PROPOSED CIA RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION WHICH HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000200060129-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 129
• Publication Date: February 21, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Plans
SUBJECT: Proposed CIA Response to Request for
Information Which I-lave Been. Received
From the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-
committee on Multinational Corporations
1. This memorandum contains action recon:-imendations in para-
graphs 4 and 5.
2. On 12 February 1973, in response to their request for a
meeting, Mr. Maury, CIA Legislative Counsel, contacted Messrs
Jerome Levinson and Jack.Blum, staff members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. This resulted
in Mr. Maury receiving five questions which the staff members wanted
answered. The questions focus on the 1970 elections in. Chile and the
CIA and ITT role in these elections. Mr. Maury took note of the ques-
tions and told the staff members he was not familiar with the substan-
tive issues which were involved in the inquiries. Mr. Maury did
agree, however, to refer the questions to appropriate CIA officials
for study. The staff members are, therefore, expecting a response.
Attachment A, which is for information purposes: only, lists the five
questions and their correct answers.
3. It should be noted that in formulating the para~ra}:)h 4 recon-i-
mendation., special note was taken of the 12 February statement by Mr.
Levinson to Mr. Maury that he felt there were significant discrepancies
between the 5 and 7 February 1973 testimony of Mr. Richard Helms
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 1970 events in
Chile and data which ITT had previously provided to the Subcommittee
on Multinational Corporations. In this context Mr. Levinson made the
point that these contradictions might require the Subcommittee to ask
Mr. Helms to provide additional testimony at a later date, even if this
meant Mr. Helms would have to return to Washington. from Iran. The
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CIA debriefing of Mr. Helms on 12 February did not identify any
deviations in his testimony from the known facts. This debriefing,
however, did not have the benefit of our being able to compare the
transcript of Mr. Helms' testimony with his recollections of the
salient points that were discussed with him by the Senate Committee.
This was due to the fact that to date the staff members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee have refused to release a copy of Mr..
Helens' testimony to either CIA or the Department of State.
4. The recommended CIA response to the staff members' ques-
tions is as follows:
"The testimony of Mr. Helms on 5 and 7 February 1973
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee clearly estab-
lished that CIA neither gave to nor received from ITT funds
for use in Chile in 1970 for the support of political parties.
In addition, Mr. Helms' testimony brought out the fact that
there were no joint action }programs established between CIA
and ITT for implementation in the context of the 1970 political
developments in Chile. CIA regards Mr. Helms' testimony
on this topic to be accurate, thus no further elaboration is
planned. "
5. The Subcommittee staff members will undoubtedly find the
paragraph 4 response less than satisfactory. It is to be anticipated,
therefore, that they will refer the issue inherent in this answer to
the Subcommittee in an attempt to. set in motion action which would be
designed to produce what they would regard as a more forthcoming
reply from CIA. In the interim between forwarding the paragraph 4
answer to the Subcommittee staff members and their reaching agree-
ment with the Subcommittee on how to proceed on the basin of this
answer, it is recommended that CIA take the following actions,
a. The Legislative Counsel be authorized to sound out
Senator Jackson on the prospects of CIA being able to obtain,
either Senator Stennis or Senator Symington's assistance in
arranging for the CIA Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee to consider the problems of how CIA
sources and techniques could be protected before the Agency
proceeds further with the Senate Foreign Relations Subcorn-
mittee on Multinational Corporations. In this connection it
should be noted that Senator Jackson has a proven record of
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supporting CIA and in the past his advice on how CIA might
handle a particular piece of Congressional business has been
sound. In addition, Senator Jackson is discreet and can be
counted on not to comment further on what he learns about CIA
or ITT actions in Chile during 1970. It must be noted, however,
that for the discussion with Senator Jackson to be meaningful
and fox his advice to be sound, CIA would have to give him a
briefing on the nature of CIA's relations with ITT in. 1970 during
the Chilean election period. In short, a risk. would be taken for
sensitive information would be surfaced to a Senator with there
being no guarantee he would be helpful.. This is a risk which is
worth taking, for the net gain from such action favors CIA if the
desired results are obtained.-
b. If Senator Jackson believes that it would be useful for
the Agency to approach Senator Stennis or Senator Symington,
then such an approach should be made. Perhaps Senator Jackson
could'pave the way for such a contact. In the discussion with
either Senator Stennis or Symington, CIA should work toward
the goal of having its testimony on events in Chile during 1970
shifted to the Senate Committee on CIA. Once that objective is
achieved, the DCI could spell out in Executive Session to the
Senate Committee on CIA that the Agency and ITT did not engage
in joint action programs in Chile. The DCI would indicate,
be persuaded to work out with the Senate Foreign . Zelations Sub_
K
Alu W l',; v c;,. , LA I C4, t- v.crl aii.u i. i 1 ulu e c:ilari.ge: views on P0 iitic a i. ana
economic trends in Chile. This in turn, led to possible course
of political and economic action being discussed, but no agree--
m.ent was ever reached on any joint action programs.. Having
received such a briefing as a member of the Senate Committee
on C.I.A., it is believed that Senator Stennis or Symington . could
coxrunittee on Multinational Corporations an arrangement whereby
the DCI could make a controlled presentation before the latter
group. In such an appearance the DCI would want to make the
critical point i. e. , CIA neither received from nor gave to ITT
funds '.for the support of political parties in Chile in 1970. See
Attachment B for a proposed statement that would be used by
the DCI in making a controlled appearance before the Subcom-
mittee on Multinational Corporations.
c. As it is anticipated that even though Senators Stennis or
Symington might arrange for a controlled appearance by the DCI
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before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, it is
possible that at the time of the DCI's appearance, some Senator
might choose to violate the understanding. In such-a case the
DCI would have to fall back on Executive Privilege, and in so
doing would have to avoid answering any questions that would
compromise instructions which the Agency received from the
President, Dr. Kissinger or the 40 Committee. Since it may
be necessary to invoke Executive Privilege, we note that Presi-
dential instructions state that this should be coordinated with
Justice but in this instance the DCI should discuss thiS, line of
strategy with the White House first for basic policy guidance.
6. In considering the paragraph 4 and 5 recommendations, it
should be noted that all of this involves unilateral action by CIA. This
is due to the fact that while it would be desirable to have an agreed--
upon interdepartmental coordination mechanism whereby CIA, the
Department of State and the White House could jointly work out a
governmental strategy for dealing with the various aspects of the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee Hearings on Multinational
Corporations, the simple realities indicate that it has not been pos-
sible to date to establish such an arrangement. CIA has worked with
the Department of State to establish a coordinating group, but this
effort has not been successful, primarily because the Department of
State has not received the guidance it requested from the White house.
In short, the lack of a coordinating mechanism forces. CIA. to respond
to events on an ad hoc basis. In so doing CIA has to keep its options
open so that flexibility can be preserved for as long as possible,
pending resolution of the policy issue of how the hearings will be
handled on an interdepartmental basis.
25X1 C
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8. Attachment C provides an overview of CIA's involvement in
the Chile electoral situation of.1970. This document is forwarded for
information purposes only.
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division
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Attachment:
A - Questions and Answers
B - Proposed. Statement
C - Overview
Deputy Director for Plans
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