CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000400100001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 17, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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17 December 1954
aOCUMENT NO. 10 -
No CHANGE IN CLASS, C
D DECLASSIFIED
ss CHJWGED TO: TS S
A
CL
NEXT REVIEW DATE: --r--
AUTH. HR 70-2/}, 25X1
7 0/ REVIEWER:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
ate Dept. review completed
lIBRARY ~ con
DO 'NOT . DESTROY
i
U
-In 2,5X1
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
tJ
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared prima-
rily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It does .not represent 'a complete coverage of all current
situations. Comments and conclusions represent the im-
mediate appraisal of the Office of, Current Intelligence.
'u
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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Satellite gestures toward neighboring countries--
Changes in Polish security apparatus--Soviet attitude
on Chinese Communist imprisonment of American fliers--
Soviet exploitation of anniversary of French-Soviet
pact.
THE CURRENT STATUS OF AFGHAN-SOVIET RELATIONS . . . . page 6
An Afghan government decision to accept a calcu-
lated risk in order to improve a critical economic
situation and to stimulate American interest in
Afghanistan's internal problems may be primarily re-
sponsible for the recent increase in the number of
Soviet technicians and Soviet-sponsored development
projects in that country,
FRANCE TENDING TO SEEK ACCOMMODATION WITH VIET M1INH . Page o
There.are growing indications that France's policy
in Indochina is aimed primarily at ensuring that French
interests will not be eliminated even if, as Paris con-
siders probable, the Viet Minh takes over all Vietnam.
HATOYAMA REGIME MAY POINT WAY TO MORE INDEPENDENT
JAPANESE POLICIES . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The new Japanese government of Prime Minister
Ichiro I1atoyama will try to pursue a more independent
course in foreign relations than Yoshida's cabinet
without drastically altering Japan's pro-American
orientation.
THE COMMUNIST THREAT IN SYRIA . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Syrian Communists are collaborating in a loose
coalition of extremists and independents bent on up-
setting the ineffectual government of Prime Minister
Faris al Khouri--the third weak cabinet that has ruled
Syria since the overthrow of dictator Shishakli in
February.
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POSSIBLE CHANGES IN SOVIET-SATELLITE CONTROL
RELATIONSHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Recent gestures by the USSR and changes in inter-
nal Satellite policy suggest that Soviet control
mechanisms may be undergoing alteration.to strengthen
the appearances of Satellite independence.
PERON'S RIGHTWARD TREND ENCOUNTERS POLITICAL Page 15
OBSTACLES . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . .
Argentine president Peron's rightward trend is
encountering increasingly bold opposition efforts to
undermine his support among the lower classes. There
is evidence of this especially in his current dispute
with the church which apparently also involves polit-
ical maneuvering within his own Peronista Party.
SUPPLEMENT: A REVIEW OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY--
JANUARY-NOVEMBER 1954
The foremost objective of Soviet foreign policy
during 1954 was to defeat EDC and to prevent the in-
corporation of a rearmed West Germany in the Atlantic
alliance. Simultaneously, Moscow tried to improve its
relations with the countries immediately adjacent to
the Orbit and, by easing world tension, to reduce the
dangers of involvement in a general war. The diplomatic
setback of the London and Paris agreements led Moscow to
call an Orbit security conference to lay the groundwork
for a security system to counterbalance the augmented
power of NATO.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
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The Communist world last week continued to hide its
Stalinist heritage of aggressiveness and totalitarianism be-
hind the guise of a peaceful neighbor interested in mutually
profitable intercourse-~-a role which it warned might change
with ratification of the Paris accords.
In Paris and Prague, Albanian diplomats are reported to
have hinted recently through third parties to Greek representa-
tivesthat Albania wishes to restore normal diplomatic relations.
Furthermore, an Italian trade delegation is reported to be in
Tirana at the invitation of the Albanian government, holding
economic talks with Albanian officials for the purpose of con-
cluding a trade agreement. These are the first such talks since
World War II. Previously Albania has only sporadica":'y ad-
vocated normal relations with Greece and trade with Italy, but
has in general made no real effort toward these ends.
In a move to reassure the Polish public that a policy of
arbitrary arrest is no longer a feature of the government's
security apparatus and to break up the tremendous power complex
formerly concentrated in the security forces, the Polish regime
on 8 December announced the replacement of the infamous Ministry
of Public Security by an Internal Affairs Ministry and a special
Committee of Public Security. The ministry has jurisdiction
over the uniformed police services, including the elite Internal
Security Corps and the border guard. The special committee,
headed by politburo member Wladyslaw Dworakoviski, was made re-
sponsible to the Council of Ministers, and apparently has
jurisdiction over the secret police. Poland is the first Satel-
lite to adopt this form of security organization, which closely
resembles that of the USSR.
While some security officials involved in the reorganization
and shake-up of the ministry may eventually be tried for "abuses
of their authority," the former minister of public security,
politburo member Stanislaw Radkiewicz, was given a face-saving
position as minister of state farms.
It is probable that the timing of the reorganization, which
was based on last year's investigations of the security serv-
ices, resulted from the disclosures of.former high security
police officer Swiatlo and the release of Herman Field.
Although Soviet propaganda has continued its somewhat be-
lated backing of Peiping's charges against the 13 US "spies,"
several UN delegations informed an American journalist that
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members of the Soviet delegation were very unhappy that the case
had been brought up in the Assembly; it upset Moscow's develop-
ment of'a peaceful atmosphere for coexistence. Allegedly the
Soviet Union regretted the Chinese action and was using its in-
fluence to obtain the fliers' release.
The Soviet note of 9 December, Molotov's speech on 10
December, and concurrent propaganda have all been devoted to
warning the West--and especially France--in somewhat stronger
terms than previously that ratification of the Paris agreements
would exclude the possibility of German reunification and make
four-power talks on that issue pointless. The Moscow conference
warnings of new Orbit defense measures have been replayed, with
Molotov repeating Grotewohl's specific threat of East German
armed forces.
The tenth anniversary of the French-Soviet pact-...The occasion
for Molotov's speech--wasexploited for particular appea:.'_
France not to break its alliance with Moscow by endors.;
German rearmament. Although Molotov made no threat of w.r;, wing
the pact if France ratified the Paris agreements, this was em-
plied in a Pravda statement that treaties are lasting only when
their conditi are observed and lose force when violated by
one side.
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THE CURRENT STATUS OF AFGHAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
An Afghan government decision to accept a calculated risk
in order to improve a critical economic situation and to stim-
ulate American interest in Afghanistan's internal problems may
be primarily responsible for the recent increase in the number
of Soviet technicians and Soviet-sponsored development proj-
ects in that country. The USSR, which for years has been
trying to increase its influence in Afghanistan, is unlikely
at present to enforce its suggestions, and its current posi-
tion seems to be one of capitalizing on opportunities offered
by Kabul.
During 1953, the USSR apparently made no important ef-
fort to penetrate the Afghan economy, and Moscow's approaches
seemed designed only to demonstrate its continued in-..arest in
maintaining Afghanistan as a buffer state between Pakistan and
the USSR's central Asian industrial complex.
As rumors of a Turkish-Pakistani pact and a northern-tier
defense scheme began to circulate in 1953, however, Soviet
interest in the countries on the Asian periphery of the Orbit
sharpened noticeably. A campaign to provide economic and
technical assistance to underdeveloped countries was put into
concrete form. It was given significant impetus by the USSR's
willingness, for the first time, to send abroad both goods and
technicians in support of its program.
In early 1954, the first signs of an awakened Soviet in-
terest in Afghanistan were manifested in moves which ap-
peared to be aimed at opposing an increase of Western influ-
ence on the USSR's border. The USSR, on the basis of pre-
vious experience, had little reason to believe its activities
would be as successful as they reportedly have turned out to
be.
The apparent success of the relatively modest $6,200,000
Soviet economic program in Afghanistan during 1954 may, there-
fore, result from an increased Afghan willingness to deal with
the USSR.and not from any pressure that Moscow has put on
Kabul.
Afghanistan, having suffered severe setbacks in 1950 and
1952, is in a critical economic condition. Its hard currency
balance is close to zero primarily because of the collapse of
the karakul market, which has in the past zupplied the major
proportion of Kabul's hard currency earnings. Its internal
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financial structure has been upset by the efforts of Prime
Minister Daud and Finance Minister Malik to extend government
control over the private sector of the economy. The govern-
ment seems, therefore, to have accepted'increased barter trade
with the USSR and a number of financially attractive Soviet
economic aid offers partially to keep its head above water.
Possibly more important, however, are the attitudes and
statements of Afghan officials which show that they have been
trying for almost a year to evolve'a method for allying them-
selves more closely with the West as Turkey, Iran, and Paki-
stan have done, without overly antagonizing the Soviet Union.
Prime Minister Daud, himself, revealed his basically pro-
Western thinking as recently as October 1954, when he asked
an American visitor why the United States was ignoring Afghan-
istan in plans for regional defense. Daud.stressed that,his
country must have some kind of understanding with the United
States. Also in October, Daud's brother, Prince Naim, now Af-
ghan foreign minister, officially approached the American gov-
ernment along the same lines.
With this background, it seems that Afghanistan may not
only be attempting to improve its economy but also to try a
new version of the "threat to turn to the USSR" to force the
United States into taking-action.
Soviet-Afghan relations have not yet reached a point of
immediate danger for Afghanistan, despite some apparent in-
crease in Soviet-Afghan trade and the influx of Soviet techni-
cians and equipment during 1954. Government leaders in Kabul
are aware of the dangers involved, and they are reportedly in-
tending to keep a close watch on all Soviet personnel. The
projects being constructed under Soviet supervision, including
a bakery, flour mill, gasoline and food grain storage facilities,
and paved streets, are not of a sort to provide the USSR with
permanent pressure points for extending its influence. Rather,
they are of a type the Afghan government might be expected to
accept if it hoped to acquire maximum economic benefits with-
out jeopardizing its sovereignty.
It is probable that Afghanistan could at present success-
fully withstand Soviet diplomatic or economic pressure applied
to counter the effects of a modest program of American aid.
Furthermore, it seems probable from expressed attitudes of gov-
ernment leaders that Afghanistan might curtail, or at least not
greatly expand, its economic ties with the USSR following the
receipt of such American assistance. It would try, however, to
maintain a strong bargaining position by playing the Soviet Union
Against the United States.
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FRANCE TENDING TO SEEK ACCOMMODATION YiI H VIET MINT
There are growing indications that France's policy in
Indochina is aimed primarily at ensuring that French interests
will not be eliminated even if, as Paris considers probable,
the Viet Minh takes over-all Vietnam. Desirous of reducing
its own commitments and at the same time convinced that
American aid and the Manila pact are inadequate to prevent
South Vietnam's loss to the-Communists, France is trying to
do business with the Viet Minh. Based on the belief that Ho
Chi Minh is a potential Tito, this effort is at the same time
aimed at.testing.a general policy of coexistence.
Concern for the 'maintenance of France's economic and
cultural interests in Indochina under any political system
has been evident since the Geneva settlement, but since
October this concern has appeared to dominate French policy.
France resents the'United States' refusal to support the
expeditionary corps at the present level, which it regards
as necessary to the protection of French citizens and property.
Because of the cut in dollar aid and the channeling of Amer-
ican aid directly to. the Associated States, the French govern-
ment is about to. take a decision to speed up the reduction in
the strength,.of the corps .
General Ely in Saigon, has implied to General Collins
that because of the United States' decision to reduce the
size of French and native forces, it now has equal re-
sponsibility for the security of the area.
In addition, French officials in Paris and Saigon have
on various occasions in.the last two months made it clear
that they are concerned over the growing American influence
.in Vietnamese affairs. Premier Mendes-France, in the course
of his Washington visit, promised French. assistance in
building a strong, free Vietnam, but showed particular
sensitivity to anything tending to.liqui.date the French posi-
tion. Dao Dai'.s dismissal of General Hinh as army chief of
staff on 29 November was interpreted both by officials and
the press in France as signifying Vietnamese acceptance of
American influence at France's expense.'
At the same time, while the French government has
checked some efforts by its "advisers" to engineer the over-
throw of Diem, his government has no practical appeal in
Paris. The French are exasperated by his obvious dedica-
tion to the elimination of French influence, and are con-
vinced as-well that. he is politically inept.
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A pessimistic attitude toward present efforts to stern
the Communist tide in Vietnam has developed in official
quarters as well as in the French press. Although General
Ely has many times stated his opposition to the policy being
pushed by Sainteny's mission in Hanoi, he suggested to
General Collins that since the French Union forces in Indo-
china were much weaker than the Viet Minh, it "might be
,.:wiser to consider a political settlement." La Chambre has
stated that France will carry out the all-Vietnam election
in 1956, even if a Communist victory seems inevitable.
Mendes-France has professed opposition to any "North-
South mixture," but told Canadian officials last month that
he had found Ho "not completely un-co-operative" and that a
"flexible policy" offered the best chance in Indochina. His.
determination to lower military expenditures provides a
prime motive for his desire to reduce French commitments
there. The American embassy in Paris on 15 November ex-
pressed the view that the premier, his entourage, and his
cabinet are all favorably disposed to seeking an eventual
north-south rapprochement in Vietnam.
The Sainteny mission in Hanoi has been seeking to work
out a modus vivendi with the Viet Minh to assure the mainten-
ance of French cultural and economic interests in North
Vietnam. Sainteny describes this effort as an experiment
in coexistence, although admitting that there are no prec-
edents for Western firms continuing extensive operations
within Communist states.. The announcement that he has an
agreement purporting to safeguard French business interests
in North Vietnam has airoac.v been hailed by the French press.
It may lead to pressure on the United States to accept
Sainteny's thesis that his efforts will reduce Ho Chi Minh's
dependence on Communist China.
The considerable sentiment in France for a general
;policy of coexistence with the Orbit works in favor of an
accommodation with the Viet Minh. Le Monde, an influential
progovernment Paris daily, stated flatly on 4 December that
it was necessary to make "the United States understand our
common interest in attempting the coexistence experiment,
and Indochina offers the experimental ground." Non-Com-
munist pressure for a general coexistence policy is also
strong in-the National Assembly, particularly among the
Gaullists and the Radical Socialists:. .
Mendes-France apparently believes that every avenue
to a modus vivendi with the Orbit should be explored.
Vietnam presents him with a situation which many Frenchmen
consider ideally designed to test this thesis.
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HATOYAi+Ili REGIME MAY POINT WAY TO MORE
INDEPENDENT JAPANESE POLICE S
The new Japanese government of Prime Minister Ichiro
Hatoyama will try to pursue a more independent course in
foreign relations than Yoshida's cabinet without drastically
altering Japan's pro-American orientation. Although i Iatoyama's
promise to dissolve the )let in January and call for an election
in March gives the new regime a "careta:kor" status with insuf-
ficient time to alter Japan's policies extensively, the new
cabinet will prepare the ground for any succeeding conservative
government.
The need to demonstrate a "break" with the Yoshida era and
,provide a "fresh" policy will place co-operation with the United
States on a tougher, more nationalistic basis. Popular pressure
will force this and subsequent cabinets to move toward estab-
lishing normal relations--both economic and political--with
the Orbit, particularly Communist China.
Former prime minister Yoshida's long tenure thwarted
Japanese desires for a break symbolizing the end of the occu-
pation. Consequently his opponents charged he was excessively
pro-American, too dependent on American su.p.port, and unable and
unwilling to stand up to American demands. This, they alleged,
resulted in Japan having unequal status under present treaties
and agreements. They implied that Yoshida's unilateral decisions
and his dependence on a small inner ",palace" guard violated the
tradition of wide consultation and of agreement by compromise.
Hatoyama acknowledged that such attacks on Yoshida had been
for domestic ,political purposes when he told newsmen, "I will
be in a responsible position now" and "should not be spouting
as in the past." Both he and his foreign minister, Mamoru
Shigemitsu, have pledged that co-operation with the free
nations, particularly the United States, will be the basis of
their policy. The minority position of I-Iatoyama's Japan Demo-
cratic Party in the Diet and in the conservative movement will
compel the regime to voice policies with popular appeal in order
to gain control of Japan's dominant conservative forces.
Hatoyama has already publicly stated he will promote trade
with the Communist Orbit as a means of preventing World War III.
Concurrently Shigemitsu has.announced a four-point foreign
policy which calls for: normal diplomatic and trade relations
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with thi:: Co irnullist Orbit anii ecokloiilic
CU-operation with Southeast Asia; %2'c de LroC:ill:;x tM Ii "1" all
.possible nations; and .maintenance of present ties with the
free nations.
These policies re3ult from the General interL)retation :ill
J"loan that the i-orean and Indochina .7 :t l % :ii. i V! 'rc Ovi 011CC
of a relaxation of 1':ast--ilea lso
indicated by %a"h1Z~C.'iill'l.iCll ' " .l ;h`tciill;2] obsz-.L VC
i 'i. '%,~:~
illternationt l coiltro i .; in trade Wit;:-, Com'..un7 ::;'lam it