THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT: MOROCCO'S MILLSTONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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The 'Nest ~r~~ -a~ ~ ~-~. %~~n~ icy:
1V~or ARio's 3,000 to 5,000 combatants are exploiting
the tactical advantages of the sparsely populated desert
terrain, and while they probably cannot drive the
Moroccan Army out of the Western Sahara, they can
probably make the price of staying there unacceptable
to Morocco, (s)
King Hassan won popular support by his 1976
annexation of Morocco's portion of the Western
Sahara, but since then the cost in men and resources
has become a political liability. A political settlement
is badly needed, but he would lose considerable
prestige-and possibly his throne-if he were to back
down on his claims. (s)
Algeria's new leadership has not slackened from the
late President Boumediene's commitment to the cause
of Western Saharan nationalism. Algeria continues to
refuse to recognize the Moroccan-Mauritanian annex-
ations and provides the roLtsnRto guerrillas sanctuary
and material support .There appears to belittle
immediate prospect of a negotiated settlement to this
conflict without the prodding of outside mediation. (s)
NOTE-This study addresses the principal developments leader-
ship changes in Algeria and Mauritania and Mauritania's with-
drawal from the war that have occurred in the two years since
publication of the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, The
C'ort/7ict in the Western Sahara.
Several developments in the dispute seem plausible
over the next few years:
? Growing domestic opposition to the war in Morocco
may within a year or so seriously weaken Hassan's
negotiating position. In the absence of negotiations,
political, economic, and military constraints will prob-
ably keep the conflict from escalating into a conven-
tional war. (s)
? The Yot.[sARio will continue to move at will through
the countryside, scoring occasional military successes
and inflicting heavy casualties on Moroccan forces.
Some guerrilla attacks-notably those in southern
Morocco proper-will have considerable propaganda
value. For their part, Mauritanian forces will continue
to honor their cease-fire with the guerrillas and may
pull out of their sector altogether.
Buoyed by the guerrillas' battlefield successes,
Algeria and the ro~tsnxro may become less and less
disposed to compromise. A political settlement would
fnost likely have to take the form of Moroccan
acknowledgment of Saharan self-determination and
territorial concessions to the new Saharan state.
? If a Saharan ministate were created in the
Mauritanian sector, such an arrangement would be
unstable. Por.tsnxto leaders would view their ministate
as a liberated zone from which they would continue
their insurgency in the Moroccan Sahara. They would
turn to Algeria for military support when threatened
by Morocco.
? Most countries have not acknowledged the partition
of the Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania, and
the NoL> a,xro's government-in-exile will slowly gain
broader recognition.
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!~J1J1?'OKN-NOCONTKAC' -
a ~Z? ~~N
-~ ~.~~stly and embarrassing attacks from Algerian-
i,ased eoLisARto guerrillas seem likely to continue, and
~.ing Hassan may be pressured into a more aggressive
r~t~3icy toward Algeria. Given the military balance,
which is greatly to Morocco's disadvantage, Hassan is
like-iv to restrict cross-border operations to commando
;-=~i~is that carry minimal risks of drawing a major
~;nonse from Algerian regular forces, but also afford
=~a~l ~ minimal promise of slowing the insurgency. (s)
?ret ~~'
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ORCON
The Western Sahara Cont7ict:
Morocco's Millstone (s)
After more than three years of conflict, Morocco's
military capability to fight an effective counter-
guerrilla war has been seriously eroded. Moroccan
forces are increasingly defensive minded and show
little ability to detect and respond to concentrations of
Yol.ISnRIO forces. Other factors contributing to declin-
ing Moroccan effectiveness are failures resulting from
inadequate maintenance, lack of spare parts, poor
intelligence and security operations, command fail-
ures, and low morale. (s rrF)
The rot,tsARlo forces are well armed and supplied.
They have not yet attempted to occupy and hold
territory, preferring to operate from bases in Algeria
and thereby deny superior Moroccan forces a fixed
target. The roLlsnRlo probably hopes that a pro-
tracted guerrilla war will force Rabat to accept a
political settlement creating an independent Saharan
state. (s tvF)
roLisnR>i3nses of northwest Africa. They are known for their
~~,?rucity, pride, and skill with firearms and have
a~jminated the eastern part of the territory for some
+.@#51e. (U~
t ragmentary information on the Pot,tsARto Front's
;d~ai.dowy leadership permits us to draw a few tentative
;c?nclusions on its political orientation, ideology, and
:~~?icctives. The key figures are single-minded young
~~~~r in their thirties who seem prepared to fight as long
.:> accessary to achieve independence. The Front-does
~,t seem to be tied to a single ideology but is a coalition
,i f=ictions representing diverse political leanings. (s uF
ed authority and depe~ids on
the support of the Arm}~ Until power reJadonsh:ps are
sorted out, Bend~edid ar.J his military backers veil(
probably hold fa:;t to B~:.imediene's Sa:+raran policy to
deny powerful ri.~als an exploitable openings. (s)
Algeria has no tcrrituri, claims an the Sahara,
although it has s~eadfas iy maintained that it is an
interested party with p?as tried to adopt a more balanced
position. It has been icting as broker, but with little
success. Paris wants ' ~ continue to improve its relation-
ship with Algeria, with which it has more important
trade ties than it has with Morocco. (s)
France has demonstr :fed in the past, however, that it is
willing to risk Algeri to hostility as well as domestic
and internatic,nal cri cism by taking military action
against the rout sArtt :~ when it believes its interests are
threatened. [n 1.he wi rter of 1977-78 and again in May
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1978 France carried out effective air strikes in
retaliation against the YoirtsAxto in Mauritania for the
taking of French hostages from the mining complex at
Zouerat. (s)
France wanted to display its determination to protect
French citizens and demonstrate to pro-French gov-
ernments in Africa that Paris would use force when
necessary to safeguard its interests. The raids were
well received by the French public, which greeted with
enthusiasm the subsequent release of the French
hostages. The government recognizes, however, that
military intervention usually pays few dividends do-
mestically, especially should there be French casual-
ties. Thus, France has been careful to emphasize the
selective and defensive character of its strikes in
Mauritania. (s)
Should military hostilities break out between Algeria
and Morocco, France would support Morocco
militarily-discreetly, if possible. The French have
continually stressed the need for a political solution
and initially would probably offer to mediate. ]f
unsuccessful, they probably would expedite delivery of
previously ordered equipment to the Moroccans and
might send some advisers. They might also provide
pilots for restricted use in Morocco and the Western
Sahara. Paris continues to promote the idea of an
African mutual security organization, and the French
might try to aid Morocco under the guise of an ad hoc
African defense force. (s)
Spain's Residual Ties
Madrid's policy toward the Western Sahara is also
based on a need to maintain a rough balance in its
relations with Morocco and Algeria. Spai~i continues
to pay lipservice to the Madrid Tripartite Agreements
of November 1975, in which Madrid surrendered
administrative power over the Spanish Sahara to
Morocco and Mauritania. This position is calculated to
please Morocco. Madrid has sought to hedge its bets
and placate Algiers by insisting that sovereignty over
the region resides with the people of the Sahara, whose
aspirations toward independence must be determined
in a UN-sponsored referendum. (s)
Strong Spanish security interests in North Africa are
closely tied to the struggle between Morocco and
Algeria. The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on
the Mediterranean coast of Morocco are coveted by
Moroccans, and Madrid worries that friction with
Rabat could provoke a "green march"6 against the
enclaves. Spain is even more determined, however, to
keep its Canary Islands-where Algiers has demon-
strated an ability to stir up trouble among a small
separatist group in order to apply pressure on Madrid
to renounce the Sahara settlement. Spanish fishermen,
moreover, arc vulnerable to Moroccan-, Algerian-, and
NoLtsnttto-sponsored attacks as they ply the fishing
grounds off the Saharan coast. (s)
The transition to democracy in Spain has also brought
pressure on the government from the socialists-the
principal opposition party-who threw their support to
the Algerian-backed r'ot.tsnttto Front in 1.977. Partly
in order to protect his government from charges of
favoring the Moroccan monarchy, Prime Minister
Suarez has encouraged informal public contacts be-
tween leaders of his party and the roLtsARto; he also
seemed to be moving toward a rapprochement with
Algeria last fall when Boumediene's declining health
interrupted negotiations. (s)
Torn by conflicting pressures, Madrid is likely to stay
aloof from direct involvement in any negotiations. The
Spanish Government believes that Spain pulled out of
the Sahara just in time to avoid a colonial war, and it is
determined not to be drawn back into the fray. in the
event of hostilities between Morocco and Algeria
Spain would keep its distance, while possibly offering
to mediate. (s)
Should a settlement create an independent Saharan
state, Madrid would probably offer what limited
financial and technical aid it could to bolster the new
regime. The Spanish Government would hope that
such support would be favorably received internation-
ally. Spain's support to an independent Western
Sahara would also assuage guilt feelings over the
precipitate withdrawal of Spanish forces in early 1976
and perhaps facilitate Spanish access to the phosphate
deposits in the Sahara. (s)
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'v'~~ .Settlement in Sight
~l~lrcre seems to be little immediate prospect of a
g~eaceful solution to the Saharan dispute, and the war is
likely to drag on through its fourth year. Desultory
?;~:i.tement efforts between Morocco and Algeria had
~~talled at the time of Algerian President Boumediene's
fi~;ath last December. Neither Morocco nor Algeria
Las yet shown a willingness to back away from its basic
~aaasition. Although changes of governments in Algeria
:a-~d Mauritania might have been expected to break the
,taiemate, the dispute now seems even less tractable
~':ra.n when the war began more than three years ago.
it
lire continuing negotiating deadlock is attributable to
several factors. Pot.isnRto military capabilities in the
~~~estern Sahara are growing relative to those of the
~lcreasingly frustrated, dispirited, and ineffectual
i'vtoroccan Army. "l'he guerrillas' battlefield successes
;rc reinforcing the Algerians in their rigid Saharan
,policy. The Algerians show no sign of considering the
~,~~~thdrawal of their support to the guerrillas, the one
l~ressure tactic that might compel the guerrillas to
stile for something less than independence in all of the
l~~_3rmer Spanish Sahara. The poLisnxto Front seems
;v,ore concerned with consolidating its military gains
.z~ainst an increasingly isolated Morocco than with
fE~rmulating a negotiating position. (s)
i~4~r his part, King Hassan is presently unwilling to