A NEW GOVERNMENT FOR UGANDA (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000900070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
Center
A New Government
For Uganda
Research for this report was completed
on I1 April 1979.
This memorandum was prepared by the Africa
Division of the Office of Political Analysis and
coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer
for Africa, the Directorate of Operations, the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of
Strategic Research, and the Office of Central
Reference. Questions and comments may be ad-
dressed to the author,
Secret
PA 79-10184
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For Uganda
Now that the invading Tanzanian and anti-Amin
Ugandan forces have established control over Kam-
pala, installing and gaining recognition of a new
Ugandan government will be their next order of
business:
? The Ugandan National Liberation Front is the
leading candidate for the role of successor government.
? The Front is a coalition of long-time rivals hastily put
together last month under Tanzanian auspices. It has
geographical balance, but little political cohesion.
? Formation of the Front dims the prospects of former
Ugandan president Obote, long regarded as Tanza-
nia's favored candidate to succeed Amin.
? Once it is in place in Uganda, a Liberation Front
government will encounter deep-seated ethnic, reli-
gious, and political divisions as well as resentment from
those who remained in Uganda throughout the Amin
years.
The 2,000-man exile army did not give a very
impressive account of itself in the war against Amin,
but it may yet become an arbiter of power:
? Obote apparently has many supporters in the exile
army and reportedly believes he can use this force to
intimidate the Front's civilian leadership after the war
is over. Ambitious commanders might, however, use
the troops to wrest, control for themselves.
Restoring the Ugandan economy to full productivity
will be a two-to-three-year proposition at best:
? Agriculture-the principal sector-should revive
readily but the economy's once well developed infra-
structure is a shambles.
Tanzania will face some hard decisions about its future
role in Uganda:
? Maintaining the military force currently in Uganda
is a heavy economic drain, even if no effort is made to
occupy the remaining two-thirds of the country.
? Prolonged support of a new regime in Uganda.--
basically a richer country than Tanzania-could cause
In foreign affairs, since Kenya controls the transit
routes to Uganda its approval of a new regime will be
crucial:
? Not only are its own relations with Tanzania
strained, but Kenya also shares the apprehension of
most African countries that Tanzania's intervention in
Uganda may establish a dangerous precedent.
? The Soviet Union-the major military supplier o1
both Uganda and Tanzania-may emerge as a prime
contender to assist the rebuilding of the Ugandan
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For Uganda
Now that the invading Tanzanian and anti-Amin
Ugandan forces have established control over Kam-
pala, installing and gaining recognition for a new
Ugandan government will be their next order of
business. Difficulties in getting the key Ugandan exile
factions-long divided by tribal and personal dif-
ferences-and their Tanzanian benefactors to agree on
the composition of a provisional government may have
been one of the reasons for the slow pace of the final
Tanzanian push.
The Ugandan National Liberation Front, a coalition of
exiles put together late last month under Tanzanian
auspices, is the leading candidate for the role of
successor government. Its executive council has been
functioning in Dar es Salaam, where it has issued a
stream of press releases. By 6 April it reportedly had
drawn up a list of cabinet members, sent a delegation
to the UN to contact foreign diplomats, and appointed
district commissioners for some of the "liberated"
areas. Front leaders also claim to have the allegiance of
the Ugandan exile military force that has accompanied
the Tanzanian army on its march from the border.
The Liberation Front is a coalition of long-time rivals
that appears to stress tribal balance more than political
consistency. It was created at a hastily arranged
weekend meeting held in Moshi, Tanzania, late last
month to which representatives of the major Ugandan
exile groups in Africa, Europe, and the United States
were invited by Tanzania. Approximately 120 dele-
gates were accredited, with each group allocated four
voting members and two observers. As word of the
meeting spread, a number of new groups were formed
just in time to qualify. A last-minute effort by
followers of former Ugandan President Milton Obote
to pack the meeting failed.
In addition to establishing the Front, the delegates
to the Moshi meeting named Yusuf Lule-a widely
respected former educator-as its president and
created a 10-member executive council to function as
an interim government. A 30-member consultative
council formed at the meeting is to serve as an interim
legislature in Kampala until new national elections are
held in two to three years. Relatively little attention
was paid to formulating a political program.
The 67-year-old Lule, chosen to head the Front and its
anticipated provisional government, has been living in
London for several years. He was dismissed as head of
the prestigious Makerere University in Kampala while
Obote was still in power. Lule's selection was probably
designed to confer respectability on the exiles' organi -
zation, land his
political effectiveness and the depth of his support
within the disparate exile movement are untested.)
In addition to Lule, the executive council is composes
of five northerners and five southerners-an indication
that greater effort went into solving the touchy
problem of achieving geographic balance than into
seeking ideological cohesion. Lule and two others are
from the Baganda group, the once dominant tribe
located in the Kampala area of southern Uganda.
Three of the northerners are from the previously highly
politicized Acholi tribe. The members of the council
are drawn from the professions and from business;
several are former cabinet members and diplomats:
their political views range from radical Marxist to
conservative. The list conveys an aura of dignity and
consensus, but opens the question of whether the
council members will be able to govern Uganda under
conditions almost certain to be difficult, or even to
work together for any length of time. The neat package
that emerged from the Moshi meeting obscures deep
cleavages within the coalition and serious frustrations
among the factions that were excluded. In the event
that the Liberation Front proves unable quickly to gain
control of a post-Amin Uganda, Obote's supporters or
the exile armed forces mi ht yet make a bid for power.
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Former President Obote was the principal victim of the
Moshi operation. A resident of Dar es Salaam since he
was overthrown by Amin in 1971, Obote had long been
assumed to be Nyerere's choice to head a successor
government in Uganda even though he is generally
unpopular in his home country. He is a Lango, but he
also had a political base among the Acholis. Since the
Tanzania-Uganda war started, however, Nyerere has
consistently denied that he was working to reinstate
Obote, and last month he appeared finally to have
decided that Obote was a liability. The origins of the
Moshi meeting remain obscure enough to permit
speculation that it was prepared by Nyerere as a way
of gathering all the Ugandan exiles into one anti-Amin
movement. Obote, however,
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refused to attend. His support-
ers secured the post o vice chairman of the Liberation
Front for one of their number, plus two other seats on
the Council.
Obote reportedly still feels that he retains a stronger
network of supporters than any other single presiden-
tial contender and that there will be further rounds of
political sparring before the succession to Amin is
established. He probably can count on some backing
from the Acholi and Langi, two of the groups that
suffered most under Amin and that are well repre-
sented in the exile military force. He might anticipate
that Nyerere will eventually turn to him again,
especially if the alternative is a power vacuum in
Uganda.
erious disagreement had developed between
Lu Nyerere over the proposed new cabinet.
Nyerere reportedly insisted that some Obote support-
ers should be included, and, in particular, that internal
security, foreign affairs, and defense should be as-
signed to exiles well-disposed to Tanzania. Lule is
resisting what he feels is Nyerere's attempt to dictate
the composition of the post-Amin government.
The Tanzanian army still controls, arms, and supplies
the Front's military forces and will be encouraged to
stay long enough to dampen down political rivalries.
Although the exiles' armed forces have not given a very
impressive account of themselves in the war against
Amin, they are a relatively cohesivegroup that may
yet become an arbiter of power.
While we have no accurate breakdown, about half of
the 2,000-man exile army is probably composed of
Obote supporters. Moreover, the deputy commander of
this army and the chairman of the Front's military
committee are both close to Obote. Working with these
While the Tanzanians are easily capable of installing
the Liberation Front as an interim arrangement, they
may find eliciting permanent Ugandan support for it
extremely difficult. The passivity of the Ugandan
population throughout the war may give the returnees
and their Tanzanian backers a misleading impression
that it will not be difficult to establish a work-
able government. Many Ugandans bear long-standing
ethnic, religious, or political grudges against the new
rulers, and those who endured the Amin years in
Uganda are unlikely to welcome those who did not,
especially if-as can be expected-large numbers of
former exiles attempt to claim choice jobs in the
bureaucracy.
There are no signs of political leadership emerging
from within Uganda. While there were recurrent
reports of anti-Amin plotting in recent years-and
several unsuccessful attempts on his life-these
incidents were almost exclusively instigated by
dissidents within Amin's military forces. The "popular
uprising" so much anticipated by exile spokesmen
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never materialized; the population, generally apathetic
politically, for the most part simply moved away from
areas of active conflict. Normal political activity had
all but ceased during Obote's regime after it had
imposed a tightly controlled one-party system.
Restoring basic services and bringing the economy to
full productivity will be a two-to-three-year proposition
at best. Agriculture-the principal sector-benefits
from excellent soil and weather conditions and can
probably rebound fairly quickly. Subsistence farming
survived the Amin years with little loss, and some
formerly profitable commercial farms were returned to
food production. However, there has been some decline
in the acreage devoted to the most important export
crop- -coffee-and the lead time for bringing new
Amin ruled with the backing of armed men from his
own small Kakwa tribe and other remote northern
Muslim groups who did not get deeply involved in
policymaking or statecraft. A.min's government was
largely a one-man show that functioned without much
guidance from his ministers and gradually declined in
efficiency. With the disintegration of the old army,
many of the troops will probably head back to their
northern homelands. As long as they retain their
weapons, these soldiers will be a threat to the security
and property of the residents of the areas they traverse.
There may also be some localized settling of old. scores.
On the whole, the country can probably manage
reasonably well in the temporary absence of a central
government. With 40-some ethnic groups-most with
deeply engrained political and economic systems of
their own--and with identification by religion taken
almost as seriously as by language, Ugandan society is
highly fragmented. Moreover, the dividing line be-
tween Bantu and non-Bantu-the basic division of
African peoples-areas of settlement runs across the
middle of Uganda, producing marked differences
between the northern and southern parts of the
country. As a result of these fissions there is a strong
emphasis on local self-reliance
The importance attached to local affairs may
become a significant factor in the rebuilding of
Uganda's political structure. While the provisional
government is likely to focus on the central bureau-
cracy and the military, the appointments of the
regional administrators may be more important in the
long run. There are already indications of concern that
ambitious regional commissioners assigned to their
native areas-notably Paulo Muwanga in South
Buganda and Yowari Museveni in Southern-may be
creating personal followings in the newly "liberated"
parts of southwestern Uganda. The Liberation Front's
prompt dispatch of additional district commissioners to
these areas shows its awareness of the political threat
trees into production is five years.)
After prolonged neglect, Uganda's once well-devel-
oped infrastructure is a shambles. Financial reserves
are depleted, transportation facilities require substan-
tial investment and technical input, and the personnel
who once filled key positions have dispersed.
It is unlikely that much has survived of Amin's regular
military forces. Many soldiers appear to have returned
to their homelands, taking their personal weapons and
their vehicles with them. Many of the major items in
the military inventory probably did not survive the war
in usable condition. Rebuilding the defense forces will
probably receive high priority under the new govern-
ment, with attendant requests for foreign assistance.
The Ugandans themselves will have to transform the
exile forces into the nucleus of a new army and then
attack the more difficult task of recruiting men and
officers. They will also have to dilute the traditional
northern dominance of the military if they are to
decrease the chances of another coup.)
Tanzania will face some hard decisions about its future
role in the administration and reconstruction of
Uganda. It is sustaining a heavy economic drain just to
support the 30,000 troops it has in the country no,
and occupation of the remaining two-thirds of
Uganda-should that appear necessary to keep the
new government in power-would be an even more
costly option. Tanzania probably anticipates that other
donors will pick up the costs of launching the new
regime and rebuilding Uganda's civil and military
institutions. If, however, it finds itself locked into
prolonged support to Uganda-basically a richer
country than Tanzania-it could face mounting dis-
content at home over this foreign adventure.
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Foreign Relations of a New Regime
Dar es Salaam will probably attempt to ensure that
a new regime placed in Kampala through its own
military efforts will be compatible with Tanzanian
interests. If the Liberation Front group hangs on to
power, it may veer off into domestic policies not
modeled on those of Tanzania. It may be slower to
develop a clearly defined foreign policy of its own and
may echo Tanzanian views in international forums for
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backing Obote-still intensely unpopular in Kenya-
to supporting the front is not likely to be sufficient to
reassure the Kenyans.
The Organization of African Unity has created a
mediation committee to try to resolve the dispute
between Tanzania and Uganda. The effort has been
stalled, however, by Tanzania's refusal to negotiate
unless the OAU first censures Uganda for its incursion
into Tanzania in October and Nyerere's disparaging
remarks about the organization itself. In practical
terms, the OAU is unlikely to take further action
before its next summit meeting in July, if at all, even
though Nyerere's actions have weakened its two
fundamental principles-that no African country has
a right to interfere in the internal affairs of another
and that existing borders are to be respected. A few
African countries have expressed support for the
Tanzanian venture, but the vast majority, sensing their
own fragility, are apprehensive that it mi ht establish a
dangerous precedent.
With the end of Amin's regime, a shift in Uganda's
relations with the non-African world is almost inevita-
ble. The heavy emphasis on contacts with the Arabs-
notably Libya-is likely to vanish when Amin's
Muslim-dominated regime is replaced by a Christian
government. Western states that have condemned
Amin's record on human rights or been the object of
his wrath are likely to be solicited for an early renewal
of friendly relations and economic aid-even at the
risk of irritating African states that feel special consid-
Kenya's approval of a new regime could be most
crucial, since it controls the transit routes to land-
locked Uganda and is the leading moderate state in
East Africa. Kenya's own relations with Tanzania have
long been strained-the border between the two
countries has been closed since early 1977-but
Nyerere has tried to reassure Kenya at each step of his
Ugandan campaign.
Nairobi had no enthusiasm for the former Obote
government, in part because it considered it danger-
ously socialistic and pro-Tanzanian. During the Amin
era, Kenya had its troubles with the erratic Ugandan
leader and at times did some sabre-rattling, but over
the last few years it has maintained fairly good
relations with Uganda and the extensive business
contacts between the two countries continued. Ugan-
dan refugees were allowed to settle in Kenya, but were
prohibited from engaging in political activity there.
Since the fighting broke out between Tanzania and
Uganda, Kenya has remained scrupulously neutral-
providing normal trade and transportation facilities to
Uganda and resisting Nyerere's efforts to sway its
views. Nairobi did draw the line, however, at facilitat-
ing Libyan military assistance to Amin.
eration should be given to African views.
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One looming question will be the role of the Soviet
Union. It was the major military supplier of both
Uganda and Tanzania prior to the war, and it stood
aside during the conflict. The equipment destroyed was
mainly of Soviet origin; more Soviet equipment is the
logical replacement. Since its ties with Tanzania are
well established and it presumably has some residual
influence in the Uganda military, the USSR may
emerge as a prime contender for a leading role in
rebuilding the military forces of a new pro-Tanzanian
regime in Uganda. If Nyerere retains influence in
Kampala, however, he will probably try-as he has
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The bad feeling between Kenya and Tanzania is rooted
as much in the differing styles of the two regimes as in
practical matters. Kenyan leaders disapprove of Tan-
zania's socialism, which they feel does not work well
even in Tanzania, and they are particularly irritated by
Nyerere's moralizing and preaching. They almost
certainly will point out the contradiction between his
moral pronouncements and his scantily disguised
ouster by military force of one regime in Uganda and
the imposition of another. Nyerere's switch from
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