WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT CUBA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000200240030-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Content Type: OPEN

j 9( Approved CUNGREggI69i/p06i&do i RD S~W~Ti83R000200240030-3 9875
to tracts for prorated cost of educa-
tion of migrant childreo in free public grade
and high schools, we believe the local areas
should assume this obligation as the taxpay-
ers in such areas are the direct beneficiaries
of the efforts of the migrant laborers. In our
areas of Oregon and Idaho the migrant
children are accepted freely by the various
school systems, as soon as they arrive, and
they attend the schools until their departure,
receiving1the same educational opportuni-
ties as the local children.
S. 522, day child care: Our position is the
same as previously mentioned. As long as
the opportunity to work is available most
migrant children will be working with their
families and the very young are usually
cared for by the mother or older daughter.
From our experience with labor camps this
arrangement seems to work very well.
S. 523, child labor provisions, is objection-
able as it imposes restrictions which are un-
fair to the children for whom the protection
is intended. First, children who are ambi-
tious or willing enough to work in the fields
should be given the opportunity to do so
and migrant children should not be discrim-
inated against with a 14-year restriction
while local children are limited only to 12
years. Another reason migrant children
should not be restricted is that they usually
are part of a family unit where the family is
endeavoring to earn sufficient income to sus-
tain it through periods of unemployment
and any assistance the children can render
maintains the well-being and self-respect of
the family. The provisions of this bill would
eliminate many local women who go out with
their children to pick vegetables and fruit.
Several examples brought to mind are the
need for this type of labor during pea, bean,
and strawberry harvest in Oregon, Idaho, and
Washington. We believe that minors under
18 years should be fully safeguarded from
hazardous employment.
S. 524, farm labor contractor and crew
leader registration, will work an unneces-
sary hardship on crew leaders with the finan-
cial burden of the insurance requirement.
Most of these men come to work areas as a
family unit which consists of their immedi-
ate family and close relations. Invariably
members of a crew will travel in their own
cars and in some instances the crew leader
will come to the work area with his family
and recruit the remainder of his crew from
among migrants already arrived. These crew
leaders do not usually earn substantial in-
comes and in many instances will work with
their crews, receiving their supervisory in-
come as the only additional income. Re-
quiring insurance coverase will not serve as
a control over crew leaders but will only re-
sult in an additipnal unnecessary expense
to them.
S. 525, National Advisory Council, is
-pointed inthe right direction.
S. 526, sanitary facilities, seems to call for
an unnecessary expenditure of Federal funds
while our Government faces a severe deficit.
There appears to be no need for money to be
granted to States to provide sanitary facili-
ties for migratory workers. We have nu-
merous camps in our areas which have pro-
vided adequate sanitary facilities for their
migrant workers with improvements made
annually. ' The cost of. these facilities are
borne by the farmer. Field facilities should
not be provided by the State at the expense
of the Federal Government or the taxpayer
farmer.
S. 527, Farm Employment Service Act, is
but should be provided by the- individual
a burdensome, unworkable bill, as migrant
labor is free labor which comes and goes
as it desires. In this area hundreds of
migrants travel from place to place at their
own expense, without being recruited, and
stay, so long as work is available or until
other pastures look greener. If the restric-
tions of this bill are forced upon the farmers
they will be obliged to resort to complete
mechanization, wherever possible, at the ex-
pense of migrant labor which will thus be
faced with unemployment.
S. 528, Minimum wages: The aim of this
bill if attained would have the same results
as S. 527, the elimination of employment of
many migrants. In this area farm labor,
whether local or migrant, is receiving not
less than $1 per hour with the range to $1.25
per hour. On piecework in sugarbeet and
potato crops some migrants earn $20 or
more per day.
S. 529, NLRB coverage: We oppose this bill
as farmwork is so different from industrial
work that agricultural labor would not be
benefited by unionization. In many in-
stances farmers will hire their labor on a
yearly basis even though the need for such
labor is not entirely necessary during many
of the months outside the crop season. This
employment is maintained on a compensa-
tory basis since the farmhand is called upon
to work long and odd hours during the
growing season and he works short hours and
light work during the off season. If the
farmer is forced to live with unionization
he would have to hire his labor only when
needed. - Furthermore with farmers produc-
ing crops which require harvest within
limited periods a strike could result in the
complete loss of a crop and financial disaster
to the nonfarming segment of the economy
dependent on the farmers, as well as to the
farmer.
We are offering these remarks so you will
have the benefit of the local farmers' view-
point.
We hope you will support the extension
of Public Law 78 without amendments.
Thanks for the many courtesies you have
have extended to me in Washington and your
interest in the dirt farmer.
Sincerely yours,
WILLIAM M. CARSON,
President. -
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, farm la-
bor legislation-almost by definition-Is
controversial. Honest men of sincere
conviction can be found on both sidesof
the issues. Conditions of work may dif-
fer in different areas of the country so
that what is felt in area A to be is ne-
cessity, in area B may have far less im-
portance attached to it. By and large,
it is my judgment that Oregon farmers
are good and conscientious- employers.
They are family - farmers for the most
part. Being fairly small operators, many
of- them actively engage in their field
operations, working alongside their har-
vest-time help. I suspect that, even as
you and I, they dread the thought of
legislation which might involve them in
more paperwork. But, they are affected
in their operations by this legislation,
and that being so, they have the right
to have their views presented to the Sen-
ate, before the legislation is acted upon.
As one of their representatives in the
Congress, I feel that I have this obliga-
tion to them. When the floor leader for
the legislation presents it to the Senate,
I am confident that he will do so force-
fully, and well. - He has assured me that
thesubcommittee has weighed carefully
the points, similar to those presented by
my constituents, which were presented
by other witnesses. It- is my judgment
that the Senate is ready to work its will
in this area, to the end that the public
good may be served.
Mr. President, in order that I may not
leave an incorrect impression of the mail
I have received on this subject, I ask
unanimous consent- that -a letter dated
May 24, 1963, which I have received from
the Reverend Kent D. Lawrence, chair-
man, Department of Migrant Ministry,
be printed at this point in my remarks.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
WESTMINSTER PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,
Portland, Oreg., May 24, 1963.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I want to reaffirm
the position I support for legislation rela-
tive to migrant farm laborers which the
Oregon Council of -Churches Department of
Migrant Ministry personnel has consistently
taken in recent years.
S. 521-9 and S. 981 and H.R. 4516-23, and
H.R. 4558 represent a comprehensive program
which would greatly help the migrant popu-
lation. Even in Oregon, where State laws
have done much to impro^e the situation,
we find growers saying that the State should
not require what the Federal Government
does not require.
I want to register disapproval of any out-
right extension of Public Law 78. The use
of bracero labor should be gradually elim-
inated.
Very truly yours,
KENT D. LAWRENCE,
Chairman, Department of Migrant
Ministry.
WHAT CAN WE DO ABOU
Mr. DODD. Mr. President' .1 believe
that all of us are agreed that something
must be done about Cuba. The question
the confronts us is, what can be done,
short of military invasion, that will help
to restore freedom to the Cuban people
and eliminate the menace of Castroite
subversion in the hemisphere?
This last April 25 to 27, Freedom House
in collaboration with the Citizens Com-
mittee for a Free Cuba, brought to-,
gether a group of experts at Ardsley-on-
Hudson, N.Y., in an effort to find an
answer to this question. This last Tues-
day Freedom House released to the press
a 16-page summary of the discussion
which took place at the conference. I
consider this to be a document of such
significance that I earnestly commend
it to my. colleagues, and I ask unanimous
consent to have the text of this report
printed in the RECORD at the conclusion
of my remarks.
. The report found that, "The freeing of
Cuba,- not ultimately but soon, must be
the, aim of U.S policy." The document
takes on all the more significance, in
my opinion, because of the extraordinary
caliber and balance of the list of partici-
pants in the Ardsley-on-Hudson con-
ference. - There- were conservatives and
liberals, Democrats and Republicans in
the group. - There was not- a single mem-
ber of the group whose name carries an
extremist connotation; and the discus-
sion at the conference was gratifyingly
free of partisan rhetoric. On certain
issues,, as - was inevitable, there were
marked differences between the distin-
guished participants. What was re-
markable, was that despite these differ-
ences the debate revealed an extraordi-
nary degree of agreement on funda-
mentals.
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CONGRESSIONAL
I should like to read the concluding
paragraphs of the section of the report
entitled, "A Consensus for Action":
Timing Is, of course, a crucial factor in
assessing risk. The Freedom House con-
ferees tended to the view that the risks later
will be more formidable than the risks now.
Even on the assumption that time is Inev-
itably on our side, which we do not accept,
one cannot be sanguine about a Sovietized
Cuba that brings a large portion of the
United States and the Western Hemisphere
within easy range of Communist missiles
and nuclear warheads.
The conference was aware that the major
premise of present policy is the assumption
that action on Cuba must be delayed because
of risks to our position elsewhere In the
world. But the conferees were Impressed by
the fact that the U.S. position In October,
far from provoking Communist adventures,
forced the Soviet leaders to act with greater
caution everywhere. In the context of the
Sino-Soviet dispute, American toughness
justifies Khrushchev's position of restraint,
while any evidence that the United States
is a "paper tiger" would strengthen Mao's
c,
'111 for aggression.
In any ease, If choices must be made as to
where we should take bold stands. Cuba is
the most logical place. The Soviet Union has
overextended itself geographically by reach-
ing into the Caribbean. Of all the fronts
on which we face each other, Cuba is mili-
tarily Russia's weakest, and our strongest.
The only Russian chance for success in such
a contest would be to convert the local con-
flict into a general war-clearly too fearful
a price for so small a prize. Moreover, mili-
tary opinion considers the risk of general
war in the near future relatively small be-
cause the Kremlin knows that it could not
win. The record already shows that the
Soviets have almost always backed away
from action that might lead to general war
when the United States has taken a firm
stand, as In Cuba last October and In Berlin
since Kfirushchev Issued his original ulti-
matum In November 1958.
The risks of inaction, however, must be
spelled out also in terms of the impact on
the non-Communist world. There Is the
risk-indeed, almost a certainty-that in-
action will encourage neutralism. If the
United States can accomodate Itself to the
Indefinite perpetuation of a Communist
regime In Cuba, why should not the rest of
Latin America? And the consequence will be
a steady seepage of Communism into the
other islands of the Caribbean and the other
Latin countries of the hemisphere. At the
same time, in Europe and Asia. countries
contiguous with the Iron Curtain will have
every reason to ask: If the United States dare
not uproot Communism from its own door-
step, how can we expect it to risk anything
on our behalf?
The freeing of Cuba. not- ultimately but
soon, must be the aim of U.S. policy, Imple-
mented by a practical program of action:
Mr. President, I consider the report of
the Ardsley-on-Hudson conference,
sponsored by Freedom House and the
Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba, to
be an example of the workings of de-
mocracy at its best. Here were private
citizens with a genuine concern over the
course of hemispheric affairs, coming to-
gether for the purpose of exploring one
of the most critical problems which con-
fronts our Government and attempting
to share with their Government the
problem of exploring and assessing alter-
native solutions.
Again I want to say that I hope my col-
leagues will find the time to read this
report in its entirety and to accord it the
careful thought which it deserves,
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have the report printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the report
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
WHAT CAN WE Do AsotT CvBA?
FOREWORD
In October 19G2 the world was shocked
by the relevation that the Soviet Union had
established a nuclear missile base in Cuba.
The American people were virtually unani-
mous in supporting the President's decision
to take prompt and effective action, regard-
less of the risk, to force the withdrawal of
Russian missiles and troops.
The succession of- events needs no re-
counting here. What is significant is that,
as of this writing, more than a bait year
has gone by and the task has not been com-
pleted. In the meantime, relations between
the United States Government and anti-
Communist Cuban exiles have deteriorated
rapidly, dimming hopes for an early over-
throw of the Castro regime. It Is urgent,
therefore, for the American people to review
what has happened and to consider what
ought now to be done.
To help In this process, Freedom House
invited a group of prominent Individuals-
seasoned observers and analysts-to meet
at Gould House. New York University's Con-
ference Center at Ardaley-on-Hudson, New
York, April 25-27. The sessions were con-
ducted In association with the Citizens Com-
mittee for a Free Cuba.
This report on the sessions was prepared
by Freedom House; nothing In it is binding
on any participants. The aim is to present
the exchange of opinions among people rep-
resenting different points of view, the airing
of their proposals and the consensus which
emerged from the deliberations.
Freedom House expresses its gratitude to
the busy men and women who put aside per-
sonal Interests to attend the Conference.
The list of participants Is as follows:
Mr. Marlada Arensberg. executive director,
Cuban Freedom Committee.
Mr. William E. Barlow, publisher. Vision
magazine.
Mr. Murray Baron, labor relations.
Mr. Paul Bethel, editor, "Cuba Research
Reports."
Mr. Leo Cherne. executive director, re-
search Institute of America.
Mr. 'James Daniel. roving editor, Readers
Digest.
Mr. Roscoe Drummond, columnist, New
York Herald-Tribune.
Mr. Christopher Emmet, chairman. Ameri-
can Friends of the Captive Nations.
Mr. George Field, executive director, Free-
dom House.
Miss Frances R. Grant, secretary general,
Inter-American Association for Democracy
and Freedom.
Mr. Hal Hendrix, Latin America editor,
Miami Daily News.
Mr. William vanden Heuvel, president,
International Rescue Committee.
Mr. Daniel James. secretary, Citizens Com-
mittee for a Free Cuba.
Prof. Harry Kantor, Department of Politi-
cal Science, University of Florida.
Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall (retired), mili-
tary writer and syndicated columnist.
Mr. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, syndicated col-
umnist.
Mr. William Patterson, business executive.
Miss Virginia Prewett, Latin American
columnist, Washington News.
Mr. John Richardson, Jr., president, Free
Europe Committee.
Mr. Leo Sauvage, New York correspondent,
Le Figaro.
Mr. John Smithies, consultant on Latin
American Affairs,
Mr. Gerald Steibel, Research Institute of
America.
Dr. Sig Synnestveldt, Latin Aiu,._ V)e-
cialist. Foreign Policy Research Institute,
University of Pennsylvania.
Prof. Frank Tannenbaum, School of In-
ternational Affairs, Columbia University.
Vice Admiral Charles Wellborn, Jr. (re-
tired), Hudson Institute.
Prof. A. Curtis Wilgus, director, School of
Inter-American Studies, University of Flor-
ida.
Mr. Chester S. Williams, associate director,
Freedom House.
FOCUS ON A PRODLEM
Americans are agreed that a Soviet Cuba
Is Intolerable to the Western Hemisphere.
The reasons bear upon our security and free-
dom as well as the independence and In-
tegrity of the other nations In this hemi-
sphere.
The facts about Castro and Communist
Cuba are beyond debate: Six million people
who won their freedom from Batista's dic-
tatorship found therselves betrayed into the
hands of a new dictatorship. They are denied
the right to vote, to speak, to publish-to
think. More than 100,000 Cubans have been
jailed for refusing to accept communism.
Another 250,000 have fled, preferring exile
to tyranny at home; 180,000 more are await-
ing transportation and countless others
dream of escaping from the terror.
Cuba has become an overt Soviet satel-
lite-the only one in the Americas. The
Castro regime deliberately handed over the
island to the Russian dictator and allowed it
to be transformed Into a launching pad for
potential military aggression against the
United States and the other countries of the
hemisphere.
Present conditions do not suggest that the
evil has been abated, much less eliminated.
Evtn if we could be certain that every offen-
sive military weapon has been removed from
Cuba, we would still live in the presence of
the 20th century's most efficient offensive
weapon-aggressive communism itself. This
time bomb Is still to be defused.
Fundamental objectives
American policy must rest on three ob-
jectives:
1, The elimination of the Soviet political
and military base in Cuba;
2. The halting of Castro-Communist sub-
version, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare
against Latin-American peoples; and
S. The liberation of the Cuban nation from
Castro's brutal police state.
Americans will unite behind any program
that gives hope of achieving these goals.
But what would such a program be?
Formulating it presents certain immediate
difficulties. Public opinion, while It is clear
on the basic objectives, does not have full
access to the facts. The reasons are many.
Some are founded in the requirements of
security, some rest on theories of "strategy"
that may or may not be sound. In the last
analysis, however, whatever policy is adopted
will require, for its success, the understand-
ing of the American people and their whole-
hearted support. Indeed, it is a function
of alert citizenship to participate actively
in the formulation of policies, even if it
must do so on the basis of incomplete In-
formation.
The conference agenda
The mechanics of the conference were
designed to facilitate a full exchange of
ideas, help clarify differences in approach
and substance, and pave the way for the
enunciation of areas of common agreement.
The agenda was divided Into three parts:
1. What we know: the basic facts about
the situation inside Cuba and among Cuban
exiles, and the views of U.S. Government
officials and Congressmen as well as leaders
of Latin American republics.
2. What we do not know and need to
know: the difficulties of Incomplete infor-
mation about U.S. and Latin American
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
polM"s and programs. (Where possible, con-
ferees filled in the gaps, clarified ambiguities
and defined the areas of uncertainty.)
3. Policy and actions: judgments on ob-
jectives and tactics, consensus on what Gov-
ernment policy should be in the interests
of the Nation, Latin America and the Free
World, alternative courses of action.
The Department of State had been invited
to participate but found it necessary to de-
cline because "pressure of problems relating
to Cuba preclude attendance of officers of
the stature which your seminar would merit."
The Department, however, supplied the con-
ference with a statement for its guidance.
In view of the consensus ultimately
reached by the participants, the diversity of
premises from which they started, is note-
worthy. The diversities came out clearly in
a formal opinion poll composed of 21 ques-
tions formulated in the light of the first
day's discussion. At the time the poll was
taken, 25 participants were seated at, the
conference table.
Some sense of the participants' initial
attitudes emerges from the rather even divi-
sion on such questions as these:
Does the administration believe that Rus-
sian troops will leave Cuba?
Has Washington reached a decision not to
act except as it is presently acting?
Does the administration believe that con-
tinue economic pressure will topple Castro?
Does the U.S. Government have a policy
for liberation of Cuba?
On the other hand, there was fairly close
agreement on the following:
That Castro's regime can be toppled with-
out U.S. military action and without an
invasion.
That the hit-and-run raids of the exiles
were contributing to Castro's difficulties.
That raids not based on U.S. soil did not
endanger the peace.
To ascertain the political bias of the con-
ferees, they were asked to express their atti-
tude toward the present administration on
issues other than Cuba. Of the 25 partici-
pants, 14 declared themselves friendly, 7
said they were opposed and 4 abstained.
(For a full appreciation of both the temper
and the substance of the conference, the poll
is reproduced as Appendix II of this report.)
In the judgment of Freedom House, it is
worth study not only as a summary bf the
conferees' views but as a reflection of the
way qualified observers see America's cur-
rent Cuban posture.
IN SEARCH OF A POLICY
An American's confrontation with the
Cuban problem must begin with the ques-
tion: What is our Government's policy?
Since Castro took power in 1959, and espe-
cially since the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961,
there have been many conflicts and contrasts
between official pronouncement and actual
performance. While no one doubts the ad-
ministration's desire to see Cuba liberated
from the grip of communism, there is con-
siderable concern that far less than an all-out
effort is being made lit the Caribbean to do
anything about it.
Troubling questions
From their own specialized vantage points,
the experts at the Freedom House conference
raised these troubling questions:
1. Is American Cuban policy geared to a
negotiated accord with Khrushchev on the
kind of Cuba with which the United States
could "coexist"? If this is not contemplated,
why the reluctance to make public the ex-
change of messages and letters between the
President and the Soviet Premier? The time
seems overdue for a full disclosure of the
agreements reached and the promises broken.
2. Under present circumstances, is the ad-
ministration reluctant to increase pressure on
the Cuban regime? The east coast long-
shoremen's union has been boycotting Polish
and other satellites fines that use some of
their ships in Cuban trade. Washington has
been seeking to end the boycott. The ques-
tion was asked: Why has there been no
tough, ironclad ban on the shipment of
American goods in any vessel of any line that
trades with Cuba? At the present time, a
watered-down regulation applies only to the
individual ships that deliver goods to Cuban
ports, and even violations of this weak
measure are reportedly permitted.
3. At a meeting in England, Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., is said to have described the
U.S. position on Cuba in these terms: The
first objective is to clean up our own back-
yard in Central and South America by vigor-
ous implementation of the Alliance for
Progress, meanwhile containing Communist
Cuba. A second objective is to bring iso-
lated Cuba back into the Organization. of
American States as a chastened, cooperating
member. If this is an accurate reflection of
U.S. policy and not just a personal view,
how long does Washington think step No. 1
will take before action can begin on step
No. 2?
4. Is it possible that the humanitarian
mission of James Donovan, the lawyer who
negotiated the release of the Bay of Pigs
prisoners, has become something mare? Is
it also a cover for administration-approved
negotiations with Castro, looking toward
some kind of reconciliation, perhaps on the
basis of a Tito-type arrangement for Cuba?
Castro's conspicuous entertainment of Don-
ovan and his son in early April 1963 suggests
that the Cuban dictator may be reaching for
some kind of "accommodation" with the
United States, since the October events may
have convinced him that the Soviets are
unwilling to risk much to support him.
(Significantly, a television interview filmed
on April 24 just before Castro's departure
for Russia, released after the Freedom House
Conference had adjourned, lent credence to
this assessment of Castro's policy. Aware
that he was addressing an American aud-
ience, Castro expressed appreciation that the
United States has "taken some steps in the
way of peace" such as "the stopping of pirat-
ical acts against Cuba." He indicated that
these steps might be the basis for better re-
lations. "I have looked at such steps with
good eyes," he said, adding that the question
of Soviet technicians in Cuba-"who would
fight with us against any aggressor"-might
be the subject of a three-way-discussion be-
tween Cuba, the United States and the So-
viet Union, and not just between the United
States and the Soviet Union.)
These uncertainties about the direction of
American policy, whether well founded or
not, are profoundly disturbing in and of
themselves. They suggest that actually there
may be no master plan and that we are
merely improvising on this crucial cold war
front. Certainly, a coherent policy and plan
of action would have to begin with an evalua-
tion of a whole series of basic relationships,
including the following:
1. The relation of the Cuban problem to
the other cold war fronts.
2. Cuba's relation to the other Latin
American countries.
3. The relation of the United States to
the other Latin American countries.
4. Possible effects on the Sino-Russian
conflict.
5. The fear that action on. Cuba may esca-
late into global war.
Specifically, clear-cut US. policies are
needed in these areas:
1. Exiles' activities.
2. Developments Inside Cuba.
3. Post-Castro Cuba.
4. Current Russian presence in Cuba.
Virtually all the discussion on Cuba re-
volved around these issues. The following
pages are an attempt to organize and inte-
grate the observations.
9877
Cuba and the other cold war fronts
Communism's conquest of Cuba must be
viewed in the context of the worldwide
expansionist drive conducted by the Krem-
lin, which has already led to totalitarian
control over a third of the human race. At
this point in history, simple solutions are no
longer possible. The problem of resisting
Communist expansionism is growing more
complex and less manageable all the time.
Any plan of action in the Caribbean has to
take into account conditions and potential
developments around the globe. Since we
have committed ourselves to the defense of
allies in all the continents, our Cuban policy
must be consistent with those commitments,
or at least must avoid jeopardizing them.
Participants in the Freedom House Con-
ference saw this fact as a major preoccupa-
tion in the thinking of those responsible
for American policy. In an effort to define
Washington's current approach, several con-
ferees used role-playing procedures to pre-
sent what might be the views of high Gov-
ernment officials. In substance, they said:
"Our policy on Cuba must necessarily fit
into the larger U.S. policy of defending the
free world against communism while avoid-
ing war. Where certain common interests
are shared by the United States and the
Soviet Union, we must press for an agree-
ment with the Soviets. In this context,
other problems may have priority-such as
reconstituting the troika coalition in Laos
to prevent a serious collapse that would
have dire consequences for Vietnam, Indo-
nesia, and others; the urgent need for con-
cluding a nuclear test ban in Geneva; and
preventing the military use of outer space.
In such a framework Cuba is not the most
pressing issue, We are concerned not only
with restoring freedom to Cuba but also
with maintaining and enlarging freedom in
Berlin. A victory on any given front would
hardly be worthwhile if the price turned
out to be the loss of Berlin, Iran, Vietnam,
or some other sector of the global struggle.
What we do about Cuba may precipitate
reactions elsewhere that could seriously in-
jure our wider interests.
"Nor can we forget the implications of
the rift between Moscow and Peiping. At
this juncture it. would hardly be wise to
increase the pressure on Khrushchev and
possibly make him look worse than he did
when we forced him to pack up his missiles
and go home. The prospect of another such
defeat might force him, for example, to
move into Iran in order to salvage his al-
ready shaky position as leader of the world
Communist movement.
"As realists, we know there is no auto-
matic virtue in just doing something: Con-
sider the Bay of Pigs and the trouble we're
having in Vietnam. And we have to take
congnizance of the handicaps imposed by
our very strength-the restraints on our
freedom of action that flow from our giant
size in comparison with the Cuban pigmy.
Rough action would alienate world opinion.
In any case, even our friends in Latin Amer-
ica are opposed to what they call interven-
tion. Certainly, the reaction during the
Bay of Pigs misadventure demonstrates that
a program of direct action by U.S. forces
would be even less palatable than action
by the Cuban freedom fighters-and that
would be so despite a quick success and
moderate casualties on both sides.
"We are committed to getting Soviet
troops out of Cuba as fast as possible. Some
Sovietologists tell us we can probably do it
more quickly by reducing rather than in-
creasing the pressure on Khrushchev.
Meanwhile, we are isolating Cuba from the
rest of the hemisphere and discrediting its
revolutionary image among Latin Ameri-
cans. We are slowly strengthening our OAS
allies and reinforcing their ability to main-
tain internal security. Over the long haul,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE J? 10
we hope to achieve our goals through a
successful Alliance for Progress.
"Those who demand a commitment to im-
mediate Cuban liberation are simply ig-
noring the unacceptable risks that would
be involved. After all, we have a commit-
ment to the eventual liberation of Eastern
Europe, but those who pledged in campaign
speeches to make good on it soon found out
that they couldn't fulfill'this promise with-
out risking a global war' In 1956, Radio
Free Europe and even the official Voice of
America were criticized for having encour-
aged the Hungarians to revolt under the
misconception that outside help would be
forthcoming.
"The risks of precipitant action cannot be
dismissed. To go to the brink and then be
forced to retreat rather than accept the
dreaded next step would be disastrous.
Even the political opposition which con-
dems a policy of caution, does not advocate
military action In Cuba. Its leaders have
been quick to disavow the few who call for
blockade and Invasion."
Such is the point of view apparently pre-
vailing In Washington, as the conferees re-
constructed It. It represents the considera-
tions that seem to trouble the administra-
tion as it picks Its way across the heavily
mined terrain of foreign policy.
Opinion at the conference was predomi-
nantly pessimistic that such consideration
could get anywhere. As one participant put
it: "The United States wants Cuba to be
free, but does not want Cuba to become
free. We are eager for the result that is
sought; but we have no stomach for the ac-
tions needed to achieve It." Concededly,
there was good reason during the first part
of 1962 (before October) for U.S. officials
to be apprehensive over the effect on Berlin,
Laos, and Vietnam if this country challenged
Soviet arms shipments to Cuba. The most
significant aspects of the brilliantly executed
confrontation In October-November, how-
ever, was that it did not trigger Soviet ac-
tions in Berlin or In other places where
Soviet capability existed.
The lesson of October-November confirms
the thesis that action in the Caribbean
ripples out to distant Shores and sensitive
regions. But even more Important, It em-
phasizes dramatically that indecisiveness in
the Caribbean can have the most deleterious
effects on our alliances, especially NATO and
SEATO. Inaction on the Cuban front will
only be taken to mean a United States un-
willingness to run risks in defense of others.
If the United States accepts Russian in-
trusion at its own doorstep, where the Soviet
military posture is weakest, how can Euro-
peans expect the United States to risk nu-
clear devastation to repel a Soviet attack
in Europe where Soviet military power Is
greatest?
Indeed. American resistance to Soviet mili-
tary penetration in the Caribbean is a pre-
requisite to restraining the the Soviets from
an adventure in West Berlin. Defend our
interests close to home, and we reinforce
rather than endanger our outposts in more
distant places. Blur our purpose and com-
mitment in our own hemisphere, sow confu-
sion between words and deeds about Cuba
and we can only damage American objectives
around the world.
CUBA IN CONTEXT: LATIN AMERICA'S FUTURE
Thoughtful observers are by now aware
that Cuba Is the Western Hemisphere base
from which the Communist knife is aimed at
the soft underbelly of the hemisphere -Latin
America. A long history of economic and
political errors has filled Central and South
America with internal discontent, thus mak-
ing it vulnerable to conquest by external
forces. How many more Cubes can we sus-
tain?
Time is a vital factor. There are hopeful,
prodemocratic forces at work, but they are
in a deadly race with the destructive, to-
talitarian forces. Decisive to the outcome
will be the length of time it takes to dislodge
not only the Russian troops but communism
itself from Cuba. The mere survival of the
Castro regime is a factor or great importance.
It strengthens the Communists In other La-
tin American countries and creates an image -
of Communist invincibility. It encourages
the trend toward neutralism, already pro-
nounced In some countries, with Increasing
numbe-a of Latin Americans saying, "If the
United States Is willing to tolerate or coexist
with a Communist Cuba, why shouldn't we?"
It also encourages an equally dangerous
trend toward extreme rightist dictatorship.
The spawning of more neutralist or mili-
tarist governments in Latin America, in re-
action to the continued existence of the
Castro regime in Cuba. can threaten the
U. objectives of preserving and enlarging
freedom. Coexistence, on the one hand, may
lead to coalitions which ultimately produce
one-party rule, while rightist dictatorship
gives the Communists a moral pretext for
carrying out their tactics of conspiracy and
helps polarize public support in their
direction.
History does not operate in smooth uni-
directional lines. Developments are the
product of a given equilibrium between rival
forces. The presence of Castroism, viewed as
a temporary phenomenon, has generated
some wholesome reactions in Latin America,
which should not be dismissed. The delivery
of Cuba to Khrushchev as a military base
added considerably to the disenchantment
of many Latin Americans who had originally
considered Castro a genuine patriot fighting
foreign economic exploitation. Even before
October Castro had paid some price for his
betrayals-ranging from unfulfilled promises
to hold elections to the public confession
that he had been a Communist all along but
had concealed the fact while seeking popular
support. But now Soviet domination of
Cuba has made it plain that Castrolanl Is not
a nationalist liberation movement. Politi-
cal, labor, and business leaders, editors, in-
tellectuals and students whose hostility to
Batista's dictatorship made them sympa-
thetic to Castro, have been disabused. Mili-
tary officers who might have been tempted
to seek a deal with "the wave of the future"
have been sobered by the purges and execu-
tions that followed Castro's accession to
power.
The volatility of the poverty-stricken
Latin American masses is another matter.
It is difficult to predict the direction In which
their pent-up resentments are likely to ex-
plode In a period when old Institutions are
disintegrating and new claimants are de-
rfianding power. Army take-overs, like those
In Peru and Guatemala, are In the historical
Latin American pattern. They are the tra-
ditional response when power centers are
threatened or when chaos seems imminent.
To be sure, in some situations the military
play a legitimate role in preventing a minor-
ity from seizing power. But U.S. policy must
take into account the fact that the Commu-
nists often find oppressive rightist regimes
more useful than liberal or anti-Communist
leftist-governments.
The ultimate success of the Alliance for
Progress may hinge on whether Latin Amer-
ica can be persuaded that Castro to not here
to stay, and communism will not spread to
other Latin republics. Unfortunately, the
Communist challenge has not yet convinced
a majority of the more conservative Latin
Americans to accept the reforms essential to
the success of the Alliance. The effect of
that challenge has been, rather, to encourage
a massive flight of capital from Latin Amer-
Ica and to discourage new investment there,
thus contributing to further economic de-
terioration and reducing the , Alliance's
chances of success.
American policy seems geared - to the
thesis that we can defeat communism .., 3e-
feating hunger, poverty and disease in Latin
America, and that all we need is time to ac-
complish the latter. The reality is that the
attainment of a higher standard of living
does not necessarily preclude communism, as
demonstrated by the very case of Cuba,
which before Castro was one of the two or
three most advanced countries in Latin
America. At bottom, we are engaged in a
two-front struggle against both communism
and poverty, at the same time. If com-
munism remains in control of Cuba indeft-
nitely. It will have proved Its permanency in
the Western Hemisphere before the reform
battle can be won. On the other hand, the
mere erasure of communism from Cuba
would not, by Itself, automatically insure
orderly social and economic progress.
U.S. relations with Latin America
These considerations brought the confer-
ees to an examination of American policy
vis-a-vis the countries south of the border.
Despite the fear of Communist expansion;
Latin America still considers U.S. interven-
tion an anathema. The question was
whether this factor has not been given un-
due weight, distorting our relations with
Latin America generally. Oversensitivity to
the charge of Interventionism, based on
fear of offending our friends, may now have
reached the point where we are alienating
support or weakening the hemisphere be-
cause of our restraint.
The Conference members therefore dis-
cussed these questions in the framework of
concrete situations. For example:
1. In 1947. the United States and Latin
America joined in the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, more pop-
ularly known as the Rio Treaty, which estab-
lished a mutual security system, based on
the formulation that an aggressive act
against one is an aggressive act against all,
to be met by economic, political and military
sanctions. At Punta-del Este In 1962-be-
fore the Russian military base In Cuba was
revealed-the United States pressed for
strong resolutions, which were adopted by
the Organization of American States, spe-
cifically applying the Rio Treaty to the
Sino-Soviet Intrusion into the hemisphere.
Why did not the United States rest a forth-
right policy of eliminating the missile bases
in Cuba on those OAS resolutions? Can the
United States entertain the idea of deals
with Khrushebev and/or Castro, involving
coexistence with a Sovietized Cuba or even
a Titoist Cuba, without repudiating the Rio
and Punta del Este positions and in effect the
whole inter-American system?
2. Since December 1962, according to re-
liable reports, President Romulo Betancourt
of Venezuela has wanted to go before the
OAS to document the story of Castro-
supported sabotage and terror against his
country. The Immediate objective would be
to induce the five OAS members that still
maintain relations with Cuba-Mexico, Bra-
zil, Uruguay. Chile, and Bolivia-to end their
ties. It is reported that the United States
has been stalling off the Venezuelan action.
If the reports are not true, the question re-
mains whether the United States has been
using Its full influence to persuade the Ave
to break relations. The issue is a practical
one. If the five states permit Cuban embas-
ales to operate in their countries, the sub-
version will spread throughout Latin Amer-
ica under the shelter of diplomatic immu-
nity, and subversives trained in Cuba and
the Soviet bloc will be free to undermine
other nations.
The fear of escalation
Undoubtedly, much of American policy Is
based on genuine fears-not only the fear of
consequences in other areas of the cold war,
or of the reactions in Latin American coun-
tries, but also the fear that decisive action
might escalate into a global, nuclear war.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
This of an, irrational fear, and it cannot
lightly be dismissed. But it is precisely be-
cause we are living in a world of risks that
leadership is necessary. Whoever would give
guidance to others must be capable of assess-
ing the risks, and then of acting. In a risk-
less world there would be no need for leader-
ship.
In his speech of October 22, 1962, President
Kennedy, said that the greater risk lay in
riot acting. Heconcluded that strong action
involved the lesser risk.
Whatever happens, the same task will re-
main: to follow the line of the lesser, more
manageable risk. In evaluating the hazards
of weak versus strong action, the Freedom
House conferees cited the following ques-
tions as most relevant:
1. To what extent will the risk of nuclear
war increase with the passage of time, in
view of the relative increase of Soviet nu-
clear capabilities?
2. What will be the effect of American
vacillation in Cuba on other sensitive fronts
of the cold war?
3. What will be the worldwide psycho-
logical impact of continued taunting propa-
ganda by Castro and the Soviets?
4. What are the probabilities that the
Cuban Communist base will be used against
us In the future under unpredictably
changed circumstances?
5, What will be the probable effectiveness
of the Cuban Communist base in under-
mining other Latin American governments,
with a consequent spread of communism in
the hemisphere?
The net effect of examining such factors
Is to suggest that a simple policy of risk
avoidance can lead only to the certainty of
a worsening position for the United States.
Indeed, it is more likely that an improve-
ment of our position will occur only from a
process of intelligent risk taking.
This was demonstrated in the October
confrontation. The administration took,
manageable risks rather than accept the cer-
tainty that the nuclear balance would swing
in Russia's direction and that Khrushchev's
capabilities for blackmail and attack would
be increased by the presence of Soviet mis-
siles in Cuba. Unfortunately, while It was
clearly willing to take risks in order to ob-
tain a Soviet pledge of an inspected with-
drawal of the missiles, there was no willing.
ness to take the risk of a followthrough. Is
there any practical value in running risks to
gain a pledge, and running no risks to en-
force it?
The fear of escalation, while it might logi-
cally deter certain types of all-out action,
has distorted the judgment of our decision-
makers on more limited action and narrower
sectors of strategy and tactics.
U.S. policy on exile activity
The conferees were especially troubled by
the deterioration in the relations between
the U.S. Government and the Cuban exiles,
whose principal concern is to find ways and
means of liberating their country. Does
this development foreshadow an ultimate
conflict between the freedom fighters' objec-
tive of liberation and an American policy of
containment? This disturbing question un-
derlay the discussion of American policy to-
ward the Cuban exiles.
Arguing that there. has been no consisten-
cy of purpose or action in our Government's
relations with Cuban activists in exile, con-
ferees cited these specific items:
We can understand the legal and techni-
cal reasons for withholding the use of U.S.
territory as a base for launching raids against
Cuba and against Soviet shipping bound for
Havana. But why was it considered neces-
sary to deprecate as "irresponsible, ineffect-
ive and dangerous" the raids and supplying
missions that originated outside the. United
States? Is that not inconsistent with our
official position that the Cubans themselves
must get rid- of the Castro dictatorship? .Does
it mean that the administration disapproves
of the rebel action in the mountains and
their use of sabotage against Castro? If we
favor. such action, can we expect the Cubans
to proceed without our help and in the face
of our public condemnation? In any case,
what are anti-Castro Cubans in exile or in-
side Cuba to conclude?
Miro Cardona and his council had urged
Cuban exiles to enlist in the V.S. Army for
training. Thousands of young Cuban exiles,
including many of the Bay of Pigs veterans,
did so, Why? What official representations
led them to believe that joining the U.S.
Army would offer them the best way of fight
ing for a free Cuba?
Reports of Central Intelligence Agency col-
laboration with the exiles seem to suggest
a conflict of policies and activities within the
administration. Has CIA at times followed
an independent line in conflict with that of
the State Department?
Attorney General Robert Kennedy appealed
to the Cuban exiles to unite in one organiza-
tion with which the U.S. Government could
.consult. Does this mean that the adminis-
tration disapproves of CIA's experiment in
favoring certain Cuban factions which has
merely increased the disunity? Does the
Attorney General's statement look toward the
recognition of a government in exile?
The answers to these questions are un-
certain, but they sustain the impression that
American policy toward the Cuban exiles has
lacked consistency and has not contributed
toward their unity essential for the fight
against Castro.
POLICY ON POST-CASTRo CUBA
American policy should not limit itself
to the overthrow of Castro. The attitude
of the United States toward the long-range
future of Cuba is itself a major strategic ele-
ment in the fight to end the Communist
regime.
Discussion among the conferees revealed
that little is known about the administra-
tion's orientation on this question. To be
sure, it would be tactically unwise for the
United States to appear to take any action
imposing or supporting a specific type of
regime. The very concept of democracy held
by the United States prohibits such a course
of action. Moreover, as a practical matter,
arty candidate selected by the United States
to succeed Castro would be rejected by
Cuban public opinion long before he reached
Havana.
Nevertheless, intelligent policy, used as a
guide for action, must have some orientation
on the possible alternatives that will be
available, or probable, when Castro Is driven
from the scene. These possibilities, which
American policy must take into account, in-
elude :
1. A Titoist Communist state in Cuba:
There are indications that this result might
be acceptable in certain American quarters.
There appear to be some who even believe
that a modus vivendi could be worked out
with a Communist Castro if, like the early
Tito, he breaks all ties with the Soviet
Union and ceases to be a tool of its foreign
and military policy.
2. A democratic Socialist state: This would
be a regime in the tradition of the Western
Socialist parties which are anti-Communist
but seek to resolve economic problems on
the basis of government planning and con-
trols. Pressure for such a form of govern-
ment might grow inside Cuba after Castro
is overthrown, the objective of the people
being to retain certain welfare programs and
socialized industries rather than restore a
free enterprise economy.
3. A liberal democracy: Another choice
might be a social, economic, and political
system resembling that of Western democ-
9879
racies in its fundamentals, but adapted to
Cuban conditions.
It is conceivable that Cuban exiles in the
United States could reconcile their . differ-
ences and join with the resistance forces
inside Cuba to form a provisional govern-
ment. Much would depend upon the com-
position of the forces which topple Castro.
American policy, of course, must not seek
to impose any regime on Cuba as a substi-
tute for the present one. The danger is that
its actions in relation to the exiles in the
United States-will be interpreted as favoring
or opposing one or more of the alternatives,
when in fact no formal decision has been
reached. The effect might then be to pro-
duce exactly the opposite of the one we might
ultimately find preferable.
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN CUBA
Despite the political retreat by Khrushchev
during the October-November crisis, there
is no reason to believe that the Russian dic-
tator has abandoned his hopes of maintain-
ing a Soviet base only 90 miles from U.S.
shores. That "Fortress Cuba" is- a military
threat in the Western Hemisphere is beyond
question: it is operating as the training
ground for guerilla warfare against Latin
American republics and as a center for the
spread of subversion, terror and sabotage.
The latest Soviet aim in Cuba is to use the
island as a base for medium-range missiles
which could completely circumvent U.S.
warning systems and keep a large part of
the hemisphere and the United States under
the constant threat of nuclear attack. (This
subject has most recently been treated in
the "Summary of Major Findings" on the
Soviet buildup in Cuba by the Prepared-
ness Investigating Subcommittee of the Sen-
ate Committee on Armed Services, May 9,
1963.) , In the absence of verified and precise
knowledge of the conditions inside Cuba,
American policy must be predicated on, the
assumption that the danger is real and will
persist.
Other Soviet aims in Cuba have been
achieved:
1. Castro has been supplied with the latest
weapons to fend off an invasion from with-
out or- an uprising of the people from within.
What still remains is*for the Russian ex-
perts to train . Cuban Communists in han-
dling these weapons. According to some
military- opinion, this will take 4 to 6 years.
The Castro regime argues that it has the
right, as a sovereign power, to invite mili-
tary assistance from a foreign country.
2. Cuba has been converted into a Com-
munist West Point for the training of officers
intended to lead military attacks on existing
regimes. The island will eventually be the
arsenal of Latin American revolutions, from
which swift military support can be given to
the creation of "new Cubas."
3. With its 150 operational jet fighter
bombers, which have a substantial range,
Cuba is in a position to control the air over
a number of small, nearby countries. (It is
reported that some policy makers in Wash-
illgton find comfort in the fact that all this
lethal equipment is under the control of
Soviet officers rather than the hard-core
Castro Communists who incline toward the
more reckless views of the Chinese.) -
American policy at the present time is
focused, however, on the issue of the missile
buildup in Cuba, There is little confidence
-that Khrushchev has actually carried out his
pledge of last October-November. Russian
credibility was completely destroyed by the
fact that the prelude to the crisis was a
direct face-to-face lie by Foreign Secretary
Andrei Gromyko to President Kennedy on
the very subject of missiles in Cuba. In the
absence of on-site inspection, there can be
no certainty that all the missiles and nuclear
warheads have been removed. Some could
have been installed in caves from which they
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE . ' 10
can be fired with perhaps as great precision
as missiles from an underwater Polaris.
Moreover, the Soviet troops and technical ad-
visers, even If we accept the lowest estimate
of their numbers. an accomplish significant
secret preparations, partly protected by
darkness, cloud formations, and other simi-
lar Impediments to aerial surveillance.
After the Kremlin took such large risks to
execute the buildup, one does not have to
be of a suspicious nature to wonder what
12,500 to 30,000 Russian military personnel
would be doing in Cuba.
Continuance of the status quo-the un-
certainty about the missiles and the absolute
certainty of the Soviet Army presence-ob-
vlously has strong implications about our
global position and could lead to even more
serious consequences than we have already
suffered. Both President Eisenhower and
President Kennedy have categorically de-
clared that a Communist base In this hem-
isphere would never be tolerated. The fact
that a Soviet base is now being tolerated
can lead the enemy to the kind of mtseal-
culation that might be disastrcus. A mis-
reading of our equivocation could, Induce
probing adventures elsewhere. Also, our ac-
ceptance of the situation could be taken as
some justification for the Chinese view that
strong-arm methods do work in dealing with
the "degenerate democracies."
But most serious of all, the continued
presence of Soviet military forces In Cuba
could provide the very spark that Ignites a
nuclear war. The United States has warned
that it will not stand by and allow Soviet
forces to quell an uprising in Cuba as they did
In Hungary. Any incident-a barroom brawl
with Soviet soldiers in Havana, a flareup of
tempers over a child run down by a Soviet
jeep-could lead to Russian shooting, even
in self-defense. As long as Russian troops
are in Cuba. -peace is endangered by the
possibility of an accident. Emotions in this
country might well make It impossible for
any administration to control the conse-
quences, which could escalate Into nuclear
war.
Precisely because the situation endangers
peace, and because It threatens Khrushchev's
policy of coexistence there is some leverage
In persuading the Russians to withdraw.
But this can be done only if the United
States persists in applying pressure.
A CONSSNSUS Poe ACTION
Readers of this report are aware of the
diversity of views that were brought to the
conference table at Gould House. Early in
the proceedings, a formal opinion survey has
made the conferees conscious of their differ-
ences, the significance of which was explored
thoroughly in the ensuing sessions. Ulti-
mately, however, the incisive, and often
pointed debate revealed an extraordinary
amount of agreement on fundamentals. (A
listing of alternatives will be found in ap-
pendix I at the end of this report.)
It should be underscored that the follow-
Ing effort to state a consensus is not in-
tended to suggest unanimity on all its com-
ponents. The task of formulating crucial
policy to never really completed, and those
who contribute to it render their greatest
service by expressing dissents, probing for
weaknesses and asserting their own personal
Insights.
The lack of public information'
It was recognized that the Implementation
of policy may sometimes call for a withhold-
ing of information when publication might
automatically defeat the objective. But the
conferees felt that the effect ofcurrent prac-
tice was to hinder the formation of American
public opinion rather than obstruct the
enemy. Many participants indicated their
belief that some kind of negotiations were
being conducted off-the-record In the effort
to balance the Interests of one sector of West-
ern defense against the interests of another.
It was acknowledged that the President
alone was In posession of the fullest body of
information, while others who seek proposed
courses of action must do so with less than
complete knowledge. In a free society the
concerned citizen has no other alternative
but to proceed on the basis of the limited
information available.
At the same time, it is a legitimate and
essential demand on the part of the citizen
that his Government clearly expound Its
policies and thus expose them to the whole-
some Influence of public debate. Such an
exposition, to be constructive, must be con-
ducted In an atmosphere of bipartisanship
which has been missing from recent dis-
cussions In which both parties have been
seeking political advantage. A bipartisan
approach, of course, cannot be Invoked
merely for the convenience of the party in
power. any more than the difficulties created
by our adversaries abroad may be properly
used as ammunition in political campaigns.
Nor should national debate be suspended by
bipartisanship, the function of which is to
nourish discussion by providing conditions
favorable to intelligent appraisal. Certainly
no political party has a right to utilize a pe-
riod of great national anxiety and difficulty
to further narrow party purposes.
Every American who ventures to suggest
a policy on Cuba must recognize that there
is an enormous difference between presenting
the most intelligent critique of policy and
actually carrying the awesome responsibility
for the consequences. The effect of such
awareness should be to temper forms of ex-
pression but it should not reduce the per-
sonal responsibility of the citizen to seek
and advocate solutions for our national
problem.
Definition of the American commitment
Both political parties seem to be united
on the objective-freedom for Cuba. To
carry out appropriate measures will call for
a national unity such as prevailed In the
October crisis. But we must be prepared
for the fact that future measures will have
to be more numerous, more involved, per-
haps more onerous and surely less dramatic,
requiring a longer period of application than
the quarantine during the fall of 1962. Bi-
partisan consultations are needed now to
reach a broad, long-range understanding.
This Is possible, however, only if the ad-
ministration recognizes that it is responsible
for providing leadership in a national dis-
cussion of the Cuban problem. It must sup-
ply the needed facts and it must clearly ar-
ticulate the country's objectives.
No responsible American doubts the desire
of the administration to see Cuba ultimately
free and meanwhile to prevent Castro from
spreading Communist dictatorship to other
parts of the hemisphere. It can certainly
be assumed that Washington Is committed
to eliminating the Soviet political and mili-
tary base from Cuba eventually and to
blocking Sino-Soviet ambitions in Latin
America. What Is needed Is a commitment
to urgent and immediate action, unambig-
uously expressed to the Nation and the
world. It is Imperative that our people, our
allies, and especially our enemies, clearly
understand that this Government Intends
to use all its power to achieve the objective.
All must know that we not only want to
free Cuba but we are determined to help It
become free--without undue delays. Any
doubts on this score must be dispelled-for
example, by publication of the correspon-
dence between Khrushchev and the Presi-
dent during and following the October con-
frontation. So long as the record is with-
held, there will be rumors and apprehen-
sions, at home and abroad, about our Cuban
commitment. There must be no gap be-
tween word and deed.
Providing leadership
Because the Cuban Issue deserves high
priority and as an evidence of the Intention
to act decisively, the administratiu- must
assign top national leadership to concentrate
on this area of national concern. The ap-
pointment of an outstanding personality
to a Federal post on Cuban or Latin American
affairs will symbolize the importance we
assign to the problem and should help to
improve our performance. Arrangements
should be made to call together Department
of State personnel, both incumbent and
retired, who know the problems and can com-
municate effectively with our OAS allies to
win support for U.S. policies and actions.
The Alliance for Progr6s
Thoughtful Americans support the Alliance
for Progress. Experience demonstrates that
the Communists cannot be defeated in their
drive for world domination by purely defen-
alve action or negative opposition. The jus-
tification of the free world lies in its promise
of a better life to the individual. For mil-
lions of hungry, Illiterate people, living in
mud huts and doomed to early death, free-
dom means, above all, a chance towork and
live In dignity. Their yearning for escape
from hardship makes them an easy prey for
the demagog who holds out glittering pros-
pects under communism.
Every effort must be made, through the
Alliance for Progress, to raise the living
standards of Central and South America,
But the program will succeed only If the
people can see and feel the advances. Un-
fortunately, so long as communism can use
Cuba as a base for subversion, economic pro-
gress will be sabotaged by the Communists,
on the one hand, or strangled by rightists
who use the threat of communism to oppose
essential reforms. Awareness of these obsta-
cles should lead us to increase, not diminish,
our zeal for strengthening the economies of
our neighbors to the south. We must be
prepared for an up-hill struggle against re-
action, corruption and communism-all foes
of an effective Alliance for Progress.
But there may be an even more serious
danger to the Alliance for Progress-our own
illusion that it can succeed by itself. The
Communists can destroy faster than others
can build. The Alliance for Progress must
therefore not be considered as a substitute
for direct, militant opposition to commu-
nism. It is but one of the weapons that
must be brought Into action. The Marshall
plan did not really take hold until NATO
provided a shield against the military threat
of communism. So too the Alliance for
Progress needs an alliance for freedom as a
shield against Communist violence and
sabotage.
The achievement of progress in Latin
America will require the development of lo-
cal leaders, dedicated to freedom and capable
of standing as "a wall of dedicated men"
against the Inroads of totalitarian tyranny.
Theirs will be the task of combating the
agents now being trained in Cuba and Russia.
Even after the liberation of Cuba, Latin
America will be confronted by a formidable
disruptive force because of those who have
already been taught Communist subversion
and guerrilla warfare In Castro's and Khru-
shchev's schools of revolution. They will be
defeated only if the free world Is defended by
trained men who possess the skills of demo-
cratic leadership.
The activities of the Alliance for Prog-
ress-such as the labor Institutes now under-
way-must be enlarged. The OAS should be
encouraged to set up additional training cen-
ters in democratic countries like Costa Rica
and Venezuela, with U.S. supported facili-
ties and teachers. We must fight commu-
nism with trained minds as well as good
hearts.
This need grows all the more urgent be-
cause Communist attacks on the weak spots
in Latin America increase the danger of a
resort to military dictatorships like the
Peralta junta In Guatemala. Such a trend
would multiply our difficulties and jeopar-
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19 6 ` ? CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD --SENATE
diz ?fie cause of freedom. We cannot af-
ford to be caught In the crossfire of a battle
between the extremists. To escape such a
dilemma, we must take timely action in but-
tressing a system of inter-American democ-
racy. Our need is for knowledgeable leader-
ship in all our embassies and agencies in the
field as well as at the top. Only by putting
our best men in strategic posts can we hope
to handle the explosive situations if and
when they occur.
Aid to the Cuban exiles
Cuba's proudest hope is the resistance of
its patriots to Communist domination. No
act of the American Government should
downgrade their courage; every pronounce-
ment should aim to uplift the morale of
freedom-loving Cubans everywhere.
We have a considerable responsibility for
helping the exiles to achieve unity in their
own ranks. We injure such unity if we play
favorites among factions. We must encour-
age all groups to select responsible leaders
with whom the U.S. Government can co-
operate for the common cause. Through
every possible channel, we must assist the
organized underground inside Cuba, bring-
ing to bear our extensive resources and
experience.
Exile and underground activity has many
values. Not the least is 'the fact that it
warns the Soviet interventionists that
seizure of other men's countries will bring
inevitable retaliatory action. If Communists
can promote phony wars of liberation, we
can and should support real ones.
The presence of Cuban refugees in the
United States, now numbering about 250,000,
presents as with a rare opportunity. These
men and women are the only major groups
of exiles since World War II who have any
reasonable prospect of an early return to a
liberated homeland.
Cuba's problems will not end with the
overthrow of the Communists. If those
problems are solved by a future democratic
regime, a powerful blow will have been
struck for liberation everywhere behind the
Iron Curtain. Thus, we contribute to the
caution everywhere. In the context of the
Sino-Soviet dispute, American toughness
justifies Khrushchev's position of restraint,
while any evidence that the United States
is a "paper tiger" would strengthen Mao's
call for aggression.
In any case, If choices must be made as to
where we should take. bold stands, Cuba is
the most logical place. The Soviet Union
has overextended itself geographically by
reaching into the Caribbean. Of all the
fronts on which we face each other, Cuba is
militarily Russia's weakest, and our strong-
est. The only Russian chance for success in
such a contest would be to. convert the local
conflict into a general war-clearly too fear-
ful a price for so small a prize. Moreover,
military opinion considers the risk of general
war in the near future relatively small be-
cause the Kremlin knows that. It could not
win. The record already shows that the
Soviets have almost always backed away from
action that might lead to general war when
the United States has taken a firm stand, as
in Cuba last October and in Berlin sinel3
Khrushchev issued his original ultimatum in
November 1958.
The risks of Inaction, however, must be
spelled out also in terms of the impact on
the non-Communist world. There is the
risk-indeed, almost a certainty-that inac-
tion will encourage neutralism. If the United
States can accommodate itself to the indef-
inite perpetuation of a Communist regime in
Cuba, why should not the rest of Latin
America? And the consequence will be a
steady seepage of communism into the other
islands of the Caribbean and the other Latin
countries of the hemisphere. At the same
time, in Europe and Asia, countries contigu-
ous with the Iron Curtain will have every
reason to ask: If the United States dare not
uproot communism from its own doorstep,
how can we expect it to risk anything on our
behalf?
The freeing of Cuba, not ultimately but
soon, must be the aim of U.S. policy imple-
mented by a practical program of.hction.
CONCLUSION: THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESIDENT
oppressed people In. Cuba and all the satei- The men and women who assembled at
lites when we provide special study oppor-? the invitation of Freedom House were sym-
tunities to the refugees now within our , pathetic to the heavy burden carried by
shores. By training them in the fields of
democratic government, public administra-
tion, industrial and agricultural manage-
ment, :defense, public safety and order, pub-
lic education, we can lay the foundations for
a wholesome future.
THE TAKING OF RISKS
Underlying the discussion of policy and
action was the question: What risks are
Americans willing to take in response to
Communist expansionism and which policy
is likely to minimize the risks?
We are most in danger of Communist at-
tack, whether from Peking or Moscow, when
our indecision suggests fear, weakness, or in-
eptness. We are safest when our. adversary
realizes that we are clear about our objec-
tives and determined in pursuing them.
Timing is, of course, a crucial factor in
assessing risk. The Freedom House con-
ferees tended to the view that the risks later
will be more formidable than the risks now.
Even on the assumption that time is In-
evitably on our side, which we do not accept,
one cannot be sanguine about a Sovietized
Cuba that brings a large portion of the
United States and Western Hemisphere with-
in easy range of Communist missiles and
nuclear warheads.
The conference was aware that the major
premise of present policy is the assumption
that action on Cuba must be delayed because
of risks to our position elsewhere in the
world. But the conferees were impressed by
the fact that the U.S. position in October,
far from provoking Communist adventures,
forced the Soviet leaders to act with greater
the President of the United States and his
advisers. Theirs is a fearsome responsibility
in these days of civilization's great dilemma.
As we were meeting, Haiti became a close
second in the Caribbean developments of
deep concern to the United States. South-
east Asia Is engaging our attention and
costing American lives. Berlin is always in
the wings. The complexity of these inter-
related problems must not be minimized
by those who seek to be helpful in the
finding of solutions. Our chosen leaders
should be able to count on the cooperation
of all Americans in the effort to solve the
gigantic problems confronting the Nation
and the world. And they have a duty to
do all in their power to create a spirit of
national unity that will prepare us for the
crises ahead.
Both the cooperation and the national
unity can be achieved only if the people
have access to relevant information, study
every suggested solution, and develop a
consensus for, action. Our leaders must
keep us informed of the facts and their
plans for the future; we must keep our lead-
ers Informed of 'the people's judgment and
willingness to sacrifice.
This is the discourse of democracy. Only
through such an interchange between the
people and their Government can America
find the way toward freedom and peace in
the difficult days ahead.
APPENDIX I: A PANORAMA OF ALTERNATIVES
From the vantage point of their own con-
tact with the problems of Latin America and
the cold war, the conferees attempted to
9881
formulate their personal conclusions within
the framework of these parameters:
1. Questions of high policy: (a) What do
we regard as indispensable? (b) What is
Intolerable?
2. What costs and risks are acceptable in
achieving our objectives?
3. How much action, and what. kind, is
needed and feasible on the part of (a) the
United States; (b) Cuban exiles; (c) the
underground in Cuba; (d) the Organization
of American States; (e) NATO?
4. What mix of measures would be most
effective, including (a) refugee training for
service in a liberated Cuba; (b) propaganda
and psychological warfare; (c) economic iso-
lation of Cuba; (d) support of sabotage and
rebel forces; (e) aid to insurrection; (f)
Para-military and military actions?
Freedom House commends this formulation
to other discussion groups as a helpful tool
in studying one of- our most urgent prob-
lems. It use In the sessions of this confer-
ence proved profitable in laying out at least
a partial list of alternative policies and ac-
tion points. They are listed here, not as
points advocated by the conference or even
by the indivduals who presented them but
as evidences of the fact that a frank facing
of our position reveals many directions-of
varying merit, to be sure-in which we -can
go. Many of the proposals are contradictory
in some respects or even mutually exclusive.
They nevertheless help to illuminate the
areas in which decisions must be made con-
sciously rather than by default.
TOP-LEVEL DECISIONS
1. Insist as a basic premise that Castro-
communism must go or be defeated.
2. Seek to coexist with a Communist Cuba
headed by Castro or some other ruler.
HEMISPHERIC POLICY
1. Reassert the Monroe Doctrine, or a
modernized version.
2. Announce U.S. support for all dedicated
democrats who fight for freedom against
dictatorship anywhere in the hemisphere.
8. Proclaim a hemisphere-wide right of
self-determination, accepting any demo-
cratic. decision on the form of government
and social system so -long as "human rights
and fundamental freedoms" are observed.
4. Help to organize a Latin American
Treaty Organization (LATO) outside the
OAS, which would welcome all nondictator-
fal states willing to ally themselves for pur-
poses of military defense after the pattern of
NATO. (It Is assumed that several of the
larger Latin American states would be re-
luctant to join, and that dictatorships like
Haiti, Paraguay, etc., would be barred.)
5. Rally nongovernmental organizations
throughout the hemisphere, Including busi-
ness groups and labor unions, for freedom
and social justice.
6. Declare that the United States oppose
Communist penetration but not revolution-
ary social change in Latin America.
DIRECT PRESSURE ON CM
1. Assert a policy of collective measures
against Cuba based on a rigorous implemen-
tation of the Rio treaty, the Bogata pact, and
the Punta del Este resolutions.
2. Repeal or amend the U.S. Neutrality
Acts.
S. Organize a tight OAS embargo against
trade, communications, and travel between
member states and Cuba; any states reject-
ing participation to forfeit U.S. aid.
4. In cooperation with Venezuela, exert
effective pressure on the five OAS members
still maintaining diplomatic relations with
.Cuba to sever their ties. -
5. Withdraw U.S. recognition of the Castro
government.
6. Propose an OAS study of the steps
deemed necessary to achieve the objective of
a free Cuba.
7. Impose comprehensive sanctions on
shipping to include all vessels of any line
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE a 10
that uses as much as one of Its ships in the
Cuban trade.
8. Use preemptive buying to tighten the
noose on Castro's economy.
9. Press OAS to Impose the same quaran-
tine on Communist Cuba as It did on Tru-
jillo's Dominican Republic.
10. Citizen groups in this country should
cooperate with free Cuba committees in our
sister Republics.
11. Press NATO countries to curtail the
sale of any goods to the iron Curtain coun-
tries of the type being supplied to Cuba by
the Communists.
12. Quarantine Cuba against receiving any
weapons, whether called offensive or de-
fensive.
13. Quarantine all shipments of petroleum
to Cuba.
14. Promote the organization of an OAS
task force and prepare an OAS Invasion force
to be used as a last resort.
AID TO ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS
1. Arm and assist Cuban freedom fighters
Inside and outside of Cuba; encourage
sabotage and raids.
2. Help establish bases for Cuban rebels
outside U.S. territory.
3. Publicize the extent and character of
current Cuban resistance.
4. Launch a major propaganda effort
through all media, calling for public support
of a Radio Free Cuba.
6. In cooperation with Cuban exiles, start
OAS work on "winning the peace" to a free
Cuba.
6. Help to organize a Cuban Government-
In-exile.
POST-CA.STRO CUBA
1. Create OAS machinery for governing
liberated countries and conducting elections
under preplanned rules, to be available for
action In Cuba, Haiti, and elsewhere.
2. Provide opportunities for qualified Cuban
refugees to receive advanced training In their
fields and to conduct studies on problems
they will face In a liberated Cuba.
3. Prepare plans for the political. social,
and economic future of a free Cuba.
4. Declare that Cubans must and will
choose their own form of government.
REMOVING TILE RUSSIANS
1. Announce that the removal of Soviet
troops from Cuba has first priority In Amer-
lea's agenda.
2. Adopt a formal decision that Soviet
troops and technicians must be repatriated
within a stated time or face measures of
expulsion.
3. Impose an OAS quarantine or blockade
if necessary to expel Soviet forces or bring
down the Cuban Communist regime-any
states rejecting participation to forfeit U.S.
Ltd.
4. Establish GAB teams to inspect all ships
bound for Cuba.
APPENDIX rI: OPINION BuavET ON CUBAN
POLICY
The following questions were formulated
by a subcommittee in the light of the first
day's discussion. Participants were requested
to Indicate their views by choosing among
four possible replies: (1) Yes; (2) Qualified;
(3) No; (4) Qualified No. The qualified re-
plies were intended to indicate the respond-
ent's degree of conviction about his views.
During the poll, 25 participants were present.
Questions
Yes (
Qualified
yes
No
Quell(ied
no
Absten-
Lion
1. Iles Washington reached an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on
Cubs? ------------------------------------------------------
2. Is Washington tntete.etsd In reaching an agreement with the
7
9
2
7
U.S.S.R. on Cuba?______________________ _
U
8
0
0
3
3. Is Washington fully committed ors a policy to bring down
Castro in practical terms?
-----------------------------------
4. Does the adminisiralion believe that Russian troops will Leave
3
6
it
8
e
Cuba?------------------------------------------------------
6. ffas Washington reached a decision not to art exocpt as it Is
6
7
8
1
4
presently acting?--------------------------------------------
6
6
4
2
2
6. Does Washington wish an exile Cuban (lovernment?.........
1
1
20
2
1
7. Does Washington hope to pry Castro loose from the U.S.S.R.?.
2
S
8
8
7
8. Does Washington have a plan on Cuba?----------------------
9. Does the administration think It runs a seri
k
i
f l
i
1
6
13
4
2
ng
ous r
s
o
os
the 1964 election If Castro remmains?-------------------------
4
2
18
2
4
10. Can Castro's regime be toppled-
(a) With
ut U
B
ilit
i
. m
o
.
ary aM
on?._-------_. ---._.--_.
(b) Without an invasion by the Unit
d st
?
t
10
21
11
8
0
1
e
es
-----------
a
11. Do President Belaneonrt of Venezuela, former President
1
0
0
8
Figueres of Costs Rica, and others want sterner U.S. action
than presently exists?------------ -- -- ---- --
19
2
0
1.
12. Would Brazil and Mexico be ready to support such action?--.
13. Can Castro-Communist subversion In Latin Ameri
b
4
18
2
1
6
ca
e con-
tained without action larger than presently exists? ------- --.
2
2
19
1
1
14. Is It U.S. policy to oppose widespread and organised internal
sabotage against Castro? ............................. ----_.
~
0
7
12
2
4
15. Is the United States opposing oil refinery sabotage becansa
former and future U
S
ti
. proper
.
es are Involved?.-_------_-.
0
1
11
4
9
10. Were the hit-and-run raids contributing to creating difficulties
for Castro?---------- -----` ---------- - - --------.
20
2
1
0
2
17. Did raid? not based on U.S. soil endanger the pesos?..--__--..
1
2
18
1
8
18. Does the administration count on or believe It can Isolate
Cuba? .-?------------------------- ----------------------`
19. Does the administration believe that continued economic
10
9
0
2
4
pressure will topple Castro? _____________________________?_-.
4
9
4
2
20. Is Washington'sconcernwith nuclear raida-
- (a) A significant cause of Inaction? ----------- ?-----_-_---_
6
8
5
2
6
(b) Orlsitarstlonalizatlon tosuppportitapre ant policeyy?-.
21. Does theU
S
OevernmentbaveapolIcyoftiberationofC
bs?
8
4
7
2
2
6
.
.
.
u
6
8
. 4
a
Apart from Cuba, bow many in this room are friendly to the administration, or opposed to the administration?
Fdendly------ ---..? ....................
Abstention----------------------?.__......... - ??.?....._........_..._....._.._... -
FOREIGN AID AND THE AMEt.,_' AN
PUBLIC
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, as
the foreign aid program for next year is
now being presented to the appropriate
committees In the Senate and the House,
the question of support for the foreign
aid program by the American public
once again is being raised. Once again
a good deal of mythology is being
spawned about the unpopularity of the
foreign aid program with the American
public. And it is being circulated with-
out any prior examination of the facts,
the facts about the American public's
true views on the program.
In essence, unlike much of the con-
ventional wisdom that has been peddled
about the alleged unpopularity of the
foreign aid program, there is clear evi-
dence to indicate that foreign aid is now
more popular than ever with the Ameri-
can people. In fact, a recent Gallup Poll
indicated that popular support of the
foreign aid program is at a high point
for the entire 9-year period. How-
ever, the poll also indicated that the
American public is also gravely misin-
formed about the facts of foreign aid.
These facts relate to such basic matters
as percentage of gross national product
devoted to foreign aid, percentage of the
Federal budget, and actual amounts. It
is most important that supporters of
foreign aid do a far better job in bring-
Ing these facts to the American people.
In a recent speech before the National
Conference on International Economic
and Social Development, I have
attempted to evaluate some of the salient
factors about the American public's
of this speech be inserted into the
RECORD.
There being no objection
the s
e
h
,
p
ec
' was ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follows:
FoRxiow AID AND rss AMERfCAN PUBLIC
(Speech delivered by Senator ROBERT H.
HnsvnaxT before the National Conference
on International Economic and Social De-
velopment, Mayflower Hotel, Washington,
D.C.. May 29, 1963)
Discussion about the foreign aid program
this past 2 months has invariably centered
around the Clay report. Some of this dis-
cussion has been illuminating and helpful;
much has been confused and harmful.
One of the most misguided arguments
raised in the discussion of the Clay report is
that which'contends that since the foreign
aid program is more unpopular today than
ever before, a critical report will only tend
to Increase the unpopularity of foreign aid
among the American public. This argument
is based on a fundamentally unsound pre-
mise-that foreign aid Is unpopular with the
American people. On the question of the
popularity of foreign aid, I should like to call
attention to a recent Gallup poll released
Which indicated that, contrary to a wide-
spread mythology. foreign aid is more popu-
lar with the American public today than
ever before.
A study of a whole sequence of findings of
the Gallup polls from 1955 to 1963 shows
that;
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