CRITICAL ISSUES LIKELY TO FACE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION DURING ITS INITIAL WEEKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00493R000100100007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 2, 1981
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Rse 2004/07/0$EFAT RDP81 B00493R1001MEMO' 3-$1
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI-designate
2 January 1981
SUBJECT . Critical Issues Likely to Face the New Administration
During Its Initial Weeks
Th.L memotandum has bout .a ect i ond . Section A dead with
.some genetae cons.idenutions, .inceudt,ng the queai,Lon of ".testing"
the new Adm.inis 'cation. Section B d.izcuoaea .apecii c. zhonu-
tetm cAitLcat "zue s. Section C +t'tea-t6 vdewa of gotetign .intee-
#igence 4ehv.iceA, and Section V US Lnte.P.PLgence and watn.i.ng
capabiZitLe4 in broad W uns . A .s epa to to memorandum btom the
Cottect,ion Tcu I Lng Sta 6J deatz with there in mote detail.
A. In General:
1. Numerous critical international issues will almost certainly re-
quire NSC or Presidential attention during the initial weeks of the new
Administration. Except as outlined below, however, most of them would
arise whether or not there were a new Administration in Washington.
2. It is the unanimous judgment of the NIC, NFAC, and the Intel-
ligence Community representatives that the USSR will not deliberately
confront the new Administration -- at least during its earliest weeks --
with some dramatic test or aggressive military move, although as noted
below it may move for other reasons in Poland. The past practice of the
USSR at the outset of new US Administrations has been to preserve its own
equities, to await US initiatives, and then to test the US at a later
time -- depending on how the initial period has affected Soviet estimates
of the,new Administration. Meanwhile, the Soviets will of course be
"testing" the new Administration in numerous non-crisis ways. Of par-
ticular note in these respects will be Soviet efforts to seek to clarify
US intentions with respect to arms control, European security, and the
grain embargo; and US determination with respect to Iran-Iraq-Gulf
questions.
3. More generally, the primary interest of the USSR and most other
governments during January-March will be to assess the new Administration
on issues of prime importance to them. They will generally exercise care
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not to foreclose options and opportunities -- at least until they have
taken the measure of the new Administration and determined the degree to
which its policies appear likely to accord with their particular interests.
4. Of the countless issues which will be pressing for NSC and Presi-
dential attention, this memorandum concentrates on those likely to confront
the Administration's policymakers from the outset or within a very few weeks.
These specific issues are discussed below, in Paragraphs 6-21. There are,
of course, many other prime issues which are and will be on-going in their
character and demands on decisionmaking.
5. Such problems -- insistent but not necessarily posing critical
choices between January-March -- include the US' overall approach to:
(a) The USSR and arms control;
(b) The many cracks in US-Western European relation-
ships, and the problems of strengthening NATO's cohesion
and capabilities;
(c) Economic summitry, including the North-South mini-
Summit to which Mexico and Canada will soon be inviting the
US;
(d) The deteriorating stability and economic status of
key LDC's;
(e) US military and economic problems with respect to
Japan;
(f) China and its role in US strategic thinking and
balancing;
(g) Nuclear proliferation; and,
(h) Arms transfers.
B. Specific Critical Issues likely to arise which may demand
NSC-Presidential decisionmaking, January-March.
6. The hostages in Iran.* The behavior of the Iranians will continue
to be a wild card. The passions, pride, and domestic factionalism affecting
the Iranians, added to the pressures and vicissitudes of the war with Iraq,
and -- behind the braggadocio -- a great fear of extreme US action of some
kind, will almost certainly continue to produce rapid twists and turns on
the Iranian side. Unless the hostage question has been settled by 20 January,
*Thi.6 zen4-i.tLve, compeex d.4due .v6 being .tAeated in depth by CIA in a .6pec.Lat
.6.ady bung neadied Lon you and the new Admin,ia .a Lon.
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the new US Administration could be faced by any of a spectrum of actions,
ranging from sudden reasonableness to severe steps such as trying hostages
for espionage or physically harming them.
7. The Iran-Iraq war. A number of critical issues could suddenly
arise from this now-stalemated contest. If the Iranians come to feel that
they are up against the wall, they might strike out at non-Iraqi targets
across the Gulf, attempt to mine portions of the Gulf, or take other des-
perate actions which might enlarge or greatly complicate the war. War
weariness in Iraq may lead to the assassination of Saddam Hussein or to a
coup against him. Within Iran, such stability as exists could suddenly
give way through assassinations or coup attempts, with consequent tempta-
tion for the USSR rapidly to exploit the situation.*
8. The possibility of an oil crisis brought on by extreme Iranian
action. Oil market prospects are highly uncertain because of the Iran-
Iraq war. The two countries recently have been exporting enough oil, given
high stock levels, to keep the market fairly stable. But key export facil-
ities are extremely vulnerable to military action. Iran with its back to
the wall could stop all oil shipments out of the Persian Gulf. If oil
exports fall, or stocks are reduced to the point that panic buying begins,
prices would easily reach $50 a barrel by spring. In the extreme case,
severe world-wide shortages would develop.
9. Poland. While the Soviets have apparently been persuaded to give
the Kania regime time to begin getting its house in order, the Poles are
still living on borrowed time. The Soviets remain militarily prepared to
intervene on short notice -- and with little warning. The internal situ-
ation in Poland has not been at fever pitch for nearly a month and, in the
absence of a serious provocation by Solidarity (and further concessions by
Kania), we do not expect a Soviet military move into Poland. The situation
in the country remains very unstable, though, and any combination of events
food riots, new strikes, interference with lines of communication, further
disintegration of party control or unity, etc. -- could trigger coercive
measures and major crisis. A formal Special National Intelligence Estimate
on Poland is in preparation and should be out by late January. In the
meantime, definitive US intelligence on Soviet and Eastern European military
moves will continue to be constrained by cloudy weather conditions.
10. Allied Responses re Poland. Should Soviet/Warsaw Pact interven-
tion in Poland occur, one of the chief challenges facing the US would be
that of coordinating US actions with the responses of the Allies. So far
they have generally shared US views on the Polish question, but a Soviet
invasion of Poland would almost certainly evoke wide differences of view
among the Western Europeans on specific means of responding to the Soviet
intervention, and in some instances perhaps strong disinclination to follow
US leads.
*Soviet optiom to ea.tLve to Itan and Iraq ate examined in Special NatLonat
Inte2&gence Estimate 11-34/36.2-80, 24 Vecembet 80.
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11. Afghanistan. The Soviets continue to face a prolonged and dif-
ficult military operation in Afghanistan. The level of insurgency appears
to be on the increase again, and the Soviets may be hard pressed to main-
tain their existing control over the major population centers and lines
of communications. While we do not expect a major Soviet troop increase
in the next few months, pressures to alleviate the military situation are
likely to intensify. Renewed cross border strikes by Soviet or Afghan
aircraft against guerrilla sanctuaries could occur, possibly leading to
Pakistani appeals to the new Administration for material and/or political
support.
12. The PRC's Deng Xiaoping will be seeking to clarify US intentions
toward Beijing and Taipei. And, because of the delicate and complicated
realignments he is attempting to orchestrate at this moment within
China, Deng will be extremely sensitive to developments in US policy toward 25X6
China within the US such as, for example, US arms sales to Taiwan.
14. In El Salvador both the extreme left and the extreme right will
almost certainly step up their efforts to depose the present center-right
government and to increase their leverage by the time the new US Admini-
stration takes office, if not sooner. There is a good chance that the
extreme left will receive sharply increased international support from Cuba
and Nicaragua and will be in a much stronger position to challenge the
military.
15. Horn of Africa/Ogaden. The tide is beginning to turn more
clearly there in Ethiopia's favor, and against Somali President Siad.
His domestic position may weaken greatly because he has not been able to
gain more forthcoming US assistance, and elements of the Somali officer
corps may try to move against him. Thus, the new US Administration
might well be faced with a sudden threat to US military access rights in
Somalia.
16. Libya under Qaddhafi remains a major international trouble-maker.
Qaddhafi may follow his success in Chad with new initiatives against
Tunisia, Sudan, or any of several West African states. Of more immediate
importance, a Libyan attack on a US reconnaissance aircraft over the
Mediterranean might occur at any time.
17. Namibia.* There is a good chance that the Geneva Conference
on Namibia which convenes 7 January) may collapse, with a subsequent
expansion of guerrilla war in Namibia, a possible African-backed call
for UN sanctions against South Africa, and a further complicating of US
policy options.
*See NFAC Memorandum, "Namibia: S.t tu,a o6 the SetJ1ement Phocu.6," os
30 December 1950...
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18. In Israel, a vote of no confidence against the government, or
the sudden death of Prime Minister Begin (who is in poor health) could
quickly lead to significant changes in the Israeli negotiating stance
toward Camp David questions; possibly to new diplomatic initiatives by
Israel, Egypt or (perhaps) the USSR; and to a need for the US to shift
diplomatic gears rapidly.
19. A major crisis could abruptly reappear" among Israel, Syria, and
Jordan occasioned by events in Lebanon, including that of dramatic Israel
military action there. Such a crisis could have serious implications for
peace efforts re Israel-Syria, Syria-Jordan hostilities, US decision-
making with respect to the Palestinian question, Syrian-Iraqi relations,
or the possible further complicating of the Iran-Iraq war.
20. Major crisis could return in the Indochina area occasioned by
sustained, large-scale Vietnamese strikes against Democratic Kampuchean
sanctuaries in Thailand, undertaken in an effort to bring Kampuchea under
more effective military control. The significance for US decisionmaking
would likely transcend Vietnamese-Thai hostilities: the principal compli-
cation would be Chinese re-invasion of Vietnam -- with accompanying
great pressures on the Soviets to defend their interests in Vietnam.
21. Possible disruptive Cuban initiatives. Castro's initial overall
stance will probably be essentially defensive except in El Salvador. But
he might choose to undertake sudden initiatives such as close security ties
to the USSR, greatly increasing Cuban assistance to the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua, reviving the refugee exodus, or making threatening sounds
with respect to Guantanamo.
D. US Intelligence Capabilities
23=. US intelligence capabilities are best when hard evidence is avail-
able and where our resources are concentrated most heavily. Technical in-
telligence is relatively unambiguous; human source data (clandestine or
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overt) is often subject to differing interpretations. Imagery provides
voluminous and relatively clear-cut evidence on military capabilities
and some economic topics. Communications intelligence may be either very
hard or extremely ambiguous; it generally is more clear-cut on military
and economic topics than political ones. Overt sources normally can be
trusted more on economic and biographic topics than political and mili-
tary ones, although that varies widely with the political makeup of the
country in question.
24. Generally speaking, clandestine source data creates the most dif-
ficult problems of interpretation. Some is documentary and very solid.
Much is ambiguous or contradictory, and almost all must be considered as
possible disinformation. The Community is seldom willing to accept clan-
destinely acquired information on critical topics unless some confirmation
is available from technical sources.
25. As a result, we continue to be strongest on military capabilities
of major powers, good on many key economic questions, and least confident
when trying to predict short-term decisions of political leaders, especially
in closed societies. We can provide good general warning of major develop-
ments in the world and good detailed support to crisis management on most
subjects in most places. But there will doubtless continue to be occasions
when intelligence cannot predict the timing of a new crisis. We can usually
warn that conditions are right in Country X for a coup, but predictions of
a particular coup, assassination, or terrorist act in the unstable arena of
world politics are largely a function of intelligence access to the secret
deliberations of a small group of actors, which we often may not get.
26. Most of our collection and analytic problems are not susceptible
to quick fixes. They depend on additional resources, better cover, more
intensive training, and developing solutions to technical problems. These
involve significant lead times.
All portions of this memo
are classified SECRET
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 S~CRE~T
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SUBJECT: Critical Issues Likely to Face the New Administration During
Its Initial Weeks (NFAC 013-81)
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