SPEECH AT AIR WAR COLLEGE, MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R002100030026-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: October 12, 1973
• Content Type: AG

erovh ed For, Re ease 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
ec a Air Oar College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama,
12 October 1973 - 0830 - Includes lunch.
"Critical In-puts frnm flip Tni- ence Community"
Contact: Miss Brown, autovon: 875-2492/2834
Maxwell provided T-39. 1630 take-off from
Andrews AFB on 11 Oct 73. Arrive Maxwell
AFB 1730. Tail # 488, Call Sign TUG-99.
Gen Walters invited by Colonel Lyle, acquaintance
from Brazil, to attend his seminar party on
evening of 11 Oct. Co.l Lyle is student at AWC.
Dinner/Theater party starts at 1830. Lamplighter
Theater-in-Round show with Broderick Crawford.
Cocktails/Dinner/Show. Gen W. accepted.
Gen Walters' brother F. J. Walters picking him
up at Maxwell to drive him to Altanta on 12th
in the afternoon where he will spend weekend.
Gen Walters returning to Washington Monday
morning, 15 Oct, departing Atlanta at 0630.
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
27 August 1973
Major General James V. Hartinger
Commandant
Air War College (AU)
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
Dear General Hartingert
Thank you for your letter of 10 August 1973 inviting
me to address the Air War College Class of 1974 on 12
October. I would be delighted to make the presentation on
"Critical Inputs from the Intelligence Community" and to
visit some of your seminars.
I will have my office contact Colonel Holcombe to
make the final arrangements.
Faithfully,
J?i. Vernon A. Walterd
Vernon A. Walters
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
VAW/ncl
Distribution:
Orig & I - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 -ER
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release QdAJQPAffWJ~g R00 7;00 0 6-2.
AIR WAR COLLEGE (AU)
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear General Walters
I am honored to invite you to address the Air War College Class of 1974 on
"Critical Inputs from the Intelligence Community" at 0830, Friday,
12 October 1973.
This presentation is scheduled early in our new academic year. The area of
study is "National and World Environment" and the phase of instruction in
which the lecture is to be given is "Formulation of National Security
Policy." The attached sheets show the scope of your presentation and how
it fits into the overall area of study (Attachments 1 and 2). Should you
accept, you will receive a complete schedule of instruction for this phase,
along with the required student readings, in the near future.
We have scheduled a 45-minute period for your presentation followed by a
discussion period. In addition, we would be delighted if you would be able
to visit some of our seminars following the question period. These periods
will be separated by a short break.
The attached biographical sketch form is forwarded for your convenience
(Attachment 3). Should you be able to accept, we would appreciate your
including on this form any information you desire, and returning it to us
in the attached envelope as soon as conveniently possible.
Colonel Bondy H. Holcombe, of the Air War College faculty,-will provide any
additional information and assist you in any way possible. He may be con-
tacted at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, area code [phone] or
293-2127.
I understand the heavy demands of your schedule during this period; neverthe-
less, I sincerely hope it will permit your acceptance as your presentation
will be one of the highlights of our academic year.
Sincerely
JAMES V. HARTINGJ ' 3 Atch
Major General, US'
1.
Scope Sheet
Commandant
2.
Instruction Program
3.
Biographical Sketch Form
Strength Through Knowledge
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Approved For Release ?&j1t/AI~c?~R017312b10~00i36
E A ,~ .,,z ;
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
I am honored to invite you to address the Air War College/Class of 1974 on
"Critical Inputs from the Intelligence Community" at 0830, Friday,
12 October 1973.
This presentation is scheduled early in our new academic year. The area of
study is "National and World Environment" and the phase of instruction in
which the lecture is to be given is "Formulation of National Security
Policy." The attached sheets show the scope of your presentation and how
it fits into the overall area of study (Attachments 1 and 2). Should you
accept, you will receive a complete schedule of instruction for this phase,
along with the required student readings, i% the near future.
We have scheduled a 45-minute period for-your presentation followed by a
discussion period. In addition, we would be delighted if you would be able
to visit some of our seminars following the question period. These periods
will be separated by a short break.
The attached biographical sketch form is forwarded for your convenience
(Attachment 3). Should you be able to accept, we would appreciate your
including on this form any information you desire, and returning it to us
in the attached envelope as soon as conveniently possible.
Colonel Bondy H. Holcombe, of the Air War College faculty, will provide any
additional information and assist you in any way possible. He may be con-
tacted at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, area code [phone] or
293-i~.
I understand the heavy demands of your schedule during this period; neverthe-
less, I sincerely hope it will permit your acceptance as your presentation
will be one of the highlights of our academic year.
Sincerely
)JAMES V. HARTINGER
3 Atch
Major General, USAF
1.
Scope Sheet
Commandant
2.
Instruction grogram
3.
Biographical. Sketch Form
Strength Through Knowledge
Approved(~rf
;4e 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R00210003002672
27 August 1973
Major General James V. Hartinger
Commandant
Air War College (AU)
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
Dear General, Hartinger:
Thank you for your letter of 10 August 1973 inviting
me to address the Air War College Class of 1974 on 12
October. I would be delighted to make the presentation on
"Critical Inputs from the Intelligence Community" and to
visit some of your seminars.
I will have my office contact Colonel Holcombe to
make the final arrangements.
Faithfully,
is] Vernon A. Walters
Vernon A. Walters
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
VAW/ncl
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 FF102,10.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR WAR COLLEGE (AU)
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112
18 SEP 1973
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
As promised earlier, we are sending you the Air War
College Bulletin which provides information about our
facilities and curriculum. In addition, we have attached
a copy of the readings which apply to your period, and
which will be completed by the students prior to your
lecture.
Also included is a brief outline of the composition of
our student body which we felt may be of interest to you.
We are looking forward with great pleasure to your appear-
ance on the Air War College platform. Please do not hesi-
tate to contact us if you would like further information
or if we can be of any assistance to you.
FRANCIS C. R NDY
3
Atchs
Colonel, USAF
1.
AWC Bulletin
Chief, Dept. of Governmental
2.
Reading Selections
Affairs
3.
Class Composition
Approv@l4Fo gttfage' b0
P8f bf71 AdbYIff6ft026-2
 team nt eel t r otn rime Ito Weekly Newsmagazine, Jane lt, 1973, p. 21t by permission.
uF~ ?
conyxt.ght 1973 by t late, Tric.
The cwcr s the at Monitor and Protect
The nation's intelligence system is un-
questionably large but it is anything
but monolithic. It is a loose aggrega-
tion of agencies, each with a specific
role and place, wary of any encroach-
ments on its prerogatives. The prin-
cipal members:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.. Di-
rector-designate: William Colby. Esti-
mated number of employees: 15,000.
Estimated budget: $750 million. Es-
tablished by the National Security Act
of 1947 to replace the World War II
Office of Strategic Services. Officially
supervised by four congressional com-
ruittees, but largely autonomous and
excused by a 1949 law from any ac-
counting of the funds it gets or spends.
In charge of espionage and clandestine
operations abroad as well as overt in-
telligence-gathering activities; forbid-
den by law to exercise any police, sub-
poena or law-enforcement powers, or
internal security functions in the U.S.,
but has occasionally interpreted these
laws freely. Grown somewhat fat over
the years, was ordered this year to cut
its staff by 10%, but cuts are still not
completed.
The director of the CIA also serves
ex officio as chairman of the U.S. In-
telligence Board, which reports to Pres-
ident's National Security Council (see
diagram). The hoard coordinates and
supervises major American intelligence
activities, and exercise's supervisory
control over every other security
system.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Ditec-
lor: Vice Admiral Vincent P. dePoix.
Number of employees: 5,000. Budget:
$129,300,000. Set up by Robert S. Mc-
Namara in August 1961, after the CIA
intelligence for Bay of Pigs invasion
proved disastrously inadequate, and be-
cause the three military services' op-
erations suffered from a lack of over-
all evaluation. The agency operates
under the direction of the Secretary of
Defense. Charged with assessing the
worldwide military situation, the De-
fense lutelligencc Agency coordinates
the conflicting and not infrequently self-
serving intelligence operations of the
three armed services-Army's G-2, Of-
fice of Naval Intelligence and Air
Force's A-2. DIA men tend to view CIA
men as the spoiled darlings of the in-
telligence community. The CtA, which
once dealt directly with military in-
telligence services, resents DIA's role
as middleman. and tends to look upon
pprovec to-rii e'' 0 3 f01
172
its members as minor-league spies.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. Direc-
tor: Lieut. General Samuel Phillips,
U.S.A.F. Employees: 25,000. Budget:
classified. Created in 1952 as a sep-
arate agency within the Defense De-
partment. Makes and breaks codes, de-
velops techniques for electronic sur-
veillance of foreign troop and ship
movements and construction of military
facilities (NSA equipment was used on
the U-2 spy plane shot down over Rus-
sia in 1960).
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RE-
SEARCH. Director: Ray S. Cline. Em-
ployees: 33"5. Budget: about $8,000,000.
Intelligence arm of the State Depart-
ment since 1947. Charged with gath-
ering and analyzing information essen-
tial to U.S. foreign policy. Staffed by
economists and academicians. Prepares
studies on subjects as diverse and es-
oteric as Albanian public health sys-
tem and the clove industry in Zan-
zibar. Generally considered a "clean,"
as opposed to "dirty" or covert oper-
ation.
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. Direc-
tor: Dr. Dixy Lee Ray. Total employ-
ees: 7,000. Overall budget: $2,500,000,-
000. Established in 1946 to govern
development of atomic energy. Also
maintains a constant watch on the
atomic capabilities of other countries,
detecting and identifying nuclear tests.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. Direc-
tor: George P. Shultz. Total employees:
117.462; 100-200 directly involved in
intelligence. Oversees Bureau of Cus-
toms and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms. Thus responsible for nar-
cotics investigations. Department also
includes Secret Service, which protects
President and other top officials, main-
tains liaison with Interpol, the inter-
national criminal police organization.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
Director: William Ruckelshaus. Em-
ployees: 19,857 (including 8,700
agents). Budget: $336,300,000. Number
of field offices: 59. Established in 1908
as investigative arm of the Justice De-
partment, the closest U.S. equivalent
to a national police force. r-BI has ju-
risdiction over wide range of crimes
from assassination of a President to
hank robbery, kidnaping and transpor-
tation of stolen cars. Since 1936, has
had jurisdiction over espionage and sab-
otage within the U.S. J. Edgar Hoo-
ver, director from 1924 until his death
last year, expanded FBI authority to in-
vestigate Communists, Ku Klux Klans-
men, radical students and other ele-
ments he considered a threat to national
security. The bureau's latest assign-
ment: getting to the bottom of the so-
R0199I1 06 W6 6b16-2
?
 Reproduced by special errnissio
A I-Q97leppe 9616:
Foreign Relations, Inc., New York.
THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING
By Chester L. Cooper
"The most fundamental method of work . . . is to determine our working policies ac-
cording to the actual conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have made,
we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation ... and were
subjective in determining our working policies The Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."
N bucolic McLean, Virginia, screened by trees and sur-
rounded by a high fence, squats a vast expanse of concrete
and glass known familiarly as the "Pickle Factory," and
more formally as "Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency."
Chiselled into the marble which is the only relieving feature of
the building's sterile main entrance are the words, "The Truth
Shall Make You Free." The quotation from St. John was
personally chosen for the new building by Allen W. Dulles over
the objection of several subordinates who felt that the Agency,
then still reeling from the Bay of Pigs debacle, should adopt a
somewhat less lofty motto. (In those dark days of late 1961, some
suggested that a more appropriate choice would be "Look Before
You Leap.") But Dulles had a deeper sense of history than
most. Although he was a casualty of the Bay of Pigs and never
sat in the Director's office with its view over the Potomac, he
left a permanent mark not only on the Agency which he had
fashioned but on its building which he had planned.
Allen Dulles was famous among many and notorious among
some for his consummate skill as an intelligence operative
("spook" in current parlance), but one of his greatest contribu-
tions in nurturing the frail arrangements he helped to create to
provide intelligence support to Washington's top-level foreign-
policy-makers.
Harry Truman, whose Administration gave birth to both the
National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency,
recalls that, "Each time the National Security Council is about
to consider a certain policy-let us say a policy having to do
with Southeast Asia-it immediately calls upon the CIA to
present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to
have....' President Truman painted a somewhat more cozy
relationship between the NSC and the CIA than probably
existed during, and certainly since, his Administration. None
the less, it is fair to say that the intelligence community, and espe-
1 "Memoirs of Harry S Truman." New York: Doubleday, r958.
173
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
cially the CIA, played an important advisory role in high-level
policy deliberations during the i95os and early 196os.
To provide the most informed intelligence judgments on the
affects a contemplated policy might have on American na-
tional security interests, a group especially tailored for the task
was organized in i95o within the CIA. While this step would
probably have been taken sooner or later, the communist victory
in China, the Korean War and growing East-West tensions stimu-
lated the Truman administration's interest in obtaining care-
fully prepared intelligence assessments and projections. The
Office of National Estimates (ONE) was headed initially by
Professor William Langer, eminent diplomatic historian, lead-
ing authority on the American duck and master of prose-style.
Under his brief stewardship he established guidelines for crisp,
objective assessments that have been maintained for two decades.
Since its inception, the Office of National Estimates has main-
tained its independence within the hierarchy of the CIA, within
the intelligence community, and within the national security and
foreign policy elements of the government. Each National Intel-
ligence Estimate is written after due consideration of contribu-
tions submitted by intelligence analysts both within and outside
the Agency, but the final wording bears the unmistakable stamp
of ONE's style of composition and analysis.
Estimates, about 5o a year, are written on a variety of subjects
relevant to situation or policy considerations affecting the na-
tional security interests of the United States-from such elab-
orate, highly technical examinations as Chinese communist nu-
clear capabilities as they may develop over the next several
years, to more speculative judgments about, say, the probable
course of Japanese-Soviet relations in the light of evolving
American foreign and economic policy.
The estimates are, by their very nature, a projection into the
future: "What will be the effects of ...?" "What are the prob-
able developments in ...?" "What are the intentions of ...?"
"What are the future military capabilities of ...?" When Pravda
has been scanned, the road-watchers' reports from Laos checked,
the economic research completed, Pham van Dong's recent
speeches dissected, radar signals examined, satellite observations
analyzed, and embassy cables read, the estimatgrs set about
their task. What emerges reflects a mass of distilled information,
a painstaking search for the mot just and an assiduous effort to
17h
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING
coordinate the views of all appropriate elements of the intelli-
gence community. And,when all is said and done, what emerges
is an opinion, a judgment. But it is likely to be the best-informed
and most objective view the decision-maker can get.
The ten men on the National Estimates Board and the twenty
or so on the National Estimates Staff (the Board and Staff make
up the Office of National Estimates) have virtually unlimited
access to classified and unclassified information concerning the
political, military and economic situations of foreign countries.
Their access to high-level White House, Defense or State policy
thinking is much more limited; the fear of leaks which has per-
vaded the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations has
tended to seal off even such elite intelligence groups as the Office
of National Estimates from advance knowledge of sensitive
"options" under serious consideration by the President. On occa-
sion, now less frequent than in previous years, the Estimates
folk are given an inkling of closely held courses of action that
may be under high-level review through requests from the
White House or the NSC to undertake a "Special" National
Intelligence Estimate on "The Consequences of Certain Possible
Steps the United States May Take Toward (let us say) Cash-
mania."
The position of the men and women in the Office of National
Estimates, particularly those on the Board, is unique in the gov-
ernment (their closest counterparts were members of the Policy
Planning Staff of the Department of State prior to the recent
reorganization of that staff). They are among the most senior
civil servants in the government, but unlike their peers else-
where in the CIA or in other agencies and departments, they have
no managerial or administrative responsibilities, they are not
obliged to concern themselves with the painful and mundane
matter of the annual budgets, they are not asked to appear be-
fore congressional committees. Their assigned responsibility
is to brood about the world's problems and to project their views
about how these problems are likely to affect American national
security interests. No one has ever tried to cost out the production
of a National Intelligence Estimate. Even if the dollar costs
could be determined, who is to weigh the nondollar value of a
considered, objective judgment, based on all relevant available
information, on a matter important, perhaps vital to American
security? At a time when government officials of whatever
175
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
stature find themselves so harried that thinking time is at a pre-
mium, a group of experts that has an opportunity to ponder is a
scarce and precious national asset.
The salad days of CIA's Office of National Estimates were
during the Eisenhower administration. It was in this period
that the estimators sensed that they had a direct, or at least dis-
cernible, participation in the policy process. The National Se-
curity Council then played a more important role in the formu-
lation of national security policy than it did under its creator,
President Truman, or has under any subsequent administration,
including the present one. Anxious to make the NSC a more
orderly and effective body, President Eisenhower established a
Planning Board charged with "staffing out" policy reviews and
recommendations prior to consideration by the Council itself.
The Planning Board was chaired by the President's Assistant
for National Security Affairs and its membership included
representatives from the departments and agencies which com-
prised the NSC. The State Department member, for example,
was the chairman of the Policy Planning Staff. The CIA ad-
viser (both the CIA and the Joint Chiefs are nominally, at least,
"advisers" rather than "members" of the NSC) was the Deputy
Director for Intelligence to whom the Office of National Esti-
mates was then responsible'
The typical Planning Board arrangement involved assigning
to the State Department's Policy Planning Staff the task of writ-
ing a "position paper" on the issue at hand and to the intelligence
community, through the Office of National Estimates, the chore
of preparing a National Intelligence Estimate. In due course,
a Planning Board draft would be prepared incorporating the
essence of these two documents and appropriate contributions
from the Bureau of the Budget, the Department of Defense or
other member groups.
While this was a far cry from having a firm assurance that the
President and his advisers personally read the National Intelli-
gence Estimates, it provided a built-in arrangement for gearing
intelligence guidance into the policy-making process. Moreover,
Allen Dulles, then Director, included a summary of relevant
Estimates in his weekly briefings to the Council. This did not
mean that every Estimate was heeded or even taken very seri-
2 ONE has since been removed from the Intelligence Directorate of the CIA and now
operates under the Office of the Director.
176
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING
ously by the policy-makers. But the estimators had some con-
fidence, then, that their views were at least considered prior to
a National Security Council position and a presidential decision.
President Kennedy was more interested in dealing with se-
lected individuals than with formal institutions. He abolished
the Planning Board together with other subordinate groups
that had mushroomed under Eisenhower's NSC and, like Presi-
dent Johnson later, used the Council primarily as a vehicle for
communicating decisions already reached in smaller, more con-
genial forums. There were still high-level, sometimes urgent,
requests for Estimates directly addressing pending policy deci-
sions,s but ONE's umbilical cord to the policy-making process
was severed with the disappearance of the Planning Board. The
fact that John Kennedy was a "reading" President was, of
course, some compensation. (He is reported to have once called
a startled young member of the Estimates Staff about a point in
an estimate on Indonesia.)
Aside from momentary diversions into the Caribbean and the
Middle East, the Johnson administration's foreign policy con-
cerns were dominated by Vietnam. It is revealing that President
Johnson's memoirs,' which are replete with references to and
long quotations from documents which influenced his thinking
and decisions on Vietnam, contain not a single reference to a Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate or, indeed, to any other intelligence
analysis. Except for Secretary McNamara, who became a fre-
quent requester and an avid reader of Estimates dealing with
Soviet military capabilities and with the Vietnam situation, and
McGeorge Bundy, the Office of National Estimates had a thin
audience during the Johnson administration. This is not to say,
of course, that "current intelligence" on crisis situations was
ignored. It is to say that Estimates, think pieces and in-depth
analyses were far from best sellers.
Early in its tenure the Nixon administration publicly em-
phasized its determination to restore the National Security
Council to its place at the pinnacle of the policy-making pyramid
and to establish a more orderly process of policy planning and
review. But the system that evolved relegated the National Esti-
mates to but a tiny fraction of the studies, analyses, position
8 During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, the President's "Executive Committee"
requested several estimates.
4 Lyndon Baines Johnson, "The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 3963-
r969." New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
papers, contingency plans, research reports and memoranda
generated by the large new NSC staff murmuring the magic
words, "The White House wants immediately.. . ." How much
of this deluge of paper has ever been read and assimilated by
even those NSC staffers who originally requested the material
is a well-kept secret and understandably so. How much ever went
beyond their overflowing desks to Mr. Kissinger's busy deputy,
to the harassed Mr. Kissinger or to the even more harassed Presi-
dent can only be imagined. A safe bet would be precious little.
Most Americans concerned about foreign affairs have long
had to accept on blind faith that our government takes pains
to provide its highest officials with the best possible intelligence
guidance-and then to squirm under our private suspicions that
this advice is, all too often, regarded with indifference. Thanks
to Daniel Ellsberg, those of us who have not seen a National
Intelligence Estimate for many years, or who have never seen
one, can address the matter with somewhat more confidence than
we could have a few months ago. Although it probably did not
cross Ellsberg's mind when he released the "Pentagon Papers"
to The New York Times, he succeeded in doing what the
Agency, on its own, has rarely been able to do for more than 20
years: he made the CIA "look good" through what inhabitants
of the Pickle Factory themselves would call a "highly credible
source."
By some stroke of prescience, President Truman singled out
Southeast Asia as his example of a problem area where the
National Security Council would call for intelligence guidance
for policies under consideration. Since Truman wrote his mem-
oirs, this troubled part of the world has given rise to a fair share
of NSC deliberation, intelligence analysis and policy decisions.
While the "Pentagon Papers" tell us little about what actually
happened in the White House Cabinet Room, they do reveal
much about the intelligence guidance made available to the
policy-makers. The record, recently amplified by President John-
son's memoirs, gives us some insight into the extent to which such
guidance was reflected in policy decisions. A review of the rec-
ord is disquieting.
in the summer of 1954, following the Geneva conference, the
Eisenhower administration was desperately attempting to erect
178
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING
a shield against further communist expansion in Asia. Secretary
Dulles, especially, was determined to develop a strong anti-
communist government south of the 17th parallel in Vietnam
and to replace the French economic, military and political influ-
ence in that area with our own. The man the United States
counted on to establish strong anti-communist rule was Ngo
Dinh Diem. By mid-summer, the issue of American support for
Diem's fledgling and untried government was high on the NSC's
agenda. The CIA was requested to prepare an Estimate on the
viability of a Western-supported, anti-communist government in
Vietnam. According to the "Pentagon Papers," the National
Intelligence Estimate of August 3 warned that "even with Amer-
ican support it was unlikely that the French or Vietnamese
would be able to establish a strong government and that the
situation would probably continue to deteriorate." The NSC,
nevertheless, recommended American aid for the frail and
untried Vietnamese government, a recommendation that was
soon followed by President Eisenhower's fateful letter to Diem
offering American support.
This estimate has long since been validated and it seems clear
that the United States would now be better off if President
Eisenhower had paid more heed to that warning and less to the
strong pressures that were being exerted by his Secretary of
State and hard-line members of Congress. But this would prob-
ably be asking too much, considering the atmosphere in Wash-
ington during the summer of 1954. In any case, the Diem
regime proved reasonably effective and stable until 1959, four
years after .the estimate-a period about as long as any intelli-
gence judgment can be projected with confidence and any par-
ticular policy can be expected to be viable. It is probably a moot
point, therefore, whether the estimators or tLe policy-makers
were right in terms of what they knew and what they said and
did in 1954. What is worth noting for our purposes here is the
readiness of the estimators to send forward a point of view very
much at variance with the current policy "line." This attribute,
comes through time and again over the succeeding years.'
The 1954 Estimate was but the first of many blinking yellow
lights flashed from intelligence analysts to the Eisenhower, Ken-
5 The Vietnam estimate of August 1954 was by no means the first example of this kind
of objectivity; many estimates on East Asia written during the 19509 went squarely
against the policy inclinations of the time.
179
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
nedy and Johnson administrations on the course of events in
Vietnam. In August 1960, according to the "Pentagon Papers,"
the National Security Council was told that unless Diem's gov-
ernment took "more effective measures to protect the peasants
and to win their positive cooperation" the Vietcong would
expand their areas of control. If adverse trends were not
checked, the estimate noted, "they will almost certainly in time
cause the collapse of Diem's regime." Six months later officials
in the new Kennedy administration were given an even sharper
warning: "An extremely critical period . . . lies immediately
ahead." Diem's "toleration of corruption" and his reliance on
"one-man-rule" cast doubt on his ability to lead the government.
And in October 1961, when Kennedy's NSC was considering
deploying SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization)
ground forces to Vietnam, it was cautioned that, "The commu-
nists would expect worthwhile political and psychological re-
wards from successful harassment and guerrilla operations
against SEATO forces. The DRV (North Vietnamese Govern-
ment) would probably not relax its Vietcong campaign against
the GVN (South Vietnamese Government) to any significant
extent." In November 1961, shortly after General Taylor and
Walt Rostow returned from their trip to Vietnam recommend-
ing, inter alia, that the United States "offer to introduce into
South Vietnam a military Task Force," a National Intelligence
Estimate warned that any escalation of American military activi-
ties in Vietnam would be matched by a similar escalation by
Hanoi: "the North Vietnamese would respond to an increased
U.S. commitment with an offsetting increase in infiltrated sup-
port for the Vietcong." Kennedy turned down the recommended
"Task Force," but approved a substantial increase in American
military advisers.
In June 1964, CIA analysts challenged the validity of the
hallowed "domino theory." According to the "Pentagon Pa-
pers," President Johnson asked the Agency: "Would the rest of
Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came
under North Vietnamese control?" "With the possible excep-
tion of Cambodia," the President was told, "it is likely that no
nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a
result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a
continuation of the spread of Communism in the area would not
be irreparable. . . ." So long as the United States retained its
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING
offshore bases in Asia, China and North Vietnam could be de-
terred "from overt military aggression against Southeast Asia
in general." But, as President Johnson himself confides, the
"domino theory" continued to dominate his thinking about
Vietnam: "... from all evidence available to me it seemed likely
that all of Southeast Asia would pass under Communist control,
slowly or quickly, but inevitably, at least down to Singapore but
almost certainly to Djakarta . . ." if the United States "let South
Vietnam fall to Hanoi."'
Intelligence officers apparently have been consistently bearish
about the effectiveness of American bombing of North Vietnam.
During late 1964, when a group of contingency planners were
examining the costs and advantages of bombing North Vietnam,
intelligence analysts took issue with those who maintained that
bombing would force Hanoi to cease supporting the insurgency
in South Vietnam: "We do not believe that such actions [i.e.
bombing the North] would have a crucial effect on the daily
lives of the overwhelming majority of the North Vietnam popu-
lation. We do not believe that attacks on industrial targets would
so exacerbate current economic difficulties as to create unman-
ageable control problems.... [The Hanoi regime] would prob-
ably be willing to suffer some damage to the country in the course
of a test of wills with the United States over the course of events
in South Vietnam." As the Pentagon historians note, this view
had little influence on the contingency paper which emerged.
In November 1965, after eight months of American bombing
without any discernible effect on Hanoi's ability to continue the
war, there was a quest for more "lucrative" targets. The Joint
Chiefs proposed bombing North Vietnamese petroleum storage
facilities, and Secretary McNamara asked for the views of the
Board of National Estimates. "Hanoi would not be greatly sur-
prised by the attacks," the Board responded. "Indeed . . . it
has already taken steps to reduce their impact.... We believe
that the DRV is prepared to accept for some time at least the
strains and difficulties which loss of the major POL facilities
would mean for its military and economic activity." After the
petroleum storage facilities had been bombed in June 1966, it be-
came clear that Hanoi had pre-positioned adequate oil caches
throughout the country.
A month later, McNamara asked the Board to estimate the
181
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
effect on Hanoi of a substantial escalation of American ground
and air activity. There must be many officials of the Johnson
administration who now wish they had taken more cognizance
of this in late 1965: "Present Communist policy is to continue to
prosecute the war vigorously in the South. The Communists
recognize that the U.S. reinforcements of 1965 signify a deter-
mination to avoid defeat. They expect more U.S. troops and
probably anticipate that targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area
will come under air attack. Nevertheless, they remain unwilling
to damp down the conflict or move toward negotiation. They ex-
pect a long war, but they continue to believe that time is their
ally and that their own staying power is superior." "An escala-
tion of the bombing would not be decisive: the DRV would not
decide to quit; PAVN [North Vietnamese Army] infiltration
southward would continue. Damage from the strikes would make
it considerably more difficult to support the war in the South,
but these difficulties would neither be immediate nor insur-
mountable."
Throughout 1966 intelligence analysts were to continue to
maintain that the American bombing of North Vietnam would
not produce "either a military victory or early negotiations."
During a sober moment of rethinking about the bombing in the
spring of 1967, McNamara requested three intelligence assess-
ments on this issue. According to the "Pentagon Papers," one
CIA study concluded that 27 months of bombing "have had re-
markably little effect on Hanoi's overall strategy in prosecuting
the war, on its confident view of long-term communist prospects,
and on its political tactics regarding negotiations." Another de-
scribed North Vietnamese morale as one of "resolute stoicism
with a considerable reservoir of endurance still untapped." And
a third noted that although the bombing had "significantly
eroded the capacities of North Vietnam's industrial and military
bases," the damage had "not meaningfully degraded North Viet-
nam's material ability to continue the war in South Vietnam."
The snippets of intelligence guidance which the "Pentagon
Papers" reveal may not, of course, be the whole story of intelli-
gence judgments offered and intelligence judgments heeded.
The complete text of the documents which were cited may have
couched the conclusions in a more tentative form; Intelligence
182
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING
Estimates and memoranda tend to be generously sprinkled with
"on the one hand and on the other hand" and "on balance we
believe." The Pentagon historians refer to other documents
which countered or at least dissipated the effect of those pre-
pared in the intelligence community as a whole or within the CIA
itself. For example, the "Pentagon Papers" frequently refer to
assessments of American bombing submitted by the joint Chiefs
which were typically more bullish than those generated within
CIA or produced by the Office of National Estimates with con-
tributions from and the concurrence of the Defense Intelligence
Agency. The extent to which Defense Intelligence analysts had
a hand in the joint Chiefs' assessments is unknown, but one must
assume that they played some role. Secretary McNamara may
have become concerned about this apparent schizophrenic ten-
dency within the Defense Intelligence staff because he tended,
increasingly, to rely on the Board of National Estimates or other
components within CIA for their own, uncoordinated, views on
current or projected U.S. courses of action regarding Vietnam.
Who besides McNamara was influenced by the CIA judgments,
and who by the JCS, the "Pentagon Papers" do not say.
But they do indicate that the CIA's estimators and analysts, if
not those within the Pentagon, appear to have passed the test of
time, the sternest test of all. Confronting one of the most passion-
laden, persistent and dangerous foreign crises the United States
has confronted since World War II, they consistently seem to
have kept their cool, they remained impeccably objective, and
they have been right. But if the record was so good, why wasn't
anyone Up There listening?
Sherman Kent, a seer among the professional intelligence
analysts and a long-time Chairman of the Board of National
Estimates, has said, "The nature of our calling requires that we
pretend as hard as we are able that the wish is indeed the fact
and that the policy-maker will invariably defer to our find-
ings. . . ." He feels that his associates' concern about their influ-
ence is misplaced; "no matter what we tell the policy-maker, and
no matter how right we are and how convincing, he will upon
occasion disregard the thrust of our findings for reasons beyond
our ken. If influence cannot be our goal, what should it be?
... It should be to be relevant within the area of your compe-
tence, and above all it should be to be credible."'
7 Sherman Kent, "Estimates and Influence," Foreign Service Journal, April 1969, p. A.
. 183
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
This exemplary admonition must be satisfying to Mr. Kent's
co-professionals, but it is less than nourishing to those of us who
are not as lofty-minded nor so high above the battle. Intelligence
judgments on Vietnam, we now know, were both "relevant" and
"credible" but were ignored or cast aside. Why? Because, since
at least the early 196os, they ran counter to the mood prevail-
ing in the upper reaches of the policy-making community.
With the notable exception of Secretary McNamara (whose
eventual change of view on the wisdom of our Vietnam policy
may in no small part have been influenced by the seriousness
with which he regarded CIA's assessments), senior officials seem
to have dismissed the intelligence judgments as "just another
opinion." It would be surprising if President Johnson had actu-
ally read the intelligence documents referred to in the "Penta-
gon Papers." Indeed, as he points out in his memoirs, the "Wise
Men" he had assembled to examine American policy alternatives
following the communists' 1968 Tet offensive were receiving
"gloomier" assessments of the situation in Vietnam than he had
been aware of. On important and sensitive political questions,
intelligence judgments were virtually excluded from considera-
tion. The State Department's Intelligence Bureau, for example,
was cut off from the distribution of telegrams dealing with
negotiations initiatives in 1966 and 1967, and thus was precluded
from playing any useful role in this area. Intelligence analysts
were thus banished to the darkness of official indifference. We
know much less about the disposition of the Nixon administra-
tion, but it is no secret that the word has been passed down that
Nixon officials are interested in "facts, not opinions."
IV
What can we realistically strive for in closing the yawning
gap between the ultimate analytical product of an elaborate and
costly intelligence structure and the tight if not always orderly
process of arriving at national security and foreign policy de-
cisions? Obviously, it is unrealistic to expect that policy-makers
should be bound by the advice of intelligence analysts or even
that intelligence judgments or guidance should be influential in
every major decision; we already have acknowledged that other
considerations may override intelligence assessments concerning
the probable risks or advantages in a particular course of action.
But the operative verb should be "override," not "disregard."
181.
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING
We do have a right to expect that the findings of Intelligence
Estimates be put forward in policy councils, pondered upon and
then accepted or, by conscious decision, set aside.
The policy-making process comes into final focus and de-
cisions are ultimately reached through oral rather than written
communication. It is at this critical juncture that officials should
perceive, as clearly as possible, "the effects a policy is likely to
have." And it is at this point that the men whose metier it is to
render such judgments should be directly involved. But long-
standing practice has insulated the estimators from face-to-face
confrontation with those who grapple with policy issues and
options. Clearly if they are to play a more direct and useful
role, the estimators must be brought out of their cloister into the
real world. They must, in short, engage the policy-makers.
If not the Board of National Estimates, a Board should be
given a broader charter which would assign it responsibilities
well beyond that of presiding over National Intelligence Esti-
mates. In effect, Board members should function within their
special areas of experience and expertise as senior intelligence
advisers to the policy community. The issues they should under-
take or be called upon to examine and the nature of their partici-
pation obviously call for discrimination. The value of their
contribution will stem from their unique opportunity to form
considered judgments and to maintain cool objectivity; indis-
criminate participation in every policy discussion is likely to
erode both of these precious attributes to the point where they
are just one more group in Washington living by its wits in an
atmosphere of advocacy and passion.
The recent reorganization of the intelligence community pro-
vides an opportunity to increase the prestige and the influence of
an Estimates Board. The Director of Central Intelligence has
been relieved of his day-to-day responsibilities for running the
Central Intelligence Agency and has been given greater authority
over all the government's intelligence services. The Director in
his new role will need a strong, knowledgeable policy support
staff experienced in extracting, digesting and using the informa-
tion and analysis available throughout the intelligence com-
munity. One way of meeting this need would be to provide the
Director with a senior personal staff which would work closely
on issues under consideration in high policy councils and repre-
sent him in consequential, subordinate forums,
185
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
Another, more draconic alternative for giving a greater em-
phasis to intelligence judgments would be to remove the esti-
mating responsibility from the Central Intelligence Agency and
place it within the National Security Council structure. In
essence, this would expand the role of the new Net Assessments
Staff created by the recent reorganization. Broad political and
economic judgments as well as more quantitative assessments of
the strategic balance could then be channeled directly into policy
forums. Such a move would also give the estimators a more sen-
sitive feel for policies under consideration. Close association
with the policy element of the National Security Council would
permit an Estimates Board to initiate intelligence analyses and
estimates that would squarely confront national security issues
in their early stages of review. Under these cirmumstances, esti-
mates would be more relevant as well as more influential.
But what about objectivity, the quality that has distinguished
the estimates over the years? The risk of sacrificing this in the
quest for influence cannot be dismissed lightly. Obviously the ob-
jectivity-influence trade-off must be closely examined before
giving the National Security Council ultimate responsibility in
making intelligence judgments. On the assumption that the ob-
jectivity issue can be resolved, direct access to an Estimates Board
by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
and, on occasion, the President himself, would make available
what every President since Truman has said he wanted, but
what none of them has been able to obtain on a routine basis-
the best possible first-hand intelligence judgments on critical
international problems.
A move of this kind would obviously involve consequential
changes in organization and' philosophy within Washington's
intelligence and policy, hierarchies. It would also add to the in-
fluence on foreign policy exerted by the White House-an influ-
ence already a matter of congressional criticism and State De-
partment concern. But, the price would appear tolerable if a
more thoughtful and prudent approach to the world was the
result.
186
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
Reprinted from The Friday Review of Defense Literature, May 4, 1973, p. 7.
BOOKS
Prouty, L. Fletcher, THE SECRET TEAM:' THE CIA AND ITS ALLIF rN
CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD, Englewood C:'_ffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1973, 496 pp., $8.95, reviewed by Harry Zubl.off,
SAFAAR. (73-18)
(Nate: Mr. Prouty is a retired Air Force colonel.)
Fletcher Prouty, a briefing officer from 1955 through 1963,
was one of the focal points for contacts between the CIA and the
DoD on military support of CIA's "special operations." In this
unique position, he became extremely well informed about the covert
activities carried out by CIA agents throughout the worli1. The men
who receive the secret intelligence reports and make the decisions
to undertake "special operations," are the members of the "Secret
Team." Some of them are in Government, some in uni5,orm, soi,,e in
industry or in education, rotating in and out of official jobs but
never losing their power to make or influence such decisions.
Together, says Prouty, they have damaged the coherent conduct of
foreign and military affairs, often to the detriment of American
interests.
This book seeks to undermine their pervasive influence by
exposing their activities. It is filled with startling assertions
and a wealth of detail, obviously based on considerable research and
a background of authentic experience. Moreover, it exposes a number
of incidents in recent experience which were engineered by the
""secret team," though outwardly there was no indication of such
involvement. The celebrated "Pentagon Papers," for example, which
played a major role in influencing national policies on Indochina,
were not genuine Pentagon papers at all, but rather papers prepared
mainly by people outside the Pentagon.
Prouty discusses at some length the organization and evolution
of the CIA, from its original establishment in the post-World War II
period to the present. Its intelligence coordinating functions,
including the evaluation and dissemination of this information to
proper authorities, have long since been expanded to include both
the active collection of intelligence and the conduct of secret
operations. The nature of these clandestine activities is also
discussed at length, with the Cuban Bay of Pigs affair cited as a
prime example of the manner in which the secret team can commit the
US to a course of action without sufficient debate or study of the
possible consequences. Over the years, these activities have
expanded to the point where President Truman, who set up the CIA,
assigned it specific missions, and made it organizationally subor-
dinate to the Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the White-_
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 :18?A-RDP80R01731R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA7-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
House, conceded some time after he left office that it had gone far
beyond its original purpose.
President Kennedy, too, became convinced that the CIA was
exceeding its authority in many ways, but by that time the Agency
had become so adept in exercising its power and influence that all
attempts to control it were futile. The instructions and directives
he issued, designed to place stricter controls over the CIA's
activities, were simply taken over by the Agency to suit its own
ends or ignored when they conflicted with its own objectives. In
fact, all the Presidents since Truman have had to learn to live with
the "nightmare" of CIA, and with the realizaticin that they are
almost powerless to control it. This "secret team," says Prouty
must be "exposed, bared, and silenced;" above all, it "should be
limited to the function of intelligence--and not a bit more."
188
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 ~E~ ..t nn' j,rj f
r r ~? _~?-pproar~g,~
rprrii? :!~?; '?""` ii-.r .a `~`:.tt\r r?,~ "yj`].- `r'il:u,.,r..,, ~U'?
or, Felg03DO91P'MAQ0030026-2
THE I TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: time for revie ?
The following report is reprinted from the De-
ember, 1972 F.A.S. Newsletter, publication of the
Federation of American Scientists. The Federation,
founded in 1946, is a national organization of nat-
ural and social scientists and engineers concerned
with problems of science and society. It counts more
than 25 Nobel Prize winners among its. members.
1hiE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, and its budget,
pose many problems of traditional concern to
the Federation of American Scientists: governmental
reform, morality, proper use of high technology and
defense expenditures. In the last quarter-century
inteigence agencies have proliferated. The United
States has established an agency that goes beyond
intelligence collection and, periodically, interferes
in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology
molted to the invasion of national and personal pri-
vacy has been developed apace. And the $4-6 billion
being spent for intelligence might well be termed
the largest "unreviewed" part of the defense budget.
'Twenty-five years after the passage of the Na-
.ional Security Act of 1947 (NSA) seems a good
time to consider the problems posed by these devel-
opments.
Of least concern in terms of its budget but of
overriding significance in its international political
impact is the Directorate of Plans of the Central
Intelligence Agency, within which clandestine polit-
ical operations are mounted. This [latter aspect] is
the issue discussed in this newsletter. More and
:shore, informed observers question whether clandes-
sirte political operations ought to be continued on a
"business as usual" basis. In the absence of an inves-
tigation, a secret bureaucracy-which started in the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during a hot war
and which grew in the CIA during a cold war-may
simply continue to practice a questionable trade.
Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not
only abroad but at home, where they are encour-
aged only too easily. And is not interference in the
eventually destroy free institutions." We would see,
he predicted: pressure for defense expenditures, ex-
pansion and centralization of government, with-
holding of information, general suspicion, an under-
mining of press and public opinion, a weakening
of political parties, a decline of the Congress and of
the courts.
Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in
order to re-examine our institutions, goals and
standards. Which responses to the emergency of
yesterday can we justify today?
The National Security Act of 1947 created the
CIA and gave it overall responsibility for coordinat-
ing the intelligence activities of the several relevant
government departments and agencies interested in
such matters. Today, the CIA is reported to have a
budget of about $700 million to $i billion and a
staff of perhaps 18,ooo people, or about 8,ooo more
than the Department of Statel (This advantage in
size gives CIA an edge in interdepartmental -meet-
ings for which others may be too rushed to fully
prepare, or not be able to assign a suitable person.)
The National Security Act authorized the CIA to:
perform for the benefit of the existing intelli-
gence agencies such additional services of com-
mon concern as the National Security Council
(NSC) determines can be more effectively accom-
plished centrally;
perform such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security as
the NSC may from time to time direct (italics
added).
These clauses clearly authorize clandestine i'itel-
ligence collection, but they are also used to justify
clandestine political operations. However, over-
throwing governments, secret wars, assassination
and fixing elections are certainly not done "for the
benefit of the existing intelligence agencies," nor
are they duties "related to intelligence." Someday
a court may rule that political activities are not au-
affairs of other nations wrong? thorized.
Two decades ago, as the Cold War gained mo- In any case, at the urging of Allen Dulles, the
nientum, one of America's greatest political scien- NSC issued a secret directive (NSC 10; 2) in S48
and prophetic book, National Security and Individ- provided they were secret and small enough to be
ual Freedom. He warned of the "'insidious menace" plausibly deniable by the Government, Even this
that a conk pproie`dYor ilease'11%e~ /rpOe/1 n CIA-RDP80RO173 ROO21exceeded, ?e several rmpo=,-
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP80R011731 RO02100030026-2
sible-to-deny operations have been undertaken: the deciding now not to et Mr. ems a succeeded by
U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian another Deputy Director for Plans (i.e. clandestine
coup, the Laotian War, and so on. operations). This would otherwise tend to institu-
The NSA gave the CIA no "police subpoena, law tionalize the notion that the CIA itself is run by
enforcement powers, or internal security func- the organizers of clandestine activities rather than
tions. . .." But another secret executive branch by those who do technical intelligence. Indeed,
document evidently did give the CIA authority to there is much to be said for a tradition of bringing
engage in domestic operations related to its job. It in outsiders to manage the CIA.
was under this authority that such organizations as The unprecedented secrecy concerning CIA's bud-
foundations, educational organizations and private get also deserves re-examination. It is being argued,
voluntary groups were involved with.the CIA at the in a citizen's suit, that it is unconstitutional to hide
time of the National Student Association revela- the appropriations of CIA in the budgets of other
tions (1966). departments because the Constitution provides (Ar-
Clandestine Operations
The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover
for the "black" side. CIA supporters and officials
invariably emphasize the intelligence, rather than
the manipulation, function of CIA, ignoring the
latter or using phrases that gloss over it quietly.
The public can easily accept the desirability of
knowing as much as possible. But its instincts op-
pose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at
home. And it rightly fears that injustices committed
abroad may begin to be tolerated at home: how
many elections can be fixed abroad before we begin
to try it here? The last election showed such a de-
generation of traditional American standards.
The present Director of Central Intelligence,
Richard Helms [since publication, Mr. Helms has
been replaced by James Schlesinger], is working
hard and effectively at presenting an image of CIA
that will not offend. In a recent speech, he said:
"The same objectivity which makes us useful to our
Government and our country leaves us uncomforta-
bly aware of our ambiguous place in it.... We
propose to adapt intelligence to American society,
not vice versa." Even construed narrowly, this is
no easy job, and adapting clandestine political op-
erations to American ideals may well be quite im-
possible.
At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy
gave serious consideration to breaking the CIA into
two pieces: one piece would conduct operations and
the other would just collect intelligence. The dan-
gers were only too evident to Kennedy of letting
operations be conducted by those who were ac-
cumulating the information. Allen Dulles insisted
on a united operation, arguing that separation
would be inefficient and disruptive. But there are
many arguments on both sides, and the issue de-
serves continuing consideration.
In particular, there is something to be said for
ticle I, Section 9, Clause 1) that:
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but
in consequence of appropriations made by law;
and a regular Statement and Account of the Re-
ceipts and Expenditures of all public Money
shall be published from time to time (italics
added).
Not only CIA expenditures but the distorted bud-
get reports of other agencies would seem to violate
this provision. The petitioners call for a functional
breakdown showing general categories of uses of
CIA funds and a breakdown by nation showing
where funds have been spent.
Certainly, there is little justification for hiding
the total figure of CIA expenditures from the public
and the Congress. This figure reveals less to any
potential enemy than the size of the Defense De-
partment budget-which we freely reveal. Releasing
at least this overall figure would make unnecessary
the hiding of the CIA budget in other agency bud-
gets. This would stop an authorization and appro-
priation procedure that systematically and peren-
nially misleads Congress and the public.
CIA's four divisions concern themselves with sup-
port, science and technology, intelligence, and plans.
Press reports suggest that the personnel in these di-
visions number, respectively, 6,ooo, 4,000, 2,000 and
6,ooo.
The Intelligence Division examines open and se-
cret data and prepares economic, social and polit-
ical reports on situations. It is in the Plans Division
that clandestine operations are undertaken. Former
Deputy Directors for Plans have been: Allen Dulles,
Frank Wisner, Richard Bissel and, after 1962, Rich-
ard Helms-now the Director of CIA itself.
The most dramatic clandestine operations obvi-
ously have the approval of the President. But, as
any bureaucrat knows, it can be hard for the Pres-
ident to say "no" to employees with dramatic ideas
that are deeply felt. The U-2 and Bay of Pigs oper-
ations-both under the guidance of Richard Bissel
190
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 reveal thisgg%
~ra'reoec~~1T0 fs: CIA- t5ffa'1F~U'ed?nt in which
ident (first E1s nhower, then enne y went a ong arc etti is prec uc e rom pu ishing anything
with the plan reluctantly. In both cases the opera- about the CIA, fiction or not, without letting the
tion eventually embarrassed them greatly. CIA clear it. Thus a dangerous precedent against
In the case of the U-2, President Eisenhower re- the traditional freedom of American press and pub-
called saying: "If one of these planes is shot down, lishing is now in the courts as a direct result of
this thing is going to be on my head. I'm going to Government efforts to act abroad in ways that can-
catch hell. The world will be in a mess." He often not be discussed at home. This is a clear example of
asked the CIA: What happens if you're caught? the statement written by James Madison to Thomas
They would say: It hasn't happened yet. But it was Jefferson (May 13, 1798): "Perhaps it is a universal
obvious that it would happen eventually. . . . At truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be
what point would CIA itself have had the self- charged to provisions against danger, real or pre-
control to stop the flights? tended, from abroad."
We learned a great deal from the U-2 flights,
though it was of much less direct significance to our The CIA and the Third World
security and tranquility than is commonly believed.
The last U-2 flights still had not found any Soviet For the clandestine (Plans) side of CIA, a large
missiles other than test vehicles. But the informa- institutionalized budget now sees little future in the
don was too secret to be used even though it was developed world. In the developed free world the
known to the Russians. At home, missile gap was stability of governments now makes political opera-
still a popular fear based on pencil and paper cal- tions unnecessary. In the Communist developed
culations of "capabilities" rather than "intentions world these political operations are largely impos-
or direct knowledge." Eventually, the flights de- sible. Indeed, even intelligence collection by tradi-
stroyed a hop~^ful summit conference in 1g6o and tional techniques seems to have been relatively un-
thus perpetuated dangerous tensions. Yet this was successful.
CIA's greatest clandestine successl The penetration of the CIA by the Soviet spy
In the case of the Bay of Pigs operation, the dis- Philby is said to have left the CIA with a total net
aster was complete. CIA supporters of the plan be- negative balance of effectiveness for the years up to
came its advocates and pressed it upon President 1951. It completely destroyed the CIA's first "Bay of
Kennedy. According to some reports, they even led Pigs"-that effort to overthrow the Albanian Gov-
him to believe that the Eisenhower Administration ernment in 1849, which cost the lives of 300 men.
had given the plan a go-ahead from which dis- The only really important clandestine Soviet
..ngagement would he embarrassing. Once the inva- source of information known publicly was Pankof-
sion started, they pissed for more American in- sky. The public literature really shows only one
volvement. The plan itself was, in retrospect, Judi- other triumph in penetrating Soviet secrecy with
crously ill-conceived. Despite the proximity of Cuba, spies: the obtaining of a copy of the secret speech
intelligence about the likelihood of the neecssary by Khrushchev denouncing Stalin. But this speech
uprising was far too optimistic. was being widely circulated to cadre and Eastern
This failure had repercussions as well. It left the European sources. Allen Dulles, on television,
President feeling insecure and afraid that the So- called this "one of the main coups of the time I was
viets thought him weak for not following through. [at CIA]."
It left the Soviets fearing an invasion of Cuba in Compared to the Soviet Union, the undexdevel-
due course. The stage was set for the missile crisis. oped world looks easy to penetrate and manipulate.
Some believe that US involvement in Viet Nam was The governments are relatively unstable, and the
also encouraged by Kennedy's fear of being seen as societies provide more scope for agents and their
too weak. [Thus] clandestine political operations maneuvers. While the underdeveloped world lends
obviously have far-reaching political consequences itself better to clandestine operations, these opera-
no one can predict. tions are much harder to justify.
The CIA recently brought suit against Victor We are not at war-usually, not even at cold war
Marchetti, formerly executive assistant to the Dep- -with [these] countries. And they rarely, if ever,
uty Director, for not submitting to them for clear- pose a direct threat to us, whether or not they trade
ante a work of fiction about spying operations. It is or otherwise consort with Communists. Today, few-
evident that the CIA feared disclosures about clan- er and fewer Americans see the entire world as a
destine operations or methods. The result was a struggle between the forces of dark and light-a
i91
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 struggle in which
the globe.
Approved For Release corner o20013/10/16 (1 ro i
we must influence every ~11'rontuzt cur op ranvir fl9%0*nrrJivm the
d
van-
underdeveloped world. This would have the a
tage of protecting America's reptitation-and that
of its citizens doing business there-from the con-
stant miasma of suspicion of CIA involvement in
the internal affairs of other countries. Open, sources
would continue to supply the US with 8o 'percent
of its intelligence. Further intelligence in the under-
developed world could be collected by State Depart-
ment officials through embassies. This polic would
enforce the now-questioned supremacy of the State
Department in dealing with the nations involved.
Arguments against this policy include these: the
area is too important to US interests to permit such
withdrawal, and the credibility of the withdrawal
would be hard to establish, at least in the short run.
(2) Permit covert activities in the underdeveloped
world only for information, not manipulation. This
policy would prevent the fixing of elections, the
purchase of legislators, private wars, the overthrow
of governments, and it would go a long way, toward
protecting the US reputation for noninterference
in the affairs of other countries. One might, for ex-
ample, adopt the rule suggested by Harry Howe
Ransom that secret political operations be used
only as an alternative to overt military action in a
situation that presented a direct threat to US se-
curity.
Of course, the mere existence of a covert capabil-
ity for espionage would leave the US with a capabil-
ity for manipulation; the same agents who are se-
cretly providing information could secretly try to
influence events. But there is still a large gap be-
tween buying "assets" for one purpose and for the
other.
Also, large scale operations would not be con-
ducted under this rule. According to some reports,
the committee, chaired by Maxwell Taylor, that
reviewed the Bay of Pigs episode recommended to
President Kennedy (who apparently agreed) that
the CIA be limited to operations requiring military
equipment no larger or more complex than side
arms....
(g) Require that [appropriate] representatives of
Congress be consulted before any clandestine oper-
ations, beyond those required for intelligence col-
In tacit agreement with this, CIA Director Helms
recently said:
America's intelligence assets (sic), do not exist
solely because of the Soviet and Chinese threat,
or against the contingency of a new global con-
flict. The United States, as a world power, either
is involved or may with little warning find itself
involved in a wide range and variety of problems
which require a broad and detailed base of for-
eign intelligence for the policy makers.
Thus, . . . the present justification for intelligence
activities in the underdeveloped world springs ever
more only from America's role as a "great power."
Moreover, the word "assets" above is significant.
If information were all.that were at issue, a strong
case could be made for getting needed information,
when you need it, through open sources, embassies
and reconnaissance. But if clandestine political ma-
nipulation is at issue, then one requires longstand-
ing penetration of institutions of all kinds and a
great deal of otherwise unimportant information
necessary to plan and hide local maneuvers.
Because political operations are so sensitive, and
potentially so explosive, it is imperative that the
agents be under strict control. But is this really pos-
sible? To each foreign movement of one kind or
another-no matter how distasteful-the CIA will
assign various operatives, if only to get information.
In the process, these operatives must ingratiate
themselves with the movement. And since they are
operating in a context in which subtle signals are
the rule, it is inevitable that they will often signal
the movement that the US likes it, or might support
it. Indeed, the agents themselves may think they are
correctly interpreting US policy-or what they
think it should be-in delicate maneuvers that they
control. What, for example, did it mean when CIA"
agents told Cambodian plotters that they would do
"everything possible" to help if a coup were mount-
ed. (See Philadelphia Inquirer, April 6, 1972, "CIA
Role Bared in Sihanouk Ouster.")
What Are the Alternatives?
No one who has ever tried to control a bureaucracy
will be insensitive to the problems to which these
situations give rise. These problems would be dra-
matically diminished, however, if the CIA were re-
stricted to information gathering and were known
to be. The movements would then cease to look to
the CIA for policy signals.
What alternative positions might be considered
toward CIA involvement abroad? There are these
alternative possibilities:
lection, are undertaken. It is an unresolved dispute
between the executive and legislative branches
whether and when the executive branch may under-
take operations affecting US foreign policy without
consulting Congress. If a clandestine political oper-
ation is important enough to take the always high
risks of exposure, it should be important enough to
consult Congress. These consultations can produce
a new perspective on the problem-which can be
all important. The chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee was one of the few who pre-
dicted accurately the political consequences of the
Bay of Pigs operation.
(4) Require that the Ambassador be advised of
covert operations in the nation to which he is ac-
credited; monitor compliance with Congressional
oversight. Under the Kennedy Administration, after
the Bay of Pigs, a letter went to all embassies affirm-
Approved For Release 2003/10~-'~$ : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP80R01'731 800210003.026-?d
ing the authority of the Ambassador over the repre- program in motion, Thomas W. Men, saw it this
sentatives of CIA. But this authority is variously
interpreted and might be periodically clarified and
strengthened. One method of policing the order
would involve occasional visits by Congressmen or
Congressional staff, who would quiz the Ambassa-
dor to be sure that he knew at least as much as they
did about local covert activities. Another control
would require that Assistant Secretaries of State
know about the covert activities in their region. In
all cases, political oversight and political perspective
would be injected into operations that would other-
y dise be largely controlled by an intelligence point
of view.
One morally and politically important imperative
seems clear: Adopt and announce a firm rule against
murder or torture. There are repeated and persis-
tent reports that this rule does not exist. There was
the murder by a Green Beret. There is the Phoenix
Program involving widespread assassination of "Viet-
cong agents"--many of whom, it is reported, were
simply the victims of internal Vietnamese rivalries.
Some years ago, The New York Times quoted one
of the best informed men in Washington as having
asserted that "when we catch one of them" [an
enemy agent], it becomes necessary "to get every-
thing oat of them, and we do it with no holds
barred.
There is also this disturbing quotation from Vic-
tor Marchetti-
The director would come back from the White
I-louse and shake his head and say "The Presi-
.vent is very, very upset about`-. ,We agreed
that the only solution was. . But of course,
that's impossible; we can't be responsible for a
tilin,ig like that."
The second man would say the same thing to
the third man, and on down through the station
chief in some country until somebody went out
,,,nd__.___, and nobody was responsible. (Parade,
"Quitting the CIA," by Henry Allen.)
Infiltration and Manipulation
After the 1966 revelations that the CIA had been
financing the National Student Association, a vari-
tsv of front organizations and conduits [about 250]
were unravelled. The CIA gave its money directly
to foundations that, in turn, passed the secret funds
along to specific CIA-approved groups, organiza-
tions and study projects. These, in turn, often sup-
ported individuals. The organizations included the
National Education Association, African-American
Institute, American Newspaper Guild, International
Development Foundation and many others.
The way in which these organizations were con-
trolled was subtle and sophisticated in a fashion ap-
parently characteristic of many clandestine CIA op-
erations. Thus, while distinguished participants in
the Congress for Cultural Freedom and editors of
its magazine, Encounter, evidently believed that
the organizations were doing only what came nat-
urally, the CIA official who set the entire covert
We had placed one agent in a Europe-based
organization of intellectuals called the Congress
for Cultural Freedom. Another agent became an
editor of Encounter. The agents could not only
propose anti-Communist programs, but they
could also suggest ways and means to solve the
inevitable budgetary problems. Why not see if
the needed money could be obtained from
"American foundations"? (Saturday Evening Post,
May so, 1967.)
President Johnson appointed a panel headed by
Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzelpbach
to review this aspect of CIA operations. The other
panel members were HEW Secretary John Gardner
(a former OSS employee) and CIA Director Helms.
The panel was to study the relationship between
the. CIA and those "educational and private volun-
tary organizations" that operate abroad and to rec-
ommend means to help assure that such organiza-
tions could "play their proper and vital role." The
panel recommendations were as follows:
(1) It should be the policy of the United States
Government that no Federal agency shall pro-
vide any covert financial assistance or support,
direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educa-
tional or private voluntary organizations..
(k) The Government should promptly develop
and establish a public-private mechanism to pro-
vide public funds openly for overseas activities
or organizations that are adjudged deserving, in
the national interest, of public support.
On March 26, 1967, President Johnson said he
accepted [the first recommendation] and directed
all Government agencies to implement it fully. He
said he would give "serious consideration to [the
other] but apparently never implemented it.
When these operations were first proposed by
Braden, Allen Dulles had commented favorably on
them, noting, "There is no doubt in my mind that
we are losing the Cold War." Twenty years later,
though we are no longer in any risk of "losing the
Cold War," some would like to continue despite
the regulations.
At least one influential former CIA official's think-
ing was simply to move to deeper cover, ... [but]
what could such deeper cover be? ... Commercial
establishments or profit-making organizations are
exempt from the ban. Hence, with or without the
acquiescence of the officials of the company, CIA
agents might be placed in strategic positions. It is
possible also that organizations that seemed to be
voluntary were actually incorporated it,. such a way
as to be profit-making. Other possibilities include
enriching individuals by throwing business their
way and having these individuals support suitable
philanthropic enterprises.
To the extent that these arrangements touch vol.
untary organizations, they pose the same problems
that created the distress in 1966. In short, the policy
approved by President Johnson was sensible when
it proscribed "direct or indirect" support. More-
193
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
over, in the coming generation, we can expect a Keeping the CIA Honest
continuation of the existing trend toward whistle-
blowing. The CIA's reputation and its ability to As the public sense of cold war dissipates, the
keep secrets can be expected to decline. Even the American distaste for secret organizations can be
most "indirect" support may eventually become expected to grow. The occasional disclosure of any
known. "dirty trick" or political manipulation sponsored by
All of these deep-cover arrangements are made CIA will certainly deepen this sense of unease. In
much easier by the intelligence community's so- the end, as now, many of the best and most sophisti-
called "alumni association." These are persons who cated college graduates will not be willing to work
are known to the community through past service for the CIA. And professional consultants will be
and who are willing to turn a quiet hand or give a discouraged as well. The result can change the char-
confidential favor. Sometimes, much more is in- acter of the agency in such a way as to further
volved. Examples from the past include these. A threaten American values.
high official of OSS becomes head of the CIA- One method, in the American tradition, for keep-
financed National Committee for a Free Europe. ing the CIA honest would he a public-interest orga-
Another becomes an official of the CIA-funded nization of alumni of the intelligence community
American Friends of the Middle East. A deputy di- (and those who are serviced by intelligence in the
rector of State Department Intelligence becomes Government). This public-interest group would, as
president of Operations and Policy Research, Inc., do so many others, offer its testimony to Congress
a CIA conduit that financed "studies" of Latin on matters of interest to it-in this case, intelli-
American electoral processes. (This official is simul- Bence. The testimony might be given in public or
taneously well-placed to arrange studies of elections in executive session, as appropriate. And construc-
as the director of the American Political' Science tive suggestions and criticisms could be made.
Association!) Such an organization would have a credibility and
Thus, a large and growing domestic network of authority that no other group can have and a gen-
persons trained in dissembling, distortion and hu- eral knowledge of the relevant intelligence prob-
man manipulation may be growing in our country. lems facing the nation and public. It goes without
And the use of these kinds of skills may also be saying that no one in this organization, or commu-
growing more acceptable. During the campaign for nicating with it, would violate laws, or oaths, asso-
President a memorandum went out to Republican ciated with classified information. The Federation
college organizers that urged them to arrange a of American Scientists' strategic weapons, committee
mock election; it gave what seemed to be pointed is an example of the feasibility and legitimacy by
hints about how to manipulate the election. which a group of persons well-grounded in strategic
This kind of thing produces a suspicion and par- arms problems can, without violating any rules
anoia that divides Americans from one another. It concerning such information, make informed and
makes them ask questions about their associates, useful policy pronouncements. Many persons con-
colleagues, secretaries and acquaintances--questions sulted in the preparation of the newsletter endorsed
that are destructive of the casual and trusting atmo- this suggestion.
sphere traditional in America. (Already, unbeliev- In any case, as the distaste for the CIA grows, the
able numbers of persons seem to assume that their CIA has a moral obligation to stay out of the lives
phones are tapped and their mail read.) of those who do not wish to be tarnished by associ-
ation with it. In one country, it is reported, CIA put
funds into the bank deposits of a political party
without its knowledge. But what if this were discov-
ered! Obviously, CIA could lightly risk the reputa-
tions of persons it wanted to use, or manipulate, by
trying to help them secretly....
In each house of Congress, the Armed Services
and the Appropriations Committe have a subcom-
mittee that is supposed, in principle, to oversee
CIA. In the House of Representatives, even the
names of the Appropriations subcommittee mem-
bers are secret. In the Senate, the five senior mem-
bers of the Appropriations Committee form a sub-
committee on intelligence operations.
The subcommittee of Armed Services on CIA has
not met for at least two years-although Senator
Symington, a member of the subcommittee, has
sought to secure such a meeting. In 1971, Senators
John Stennis and Allen Ellender-then the Chair-
men of the full Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees (as well as of their CIA subcommittees)
said they knew nothing about the CIA-financed war
in Laos-surely CIA's biggest operation! (Congres-
sional Record, Nov. 23, 1971, S19521-S1953o.)
Approved For Release 2003/10/))1 6 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
Congressmen are understandably reluctant even
to know about intelligence operations. Without
publicity, and public support, there is a limit to
their influence over the events about which they
hear. And if they cannot appeal to their constitu-
encies, the knowledge of secrets only makes them
vulnerable to the smear that they leaked a secret or
Mishandled their responsibilities.
Approximatey 15o resolutions have been offered
in the Congress to control the CIA and/or other
intelligence functions. The most common resolu-
tion has called for a joint committee on intelli-
gence, and there is much to be said for it. Such a
renewal of Congressional authority to review such
matters might strengthen Congressional oversight.
'14o more recent efforts, both sponsored by Sen-
ator Symington, have tried different tacks. One res-
olution called for a select committee on the coordi-
nation of US Government activities abroad; such
a committee would have authority over CIA and
DOD foreign activities in particular. Another ap-
proach called for limiting the US intelligence ex-
penditures of all kinds to $4 billion.
Senator Clifford Case has sought to control the
CIA by offering resolutions that simply apply to
"any agency of the US Government." These resolu-
tions embody existing restraints on the Department
of Defense (DOD) that CIA was circumventing: e.g.,
he sought to prevent expenditure of funds for train-
ing Cambodian military forces. In short, Senator
Case is emphasizing the fact that CIA is a statutorily
designed agency, which Congress empowered and
which Congress can control.
Congress has . . . given the executive branch a
blank check to do intelligence, but it has not even
insisted on seeing the results. The NSA requires the
CIA to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relat-
ing to the national security and provide for the ap-
propriate dissemination of such intelligence within
the Government . . ." (italics added). As far as the
legislative branch of "government" is concerned,
this has not been done. On July 17, 1972, the For-
eign Relations Committee reported out an amend-
ment (S. 2224) to the NSA explicitly requiring the
CIA to "inform fully and currently, by means of
regular and special reports" the Committees on For-
eign Relations and Armed Services of both houses
and to make special reports in response to their re-
quests. The Committee proposal, sponsored by Sen-
ator John Sherman Cooper, put special emphasis
upon the existing precedent whereby the joint
Atomic Energy Committee gets special reports from
DOD on atomic energy intelligence information. f7
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
o C;
 nnri nted from "J S. dews R-. Uorld Report', for use only at Air War Cr'Il.ege.
Nay 7, 1973,
Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP80R01731 R002100030026-2
WHY "SPY" AGENCIES
ARE BEING SHAKEN UP
Drastic changes are aimed at
ending rivalries and improving
the usefulness of U. S. intelli-
gence. One result: Some inner
workings are being disclosed.
The supersecret U. S. intelligence ap-
paratus is being rocked from within on
a scale never before so visible to the
public.
What set off the tremor is a major
overhaul, no'.v in progress, of the ma-
chinery that produces the worldwide
intelligence assessments on which crucial
national decisions are based.
Under James R. Schlesinger, the new
Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and overseer, also, of the vast
U. S. information-gathering net-,vork-mil-
itary as well as civilian-significant
changes are being made. They have
these objectives:
? To shake up the whole system and
sharply improve its usefulness to the
President and his top advisers.
? To process vital intelligence more
effectively, at less cost.
Mr. Schlesinger cracked down on
CIA, his home base, first. Now he is
expected to focus on other parts of the
intelligence community-military and
civilian.
Payroll reductions. In the reorga-
nization process, wholesale firings have
occurred at the CIA-a cutback, sources
say, of perhaps more than 1,000 of the
agency's estimated 15,000 employes.
Some professionals assert that Mr.
Schlesinger is bent on rooting out an
"intellectually arrogant" clique that has
been riding high in the CIA hierarchy
for years.
Others counter that the chief purpose
of the housecleanings is to enable the
Nixon Administration to "politicize" the
intelligence mechanism to its own ideo-
logical shape-and use Mr. Schlesinger
to do it.
Both charges are vigorously denied
by responsible people on all sides. In-
stead, the charges are cited as examples
of the bitter bureaucratic infighting go-
ing on in Washington-and spreading
into the intelligence system.
On one front, heated feuding between
Pentagon intelligence specialists, trying
to regain control of assessing military
threats to the U. S., are citing what they
characterize as examples of blunders and
bias by the CIA.
The military critics admit that their
own mistakes a decade and more ago
obliged the Government to turn to the
civilian CIA for the main assessments
on military threats. But now, the mili-
tary men contend that DIA has been
revamped, is more objective-and less of
a lobby designed to scare Congress into
voting higher defense budgets.
Against that background of turbu-
lence, Mr. Schlesinger is moving to
carry out the sweeping reorganization
of the U. S. intelligence community orig-
inally ordered by President Nixon a
year and a half ago-in November, 1971.
Knowledgeable sources say that Rich-
ard Helms, now Ambassador to Iran,
was replaced by Mr. Schlesinger as CIA
Director because he failed to carry out
the overhaul mandate to Mr. Nixon's
satisfaction.
A top man in the intelligence network
put it this way: "The President and his
national-security adviser, Henry Kis-
singer, just didn't think they were getting
their money's worth."
The reorganization plan, in fact, is
Mr. Schlesinger's own handiwork. He
drafted it while serving as Assistant
Director of the Office of Management
and Budget. Later, he was named
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission-the job from which he was
transferred to his present post as Amer-
ica's "superspy."
Like Mr. Helms before him, Mr.
Schlesinger is not only Director of the
CIA but also Director of Central Intel-
ligence-DCI. That makes him boss of
all American intelligence operations.
New faces. One thing that Mr.
Schlesinger has done is to put together
what he calls the intelligence communi-
ty staff, with offices on the top floor of
the CIA headquarters building in a
Virginia suburb of Washington.
Significantly, two military-intelligence
THE U.S. INTELLIOENCE NETWORK AND
CJA Central Intelligence Agency, top-secret Government
organization, responsible only to the White House, col-
lects and evaluates intelligence information, runs clan-
destine missions abroad, conducts espionage and counter-
espionage.
the CIA and the Pentagon's Defense In-
telligence Agency-DIA-is out in the
open.
196
James Schlesinger, Dir.
of Central Intelligence,
presides over the US
Intelligence Board, which
sets intelligence re-
quirements and priorities.
Aft
?(.our, ?ht 1973, ,ij, . New ec r d Re A U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 7, 1973
War College. FuFC~~t~eSri~o~sep~ /e'6 ? GI -F~8~ O'f31 R002100030026-2
 source, the aide who blocked
I OOO O 2 2us estimate "won
no friends."
v In Vietnam, it is now
revealed, CIA and DIA were
often at odds. For instance,
they agreed that some Com-
munist arms were reaching
South Vietnam through the
Cambodian port of Sihanouk-
ville, but both wee "wildly
wrong" on how much. But an
official, not in intelligence,
recalls that CIA was "much
further wrong" than DIA-al-
though each was on the low
side.
sr reassertion of a doniinaiit
James R. Schlesinger, who Order' in the title was like overprinting
oversee.. ail U. S. intelligence, desig a Nazi swastika on the cover. It paint-
3osted two military me : -srnong deputiee. ed the ;iiackest possible picture of the
cxliert.s ii,ct been assigned to tiiat staff
as M?r. 4icUesinger's deputies. One is
eIaj. '::w Allen, al' die Aar Force,
wfto his +.wea nominat_di for pioiiwtion
in. 1a& _;,..=.,ae ;e general. The other is Maj,
'en. ?:+aniei O. Graham, of the Army,
,i career intelligence officer.
C?:nria, 1'.lrahani, who has been dep-
uty director for estimates in the Penta-
lTil,', : 1A, sounded a call in an article
h