THE CUBAN INVASION - 1

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170025-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: August 3, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN

A6048 Approved ft ft i C RDP)Mof000200170025-9 August 3
search going on now in the use of aids to
learning (TV, teaching machines, tapes, etc.)
foretells greater knowledge and greater ap-
plication of the psychological principles of
learning. We will probably use many of our
old techniques in new ways. We will have
more team teaching, more teacher helpers
(professional and nonprofessional), more
adult education (14 years of schooling will
be common). We need more interclass visi-
tation; we should experiment in home eco-
nomics with new grouping procedures. We
will have new time arrangements in our
schools-a 12-month school year with rotat-
ing vacations. We should do more about the
role of the unknown in teaching to help
students discover and think for themselves.
Yet, Edgar Dale cautions us, "In our anxiety
to get on the band wagon of these new teach-
ing techniques we do not end by learning to
do better something we should not do at all."
What can you do as an individual teacher,
then, to keep up and move ahead? I have
five suggestions to get you started. First,
you can examine critically what you are
teaching now. (Miss Coon's questionnaire
may help if it is still available.) Second,
you can decide what changes in emphasis and
content you need to make. Let me caution
you to "make haste slowly" at first. Be in-
quiring and diagnostic, Like a doctor, use
every way you know how to discover what's
wrong. Guard against "the invisibility of
the obvious." Thirrd, perhaps all you need
to do is to rediscover your enthusiasm for
your job. For there is nothing more potent
or more effective than an enthusiastic home-
making teacher. It's catching, that enthu-
siasm. Fourth, be a little daring. Try a
new method of teaching-at least once a
week. Teach something (content and skill)
with which you are most familiar in a new
way. If you're in a rut-pull out. Someone
has said that the only difference between a
rut and a grave is that one is longer and
the other is deeper. Use your imagination.
Be an "imagineer." Fifth, make your life
out of school as rewarding for you as you
know how. Use your leisure (and I hear you
all thinking, "What leisure?") in such a way
that you feel refreshed both mentally and
physically when you get back to your classes
on Monday morning. Someone has said that
whoever put Saturday and Sunday between
Friday and Monday certainly had teachers
in mind. The first move is the hardest. So
I hope you will resolve to begin now.
People, ideas, and money will be needed to
take us from where we are to the place we'
hope to reach. But the most powerful of
these are ideas. These are generated and ap-
plied only as we creatively combine expe-
rience, research, imagination, and wisdom.
Ideas are needed to maintain balance and
perspective, too.
In closing, I'd like to tell you a short story
which best illustrates what I have tried to
say in a few thousand well chosen words.
The story is about Dorothy Parker who
came back from a visit carrying two baby
alligators, a gift from a friend. She had to
leave the house almost immediately so she
temporarily placed them in the bathtub.
When she returned later in the evening she
found a note from her maid who had been
with her for many years. It read:
"DEAR MADAM: I am leaving. I cannot
work in a house with alligators. I would
have told you this before,, but I never
thought the question would come up."
What will come up in the next 20 or 30
years we do not know exactly, but we do
know that there will be changed. Change is
a certainty for which our young people must
be prepared. As teachers we must look to
the past and learn to be better evaluators;
we.must look at the here and now and learn
to become better generators; we must look
to the future and become better prognosti-
cators.. These three-hindsight, insight, and
foresight-can lead to a brighter future for
home economics.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. FLORENCE P. DWYER
OF NEW JERSEY
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, August 3, 1g61
Mrs. DWYER. Mr. Speaker, the dis-
tinguished military correspondent of the
New York Times, Mr. Hanson W. Bald-
win, has written a two-part analysis of
the attempted invasion of Cuba from the
United States earlier this year which I
believe deserves the widest possible at-
tention. Under leave to extend my re-
marks in the RECORD, I commend the
articles to our colleagues.
The first article follows:
THE CUBAN INVASION, I-WHITE HOUSE DE-
CISIONS CITED IN STUDY OF WHY LANDING
IN APRIL WAS A FAILURE
(By Hanson W. Baldwin)
The celebration, in Cuba last week de-
liberately emphasized the increasing
strength of Premier Fidel Castro's pro-
Communist state.
Part of the emphasis represents propa=
ganda, but there is some truth behind the
embroidered claims.
About 3 months after the United States-
sponsored abortive invasion of Cuba, Dr.
Castros' regime is stronger than it has ever
been, physically and in prestige.
In April, when 1,500 to 1,600 anti-Castro
Cubans, with United States support, at-
tempted to overthrow the Cuban Govern-
ment, Havana had only 9 operational mili-
tary aircraft, all propeller-driven, except 3
jet powered T-33 trainers that had been
armed. The Cuban militia, then equipped
with Czechoslovak and Russian small arms,
about 50 Russian tanks and self-propelled
guns and small amounts of field artillery,
was impressive in quantity but not in quality.
About 200,000 men and women had been
armed, but most of these were, ill-disciplined
and sparsely trained, undependable against
a good military force. About 15,000 to
20,000 regular army and militiamen had re-
ceived more training and could be termed
a "hard core," although their combat ef-
fectiveness and dependability were open to
question. There was, in April, a Cuban anti-
Castro underground, and about 2,000 guer-
rillas scattered in the mountains all over
Cuba.
Today, with the victory at the Bay of Pigs
behind them, the Cuban armed forces are
far more confident, less likely to defect, bet-
ter armed and trained. Between 20 and 30
Soviet Mig-17 jet fighters have been deliv-
ered to Cuba and are now in operation.
Heavy crates, which may contain additional
disassembled planes, have been seen. Some
Cuban pilots have returned from jet training
in Czechoslovakia. More arms and equip-
ment for ground troops have arrived in Cuba
from Communist countries.
GUERRILLAS ARE INACTIVE
The underground has been virtually
quiescent; the guerrillas have been inactive;
Dr. Castro's opposition is disorganized and
downcast. The overthrow of Dr. Castro's
government would be far more difficult to-
day, even if U.S. forces were sent into the
island, than it would have been 3 months
ago. And the U.S. Government apparently
has no plan for eliminating what many ob-
servers have called the cancer of commu-
nism in Cuba.
The April invasion has been widely ridi-
culed since its failure, and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have been made the principal whipping boys.
The impossibility of overthrowing Dr. Castro
with 1,500 to 1,600 men appears self-evident;
the rhetorical question, "How could anyone
be so stupid?" has been a popular one
around Washington in the last 3 months.
Yet the operation in its original concepts
was not as stupid as it had been made to
appear and the responsibility for the mis-
takes appears to be widely distributed.
The story of the Cuban venture, pieced
together from talks with many Government
officials and from other sources, postulates
many lessons of major importance in the
Berlin crisis.
PLANNING STARTED IN 1960
Planning for the Cuban assault started in
the late spring of 1960, when former Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the
Central Intelligence Agency to organize,
train, and equip anti-Castro Cuban refugees.
Allen W. Dulles, Director of the CIA, and his
Deputy for Operations, Richard M. Bissell,
initiated the secret operation. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the military were not
initially given any details of the plans for
employment of the Cuban refugees, but as
their training progressed the Pentagon was
asked to assign officers, training cadres,
weapons and equipment to the CIA.
The plan, as it developed under the Eisen-
hower, and later the Kennedy administration,
did not, contrary to published reports, com-
mit U.S. Armed Forces to support of the
Cuban refugees in actual military operations.
Such a commitment was considered but
never, as far as can be learned, officially ap-
proved, although it was not publicly and
finally disapproved until a few days before
the landing.
The original Eisenhower planning con-
templated one or more series- of relatively
small landings to reenforce the anti-Castro
guerrillas in the hills. Last November 30
had been, tentatively, one of the target dates
for the invasion, but the impending change
in administration as a result of the November
elections forced its postponement.
About December, the character of the
operation appears to have changed from
dispersed guerrilla landings to the estab-
lishment of one beachhead. If the beach-
head appeared to be firmly established, a
Cuban government in exile could be flown
in, and all Cubans would then be called
upon to join in the revolt against Dr. Castro.
Whether the United States would recognize
this government and the kind and degree
of support it might give it were apparently
left open.
INVASION SITE SHIFTED
After the Kennedy Administration took
office other changes were made.
The Bay of Pigs, closer to Havana but
seventy-five miles from the nearest concen-
tration of guerrillas in the Escambre Moun-
tains, was substituted for another suggested
beach, less than 100 miles to the east.
Perhaps more important, the preparations
for the operation became so big and so
obvious that it was no longer secret. Pub-
lished stores about the refugee training
camps in Guatemala and preparations in
Florida plus the expectation that Sov'_et
MIG-17's, now in Cuba, would soon arrive in-
creased pressure on the administration for
quick action and also rallied, within the ad-
ministration, the opposition to any U.S.-
sponsored intervention.
On April 12, 5 days before the invasion
at the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, President Kennedy
announced at a press conference that U.S.
armed forces would "in no circumstances" be
used to overthrow Dr. Castro.
THE INVASION FORCE
The Kennedy announcement meant that
about 1,600 Cuban refugees, supported by
16 American-built B--26 propeller-driven
light bombers based in Central America,
transported by old U.S. merchant ships pro-
cured with U.S. funds, armed with Amer-
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1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
a rarity. Do we really want that in Amer-
ica?" he asks. "Or do we prefer what the
Bonn government has set up-a system of ex-
aminations through which the decision to go
to the university, or not to go, is firmly made
when a child is 10 years old? The result:
Only 1 out of 20 pupils makes the grade."
How do you think these ideas affect us in
home economics? We must think about it
if we are to remain in the mainstream of
educational progress.
Critics seem to forget that it is essential
that faultfinding be preceded by factfinding.
Alice was right when she told the King of
Hearts that it was "nonsense to consider the
verdict before considering the evidence."
I believe the foundation to our future
growth and development in home economics
rests with our philosophy. For what we be-
lieve affects everything that we think and
say and do. What do you believe the role of
home economics is in education and in the
world of the future? Remember if it is
really a sound philosophy, the basic ideas
will not change much although the world
will change rapidly. It will have a built-in
flexibility which will keep us abreast and in
certain instances, ahead of the times. We
cannot become static nor fall into a pat-
tern of prefabricated judgments. Remember
the bed of Procrustes. In days of old, Bul-
finch tells us, "evildoers and monsters op-
pressed the country." And prominent
among these was a giant called Procrustes,
or the Stretcher. He had an iron bedstead
on which he used to tie all travelers who fell
into his hands. If they were shorter than
the bed, he stretched their limbs to make
them fit it. If they were longer than the
bed, he lopped off a portion."
One of the most basic questions often
asked is this. How can we educate today's
young people for the future in which they
will live but that we cannot predict?
Laura Zeibes has one of the finest answers
I've been able to find. "Anthropologists tell
us that we can and must educate for adapt-
ability, resourcefulness, flexibility, and readi-
ness to adjust, but also for: steadfastness to
human values, creativity and self-reliance.
We must try to develop intercultural under-
standing and a concern for the common
good. In a scientific age we should try to re-
duce strains and tensions, hunger caused by
want, deprivation and denial, reaction and
regression."
In other words, build the human value-
and this is our greatest area of strength.
Incidentally, one of the books which every
teacher should read if she wants to be more
creative and develop the creative potential in
her students is "Creative Power" by Hughes
Mearns.
You will need to be quite sure in your own
mind what it is you really believe about
home economics in order to face the exciting,.
exacting future.
What would it be like, this world in the
next decades? What kind of education will
we need? What kind of jobs must our chil-
dren make themselves ready to fill? What
now opportunities will they face? What kind
of people must they be to cope with the
future's problems? The answers to such
questions should be guiding what we do now,
everyday, as well as give direction to our
plans for the future.
Many changes are predictable. The influ-
ences which will drastically affect our future
are all around us. As John Dewey said, "The
future surrounds the present like a halo."
Here are a few of the most important issues
and influences; think about implications for
home economics in these:
First and foremost is the problem of peace;
without peace there will be no future for any
of us. This is an issue none of us can evade.
If we want peace we must make sure that
our representatives in Government know
our representatives in government know
where we stand.
Our relations with other peoples of the
world cannot be trusted to cultural and in-
tellectual pigmies. We need education for
all children and must fight to get and be
willing to pay for the schools we obviously
need. H. G. Wells once said, "Human his-
tory becomes more and more a race between
education and disaster." It was never more
true than it is today. Truly the future is in
our hands. This is a time of crisis. The
Chinese write the word "crisis" with two
characters. One stands for danger and the
other for opportunity. Both danger and op-
portunity confront us.
Margaret Mead says that we built our
country on the assumption that anybody can
be President, but that we need now to act
as if any of our children might reach the
moon. We must be ready for the world in
which the moon and outer space will be ex-
plored. She makes some interesting obser-
vations about the kind of world we are even
now beginning to experience, where many of
our daily processes will include machine
links. Such aspects of everyday life as buy-
ing a ticket, cashing a check, applying for a
job, getting into college, passing an exam,
ordering a spare part, will depend on the
accuracy with which someone turns a screw
or punches a hole in an IBM card. It seems
to me that life will become increasingly like
a parachute jump-something that has to be
done right the first time.
Thomas Watson, Jr. ("Mr. Automation"
himself), president of IBM, has said, "Man
has made some machines that can answer
questions provided the facts are previously
stored in them; he will never be able to make
a machine that will ask questions. The
ability to ask the right questions is more
than half the battle of finding the right
answer." We must increasingly be like the
mother who daily asked her son (who inevi-
tably became a scientist), "Did you ask any
good questions today?"
I've tried to find someclues to the future
in today's world. How they will affect us
in home economics I hope you will figure out
for yourselves.
In housing these are some features which
may be of interest: add or take-away-a-room
feature; adjustable and movable interior
walls; circular rooms; new equipment and
materials; move-a-house (secondhand
houses will be sold for use somewhere else,
or it will be possible to take your old home
to a new job location). Other factors which
will affect housing include decentralization
of industry into satellite towns and smaller
cities, use of revolutionary high-speed trans-
portation, such as helicopters and mono-
rail el trains. (Will we have helicopter
schoolbuses) Perhaps commuting will be
eliminated through a rearrangement of busi-
ness and factory procedures-instant com-
munications will make possible business of-
fices in the suburbs, a core of "contact men"
in the city itself, and factories in autono-
mous suburbs. Teams of planners for
homes of the future will include "imagi-
neers" and engineers, architects, home econ-
omists, psychologists, materials technolo-
gists, production and mechanical engineers,
interior decorators, landscape architects, and
acoustical experts.
New kitchen concepts will replace current
classic work centers, because of further ad-
vances in the preparation and packaging of
foods and the effects of improvements on
the buying habits and food preparation.
Cooking will be faster and more automatic
and will require fewer utensils. Toting and
carrying will be taken over by automatic
conveyor systems.
The laundry will be a completely automa-
tic and sanitary unit. Easy-care fabrics and
noniron clothing will be cleaned in appli-
ances using ultrasonic soundwaves. We will
have disposable clothing sold at low prices
for children, garage men, factory workers,
housewives, and home handymen.
A6047
As for food, no pill will every substitute
for meals, for food is tied in too closely with
the joy of living. We will have better ways
to process and package foods to retain nu-
trients and cut waste: preservation by ion-
izing radiation to kill microbes; dehydration
by "freeze drying" (food dehydrated by mi-
crowave energy in below-freezing vacuum,
put in airtight cans where they will keep
for years; to use, simply immerse in water).
Research may develop "fish farms" for easier,
better source of protein.
There will be fabulous changes in the
marketing and distribution of foods. Re-
gional dishes and foreign foods will be made
available on a worldwide scale. The num-
ber and kinds of special foods for the sick
and for older people will increase. One
of the innovations at the supermarket will
be a home economist as one of the regular
employees to stand by and help plan meals
and parties.
Nutrition research has many exciting pos-
sibilities. One is the discovery that food
is closely related to brain metabolism and
mental health. Will the application of
greater nutritional knowledge to the study
of body chemistry mean freedom from cer-
tain mental disorders current today? Even
now the B vitamins are being used to treat
psychogenic symptoms of depression, anx-
iety, and extreme sensitivity to noise and
light.
Does this mean we will have no more
home cooking? On the contrary, with in-
creased leisure and longer weekends there
may be a rebirth of-home-cooking. Creative
cooks will enjoy cooking, and others who do
not care about cooking will be able to eat
better because they can buy pre-prepared
foods. I believe there will be many more
men who will cook.
What changes does this mean for us in
home economics? Our houses may become
thermoelectric, ultrasonic, and -electronic,
and air conditioned from a central plant like
our gas and electricity is now, and much
of the equipment will be truly automatic
(stoves that can be turned on and off by dial-
ing the instructions from a phone booth).
All of this may be paid for "on the cuff"
through new concepts of financing which
include monthly payments that increase as
the family income goes up, for example.
How will this affect the content and methods
of teaching?
Although I have not had access to Miss
Coon's report of her study about what we
are now teaching in our secondary schools in
home economics, I did hear a report of her
findings at the North Atlantic Regional Con-
ference. And, if what the teachers them-
selves have told her is true, we are way
behind the times even now. In general, the
teachers said they gave clothing and foods
each one-third of the class time they had at
their disposal. The other third was devoted
to child development, family relations, home
management, consumer education, housing
and family health.
If we look at the way families are living,
even today, and most certainly if we want to
keep up with their way of life in the future,
this implies that we must teach a lot more
and better management in all areas. We
must teach more consumer education and
increase our offerings in home and family
living, child development and problems of
parenthood. In management, it is my hope
that along with basic principles we learn
more about, and use more often, the notion
of "intelligent neglect" , to avoid sterile
stereotypes of management most people have,
now.
In teaching, traditional ways of teaching
and learning will be greatly changed if cur-
rent experiments and innovations continue
to prove their worth. The chores associated
with teaching will be lessened. Records will
be kept through automation devices and
techniques, for example. The amount of re-
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AFM6R000200170025-9
scan equipment and trained by American
cadres but without the help of U.S. armed
forces, would attempt to establish a beach-
head in Cuba. EXTENSION OF REMARKS
A second decision of major importance was or
made by the White House just a short time
before the invaders actually landed at the
Bay of Pigs on April 17. Two days before
the invasion, preliminary air strikes were
flown by. a few B-26's piloted by Cuban
refugee fliers, against some of Dr. Castro's
airfields. The planes were based on Central
America and landed in Florida after their
mission.
The United States asserted these planes
were flown from Cuban airfields by defecting
pilots. A storm arose in the United Nations,
and Adlai E. Stevenson, the U.S. delegate,
who had not been informed fully of our
Cuban plans, declared publicly with great
emphasis that the planes came from Cuba.
He was hastily informed by Washington of
his mistake.
The invasion force left as scheduled from
Central America, and was escorted at sea by
U.S. Navy destroyers, with an aircraft carrier
in the background. The naval vessels had
orders to stay outside the Cuban 3-mile
limit, but to be prepared for anything.
On the night and early morning of the in-
vasion a key airstrike, flown by Cuban
refugee pilots in B-26's, was scheduled to
bomb the nine Cuban planes spotted in
known positions on Cuban airfields. A few
hours before the invasion was scheduled,
while the ships were nearing the Bay of Pigs
beaches, the airstrike was canceled by the
White House.
The cancellation was apparently the result
of representations by Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, and through him by Mr. Stevenson.
Both of them were worried by the effect of a
second air strike from Central America upon
opinion in the United Nations and Latin
America. The President ordered the CIA to
cancel the strike, but, according to an ad-
ministration spokesman, specified that the
CIA had the right to appeal to the President
and left the possibility of reversal open. The
appeal was not made, according to the
spokesman.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not aware
of the cancellation of this key airstrike
until after the beachhead had actually been
established, according to Government
sources.
By this time much of the damage had
been done, for Dr. Castro's planes, alerted by
the actual landings, were in the air attack-
ing the invading ships, and were dispersed
after their sorties to new airfields. Contrary
to general opinion, the actual landings
achieved, as Dr. Castro has since conceded, a
tactical surprise, much as the Allied landings
on the coast of Normandy in World War II
achieved a tactical surprise. Dr. Castro
knew the invasion was coming; it could not
be a strategic surprise. But he did not know
where or when.
After the landing, the Cuban refugee
pilots were permitted to fly close support
missions from Central America but with or-
ders to touch down first at the Bay of Pigs
airstrip (within the beachhead) to provide
the verisimilitude of legality. But it was too
late. The nine Cuban planes sank two of
the Cuban refugees' ships before communi-
cations equipment and ammunition had
been unloaded. And the three T-33 jet
trainers, which had been armed by Dr.
Castro, played havoc with the slow B-26's.
U.S. Navy pilots, flying in fast jet attack
planes off the beachhead, armed and ready
for action in case they should be ordered to
intervene, saw the end of the invasion from
the air as Cuban tanks rumbled down the
roads. The invaders. had run out of am-
muntion; there was nothing to do but sur-
render.
HON. FLORENCE P. DWYER
OF NEW JERSEY
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, August 3, 1961
Mrs. DWYER. Mr. Speaker, under
leave to extend my remarks in the
RECORD, I include the second article in a
two-part series written by the New York
Times correspondent, Mr. Hanson W.
Baldwin, and published by the Times in
its issues of July 31 and August 1.
The second article follows:
THE CUBAN INVASION, II-REBELS' DEFEAT IS
ASCRIBED TO ERRORS IN PLAN AND EXECU-
TION IN WASHINGTON
(By Hanson. W. Baldwin)
The invasion of Cuba last April, it is now
clear, was lost in Washington.
The small invading force was adjudged
shortly before the operation, in a written re-
port submitted by a Colonel Hawkins of the
Marine Corps, to be battleworthy and com-
paratively almost as well equipped as a simi-
lar U.S. unit. This judgment had some ef-
fect in Washington and, observers contend,
was borne out by the actual fighting.
Despite the casualty statistics (some 1,200
of the 1,500 to 1,600 captured), the invaders
gave a good account of themselves. Most
sources agree that the refugees fought well
until their ammunition ran out, that they
inflicted more casualties on Fidel Castro's
forces than he had conceded, and that the
Cuban militia in the area of the landing
almost immediately defected in scores to the
invaders' side only to defect back again to
Dr. Castro after the failure of the invasion
became obvious.
Like the British and French invasion of
Port Said during the Suez crisis of 1956, the
Cuban operational plans and their imple-
mentation were watered down and the in-
vasion was doomed by nonmilitary considera-
tions.
The errors made and the blame for them
are widespread.
ERRORS LAID TO KENNEDY
President Kennedy, new to supreme power,
showed uncertainty in one of his first tests
as Commander in Chief and met the oppos-
ing opinions of his advisers by compromise
instead of clear-cut decision. His announce-
ment a few days before the invasion that "in
no circumstances" would U.S. Armed Forces
be used to overthrow the Cuban Government-
should have led to cancellation, or major
revision of the operation, for use of the U.S.
Armed Forces was the one factor that could
absolutely insure success.
Similarly, the cancellation of the preinva-
sion air strike--a key to the achievement of
air superiority, a stipulated precondition for
success-was the final, counterweight against
the invaders.
But it is also true that the President in-
herited the Cuban problem and a plan that
had grown too big, physically and because
of its political implications, for the Central
Intelligence Agency.
In effect, everybody had a hand in the
Cuban venture and yet nobody was clearly
in charge. It was bureaucracy at its worst,
with the right hand sometimes not knowing
(as in the case of Adlal E. Stevenson at the
United Nations) what the left hand was
doing.
The close and careful liaison between po-
litical and military planning that is abso-
lutely essential to strategic success was lack-
ing.
A6049
In fact, neither the military nor the State
Department was the primary planner or
executor of the Cuban Invasion.
The invasion, partly because the original
plan just grew and expanded, partly in the
interests of security and secrecy (which
could not possibly be maintained when the
operation became so large), was primarily the
baby of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Agency made mistakes in planning, ex-
ecution and judgment. Allen W. Dulles, its
Director, and Richard M. Bissell, the Deputy
for Plans and Operations and in direct
charge of the Cuban affair, will probably
bear the burden of failure by resigning their
offices.
FAILURES OF JOINT CHIEFS
The Joint Chiefs of Staff made mistakes
in failing to be explicit and emphatic-in
not pounding the table enough and in fail-
ing to commit all their ideas and viewpoints
to paper. (In the interests of secrecy much
of the Cuban planning and direction was
oral.)
The White House believes the military
judgments were faulty and the studies inad-
equate, but Pentagon sources deny this.
The State Department and other advisers
bear responsibility for contributing to con-
fusion and defeat by insisting upon legal-
isms that the guilty conscience of a democ-
racy so often demands when it resorts to
naked force.
McGeorge Bundy, a Presidential assistant,
shares and manfully has accepted blame for
insufficiently emphasizing to the President
the dangerous and negative aspects of the
operation. And the President himself has
assumed full responsibility for the failure.
But the assessment of fault, although
essential to analysis, is far less important
than the lessons learned.
The primary lesson is the importance of
the principle of the objective, as it is known
in military parlance, or in slang terms,
"keeping your eye on the ball."
The original objective was the overthrow
of Dr. Castro. Whether this was an ade-
quate political objective, or whether there
should have been another constructive long-
term goal is open to question. But even
this original objective was rendered impos-
sible of accomplishment before the assault
started.
A considered statement of what one is
trying to accomplish, with political, mili-
tary, and economic factors all carefully
weighed, is the essential first step for any
operation.
The operational plan must be capable of
accomplishing this objective. In the Cuban
invasion the objective itself seems to have
become fuzzy, and the invasion plan as ac-
tually modified in execution could not pos-
sibly have accomplished the overthrow of
Dr. Castro.
NEED FOR U.S. FORCES
The political and military disadvantages
of any given plan must be weighed against
the advantages obtained by accomplishment
of the objective.
The disadvantages of the Cuban invasion
were so great that either it had to succeed
or it should never have been attempted. To
insure success, the support of U.S. Armed
Forces was essential, yet this was ruled out
before the start of the operation.
The world respects power successfully used
to accomplish national objectives. A suc-
cessful invasion of Cuba and the overthrow
of Dr. Castro backed by the United States
would probably have overbalanced the ad-
verse political, legal, and moral effects of our
open intervention in Cuban affairs.
As it was, we suffered all the opprobrium
that attaches to failure, and all the psy-
chological and political disadvantages asso-
ciated with the term "Yankee imperialism."
And our backing of the Cuban refugees was
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so thinly disguised that it immediately ex-
posed Washington to the same charges we
would have faced had U.S. Armed Forces been
employed.
The second great lesson of Cuba is the
importance of tight policy control, direction
and management of any" venture involving
the application of military power, no mat-
ter how small.
This control and management must cen-
ter in the President as Commander in Chief;
each President will use the machinery of
Government differently, but history has
shown that ordered discussions and debates
and staff work, and recorded decisions may
bring new insight and prevent major mis-
takes. These procedures were largely lack-
ing in the Kennedy administration prior to
the time of the Cuban invasion.
MISTAKES OF THE CIA
A third lesson of Cuba is that no military
or paramilitary operation should be under
the control of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy if it 1s of such a size and character that
it is bound to become overt or open, rather
than covert or secret. Operations of the size
of the Cuban invasion should be managed
by the Defense Department, which is far
better staffed and has more expert military
knowledge than the CIA.
Another lesson is the necessity of keeping
all secret intelligence activities and opera-
tions under constant top-echelon surveil-
lance and review. Machinery for a critical
and objective analysis of all such efforts
should be strengthened by the creation of
a joint congressional watchdog committee,
and by a careful supervision of the CIA by
the National Security Council and other
White House staff agencies.
But the Cuban failure offers no valid rea-
son for dismembering the CIA, or for chang-
ing its name. Intelligence operations of
many different kinds-black or concealed ra-
dio, propaganda, sabotage and so on-must
be conducted by some agency of Govern-
ment. Most of these do not properly fit into
the Pentagon, except, of course, when the
operation assumes a character distinctly
military and a size and complexity that make
the Pentagon the obvious place to handle it.
But specialized and distinctive secret op-
erations of various sorts are best handled
by some separate, centralized agency. There
is no magic in separating these specialized
operations from intelligence-gathering col-
lection and evaluation; in fact the two must
work hand in hand. -
One man, as Mr. Dulles now does, could
well head both, but the organization must
provide, as CIA now does, for separate but
coordinated efforts in secret operations and
in intelligence.
LESSON FOR INTELLIGENCE
The CIA, whether we like it or not, is an
inevitable part of the modern machinery
for national survival in the nuclear age. It
has made mistakes in the past and will again
in the future. But it has also had great
successes in the past, as in the U-2 opera-
tion. It must be improved, not made a
scapegoat. It probably employs too many
people and its administrative machinery
could be considerably improved.
Power-the power of secret information-
is insidious, and some of CIA's personnel
need to relearn the lesson of humility and
of human failure. -But the CIA is here to
stay.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff similarly is a key
body in our national security machinery.
They, too, have human weaknesses, and
they, too, have made mistakes. But the
principles they embody-differing military
approaches to the same military problem;
the right of dissent; collective wisdom as
opposed to the judgments of a single military
mind-are essential in the future as they
have been in the past.
In sum, the failure of Cuba was a failure
of bureaucracy, but as in all failures it was
essentially a failure of men rather than of
organization.
Rear Adm. H. E. Eccles, retired, comments
in "Notes on the Cuban Crisis," a paper pre-
pared under the sponsorship of the George
Washington University Logistics Research
project, that "somehow or other there seemed
to be a complete divorce between the na-
tional policy and the power allotted to the
task at hand."
He points out that "in great matters of
state, the President simply cannot afford to
leave these vital three (analysis of objectives,
clear conceptual unity and careful followup)
to his subordinates. The price of failure or
of mediocre execution is too great."
And Admiral Eccles stresses that the
Cuban venture again emphasizes that in "the
protracted conflict with the totalitarian con-
cept the fate of the free society will be
determined much more by the understand-
ing of human emotion and the exercise of
intellectual power and moral values than by
technological factors.',
Glastonbury Miss Heads Girls' Nation
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. EMILIO Q. DADDARIO
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, July 10, 1961
Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, it is
with a great deal of pride that I learned
earlier this week that a young lady from
my district, Miss Susan MacDonald, was
elected president of Girls' Nation. I
offer for the RECORD news stories that
appeared in the Hartford Times and the
Hartford Courant about this outstanding
and talented girl.
[From the Hartford Times]
MAY MEET FAMOUS COUNTERPART; AREA LASS
HEADS GIRLS' NATION
A 17-year-old South Glastonbury girl was
elected president of Girls' Nation Tuesday
in Washington, D.C.
Susan L. MacDonald, daughter of Mr. and
Mrs. Berton A. MacDonald, of 1073 Main
Street, South Glastonbury, won the 1961 elec-
tion on a platform supporting intensive civil
defense training.
Elected vice president. was her running
mate, Deborah Rosen, of Orangebury, S.C.
Both girls campaigned on the Nationalist
Party ticket to defeat opposing Federalist
candidates from Mississippi and Idaho.
Earlier, Susan had been chosen majority
floor leader of the Girls Nation senate at
the convention, sponsored by the American
Legion Auxiliary.
The new presidential post may also win her
a chance to meet President Kennedy Friday
as Girls Nation delegates meet their counter-
parts in the National Government.
Susan, a senior this fall at Glastonbury
High School, was chosen by her classmates
to attend Laurel Girls State in Storrs and
there won the chance to go on to Girls Na-
tion.
At the State convention, she was also voted
the outstanding girl and received the Joan
Connell Memorial Award.
Susan, who wants to go into foreign rela-
tions work, will be president of her high
school student council this fall. She has
been active in scouting and was a leader this
summer at the Girl Scout day camp in Glas-
tonbury.
August ,
Connecticut's second delegate to the an-
nual convention is Nancy L, Thompson, of
77 Golf Street, Newington.
Girls Nation, now in its 15th year, is held
on the campus of American University in
Washington. Nearly 100 delegates from 48
States and 2 U.S. territories are attending.
Sessions will end Friday and girls will head
home Saturday. ,
[From the Hartford Courant)
GLASTONBURY MISS HEADS GIRLS NATION
Susan L. MacDonald, 17, of Glastonbury,
won the 1961 presidency of Girls Nation
Tuesday in Washington, D.C.
Campaigning hard for civil defense on the
Nationalist Party ticket, she defeated the
Federalist candidate, Judy Simono, of Vicks-
burg, Miss.
Also elected with Susan was her running
mate, Deborah Rosen, of Orangeburg, S.C., is
vice president.
In a telephone conversation with her
mother late Tuesday night, Susan said she
was presented with roses before a reviewing
stand at ceremonies held at Fort Myer, Va.
The defeated candidate during the same
phone call told Mrs. MacDonald that Susan
was a terrific person.
Susan is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs.
Barton A. MacDonald, of 1073 Main- Street,
Glastonbury, and is one of more than 100
delegates meeting on the campus of American
University for a week of mock-Government
sessions.
Sponsored by the American Legion Aux-
iliary, Girls Nation is now in its 15th year.
The delegates form parties, hold elections,
establish a model government, and meet
members of the U.S. Government.
Susan wrote her parents Sunday after her
first airplane ride, which she-said was bumpy,
and said she was rooming in a modern dormi-
tory with a girl from Nebraska. She also
told her parents she had her picture taken
with the Air Force Bagpipe Band.
Susan and Nancy Thompson, of Newington,
were selected from Laurel Girls State, held in
Storrs earlier in July, to be the Connecticut
representatives.
At Girls State, Susan presented her party's
platform to the assembly. She was also
elected the outstanding girl by the other
girls, and received the Joan Connell Memorial
Award.
A junior in Glastonbury High School, Su-
san was chosen by her class to go to Girls
State. The Glastonbury American Legion
Auxiliary sponsored her trip to Storrs. The
State auxiliary makes the trip to Washington
possible.
Susan, who will be president of the high
school student council this fall, wants to go
into foreign relations.
She is active in girl scouting and was a
leader at the Girl Scout day camp in Glas-
tonbury this summer.
The sessions end Saturday morning.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
- HON. SEYMOUR HALPERN
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, August 3, 1961
Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, yester-
day I called on the Secretary of Defense
to look into reports that a civilian em-
ployee of the Department, a -strategic
technician, has figured in the notoriety
of the American Nazi Party of George
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