SOVIET OPTIONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002300140005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 30, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
30 August 1980
SUBJECT: Soviet Options for Military Intervention in Poland
1. A Soviet decision to invade Poland would be
predicated on both:
--the existence of political conditions requiring
the use of military force to control the situation;
and
--a Soviet perception that the Polish government
and military were either unwilling or unable to
take effective action.
Specific examples of situations which could prompt such a
decision might include a refusal by portions of the Polish
armed forces to take actions ordered by the Polish
government or fundamental changes in the Polish political
system which were unacceptable to the Soviets.
2. We doubt that the Soviets would attempt a small-
scale military intervention in Poland. The use of small
contingents of Soviet troops to supplement the efforts of
the Polish military probably would be undesirable from the
point of view of both the Soviet and Polish governments.
The Soviets' restrained behavior to date indicates that they
strongly prefer that the Polish government use its own
military units to deal with any situation requiring military
force. Moreover, we doubt that the Polish government would
request the assistance of Soviet troops even under
considerable pressure. If such a request were made,
however, the two Soviet divisions-already in Poland as part
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HIE: This memorandum was prepared byl and 25X1A
I I Theater Forces Division, Office of
ra egic Research. omments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to or to 0 25X1A
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of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces might be used (See
Flap 1 - Soviet Ground Force Divisions In and Around
Poland).
3. A more likely eventuality is that prior to or
concurrent with Soviet preparations for a large-scale
military invasion triggered by unacceptable Polish events,
the Soviets would begin to "intervene" politically using the
threat of military force. They probably would issue
warnings of some kind in their press and radio broadcasts,
send high-level emissaries to Warsaw or call Polish
officials to Moscow, and take a variety of other steps
designed show the Poles that Soviet tolerance was over.
4. Given the general anti-Russian attitude of the
Polish populace, we assume that at least some Polish
military forces would resist a Soviet invasion. In any
event, Soviet planners would assume that their invasion
force would not only have to subdue substantial civil
disturbances but would also have to contend with active
resistance from part or all of the Polish military. The
Soviets in 1968 evidently assumed that the Czechoslovak
military would resist and concentrated 29 divisions for
about a 3:1 force superiority against them. We also know
that the Soviets rate the military capability of the Polish
armed forces highly--second only to the East Germans among
the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies--and would expect the
Polish military to fight effectively should they decide to
do so.
5. The Soviets would want to prepare a force large
enough to subdue resistance quickly and, indeed, to
discourage resistance by its overwhelming appearance. (See
Maps 1 and 2 - Soviet Ground Force Divisions In and Around
Poland). The actual invasion force might consist of the
majority of their divisions in the three western military
districts, along with the two Soviet divisions already in
Poland and possibly five Soviet divisions from East
Germany. Two airborne divisions and other specialized units
.might be added to this force and at least token non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) participation would be sought (see
paragraph 8). The invasion force might total about 500,000
men including more than 30 divisions (see Troop List -
Soviet Ground Force Divisions In and Around Poland). Over
250,000 men would have to be mobilized to form this invasion
force and its immediate support elements. At least some of
the 14 Soviet divisions remaining in East Germany probably-
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would be prepared to reinforce the effort if necessary.
Moreover, we believe the Soviets would mobilize additional
forces in the western USSR in order to be prepared for all
6. On balance, we believe that the Soviets would need
about two weeks to mobilize such a force and adequately
prepare it for the demanding job of decisively and promptly
subduing Polish resistance once the invasion began. The
Soviets likely would perceive several difficulties in making
units available for the invasion and in preparing them for
the invasion. The most ready divisions that could be used
to invade Poland are those in the Soviet groups of forces in
Eastern Europe--particularly the 19 Soviet divisions in East
Germany (see Map 2 - Soviet Ground Force Divisions In and
Around Poland - By Category). Undoubtedly they would use
the two Soviet divisions already in Poland. We believe,
however, that they would be hesitant to use more than about
five of the Soviet divisions in East Germany both because of
concern that political unrest might spread to East Germany
and because of concern regarding possible NATO actions
during the period of civil disturbance in Eastern Europe.
Only five Soviet divisions from East Germany participated in
the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and then only after
the Soviets had reinforced their troops in East Germany with
r
en
ec
tly mobilized divisions from the USSR.
7. Even though the 30 divisions the Soviet
ld
s wou
probably want to use for such an invasion could be mobilized
and moved into position in about a week, commanders, staffs,
and the troops themselves would not have been exercised or
rehearsed in the type of actions they would likely be
engaged in or in the specific plans for the invasion.
Because of the Soviets' desire to ensure a prompt and
decisive outcome--and perhaps, through intimidation, to
avoid the necessity for an actual invasion--they probably
would take at least a week following the one week of
mobilization to exercise the invasion force and to
demonstrate its strength to the Poles. If negotiations were
proceeding and the Soviets judged that more time could be
spared, preparations might extend over weeks or months. In
the case of a two-week preparation time we would expect to
detect mobilization on this scale within one to two days of
its initiati
on. Political events in Poland and elsewhere
l
wou
d also help to provide us warning.
8. At least token NSWP participation would probably be
sought to'lend legitimacy to the intervention. If the
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decision to invade were made within the next several days,
some UlS14P forces assembled for exercise Comrades-in-Arms
might be retained in the vicinity of Poland after the
scheduled end of the field activities which are to run from
8 to 12 September. This in itself would be a warning
indicator. The non-Polish forces currently scheduled. for
participation in the exercise, however, are too small to
constitute a suitable invasion force. Thus, we do not
believe that an invasion would be launched followin
Comrades-in-Arms without further mobilization. 25X1
9. If the situation in Poland were deteriorating
rapidly and the Soviets judged that they must intervene
hastily, despite the high military and political risks
involved, they could commit a portion of their mobilizing
force more rapidly. The airborne divisions, some of the
higher strength divisions from the USSR immediately adjacent
to Poland, and possibly some Soviet divisions in East
Germany and in Poland would likely be used (see Troop
List). Sixteen divisions probably could be assembled and
committed within four days under exigent circumstances. The
urgency of political events and the intensity of military
operations would likely give us warning within the first day
of all-out preparations. Such a hastily prepared invasion
would not provide the overwhelming show of force during its
early stages that the Soviets probably would like to have to
discourage resistance. It would also be poorly rehearsed if
undertaken without prior command post exercises and there
might be insufficient time for securing NSWP
participation. The Soviets might calculate, however, that
reinforcements could be brought in from East Germany--
despite the risk of seriously weakening their military
posture there--if the ? n force could not
quickly subdue Poland.
10. Polish forces are disposed to defend against a
NATO attack from the west (see Maps 3 and 4 - Polish Ground
Force Divisions). The Warsaw Military District (MD) forces
in the east are both fewer and less ready than Pomeranian
and Silesian MD forces in the west. These forces would be
.no match for Soviet units from the western USSR. Soviet
units invading from East Germany, however, could meet
stiffer resistance. Key Polish airfields would be possible
targets for early seizure by Soviet airborne forces while
Polish air defense assets would have to be considered by
Soviet planners (see Map 5 - Polish Airfields and Air
Defense Sites). Because of the short air distances
involved-, the Poles rob ably would have little tactical
warning.
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11. We believe there would be observable differences
between a Soviet mobilization in preparation for an invasion
of Poland and the type of mobilization that the Pact would
undertake in preparation for war with NATO. Mobilization
probably would be restricted to the western USSR and, even
there, would not be total. Mobilization likely would be
very limited within the NSWP countries. Soviet strategic
and naval forces might~ignificantly change their
readiness posture.
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Soviet Ground Force Divisions in and Around Poland-By Type
-Q. Tank division
Motorized rifle division
Airborne division
itenmar c
COPENHAGEH*
Baltic
Military
- District
t9?+!f
Carpathian
'ms's Military District
Boundary reo.es++tation a
not nacessany 3cthotitae:.e
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Soviet Ground Force Divisions In and Around Poland-By Category
? Category I
A Category II
? Category III
? ? ? i iBERU hfiiifary District
a v w
? ? Belorussian
.('_ ? Germany
4 ? ?
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Polish Ground Force Divisions-By Type
--Mw Tank division
'COPP Motorized rifle division
Airborne division
.d- Sea landing division
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Polish Ground Force Divisions-By Category
PRAGUE
Sweden
VIENNA* `
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? Category I
A Category II
e Category III
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LGermany
Military airfield
4 Soviet controlled
4 Polish controlled
Civilian airfield
(permanent runway greater
than 2500 meters)
? -Polish SAM and AAA site
Czechoslovakia
Baadary opt" tti.. is
.at aecSSari l a.m.naryre
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Categorization of Divisions
Category I These divisions are estimated to have a full
complement of combat equipment and more than
three-fourths of their authorized wartime
personnel.
Category II These divisions also have a full complement
of combat equipment, but frequently lack
some support equipment. Assigned personnel
strengths vary from about one-third of
authorized wartime strength in some NSWP
divisions to about two-thirds in Soviet
divisions.
Category III These divisions are manned at cadre strength
with manpower levels ranging from about
one-tenth to one-third of authorized
wartime personnel. They apparently have
most of their essential combat equipment,
except armored personnel carriers, but
have less support equipment than Category
II divisions.
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Unit
Troop List - Soviet Ground Force Divisions
In and Around Poland
Group: Northern Group of Forces (NGF), Poland
(2 TD)
20th TD
u/i TD
Swietoszow
Borne
Possible
Category Use*
Group: Central Group of Forces (CGF), Czechoslovakia
(2 TD, 3 #4RD )
CGF Subordinates
18th GMRD
u/i TD
28th Corps
48th MRD
30th GMRD
31st TD
Group: Group of Soviet
(9 TD, 10 MRD)
1st Guards Tank Army
7th GTD
9th TD
11th GTD
27th GMRD
2nd Guards Tank Army
16th GTD
25th TD
21st MRD
94th G.^RD
. 3rd Shock Army
10th GTD
12th GTD
47th GTD
207th MRD
Mlada Boleslav
Milovice
Olomouc
Vysoke Myto
Zvolen
Bruntal
Forces, Germany (GSFG)
Dresden
Rosslau I
Riesa I
Dresden I XX
Halle I
Furstenberg
Neustrelitz I
Templ i n
Perleberg I
Schwerin I
Magdeburg
Krampnitz I
Neuruppin I
Hillersleben I
Stendal I
*For illustration we have selected divisions we believe might be used in-the
two options discussed in the memorandum. Those divisions figuring in the 31-
division option are indicated with a single mark (X); those figuring both in
the 16-division option and in the 31-division option are indicated with a
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Troop List - Soviet Ground Force Divisions
In and Around Poland
double rUntt(XX).
8th Guards Army Nohra
20th GMRD Grimma
39th GMRD Ohrdruf
57th GMRD Naumburg
79th GTD Jena
20th Guards Army Eberstiwal de
6th GMRD Bernau
14th GMRD Juterbog
35th MRD Dallgow-Doberitz
Military District: Baltic
(3 TD, 5 MRD, 2 ABN)
Possible
Category Use
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MD Subordinates
Ith Guards Ai
orne
*
Division
44th -Guards Airborne
Division*
(Training)
Jonava
III
24th
TD (Training)
Dobele
III
107th
MRD
Vilnius
III
56th
GMRD
Tallinn
III
3rd
GMRD
Klaipeda
III
11th Guards Army
Kaliningrad
1st GTD
Kaliningrad
II xx
40th GTD
Sovetsk
II xx
1st GMI D
Kaliningrad
II xx
26th GMRD
Gusev
III X
Military District: Belorussia
(8 TD, 2 MRD)
MD Subordinates
45th G TD gaining) Borisov
120th GMRD Minsk
*Subordinate to Soviet Airborne Troops Headquarters, Moscow.
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Troop List - Soviet Ground Force Divisions
In and Around Poland
Location
Ca
t
g
ry
Possible
U
5th Guards Tank Army
Bobruysk
_
e
o
se -
8th ID
193rd GTD
29th GTD
7th Tank Army'
Marina Gorka
Bobruysk
Sl ut sk
Borisov
III
III
III
X
X
X
3rd GTD
34th TD
37th GTD
28th Army
Lepel
Bori sov
Pol otsk
Grodno
III
III
III
X
X
X
6~ D
50th GMRD
Slonim
Brest
III
III
Military District: Carpathia
(3 TD, 8 MRD)
MD Subordinates
66th G raining)
Chernovtsy
III
117th GTD (Training
Berdichev
III
24th MIRD
Lvov
II
8th Tank Army
Zhitomir
23rd TD
Ovruch
II
xx
30th GTD
Novograd Volynskiy
III
x
13th Army
Rovno
15th G; IRD
Vladimir Volynskiy
III
97th GMRD
Slavuta
III
161st NRD
Izyaslav
III
38th Army
Ivano Frankovsk
70th GMRD
Ivano Frankovsk
III
X
128th GMMRD
Mukachevo
II
xx
17th GMRD
Khmelnitskiy
III
x
Additional Airborne Division
Military District:
Leningrad
76th Guards Airborne
Division*
Pskov
*Subordinate to Soviet Airborne Troops Headquarters, Moscow.
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