CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000400050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 12, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI NO. 1745
12 November 1954
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL
DOCUMENT NO.
N4 CHANGE IN CLASS. U
CLASS. CHANGED TO: Is
State Dept. review completed NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUTHk _14R 70,1
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared prima-
rily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It does not represent a complete coverage of all current
situations. Comments and conclusions represent the im-
mediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
THE SOVIET WORLD o o o e o 0 0,, Page 4
The October Revolution--Communist divisive
tact ics --East-Wes trt.rade ,
PROSPECTS FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
OPENING 22 NOVEMBER o o a, o. 0 0 0 a, a o, o, Page
At the inter-American economic conference opening
in Rio de Janeiro on 22 November, almost every Latin
American government seems likely to support at least
one resolution opposed by the United States. The
most troublesome proposals will be those for setting
up new lending agencies and organizations to stabilize
raw material prices.
THE MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD--OPPONENT OF THE NASR REGIME o Page 8
With the attempt on the Egyptian premier?s life
on 26 October, the extremist Moslem Brotherhood and
the Nasr regime apparently moved from a period of
armed truce into an open contest of strength. The
arrest on 30 October of Hassan Hudaibi, leader of the
Brotherhood, on charges of plotting to overthrow the
army regime by a series of assassinations suggests
that the Revolutionary Command Council has now de-
cided to force a showdown with its most dangerous
opponent
EMERGENCE OF VIET MINH REGIME POSES SPECIAL PROBLEMS
FOR COMMUNIST ORBIT , o o d o 0 o u o a o 0 0 0 0 o Page 10
The circumstances surrounding the rise to power
of the Viet Minh, plus its geographical separation
from the Soviet Union by China--a junior partner
rather than a Satellite--present a unique situation
for the Kremlin. The Viet Minh, the USSR, and
Communist China, however,, have apparently been able
to resolve their problems harmoniously and are ex-
pected to continue to do so.
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ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF NORTH VIETNAM TO THE SOVIET
BLOC . . a . o . . . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The partitioning of Vietnam has placed under
Viet Minh control most of the coal and other mineral
resources of that country, and most of its limited
industry. Among the Soviet bloc states, Communist
China seems likely to be the major beneficiary of
the exploitation of North Vietnam's economy. To
benefit in this way, however, Peiping will require
assistance from the Orbit.
THE NEW ANTIRELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN IN THE USSR AND
SATELLITES a . o 0 0 . a . . . . . . . , . . . . Page 15
The Soviet government has launched its most
extensive antireligious propaganda drive since the
war, and this campaign--modified by local conditions
--has now spread to some of the Satellites. Coming
at a time when the Soviet leaders appear to be making
real efforts to win popular support, it shows that
they view religion as a serious block to the develop-
merit of a Marxist society.
ALGERIA POSES SECURITY PROBLEM FOR FRANCE . . . . . . Page 17
The unexpected, widespread and carefully co-
ordinated terrorism in Algeria on 1 November--the
first major outbreak since 1945--poses a security
problem for France.
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THE SOVIET WORLD
This year's Moscow celebration on the anniversary of the
October Revolution was somewhat more relaxed and less martial
in tone than those of previous years. The speech of Defense
Minister Bulganin, like that of Deputy Premier Saburov, was
less aggressive than the speeches on previous occasions, and
the military portion of the ceremonies was curtailed.
In the European Satellite celebrations, the principal
speakers followed the standard pattern of recent years. In
Hungary, however, the USSR was somewhat less emphasized in
this year's preholiday.build-up., according to the American
legation, and Western diplomats were invited for the first
time to participate in wreath-laying ceremonies at the Soviet
memorial.
Yugoslav treatment of the holiday was marked by rel-
atively cordial overtones, although the general pattern re-
mained the same as that established last year. The press
quoted without comment the section of Saburov's speech on
the recent improvement in relations between Yugoslavia and
the USSR. Unlike 1953, when the press criticized the USSR
and Stalin for corrupting the true aims of socialism, this
year's editorials spoke hopefully of recent efforts toward
decentralization in the USSR as a sign that the Russian
people might at long last begin to enjoy the fruits of rev-
olution...
In announcing on 8 November the transfer to Hungary of
the Soviet share of joint enterprises, Moscow gave a further
demonstration of a policy designed to stress the economic and
political independence of the individual countries of the
Orbit. The return of the various companies will not, however,
weaken Soviet control of the Satellites'economies, which will
continue to be exercised through high-level government ad-
visers and party leaders.
In keeping with the general Communist policy of at-
tempting to split the United States from its major allies,
the Viet Minh has adopted a relatively soft policy toward
the British and French missions in Hanoi, in contrast to
that applied to the American consulate. The chief of the
Hanoi administration told the British consul general on
3 November that the Viet Minh would be pleased to enter into
relations with the British mission. He implied that the
British in Hanoi%would be accorded'a:different status and
treatment from the.Americans.
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The executive secretary of the French minister for the
Associated States reported that the Sainteny mission to
North Vietnam had succeeded in obtaining important economic
guarantees from Ho Chi Minh. Ho's ostensibly conciliatory
statement of 8 November on French-Viet Minh relations
appeared designed to provide grist for those in France who
favor doing business with the Viet Minh and perhaps even
writing off non-Communist Vietnam.
The new Soviet-French trade agreement, which was
signed in Paris on 1 November within the framework of
the three-year pact of July 1953, calls for an increase in
trade. This increase appears feasible-in the light of the
volume of trade between the two countries from July 1953
to July 1954. French deliveries approximated the original
goal, and Soviet deliveries to France were some 85 percent
above it. The new target is for exchanges totaling-about
$154,000,000 during an 18-month period. This is at a rate
60 percent higher than that scheduled for last year.
Preliminary reports on the Sino-Burmese rice agreement
of 3 November indicate that it may.not be fully implemented.
As much as 80 percent of the value of the 150,000 long tons
of rice Peiping has agreed to take must be offset by Burmese
imports of Chinese goods, the natural demand for which is
extremely limited. Rangoon trade sources doubt that suf-
ficient commodities will be imported from China to permit
the export of the entire 150,000 tons.
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PROSPECTS FOR INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC
CONFERENCE OPENING 22 NOVEMBER
At the inter-American economic conference opening in Rio
de Janeiro on 22 November, most Latin American governments
seem likely to support resolutions opposed by the United
States, The most troublesome proposals will be those for
setting up new lending agencies and organizations to stabi-
lize raw material prices. Recommendations along these lines
have already been offered by the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America and by the Secretariat of the Organization of
American States.
The Latin American countries' economic fears and griev-
ances, voiced in more than 25 resolutions passed at the Tenth
Inter-American Conference at Caracas last March, appear
basically unchanged. At Caracas, the Latin Americans were
interested chiefly in solving economic problems which they
said were aggravated by American policies, and they protested
bitterly Washington's overriding emphasis on anti-Communist
measures. Chile's drive to force a special conference on
economic problems won unanimous support and resulted in the
scheduling of the forthcoming meeting.
Washington's subsequent insistence that inter-American-
economic relations must be based on self-help and on pre-
dominantly private rather than intergovernmental arrangements
apparently reduced, but did not destroy, the Latin Americans'
hope of substantial achievements at Rio de Janeiro. In addi-
tion, Assistant Secretary Holland's tour of Latin America in
September and October and his efforts to lessen fears of
American trade restrictions and dumping in Latin America's
traditional markets may have encouraged a belief that Wash-
ington would offer concrete proposals on these subjects.
A change in attitude has been evident, however, since
Holland's 27 October speech depicted the meeting as part of
a long process of adjustment and not as "an occasion for any
dramatic disclosures of new policies." Comment in Brazil,
Colombia, Venezuela, and Haiti has indicated that "public
opinion" may now demand a more aggressive Latin American
approach.
A Venezuelan official has termed the American position
"unduly negative" and predicted the Latin Americans may
"force through" measures designed to underline their aspira-
tions. A Brazilian Foreign Ministry official has publicly
suggested increased trade with the Orbit to compensate for
the uncertainty of American markets.
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Proposals for one or more kinds of inter-American bank--
opposed by the United States--seem certain. Chile, for
example, is waging a diplomatic campaign to promote a special
bank which apparently would be designed to attract European
capital and to favor increased trade with Europe rather than
the United States. Brazil's chief delegate is reported to
have been forced by coffee exporters to draft a proposal for
a bank to be financed largely from the taxes collected by the
United States on American businesses operating in Latin
America.
Chilean and Colombian proposals for an organization to
stabilize the prices and markets of raw materials--also
opposed by Washington--have aroused widespread interest
and support. The Central American states are expected to
join other coffee-producing countries in sponsoring addi-
tional machinery for steadying the coffee market.
Many governments have registered objections to one or
more of these proposals--particularly those involving new
banks--but have intimated they will feel obliged to support
any measures for the "defense of Latin American interests"
that gain widespread approval. Argentina, for example,
has expressed unusually strong agreement with the American
opposition to. new financial institutions and with Washington's
endorsement of private investment as the primary source of
new capital. Top Argentine officials have admitted, however,
they may have to support any "price parity" proposal intro-
duced by another country. Venezuela and Peru have sketched
out similar positions.
Latin American aggressive tendencies may be modified
by Brazil's and Argentina's apparent preference for bilateral
rather than plenary conference negotiations with the United
States on key problems. Brazilian finance minister Gudin
during his October visit to Washington expressed hope for a
later continuation of two-way talks on trade and exchange
problems. An Argentine official has stated Peron had in-
structed his delegation to seek "direct negotiations" on
agricultural surplus disposals. Peru and Mexico appear to
have similar ideas.
Latin American positions at the forthcoming conference
will certainly reflect the view, found even in the friendly
Cuban papers,; that Washington's "best friends" are last on
the list for aid and loans, as well as the view, expressed
recently by Colombia's President Rojas, that there is a
need for hemisphere economic machinery comparable in im-
portance to existing political and military arrangements.
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With the attempted assassination of Premier Nasr on 26
October, the extremist Moslem Brotherhood and the Egyptian
regime apparently have moved from an armed truce into an
open contest of strength. The fanatical and terrorist
Brotherhood, with an estimated 500,000 members and cells
throughout the Arab world, is capable of seriously harassing
the regime.
The arrest on 30 October of Hassan Hudaibi, head of the
Brotherhood and outspoken critic of Nasr, on the charge of
plotting to overthrow the regime by a series of assassina-
tions of army leaders, suggests that the Revolutionary Com-
mand Council has decided to force a showdown with its most
dangerous opponent.
nce e
assassination attempt, more than 400 arrests have been re-
ported, and the regime has set up a tribunal composed of
three members of the RCC with wide powers over "all Brother-
hood crimes considered treasonable and directed against the
regime." The first trials are expected to start shortly, and
raids on Brotherhood centers and arms caches are under way in
an effort to destroy the organization's power.
The Moslem Brotherhood, founded in 1929 to promote a
strict observance of the tenets of Islam and a return to the
principles of the Koran, has always drawn most of its mem-
bers from among religious fanatics and extreme nationalists.
By 1948, when it was first outlawed for its terrorist activi-
ties, the Brotherhood had become a powerful political move-
ment with an extensive organization throughout Egypt and with
branches in other Arab countries. It continued its activities
clandestinely until officially reinstated in 1951 as a
"cultural society."
The Brotherhood came to the fore in Egyptian politics
immediately following the army coup of July 1952. The mili-
tary regime initially sought its support and either put into
practice or endorsed most of the organization's program, in-
cluding land redistribution, clean.-up of political corruption,
abolition of titles, and other social and economic reforms.
Relations between the regime and the Brotherhood deteriorated
during 1953, however, as the Nasr group in successive steps
moved to assure its absolute authority. In January 1954, the
regime charged the organization with interference in political
affairs, decreed its dissolution, and arrested some of its
leaders.
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As a result of the Nagib-Nasr crisis of March 1954, how-
ever, the regime was forced to release the Brotherhood's lead-
ers and tacitly permitted it to resume its activities. During
the uneasy truce that followed, Hudaibi toured the other Arab
states and is reported to have made arrangements to carry on
the organization's activities from outside Egypt in anticipa-
tion of another crackdown by the regime.
The signature of the Anglo-Egyptian "Agreement on Princi-
ples" in July, covering the British evacuation of the Suez
base, marked the beginning of open attacks on the Nasr regime
by the Brotherhood. The regime retaliated with efforts to dis-
credit Hudaibi and divide the Brotherhood. These efforts
failed, but on 21 October the organization's general assembly
elected a new governing body, less likely to oppose the regime,
and placed Hudaibi "on indefinite leave" as head of the organi-
zation.
If Nasr, capitalizing on his rise in popularity following
the attempt on his life, can break the power of the Moslem
Brotherhood and discredit its activities, the regime will have
removed its only organized opposition and the most serious
threat to its continued rule. However, if the present drive
against the Brotherhood fails to destroy its power and organi-
zation, the regime will face further attacks from its clandes-
tine operations, possibly assisted by its cells in other Arab
states. Elements of the outlawed nationalist Wafd party--the
only other group in Egypt with an extensive organization--may
also be expected to support Brotherhood attacks on the govern-
ment. If this should happen, the regime would face a serious
threat to internal security,
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EMERGENCE OF VIET MINH REGIME POSES
SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR COMMUNIST ORBIT
The circumstances surrounding the rise to power of the
Viet Minh, plus its geographical separation from the Soviet
Union by China--a junior partner rather than a Satellite--
present a unique situation for the Kremlin. The Viet Minh,
the USSR, and Communist China, however, have apparently been
able to resolve their problems harmoniously and are expected
to continue to do so.
The Viet Minh's growth is similar to Communist China's in
that both developed as Communist-controlled "liberation" move-
ments operating from rural bases and relying almost entirely
on their own military manpower, in contrast to North Korea,
where a Communist regime was set up under a Soviet occupation.
Like Communist China, moreover, the Viet Minh has been led by
a long-time communist of outstanding ability. Ho Chi Minh,
indeed, probably enjoys greater prestige as a nationalist and
is more popular among his compatriots than any of the Chinese
Communist leaders. Anti-imperialism played an even more
important part in Vietnam than it did in China, and the Viet
Minh as a result has had a greater popular appeal.
Tonkin's location at the outer periphery of the Orbit
compels Russia to operate largely through Communist China.
Because the Chinese, long the object of Vietnamese hostility,
are the channel for most of the material and technical aid
the Viet Minh receives, Viet Minh, Chinese and Soviet leaders
could be expected to try to avoid the impression that Tonkin
is falling under Chinese suzerainty.
These factors--which could be conducive to development of
a relatively autonomous Communist state in northern Vietnam--
are probably outweighed, however, by others making for ideologi-
cal orthodoxy and the integration of the Viet Minh within the
Orbit. The Viet Minh is led by orthodox Communists who have
exploited Vietnamese nationalism to attain power. Reports of
"Titoist" tendencies appear premature and can be explained in
part as a deliberate effort of certain French officials to
rationalize a policy of working with the Viet Minh.
Actually the Viet Minh has been careful to co-ordinate
its policies closely with the Orbit's. For the most part,
co-ordination is effected by the simple process of monitoring
Soviet propaganda to determine the current line.
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Perhaps the most potent factor behind the solidarity of
the Viet Minh with the Orbit is Ho Chi Minh's dependence on
material aid supplied through China. The prime object of
Viet Minh policy is the conquest of southern Vietnam--for the
present by political means, perhaps eventually by military
means. To achieve this, the Viet Minh must revitalize the
economy of the north, both for the psychological impact such
a program would have on the population and to create a stronger
military base.
No appreciable friction has been observed between the USSR
and Communist China regarding relative influence on the Viet
Minh. Viet Minh propaganda unequivocally endorses the Soviet
Union as the bastion of the world revolution and takes its cue
on larger policy matters--such as the cease-fire agreement--
from Moscow. In the concrete application of policy--for
example, the exchange of diplomatic missions and the organiza-
tion of trade and military aid--the Viet Minh's contacts with
the Chinese Communists have been closer than those with the
USSR. The Viet Minh may well feel that the extension of
Soviet influence would be a desirable counterpoise to the
influence of Communist China.
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ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF NORTH VIETNAM TO THE SOVIET BLOC*
The partitioning of Vietnam has placed under Viet Minh
control must of the coal and other mineral resources of that
country, and most of its limited industry (see map, p. 14).
Among the Soviet bloc states, Communist China will be the
major beneficiary of the exploitation of North Vietnam's economy.
In the development of its economy, however, North Vietnam will
require assistance from the Orbit.
Important to the bloc, and to Communist China in particular,
are the additional supplies of coal and cement that will soon
become available. The estimated reserves of coal in North
Vietnam are 20 billion tons, in large part high-grade anthracite,
about equal in volume to the estimated original reserves of
anthracite coal in Pennsylvania. Production in recent years
has amounted to somewhat less than 1,000,000 tons per year, in
contrast with approximately 2,500,000 tons prior to World War II.
Although it is unlikely that the recent production level
will be exceeded in the next few years, the limited local
market permits substantial exports to be made, thereby provid-
ing an important supplement to the bituminous coal currently
being mined in China, as well as a valuable barter item for
trade with other nations.
The acquisition by the Viet Minh--under the terms of the
Geneva agreements--of the Haiphong cement plant in May 1955
will provide a significant source of supply to Communist China.
This plant, the largest cement producer in Southeast Asia, has
an annual capacity of 400,000 tons.
The rehabilitation of North Vietnam's rail system, most
of which has long been in disuse, has been assigned a high
priority by the Viet Minh, and recent reports indicate that
intensive reconstruction, employing thousands of laborers, is
under way. The important lines from the Red River delta to
the China border--one to Lao Kay, the other to Lang Son--should
be in operable condition by the middle of 1955, assuming
adequate Chinese assistance.
*Based on a study prepared by the Office of Research and
Reports.
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This rehabilitation will be advantageous both strategically
and economically, particularly to Communist China but also to
the Soviet bloc in general. By connecting the Chinese rail
system with that of North Vietnam north of Lang Son, the bloc
will establish through rail service from the USSR via Communist
China to the Southeast Asian Communist frontier. The restora-
tion of the line to Yunnan Province in Southwest China will
provide a means for the further development and exploitation of
the tin and copper resources of that area. The acquisition of
Haiphong will--following restoration of the Yunnan-Indochina
railway--provide Southwest China with an easily accessible deep-
water port for its commercial use.
Any substantial production from North Vietnam's mineral
resources other than coal can be made available to the bloc
only at the cost of considerable investment in mining and
,processing facilities. It is anticipated that any forthcoming
aid will be directed primarily at the exploitation of the
area's coal, tin and zinc deposits. Manganese, tungsten, and
chrome, although present in North Vietnam, are less important
owing to the bloc's sufficiency in these raw materials. Re-
construction of North Vietnam's rail system will be accomplished
almost entirely with Chinese Communist or bloc material and
technical personnel. Similar assistance will be necessary to
maintain and improve the port of Haiphong.
North Vietnam is normally a rice-deficit area, and reports
suggest that this year's famine conditions--with rice production
down 25 percent or 600,000 tons from 1953--may be the worst in
almost ten years. In the past, Communist China has provided
large quantities of rice via overland supply routes, and that
country is expected to supply the minimum quantities necessary
to maintain the Viet Minh regime's stability.
Long-term improvements in agriculture, notably through
the development of considerable phosphate deposits and the
expansion of the phosphate fertilizer plant in Haiphong, are
expected to increase indigenous food production, but not to
the point of self-sufficiency. The food deficit in the north
provides a strong economic incentive for the Viet Minh
campaign to obtain control of the south, where a large sur-
plus is available.
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 INQ kkj Op IiW r 6~lA t~7?~ 6bpII~; 1954
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Circled symbols represent mines
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Antimony
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Chromium
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Copper
W
Tungsten
Fe
Iron
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Anthracite coal - exploited
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C Lignite- exploited
7 Petroleum field-unexploited
Rice
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PROCESSING CENTERS
A Rice milling B Textile
^ Sugar milling S Glass
? Fish processing ^ (bottle)
Iron processing ? Coke
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Portions of
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Nha Trang
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International boundary
National capital
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THE NEW ANTIRELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN IN THE USSR AND SATELLITES
The Soviet government has launched its most extensive
antireligious propaganda drive since the war and this cam-
paign, modified to suit local conditions, has now spread to
some of the Satellites. This renewal of emphasis on the
traditional Marxist attitude toward religion cannot help but
alienate the more religious segments of the population from
the Malenkov regime. Coming at a time when the Soviet leaders
appear to be making real efforts to win popular support, it
shows that they view religion as a serious block to the
development of a Marxist society. At the same time, the
limitations which have been imposed on the attack illustrate
the regime's desire to present the campaign from interfering
with the Kremlin's current attempts to attract popular
support.
During the past six months, the portion of Soviet prop-
aganda output devoted to antireligious themes has been greater
than at any time since 1941. On 24 July, Pravda printed its
first editorial on this subject in ten years, and, on a
typical day in September, 50 percent of the broadcasts in the
Russian Republic and 75 percent of those in the Ukraine dealt
with antireligious themes. Teachers are now told to incor-
porate "scientific-atheistic" propaganda in their instruction,
and antireligious articles have become a regular feature of
Moscow and provincial newspapers. Although the intensity of
the campaign has diminished slightly in the past month,
"scientific-atheistic" material still occupies a major place
in Soviet internal propaganda output, and it apparently will
be a continuing feature.
The campaign against religion is largely confined to the
propaganda field. There has apparently been no increase in
coercive measures against the church, and even propagandists
have been told to stay within definite limits. They are
warned to use an educational, "sensitive" approach, and to
avoid "injuring the feelings" of believers.
In the Satellites, where the population has not been
exposed to Marxist indoctrination for as long a period as has
that of the USSR, the campaign is even more cautious. Only in
Poland, where a strong tradition of Roman Catholicism facil-
itates extraorbital allegiances, have administrative measures
recently been taken against the church. Yet even here, as in
Czechoslovakia, party members who hold religious beliefs are
to be first subjected to a long-range. educational campaign
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rather than disciplinary action. In the event of the .failure
of this policy, certain members may be expelled, but the real
reason for the expulsion is not to be stated publicly.
The renewal of the campaign against the church does not
appear to have been caused by any new or imminent religious
threat to the state or to the socialist system, even though
there has apparently been a slight increase in religious
activity since Stalin's death. The churches all echo the
party line in their official statements and are under the
tightest overnmen al con ro
25X1
The regime 25X1
even continues to make use of churches an
in appealing to foreigners.
religious themes
25X1
. The current campaign, moreover, conflicts with the new
leaders' program for reducing tensions and building popular
support for the regime, and it hampers their efforts to win
friends abroad. The leaders apparently recognize these dele-
terious effects and are attempting to minimize them by limit-
ing the types of propaganda used and avoiding any action
against the church hierarchy,
The regime's reason for launching this campaign despite
its drawbacks appears to be a conviction that the accommoda-
tion arrived at with the church by Stalin in 1943 in order
to strengthen the front against the Axis invaders cannot be
continued indefinitely without jeopardizing the maintenance
and strengthening of the socialist system.
This situation exemplifies one of the dilemmas which
faces a Marxist government in quest of popular support, and
the campaign makes it abundantly clear that the regime is not
prepared to sacrifice the socialist orientation of Soviet life.
12 Nov 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY Page 16
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ALGERIA POSES SECURITY PROBLEM FOR FRANCE
The unexpected, widespread and carefully co-ordinated
terrorism in Algeria on 1 November--the first major outbreak
since 1945--poses an added security problem for France.
French officials in Paris regard the Algerian situation as
extremely serious
The nature of the French police actions suggests that
the French think responsibility for the current terrorism
lies with the extremist Algerian nationalist party--the Move-
ment for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD). The
movement was banned on 6 November and its leaders throughout
France and Algeria have been arrested.
The'MTLD advocates the use of violence to obtain inde-
pendence from France and has been harassed by local French
authorities since 1945. Its fanatical leader, Messali Hadj,
was exiled from Algeria in April 1952, and his party has dis-
sipated most of its effectiveness in internal strife and
rivalries. The carefully co-ordinated action on 1 November
at 30 widely separated points--primarily against police and
communications--suggests greater organization and discipline
than the party had demonstrated previously.
While the outbreak was probably initiated by national-
ists, the past history of the MTLD's intermittent co-operation
with the Algerian Communist Party leaves open the ossib
of Communis anticipation and support. 25X1
French officials are playing heavily on the
eme o ommunist inspiration of the disorders.
The Algerian Communist Party, with an estimated member-
ship of about 15,000, is controlled largely by Europeans. Be-
cause northern Algeria is part of metropolitan France, the
party is legal and has mobility and freedom. It supports Al-
gerian independence and has tried to lure the nationalists in-
to united action. The MTLD--or some of the more vigorous fac-
tions struggling for leadership of the movement--may have ac-
cepted Communist support.
12 Nov 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY Page 17
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 { 1W ,,,,,.. - - ~
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The possibility that the outbreak was a diversionary ma-
neuver of the Tunisian fellagha (quasi-military forces) ap-
pears less likely. Some of the fellagha may have moved into
eastern Algeria under French pressure, but the widespread
nature of the Algerian outbreaks and the organization and prep-
aration they clearly required suggest that the origin and in-
spiration of the disorders were indigenous.
French officials are laying. much of the blame on Radio
Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs" and the Communist "Voice of Na-
tional Independence and Peace" beamed from Budapest. The
French have unsuccessfully protested against the inflammatory
"holy; war" broadcasts from Cairo and some officials are now re-
ported to be considering economic reprisals against Egypt.
Tunisia and Morocco, not Algeria, have been in the fore-
front of the North African movement for self-government and
independence following World War II. Since France has con-
trolled Algeria for over 120 years, French settlers are pro-
portionally more numerous and, having been established for a
longer period of time, have greater influence. Destruction of
tribal rule and local customs has weakened native solidarity
and further hampered the nationalist movement.
Nevertheless, Algerian nationalists have worked assidu-
ously for Arab recognition and support. They have also been
seeking recently--without success--to.have the Algerian ques-
tion inscribed on the UN agenda. The outbreak of terrorism
on 1 November may have been-undertaken to win greater support
from the Arab states and to focus world and UN attention on
Algeria.
The 1 November outbreak emphasizes the latent tensions
in Algeria and indicates that Algerian nationalists have the
capability of challenging French authority. While the French
military forces can and will quell the disorders, the outbreak
may gain North African nationalism increased support in Algeria
and among the Arab states. Algeria's nationalist potential,
if co-ordinated with that of its neighbors, would present
France with a major security problem.
12 Nov 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY Page 18
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