LETTER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FROM JOHN A. MCCONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000500010026-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 17, 1965
• Content Type: LETTER

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED
STAT
STAT
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17 March 1965
Dear kr. Vice President:
I wish to thank you for sending me a most
interesting account of your conversation of 12 March
with Ambassador Dobrynin. I have made this avail-
able to a very small number of my senior staff
officials who are concerned with this delicate
problem.
We are looking forward to greeting you and
the member. of your staff when you visit our Head-
quarters on 24 March. At that time, we can agree
on arrangements for K e e pi n g you advised of our pro-
Lucn and activities through Mr. Connell
I, and my staff and I look forward to doing
businees with him on a regular basis.
Sincerely,
/3/ JOHN
John A. McCone
Director
The Vice President
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
WEIder:MMW (17Mar65)
Orig - ADDRESSEE
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STAT
STAT
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Dear John:
THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASH I NGTON
March 9, 1965
, is now
assisting me in the field of national security affairs.
Please use him in every way you deem appropriate to
keep me informed of your production and activities.
Special, weekly and periodic reports should be addressed
in his care to the Office of the Vice President, Room 176,
Executive Office Building.
May I again express to you, John, and to your staff,
my sincere regret that pressing business forced the
postponement of our meeting this afternoon.
Sincerely,
Honorable John McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
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endum
For: The President
From: The Vice President
March 15, 1965
1 Executive Registry
Subject: Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Soviet
Embassy. March 12, 1965
Tonight Mrs. Hun phrey and I dined alone and informally
with Soviet Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin, flasity accepting
an invitation thet had been scheduled and cancelled several
tin es during the last few rr onths.
Dobrynin had a question to put which he repeated several
tines: "How much importance does the United States give to its
relations with the Soviet Union?" 'Do you consider relations
with the USSR to be of high priority? Of highest priority?"
Dobrynin professed purzlen ?nt by U.S. air strikes agai
North Vietnam. He reviewed briefly US-USSR relations du
the Johnson dminietration. When President Johnson aseu
the Presidency his policy toward the USSR was unknown. Grad-
ually the Soviet Union hen come to respect him as a supporter of
the Test Ban Treaty, of non-prolLe ration of weapons and the
voluntary culla ck in the production of fissionable materials. Th-'
mbassador Bald the Soviet people had developed a sympathy for
the President, partly because the Soviet press had given broad
coverage to the President's positive steps for peace.
But, said Dobrynin, why did the United States bomb Hanoi
while our new Premier was there? Before his visit we were not
committed to heavy support of North Vietnam but we were now.
We thouhht the President was a man concerned about relations
with the Soviet Union -- that he had put them at the top of his list.
When the President defeated Goldwater we looked forward to
better relations. But we can't understand why you ere testing
us now. We are in a quandary. Don't you think your relations
with the USSR are of high priority? If you do, then why do you
bomb North Vie nam? Why do you test us?
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Or, asked the ,ba gado , is it ?u.e you base your
policy on Soviet-Chinese differences and you don't think we'll
aid Hanoi? If so, you're wrong. Why do you do this? Our
relations. continued Dobrynin, seemed to have improved. What's
gone wrong? The President had said he might come to Russia
and he wanted our leaders to come here.
I try to cable the truth to Moscow, including things the
Foreign Office doesn't like. I say the good things when I think
they're good. I try to tell the truth. But why are you testing us
now? Don't you understand as a Socialist State we are morally
and ideologically bound to come to the assistance of e sister
Socialist State? We can't be a leader and stand by and ignore
the bombing of the North Vietnamese.
Is it because your policy is based on Soviet-Sino differ-
ences, he asked. Those differences are real. But you are
pushing us together. You will force us to admit there can't be
peaceful co-existence. If you continue to bomb and aggress
against North Vietnam, we lose the argument. You're forcing
us to agree with the Chinese who say to us, "Look at that brutal
bombing I And you speak of peaceful co-existence?"
Dobrynin here returned to US-USSR relations. We don't
want to admit were wrong, he said. But I can't understand why
you bornbea when Premier Kosygin was there. I can't understand
what your government was thinking of. Do you care about your
relations with the Soviet Union? The fact that you bombed while
our new Premier was present leads us to the opinion that you
don't care, or is lt because you're trying to confront us? Can
you imagine the USSR bombing another country being visited by
President Johnson? If we wanted to confront you, then perhaps.
But for any other reason? Kosygin is a new Premier; do you
seek to embarrass him?
At this point I said, you know the President used every
means at his disposal to prevent embarrassment to Kosygin.
He ordered US Military to take no provocative actions and to
use all influence possible to dissuade South Vietnamese counter-
parts from taking any actions that might embarrass your Premier.
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We were of the op and Hanoi who sought
to embarrass not only Prime Minister ICosygin but also Presi-
dent Johnson. They tried to tmbarrasi us both.
Dobrynin said that surely the United States did not
the Soviet Union so stupid as not to have understood what
going on in Hanoi. But if your government had only said to
"There's been an attack on our men and material at Pleiltu and
Camp Holloway. We know Kosygin is in Hanoi. We feel we must
retaliate. But out of respect for Kosygin, we won't do it when he
is there.." What did the United States have to lose?, he asked.
North Vietnam had no air force; the United States could strike
North Vietnam at any time against little opposition.
We understood what they were doing, the Ambassador con-
tinued. Why didn't you credit our intelligence? Up until that
incident on February 7, Kosygin was not committed to North
Vietnam. He was new and his government was new. There are
always uncertainties with new governments. And then your action
caused great concern back in Moscow. When the Soviet people
read that 150 bombers took off in Saigon and bombed North Vietnam
they remembered that only 5 or 10 Luftwaffe bombers wiped out or
burned whole village*. When they heard about 150 American
bombers, what were they to think? The people asked what's
happened? What were we doing to make the Americans stop?
Then Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union had understood
tat interests of the United States. The Soviet Union respected
. It respected the power of the United States. But by bon -ting
Vietnam the United States might force a confrontation that
could grow more serious and painful every day.
Then I replied. I drew from my pocket the statement
President on August 10, 1964. I read that statement carefully to
Ambassedor Dobrynin. I made it clear that President Johnson's
policy and Congress policy were one. The policy of the United
States was published to the world and understood by the entire
world. Surely it was understood by the Soviet Union before the
trip by Prime Minister Kosygin to Hanoi and to Pyongyang. I
said we considered relation* with the USSR to be very important.
Every decision the President makes is made in the light of these
relations. The Soviet Union knows we have a C011 rnitment to
defend South Vietnam. We intend to keep that commitment.
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President h d for aLlong tin-le, I continued,
from responding to attacks upon Americans in South Vietna
There had been an attack upon Americans during Christmas.
President Johnson refrained from responding to that attack for
two reasons: he did not want to accelerate the struggle; he hoped
it was only an isolated incident and not a broad pattern.
Then I cited the White Paper which indicated the seriousness
of the infiltration of men and arms across the border into South
Vietnam. (Dobrynin did not then, or later, seek to deny Hanoi's
command and direction of the war.)
Dobrynin agreed for the moment to assume the correctness
of the facts of the White Paper. But even if there are 30,000
North Vietnamese infiltrators, that number is still only about the
same as your 24, 000 U.S. soldiers. Further, it's obvious you've
put much more military materiel into South Vietnam than has Hanoi,
he said. But the war continues. Therefore, there would be a civil
war whether North Vietnam were engaged or not. The Vietnamese
do not want the regimes of Saigon. It is the view of the Soviet Union
that South Vietnam, if left free to make a choice, would become
Communiat, sooner or later.
For a considerable period of time. Dobrynin said, the USSR
had not been disinterested in an international conference. It had
not closed the door on United Kingdom or French initiatives.
"But we're not interested anymore," he raid.
I said we had reliable information that Hanoi boasted it was
going to win anyhow and saw no reason to go to a conference. I
considered that talk a threat to peace.
I sale I wanted to direct his attention again to what President
Johnson has said. We had no great desire to have our boys killed
anywhere in the world, but the North Vietnamese must leave South
Vietnarn alone. If what you say is true, it is a civil war that is
going to end in a victory for Communism anyhow -- what do you
risk by insisting that North Vietnam cease and desist its infiltra
ties of men and supplies Into South Vietnam? Why does not the
USSR. acting in its capacity as Co-Chairman of the Conference
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that set up the GenC filia eel s, .tak so e Initiative, exercise
its leadership, and persuade North Vietnam to stop? What have
you got to lose? You say your sister State is going to win anyway,
what can you lomat Use your influence, and you have influence,
and demand that Hanoi stop its command, direction, and above all,
infiltration. If infiltrations stop, and it can be verified, then there
is something accomplished. At least there would be a step toward
conditions for a peaceful settlement.
You know, responded Dobrynin, you ca police a jun 1
border.
I know you can't be absolutely sure every rifle has stopped
coming across, I partially agreed, but if you really put the
pressure on Hanoi, it would stop.
Dobrynin said the United States could not expectthat while
its bombings were going on.
I said that North Wetnem should be willing to respect its
agreements. The first Geneva Accord was now eleven years old.
We are not going to stop our bombing while North Vietnam con.
times to ignore its agreements. If North Vietnam stye any
indication by positive action, particularly by cessation of its
flow of subversives and arres into Fouth Vietnam, we then might
have the beginning of possibilities for diplomacy. If we could
see twenty years ahead we would hope that US-USSR were working
together more closely. The most dangerous threat today was not
between the world's largest powers but from skirmishes between
smaller States which might back powerful Allies into a corner.
The situation today W t. somewhat Like 1914.
Dobrynin said ;hat we were much more mature now. We had
learned a lot. He didn't think we would let 1914 happen again.
There were some differences now between 1914 and 1965 I
agreed, but small powers seemed to get larger Allies into
interesting positions.
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Why don't wt=
n Pobrybin asked. the
0. the US and USSR United States understood t
USSR knew there were certain things it must never do when it came
down to the vital interests of the U.S. And surely the U.S. knew
the USSR could not back away from a Socialist country. If it did,
the whole Communist camp would say the USSR was weak that
the USSR put United States interests above those of the Socialist
system.
I then eesed hirra hard. He must understand the United
States is a major power. It was sensltivc about being attacked
by others. Our people would accuse us of having no courage if
we didn't respond to illegal and outrageous attacks upon American
soldiers and airmen. what the could the Soviet Union expect us
to do after this long line of bloody incidents? You recognize we
are in South Vietnam. We are committed to its defense. Rath
Vietnam is being attacked by North Vietnam. The Viet Cons are
agitators. terrorists, subversives, infiltrated, directed and coma
rounded by Hanoi. They might not have crossed the border in a
formation of ten divisions in the old fashioned way, but they have
crossed and they have aggressed. Perhaps the United States still
bad something to learn about what you call ward of national libera
lion, but we are learning. We will win the war in Vietnam. We
all know there have been certain instabilitice in South Vietnam.
but the margin of the difference between its stability and insta-
bility is the infiltration by North Vietnam. That infiltration
must cease.
Dobrynit said he knew the U.S. was a majOr power. Why
don't you believe we knew you're strong," he said. "we know
what you can do. We know you could probably destroy us. You
have massive atrength. whtever you do, you do as a very
strong state."
I said that be might say that. But Hanoi ecerns to see
nothing of the sort. They call upon ue to get up and to go home.
We are not going to get up and go anywhere as long as Hanoi
continues its aggression against South Viettutra.
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Dobrynin said ne nited States did not want to
negotiate. Right now the USSR did not want an international
conference. That was the declared position. But there were
other ways, he mused. During the Cuban confrontation, his
house had been used for various things, not for negotiations,
but for things that have been instrumental in getting a settle-
ment. There were many other ways.
I asked him to assume that North Vietnam and the United
States were locked together; tied down on a track from which
they could not get loose. According to Dobrynin, this situation
had led to trouble. Now shouldn't the USSR exercise some initia-
tive in this situation? Wasn't the USSR concerned about its relation
with the United States? If our relations were of the highest priority,
should not the USSR use its strong position in the Communist camp
and persuade the North Vietnamese to cease and desist forthwith?
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