AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R003100060008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: PAPER

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AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
(The following thoughts have been provoked by the Reston column in last
Sunday's [15 January] New York Times and other rumblings.)
I. How the Ethiopians, Somalis, Russians, Cubans, US and others got into
this thing.
The Ethiopian revolution that began in February 197'I was not plotted
by anybody in particular, although it had been long heralded. If a finger
of blame needs to be pointed, it could as well be pointed at the US, which
by its various assistance programs and particularly by its association over
a period of years with the Ethiopian military program in effect encouraged
at least three different sets of expectations among the Ethiopian elite:
that if Ethiopians were ever to emulate the kind of effective
government and administration evoked by American example and
exhortation, drastic political change would be required;
-- that while the army, as the group at the cutting edge of
modernization and the group that had a monopoly of force, would
have to lead the way to drastic change, real freedom could come
only from within the civilian elite, which would be called upon
on take over the apply the skills and ideas that its members
had been learning in the US, Western Europe, and the USSR;
-- that the US, which had sustained the Imperial regime for so
many years, which by advice and counsel had assisted the Emperor
to defend himself (and his country) against enemies foreign and
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domestic, would turn out to be at best a drag on radical change
(the view of the so-called moderates, now dead or in exile) and
at worst actively hostile to radical change because of "objective
historical relationships" (the view of the Ethiopian Marxists
and other ideologues).
When the revolution actually came, and it came somewhat gradually
(Haile Selassie ~tr~. ?I e 3 oun Until September 1974), quite a varied assort-
ment of Ethiopian elite, and some not-so-elite, "came to the party." Each
group had its own set of expectations as to what the revolution was about,
and its own set of values and programs to which it gave priority. Not sur-
prisingly, the more militantly ruthless have proceeded to impose their
definition of the meaning and direction of the Ethiopian revolution upon
the other groups. The moderates, as noted above, have vanished at least
for the time being; the radical students and teachers have been"iriven~e thee
underground into the EPRP or uneasily co-opted into the various civil organs
the revolution; the top leadership has narrowed down to a maximum leader,
Mengistu Haile Mariam, part Galla and thus almost a typical outsider turned
insider (Bonaparte the Corsican and Hitler the Grenzmensch are other
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examples of the type), surrounded by a "council" of fellow soldiers who'
yl
in an atmosphere compounded'ip enthusiasm and fear.
The attitudes of the Ethiopian revolutionaries toward the United
States had self-fulfilling prophecy as their central characteristic. They
expected opposition, even counter-plotting, from the US, and their expectations
and suspicions tended to produce, on the American side, attitudes, especially
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at higher levels, that the Ethiopians interpreted as confirming these
expectations. What seemed in Washington to be proper caution, and even a
degree of humility, in dealing with a fluid situation and a changing cast
of characters, was interpreted in Addis Ababa as indifference bordering on
outright bostility. Our refusal, through most of 1976, to agree to supply
or even to answer the Ethiopians' rather curt demands for additional military
equipment to counter, as they claimed, the growing menace from Somalia, put
the headstone on an expiring relationship. And not to the Ethiopians'
surprise, either; our charge got in to see Mengistu only after the essential
deal with the Soviets had been consummated, and I suspect that this gesture
was made at Soviet urging -- after all, there was always a chance of a few
things still in the pipeline ather than because the Ethiopian leader had
any real hope of results.
With this set of attitudes and expectations, the Ethiopians turned to
the "socialist states." The Soviets, far from leaping at this opportunity
to do the US in the eye (or the horn), reacted with considerable (though
hardly commendable) caution. No more than Washington did Moscow want to
associate itself with men who were not there to stay, whose ideological ,,~
credentials were suspect whatever their professions (Sadat too was once afi
,wt socialist), who had not, from the Soviet standpoint, finally broken
their country's ties with the non-communist world and who even at times
showed interest in Moscow's Chinese competitor. Moreover, the Soviets
were well aware that a relationship with Ethiopia could cost them their
facilities in Somalia and the position there on which they had expended
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some fair amount of hardware and psychic investment.
In the end, the attraction was too strong; the provision of relatively
modest quantities of assistance through Eastern Europeans did not promise to
produce the quality of relationship that the situation seemed to require;
the possiblity that the Soviet Union would be perceived to be either half-
hearted or, worse yet, ineffective in coming to the defense of a socialist
revolution was more than the men in the Kremlin could tolerate. The decision
was certainly made easier by Mengistu's demonstrations of toughness, by signs
of unreliability already coming from Siad in Mogadiscio, and by general
shifts in the constellations of Middle Eastern politics. There were, in
short, fewer reasons not to move to help the Ethiopians in the main way they
wanted help in late 1976 -- provision of arms; and there were a number of
reasons, though hardly compelling and probably including Soviet distrust
of new men in Washington, to go ahead with a fairly orthodox military aid
program, the Muscovite house specialty in dealing with the Third World.
The conclusion of the Ethiopian-Soviet arms deal, and more particularly
its magnitude once this became known, pushed the Somalis over the edge. They
began a campaign to secure their rear as best they could by letting it be
known in various ways that their Soviet relationships were unsatisfactory
and that they would welcome new friends, while they began to crank up their
guerrilla assets in the Ogaden and to prepare their own Soviet-modelled
military machine to support the Western Somali Liberation Front's "upris=ing"
against the Ethiopian oppressors. They reasoned that they must strike before
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Soviet arms reached Ethiopia. Two somewhat fortuitous developments made
their decision to attack more attractive: the Djibouti question had been
eased for e~by a switch in French policy that in effect gave pro-
Somali elements the dominant position in the post-independence government
there; and the United States, pursuing a new policy of showing that
progressive socialism" was not a bar to useful relations with Third World
and especially African states, entered negotiations with Siad which
culminated in a statement that the US had agreed, in principle, to provide
Somalia with "defensive" weapons. With some considerable initial success,
the Somalis portrayed this statement as a diplomatic revolution that had
brought them a new, powerful friend and a range of local allies stretching
from the Sudan through Egypt to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and even Pakistan.
The war the Somalis began late in the spring of 1977 was carefully
tailored to their resources. The guerrillas led the atttcks; Somali regular
forces with air support, armor and artillery moved to back up the guerrillas
as this became necessary; and the campaign has been fought in a series of
spasms controlled by the primitive character of the Somalis' logistic
system. Nonetheless, the Somalis appeared as a well-oiled machine in
comparison with an Ethiopian army whose leadership had been decimated and
demoralized by political purges and by years of fruitless counterinsurgency
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efforts in Eritrea. While it was not a lightning wa', by August the Somalis
felt confident enough-to assert that they would have captured Harar and Dire-
dawa, the keys to any hope of an early Ethiopian riposte, within a month or
little more (subseqently by the end of 1977, and though neither city is taken
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yet, Somali prospects are still not quite out of the question).
On the Ethiopian side, Soviet materiel had been arriving in quantity,
by sea, since early spring, but it was clear by the end of summer that supplies
in themselves were not going to keep the Ethiopian army from defeat. Moscow
5,
was faced with the prospect of having backed.a lo'ttr, and at the cost of
sacrificing the Soviet Navy's Berbera facilities in the bargain. Many aspects
of the early Angola period began to have parallels in the Horn, and the
Soviet response was similar: get a high-level military mission there to shape
up the Ethiopians as fast as possible and determine, on the spot, what was
needed; get the Cubans in; and bring the needful by the fastest available
meansy9r'in this case, as in Angola, an airlift. I feel very strongly that
the Soviet motive here has been primarily to eve-ii disaster, even though the
prospect of a longer-term strategic success in Africa was a fundamental
consideration at the outset. I doubt that the idea of "replacing the
US" was a major consideration, although it was surely one of the attractions,
and I am strongly skeptical that the airlift was viewed in Moscow as a banner-
waving "challenge" to the US. These concepts sound more like Washington putting
on its white hat and beginning to believe its own propaganda. Whether the
Horn affair may come to be perceived in this light by Muscovites, Washington-
ians and other is another issue; I argue that it didn't start that way.
Still another issue is the Cuban intervention. It seems to me that by
this time it should be clear to almost everyone that the Castro regime means
what it says and takes very seriously the obligation it feels to come to the
aid of socialist movements and revolutions, especially those in the Third
World, which appear to be threatened. Shifts in Cuban policy in this matter
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are illusory; what one really sees are tactical adjustments to the
"objective" situation, but the policy, which is rooted ultimately in the
sense of "solidarity" that has been part of the socialist ethos since
the early nineteenth century, is constant. Nor are the Cubans "for hire"
by the Soviets. Obviously, Cuban interventions abroad are in a practical
sense dependent on Soviet support, and they cannot be undertaken outside
the Western Hemisphere without Soviet agreement, inspiration, and the closest
collaboration. But the Cubans are there because Castro and his leadership
want them there, not because the Soviets have told them they have to be there.
Thus, the Cuban presence in Ethiopia is indeed one of Havana's challenges
to the capitalist world order, of which the US is the leader, but it~r is
probably not, except in this general but still important sex~-i`~;a defi
against Cuba's giant northern neighbor.
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II. Where does this mess go from here?
[It is my own suspicion that the shape of the clouds one sees in
a crystal ball is largely determined by one's own values, preoccupations,
and intellectual habits. The future is much more in the eye of the
beholder than in the "facts." My own prejudice is in the direction of
"life goes on" rather than toward a sense of international trauma, and my
constructions are likely therefore to emphasize the elements of continuity
and irony in any given situation rather than what another observer is likely
to see as the dramatically new. The reader has been warned.]
There are, I believe, a number of relatively constant factors in
the present "mess" in the Horn of Africa; whatever scenario is spun out
for the Ethiopians, Somalis, and the people involved with their problems, needs
to take account of these constants. Moving from the local to the global,
I see them as follows:
Ethiopian nationalism is gradually opening out from being
the exclusive sentiment of a dominant Amhara aristocracy,
and as it does so it is intensifying, certainly as it applies
to traditional local enemies, but more especially as it makes
foreigners generally objects of distrust and disdain. Any
successful accomplishments, military or economic or simply
organizational, of the Ethiopian revolution will be inter-
preted and touted as Ethiopian achievements, with quite
modest credit given to international socialism.
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-- Somali nationalist irridentism is a fixture of Horn
politics for an indefinite time to come, and the fissiparous
tendencies of Somalia's clan-ridden society will be subordinated
to irridentist, anti-foreign sentiments. The younger, foreign
educated generation of Somali leaders is even more dedicated
to these sentiments than their elders, and the only solvent
for these attitudes would be the achievement of Greater Somalia.
-- Eritrean insurgency is basically a product of the resistance
of predominantly Muslim lowlanders to highland Christian domina-
tion: Ethiopian nationalism cannot admit defeat at the hands of
such people, but neither can the Ethiopians impose themselves
on such recalcitrant human material. Therefore the Eritrean
insurgency will continue indefinitely, much as the Scottish
border wars against the English persisted for so many centuries.
Therefore, too, there will be a standing invitation for foreign-
ers to meddle, either constructively by advice and mediation, or
destructively through the clandestine support of the Eritreans
against Ethiopia or of one or more of the Eritrean groups against
the others.
-- The international energy problem, focused on petroleum supply,
will be with us indefinitely, and it is not possible to foresee
a time when the Arabian Peninsula, across the Red Sea and the
Gulf of Aden, will not be a major element in the energy problem
and therefore by geographical proximity a factor to some degree
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in calculations about the Horn. But the temptation to ex-
aggerate the impact of events in the Horn on the energy
problem should be resisted. The fact is that the heart of
the energy problem lies (aside from the question of physical
availability) in the grinding, frustrating process of shifting
the balance in the relationships between the major energy
producers and the major' consumers. Compared to the upheavals
and tremors produced in international society by these basic
shifts, the impact of eventsLn the Horn must be very marginal,
even though they may at times seem important to actual negotia-
tors trying to sell a scheme or make a point.
-- Detente divisible or indivisible, the USSR will continue to
seek, probably in company with Cuba and certainly in competition
with China, opportunities to support socialist revolutions and
revolutionary regimes as well as popular liberation struggles
in the Horn, in Africa generally, and in the Arab states if
opportunities present themselves there. This kind of activity
is so deeply embedded as part of the Soviet secular religion
that there is no prospect that it will be constrained seriously
for any significant period of time by anything other than the
"objective situation."
-- The USSR will continue to try to sustain and make visible its
great power status by seeking points d'appui in Africa and
adjacent areas (South Yemen, for example). Demilitarization
of the Indian Ocean, even if accomplished by agreement, would
be followed by other forms of Soviet effort (fishing harbors,
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oceanic experiment stations, space support facilities, for
example). Soviet competition in this region is here to stay,
and it cannot and will not be divorced from the socialist
revolution factor discussed above. Anything less would be an
abandonment of the privileges of great power status.
With these constants in the background, my hunch is that the situation
in the Horn could evolve in ways that'certainly are not especially favorable
to American interests, but also do not do them traumatic damage.
The Ethiopians will prevail militarily against the Somalis, driving
the latter back inside their own frontier, at least in the critical northern
area, but the job will take longer and be more costly than the Ethiopians
now think. Both the Ethiopians and the Cubans (whose combat help the
Ethiopians will not wish to admit even to themselves and which they will
dispense with at the earliest opportunity) will find the Somali regulars
and irregulars fairly tough customers and, as they advance, will also be
harried by an unfriendly local population in an unfriendly physical environ-
ment. Even with Cuban help, the Ethiopians' logistics are likely to be a
good deal less than fully satisfactory, and the fresher Ethiopian troops will
not make up in enthusiasm what they will surely lack in training if the
offensive is undertaken early on.
The Ethiopians will pause, for both political and military reasons,
at or near the Somali border, and this pause will be seconded by advice from
the Soviets, although it will be impossible to get Moscow to promise this in
advance except at a price the US would not pay, such as bringing the Soviets
into the Middle Eastern negotiations. An offer to the Somalis to negotiate
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a new demarcation of the frontier will likely be made; the Somalis will
demand not only border negotiations but arrangements for autonomy for the
Ogaden; a cease-fire punctuated by continuing incidents will ensue, as the
Ethiopians unilaterally proclaim that all the inhabitants of their country
have the same free status, and point to the 197& charter to prove it. Inter-
national backing for these negotiations will be forthcoming, but it will not
be ardent once the cease-fire is arranged. There is even a chance for some
kind of African/Arab UNEF-type a~:g*a., powerless in fact but vaguely
symbolic of international concern that the situation not he allowed to get
out of hand again. No definitive agreement will be reached, and the stars
will remain the same in the Somali flag.
Cuban combat forces will either be withdrawn from Ethiopia or trans-
formed into an oversize Cuban MAAG, as the Soviets continue to provide
equipment, training in the USSR, and good advice. The advice will become
gradually less welcome, because it will probably include suggestions for an
autonomist resolution of both the Ogaden and the Eritrean problems, and
the Ethiopians are not likely to accept this. A further evolution in the
USSR's relations with Somalia (more on this below) is also likely to produce
some cooler atmosphere between socialist Ethiopia and the USSR, although this
will not much affect either the general distaste with which the Ethiopian
leadership looks at the US nor the relative warmth of its relations with
Eastern Europeans. The Ethiopians will attempt to play the Cubans off
against the Soviets; this attempt will not succeed, and at some point the
Cuban presence will dwindle.
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The Ethiopians are not Angolans; rightly or wrongly they will think
they are able to resume basic direction of their own show at the earliest
possible moment, but this moment cannot be hastened from outside although it
can be delayed by Arab or Western hanky-panky in Eritrea or with the Ethiopian
conservatives roosting in Khartoum. The Ethiopian revolution will proceed,
gradually taking on an African pace as bureaucracy overcomes militancy. A
very gradual resumption of economic and even of economic aid relationahips
with the US is a good possibility after some time.
The Somalis will be embittered and blame their defeat, always regarded
by them as temporary, on the failure of the US and the Arabs to come to their
aid. They will resume contact with the USSR, first in hope that the Soviets
can be persuaded to bring the Ethiopians to offer better terms, and then in
a kind of fit of Titoism -- insisting that they hold basic socialist
credentials, of a special Somali variety, and therefore are to counted among
the deserving socialist poor. The Soviets will not have the assets to install
a really pro-Soviet regime in Mogadiscio, but Soviet port calls in Somali
ports will quietly resume, some spare parts for leftover Soviet equipment will
be provided, and some of the economic aid relationships will be repaired. At
the same time, the Somalis will be thinking still of another round in the
Ogaden, however distant the prospect, and will not allow their disappointment
with the US to cut them off from all possibilities of US and conservative
Arab help. So the US. will have an opening, although it may not wish to put
much effort into exploiting it.
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for failure in the Ogaden) with a wary eye, and the Somalis' continuing
relations with communist countries will not help them overcome conservative
suspicions.
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On the whole, the attitudes of other Arab States toward developments
of the kind I am describing would be relief that a great power confrontation
had been avoided, and they would. feel free to resume the kinds of postures
and activities with regard to Eritrea that are already familiar to them:
support, but not too much support, for Eritrean claims to autonomy/independence
through the provision of weapons and money. Since the Libyans would, in all
probability, continue to pursue their grand design of overthrowing Nimeiri
and Sadat and therefore wish to continue to cultivate the Ethiopian progress-
ives, support for the Eritreans would come largely from the Sudanese and the
Saudis. Syrians, Iraqis, and others are likely to be preoccupied with the '
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The Soviet presence in Ethiopia has certainly disturbed leaders of
other African countries, even I suspect those who count themselves as
associated with the socialist camp. But the focus of the anxiety, as I
see it, is more on what kind of response that presence provokes from the US
than it is on the Soviets per se. The outcome I have described above would
be optimum from the standpoint of virtually all of them, since it would have
at least the appearance of returning the situation to something like the
status quo ante, and have the further benefits of adding Somalis to the more
non-aligned, preserving the principle of the inviolability of their European-
drawn frontiers, and bringing Siad, whom nobody much likes, down several
pegs. Those Africans who like to think of themselves as covered by a
Western blanket, beneath which they enjoy more intimate relationships --
especially with the French, can attribute Soviet/Ethiopian "restraint" to the
Soviets' respect for American and Western European opposition to Moscow's
ambitions. Those whose spirits tend to move in higher realms can argue that
common African attitudes were responsible, even if the OAU.was helpless as
an organization. This argument will be somewhat more believable if Nigeria
and others do play some small role in arranging a ceasefire. But, in the end,
the Horn affairs will be perceived as another lucky escape for Africa from the
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perils of great power rivalry, even though a Soviet and Cuban presence
remains in Ethiopia and is to some extent re-established in Somalia.
The effect on the USSR of the outcome I have described could be more
serious. It would, I imagine, encourage the Soviet leadership considerably --
something had gone right, for once, and in Africa, too. They might well
approach the problems of sout,ehkn Africa with more confidence, push harder
for an even more prominent role in the Zimbabwe liberation movements and
generally encourage people like Nkomo to stick to a harder line, assuming
that Smith has not brought about an arrangement in Rhodesia by the time the
Ethiopia-Somalia war stops. They might even be encouraged, especially if
the Cubans felt similarly,'to take the Angola situation more firmly in hand
and campaign seriously for pacificaton of the Angolan hinterland while making
sure that the Angolans finally reject any deal with South Africa to keep out
of Namibia. These steps, it seems to me, rather than developments in the Horn,
would contribute,if they took them. to enhanc6-1the Soviets' image and offers -j
them opportunities for a more positive (from their standpoint) role in Black
Africa. And this, in turn, as and when it occurred, might indeed frighten
and impress African leaders in new ways. It is thus in this arena, I believe,
rather than in the Horn directly, that US interests might come to be threatened
more seriously than they are currently, and where it is possible to suffer
a loss of initiative which could have some of the consequences that Ambassador
Young and others have foreseen arising out of the situations in southern
Africa. But whether these effects would become actualities would depend
much more on the course and activity of US Policy in Africai enerally than
t y ---weti4:. on the more specific "outcome" in the Horn. In other words, as
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I see it, the Horn is a sideshow, and it's really up to us whether we permit
that sideshow, on which we are likely to have minimal influence, to affect
to our detriment the atmosphere in the main. ring. This certainly will happen
if we ourselves portly the sideshow as the centerpiece of the African or
any other circus.
III. What if?
The possibilities outlined in Part II of this opus are relatively
sane and unimaginative. What are some of the more exciting visions? It
seems to me there are at least three, none of which are too far out of
bounds.
One, the least probable in my view, is that the Soviets and Cubans
are overwhelmed by the African environment and are not able to put the
Ethiopians' military show together within a reasonable time, say the next
nine months or so. Maybe the Somalis even capture Harar and Diredawa, or
at least get close enough to the latter to make the airfield unusable. This
situation would call for:
-- Use of the Ethiopian/Soviet air force, especially the MIG-23s,
against "strategic targets" in Somalia to make up for the lack
of successes in ground combat;
-- More Cubans, at least double the present projected figuref so
that Cubans could, if necessary, substitute entirely for the
Ethiopians in the composition of a major striking force;
A substantial enlargement of the Soviet advisory presence, with
even stronger emphasis on logistic teams and on taking over
the defense of Asab and the roads inland (this development
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would be hastened by a Somali or Eritrean attack on the
Asab port and POL storage facilities);
-- A Soviet effort to bring the political situation in Addis
Ababa under better control and thus ensure both that the
rear is more reliable as their investment increased and that
the effort to organize the Ethiopian army was less hindered
by ideological diversions.
While anti-Soviet elements generally might derive satisfaction from
the Soviets' discomfiture in these circumstances, the anxieties in Africa
over great power intervention would be sharpened (still focused on worry
about what the US is going to do), while no more sympathy would be generated
for the Somali cause. The effort to take Harer and Diredawa, and to defend
them once taken, would escalate the Somalis' requirements for logistic support
and equipment, while the air warfare carried on by the Ethiopians and Soviets
would call for more intervention from those countries, like Egypt, which
could conceivably help in air defense. Were the air campaign prolonged,
foreign pilots might well be introduced on the Somali side on the ground
that the air war was indeed violating Somali sovereignty.
But none of these developments would likely make the Ethiopians
abandon the idea that military victory was essential before negotiations
could begin, and the costs to the Soviets and Cubans of further support
would still appear small, as seen from Moscow and Havana, especially as
compared to the consequences of having failed to defend a socialist revolution
as its leaders wished to be defended. This possibility, then)appears to me
to simply prolong the problem and promote the entry of additional and more
dangerous elements.
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A second possibility is thatthe Soviets and Cubans, finding the
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tq;N of pushing the Somalis back step by step awl hill by hill is too
frustrating and costly in casualties, take up again the Ethiopian/US plan
of an end run into Somalia, seizing Hargeisa or, more daringly, breaking
through in the far north and coming down the coast to occupy Berbera. They
then halt there, and attempt to carry out:the strategy of trading northern
Somalia for the Ethiopian Ogaden.
The foreseeable consequences of this move are the reasons why I
believe that it is less likely than the Part II scenario. First, it would
not, I suspect, produce the quick results desired by the Soviets and Cubans.
The Somali reaction would be too go over to guerrilla warfare, since it would be
very difficult for the Somali {s to sustain a regular campaign in the northern
Ogaden without Berbera in hand, and the Soviets and Cubans would find their
lines of communication toward Ethiopia under very severe harassment. Second,
while the Cuban force in Berbera could be supplied by the Soviets from the
sea, as Massawa is at the moment, the fact that this was a foreign, non-African
occupation would be so obvious as virtually to compel a reaction from the.
Iranians and Egyptians and thereby bring about a degree of foreign involvement
that jthe Soviets would be reluctant to contemplate, even though the Iranians
and Egyptians could not do much in practical terms. Third, the political
damages to the Soviet image in the rest of Africa would be severe and compara-
tively lasting; other African leaders would be genuinely frightened of this
demonstration of Soviet/Cuban power, and there would be a tendency to draw
together to try to find safety from it. Neto, on the other hand, might well
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ask why, if this could be done for the Ethiopians, something better cannot be
done for him. Neither of these reactions would be welcome to the-Soviets
at this time, in my opinion. Finally, the immediate result of this Soviet
success would be strategic failure, in the sense that the Somalis' unwilling-
ness to come to negotiate would drive the Soviets to consider a wider occupa-
tion, the setting up of a puppet regime, and other measures, costly and
ultimately counterproductive in terms:of the kinds of relationships the
Soviets want to have with the countries of this region. The stage would be
set for a longer run turn back toward the West.
A third possibility is that the Somalis' military effort collapses
rapidly and completely. They'in effect scatter from the field to fight if
possible another day, are subjected to some form of Ethiopian military occupa-
tion in the north and to an armistice control commission (a la Vichy) in the
south to determine reparations, and are saddled with a new regime, drawn from
those elements denied their full share of power under Siad and sustained by.
Soviet sympathizers who went underground during 1977 (if such there be -- we
have no evidence they exist in fact, although it seems a logical presumption),.
All this would clear the way for the Horn of Africa-Southern Arabia Co-
Prosperity Sphere that Castro dangled last spring before the eyes of Mengistu,
Siad, and the PDRY crowd. It is virtually inconceivable that such a construction
would be anything but jerry-built, given the strength of Somali nationalist
feeling, the Somalis) hatred of the Ethiopians, the Ethiopians) inability to
accept even Eritreans as their equals, and the distaste of all the African
parties
and not so distant, disaster for Soviet policy would surely have been sown.
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Immediately, however, such "success", even if it did not include the
r
gran confederation of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and PDRY, would produce
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some frantic reactions. To the Saudis it would seem the end of the world as
they know it, although in time this reaction would moderate as the cracks
in the situation became more evident and room for maneuvering reappeared. I
cannot judge what the full impact of their feeling on relations with the US
might be, but funadmentally I do not see where else they have to go at this 25X1
point.
Calls for arms would multiply surely.
This kind of defeat would add to Sadat's burdens, assuming Egypt had become
identified with the Somali defense, particularly if kmi-Thas not by this time
disengaged himself from his initiative toward IsraVil or alternatively drawn
some sustenance from it. A sudden quietness would settle over the Black
African leaders, as they hunkered down to await developments; certainly no
critical initiative could be expected from that quarter to help counter the
Soviets' successes. The Kenyans would be frightened out of their wits, and
come to think of trading F-5s in for MIGs, while Idi Amin might apply for
membership in the new Soviet club, or launch some adventure against Kenya
to regain Uganda's lost territory west of Rift Valley.
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The longer term significance of this development would turn on the
US reaction. If Washington were seen to be riding it out, taking the minimum
steps to reassure nervous allies and pointing to the weaknesses that must
be obvious in the new alignments in the Horn (after all, the Somalis had spent
more than a dozen years in close association with the Russians and the rela-
tionship had broken up), the damage could be limited. But, again, if the
US chose to portray this development as some sort of irretrievable "solution,"
the end of the game, this perception could "take" and could be damaging to
the whole range of our relationships in this part of the world until it
became apparent that the historical processes had not stopped and that the
local constants were still there.
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A Footnote on Djibouti
Given what has been the basic French attitude, which I understand
to be a desire to get out of Djibouti with as much grace and as few
casualties, physical and political, as possible, it follows that the longer
term fate of Djibouti under any scenario depends on the degree of Ethiopian
dominance in regional affairs. It is conceivable, for example, that under
the conditions outlined in Part II, the situation in Djibouti could shift
only gradually in the direction of a pro-Ethiopian or at least less pro-
Somali regime. This would be a shift back to the French scheme as of 1975.
The scenarios in Part III that give the Ethiopians and Soviets more
dramatic "successes" would mean a more rapid, even coup-like shift toward
Ethiopian control and toward the possibility that Djibouti would become a
new Berbera as far as the Soviets are concerned. Certainly, under these
conditions, the Soviets would have a much broader choice of shore facilities
to support their naval operations, and could make the choice on the basis of
naval logistic and communications considerations rather than politics.
If French attitudes are not what I assume them to be, then there
clearly would be complications with Paris as the Ethiopians/Soviets move into
Djibouti. Just what these might be is 'dArd to say, but in the end they probably
would not matter much locally (i.e., the French would get out), although they
could contribute something to poisoning the air of French-Soviet relations.
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