DIVISIONS WITHIN THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP: A SIMULATED POLL (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000900090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1979
• Content Type: RP

ro i I'8I Release 2002/06/13: CIA-RDP80T00942A0009000960q~ dentlal
Assessment
Center
Divisions Within the
Cuban Leadership:
A Simulated Poll
Confidential
PA 79-101x8
April 1979
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 National ential
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Assessment
Center
Divisions Within the
Cuban Leadershi
A Simulated Poll
Research for this report was completed
on 1 February 1979.
Confidential
PA 79-10188
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Divisions Within the
Cuban Leadershi
A Simulated Poll
This study is an experimental approach to the analysis
of political groupings in a closed political system. The
technique, called simulated polling, was developed to
communicate-in an understandable manner-the
combined judgments of a group of analysts concerning
a wide range of complex political relationships. As a
first step, we identified seven key individuals or groups
that make up the Cuban decisionmaking elite. Next,
we selected 24 policy issues that confronted the Cuban
leadership during 1978. Since it was not possible to poll
the Cuban leaders directly, we relied on a panel of six
analysts who have considerable knowledge of Cuba. In
essence, the panel members responded to an opinion
poll as surrogates for Fidel Castro and his associates.
Finally, the panel's responses were converted-using a
mathematical technique known as multidimensional
scaling--into visual models of the policy differences
within the Cuban elite. The methodology is explained
in greater detail in appendix A.
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 Confidential
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Divisions Within the
Cuban Leadership:
A Simulated Poll
The Cuban leadership, although dominated by Fidel
Castro, consists of several identifiable opinion groups.
But the political relationships in the Cuban elite are
highly complex. The group alignments do not remain
constant across all policy questions, and coalitions that
exist on certain issues break down on others.
Participants in this study identified the question of
providing support for Latin American revolutionary
movements as the most divisive issue facing Cuba
today. They found that other issues, such as the Cuban
military role in Africa, Cuban-Soviet relations, and
Cuban-US relations, involved a relatively broad range
of opinions rather than sharp dichotomies.
Raul Castro, the younger brother and heir apparent of
the Cuban leader, was identified in the analysis as an
aggressive hardliners on virtually all issues. Raul
Castro differs from Fidel on such issues as the
desirability of a more aggressive military policy in
Africa, the degree of cooperation with the USSR, and
the wisdom of better relations with the United States.
Fidel Castro was seen as occupying a relatively centrist
position on all policy questions with a single
exception-the issue of Cuban-Soviet relation'. The
other key actors in the Cuban leadership nevei
coalesce as a single group against him. Fidel's central
position on the issues apparently facilitates his ability
to act as a unifying force in a highly diverse leadership.
Given Raul's extreme position on almost everN issue,
he would be unable to perform the same role should his
brother suddenly pass from the scene. Unless a major
realignment of policy attitudes occurred, Fidel's ab-
sence could lead to the development of a bitter split in
the Cuban hierarchy.
PA 79-10188
Confidential
April 1979
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Divisions Within the
Cuban Leadership:
A Simulated Poll
The Cuban Leadership
And Decisionnmaking
The Cuban regime is not a monolithic structure. It is a
hierarchy consisting of various groupings, factions, or
coalitions with differing viewpoints and interests over
which Fidel Castro has exercised unifying authority.
The existence of these goups has been overshadowed by
Fidel's dominant role since 1959.
The key members of the current Cuban leadership
have a common base-they were all participants in the
1956-58 guerrilla struggle against President Batista.
But the restructuring of the Cuban economy following
the disastrous 1970 sugar harvest and Cuban military
involvement in Africa, particularly Angola and Ethio-
pia, have spawned new actors in Cuba's ruling
coalition. Former leaders of the Popular Socialist
Party (PSP), the pre-Castro Communist party, new
technocratic-administrative civilians and military offi-
cers in the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces, and the armed forces themselves have become
important elements in Cuban decisionmaking. The
influence of the technocrats and younger military
officers is likely to rise as Castro becomes more willing
to listen to expert advice and less prone to rely solely on
his personal instincts to make spontaneous political,
economic, and social decisions. Nonetheless, the domi-
nant forces in the Cuban leadership still consist of the
ex-guerrilla elite led by Fidel and Raul Castro.
The seven actors listed below constitute the significant
elements of the Cuban leadership today. Three of these
actors are individuals (Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez); the remaining four repre-
sent major political groupings whose similar origins or
institutional affiliations are presumed to have pro-
duced similar policy views.
Fidel Castro
Regardless of what official title Fidel Castro has held
during his 20-year reign in Cuba, his hold on the
Cuban people has made him the linchpin of the
revolutionary process he has dominated from the
outset. He is likely to remain the center of power in
Cuba as long as he is in good health. His leadership is
unchallenged, and his authority is supreme despite the
extensive institutional changes Cuba has undergone.
Opposition to Castro, which was more evident in i he
early days of the regime, has been diluted or elimi-
nated. Today, Fidel owes his strong position to the`
loyalty of ex-guerrilla combatants (the "fidelista.-"
who are described below) who control the Cuban
security forces and hold key positions in the govern-
ment and party and to his immense popularity with the
Cuban people.
Raul Castro
Raul is the undisputed number-two man in Cuba. Iie is
the adviser Fidel trusts more than any other and is
steadily expanding his influence in decisionmakingc. He
has attained authority by virtue of familial and
revolutionary ties and also by his institutional posi-
tions; he is first vice president of the Councils of
Ministers and State and second secretary of the Cuban
Communist Party (PCC) Political Bureau and Secre-
tariat. He enjoys a relatively free rein in fashioning the
military establishment. Many of the guerrillas who
fought under his command in the Sierra Cristal now
hold important positions in the military and govern-
ment. This, along with his good working relations with
Moscow-upon whom the Cuban military establish-
ment is dependent for virtually all of its military
equipment-has provided him with his own power
base. Although in the past he devoted himself almost
exclusively to the armed forces, Raul has become
increasingly involved in domestic and foreign poky
issues that technically fall outside his purview as head
of the military establishment.
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Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
Third in influence in the Cuban leadership, Rodriguez
provides a bridge between the "old Communists" and
the "technocrats" that eases the relations of both with
Castro. He is in charge of much of Cuba's foreign
policy apparatus and is a major government spokes-
man at international gatherings. He is the only
economist among the top leaders and, as such, is a key
figure in the formulation of economic policy in both the
foreign and domestic realms. Rodriguez is one of the
few members of the PSP (the "old Communists," who
are described below) to emerge unscathed from the
purges directed against the party, and he is the only
former PSP leader to have strengthened his position
within the regime. He publicly expressed his
differences with the late Che Guevara's emphasis on
moral incentives, centralization of administration, and
the elimination of money during the economic debates
of the mid- I960s, arguing instead for orthodox eco-
nomic planning techniques. The failure of the
Guevarist model and the subsequent setbacks caused
by the 1970 sugar harvest strengthened his position
within the leadership. While he is not a member of
Fidel's inner circle, his professional expertise and his
close links with many of the technocrats, along with his
connections to Moscow, have enabled him steadily to
expand his influence.
The Fidelistas
']'his group which is made up of a major part of the
PCC Central Committee, and constitutes the stable
inner circle around Fidel. Its loyalty to Fidel derives
from a variety of sources. Some members of the group
have been associated with Fidel since the days of the
Moncada attack and the guerrilla struggle; others were
members of the Student Revolutionary Directorate
(luring the anti-Batista struggle; still others were
involved in the urban underground of the 26th of July
Movement during the years of the insurrection.
Political Bureau members generally presumed to fall
in the category of "fidelistas" include Juan Almeida,
Ramiro Valdes, Armando Hart, Sergio del Valle,
Guillermo Garcia, and Pedro Miret. They have a
strong interest in preserving Castro's commanding role
in the regime and protecting the present distribution of
power against encroachment from newcomers. They
are very nationalistic and anti-American; their entire
adult lives have been spent in the shadow of what they
see as aggressive US actions.
The Technocrats
This group consists primarily of younger individuals
distinguished by their technical-administrative com-
petence rather than their revolutionary or ideological
ties. Many have little or no personal recollection of the
Batista era. Their first concern is the maximization
and rationalization of production and distribution
through administrative reform. Their influence has
been rising since the late 1960s, when the deteriorating
economic-political situation in Cuba forced a reorgani-
zation in the Cuban Government and a reorientation in
its economic policies. The ability of this group to affect
policymaking is likely to increase as the Cuban
Revolution becomes more institutionalized and the
economy more complex. The most influential represen-
tative of this group is Humberto Perez, Vice President
of the Council of Ministers and Minister-President of
the Cuban central planning agency.
The New Military
Cuba's military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia
has created a second generation of combat-tested
veterans who are beginning to assume increasingly
important positions in the military establishment,
though still behind the first line of "fidelista" com-
manders. Trained and equipped by the Soviets, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) possess a
disciplined coercive capacity unmatched by other
organizations. A growing number of junior officers
were born in the 1940s and their formative political
experiences are very different from those of the
"fidelistas." They have gone through military acade-
mies and have received technical education in the
management of sophisticated weaponry, logistics, en-
gineering, and military organizations. Consequently,
their military skills are far more advanced than most of
the ex-guerrillas. In addition to their role in the
military establishment these younger officers have
since 1968 played an increasingly important role in the
economy. This is reflected in the rising number of
former military officers serving in technical and
economic planning positions.
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Confidential
The preeminent position of the military in the Castro
regime is likely to continue as some of the more
pragmatic elements of the leadership-particularly the
aged hierarchy of the pre-Castro Communist party-
die out. The Cuban combat role in Angola and
Ethiopia provides justification for military priorities,
and the return of war veterans from Africa introduces
new blood into the upper echelons of the military
establishment.
The Old Communists
These veterans of the pre-Castro Communist party
lend the Cuban leadership a certain element of
seasoning and experience and are more likely to seek
compromise than confrontation in settling policy
disputes. They are prone to represent Soviet interests in
the formulation of Cuban domestic and foreign policy,
and are, in fact, Castro's main link to Moscow. A
generation older than the guerrilla elite, they have a
more solid background in politics and administration
and have helped the country stave off economic
collapse. Their influence today is at a high point, but is
likely to wane over the next few years because of their
advanced age. Since they have no power base of their
own, they have had to rely heavily on Soviet backing
and Fidel's sufferance. Inclined toward cooperation
and avoidance of internal strife, they experienced a
resurgence of importance in the late 1960s when Fidel
realized that he would have to move Cuba closer to
Moscow. The principal representative of this group in
the Political Bureau is Blas Roca. Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez, described above, and Arnaldo Milian are
former members of the PSP, but both have strong links
to the "technocrats" as well.
In our analysis of attitudinal differences within the
Cuban leadership, 24 major policy questions were
selected.' These issues are not intended to be a
comprehensive catalog of every topic discussed by the
Cuban hierarchy; rather they are representative of the
five basic decisions that confronted Cuba's top policy-
makers during 1978:
? Expansion or reduction of Cuba's military role in
Africa.
'The 24 issues are listed in appendix B.
? Level of support for Latin American revolutionary
movements.
? Relations with the USSR.
? Relations with the United States.
? Domestic economic priorities.
The questions were designed to highlight differences of
opinion within the leadership. Each was phrased in
terms of a possible policy option to be undertaken by
the Cuban Government. In a number of cases, several
policy options were presented in a series of three or four
questions. This permitted the panel members to specify
with greater precision the policy preferences of the
seven leadership groups or individuals. Moreover. an
effort was made to select controversial issues. Those
questions on which there is near complete agreement
would tell us little about cleavages within the elite.
Therefore, the results of this analysis tend to empha-
size differences within the elite.
Figure 1 provides a representation of the attitude;;
ascribed to each of the seven actors by the panel on the
questions relating to Africa (Questions 1 to 71.1 Each
of these questions revolved about the larger issue of
whether Cuba should pursue an even more aggressive
policy in Africa than is now the case. It was expected
that the wording of these questions would produce a
relatively straightforward "hawk-dove" dimension.
The solution produced by a multidimensional scaling
technique confirmed this expectation. Raul Castro and
the new military, whose prestige and influence have
been considerably enhanced by the performance of the
Cuban armed forces in Africa, were seen as holding the
most aggressive positions. Although the "technocrats,"
apparently concerned about the economic disruptions
that could result from further African adventures,
looked less favorably on a significant expansion or
Cuba's military activities, Raul and the new military
made up the only clearly separate and cohesive opinion
group. None of the other actors showed a close affinity
2 This representation is a visual model derived from the responses of
the panel on the seven questions concerning Africa. The tnathmat-
ical program utilized to produce these models operates on a simple
basis: the distance between the actors is directly related to the
similarity of their views. The greater the distance between twu
actors, the greater their disagreement on the issues.
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Expansion or Reduction of Cuban Military Role in Africa
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for any other. The existence of this broad range of
opinion rather than a sharp dichotomy suggests that a
highly divisive debate over the policy of military
intervention in Africa is unlikely to develop within the
Cuban leadership.
The questions relating to the support of Latin Ameri-
can revolutionaries (Questions 8 to 11) were expected
to produce another "hawk-dove" dimension similar to
that shown in Figure 1. An inspection of figure 2
shows again a unidimensional configuration, but this
one differs significantly from the African dimension.
Most important is the apparent existence of an
incipient dichotomy within the leadership on the Latin
American issue. There is a fairly broad gap between
the more cautious group (consisting of the "techno-
crats," Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and the "old Com-
munists") and the rest of the leadership. Although the
lack of cohesion on the two sides indicates that a
dichotomy has not yet formed, it is possible that given
the right circumstances, in Nicaragua or some other
nation, a schism could develop within the Cuban
Government.
The differences between figures 1 and 2 indicate that
the seven key actors react in different ways to the two
issue areas. Thus an attempt to combine the results
into a single "hawk-dove" continuum would distort
some of the relationships between the actors. For
example, Fidel Castro and the "fidelistas" are located
closer to Raul Castro and the "new military" on the
Latin America dimension, and greater separation
between Rodriguez and the "old Communists" is
shown on the Africa dimension.
To meet these problems, we present a two-dimensional
solution, shown in figure 3. The horizontal axis
represents the Africa dimension and runs from the
more cautious positions on the left to the more
aggressive on the right. The order and relative
distances shown in figure 1 are retained along the
horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the Latin
America dimension and runs from the more cautious
positions at the top to the more aggressive at the
bottom. In this case the order shown in figure 2 is
duplicated, although some minor differences in the
relative distances are apparent.
The two-dimensional presentation permits several
conclusions about the policy positions of the Cuban
leadership on these two issue sets. First, it can be seen
that three general opinion groups exist within the elite.
The most cohesive cluster consists of Raul Castro and
the "new military." Both are located in the quadrant
occupied by those who tend to be aggressive on African
and Latin American issues, and their proximity shows
that they hold very similar views on the two issues. In
the opposite quadrant-occupied by actors who tend to
be cautious on both the Africa and Latin America
questions-a second cluster is apparent. This group
(Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the "technocrats," and the
"old Communists") is less cohesive than the Raul
Castro -"new military" group. Rodriguez and the "old
Communists" have nearly identical views regarding
Latin American policy but have some differences on
the Africa questions. Rodriguez, who has strong links
to both the "old Communists" and the "technocrats,"
is located between them on both dimensions.
The third opinion cluster consists of Fidel Castro and
the "fidelistas." Although their positions are relatively
close, they occupy different quadrants. The
"fidelistas" are located just inside the quadrant
occupied by those actors favoring the more aggressive
policy options in both Africa and Latin America.
Despite their positions in different quadrants, Fidel
and the "fidelistas" show-as expected--fairly close
agreement on both issues. Fidel Castro, interestingly,
is the only actor occupying the lower left quadrant, but
more important is his centrist location on both issue
dimensions. Although his overpowering influence is
sufficient by itself to dominate the decisionmaking
process, his position relative to the other actors
undoubtedly facilitates the achievement of consensus.
Without the powerful attraction of his charismatic
leadership, there would be far less incentive for either
of the other two clusters to abandon their positions on a
given issue in order to achieve a consensus within the
leadership.
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Support for Latin American Revolutionary Movements
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Cautious
in Africa
[iuurA i
Aggressive
in Africa
Aggressive in Latin America
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578734 2-79
Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez
C mmlunists
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Figure 4 represents the policy positions of the seven
actors on two other dimensions: relations with the
USSR (Questions 12 to 15) and relations with the
United States (Questions 16 to 19). The horizontal
axis represents the US dimension and runs from a
"pronormalization" position on the left to an
"antinormalization" position on the right. The order-
ing and the relative distances along this dimension are
fairly similar to the alignments shown in figures 1 and
2. The "technocrats," Rodriguez, and the "old Com-
munists" are again located on the opposite side of the
continuum from Raul Castro and the "new military."
Fidel Castro is again located in a centrist position. The
"fidelistas," torn between their loyalty for their leader
and an ingrained hostility toward the United States,
are situated midway between Fidel and the extreme
positions of Raul and the "new military."
The vertical axis represents the USSR dimension and
runs from a "closer cooperation" position at the top to
a "less dependence" position at the bottom. The
alignment along this dimension shows a completely
different orientation from figures 1 and 2. Here the
"old Communists" and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez join
forces with Raul Castro and the "new military." The
"technocrats" depart from their usual extreme position
and are located in a centrist position fairly close to
Fidel. The "fidelistas" are essentially isolated on this
issue, apparently as a result of their instinctive
opposition to dependence on any foreign power. This
alignment suggests that should Fidel Castro disappear
from the political scene, Cuba might well lose all
motivation to attain some semblance of independence
from the USSR.
Figure 5 represents the policy positions of the seven
actors on the single dimension of domestic economic
priorities (Questions 20 to 24). Thesc questions were
concerned with whether Cuba should continue its
emphasis on economic development that would require
continued consumer austerity. The results show that
this issue is almost as divisive as the question of support
for Latin American revolutionaries.'This is not surpris-
ing; acrimonious debates over economic policy have
been a regular feature of the Castro regime. The most
notable example was the public debate during the mid-
1960s in which Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and others
vigorously opposed the unorthodox theories espoused
by Che Guevara. The configuration shows that Raul
Castro, the "new military," the "fidelistas," and to a
lesser extent Fidel Castro all favor continued consumer
austerity in order to maximize investment in Cuba's
overall development plan. The "technocrats,"
Rodriguez, and the "old Communists" generally
oppose this view, but there is a fairly substantial
distance between the "technocrats" and the other two
actors.
The domestic economy is of considerable significance
to the Cuban leadership. The low price of sugar on the
world market has severely hampered Cuba's ambitious
economic development plans. Given its limited hard
currency income and its heavy economic requirements,
some sectors of the economy must be ignored, and
compromise solutions are difficult if not impossible to
achieve. Consequently, each decision on resource
allocation has wide-ranging repercussions.
It is possible that a second dimension underlies some of
the questions posed in this group-ideological under-
pinnings of Marxist economic theories. This possibility
was explored in a two-dimensional configuration, but
because of the limited number and scope of the
questions on economic policy, the results were
inconclusive.
The relative policy orientations of the Cuban leader-
ship have certain implications for the future. For
example, Fidel Castro's centrist position suggests that
his absence could produce a schism in the leadership on
many issues, particularly on the questions of support
for Latin American revolutionary movements and
pursuing closer ties with the United States. The
extreme positions of Raul Castro indicate that he
would be unable to play a similar unifying role.
Moreover, he lacks the influence possessed by his
charismatic brother.
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Pro-
Normalization
(US)
Closer Cooperation
(USSR)
Old Communists_.
Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez 4
Technocrats
1Fidel
Castro
" * Fidelistas
Less Dependence
(USSR)
Anti-
Normalization
(US)
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Nevertheless, Raul Castro and his supporters-along
with the "fidelistas"-control the organs of power in
Cuba: the military and the security forces. Without a
major realignment of policy attitudes, Raul seemingly
would have to rely on raw power in order to dominate
the decisionmaking process. Any such forecast, how-
ever, is highly tentative since the sudden death of
Fidel, or other traumatic events, could cause a
realignment of attitudes within the leadership.
Because of their age, the "old Communists" and
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez are likely to leave their
positions well before Fidel Castro or any of the other
key actors. For example, Rodriguez is 66 and Fidel
Castro is only 52. Rodriguez has recently been relieved
of some of his less important duties, and there are some
indications that his age may have been a factor in those
changes. An examination of the policy positions
ascribed to the "old Communists" and Rodriguez
suggests that their absence would eliminate the pri-
mary forces in the Cuban Government that prefer a
less aggressive policy in Africa and Latin America and
favor improved relations with the United States.
Although the "technocrats" were seen in our analysis
as holding stronger opinions on these subjects, they
currently occupy less influential positions than
Rodriguez or the "old Communists." While the precise
impact of the disappearance of Rodriguez and the "old
Communists" cannot be predicted, one thing is cer-
tain-the decline of these key actors has already
begun.
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Domestic Economic Priorities
Reduced
Consumer
Austerity
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40 0 Consumer
yK}? Austerity
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Appendix A
The standard procedure for measuring political atti-
tudes is the opinion poll. But when the objective is to
measure the political attitudes of foreign leaders rather
than of the general population there is a problem of
access. Most leaders have neither the time nor the
inclination to complete questionnaires.
Simulated opinion polling is one way of getting around
this problem. Instead of giving the questionnaire to
foreign leaders, we give it to a number of people
specializing in that country, and ask them to respond to
the questions as they think the foreign leaders would
respond. This combines two techniques: opinion polling
and role playing. It provides a large body of data that
can be analyzed to identify potential cleavages and
coalitions on diverse issues within a foreign leadership
group. It can also serve to identify differing assump-
tions and judgments among a group of analysts on a
given country or subject.
Multidimensional scaling requires measurement of the
similarity between every pair of objects (in this case,
key actors in the Cuban hierarchy). The measurements
used in this study are euclidian distance matrices
Figure 7 is an example of such a matrix. It shows the
computed euclidian distances between each pair of
.;actors on the questions relating to Africa. The dis-
tances in the matrix represent degrees of simiiariiv
between each pair of actors.
The smaller the distance value, the greater the
similarity between the two actors on the policy issues in
question. Thus, Raul Castro and the "new militai y"
show the greatest similarity (0.080) on the African
questions. Conversely, the "technocrats" and the `new
military" show the least similarity (1.000). The
multidimensional scaling program takes this informa-
tion and depicts it graphically in terms of distances
between the objects. Thus, the data shown in figure 7
are depicted visually in figure 1. As in the euclidian
distance matrix, the "new military" group is closest to
Raul Castro and the "technocrats" are the most
distant from him.
The seven key individual leaders or leadership groups
in the Cuban Government were first identified. We
then formulated 24 statements concerning Cuban
foreign and domestic policy and asked six Cuban
experts to indicate the extent to which they felt the
seven leaders or leadership groups agreed or disagreed
with these statements. Figure 6 illustrates the format
of the questionnaire.
The six analysts, each judging the position of seven
leaders or leadership groups on 24 issues, provided over
a thousand judgments about the Cuban leadership
views. We summarized this data to present it in such a
manner that the significant conclusions-differences
among the Cuban leaders as well as the differences
among our experts in assessing the Cuban leadership---
would be graphically apparent. For the bulk of this
work, we selected a statistical program called
multidimensional scaling.
The program produces the graphs by first placing the
objects in a space of N dimensions and replicatinit the
distances between each pair of objects as shown in the
euclidian distance matrix. It finds the most satisfac-
tory configuration by starting with a random coniigu-
ration and moving all the points a bit to decrease the
"stress," a measure of the "goodness" of the solution.
This stress value is at a minimum for the best solution
and increases sharply when too few dimensions are
used. This procedure is repeated over and over again
until some stopping criterion is reached.
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 Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000900090001-6
Figure 6
Cuban combat forces should cross the border of Somalia along with Ethiopian troops to administer
a complete defeat to the Somali army. (Make your assessment as of February - March 1978 rather
than the present time.)
Fidel Castro
-----------/ /------------/ /-----------/ /-?---------/ /-----------/ /-----------
Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly
Oppose Oppose Favor Favor
. i...... .....................................................................................
fde.. listas
----------/ /------------/ /-----------/ /----------/ /-----------/ /-----------
Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly
Oppose Oppose Favor Favor
.............................................................................................
Raul Castro
-----------/ /------------/ /-----------/ /----------/ /-----------/ /-----------
Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly
Oppose Oppose Favor Favor
New Military
-----------/ /------------/ :'-----------/ /----------/ /-----------/ /-----------
Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly
Oppose Oppose Favor Favor
................................................................................................
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
-----------/ /------------/ :F-----------/ /----------/ /-----------/ /------------
Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly
Oppose Oppose Favor Favor
.................................................................................................
Old Communists
-----------/ /------------ / /-----------/ /----------/ /----------/ /------------
Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly
Oppose Oppose Favor Favor
.................................................................................................
Technocrats
-----------/ /------------/ i----------- / /----------/ /-----------/ /------------
Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly
Oppose Oppose Favor Favor
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 Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP80TOO942AO0090006186bleleial
Fidel
Castro
Fidelistas
Raul
Castro
New
Military
C. R.
Rodriguez
Old
Communists
Techi,ocrii.
Fidel Castro
0.0
Fidelistas
0.131
0.0
Raul Castro
0.558
0.444
0.0
New Military
0.6111
0.500
0.080
0.0
C. R. Rodriguez
0.303
0.421
0.827
0.868
0.0
Old Communists
0.181
0.295
0.705
0.749
0.138
0.0
Technocrats
0.470
0.581
0.964
1.000
0.191
0.298
0.e
The chief output from the technique is a spatial
arrangement of points. Each point on the paper
represents one of the objects in the distance matrix.
The best and certainly easiest method for interpreting
the output is simply to look at the configuration and see
which points are close together and which are far
apart. The question of dimensionality requires that the
analyst suggest substantive interpretation to the mean-
ing of the relative distances between the items. In this
study, this was accomplished by a careful examination
of the responses given by the panel of experts on each
question..
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 Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000900061~8 ! tial
Appendix B
1. Cuban combat forces should cross the border of
Somalia along with Ethiopian troops to administer a
complete defeat to the Somali Army. (Make your
assessment as of February-March 1978 rather than the
present time.)
2. Cuban combat forces should give complete and full
support to the Ethiopian military campaign against the
Eritrean separatists. This would include the utilization
of mechanized infantry, artillery, and armored units in
combat against the Eritreans. (April 1978)
3. Cuban military personnel should provide heavy
advisory and logistic support for the Ethiopian cam-
paign against the Eritreans. Cuba should also perform
various combat support missions such as MIG pilots,
helicopter pilots, and artillery support. (April 1978)
4. Cuban military personnel should provide only
limited advisory and logistic support to the Ethiopian
campaign against the Eritreans. This would exclude
even indirect combat support such as artillery fire and
pilots. (April 1978)
5. Cuba should begin a gradual withdrawal of its
combat forces from Ethiopia in order to undercut
criticism from moderates in the nonaligned movement
and to remove bilateral tensions with the radical Arab
nations sympathetic to the Eritreans. (December
1978)
6. Cuba should significantly expand its combat role in
Angola to suppress, once and for all, the UNITA
guerrillas. This would involve increasing the number of
Cuban combat troops by another 10,000 men if
necessary. (December 1978)
7. Cuba should make partial troop reductions in
Angola and Ethiopia to free sonic of its troops for use
in the struggle to achieve a black nationalist govern-
ment in Rhodesia. (December 1978)
8. Cuba should provide political support (propaganda)
to the Sandinista National Liberation Front FS I N i,
provide safe haven for FSLN guerrillas in Cuba art
train FSLN guerrillas in Cuba. No other surpcm
should be provided in order to avoid provoking a l IS
intervention. (August 1978)
9. Cuba should, in addition to providing the