PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON PARIS DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800090019-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 13, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

ECRU
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13 June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Preliminary Comments on Paris Developments
1. We now have in hand the text of the new Agreement
Henry has negotiated in Paris -- the so-called "joint communique"
rela ed to us via the U.S. Delegation's NODIS cable
13 June). This document takes on additional meaning
if read in conjunction with and in light of three very informative
Restricted Handling cables received from Tom Polgar on
13 June: SAIGON Polgar's general wrap-up of the
past few days' events; SAIGON the text of his 1.3 June
memo to Ambassador Whitehouse on his session with General
Quang that morning (sent to Washington and Pa is on
Ambassador's privacy link); and SAIGON
turning to substantive questions, one internal matter deserves
highlighting. Polgar and- the Station clearly performed with
great distinction. Their activities probably were decisive in
getting and keeping the GVN in line. Polgar and his colleagues
did themselves and the Agency proud and performed a signal
service to the U.S. Government.
2. On the military side, the "communique" (i.e., new
Agreement) stipulates that at 1200 Zulu on 14 June (0800 EDT
and.2"000 Saigon time the same day) the "high commands of the
two South Vietnamese parties" are to give orders to all of their
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forces "to strictly observe the cease-fire throughout South
Vietnam beginning at 0400 hours, GMT, June 15, 1973, and
scrupulously implement the Agreement and its protocols. "
(0400 Zulu on 15 June translates to midnight on 14 June here and
noon on 15 June, in Saigon.) There is a related stipulation
(in the cable's paragraph 5) about accomplishing "a return
of the armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties
to the positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire
entered into force on January 28, 1973."
3. What all this means is that Vietnam is likely to be
quite noisy between now and midnight on 14 June our time.
Unless Henry has exerted pressure or worked out a side deal
not reflected in the formal text, the Communists will probably
launch their land-grabs and attempt to seize as much strategic
real estate as possible before the new cease-fire's implementation
deadline.* The 28 January clause is an additional hooker.
What it can mean is that the Communists will have grounds
for claiming control over areas they grabbed just prior to the
original Paris Agreement's effective date, even though the
GVN booted them out of such areas (e.g., Sa Huynh) shortly
thereafter and even if they cannot regain possession of such
areas prior to the "new" cease-fire's effective hour.
4. On the political side, buried in the text of the
"communique" is the end result of the great Article 9 flap which
so exercised the GVN and which, as Polgar's cables explain
in detail, was one of Thieu's major sticking points. In the
original (27 January) Paris Agreement, Article 9 is the first
Article under Chapter 4: "The exercise of the South Vietnamese
people's right to self-determination." Its text reads as follows:
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"The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam undertake to respect the following
principles for the exercise of the South.
Vietnamese people's right to self-determination:
" (a) The South Vietnamese people's
right to self-determination is sacred,
inalienable, and shall be respected
by all countries.
" (b) The South Vietnamese people
shall decide themselves the political
future of South Vietnam through
genuinely free and democratic general
elections under international
supervision.
" (c) Foreign countries shall not
impose any political tendency or
personality on the South Vietnamese
people. "
5. Thieu and the GVN were extremely anxious to re-affirm
all parties' commitment to Article 9 (b). This clause clearly
points in the direction of a head-to-head plebescite, something Thieu
knows he would win hands down under present circumstances.
The Communists also know this and therefore want no part
whatsoever of any such plebescite-type electoral contest in
the foreseeable future Over the medium term they would like
to replace the current Senate and House (and the GVN current
constitution) with some form of constituent assembly in which
they are allotted in advance a sizeable proportion of the seats at least one-third and, ideally, fifty percent or better. In
the. near term, the Communists want to focus (exclusively if
possible) on the tri-partite "National Council of National
Reconciliation and Concord" which -- as Thieu quite properly
suspects -- the Communists would like to transmute into some
form of interim coalition government in which the Communist
voice would be at least equal to that of the GVN.
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6. The pertinent language of the "communique" reflects
a papered-over compromise in which the GVN gains more
than it loses. The direct reference to Article 9 is blurred.
The "communique" marches along, Article by Article (specifically
flagged) through Article 8. In the chain of direct reference,
it then skips to Article 11, after which (in the next paragraph --
10 in the cable) it comes back to the substance of Article 9.
That paragraph does quote, i.e.., repeat, the language of the
27.January Agreement's. Article 9 (b), giough that quote is
immediately followed with a clause waving the flag for the tri-
partite NCNRC which is to "be formed as soon as possible, in
conformity with Article 12 of the Agreement " The GVN, however,
gets in one more lick a few lines later via an explicit stipulation that
"the two South Vietnamese parties shall agree through
consultations on the institutions for which the free and democratic
general elections provide for in Article 9 (b) of the Agreement
will be held. "
7. On the whole, if the GVN can hang on militarily
during the next 30-odd hours, its immediate political position
is theoretically enhanced rather than jeopardized. If the
Communists can be induced or compelled to participate in a
plebescite-type election within the reasonably near future,
the GVN should be able to score a major political victory.
8. The real long term kicker is of course Article 20 and
Article 7 (of the original, 27 January text). Article 20's language
obligates North Vietnam to withdraw all of its forces from Laos
and Cambodia. The "communique" stipulates that "Article 20 of
the Agreement, regarding Cambodia and Laos shall be scrupulously
implemented. " The "communique" also stipulates, a little earlier,
that -- in line with Article 7 -- the "two South Vietnamese parties"
will not introduce new troops into South Vietnam or any new war
materiel save for authorized, ICCS -supervised, one-to-one
replacements of used or worn out equipment imported solely
through designated entry points. If North Vietnam in fact
abides by these provisions, the GVN should be in reasonably
good shape. To put it mildly, I am extremely skeptical of
Hanoi's good intentions in this regard.
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9. Taken as a whole, the new Agreement (the "communique")
turns me instinctively to Horace ("parturient mantes, nascetur
ridiculus mus"). Unless there are understandings which do
not appear in the official "communique," the new Agreement
has no more teeth in it to enforce compliance than did the
27 January Agreement. We have the means, within limits, to
bring about a greater degree of compliance by the GVN, and
presumably some combination of threats and inducements --
from Moscow and Peking as well as Washington -- has been or
can be brought to bear on Hanoi. There.: is nothing in the
new text itself, however, which firmly commits either Hanoi
or the Viet Cong to anything they were not already committed
to in January. If Hanoi succeeds in enlisting our aid in pressing
the GVN to "live up" to the GVN's reasonably specific commitments,
while finessing compliance with the Communists' much more
generally stated obligations (e.g., Articles 7, 9 and 20), the
overall politico-military balance in South Vietnam will tilt
perceptibly in the Communists' favor.
/s/
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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