CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000400090001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 10, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
OCI NO. 2526
10 December 1954
(P,%/
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
III OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
DOCUMENT NO. 00
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. tl
? DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
State Dept. review completed NEXT REVIEW DATE.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared prima-
rily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It does not represent a complete coverage of all current
situations. Comments and conclusions represent the im-
mediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Soviet aid to Hungary and East Germany--Satellite
releases of deviationists--Co-ordination of Orbit eco-
nomic activities--Expansion of Orbit activities in
Southeast Asia.
THE RATIFICATION DIFFICULTIES OF THE SAAR AGREEMENT Page 6
Fundamental French-German differences on the
Saar, deliberately glossed over in the text of the
Saar agreement, are now coming to the surface. As a
result, the two governments have already been obliged
to take more extreme positions than either had origi-
nally intended. Both premiers seem confident that
public realization of the consequences of rejecting
any part of the Paris accords will carry the Saar
agreement through.
NORTH KOREA CONDUCTING INTENSIVE NEW UNIFICATION
CAMPAIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
North Korea opened an intensive propaganda cam-
paign in late October aimed at bringing about new
talks on Korean unification. Pyongyang apparently
hopes to convince the world that it sincerely desires
unification, to establish a new basis for subverting
the south, and to blunt American efforts at achieving
an economic rapprochement between Seoul and Tokyo.
While South Korean president Rhee has rejected all
previous overtures, he may come to believe that some
advantage can be gained from direct negotiations with
Pyongyang.
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PROGRAM IN TIBET. , . . . . . . Page 10
Chinese Communist control of Tibet has been
assured by a combination of military, political, and
economic pressures which have been brought to bear
on the Tibetan people and government. Peiping's
economic development of Tibet will consolidate Chi-
nesecontroland increase Tibet's importance as a
factor in Peiping's relations with India and the
small Himalayan border states.
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MOTIVATIONS OFD' SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD THE
NON-COMMUNIST WORLD . . n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
While Soviet policymakers have been alert to
exploit the political opportunities presented by
their foreign trade programs, they have shied away
from using economic measures for political purposes
when the costs have been too high. As the Soviet
economy continues to grow, the USSR will become
capable of and probably more disposed toward in-
dulging in this luxury.
ROLE OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY IN SOVIET POLICY MAKING . Page 17
The new Soviet leaders, while displaying a more
flexible and imaginative approach to problems of for-
eign and domestic policy, are apparently as orthodox
in their ideology as Stalin was. Marxist-Leninist
ideology still has an important and in some cases
determining influence on the actions and thinking of
the Soviet policymakers.
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THE SOVIET WORLD
Moscow has apparently come to the aid of two of its
Satellites which have been plagued with increasingly serious
economic difficulties. East Germany and Hungary are reported
to have been granted special assistance by the USSR in the
form of loans of approximately $161,000,000 and $27,000,000
respectively.
The East German credit may be drawn on in any desired
currency and will probably be used for the purchase of
industrial goods, machinery and--of particular importance--
consumers' goods. The loan appears to be unusually large, in
view of a 1953 Soviet loan to East Germany of $121,250,000,
including $34,750,000 in free currency. The unique "show-
window" position of East Germany vis-a-vis West Germany may
have caused the Soviet Union to give it special consideration.
Hungary's credit is reported to be in the form of vanadium,
chrome, cobalt, and consumers' goods.
Persons apparently implicated in Satellite purges of
several years ago continue to be released from prison as
part of the campaign to build up confidence in and support
for new course policies in the Orbit. The Czechoslovak
regime has released three minor figures involved in the
Slansky trial, including Vilem Novy, the former editor of
the Communist Party daily Rude Pravo. Novy was expelled
from the party in 1950 and, a tfo ugh not publicly tried, was
named as an accomplice during. the Slansky trial. The Poles
are reported to have released General Waclaw Komar, former
quartermaster general of the armed forces. At the time of
his arrest he was charged with maintaining foreign espionage
contacts and contacts with national deviationists including
General Spychalski, former minister of reconstruction.
Spychalski, named with Gomulka as a national deviationist,
is reported due to be released soon,
the Polish government is considering amelioration of the
conditions of confinement of Cardinal Wyszynski, primate
of Poland, who was arrested over a year ago.
Agreements for scientific and technical co-operation
are currently in force between virtually all the European
Satellites on the one hand and China and North Korea on the
other. Such co-operation programs are executed under the
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general supervision of the Orbit's Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance, with which China and North Korea have close
connections. It is not clear, whether these countries are
full members of the council, as the USSR and European Satel-
lites are, although they are undoubtedly represented at meet-
ings.
There have been several indications recently that the
Orbit plans a.gradual and extensive expansion of its activ-
ities in Southeast Asia. Economic assistance and trade are
expected to play the principal parts in this program, but
propaganda apparently is receiving additional emphasis also.
The Soviet embassy in Rangoon is said to be planning to
intensify its propaganda efforts in Burma through large-scale
daily distribution of current Soviet and world news to the
local press. The plan envisages a news service of suffi-
cient scope to compete with the American and British infor-
mation services. The Soviet embassy has recently stepped
up the distribution of low-priced books and pamphlets in
Burmese, and has. established distributing agencies in ten
widely separated Burmese urban centers.
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THE RATIFICATION DIFFICULTIES OF THE SAAR AGREEMENT
Fundamental French-German differences on the Saar,
deliberately glossed over in the text of the agreement
reached in Paris on 23 October, are now coming to the surface
as press and parliamentary. discussions force clarification of
ambiguous terms. As a result, the two governments have al-
ready been obliged to take more extreme positions than either
had originally intended. Both premiers seem confident, how-
ever, that the realization in France and Germany of the conse-
quences of rejecting the Paris accords "package" will carry
the Saar agreement through.
French opinion initially saw the Saar settlement as a
diplomatic victory which made the rest of the Paris accords--
i.e., German rearmament---more palatable. In late November,
however, a Gaullist spokesman surprisingly reversed this
argument. While he contended that the Saar settlement had
many serious defects, including the lack of international
guarantees, he nevertheless recommended acceptance in order
not to jeopardize the Paris accords as a whole.
The two premiers agreed in October that they might have
to interpret the Saar text in different ways to their re-
spective parliaments., but that each would try to avoid harm-
ing the other's case. Adenauer met such strong opposition
from some of his minor coalition partners, however, that he
postponed the Bundestag debate on the Paris accords from
November to mid-December and attached to the text of the Saar
agreement a preamble emphasizing that the settlement would be
provisional pending conclusion of a peace treaty and that the
Saar would remain legally German.
The French government felt it necessary to protest pub-
licly against this statement and to redraft its own "brief"
covering the Saar text in a more polemical" vein. Mean-
while, the assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee successfully
demanded postponement of assembly debate on the Paris accords
from 14 to 20 December, largely because of the government's
delay in submitting the texts, particularly that on the Saar.
Despite initial success. of negotiations on
implementation of the agreement in which the French made
important secret procedural concessions to help Adenauer,
the German negotiator now reports a definite stiffening of
the French attitude, and both Sides are backing away from
further negotiations.
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The German preamble would assure easy passage of the
Saar agreement in the Bundestag, and Adenauer could probably
secure approval of the text even without the preamble, though
with a considerably smaller majority. The French may ease
Adenauer's position somewhat if they refrain from demanding
Anglo-American guarantees of the settlement. At present the
French doubt they could obtain guarantees that Britain and
the United States would support the settlement at any German
peace treaty talks. Indeed, according to a Foreign Ministry
spokesman, the French may even decide not to ask the Germans
to join in requesting the Anglo-American guarantees of the
settlement for the period prior to peace talks, as provided
in the agreement. General de Gaulle's suggestion in his
speech of 4 December that Anglo-Saxon guarantees have little
value could be of assistance on this point.
Geriiaan concern over the French difficulties is also
evident in Bonn's suggestion that the United States and
Britain try to moderate the opposition of French groups
still angry at Mendes-France because of his handling of EDC.
Mendes-France may use one of several parliamentary devices
to emphasize that France is bound only by the basic text
on the Saar and not by the unacceptable German preamble. He
assured Ambassador Dillon on 2 December, however, that
despite these difficulties he still expects slightly more
than an absolute majority vote for all the Paris accords
including the Saar agreement.
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NORTH KOREA CONDUCTING INTENSIVE NEW UNIFICATION CAMPAIGN
The North Korean regime has waged an intensive propaganda
drive since late October for new negotiations aimed at bringing
about Korea's unification. Pyongyang apparently hopes to con-
vince the world that it sincerely desires unification, to estab-
lish a new basis for subverting the Seoul government, and to
blunt American efforts at achieving a South Korean--Japanese
rapprochement.
Foreign Minister Nam Il touched off the current drive in his
report on 28 October to the Supreme People's Assembly on the
Geneva conference. He called for meetings between North and
South Korean assemblymen and civic officials, suggested immediate
cultural and economic exchanges, demanded the withdrawal of the
remaining American troops in the south, and urged early estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations between Pyongyang and Seoul.
He also enlarged on previous tentative offers to trade North
Korean industrial products for South Korean agricultural produce.
The assembly adopted Nam's proposals and called on the south
to participate in a joint conference on unification at Pyongyang
or Seoul "during 1955.1' It suggested that a preliminary meeting
to initiate economic exchanges be held at Panmunjom or Kaesong
next February and that "political parties, social organizations
and patriotic personalities in all walks of life" be guaranteed
freedom of activity throughout Korea.
The North Korean Home Ministry on 17 November guaranteed
safe conduct to any South Koreans who might travel north to
establish economic and cultural exchanges. Subsequently Pyong-
yang asked the Military Armistice Commission to permit persons
under the military control of both the Communist and UN Commands
to cross the demilitarized zone for "nonmilitary purposes" and
invited Seoul officials to a conference on 17 December to dis-
cuss the exchange of mail and the reopening of other communica-
tions.
Pyongyang's substantive proposals on unification, calling
for a joint commission representing the North and South Korean
legislatures to arrange elections for an all-Korean assembly,
differ little from those made prior to the hostilities in 1950
and from those rejected by the UN at Geneva. This is the first
occasion, however, that the time and place for a meeting have
been spelled out. Pyongyang apparently envisages a conference
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like that at Pyongyang in 1948--which attracted some prominent
South Korean leaders--with discussions on economic and cultural
interchanges leading to broader meetings.
Pyongyang's campaign, timed to follow up the October Sino-
Soviet declaration on Korea, was apparently designed primarily
to convince the neutralist nations at the UN General Assembly
that the Communists are taking concrete steps to achieve
unification. Although Soviet delegate Malik was less explicit
than Nam, merely calling on the "interested states" to convene
a Korean conference "at an early date," he in effect seconded
Pyongyang's appeal by saying that the UN should not "stand in
the way" if a peaceful settlement could be reached by direct
north-south talks.
The inauguration of Pyongyang's campaign at the height of
American-South Korean differences over aid programs suggests
North Korea is hoping that continued tensions between Washington
and Seoul will drive the latter into eventual economic accords
with the north. The campaign also may be designed to support
Seoul's current opposition to American attempts to build up
Japan as a complementary economic area to South Korea. By
offering favorable trade terms, North Korea may be seeking to
appear a better trading partner than Japan. Actually North
Korea would be unable to deliver most of the commodities it
so extravagantly offers in its propaganda.
Pyongyang's proposal to the Military Armistice Commission
is an attempt to pervert that organization, a strictly military
body, into a commission empowered to deal with political matters
not properly within its competence. The plea for freedom of
political activity reflects Pyongyang's desire to gain legal
status for its agents to rebuild the remnant Labor (Communist)
Party in the south as a step toward subverting the Rhee govern-
ment after failing to do so by clandestine means.
While President Rhee has rejected all past overtures from
North Korea, he has frequently threatened in talks with American
officials to negotiate with the Communists, arguing that
unification under Communism would be preferable to Korea's
indefinite division. Since he is now convinced that Washington
is wedded to coexistence and unwilling to resume the war, he
may come to believe that some gains can be made by responding
to Pyongyang's appeals for joint negotiations.
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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PROGRAM IN TIBET
Chinese Communist control of Tibet has been assured
by a combination of military, political, and economic
pressures which have been brought to bear on the Tibetan
people and government. Peiping's economic development of
Tibet will consolidate Chinese control and increase Tibet's
importance as a factor in Feiping's relations with India and
the small Himalayan border states (see map p. 13).
"Liberation" Agreement
Chinese control of Tibet was formally established in
May 1951 with the signing of an agreement proclaiming the
"peaceful liberation" of the country. The agreement was the
result of a complex campaign of threats, cajolery and deceit
that followed the defeat of the main Tibetan military force
at Chan.gtu (Chamdo) in Sikang Province in October 1950.
Terms of the agreement provided that the Tibetan people
would have the right to exercise regional autonomy under the
"leadership" of the Chinese Communist government; Peiping
would have exclusive control of Tibet's external affairs;
political and religious institutions would not be altered;
and Tibetan troops would be integrated into the Chinese
Communist army. In addition, China undertook to develop
education in accordance with local conditions in Tibet and to
raise the living standard by developing the economy.
Techniques of Control
The agreement further provided that Tibet was to be
governed by a military and administrative committee with
Chinese and Tibetan members, but this measure has never been
put into effect. The traditional Tibetan civil administration,
which has not been materially altered in form, remains the
nominal government of Tibet. Tibet is controlled, however,
by a military occupation staff with the aid of the Tibet Work
Committee, an agency of the Chinese Communist Party closely
associated with the military.
Various methods are used to assure Tibetan compliance
with Chinese Communist desires. The operations of the
Tibetan government at Lhasa are supervised by a representa-
tive of Peiping who also controls Tibet's external affairs.
Local Tibetan officials work under the watchful eyes of
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Chinese Communist military commanders in their districts.
In addition, some minor changes have been made in the Tibetan
administration to bring about greater centralization and con-
trol by Lhasa.
Communist propaganda is attempting to make Chinese con-
trol palatable to the people of Tibet and to weaken their
traditional loyalties to the monks and nobility. To carry
their propaganda to the people, the Chinese have established
newspapers and formed Tibetan counterparts of China's "people's
organizations" for youth, women and other specialized groups.
Schools have been set up in Tibet and considerable numbers of
young Tibetans have been sent to Peiping. and elsewhere in
China to study.
Mao Tse-tung's regime has made astute use of internal
political tensions in Tibet to eliminate unfriendly officials.
On the topmost level the Dalai Lama remains the nominal head
of the government in spite of his open opposition to the
Chinese prior to their occupation of Tibet. Peiping's propa-
ganda, however, has emphasized the role of the Panchen Lama,
chief contender for the Dalai Lama's authority, who allied
himself with the Chinese Communists in 1949. Both lamas
are now in Peiping, where they were brought in August 1954
as delegates to the first session of Communist China's
National People's Congress.,
The Chinese army's monopoly of Tibet's scant transporta-
tion and communications facilities enables it to dominate
trade, banking, and finance in the region and further con-
solidate Chinese control.
Airfield and Road Construction
There are no known airfields in Tibet. There have been
numerous reports since 1551 of Chinese airfield construction
at Lhasa, Lake Manasarowar, Gartok and other points, but
these have not been confirmed.
The Chinese are currently engaged in an ambitious road-
building program, in which Soviet technicians are assisting,
to link Tibet with China proper. The official New China
News Agency has announced the completion of a road through
Sikang Province to Lhasa. A broadcast on 16 November stated
that a truck convoy had. arrived at the town of Heiho, 190
miles north of Lhasa, by way of a new highway through Tsinghai
.rrrovince. This road was described on 27 November as having
reached a point 50 miles from Lhasa. The roads are each
about 1,300 miles long and traverse extremely mountainous
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terrain. Their primary purpose is probably to facilitate
supply of Chinese Communist military forces in Tibet, but
they will also contribute greatly to the economic develop-
ment of the area.
In addition to these roads leading into Tibet, reports
from India indicate that the Chinese also have plans for a
highway from Lhasa to Gartok in western Tibet and another
from Gyantse to Yatung.which would provide a motor route from
Lhasa to the Indian border.
Development of this road system will enable the Chinese
Communists to maintain larger garrisons and will facilitate
the penetration of border areas to the south and west.
Communist China's threat to the northern borders of India
will thus be increased.
Future Chinese Plans
A further increase in the number of Chinese and in their
influence in Tibet is expected after the new roads are opened
to traffic. Radio Peiping has claimed that the Chinese develop-
ment program in Tibet will make it possible for the country to
support a population of more than 10,000,000. A recently
released official Chinese estimate placed the present popula-
tion at just under 1,300,000.
According to Peiping's propaganda, the economic develop-
ment of Tibet will include the bringing under cultivation of
vast areas of virgin land, the construction of hydroelectric
plants on Tibetan rivers, and the development of mineral
resources. Among these resources are borax, one of Tibet's
few exports, and possibly gold.
Low agricultural yields due to Tibet's high altitudes,
and the high cost of transport between Tibet and China proper,
will make economic development expensive. Peiping has
committed itself to an ambitious program, however, and may be
expected to attempt to carry it out.
In spite of the Chinese Communists' protestations that
they intend to respect the traditional Tibetan way of life,
there have been persistent reports of uprisings against their
rule. In some instances, unrest apparently has been due to
such unpopular measures as forcing monks to work on construc-
tion projects and restricting the supply of food to monas-
teries. With the Chinese Communists in firm control of
military forces and communication, transportation, and propa-
ganda facilities, however, it seems clear that the Tibetans
can offer no effective resistance to Communist rule.
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m
Kibmeuers
80
,Ching
POLITICAL DIVISIONS AND TRANSPORT ROUTES OF TIBET
-' _? INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
-- -- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
(undefined or in diepnte)
PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY
'Charkhhk
(Erh-th':ang)
TRAILS AND ROADS (selected)
MOTOR HIGHWAYS BUILT SINCE 1250
HIGHWAYS PLANNED OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION
RAILROAD (5eleeted)
The ioternationaI boundaries Shown on this map do not necessary mrmspond in all cams to the boondanos n nixed h0 he U. S. Gooernment
.9
Scale 1:8,000,000
50 100
Miles
0 50 100 200
Tu-Ian ""
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MOTIVATIONS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY
TOWARD THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD*
Soviet economic policy toward the "capitalist" states has
traditionally been motivated by a. hybrid mixture of economic
and political considerations. By and large, however, one
paramount fact has dominated the foreign economic policy of
the USSR--the need to import to make good deficiencies in the
bloc economies. At the same time, Soviet policymakers have
been alert to exploit the political opportunities presented
by their own foreign trade programs. They have shied away,
however, from using economic measures for political purposes
when the economic costs have been too high. As the Soviet
economy continues to grow, the USSR will become more capable
of and probably more disposed toward indulging in this practice
when high political rewards can be gained with little strain
on tx:.e Soviet economy. The Soviet policyanakers may consider
that this situation prevails in the underdeveloped economies
of non-Communist Asia and the Middle East.
To date, Soviet foreign economic policy, despite the
conciliatory gestures of the post-Stalin regime, has been
dominated by the USSR's internal economic needs. This is
clearly reflected in the modifications of the Soviet trade
pattern in the past year and a. half. Heavily committed to
giving the domestic consumer a better break, the government
has diverted a significant share of its most marketable agri-
cultural exports to the domestic market and has imported a
heavier volume of consumers' goods from the non-Communist
world. As a result, the USSR has been obliged to increase its
exports of semistrategic goods--manganese, chrome, petroleum.
These developments have resulted from revisions decided
upon by the Soviet government in the scale of priorities for
the internal Soviet economy, It is unlikely that the pros-
pects of international political gains carried decisive weight
in the Soviet councils which decided on revision of the foreign
trade program,
The USSR's attempts to make political capital out of this
situation have taken several forms. The most significant is
the propaganda claim that the new Soviet interest in Western
consumers' goods demonstrates the peace-loving intent of the
USSR and the sincerity of the Soviet claim that unrestricted
East-West trade would ease international tensions,
_._.___._ cacurred in by the Gffice of Research and Reports,
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This theme, supplemented by the bait offered to West
European businessmen in the form of large Soviet orders,
has served to stimulate appreciable political pressures
within Western Europe for relaxing COCOM regulations. In
turning economic measures to political effect in this
fashion, however, the USSR is promoting an.important eco-
nomic interest of its own removal of the remaining political
barriers to Soviet purchase of goods.required for the USSR's
internal economy.
While the general outlines of the Soviet, foreign trade
program are established by internal bloc economic consider-
ations, there is still some latitude for political oppor-
tunism in individual commercial transactions. The USSR can
afford, for example, to express its political pique at
Australia over the Petrov case by suspending wool procurement
when wool is plentiful elsewhere in world markets. Similarly,
the USSR can protest the Danish refusal to supply tankers by
walking out on trade agreement negotiations, when it is pre-
pared to continue some purchases from Denmark without a formal
trade agreement. Nor would Soviet traders be reluctant to
stir up a political disturbance by bidding for American-owned
surplus stocks when they are seriously in-the market for im-
ported butter.
The mixture of politics, with commerce in cases such as
these has one significant feature: the USSR suffers no eco-
nomic disadvantage. When economic costs are of some magnitude,
as would be the case if a program of "benevolent buying" from
favored firms or from depressed industries in the West were
called for, the USSR would not be likely to accept severe eco-
nomic losses for potential political gains.
In the coming years the growth of the industrial sector
of the Soviet economy may well accommodate a limited program
of politically motivated foreign economic maneuvers. In its
present stage of development, the Soviet economy can spare
moderate quantities of industrial goods for export with much
less strain than it can provide its traditional agricultural
exports to the West. Aware that the underdeveloped areas of
non-Communist Asia and the Middle East and Latin America
provide a fertile ground for political penetration, the USSR
may be prepared to accept the limited drain on its economic
resources which a modest program of assistance to these coun-
tries would entail.
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The over-all magnitude of such a program would probably
not be great. But the two conditions necessary for politi-
cally inspired Soviet economic moves would be present: the
prospects for substantial political gains would be bright
and the economic cost to the USSR would be slight.
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ROLE OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY IN SOVIET POLICY MAKING
The new Soviet leaders, while displaying a more flexible
and imaginative approach to. problems of foreign and domestic
policy, are apparently as orthodox in their iaeology as
Stalin was. Marxist-Leninist ideology still has an important
and in some cases determining influence on the actions and
.thinking of the Soviet policymakers.
Ideology receives the same propaganda play it did under
Stalin; there has been no reduction in the Marxist-Leninist
orientation of Soviet society; and now life has even been
infused into the pursuit of some ideological goals, such as
the elimination of religious belief. On the other hand, the
new regime is making a greater effort to reduce the dele-
terious effects of ideologically inspired policies. Where
ideological goals conflict with major practical considera-
tions, the new regime--like Stalin's--ignores the Marxist-
Leninist teachings or explains them away.
Soviet thinkers have never maintained that Marxism-
Leninism provides specific solutions for concrete situations,
but have said rather that it furnishes a way of thinking and
a guide in assessing the significance of specific develop-
ments. While the ideology outlines general goals, the need
for the utmost flexibility in the actual attainment of them
has always been emphasized.
The current Soviet antireligious campaign shows that
Marxist-Leninist doctrine does color the Kremlin's estimate
of a situation, however. The campaign's deleterious effects
on the regime's program of building popular support can only
be justified by the Marxist-Leninist teaching that religion
in any form is anathema to a Communist society and must be
completely, if gradually, rooted out of men's minds, for
religion now presents no serious threat to the regime.
The recent changes in rural administration demonstrate
how ideology influences the methods the Kremlin uses to solve
its practical problems. The changes are primarily designed
to increase agricultural production, but they are oriented
to such unpalatable Communist goals as transforming the
peasant into a wage-laborer and reducing his attachment to
his private plot.
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Marxist-Leninist doctrine also influences policy indi-
rectly by coloring the reports on which policymakers base
their decisions.
F
There has, been some evidence of the direct influence
of Marxist-Leninist dogma on the top leaders. In an inter-
view with New York lawyer Marshall MacDuffie, Khrushchev, who
is more free with his opinions than other Soviet leaders,
stated, apparently seriously, that all the American statements
on the aggressiveness of the USSR were made on order from the
capitalists to justify a profitable rearmament program. He
said that the reason that Democrats as well as Republicans
support present American foreign policy is that "behind all
these people are the magnates of capital who are interested
only in profits."
The heritage of past policies toward ideology limits
the regime's freedom of operation. The new leaders inherited
a political system, whose official doctrine and justification
were based on Marxism-Leninism; a people which had been forced
to make terrific sacrifices in the name of that ideology; and
a bureaucracy which had been taught to think in those terms
and operate under that banner. The allegiance of many of the
USSR's foreign supporters springs, at least in part, from
their adherence to the teachings of Marx and Lenin. This
ideological legacy puts practical limits on the leaders'
choice of policies and makes it virtually imperative for them
publicly to express and explain their plans in Marxist terms.
Some of the difficulties of the "new course" in Hungary, for,
example, apparently sprang from conflict between "doctrinaires"
and "moderates" within the Hungarian party over the slowdown
in progress toward Communist goals involved in even this shift
in tactics.
There has, in fact, been no discernible reduction in the
amount of Soviet propaganda and educational effort devoted to
explanations of Marxism-Leninism and its vital role in Soviet
life. With the deflation of the Stalin myth, the ideology,
in its guise as the inspiration of the party, has been given
credit for some policies previously ascribed to Stalin's per-
sonal genius, and the new leaders are attempting to revitalize
the ideology, so long stultified by the dead hand of Stalinism.
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Marxism-Leninism is still described as the party's
"guide to action," an "all-conquering teaching" which "arms
the party with knowledge of the laws of social development
and gives the party and people invincible strength and
ability to blaze new trails in history." Soviet citizens,
especially party members, are urged to study it carefully.
Its importance as a bond which unites all Communists and
provides an infallible guide to sound policies has been
especially emphasized by the propaganda issued in times of
strain or crisis, such as Ileria's purge and Stalin's death.
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