IMPACT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRESS ON UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP69B00369R000200100019-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: July 1, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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90th Congress
1st Session
IMPACT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRESS ON UNITED STATES
NATIONAL SECURITY
REPORT OF
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOLD FOR RELEASE
THU AUG 3 1967 AM
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
JOHN 0. PASTORE, Rhode Island, Chairman
CHET HOLIFIELD, California, Vice Chairman
RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia
CLINTON P. ANDERSON, New Mexico
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
WALLACE F. BENNETT, Utah
CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois
WAYNE N. ASPINA.LL, Colorado
THOMAS G. MORRIS, New Mexico
JOIIN YOUNG, Texas
CRAIG HOSMER, California
WILLIAM H. BATES, Massachusetts
JOHN B. ANDERSON, Illinois
WILLIAM M. McCULLOCH, Ohio
JOHN T. CONWAY, Executive Director
EDWARD J. BAVSER, Assistant Director
LEONARD M. TROSTEN, Staff Counsel
GEORGE F. MuRrny, Jr., National Security AfaiDs
WILLIA s T. ENGLAND, Professional Staff .Member
JoaN B. RADCLIFFE, Technical Adviser
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IMPACT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROGRESS ON UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is charged under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 with making continuing studies of prob-
lems relating to the development, use and control of atomic energy.
In recognition of the important responsibility assigned to the Joint
Committee, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 imposes upon the Atomic
Energy Commission and the Department of Defense a mandatory
obligation to "keep the Joint Committee fully and currently informed"
on atomic energy matters. All other Government agencies are required
by law to furnish any information requested by the Joint Committee
with respect to the activities or responsibilities of that agency in the
field of atomic energy.
One of the crucial matters affecting U.S. national security is the
development by foreign nations of nuclear weapons and the accom-
panying delivery systems. The present nuclear threat to the United
States and the free world comes from the Soviet Union and Communist
China. In order properly to understand the scope and magnitude of
this threat, the Joint Committee has over the years held executive
hearings at which nuclear weapons experts have charted the progress
of foreign nations as they developed and refined their nuclear arsenals.
The emergence of a serious threat from the Chinese Communists
began in 1964. In a brief span of less than 3 years, Red China has had
six nuclear tests. The last one on June 17, 1967, was in the megaton
range and indicated that they were making rapid progress in thermo-
nuclear design. They are also making progress in the development of
delivery vehicles for megaton weapons. The internal strife in Red
China appears to have had little, if any, effect on their nuclear weapons
program to date.
The trends in nuclear weapons development by foreign nations have
been followed closely by the Joint Committee. These trends have been
borne out by subsequent events. Progress, particularly by Red China,
has been more rapid and surprisingly more effective than had been
expected or indeed predicted.
The nuclear and thermonuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union
are generally well known and understood by the American public.
The Joint Committee's intention in this report is to bring into per-
spective the accomplishments and possible future trends in the
development of Red China's nuclear offensive force.
As the nuclear threat posed by the Chinese Communists became
more pronounced, Chairman Pastore decided to conduct a special
inquiry regarding Chinese Communist nuclear weapons development.
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`2 IMPACT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEA}3 WEAPONS
This probe began on January 11, 1967, and was formally annou:iced
at the Joint began first public hearing of the 90th Congress
on January 25, 1967.
In connection with this study the Joint Committee received he
following testimony in executive session:
January 11, 1967: Richard Helms, Director of the Centra. In-
telligence Agency.
February 1, 1967: Dr. Norris Bradbury, Director, Los Alai. os
Scientific Laboratory, and Dr. Michael May, Director, Liv-
ermore Radiation Laboratory.
Mar. 13, 1967: Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
July 13, 1967: Representatives of the Department of Defense,
CIA, and AEC.
These witnesses presented testimony concerning advances being
made by Communist China in developing nuclear weapons as well as
their progress in developing the capability to deliver these weapons
against neighboring countries or the United States.
Detailed technical presentations were heard concerning each :indi-
vidual Chinese Communist nuclear test and an assessment was tnuAe
of future developments by Red China in the field of nuclear wea--)oiis
and associated delivery systems.
An analysis of the impact of the emergence of Red China as a nuclear
power on U.S. foreign policy with particular emphasis on the propo;;ed
nonproliferation treaty was also presented.
Information concerning French and Soviet nuclear weapons fnd
delivery methods were also discussed but principal. emphasis was on
Red China.
CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of various hearings we have had and studies made by
the Joint Committee, the following committee conclusions have peen
developed. :
1. Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
The Chinese Communist test of June 17, 1967, at the Lop Nor
Nuclear Test Site was her sixth nuclear test in the atmosph are
and her first in the megaton range. Such a test was expeci~ed
because of the success of the preceding thermo-nuclear experilaent
conducted on December 28, 1966. The Chinese purposely' may
have limited the yield of that test-their fiftb test-to keep the
fallout in China at an acceptable level. The fifth test indicated
that the Chinese had taken a major step toward a thermonuclear
weapon.
There is evidence that the sixth test device-with a yield of
a few megatons-was dropped from an aircraft.
Analysis of the debris indicates use of U235, U238, and thermo-
nuclear material. As in the other tests, there is no evidence that
plutonium was used. The preliminary indication is that a con-
siderable improvement accompanied the increase in yield. A
large amount of U238 was used in the device.
The sixth Chinese nuclear test has confirmed the conclusion
reached from the analysis of the fifth Chinese nuclear test ,a.at
they are making excellent progress in thermonuclear design.
They now have the capability to design a multimegaton thernco-
nuclear device suitable for delivery by aircraft.
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CHINESE NUCLEAR We believe that the Chinese will continue to place a high
priority on thermonuclear weapon development. With con-
tinued testing we believe they will be able to develop a thermo-.
nuclear warhead in the ICBM weight class with a yield in the
megaton range by about 1970. We believe that the Chinese can
have an ICBM system ready for deployment in the early 1970's.
On the basis of our present knowledge, we believe that the
Chinese probably will achieve an operational ICBM capability
before 1972. Conceivably, it could be ready as early as 1970-1971.
But this would be a tight schedule and makes allowance for only
minor difficulties and delays. We believe that the Chinese have
already completed the development of a medium range ballistic
missile. We have no indication of any deployment.
We also believe that by about 1970 the Chinese Communists
could develop a thermonuclear warhead with a yield in the few
hundreds of kilotons in the MRBM class and that they could
develop an MRBM warhead with a megaton yield about a couple
of years later. Meanwhile, should they desire a thermonuclear
bomb for delivery by bomber, they could probably begin
weaponizing the design employed in the sixth test.
The missile-delivered fourth Chinese test demonstrated that
the Chinese now have the capability to design a low yield fission
warhead compatible in size and weight with a missile. With a
few tests, the Chinese could probably design an improved fission
weapon for MRBM or bomber delivery. However, they may
forego extensive fission weapon production in order to have
materials and facilities available for thermonuclear weapon
systems.
The Chinese bomber forces consist of a few hundred short-range
jet bombers and a handful of somewhat longer range bombers.
We have no knowledge of a Chinese plan to develop heavy inter-
continental range bombers.
Earlier, the Communist Chinese conducted four other nuclear
detonations:
October 16, 1964: Low yield (up to 20 kilotons).
May 13, 1.965: Low intermediate (20 to 200 kilotons).
May 9, 1966: Intermediate (lower end of 200 to 1,000
kiloton range).
October 27, 1966: Low intermediate (20 to 200 kilotons).
The Chinese were able to continue their nuclear program after
the Soviets apparently ceased technical assistance in this area
by 1960, and detonated a uranium device in October 1964.
All of the Chinese detonations have utilized enriched uranium
(U235) as the primary fissionable material. Uranium-238 was
also present in all tests. The detonation of any device which also
contains U738 results in some fissioning of the U238. The debris
from their third and fifth tests indicated some thermonuclear
reactions had involved lithium-6 in those devices.
We believe that the Chinese are interested in the development
of submarines equipped with suitable relatively long-range mis-
siles; at this time we have not determined the exact nature or
status of the program.
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4 IMPACT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR WEAPONS
2. French Nuclear Test Program
Turning to the French nuclear test program, :in February 1961)
the French tested their first atomic device. In 1966 the French
conducted five nuclear tests. In 1967 they held a short series cf
three tests. Another series of tests is planned for next summer.
All of the 1966 tests were plutonium fission devices. The last two
tests in 1966 were experiments aimed at the thermonuclee r
development.
The year's tests were conducted on June 5, June 27, and July .,.
They were suspended by balloons, above the Mururoa Lagoon.
The tests all had low yields. The French announced that all of
the tests were to be of triggers for thermonuclear devices which
the French still have not tested.
Although French officials continue to state publicly that Frame
will detonate her first thermonuclear device in 19138 when enriched
uranium becomes available, there have been hints in the press
that France is having difficulties with its program. Should this I e
true, the first generation of both the land-based and suhmarin ~-
launched missile systems might have to use warheads developed
in the 1966 series.
To recapitulate, the Chinese are well ahead of the French in
thermonuclear weapon design. In 232 years and six tests ;t.e
Chinese have successfully tested a multimegaton thermonucl,uax
device. The French, on the other hand, have conducted many
more tests over a 7-year period and have not yet tested a tri.e
thermonuclear device or achieved a megaton size yield.
The French have developed higher yield fission weapons than
the Chinese. The French have achieved yields of up to 2-10
kilotons while the Chinese fission devices have had lower yield3.
The French now have an operational strategic force of about E 0
Mirage IV aircraft with a stockpile of 60 to 70 KT nuiclefx
weapons. At this time the Chinese do not have such an opera-
tional strategic force.
SUMMARY
The Joint Committee believes that the American public needs i;o
know the threat that is posed by Red China. Communist China fits
emerged with a fledgling, but effective, nuclear weapons capability.
This capability has and will continue to have a great effect on U.,.
foreign policy in the Far East. It will have an effect on our relations
with the South East Asia Treaty Organization. It will have an efl'e-,t
on the nonproliferation treaty principally because of the close con-
nection between Chinese nuclear power and the national security
of India. Its effect will also be felt by Japan. Moreover, the Chir:e3e
Communists could use nuclear blackmail to assert their position nit
only broadly in Asia, but specifically in Southeast Asia.
Perhaps most significant for the United States is the fact that a
low order of magnitude attack could possibly be launched by the
Chinese Communists against the United States by the early 197 )'s.
At present we do not have an effective anti-ballistic-missile system
which could repel such a suicidal (for the Chinese) but neverthe:.ems
possible strike.
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It is for these reasons that the Joint Committee feels the assessment
it has made, based upon information received in executive sessions,
should be brought before the American public-not to overemphasize
or to underplay but to state clearly and concisely with due regard
for the protection of intelligence sources where we stand in relation
to this emerging threat to our national security.
O
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