CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000300130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 23, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

~ b[~..I (I I 15
OCI NO. 8261
23 July 1954
,co
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
AU
DATE REVIEWER: 25X1
LWS
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I_i
DECLAS SINED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
ET
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared prima-
rily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It does not represent a complete coverage of all current
situations. Comments and conclusions represent the im-
mediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SUMMARY OF CONTENZ
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. . . Page 4
KIRCHENTAG STIRS WEST GERMAN INTEREST IN EAST GERMANS . Page 8
The Kirchentag, the annual meeting of the German
Evangelical Church held in Leipzig from 8 to 12 July,
was unprecedented both in size and in the degree of
West German interest in Soviet zone Germans which it
apparently stimulated. It may serve to bring increased
pressure on the Adenauer government for more emphasis
on German unity at the expense of co-operation with the
West.
FRENCH MAY BACK SCHEME FOR NEW GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH
VIETNAM .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
With the abandonment of Tonkin, the French may
attempt to maintain a hold in the south by forming a
new government in south Vietnam under Cochinchinese who
in the past have worked closely with them.
REIMPOSITION OF IDEOLOGICAL CONTROLS ILLUSTRATES LIMITS
OF SOVIET "LIBERALISM" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The relaxation of strict control over cultural mat-
ters, one of a series of concessions made to the Soviet
people in the immediate post-Stalin period, has abruptly
ended. The fact that the Soviet leaders have been forced
to reinstitute the dogma of complete ideological con-
formity suggests that the same fate may await other con-
cessions.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF INDIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS . . . . Page 14
During the first six months of 1954, Indian-American
relations have been marked by friction but have not dete-
riorated appreciably. Neither are they expected to improve
materially in the near future.
CURRENT TRENDS IN BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY . . . . . . . Page 16
Constitutional change in the direction of increased
local autonomy has been comparatively rapid in the ma-
jority of Britain's most important overseas dependencies
during the past-18 months. These changes are appropriately
symbolized in the formal announcement by the British govern-
ment on 17 June that its century-old Colonial Service is
being replaced with a new.Oversea Civil Service.
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THE SOVIET WORLD
There were growing indications last week that an Indo-
china settlement will be followed by a co-ordinated Communist
campaign to defeat major American defense objectives in Western
Europe and Southeast Asia. The central theme of this campaign
is expected to stress that peace in Indochina has increased
the prospects for further reducing international tensions and
strengthening peace on the foundation of collective security
systems, excluding effective American participation, in both
Europe and Asia.
In Europe, a new Soviet move to deter French ratification
of the EDC treaty is considered likely, probably in the form
of renewed efforts to win support for Molotov's European
security scheme.
In a move that may indicate other Soviet bids to gain
support for Molotov's European security plan, the USSR at-
tempted to win Finnish support for the scheme as a condition
to signing a five-year trade agreement. The most that was
obtained, however, was a vaguely worded joint communique
stating that "only the collective forces of all states re-
gardless of their social structure can ensure the security
of peoples, since the struggle for peace ana against the
threat of a new world war is in the general interest of all
states." A Soviet or Satellite call for a European confer-
ence to reconsider the Communist formula for security is
anticipated.
On the Asian front, there were also indications that,
following an Indochina settlement, the Communists will make
proposals for an Asian security system designed to block
American efforts to establish a Southeast Asian defense ar-
rangement. As far back as 28 April, Chou En-lai, with
Molotov's endorsement, stated that Asian states should work
out their own security arrangements. Since Chou's visit in
New Delhi and Rangoon, Peiping has suggested that his "five
principles" for peaceful coexistence should be the guide for
relations between Asian states.
Another aspect of the Communist drive to block the cre-
ation of a Southeast Asian defense arrangement was reflected
in the special play made by the Soviet press and leaders for
India's sympathy in connection with the Kremlin's opposition
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to American objectives in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
On 13 July, Mal.enkov received the chairman of the All-India
Peace Council., Dr. Saifuddin Kitchiew,and, on the following
day, Indian major general Sokhey was awarded a Stalin Peace
Prize. Pravda and Izvestia devoted half of their front pages
to this presentation and Pravda published an article by
Sokhey on the peace movement in India.
Moscow's purpose in extending these gestures to Indian
sentiment was clearly indicated by an Izvestia comment that
the Chou-Nehru talks were of special importance in view of
American efforts "behind the back of leading Asian countries"
to organize "an aggressive bloc to suppress the national
liberation movement in Southeast Asia and in particular to
begin open armed intervention in Indochina." The Soviet press
has also stressed the theme of Asian solidarity as a brake on
America's aggressive ambitions in Asia and has hailed the
"new relationship which is being formed between Asian powers."
A Hungarian editorial at this same time stated that "it is no
exaggeration to say that the outlines of a new Asian front
are emerging."
Moscow's latest move to hamper Western military planning
in the Middle East took the form of a statement by the Soviet
ambassador in Cairo to Premier Nasr on 9 July that the USSR
would consider it an unfriendly act if Egypt agreed to pro-
visions whereby Western forces could re-enter the Suez base.
The ambassador implied that this provision would be used by
the West "for aggression against the peace of the world."
Following this dem.arche, the Soviet ambassador reportedly
called on the Egyptian minister of the interior with offers
of Soviet arms and of assistance for the envisioned high-dam
project on the Nile.
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KIRCHENTAG STIRS STRONG WEST GERMAN INTEREST IN EAST GERMANS
The Kirchentag, or annual meeting of the German Evan-
gelican Lutheran Church, held in Leipzig from 8 to 12 July
may prove to have been a more effective stimulant for West
German interest in Soviet zone Germans than all past Communist
unity propaganda. Some 10,000 West German church and lay
leaders met with up to 300,000 East Zone Christians, making
this by far the largest all-German gathering since World War
II.
West German comment has been surprisingly favorable and
enthusiastic for a continuation of such East-West associations.
.A Bundestag deputy of the Social Democratic Party has stated
that the personal contacts with leaders of the East German
government may result in further alleviations in interzonal
travel restrictions and a broader cultural exchange. A
Christian Democratic deputy has suggested that contacts with
East German leaders be maintained by correspondence.
Bundestag president Hermann Ehlers, who was a delegate to
the Kirchentag, stated on his return that the meeting, while
primarily religious, nevertheless had "great political
significance." Never before, he noted, was the inner harmony
of the nation so evident. The numerous press reports of
political discussions between Ehlers and East German
Volkskammer president Dieckmann, however, appear to have been
unfounded.
West German press comment has centered largely on the
surprising discussion between Kirchentag participants and East
German culture minister Becher. The influential Frankfurter
Allgemeine speaks of the "gratifyingly objective and
aggressive'" exchange, and a Munich paper is impressed with
the "admirable candor" of the discussion. The powerful
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, which termed the Becher meeting "unique
in a ommunis -governed country," reported that the Communist
government in Leipzig "manifested a tolerance which would be
unimaginable in West Germany if conditions were reversed."
West German public opinion, influenced by the enthusiasm
of the press and of. many of the 10,000 delegates in their home
parishes, may tend to become more susceptible to future
Communist approaches. The Communists can be expected to take
advantage of the current West German sentiment to foster
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further discussions between East and West Germans and to
encourage more interzonal trade and travel. In these efforts,
the East German regime will attempt to stimulate West
German sentiment favoring neutralism and unification.
While the increased contacts between the two peoples of
Germany have been a specific part of recent Soviet strategy,
they may also bring certain long-range gains for the West.
Such contacts are one of the few ways by which Western ideas
can be transmitted to and kept alive among the East German
people; thus they can help assure the West of the continued
moral support of the East German populace, regardless of any
political changes affecting Germany as a whole.
It is likely that a more immediate result of the Leipzig
Kirchentag will be increasing pressure on the Adenauer govern-
ment to place more emphasis on German unity and less on co-
operation with the West. Evangelical Church leaders had
assured American officials prior to the Kirchentag of the
decline of neutralist sentiment and of the definite wane of
neutralist Martin Niemoeller's influence within the church.
The results of the meeting indicated, however, that the deep
concern of church leaders with the future of the largely
Protestant population of the Soviet zone remains a strong
source of, potential neutralism.
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FRENCII MAY BACI> SCHEME FGi NEW GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
With the abandonment of Tonkin, the French may press
forward on a scheme to form a new government in south Vietnam
under the Cochinchinese who have in the past worked closely
with them. By such means they presumably would hope to con-
tinue the French "presence" in the south and avoid the embar-
rassment of dealing with an irredentist government under
authentic Vietnamese nationalists.
Shortly after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, certain French
officials and Cochinchinese politicians began to show interest
in the revival of a separate Cochinchina government of the sort
which the French authorities had sponsored in 1946. Former
prime minister Tam appears to be the leading advocate and con-
tender for leadership under this plan. On 12 May, four days
after the decisive northern battle, Tam indicated to the
American charge in Saigon that he favored partition of Vietnam
at the 16th parallel and the formation of a Cochinchina republic.
He said that he had been advised by "certain French sources"
to overthrow Bao Dai and assume power, but was not certain
whether "higher French authorities" would countenance such
action. However, on 28 May, Commissioner General Dejean told
the charge that his idea of a good Vietnamese government would
be one in which Bao Dai acted as his own prime minister assisted
by three vice premiers: Tam, Tran Van Huu, and General Nguyen
Van Xuan.
Dejean thus advocated a Cochinchina government in fact, if
not in name. Each of the proposed vice premiers served in the
Cochinchina government of 1946. All of.them.hold French.'citizen-
ship and are regarded by most Vietnamese as willing instruments
of French policy. Xuan holds the rank of general in the French
army.
cipal promoters of such a scherie
Marcel Mingant, a retired French officer and adviser to
earlier Vietnamese governments, is apparently one of the prin-
recently outlined to Am assn or Heath, calls like Dejean's for
a triumvirate consisting of Tam, Xuan, and Huu.
ingan s plan, which he
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Mingant, who was about to depart for France, said he
thought Bao Dal had made a critical error in appointing Diem.
He said that Bao Dai was "washed up," but that he intended to
see him and Guu Loc,.the ex-premier and present high commis-
sioner, in France and that he hoped to return in a relatively
short time "if conditions were favorable."
Vietnamese nationalists are in general violently opposed
to any dismemberment of Vietnam, and their knowledge, or
suspicion, that a separatist plan is in the making has strained
their already embittered relations with the French. The will
to continue resistance to Communism on the part of the
nationalists is certain to be gravely impaired by the abandon-
ment of Tonkin; the further step of creating a new government
in the south dominated by Cochinchinese who are naturalized
French citizens would virtually destroy any prospect of
effective local resistance to Communism.
French officials have expressed some apprehension regard-
ing the apparent irreconcilability of Vietnamese, particularly
Premier Diem and his associates, to the abandonment of Tonkin..
The French fear that Diem's insistence that Hanoi is the
"cradle of the race" and must be held or retaken at all costs
may goad the Viet Minh into breaking a cease-fire agreement.
The creation of a government with its roots in the south
would, from the French standpoint, have the double advantage
of removing excitable and impulsive nationalists from office,
and of giving a new lease on life to the maintenance of the
French "presence" in Cochinchina.
It is also evident that such a development would favor
the long-term interests of the Viet Minh, since it would
tend to shatter purely indigenous resistance to Communism
and force many inflexible non-Communist opponents of French
control into the Viet Minh camp.
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REIMPOSITION OF IDEOLOGICAL CONTROLS ILLUSTRATES
LIMITS OF SOVIET "LIBERALISM"
The relaxation of strict control over cultural matters,
one of a series of concessions made to the Soviet people in
the immediate post-Stalin period, has abruptly ended. It ap-
pears that the party, after offering Soviet writers and com-
posers more creative freedom, realized that this would lead to
works which would reflect adversely on the regime. The fact
that the Soviet leaders have been forced to return to the dogma
of complete ideological conformity, which Zhdanov instituted in
1946 in this field, suggests that the same fate may await other
concessions.
Although efforts had been made since the 19th Party Con-
gress in October 1952 to improve the quality of literary and
artistic works, it was not until Stalin died that the party
indicated the direction in which it was moving. Within six
weeks after the dictator's death, articles by top-flight ar-
tists began calling for greater originality, fewer bureau-
cratic controls, and more freedom from restraints imposed by
the ideological carping of semiofficial critics.
In the fall of 1953 the high point in the attack against
stultifying controls was reached. Three well-known Soviet ar-
tists, Khachaturian, Shostakovich, and Ilya Ehrenburg, devoted
long and bitter articles to the parlous state of the arts. In
each case the target was the petty bureaucrat, the critic par-
roting a sterile "line," the institutional guardianship of the
Union of Soviet Composers and the Union of Soviet Writers.
"No tutelage," cried Khachaturian, "creative problems cannot be
solved by bureaucratic methods." Shostakovich heaped ridicule
on those who would "'guard' composers from following independent,
untrod paths of art. We should fear, not daring creative ori-
ginality, but 'safe' superficiality, dullness, and stereotyped
work." Even Ehrenburg, who has reached his present state of
eminence through servile and abject adherence to the party
line, attacked the Soviet practice of ordering writers to com-
pose a novel or play, of supplying the subject matter and the
tone to be used.
The appearance of such criticism seemed to indicate that the
party leaders, who since the end of the war had kept a tight
rein over cultural production, were experimenting with a new ap-
proach to the problem. They probably had two aims in mind: to
make literature interesting enough so that it could once again
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be an effective tool to support the regime; and to counter disaf-
fection among the intelligentsia. Since 1945 there had been
only a few "safe" subjects--such as the restoration of a collec-
tive farm after Nazi devastation--and the same themes had been
reworked time and again. Because. the method of treating these
subjects became stereotyped, every situation could be foretold
and a deadly pallor of conformity settled over Soviet writing
and composing. Under these conditions, no one would read or be
influenced by what was written, and first-rate writers like
Sholokhov and poets like Pasternak withdrew entirely from liter-
ary activities. The new "liberalism," it was hoped, would
counteract both these tendencies while producing works which
attacked officially approved topics but did not reflect on the
regime.
Soviet writers, perhaps heartened by what appeared to be
a clear removal of the heavy hand of Zhdanovism, hurried to carry
out the party's latest dictum. But the results were apparently
not what the regime had expected and the past few months have
seen a demand for literature "dedicated to rearing the working
class in the spirit of socialism." Thus, the keynote of
Zhdanovism--Communist orthodoxy, fervor, and propaganda--is
again required of the Soviet writer. The party wanted writers
to attack the bureaucrat, the self-seeker, while at the same
time eulogizing the brave new Soviet world, but in-portraying the
negative and bad part of Soviet life the writers apparently
could not avoid casting reflections on the whole. As the cri-
ticism of Ehrenburg's latest book expresses it, the relaxation
has brought forth "works caricaturing our life and libeling it
wholesale."
Soviet leaders have thus been forced to realize that the
realities of Soviet life are such that they preclude even the
small measure of freedom of expression on the part of creative
artists which was permitted in this period, They have therefore
returned to the stringent controls of the Stalin era, and, while
continuing to demand "searching criticism," have re-established
so many qualifications as to make the demand meaningless. In
the same way, the realities of Soviet life impose limits to the
other political and economic concessions made in the first flush
of enthusiasm after Stalin's death, and, if they prove too broad
to be contained within these limits, they may well be discarded
as those in cultural affairs have been.
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CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF INDIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
During the first six months of 1554, Indian-American rela-
tions have been marked by friction but have not deteriorated ap-
preciably. Neither are they expected to improve materially in
the near 'future .
India's objections to American policy have centered on mili-
tary aid to Pakistan, the hydrogen bomb, and Indochina, demon-
strating a continued obsession with the familiar themes of anti-
Pakistanism, world peace, and colonialism.
Rumors in January of the subsequently announced Turkish-
Pakistani friendship agreement and of American military aid to
Pakistan aroused opposition from all quarters of Indian opinion.
This has continued since February, but on a diminishing scale as
more current problems have taken precedence. Reaction has been
almost exclusively verbal. The sole results definitely attrib-
utable to this issue are the increased hesitancy of Indian offi-
cials to provide information to American diplomatic officers and
the increased tendency of both officials and public to shun con-
tact with Americans.
Possibly related anti-American measures taken during 1954
include notice on 14 January of intent to terminate the Indian-
American civil air agreement in 1955, the request in March for
the withdrawal from Kashmir of UN observers of American national-
ity, increased emphasis in propaganda during April and May on
American "intelligence" activities in Nepal, and continued pres-
sure to limit the operations of missionaries and American busi-
nesses. All these measures have their roots in earlier history,
however, and are natural manifestations of Indian nationalism.
None can be attributed solely to the antagonism generated by
American aid to Pakistan.
In April the attention of the Indian government, press, and
public centered on announcements of earlier American hydrogen
bomb experiments in the Pacific Ocean and the harm accidentally
caused to Japanese fishermen by radioactivity. The outcry was
based on moral considerations, renewed impressions that American
activities harm only Asians, and on general fear that such ex-
periments can-only lead to World War III. Indian efforts to
limit further experiments continue in the United Nations.
Later in April and in May, Indian attention shifted to the
issue of colonialism as exemplified in-Indochina and discussed
at the Colombo and Geneva conferences. New Delhi objected to
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Secretary Dulles' plea for a united stand in Southeast Asia
against Chinese aggression. It opposed the concept of a South-
east Asian treaty organization on the grounds that it would con-
stitute a direct threat to China and. that it would involve non-
Asian powers. India also fought the Thai request for a peace
observation committee, probably because it felt the request was
an American-inspired maneuver.
Indian criticism has been that the United States' actions
served only to disrupt the Geneva conference and delay a peaceful
solution in Indochina. New Delhi still feels that the United
States supports the colonial powers, and the Indian press paid
little attention to Secretary Dulles' speech in Seattle on 10
June in which he said that his country would never fight for co-
lonialism and that it would not intervene unilaterally in Indochina.
At the same time, India has displayed realism in certain fac-
ets of its relations with the United States. Despite periodic
statements by persons as important as Prime Minister Nehru that
dependence on foreign economic aid is undesirable, India con-
tinues to count on it in its annual budgets and its Five-Year Plan.
New Delhi still makes military purchases in the United States of
such heavy equipment as tanks, although it has been embarrassed by 25X1
this in connection with its objections to American military aid to
Pakistan.
In addition, there seems to be a growing body of opinion that
Nehru's neutralist foreign policy is not wise and that he handled
the aid-to-Pakistan issue badly. Some of this opinion is found at
the parliamentary and cabinet levels.
These situations indicate New Delhi's basic recognition that
it needs the United States and cannot loosen important ties with
it, especially since doing so would be detrimental to India's
political and economic development. On the other hand, it seems
obvious that issues such as.anti-Pakistanism, world peace, and
colonialism will not be solved in the near future and that the
present points of friction between the United States and India
will continue for some time.
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CURRENT TRENDS IN BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY
Constitutional change in the direction of increased
local autonomy has been comparatively rapid in the majority
of Britain's most important overseas dependencies during the
past 18 months These changes are
appropriately symbolized in the ormal announcement by the
British government on 17 June that its century-old Colonial
Service is being replaced with a new Oversea Civil Service.
The evident aim of this change in title is to encourage.
the continued employment of British administrators by the
-newly autonomous governments of former colonies, and thereby
retain for London at least an indirect tutorial influence.
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The overseas dependencies continue to have an important
influence on Britain's global power position. Economically,
they have since 1950 contributed sizable dollar earnings to
the sterling area, but a continued decline in export earnings
is expected, as are deficits rather than surpluses in many
territories. In a military sense, the colonies presently
represent a liability to Britain. At a time when there is
not one complete division in the United Kingdom, British
troops are dispersed around the world and tied down by the
emergencies in Malaya and Kenya and the unrest in British
Guiana.
Politically, Britain has long assumed public responsibility
for encouraging colonial peoples to take over management of
their own affairs in so far as they are capable. Since World
War II, the attacks on colonialism in the UN, particularly by
India, have given London an added reason for speeding the pro-
cess. The aim.of British colonial policy is to abolish the
distinction between the colonies and the independent members
of the Commonwealth. British officials have stated that Bri-
tain cannot accept any conception of "second-class Commonwealth
membership" for former colonies. In addition to political
maturity, the practical criteria for independence remain those
of economic viability and the capacity to make a contribution
to the defense of the Commonwealth.
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Important changes have occurred during the past year and
a half in 11 of the 12 territories with populations exceeding
one million. Of the total of 35 territories, 11 now have full
adult suffrage. Fifteen have elective majorities in the legis-
lature. In Nigeria--where about 45 percent of the total popu-
lation of Britain's dependent empire lives--a federal consti-
tution has been instituted providing for an elective native
majority in the legislature based on wide suffrage adapted to
local conditions. It is generally agreed that the recent con-
stitutional innovations in the Gold Coast have brought it to
the last stage preceding full Commonwealth membership. Despite
the continuance of emergency conditions, changes have been in-
stituted or planned in both Kenya and Malaya.
Britain's reluctance to proceed more rapidly with consti-
tutional innovation where unstable conditions prevail, how-
ever, was demonstrated by the suspension of the liberal consti-
tution of British Guiana last October because of the subversive
tendencies of the Communist-dominated government chosen in the
.first elections a few months earlier. In British Honduras, pro-
mulgation of a new constitution this spring was accompanied by
a clear warning that irresponsibility on the part of the anti-
British People's United Party would not be tolerated.
A problem arising in other dependencies--in Malaya, for
example, as well, as in various African colonies--is disagree-
ment among different racial groups as to their respective shares
of the increased authority being granted by London. In turning
over political control last year to white settler elements in
the new Central African Federation, therefore, the British gov-
ernment tried. to assuage the native Africans' fears by retaining
final authority--probably until 1960--in matters affecting their
interests in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
In the less developed territories generally, the achieve-
ment of complete self-government will, as Colonial Secretary
Lyttelton said last May, take much longer than "even the most
patient" now believe. He held that immediate steps to insti-
tute "modern" suffrage and to end Colonial Office control would
in several areas result in the "swamping" of European influence.
On balance, however, the colonial territories present a
picture of steady political and constitutional development to-
ward greater autonomy. Despite the heightened risks of in-
stability accompanying the increased pace of change in the
colonies, Britain remains generally committed to the policy of
encouraging colonial peoples to learn the ways of parliamen-
tary democracy.
23 July 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
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