SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT (Sanitized))

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001200010002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1979
• Content Type: PAPER

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So, ie Ls . )re1 ;
On the rye of t-
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Assessment 25X1
Center
Soviet Foreign Policy
On the Eve of the Summit
Information as of 12 June 1979 has been used
in preparing this report.
The author of this paper is
USSR-Eastern Europe Division, Office of Political
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcomed and
should be directed to
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Confidential
PA 79-10264
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Confidential
Soviet Foreign Policy
On the Eve of the Summit
D
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Key Judgments The Soviets would like to use the US-USSR summit meeting to restore the
notion of the centrality of Soviet-American relations in world politics, .o
counter the diplomatic activity of China, and to demontrate that impoi [ant
US interests could be affected as a result of changes in relations with the
USSR. They have been dissatisfied with the state of Soviet-American
relations and want the summit to impart a more positive tone and foster the
impression of greater stability and, if possible, of restored forward
momentum. This in turn is intended to head off the dangers that the USSR
perceives in China's rapprochement with the United States and to pros cote
the process of detente in Europe. Moscow also wants to impress on its clients
that its relationship with the United States is helpful to their interests,
although Moscow cannot be perceived as sacrificing the interests of its
clients to detente.
The Soviets can be expected to insist on resolving regional conflicts on ;heir
own terms. They will take a major share of credit for "stabilizing" the
situations in Angola and Ethiopia, and will not see any merit in peacef -I
solutions in Africa that might help the United States and the West sal' age
their own interests. The Soviets will be particularly assertive in responding
to the recent Egyptian-Israeli treaty, which Moscow will interpret as
evidence of US exploitation of Soviet geopolitical weakness in the Middle
East. President Brezhnev will be concerned with the possibility of an
increased US military role in both Egypt and Israel, reminiscent of US
monitoring in the Sinai following the disengagement agreements in 19"4
and 1975.
The Soviets are likely to be more defensive and even truculent in those .reas
where they perceive US manipulation of Soviet anxieties over China's
relations with the USSR and the United States. The Soviets have been
worried about the possibility of improved Sino-US relations since the e, id of
the Cultural Revolution 10 years ago ushered in a new phase of Chines y
foreign policy. Moscow's posit ive response to China's recent bid for tal~.s
aimed at improved relations was designed in part to bolster the USSR'
tactical position before the summit.
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Soviet Foreign Policy
On the Eve of the Summit
As the summit approaches, President Brezhnev and
the Soviet leadership can view their country's position
in the world with considerable satisfaction. The
current balance of military power has markedly
reduced the likelihood of major reversals in central
areas of Soviet interest in Europe and in the standoff
with China. Soviet strength has also reduced the
probability of unmanageable crises in the Middle East
and Africa. There may be domestic crises in Eastern
Europe, but the Soviets remain confident that they can
be confronted without risk of military intervention by
the West.
Part of the Soviet mood is a sense of momentum during
Brezhnev's stewardship in the USSR's favor in the
Third World. This is largely a matter of growth
relative to the United States and the West as a whole,
which finds Soviet international prestige on a more
solid footing today than was the case in Khrushchev's
day. In the Middle East, the fall of the Shah and the
signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has created
a more congenial policy environment for them to
exploit. They are likely to draw some encouragement
about their prospects in Africa following successful
interventions in Angola and Ethiopia. Successes in
Africa have also enhanced the development of a strong,
long-term relationship with Cuba, and the Soviets are
probably anticipating opportunities for acquiring sta-
ble and relatively hospitable partners like Fidel Castro.
Differences over Africa.
The Soviets have already given notice that they are not
impressed with the US argument that their actions in
Africa have broken the unwritten rules of detente. The
Soviets will take a major share of credit for "stabiliz-
ing" the situations in Angola and Ethiopia, and they
will argue with their US counterparts that Africa
should not be allowed to affect important questions of
East-West relations. The Soviets realize that they are
newcomers in Africa, and they are sensitive to any
suggestion that they do not have at least as much right
to be involved as other outside powers. They believe
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their own propaganda, moreover, and regard Western
influence in Africa as a relic of the colonial past.
Clearly, the Soviets believe that the "wheel of history"
is turning in their direction on the African continent.
Mindful of US accusations about Soviet activ ties in
Africa, Brezhnev will probably respond by cri, icizing
the United States for trying to weaken the Pa, riotic
Front in Zimbabwe and to isolate the black nationalist
leadership in southern Africa. He might atterhpt to use
the summit meetings to learn more about US, fforts to
deal with southern Africa, and he will be sons tive to
the suspicion of Soviet clients that Moscow's position
in Africa could be mortgaged to detente and SALT II.
The Soviet leadership believes that it holds on-- of the
keys to solving the major confrontations on th,:
continent and will insist that the US cooperate with the
USSR on dealing with the Horn, Namibia, and even
Zimbabwe. The Soviets will not see any merit in
peaceful solutions in Africa that might help the United
States and the West to salvage their own interests.
Similarly, there will be no tacit Soviet accepts nce of
linkage, which was vigorously denied in last year's
Soviet Government statement arguing that "detente
certainly does not suppose an artificial holdint, back of
the objective processes of historical developim nt."
Defensive over Asia and Middle East
The Soviets are likely to be more defensive an i even
truculent in those areas where they perceive t S
exploitation of Soviet weakness, particularly with
regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviets have
been worried about the possibility of improved Sino-
US relations since the end of the Cultural Re-, olution
i 0 years ago ushered in a new phase of Chines-: foreign
policy. From the Soviet standpoint, Beijing is capable
of any perfidy, and Moscow is also dismayed .,t the
unpredictability of the "China card" players iii the US
administration. As a result, Brezhnev will attt mpt to
probe US intentions and to warn against prow ding the
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Chinese with modern technology and military equip-
ment. He will undoubtedly attempt to impress upon the
President the deep seriousness with which Moscow
views Chinese intentions and may imply, if not flatly
state, that detente will be jeopardized by US preferen-
tial provision to China of high technology in civilian
and military fields. Given their particular concern
about the potential for Sino-Japanese-American
cooperation against the Soviet interests, the Soviet
delegation will try to create a more favorable basis for
their own relationship with the United States.
In the past, the Soviets have undoubtedly sought
agreements with the United States that could be given
an anti-Chinese appearance. While such devices would
suit them admirably, they can have no expectation that
the United States, particularly at this stage of its
relations with China, would cooperate. They neverthe-
less expect that a generally successful summit, in and
of itself, will manifest a degree of understanding
between the superpowers that will offset some of the
rise in Beijing's prestige. This will be a delicate matter,
in which the Soviets will not want to appear
overanxious.
The Soviets will be particularly assertive in responding
to the recent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which
Moscow will interpret as evidence of US exploitation
of Soviet geopolitical weakness in the Middle East.
Brezhnev can be expected to point to the treaty as an
example of US irresponsibility in the wake of the 1977
joint statement on the Middle East. He will be
particularly concerned with the possibility of an
increased US military role in both Egypt and Israel,
reminiscent of US monitoring in the Sinai following
the disengagement agreements in 1974 and 1975.
Soviet
officials were extremely tough on issues connected
with the treaty, refusing to accept the treaty as an
accomplished fact and volunteering their negative
position on the deployment of the UN Emergency
Force to monitor the withdrawal.
Several Soviet officials have already indicated that the
USSR will try to block implementation of the treaty by
vetoing the use of UN forces in the Sinai to supervise
the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Soviet officials at the
United Nations have begun a campaign to organize
Security Council opposition to UN monitoring of the
treaty's provisions, but the summit could nevertheless
provide an opportunity for the Soviets to seek a
compromise to avoid placing Moscow on the side of the
radical Arabs in the area. Nevertheless, given
Moscow's position in the Middle East as odd man out,
the most important determinant of its veto will be the
Arab consensus on this issue.
Other Aspects of the Third World
The Soviets will be particularly interested in reviewing
trouble spots in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and
they might expect to be credited for their restraint in
these areas.
for example, the Soviets have referred to their "reason-
able" behavior during the Sino-Vietnamese war as
opposed to the "hostile actions" of the Chinese. The
Soviets could refer to additional evidence of "caution"
in their behavior:
? Failure to recognize the Polisario or to give signifi-
cant help to Algeria in its conflict with Morocco over
the Western Sahara.
? Unwillingness to get involved in the confrontations
between Libya and Chad, and Tanzania and Uganda.
? Respect for the Somali frontier on the Horn of Africa
and restraint in dealing with Eritrea.
Local factors played the major part in impressing on
the Soviets the need for restraint in these areas, and it
would be wrong to conclude that the Soviets consider
themselves restrained by detente in their behavior in
the Third World.
The Soviets want to impress on their clients that a
special US-USSR relationship is helpful to their
interest, although Moscow cannot be perceived as
sacrificing the interest of their clients to detente. The
Soviets have cooperated in the past on Arab-Israeli and
Lebanese cease-fires and have endorsed various renew-
als of UN peacekeeping missions; the limits on Soviet
support for Libya and the hesitancy of Soviet support
for Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement also augur well for the
possibility of a continued Soviet effort to avoid flash
point situations in the Middle East.
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The Soviets will try to use any discussion of Asia to
counter the diplomatic activity of China and to
demonstrate that important US interests could be
affected as a result of changes in relations with the
USSR. The Soviets are likely to raise, for example,
their interest in freedom of seas in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans, particularly because of Moscow's
geopolitical weakness in the area and its major
requirements in securing access to foreign fishing
grounds. The Soviets appear particularly interested in
resuming the Indian Ocean arms control talks, and
Brezhnev may raise the issue at the summit. The
Soviets believe that the United States enjoys distinct
advantages in being able to deploy land-based strike
aircraft and military transport and reconnaissance
flights to the region, and they regard US support
facilities in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region as
being superior to anything that Moscow has thus far
secured in Ethiopia or South Yemen.
Elsewhere in Asia, the Soviets are in a position to
refrain from certain types of activities that could have
a negative impact on the global relationships between
the superpowers. The Soviets are in no position, for
example, to influence-overtly the actions of North
Korea's Kim 11-song, but their continued unwillingness
to supply Pyongyang with such sophisticated weaponry
as MIG-23 fighter aircraft indicates that Moscow still
favors the preservation of the status quo on the Korean
peninsula. The extent of future Soviet use of Vietnam-
ese air and naval bases and Moscow's willingness to
modernize Vietnamese forces with advanced weaponry
will determine Vietnam's future dependence on the
USSR, China's perception of a threat on its southern
border, and the level of Soviet-US differences over
Southeast Asia.
Europe on the Back Burner
Unlike the summit in 1972, when the Soviets were
pressing for West German ratification of the USSR-
West German treaty and for a clear US commitment
to convene a European security conference, the Soviets
will presumably not make Europe a major political
topic at the summit. Brezhnev will almost certainly try
to prod the United States on the subject of mutual
force reductions and on the "military detente" aspects
of CSCE. The Soviets will try to appear as benevolent
as possible on European matters, if only to ur=dermine
the current view in NATO that the West must counter
the Soviet military presence in Europe. The Soviet
leadership appears to believe that Washingtoa's push
for higher defense budgets and for modernization of
theater nuclear forces is responsible in part fir that
view. The recent Soviet emphasis on security arms
control issues in dealing with European count ries
testifies to their concern with US steps to b4-ter
Western resolve.
'Uthough the main purpose of the summit mt eting, in
Soviet eyes, is to lift Soviet-US relations to a pore
amicable and more stable plane, there is alwk, vs the
possibility that various global issues could become
irritants in the bilateral talks. In addition to t're
potential for discord in the Middle East over he
Egyptian-Israeli treaty, there are other arms where
Moscow and Washington are on opposite side s of the
ence:
? Another Egyptian-Libyan clash, more than the
border fighting in 1977, would find the United States
and USSR at odds in their support for the prof agonists.
? Both the United States and the USSR have recently
increased their support for North and South Yemen,
respectively, and the Soviets are also hinting ;It a
revived insurgence by the Popular Front for tie
Liberation of Oman.
? Future events in Lebanon as well as the direction of
Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement could have an adverse
impact on the border situation between Syria and
Israel.
? The Soviet-Cuban military relationship, an? particu-
larly the impact of this relationship on events n
southern Africa, continues to cause difficultits.
The Persian Gulf is another potential area of dispute,
with the Soviets reiterating their intention of protect-
ing their interests in any future Iranian crisis nd
warning against "imperialist meddling" in a country
that borders on the USSR.
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The Soviets will be particularly assertive in defending
their interests in South and Southeast Asia, the region
in which the Soviets judge that the United States has
lost the most influence in recent years. The loss of the
US position in Iran, the dissolution of the Central
Treaty Organization, the advent of a pro-Soviet regime
in Afghanistan, and the consolidation of Soviet ties
with Vietnam must be considered key pluses in any
Soviet net assessment of the area. The Soviets have
once again adopted a tougher line on Pakistani and
Iranian aid for the insurgency in Afghanistan, which
indicates that they may have decided to justify greater
aid for Kabul and are less concerned with the impact of
on neighboring states
Ithe Soviets were found to be particu-
larly worried over events in both Iran and Afghanistan
and therefore not willing to discuss their problems and
dilemmas in the region.) The Soviets have also been
laying the groundwork for a propaganda campaign
aimed at embarrassing the United States at next
month's UN Conference on the Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace.
The Future Relationship
With the United States
The current Soviet leadership has a propensity for
formalizing its relationships with other powers in
international documents. In the past few months, the
USSR has signed treaties with states that it supports-
Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. It has also
negotiated protocols on regular bilateral consultations
with key Western states with which it is not un-
friendly-France, West Germany, and Canada. The
Soviets regard these protocols as useful in providing
continuing access to other governments, in inhibiting
the other partner should it contemplate anti-Soviet
actions, and in signifying a shift in regional
alignments.
The Soviets may not see advantages in achieving such
a relationship with the United States at this juncture,
but the Soviets would like to restore the notion of the
centrality of Soviet-American relations in world poli-
tics. This would permit Moscow to tell its clients that it
was dealing actively with the United States on Third
World trouble spots. With respect to bilateral rela-
tions, the Soviets probably judge that consultations
would help to keep Soviet-US relations in reasonably
good repair. Moscow also would like to have additional
channels for discussing such key issues as
nonproliferation and crisis management. The Soviets
would expect this arrangement to impress the Chinese
in particular with the limits of their potential. It also
would further the sense of detente in Europe, while
simultaneously causing US allies to worry about US
reliability.
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