THE CUBAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000900040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: RP

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Assessment
Center
The Cuban
Military Establishment
Secret
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PA 79-10173D
May 1979
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mN Foreign
Assessment
Center
The Cuban
Military Establishment
Research for this report was completed
on 23 March 1979.
The author of this paper i
Cuban Analytical Center, Office of Political Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be
directed to
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May 1979
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The Cuban Military Establishment
Council of State
President Fidel Castro
1st Vice Pres. Raul Castro
Council of Ministers
President Fidel Castro
1st-Vice Pres. Raul Castro
9 Vice Presidents of
Council of Ministers
Government Offices
Under Direct Control
of Pres. Council
of Ministers
Fidel Castro
MINFAR
MININT
Ministry of Culture
Central Planning Board 01
State Committee
on Finance
State Committee on
Technico-Material Supply
State Committee
On Prices
Institute of
Hydrography
PCC Cent'ra Comm
11 Members
rfy1 "Secretary
Ca tro
2 ecretary
" I Castro''
Party Control
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Key Judgments
0
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The Cuban
Military Establishment 0
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Since the last half of 1975, when Cuba shipped weapons to Angola and the
USSR began to supply new military equipment to Havana, it has become
apparent that the Cuban armed forces can lend substance to Fidel Castro's
commitment to support leftist governments and revolutionary movements
abroad and are capable of deployment abroad within a relatively shore
period of time. The changes occurring in the military that are making the
Cuban Government a more powerful international actor arc:
? The increase in size of Cuba's armed forces since 1975, reversing a :rend
toward a smaller military establishment that began in 1970. It is the second
largest in Latin America, after Brazil, and the most experienced in combat.
? The resumption of the militarization of Cuban society evident in the
1960s, including expansion of the reserves and increasing regimenlati:m of
secondary schools.
? The influx of Soviet weapons, which have been instrumental in allowing
the expansion of traditional missions to include offensive tasks that
emphasize mobility of forces and dynamic tactics.
? The low cost of military modernization as a result of Soviet underwriting
of Cuba's acquisition of military equipment since 1962.
? The increase in Cuba's ability to move its armed forces overseas as its civil
air and merchant fleets expand. 25X1
them again.
As a consequence of these changes and its experience in Africa, Cuba s
military is a potentially dominant force in Latin America and one that poses
a substantial advantage when deployed abroad. Cuba is the only country in
Latin America to have undertaken a major military effort abroad since
World War [I. Its forces have scored notable successes thousands of miles
from home twice in the last three years, and Castro is not reluctant to use
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 Cuban Ground Forces
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u. S.
.ft
Havana at
Western Army ?
Pinar
Adel Rio
Camaguey
.dSt&I/C Hi'ltl_V
Holguin a
i'
Lesser Caymans
(U.K.)
^ Army headquarters
ya Corps headquarters
* Infantry division
Infantry brigade
Whip Mechanized infantry division
AW Armored division
- - Artillery division
C'entr8/ Arm Santa
oClara
Grand Cayman
(U.K.)
0 100
Kildnelrs
wk%
Santiago
de Cuba 0
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The Cuban
Military Establishment
Resurgence in Size
only a dozen officers at the two-star, division-gcr. raI
level
All three are
b
.
mem
ers of the 13-member
During the 1960s Cuba had between 250,000 and Political Bureau, the country's highest decisionm;.king
300,000 men and women-not countin
iliti
i
i
g m
a-
n
ts body.
standing armed forces. This strength had grown in
response to fears of a US invasion, but as perceptions of Raul commands the loyalty of the military and
this threat diminished the leadership became hard security forces personnel, many of whose leaders
pressed to justify so large a fighting force. When the served with him in the mountains against Batista ind
economy took a downturn in 1970, the Castro regime, in the postrevolutionary struggle against anti-C:as ro
partly at Soviet urging, reduced its forces by some 60 forces. This experience and the promotion of
percent, eventually freeing more than 150,000 people "Raulistas" to the top levels of the government pre vide
for full-time employment in the civilian labor force. Raul with a solid base of support should he ever ha ve to
take over from Fidel. As a group, "Raulistas" Lend to
All branches of the armed services except the Air be dogmatic, authoritarian, and deeply distrustful of
Force were affect
d
t:..,., bl
_ A
r - .
e
no
y Th
D
shrank from six brigades and 24 occupied SA-2
surface-to-air missile sites to three brigades and 18
sites, leaving eastern Cuba unprotected by surface-to-
air missiles. The Navy lost a number of radar
surveillance posts, again to the detriment of eastern
Cuba. The Army was more than halved in size and
reorganized.
To serve as a link between the party and the military
establishment, the Political Bureau establishes: the
Military Department of the Central Committee,
headed by another ex-guerrilla, Division General
Calixto Garcia. He and his department are responsible
for formulating military policy options for the Political
Bureau and the
l
i
h
'
n re
ay
ng t
e Bureau
s decisions to the
Largely as a result of the decision to send troops proper government entities and monitoring their ccm-
overseas (some 32,000 to 36,000 are in Angola and pliance. The Military Department is subordinate to the
Ethiopia, rotated on a yearly basis), the armed forces Central Committee's Secretariat-presumably to
have increased to more than 160000
i
act
, ve-duty Fidel and Raul.
personnel after a low of 120,000 in the early 1970s.=
The Military Establishment and
Its Involvement in Civilian Life
The Cuban military establishment comprises the
Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
(MINFAR.) and the Ministry of the Interior
(MININT), directly subordinate to President and
Commander in Chief Fidel Castro. Next in the line of
command and Fidel's choice as his successor is
Minister of the Armed Forces Raul Castro, who holds
the second highest position in the government and in
the Cuban Communist Party. Sergio del Valle, a
guerrilla during the revolution and later Raul's rank-
ing deputy in MINFAR, has been Minister of Interior
since 1968. All three hold military rank-Raul is the
country's only four-star general, and Del Valle is one of
Of the 1 10 members of the party's Central Commit tee,
26 hold active and four hold honorary military rank,
and 19 others have transferred in recent years to
civilian posts on the basis of their proven manageri I
skills as well as high rank in the military.
In addition to uniformed personnel, MINFAR- -
virtually a state within a state-has 31,500 civilian
workers employed in factories and repair facilities in
Cuba and in building roads and airfields in Africa.
Many are employees of MINFAR's Central Director-
ate for Housing and Construction, which in addition to
military construction, builds housing and apartment
complexes for military and civilian personnel of both
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M IN FAR has its own educational system for officers
and other personnel. There are about a dozen "Camilo
Cienfuegos" Vocational Military Schools throughout
the country to provide secondary education for youths
who have decided to pursue a military career. One
school has been set aside for youths preparing for the
Air and Air Defense Forces (DAAFAR) and two
others are for prospective midshipmen. fhese
"Camilitos," as the students are called, are the prime
source of candidates for such advanced institutions as
the Mariel Naval Academy, the Camilo Cienfuegos
Artillery School, the Military Technical Institute, and
t tie General Antonio Maceo School of Combined
Arms, which are Cuba's service academies.
1'he General Maximo Gomez Armed Forces Academy
is Cuba's national war college, with Soviet and Cuban
instructors. Eleven institutions of higher education,
including the Universities of Havana, Las Villas, and
)riente, provide military training for more than
10,000 students, who receive commissions in the
reserve upon graduation. An additional six such
institutions will be graduating reservists by 1981. In
addition, more than 20,000 students are participating
in military training programs in 40 secondary schools,
triple the number of schools offering such training in
1978. Ml N FAR also operates technical schools, such
as the Armed Forces Economic Management School,
the School for Minor Specialists, and Camp Barbosa
for air defense technicians.
M I N FAR publishes its own party journal, Trabajo
Politico, and MINFAR and MININ F jointly broad-
cast over national radio a daily program that forms the
core of a political indoctrination class for military units
throughout the country. The program usually takes a
harder political line than do other se ments of the
Cuban propaganda apparatus.
The high readiness of the reserves has allowed Cuba to
rely heavily on them for service in both Angola and
Ethiopia. According to Raul Castro and other Cuban
leaders, at least half of the enlisted personnel who have
served in Africa have been reservists When returned
to civilian life, they become part of a pool of combat
veterans subject to callup for several years.
Before the Cuban involvement overseas the leadership
believed that the postrevolutionary generation knew
nothing of life under the Batista regime or of the
endurance of the guerrillas that overthrew him. The
leaders feared that military service had come to be
regarded as undesirable rather than a patriotic duty.
There were even difficulties in motivating the Youth
Labor Army, a paramilitary group organized to aid in
the civilian economy. The hope now is that the
returnees from overseas will have developed a sense of
revolutionary esprit.
Before the intervention in Angola the Cuban military
was structured as a home defense force. Its mission
since 1959 had been to assure the survival of the
revolutionary government against attack. The Army
was composed almost entirely of infantry divisions
without a great deal of mechanized travel capability;
the Air Force was largely an interceptor force with no
bombers and few aircraft equipped for airlift or
assault; and the Navy was equipped and trained to
protect the coasts against invasion and infiltration.
There were few weapons that could be considered as
offensive since the withdrawal of Soviet combat units
with their strategic ballistic missiles and jet light
bombers in 1962. This situation did not change until
1975 when Fidel Castro signaled a change by announc-
ing that Cuba would receive new weapons from the
USSR at least through 1980. Since then all branches
of the Cuban armed forces have received new weapons
in an upgrading of the Cuban military. The deliveries
reflect a change in the Soviet policy that withheld
certain equipment in order not to grate on US
sensitivities. The ground attack version of the MIG-23
;wing-wing fighter-bomber and the Ml-8 combat
helicopter have been introduced into the Cuban Air
Force. Recently an attack submarine, Cuba's first, was
delivered to Cienfuegos.
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The equipment arriving from the USSR and the
combat experience in Africa indicate that the Cuban
ground forces are adopting more mobile concepts of
operation patterned after those of the Soviet Ground
Forces. The 2 January military parade in Havana
marking the 20th anniversary of the Cuban revolution
included two paratroop units "belonging to landing
and assault troops" and a unit of naval infantry
"capable of carrying out different types of combat in
any theater of military operations."
Thanks to Soviet largess Cuba has an arsenal of
weapons that is more than adequate for a 160,000-man
army, a 60,000-man active reservist element, and
almost any callup of civilian personnel. Since mid-1975
the Cuban Army has received ZSU-23/4 self-
propelled antiaircraft guns, T-62 tanks, towed field
guns, fire control radar for antiaircraft artillery, BM-
21 tactical multiple rocket launchers, SA-7 man-
portable surface-to-air missiles, BTR-60P armored
personnel carriers armed with antitank guided mis-
siles, BMP-76 armored combat vehicles, BRDM
antitank vehicles, and mobile engineering and bridging
equipment.
teams. They are not normally integrated into tthe h ).t
country's command structure.
These weapons are being added to an inventory that Should the Mt ~i
includes some 720 tanks, 615 personnel carriers and enter the Cuban Air Force, it would provide a c!ian
reconnaissance vehicles, about 160 truck-mounted of challenging SR-7l overflights, but would not
rocket launchers, 20 FROG (Free Rocket Over improve the Cuban Air Force's ability to parrot
Ground) transporter-launchers, 3,400 antitank missile international air corridors or to identify slow-11y;rg
launchers and guns, more than 2,100 field artillery aircraft in Cuban airspace at medium and fort
pieces and mortars, and 1,500 antiaircraft artillery. =altitudes.
The Cuban ground forces are organized into four
territorial commands: The Western, Central, and
Eastern Armies, and the Isle of Youth Military
Region. In addition, expeditionary forces are in Angola
and Ethiopia. The armies contain a total of four corps.
When mobilized for war the armies and corps probably
will become equals, subordinate to MIN FAR's admin-
istrative and operational control.
In the last two years, the Cuban Revolutionary Air
Force (FAR) has received variants of the MIG 23 the
assault variant of the MI-8 helicopter, and new mo~ lels.
of the MIG-21 interceptor. In addition to incre.isir.
the site of the force, these new aircraft brine rot u
capabilities for interceptor, ground-attack. and tro. p-
carrying missions.
The ground attack variant of the MIG-'3 give. tilt
Cuban Air Force a new capability. The airplan:u
carries a heavy load of ordnance-up to I ~, born bs
100 kilograms each when the load of fuel ;s reducei`
and can deliver that load farther than other ( uhan
aircraft. It can carry a heavier bomb load than he
II_-28 light bombers that the Soviets withdrew Iror
Cuba in 1962.
In early 1978 the Air Force consisted of less than 6,(i)(
men, including only about 500 active pilots. Thee v as
little if any surplus in the number of proficient pilot
and many were not trained to fly jet fighters. Ar
undetermined number of Cuban pilots are being
trained in the Soviet Union to make up for ?hesc
manpower deficiencies as well as to learn how to
operate new equipment.
For normal tactical operations, a Cuban Army can be
considered equivalent to a corps, controlling up to nine
divisions each containing about 5,000 to 7,000 men.
The Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia apparently
are organized into regimental or brigade combat
The FAR has well over 300 military aircraft. exchic
ing utility variants. These include about 200 jet
fighters (half of which are MIG-21 fighters), about 'O
military helico ters and move than 80 transport am
cargo aircraft.
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130-mm field guns
1~s
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Since 1975 the Soviet Union has supplied a variety of mobile
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The Cuban Air Force acu .,sired
aircraft designed to attac,
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The other main element of the Cuban Air and Air
Defense Forces is the 10,000-man surface-to-air mis-
sile force. In contrast to the Air Force it lags behind the
air defenses of several Warsaw Pact and Soviet-allied
states using Soviet weaponry. For years before 1976,
Cuba received no new surface-to-air missile weapons.
Since then, SA-3 surface-to-air missiles sites have
become operational. The SA-3 system complements
Cuba's SA-2 air defense missile system, is more
effective against low-flying aircraft, and, thanks to the
use of different radar frequencies, makes the overall
air defense less vulnerable to "jamming" by in
attacking force. There are also four long-range
King radars in the early warning and tracking
net work.
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"he Air Defense Force's 10,000 members are divided
,mong the surface-to-air missile units and the
adiotechnical troops. Taken together with the Air
nrce, the Air Defense Force is capable of defending
l~cy population and industrial centers against anything
hors of a major attack. Its major weaknesses are its
dependence on the Soviet Union for material and
t .chnical support and a shortage of trained personnel.
I)AAFAR controls little or no antiaircraft artillery.
Instead, SA-7 man-carried and shoulder-fired surface-
)-air missiles and ZSIJ-23/4 and ZSI.'-57/2 vehicle-
taunted, self-contained antiaircraft guns seem to be
;apportioned to ground force units.
1 he mission of the Cuban Revolutionare Navy
f MGR) is defensive. While the Navy is thought
e:ipable of shielding Cuba's coast against anything
,;'tort of a large-scale multiforce attack by a major
power, it can carry out only limited operations at sea
.ond has virtually no antisubmarine capability. It is,
However, one of the best-equipped and best-trained
navies in Latin America. Its 10,000 personnel operate
Approximately 100 ships and boats as well as a land-
1iased coastal surveillance radar network.
1 he MGR has received five new Osa-11-class guided-
missile patrol boats since mid-1975. The addition of
these small craft, each armed with four SS-N-2 Styx
cruise missiles, strengthens the major antiship attack
e. ement of the Navy-14 Komar-class patrol boats
e-9ch armed with two SS-N-2 Styx cruise missiles, and
rive Osa-I-class patrol boats each armed with four SS-
N -2 guided cruise missiles. In the past few years, the
Soviets also have supplied three small minesweepers to
t lee Cuban Navy.
In early February the Cuban Navy took delivery of its
first submarine---a conventionally armed and diesel-
pnwered F-class. Besides serving as a showpiece, the
submarine will contribute to Cuba's antiship defenses.
N hipments of'submarines to Libya and India indicate
tl at more releases for Cuba will be forthcoming.
The Soviets also delivered =urya-class hydrofoil 25X1 B
submarine chasers in February. The Turyas do not
carry the gear for antisubmarine warfare the Soviets
use, but this equipment could be added. The delivery of
the Turya-class boats marked both their first export
from the USSR and the first time that Cuba was the
initial foreign recipient of a Soviet weapons system.
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The MGR has 10 S.O.1 small submarine chasers and
four Kronshtadt large submarine chasers for escort
duty. All were built before the 1960s and are inad-
equate for modern antisubmarine warfare. This
inadequacy became apparent during the Angolan war
when the MGR tried to guard the movement of
merchant ships and troop carriers through the Carib-
bean, but its escorts had insufficient range to go past
Cuban crews were training
on the anuchka-class guided-missile patrol ship
which the Soviet Navy has used in the eastern
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Mediterranean. If several of these ships are transferred
to Cuba, they would add significantly to the Cuban
Navy's sea patrol capability. The Nanuchka-class
ships probably would be armed with the SS-N-2 Styx
used on the Osas and Komars because the Cubans lack
beyond-the-horizon control systems required by
longer-range missiles.
There have been 19 deployments of groups of Soviet
naval ships to Cuba and Caribbean waters since 1969.
They have included destroyers, guided-missile frigates,
and submarines. The Soviet naval air force also has
sent TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft to operate from
Cuba 27 times since early 1975. Some have continued
to Africa, surveying the Atlantic for Western naval
activity. The TU-95s also reconnoiter the US east
coast, seldom missing an opportunity to fly over US
carrier task groups.
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Cuba's first submarine was delivered in early February. It was
first seenflying a Cuban ensign near Denmark on its way to Cuba.
Cuba has,five Osa-II missile armed patrol boats with more
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Cuba: Military-Aged Males
['he Angolan and Ethiopian campaigns gave Cuban (17-34 years)
officers practice in managing forces in various types of
offensive and defensive tactics, commanding both Mid-Year 100
Cuban and foreign troops, and in logistics. In addition 1978 137
to the experience gained in Africa, Cubans may be
receiving tactical demonstrations and mechanized 1979 14
warfare training in Cuba from Soviet advisers. 1980
The modernization of the armed forces and their
deployment in Africa have not imposed a serious
burden on the Cuban economy because:
? The large-scale Soviet subsidization of the Cuban
armed forces has held Havana's direct defense expen-
ditures to only 7 to 8 percent of its gross national
product.
? The regular armed forces employ only I 1 percent of
Cuba's military-aged males (17 to 34 years) and less
than 6 percent of the Cuban labor force. Both the
manpower pool and the labor force will rise sharply
over the next two decades.
Despite the absence ofa formal military aid treaty,
Soviet support of the Cuban military is extensive. We
estimate the value of Soviet military material assist-
ance to Cuba over the 1960-78 period at a minimum of
$2 billion.
Massive Soviet assistance has enabled Havana to keep
defense expenditures at relatively moderate levels. The
7 to 8 percent of estimated GNP in 1978 devoted to
defense outlays is well above the 1.4-percent average
for other Latin American countries but is generally
comparable to the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Taiwan, and far below the USSR, Saudi Arabia,
North Korea, and Israel. Cuban per capita expendi-
tures for active duty personnel averaged only about
$5,750 in 1978 compared to about $6,725 for the other
I.atin American countries. Even if the amorphous
budget categories of "other activities" and "reserves"
were included in the defense category, Cuban defense
outlays would total no more than 15 percent of GNP.
In either case the economic cost has been eased by
diverting a portion of Cuba's defense outlays to the
-1981 1523
1982 1579
1983 1634
1984 1684
1985 1730
1986 1771
1987 - 1809
1988 1853
1989 1901
1990 1943
1991
1972
1992
1989
1993
2000
1994
2008
1995
2010
1996
2005
1997
1993
1998
1973
1999 1949
0
nonmilitary sector; for example the 100,000-man
paramilitary Youth Labor Army is funded by the
military but is involved in civil action programs,
including such agricultural pursuits as sugarcane
harvesting.
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Cuban Merchant Fleet: Selected Years 1958 to 1978'
Number of Ships Year End GRT
15 - 1958 41.000
21 OWPW 1960 5.1i, 0 0 0
33 1965 i 152,000
53 1970
58 1973
60 1975
63 1976
68 apW ..1677
Neither have Cuba's armed forces constituted a
serious drain on the domestic labor force. Havana has
drawn only 160,000 men from a pool of 1.4 million
males of military age.' Moreover, due to a baby boom
in the 1960s, the number of males of military age will
rise sharply through the early 1990s -as will the labor
force. Given the modest prospects for economic
growth, Cuba's ability to provide productive civilian
employment for jobseekers is limited at best.
Although the Cuban armed forces lack a long-distance
lift capability, civilian transport has been and is readily
available. When Cuba began moving troops to Africa
in late 1975, three Bristol Britannias that belonged to
Cubana Airlines before the revolution played a key
role. These turboprop transports, with major mainte-
nance done in the United Kingdom, carried about 80
troops each at a cruising speed of 300 knots
342,000
418,000
439,000
498,000
537.000
I Includes all ships with a GIRT of 1,000 tons or mcne.
9 Figures for 1978 are preliminary.
Since the Angola airlift, Cuba has accepted
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Povret-built IL-62 jetliners. Patterned a ter
the British VC-10 airliner, these aircraft can c arr
nearly 200 troops at speeds of 435 knots.
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Cuba also is receiving other transport aircraft. inc ud-
ingAK-40 short-haul trijet s irlilters,25X1 B
N-26 turboprop transports, and art 25X1 B
undetermined number of AN-30 twin turboprc.p ul ility
and aerial-survey aircraft.
At the beginning of 1975 Cuba had 59 ships ovt:r I ;100 25X1
gross registered tons (GRT) totaling 387,000 tons in
the civil merchant fleet. By the end of 1978 there were
74 ships of the same size totaling 537,000 GRT. T1is
amounts to a 39-percent increase in tonnage si-ice
1974_ In 1976 Cuba required less than 15 percent 0 its
cargo ships to carry troops and supplies to and frorli
Africa. There was no interruption of normal crmn er-
cial operations.
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on of aita,:k. tie (uban armed io!k:es wilt not
it, it it tie trued-down status an.: lesser
nn-nt front the 1J~5I1 seem:, limit -tl Only by the
i ( O r a ao assinufate it. 1