given no indication
of change in its position.
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Selected Chinese Communist References to Intervention
Selected Chinese Selected Chinese
Public tatements Private Sta-te-m-e-nTs
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30 January 1966: In a let-
ter to Ho i Minh, Chairman
Liu Shao-chi pledged that the
Chinese people "will standy
by the fraternal Vietnamese
people in a joint struggle
to to thoroughly defeat the US
aggressors... whatever may be
the price we have to pay."
fail. Chou asserted that in
July or August, the US would
launch a "gigantic offensive"
and might even violate Chinese
borders, but he declared that
the US would never win because
China would "fight to the last
man" and might lose battles but
would never lost a war.
Chou's reported comments
parallel Peking's propaganda
predictions of US plans for
escalating the war and their
ultimate failure. The time-
able, however, is new and
suggests that the Chinese do
not regard war with the US
as like
summer
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Liu's pledge does not depart 25X1
from the generalized promises
of support Peking has been
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Public Statements
4 February 1966: Vice Pre-
mier Po 1-po declared at a
Peking reception that the
Chinese people "resolutely
support the Vietnamese people
in their just struggle and
will contribute their part
in thoroughly defeating US
imperialism."
9 February 1966: Deputy Chief
of the neral Staff of the
People's Liberation Army Li
Tien-yu declared "No matter
how US imperialism threatens
us, and no matter how far US
imperialism may expand the
war, we will unswervingly
stand by the peoples of Korea,
Vietnam and the whole world
and do our part to defeat
US imperialism thoroughly
and bury that number one
war criminal.'
Another version of Peking's
generalized pledge of support
for the Vietnamese.
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Selected Chinese Communist References to Negotiations
Selected Chinese
Public Statements
30 January 1966: The People's
Daily declared that the DRY
Tour-point formula "is the
only correct way to arrive at
a political settlement of the
Vietnam question... there can
be no bargaining about it."
It added, "if the US aggressors
truly desire a peaceful solu-
tion to the Vietnam question...
they must recognize the South
Vietnam National Front for
Liberation as the sole legiti-
mate representative of the
South Vietnamese people and
accepts its five-part state-
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on which there is no room
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0
2 February 1966: A Chinese
Foreign Ministry statement
denouncing both resumption
of bombing of the DRY and the
US move to put the Vietnam
question before the UN Se-
curity Council declared that
the Vietnamese can neither "be
deceived" by the US "peace
talks plot" nor "cowed" by US
escalation of the war. It as-
serted that the Vietnamese
Selected Chinese
Priva a atements
Peking is reiterating its
standard hard line on nego-
tiations. The Chinese have
recently been bearing down
harder than ever on the theme
of North Vietnamese determina-
tion in the war. This appears
to be "insurance" against the
possibility Hanoi might soften
at some future date rather than
a reflection of Chinese con-
cern.at any current development.
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2 February 1966 Cont'd: "have
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sive and are "fighting still
more valiantly than before."
2 February 1966: The People's
Daily blasted tie US move to
raise the Vietnam problem at the
UN Security Council asserting
that the UN "has nothing at
all to do with the Vietnam
question" and that "no country
has any right to ask for a UN
discussion of this question."
The editorial pledged the "firm
support" of the Chinese people
for the 1 February DRV Foreign
Ministry statement rejecting
the competence of the UN to
deal with the question and
reiterated Peking's position
that the Vietnam question "can
only be settled in accordance
with the principles and spirit
of the Geneva Agreements" which
in present circumstances "find
their expression" in the DRV
four-point formula and the
Liberation Front five-part
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Private Statements Comments
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Selected DRV
Public to ements
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Selected North Vietnamese References to Negotiations
28 January 1966: DRV Presi-
dent o Chi Minh on 24 January
sent a letter to the socialist
countries and to other nations
interested in the Vietnam situa-
tion. In part,, the letter as-
serted that "So long as the US
army of aggression still re-
mains on our soil, our people
will resolutely fight against
it. If the US Government
really wants a peaceful settle-
ment, it must accept the four-
point stand of the DRV Govern-
ment and prove this by actual
deeds; it must end uncondi-
tionally and for good all
bombing raids and other war
acts against the DRY. Only
in this way can a political
solution to the Vietnam prob-
lem be envisa ed."
is the unswerving stand of the
DRY Government to strictly re-
spect the 1954 Geneva agreements
on Vietnam and to correctly imple-
ment their basis provisions as
correctly expressed in the
Pham Van Dong stated a
Selected DRY
Private Statements
Ho's letter may, in part at
least, had been intended to
counter the recent US peace
initiatives that brought
American emissaries to many
countries. His letter, which
only restated the DRY position,
was tailored to suit specific
countries and to convince them
of the correctness of the DRV
position. For example, his
letter to India addressed the
Indian Government in its capac-
ity as chairman of the ICC,
while the letter to the UK
spoke of the British role in
the Geneva Conference.
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Selected DRY
Pu is a ements
28 January 1966 Cont'd: follow-
ing points; ese o lowed the
DRV's four points made public
25X1 on 8 April 1965).
29 January 1966: In a commentary
on President o Chi Minh's letter
to several countries in which he
insisted on the recogntion of
the DRV's four-points for a set-
tlement of the war, Hanoi radio
stated that "the opinions ex-
pressed by President Ho in his
24 January letter have bespoken
the definite and unchanged
stand of our government and
people with regard to the set-
tlement Vietnam rob-
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30 January 1966: The North
Vie namese army daily, Quan
Doi Nhan Dant in an editorial
assei id ?iat "To solve the
Vietnam question, the DRY
Government on many occasions
has expounded its four-point
stand, which embodied the basic
provisions of the 1954 Geneva
agreements on Vietnam. This
is the only basis to settle
the Vietnam question. This
stand is fully correct and
justified, and it has won warm
support from all progressive
people. The stand of the
Vietnamese people is imbued
Selected DRY
Private a ements
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Selected DRV
Public Statements
Selected DRV
Private Statements
30 January 1966 Cont'd: with
the brilliance of justice. US
imperialism fears justice as
an owl fears the sun. It does
not recognize the words or in-
deed the four-point stand of
25X1 the DRV Government and uses
all possible vicious means to
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3 February 1966: The DRY
Foreign Ministry issued a
memorandum on the US peace ef-
fort. The document in part
asserted that "if the US Govern-
ment really wants a peaceful
settlement, it must recognize
the four point stand of the
Government of the DRY and
prove this by actual deeds.
It must end unconditionally
and for good all bombing raids
and other acts against the DRV.
25X1 Only in this way can a politi-
cal solution to the Vietnam
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The memorandum offered a wrap-
up of recent DRV statements
on the situation in South
Vietnam and attempted to under-
cut recent US efforts at achiev-
ing a negotiated settlement of
the war. At the same time it
emphasized that the whole
four point stand of the DRV
must be accepted by the US be-
fore any settlement of the
conflict could be envisaged.
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tained that so long as bombing con-
tinued any discussions (on ending
the war) were out of the question."
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 Selected DRY
Public Statements
Selected DRV
Private Statements
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Hanoi has taken great pains
throughout the last year to
make evident its own position
to nations that have offered
to help bring the war to an
end. Hanoi not ruled out
such efforts but has insisted
that they be made on DRV terms.
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Selected National Liberation Front References to Negotiations
Selected Liberation
Front Public StatemeEts
Selected Liberation
Front Private Statements
30 January 1966: Liberation Radio
in speaking o the "aggressive" US
role in South Vietnam asserted
that "The NFLSV, the only genuine
representative of the South Viet-
namese people, clarified in stand
in its statement of 22 March 1965.
Any negotiations with US imperial-
ism at the present time would be
entirely in vain unless the US
withdraws all US and satellite
troops and means of war from
South Vietnam, unless the South
Vietnamese people's sacred rights
to indpendence and democracy
are not sacrificed to US im-
perialism by the traitorous
Vietnamese country sellers, and
unless the NFLSV, the only
genuine representative of 14
million South Vietnamese people,
can raise its decisive voice."
2 February 1966: Liberation
Radio in speaking of the fifth
anniversary of the Front which
occurred last December asserted
that "the most correct path for
the settlement of the problem
of Vietnam is the implementa-
tion of the five points of the
historic 22 March 1965 statement
of the NFLSV and the four points
of the 8 April DRY Government
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In recent weeks both Hanoi
and the Liberation Front have
emphasized that the role of
the NFLSV will play a crucial
role in any settlement of
the war. The Communists have
seen that this point is un-
palateable to the US and have
stressed that it must be ac-
cepted along with all other
demands in the four points
if a negotiated end to the war
is to be achieved.
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