WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS Week Ending 23 May 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000100030008-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 23, 1970
• Content Type: PERRPT

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000100030008-3
Csa/sAVA /wdtL 7)60J-a3
WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS
Week Ending 23 May 1970
NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
For the President Only mom
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000100030008-3
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000100030008-3
SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS
1968-1970
Weekly average for each month
FEBRUARY -MAY 1970
Weekly data as reported
500
400
300
200
100
US BATTLE DEATHS were significantly lower at 143
500
400
100
0
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
mat rianoi intends to place at
least three new battalion size
groups in the pipeline during the
coming week.
ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS increased sharply to 1050 from
April
800
600
400 i
200
0
i
March April' May June
contrasted with last week's 217.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS declined again to 308 from last
f ebruary March Aprfil May week's 380. The official total
will change as late reports are
received and will be lower than
II . figures released to the press by
the GVN.
February:
INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE remain at zero for the week. Re-
cent intercepts, however, reveal
March April Mn,,
_I?.
expected upsurge in harassing
attacks.
ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION decreased to 3321 from last
SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS
April i May 'June".
60
50
40
30
20.
i0
7 14 21 28 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25 2 9 16 23 30 6
90% February
80
70
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
last week's 822 reflecting the
June
as measured by the percentage
of enemy killed by RVN forces
rose to 68% from last week's 60%.
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Enemy Activity
In South Vietnam, attacks by fire and limited ground probes early
in the week increased the level of enemy-initiated activity as antici-
pated, but were less intense than the attacks in other recent upsurges.
The Communists are now attempting to prepare for the final phase of
their "spring" campaign scheduled for the first week in June, but con-
tinue to be plagued by supply problems and thrown off balance by pre-
emptive Allied operations.
In Laos, monsoon-like rains throughout the country hampered both
friend and foe during the past week and no significant gains were made
by either side. The Communists still appear intent on maintaining their
forward positions in north Laos while continuing to apply pressure in
the south.
Allied search operations in Cambodia are still encountering only
light enemy opposition but are causing further retrenchment by the
enemy and are reducing Communist pressures in several areas of the
country. Revised data on the volume of enemy materiel captured in
.Cambodia thus far indicate that ammunition losses amount to between
52% and 88% of the estimate of enemy stockpiles of ammunition in
Cambodia at the start of. Allied operations. These'losses equate to
about 72% of the enemy ammunition captured in South Vietnam last year.
Loss of these supplies has inflicted a sharp blow to the enemy's logis-
tical system in Cambodia, but it must be remembered that the enemy re-
tains intact stockpiles in Laos and South Vietnam and has the capability
to mount a major resupply effort to rebuild the supplies lost to the
Allies.
Enemy Infiltration
Although no new groups were observed in the pipeline during the
week., enemy communications-reveal that at least three battalion-size
groups are scheduled to enter the pipeline during the coming week. If
they are in fact inserted, these three groups, totaling nearly 1,800
.men, will be the first normal infiltration groups to start south in
over six weeks. The significance of their entrance into the system
cannot yet be determined. The number of infiltrators entering the pipe-
line since 23 October 1969 remains at some 58,000-59,500.
South Vietnam Developments
An added dividend from the Cambodian operation has been a spate
of Communist ralliers and prisoners in the border area, including a
deputy commander of Sub-Region 2, the chief of the cryptographic unit
of SR-2 headquarters, a member of COSVN's Finance-Economy section, and
a cadre from COSVN's J-3 signal office. Interrogation of these cadres
in depth should considerably improve our knowledge of the Communist
command structure.
The government's carrot and stick approach to domestic dissent
seems to be producing at least temporary surface calm, as only low-
key protest activity by the students and veterans occurred last week.
Some student violence may occur later this' week, however, in response
to an alleged request by the American National Students Association
that the Saigon Student Union support the 30 May anti-war demonstra-
tions in the U.S. by staging complementary demonstrations in Saigon
a day or two before the student demonstrations in the U.S.
Despite historically-rooted animosities that are still strong, a
number of liaison channels have been established between Vietnamese
and Cambodian officials. (These are in fact so numerous and
uncoordinated, on both sides, that they clearly contain adverse poten-
tial for duplication, confusion, and irritation.) Military liaison
ranges from casual exchanges between commanders in the field to formal
contacts between the two general staffs; permanent military missions are
planned on both sides. In the civilian sector, the GVN is represented
in Phnom Penh by the Foreign Ministry, a refugee mission, and the.
Central Intelligence Organization. In addition, there have been
direct meetings between Cambodian officials and Vice President Ky, with
Ky initially acting in a self-appointed role not entirely to President
Thieu's liking. However, both Thieu and Ky are now beginning to work
in concert and Ky will represent the GVN on a visit to Phnom Penh to
ratify the accords drawn up by the GVN and Cambodian Foreign Ministers.
Other problems connected with these poorly coordinated channels will be
.discussed with Thieu by Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams when they
meet on 27 May.
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Communist Developments
Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement on Indochina and a massive rally
the following day underscored Peking's support for Sihanouk and the
Indochinese People's struggle, but did not hint at any change in
China's cautious and prudent approach to military involvement in the
conflict. In the present situation, Peking seems to be attempting to
gain some. of its foreign policy objectives by militant propaganda in-
volving no risk. Peking'would clearly like to expand its influence in
Hanoi, and Indochina, and concomitantly see Moscow's influence reduced.
While its action commitments to date have been typically cautious,
Peking is obviously intrigued by the potential recent developments may
offer, especially Cambodian developments, for improving its position
in Indochina, at Moscow's expense, and perhaps hastening the forced
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia.
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000100030008-3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000100030008-3