CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000900050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

~~~A~prov~t~ For Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A000900050001-0
~~ pp n
,~; roved For Release 20(k2/08/~7 ;CIA-RDP80T00942A000900050 ~1-0
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A000900050001-0
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A000900050001-0
 Natioggnal
~s~~s~~Cn4r Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A00090
Center
Cuban Involvement in
' The Eastern Caribbean
An Intelligence Assessment
Irtforrnation as of 4 April 1979 has been used
in preparing this report.
Secret
YA 79-10176
Apri 1 1979
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A000900050001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1A
 Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A00090
Cuban Involvement in
The pastern Caribbean
Havana for the last several years has sought an entente
cordiale with the governments of the Caribbean while
at the same time cultivating the area's leftist leaders
and their youthful followers.
This two-track policy has not been notably success-
ful-especially in the English-speaking ministates of
the area--although Havana has made considerable
gains by participating in regional, youth, labor,
church, and women's groups and by encouraging
nascent radical political movements.
Recently, however, the Cubans can claim a break-
through in Grenada, where their support of the New
Jewel Movement (NJM), beginning in 1976, contrib-
uted to t'.he ouster of P. M. Gairy's regime.
The Cubans provided the NJM financial and limited
material su ort and training
Since t en avana as
move cautious y--wrt o ding diplomatic recogni-
tion of the Bishop government in hopes that the
Commonwealth Caribbean states will do so first.
The Grenada coup--viewed throughout the region as a
"pushover"-is likely to tempt the Cubans to act more
boldly in advising other action-prone radical groups.
iii Secret
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A000900050001-0
 pprove
The Eastern Caribbean
DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
THE
eaxAMAs
BDNItlNICAN
NAITI ~ Rf PUBLIC
~LI2E lAMA1CA
)))))) LLLLLL, XDNDURAS
Aruba
(Neth.) Curacao
(NethJ . Bonaire
(NethJ
Martinique
(Fr.)
d
Y, St. Lucia
f
~ St. Vincent
(U.K.)
BARBADOS
d ~ ,GRENADA
_r
7obage
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
VENEZUELA
o soo
Kilo meters
~t ' ~ gENE2UEtA
PANAMA 1--,.
Virgm Is.
(U K.) Anegada
l urtala
Puerto Rico _ ' r ~-~ Anguilla
(V?S?) rThoo~as?. John (U.K.) St. Martin (Guadeloupe)
(Pto. Rica) ' (U.S.) ~ St. Maarten L~ ~ St. Barthelemy (Guadeloupe)
St. Cr~ix (NettiS Saba~Neth.) (~ : Barbuda
St. Eustatius
(Netirl St. Kitts
y+ St. Kitts+-.. News ~ Antigua (U.K.)
'~"~, Nevis(U.K.Y ~ -Antigua
?~ ~ Montserrat (U.K.)
.~ - ",
d Guadeloupe
~ (FrJ
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A000900050001-0
 Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A000900~~(}QA1-0
25X1
Cuban Involvement in
The Eastern Caribbean
The recent coup in Grenada that brought to power the
leftist-oriented New Jewel Movement-a group with
close ties t:o Havana--has raised questions about the
nature of Cttba's involvement in the Eastern Carib-
bean.' This memorandum analyzes Cuba's activities in
the region during the last 15 months and offers some
conclusions about what impact the cou is likel to
have on Cuba's future policy there.
Since Havana began to focus on the Eastern Carib-
bean in 1975-76, it has pursued a conscious two-track
policy des;lgned to give Cuba a major leadership
position within the region over the next five to 10 years.
On one level-reflecting in part the Castro regime's
desire to be accepted as an integral member of the
Caribbean family of nations after years of being
ostracized--the Cubans have sought to promote cor-
dial relations with governments in the region. At the
same time, here as elsewhere, Havana has manifested
its commitment to fostering the growth of radical
souialisrn by developing close ties with leftist leaders
and their youth-based constituencies. The Cubans
believe that socioeconomic trends in the region will
push the islands on a leftist and "anti-imperialist"
course anti are confident that in many cases the young
radicals they have befriended will sooner or later come
to power.:Recent developments in Grenada have
Cuba's efforts over the last year or so to strengthen its
ties with governments in the Eastern Caribbean have
at best met with only limited success. This has been the
case not only in the larger islands of Barbados and
Trinidad and Tobago-where the leaders are known to
want to hold the Cubans at arm's length-but also in
at least one of the newly independent ministates-
where Cuba expected to be well received.
Despite the fact that Havana has had diplomatic
relations since 1972 with Barbados--as well as with
Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago- it -as
yet to be permitted to open a diplomatic mission i~:
Bridgetown. To demonstrate its interest in expanding
contacts with the government of Prime Minister 'f om
Adams of Barbados, in March 1978 Cuba designated
its Ambassador to Guyana to cover Barbados as ~ ell.
Sincc then the Cubans have been urging the Adams
government to permit them to open an embassy and a
consulate to handle the limited trade between the two
countries.
Barbadian officials have made it clear that they
remain wary of Cuban contacts with local radicah. [n
January 1978, for example, Adams denounced "scien-
tificsocialism" and its advocates in the Caribbean. His
comment was sparked by the persistent criticism and
local political activism of Ralph Gonsalves, whu resides
in Barbados but also heads apro-Cuban leftist
movement in St. Vint
Liberation Movemen
In Trinidad and Tobago, as in Barbados, Cuba's
presence has been restricted to a Cubana Airlines
office that services regional flights terminating in
Georgetown, Guyana. Cuba has also been pressinfT to
open a resident embassy in Port of Spain and -to
entice the Trinidadians-has offered to provide to=~h-
nical assistance, especially in agriculture.
' F'or the purposes of this assessment, the Eastern Caribbean will be
defined to include the independent countries of Grenada, Barbaclos,
Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica and St. Lucia, as well as the three
remaining British Associated States of Antigua, St. Vincent, and St.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
1 secret
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A000900050001-0
 Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A000900050001-0
outspoken in his warnings about the Communist threat
Strengthening Ties With Regional Radicals
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
More surprising to the Cubans has been their failure to
solidify what once looked to be a promising relation-
ship with Dominica's Patrick John. In 1976-77, using
Dominican radical Roosevelt Douglas as an inter-
mediary, Havana had ambitions of making Domi-
nica-once it became independent-a "showcase" for
Cuban development assistance. Cuba offered to supply
John with aid in a variety of fields, the Dominican
Premier's wife visited Cuba, and tentative arrange-
ments were made for John himself to travel there.
Motivated in part by disagreements with local leftists
as well as by a belief that the prospects for substantial
foreign assistance were greater in the West, John
delivered a strongly anti-Communist speech in Janu-
ary 1978. Subsequently, he shelved all plans for close
ties with Cuba. The shift in the Dominican Govern-
ment's attitude was dramatized last November during
Dominica's independence celebration when a corre-
spondent representing Cuba's officjal new service,
1'rensa Latina, was removed from a news conference,
interrogated by police, and expelled from the country.
The Cubans have fared no better in St. Lucia--the
second British Associated State to gain independence
recently. The same Prensa Latina correspondent was
tossed out of St. Lucia in October while trying to
interview government leaders. The Cubans managed
to wangle an invitation to St. Lucia's independence
celebration in late February but apparently only after
25X1 some difficulty.
Cuba's initiatives with the remaining governments
among the British Associated States have also been
unproductive. Neither St. Vincent nor St. Kitts-Nevis
has accepted Cuban offers of technical assistance, and
Premier Vere Bird of Antigua has been especially
Despite the obvious negative results of its efforts to
cultivate regional governments, Havana has continued
to solidify its ties with radical leaders. The key event in
the Castro regime's attempt to win youthful converts to
Cuba's brand of socialism and to its "anti-imperialist"
foreign policy was the 11th World Youth Festival in
Havana from 28 July to 4 August. Among the
participants from about 140 countries were delegations
from Jamaica, Guyana, Barbados, Trinidad and To-
bago, Grenada, Dominica, Antigua, St. Vincent, and
St. Lucia. In practically every case, local radical
leaders had controlled the selection of delegates.
On 22 August, soon after the youth festival ended, a
number of leading Caribbean radicals gathered in
Trinidad-no doubt at Cuban urging. To promote
greater unity of leftist forces, they established a
committee responsible for coordinating youth activities
in the area. The committee's members included Ralph
Gonsalves of St. Vincent's Youlou United Liberation
Movement (YULIMO), Bernard Coard of Grenada's
New Jewel Movement, Tim Hector of Antigua's
African Caribbean Liberation Movement, and Roose-
velt Douglas of Dominica.
Havana's closest ties to a regional radical group-
aside from those to the New Jewel Movement-have
developed with YULIMO.
s o ast sprang-ec omg
advice t ey a ear ier given to other regional radical
movements-the Cubans were urging YULIMO to
25X1
25X1
25X1
25x1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :CIA-RDP80T00942A00090001-0
pursue the electoral route to power and to broaden its
base of su ort b uniting with other local leftist
groups.
The Cubans have also broadened their ties with
radicals in St. Lucia. The Worker's Revolutionary
Movement--a small Marxist-Leninist group-re-
cently formed a St. Lucia-Cuba Friendship Society.
eorge
Odlum-the ea er o t e ma~ori y, radical faction of
the much more important St. Lucia Labor Party--is
an admirer of the Cuban revolution, but he has so far
been less active than most other Caribbean radicals in
seeking out Cuban officials. Cuba can be expected to
urge these two groups to submerge their differences
and to pursue a united front approach in order to win
the elections scheduled for later this year.
Penetrating Major Institutions
Another important aspect of Cuba's strategy for
promoting a shift toward radical socialism has been its
effort to develop ties with young activists within major
nongovernmental institutions such as labor unions,
religious bodies, women's groups, and the press.
In the labor field, representatives of Cuba's Central
Organization of Cuban Workers were instrument