CUBA: THE RECORD SETSTRAIGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170014-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: OPEN

A7694
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170014-1
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX September 23
accord to sabotage America's plane pro-
duction.
As the Axis internal threat disintegrated
under the battering HUAC investigations,
the committee realistically concentrated
on the "supreme" threat-communism.
(Nearly a third of all testimony before the
committee from 1938-48 concerned Axis
subversion.)
Communist infiltration of government,
labor, politics, and "patriotic" organizations,
as detailed by numerous witnesses, filled
the headlines.
The committee exposed sabotage (sit-
down) strikes in Los Angeles, New York,
Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and
Onglewood. The names, positions and sal-
aries of hundreds of Federal employees iden-
tified with subversive organizations went to
the Justice Department.
One report, citing 160 organizations as
fronts, lifted the veil of pseudo-patriotism
from which notorious groups as the National
Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Na-
tional Federation for Constitutional Liber-
ties, American Youth Congress, Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee, Civil Rights
Congress, and American Youth for Demo-
cracy.
Many officials of these organizations defied
HUAC and were convicted of contempt.
The battle against subversion, however,
had taken a new and significant twist, the
committee advised the House (1947). The
U.S.S.R. was using the "direct approach" to
milk America of its scientific know-how.
"The Soviet," HUAC reported, "has ob-
tained every one of America's industrial,
military and chemical patents * * * and
Amtorg (U.S.S.R. agency) has compiled a
handbook of strategic U.S. construction."
(The across-the-counter purchase of U.S.
patents by Russian agents actually began in
1944, when the Rosenberg spy ring started
funneling information to the Kremlin. In
a single month, Russia obtained 112,764
patents.)
HUAC, sensing the need for new legisla-
tion in the field of subversion, named a spe-
cial subcommittee in '48 under the chair-
manship of (then) Representative Richard
M. Nixon. Witnesses at subsequent hearings
included such experts as Adolph A. Berle,
Attorney General Tom C. Clark, Harvard Prof.
William Y. Elliott, Samuel N. Birnbaum,
Louis Waldman, and Morris Ernst.
Again in 1956, the committee sought the
advice of 125 leaders in education, military,
science, labor, and religion to bolster the
continuing investigations. Their testimony
contributed to the publication of two works:
"Soviet Total War," 900 pages in 2 volumes,
and "The Communist Conspiracy," 2,000
pages in 5 volumes.
One of the major allegations against the
House Un-American Activities Committee
hurled by those seeking its "abolition" is
its paucity of achievements.
What is HUAC's record of legislative ac-
complishments?
An independent study conducted by the
Library of Congress reveals that HUAC rec-
ommendations from 1941 to 1960 totaled 129,
of which 80 were incorporated in bills in-
troduced in Congress.
Laws enacted followed 35 committee rec-
ommendations, and an additional 52 bills
containing committee-related suggestions
were pending at the close of the 86th Con-
gress. Eight of these bills were passed by
the House. Recommendations ran the full
gamut of security safeguards.
The watchdog phase of HUAC's mandate
resulted in the adoption of 13 recommenda-
tions by the executive department.
The proof of the committee's major spade-
work, HUAC supporters stress, was reflected
in the passage of these five vital bills: In-
ternal Security Act (1950), Immigration and
Nationality Act (1952), Communist Control
Act (1954), Espionage and Sabotage Act
(1954), and the Immunity Act (1954).
Included in the 33 "emphasized" recom-
mendations made by the committee to
tighten security precautions were increased
penalties for seditious conspiracy, registra-
tion of trained spies, strengthening the Fed-
eral loyalty program, deportation and exclu-
sion of alien subversives, and passport
denial to dangerous participants in the
international Communist movement.
The research study of HUAC's legislative
history contains 130 pages of documentation.
The foreword states:
"This record will refute once and for all
the assertions made by uninformed persons
that this committee has no legislative pur-
pose * * * that the object of its hearings
is 'exposure for exposure's sake.'
"The fact's clearly show that (HUAC's)
activities have always been directed toward
remedial legislation in its assigned field of
inquiry * * * (and) congressional approval
of the committee's functioning is exempli-
fied by the vast amount of legislation *
following its recommendations."
It might have added that approval by
thinking Americans * * * is even more
convincing.
Governor Brown, of California, Appoints
Abe Kofman as Highway Commis-
sioner
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GEORGE P. MILLER
OF CAI woaNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, August 29, 1961
Mr. GEORGE P. MILLER. Mr.
Speaker, Mr. Abe Kofman, newspaper
publisher, businessman, and civic leader
from my Eighth Congressional District
of California has just been appointed to
the Highway Commission of the State
of California.
Gov. Edmund G. Brown has once
again demonstrated the sagacity and
political acumen which characterize his
appointments to high office in his ad-
ministration as Governor of California.
Commissioner Kofman typifies the
self-made man. He was born in Brock-
ton, Mass., and was raised in a family
of modest means. He learned at the
early age of 8 what it means to assist
his family to snake a living by selling
newspapers on the streets of Brockton.
Kofman's great interest in civic af-
fairs was also demonstrated early in his
life when he served on the Zoning Board
of Norwich, Conn., before reaching the
age of 30. In 1932 Mr. Kofman was a
delegate to the 1932 Connecticut Demo-
cratic State Convention which nomi-
nated Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Commissioner Kofman has been in
business for himself for 42 years. He
started a small circulation business at
age 16. Three years later he was asked
to handle circulation for the Hearst pub-
lications in Norwich, Conn. In 1939,
he purchased the Times-Star newspaper
in Alameda, Calif. In 1950, he pur-
chased the Morning News of San Lean-
dro, Calif. Today, both of these news-
papers are fine examples of sound busi-'
ness enterprise and high jouralistic
standards.
Mr. Kofman has served his community
well. He has presided over the Alameda
Contra Costa Counties Jewish Wq~, fare
Foundation. He is a 32d degree Mason
as well being a member of the Shrine,
Elks, Eagles, and a past chancellor in the
Knights of Pythias. He is a past presi-
dent of the Oakland B'nai B'rith. In
addition, Mr. Kofman was instrumental
in starting the Alameda Community
Chest and was quite active in the Red
Cross.
The new commissioner's appointment
has been greeted with high praise from
his local community. The City Council
of San Leandro, Calif., cited his dedica-
tion to public service in a special resolu-
tion which specifically commended Gov-
ernor Brown for making this selection.
The San Leandro Chamber of Commerce
also took particular note of Kofman's
new position by honoring him with a
luncheon. The San Rafael (Calif.) In-
dependent-Journal applauded the new
commissioner in an editorial. Besides of-
fering congratulations and best wishes
for success, this newspaper pointed out
that it was good to have a newspaperman
on the commission. It indicated that
Kofman, who served as a director of the
California Newspaper Publishers Asso-
ciation, has gained a broad view of the
whole State and its problems. The edi-
torial further said:
We'll wager Kofman will tackle the prob-
lems of our area without partisan political
machinations becoming involved.
Abe Kofman's life to this point has
been exemplary of what living as an
active citizen in a democracy means. He
has become successful under the free
enterprise system. He has devoted many
long hours in the service of others. He
has demonstrated strong convictions
and no fear of showing them, because
early in the 1960 presidential campaign,
his newspaper became one of the first
daily papers in the country to endorse
John F. Kennedy. I am certain that as
Abe Kofman undertakes this new service
to his State, he will add additional chap-
ters to a brilliant career. I further be-
lieve that his personal philosophy of life
is best epitomized in the words of
Thomas Jefferson that state:
If in the course of my life, it has been in
any degree useful to the cause of humanity,
the fact itself bears its full reward.
Longevity Step Increases for Postal
Employees
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
OF KANSAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, September 19, 1961
Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, yes-
terday I was privileged and pleased to
join 360 Members of this House in sup-
port of the postal longevity bill, legisla-
tion designed to establish a more equi-
table method for granting longevity step
increases for postal employees and there-
by correct a gross injustice in the Gov-
ernment service that has existed far too
long.
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP64B00346ROO0200170014-1
 1961
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170014-1
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A7693
about the cancellation of the strike. Rusk, beach until after daybreak, at which time
at on1pofnt, put his hand over the mouth- Castro's jets were certain to get them. There
piece, and asked Cabell whether he wished remained still one last clear chance to make
to speak to the President. Cabell shook his the thing go. Boxer was still on station.
head. Perhaps that was his mistake; it was The release of a few of its jets simply for
certainly his last chance to appeal a lamen- air cover should see the two crafts. safely to
table decision. But Bundy had made it clear the shore.
that Rusk was acting for the President, and DEFEAT IS AN ORPHAN
Cabell is a professional military man, trained That night Kennedy was caught up in
to take orders after the facts had been a White House reception, a white-tie affair,
argued with the man in command. for Congress and the members of his Cabinet.
On their return to the office, Bissell flashed He was informed by an aide that Bissell
orders to the B-26 commander at the stag- wished to see him. The President asked
lug field, more than 500 miles from the Bay Bissell to come to the White House. Calls
of Pigs. The force got the changed orders went out to the other principals-to Rusk,
shortly before midnight, only half an hour who had been entertaining the Greek Pre-
or so before they were scheduled to depart; mier at a formal dinner at the State De-
the bomb bays were already loaded and the partment, to McNamara, General Lemnit-
crews were aboard. Meanwhile the planes zer, Admiral Burke.
carrying the paratroopers had taken off, and They gathered in the President's office
the first assault barges, still unobserved, shortly after midnight. One of the partic-
were even then approaching the beaches. ipants recalls: Two men dominated that
TUESDAY, THE TURNING POINT singular occasion-the President and Bissell.
sell and Cabell restudied the battle plan,
while signals of consternation welled up from
their men far to the south. At 4 o'clock,
leas than an hour before first light on the
Cuban shore, Cabell went back to Rusk with
another proposal. It was manifestly im-
possible for the brigade's small force of
B-26's only 16 were operational) to pro-
vide effective air cover for the ships from
their distant base against jets that could
reach the ships in minutes. Cabell now
asked whether, if the ships were to pull back
of the 3- or 12-mile limit-whichever dis-
tance U.S. legal doctrine held to be the
beginnings of international water-the U.S.S.
Boxer, a carrier on station about 50 miles
from the Bay of Pigs, could be instructed
to provide cover for them. Rusk said no and
this time Cabell finally took advantage of
the reclama that Bundy had extended to
Bissell. The President was awakened. Ca-
bell registered his concern. The answer still
was no.
Shortly after that, on Monday morning,
April 17, Brig. Gen. Chester Clifton, the
President's military aide, received word that
the Cuban Brigade had landed. They had
little chance. They were without the rang-
ing firepower that the B-26's with their
bombs and machine guns had been expected
to apply against Castro's tanks and artillery
as they wheeled up. Castro's forces came up
fast. He still had four jets left, and they
were indeed armed with powerful rockets.
He used them well against the ships in the
bay. Before the morning was done, he had
sunk two. transports, aboard which was the
larger part of the reserve stocks of ammuni-
tion, and driven off two others, with the
rest of the stock.
Now Kennedy and his strategists became
alarmed. About noon on Monday, Bissell
was told that the B-26's could attack Castro's
airfields at will. Orders went to the staging
base for a major attack next morning. But
the orders came too late. Most of the pilots
had been in the air for upward of 18 hours
in an unavailing effort to keep Castro's planes
off the troops and the remaining ships. That
night a small force was scratched together.
It was over Cuba at dawn, only to find the
fields hidden by low, impenetrable fog.
Nothing came of the try.
Tuesday, the second day, was the turning
point. The men ashore had fought bravely
and gained their planned objectives. They
had even seized and bulldozed the airfield.
But they were desperately short of ammu-
nition and food, and under the pressure of
Castro's superior firepower and numbers they
were being forced back across the beach;
three B-26's trying to help them were shot
down.
Two small landing craft had made ren-
dezvous with two remaining supply ships and
'taken on ammunition and rations; but, from
where they were, they could not reach the
ment that had been overtaken by disaster. He
did so with control, with dignity, and with
clarity." Bissell made it plain that the ex-
pedition was at the point of no return;
unless U.S. airpower was brought forward,
the men on the beach were doomed. In
substance, he asked that the Boxer's planes
he brought into the battle to save the opera-
tion. Rusk still would not have this. Sev-
eral others were also opposed, including the
President's personal staffers. Burke vouched
for the worth of Bissell's proposition. The
discussion with the President lasted until
2 a.m. Its outcome was a singular com-
promise. Jets from the Boxer would pro-
vide cover next morning for exactly one
hour-from 6:30 to 7:30 a.m., just long
enough for the ships to run into the shore
and starting unloading and for the remain-
ing B-26's to get in a hard blow.
Next morning, through an incredible mis-
chance, the B-26's were over Cuba half an
hour ahead of schedule. Boxer's jets were
still on the flight deck. But Castro's jets
were ready. Two of the B-26's were shot
down; others were hit and forced to abort.
That was the melancholy end. At 2:30 that
afternoon, Bissell received word from one of
his men aboard a ship in the Bay of Pigs:
Remnants of the landing force were in the
water and under fire. There was a final
message from the gallant brigade commander
ashore to this effect, "I have nothing left to
fight with and so cannot wait. Am headed
for the swamp." Bissell went to the White
House to report the end. Kennedy gave
orders for a destroyer to move into the bay
and pick up as many men as it could. It
was no Dunkirk. Only a few men of the
1,400 were saved.
"Victory," Kennedy noted some days later,
"has a hundred fathers, and defeat is an
orphan." Yet, for all Kennedy's outward
calmness at this moment of defeat, he was
never, after it, quite the same. Speaking be-
fore the American Society of Newspaper Edi-
tors, a grave President said, "There are from
this sobering episode useful lessons for all
to learn."
Switch Hitting Nipped Both Reds and
Fascists
EXTENSION OF
Or
HON. GORDON H. SCHERER
Or OHIO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Saturday, September 23, 1961
Mr. SCHERER. Mr. Speaker, here
follows the fourth of a series of articles
about the House Committee on Un-
American Activities written by Pulitzer
Prize winner, Edward J. Mowery:
SWITCH HITTING NIPPED BOTH REDS AND
FASCISTS
(By Edward J. Mowery)
WASHINGTON.-In baseball, alert managers
fight for the services of a good switch hit-
ter * * a who can handle the hot ones
zooming from right or left.
In the realm of parliamentary maneuver-
ing, no congressional body in history has
proved more adept in switch hitting than
the House Un-American Activities Commit-
tee (HUAC).
HUAC trapped Communists (in govern-
ment, sensitive industries or organized
labor), the Nazis and Fascists (at their re-
cruiting centers and propaganda mills) and
agents of the Japanese (whose treachery paid
tragic dividends at Pearl Harbor).
Through the crucial '30s, '40s, and 'SOs,
HUAC took 'em as they came amid the
anguished howls of civil rights purists and
self-appointed, egghead guardians of "con-
stitutional liberties."
The glare of public exposure focused upon
such HUAC victims as Manfred Zapp, Fritz
Kuhn, Earl Browder, G. Wilhelm Kunze,
William Z. Foster, and William Pelley.
These and a host of two-bit subversives
gaily plotted America's destruction.
The committee's first full-blown investiga-
tion in 1938 centered upon the German-
American Bund testimony and legwork re-
vealed the bund's reserve force of 5,000 storm
troopers and its amazing Nazi propaganda
network.
HUAC files on the Nazi-Fascist fifth col-
umn were bulging by the time Hitler armies
started their sweep across Poland (Septem-
ber, 1939).
HUAC's relentless campaign against Axis
traitors in the United States had these
results:
Fritz Kuhn was convicted of stealing bund
funds and lost his citizenship; William Pel-
ley's pro-Nazi Silver Shirt Legion dissolved;
Arno Risi and Mrs. Leslie Fry (Nazi-Fascist
leaders) fled the country and tons of Nazi
propaganda coming via Japanese ships, were
seized.
In 1940, the committee issued a devastat-
ing 414-page report on the activities of Nazi
organizations in this country. Two subse-
quent reports (totaling 438 pages) had im-
mediate repercussions.
The first pinpointed the Nazi-Fascist-
Japanese subversive combine, leading to the
citation of 44 Axis organizations. The sec-
ond report contained original bund docu-
ments later used in convicting G. Wilhelm
Kunze.
The HUAC spotlight also swept to the Ger-
man diplomatic corps, exposing the Nazi
activities of Dr. Frederic Auhagen, Hans Ac-
kermann (and his wife), Manfred Zapp,
Guenther Tonn and others.
By 1942, the committee had supplied the
President with a list of 17,000 identified with
the Nazi.movement in the United States.
But HUAC did not neglect the threat posed
by the continuing Communist and Japanese
conspiracies. A startling, 287-page report
on Jap subversion disclosed that committee
hearings had revealed before Pearl Harbor
that Tokyo had detailed information on all
U.S. naval craft and fleet positions around
the giant naval base.
Acting speedily on this Information, au-
thorities moved hundreds of Japanese from
vital west coast areas. And a chorus of pro-
tests from civil rights groups rained on
Washington.
One of the most ironical and significant
disclosures by the committee was the rap-
port between Bundists and Communists be-
fore Hitler double-crossed Stalin and in-
vaded the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941).
Nazis and Reds were working in complete
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170014-1
 A7692
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170014-1
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- APPENDIX Septert her 23
It has since been reported that the Presi-
dent was inwardly skeptical of the operation
from the start but just why has never, been
clear-whether he judged the force too small
to take on Castro, or because he was reluc-
tant to take on so soon a nasty job that was
bound to stir up an international ruckus,
however it came out. Some of his closest
advisers, in any case, were assailed by sink-
ing second thoughts. What bothered them
was the "immorality" of masked aggression.
They recoiled from having the United States
employ subterfuge in striking down even so
dangerous an adversary as Castro, and they
were almost unanimously opposed to having
the United States do the job in the open.
Even with the best of luck, there would cer-
tainly be a flutter among the six leading Lat-
in-American states, which, with the excep-
tion of Venezuela, had refused to lend them-
selves to any form of united action against
Castro. And the repercussion would scarcely
be less embarrassing among the neutralists
of Asia and Africa, whose good opinion Ken-
nedy's advisers were most eager to cultivate.
And so the emphasis at the White House and
State began to move away from a concern
with the military considerations-the things
needed to make the, enterprise work-and
to become preoccupied with tinkerings they
hoped would soften its political impact on
the neutral nations.
THE DISMEMBERING BEGINS
The "immorality" of the intervention
found its most eloquent voice before the
President during a meeting in the State De-
partment on April 4, only 13 days before the
date set for the invasion. (Stewart Alsop
told-part of the story in a recent issue of the
Saturday Evening Post.) The occasion was
Bissell's final review of the' operation, and
practically everybody connected with high
strategy was on hand-Secretary of State
Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Sec-
retary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Gen-
eral Lemnitzer, CIA Chief Allen Dulles, as
well as Bundy, Paul Nitze, Kennedy's special-
ist on strategic planning at the Pentagon,
Thomas Mann, then Assistant Secretary of
State for Latin-American Affairs, and three
of Kennedy's specialists in Latin American
matters-Adolf Berle, Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., and Richard Goodwin. There was also
one outsider, Senator WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, who had been Kennedy's favorite
choice for Secretary of State, and whose sup-
port he wanted. After Bissell had com-
pleted his briefing and Dulles had summed
up the risks and prospects, Fuibright spoke
and denounced the proposition out of hand:
it was the wrong thing for the United States
to get involved in.
Kennedy chose not to meet this issue. In-
stead, he quickly noted certain practical con-
siderations and then, going around the table,
he asked various of his advisers whether
they thought the operation should go for-
ward. Without exception, the answer was,
yes. Berle was particularly outspoken. He
declared that "a power confrontation" with
communism in the Western Hemisphere was
inevitable anyhow. As for this enterprise,
"Let 'er rip" was his counsel. Mann, who
previously had been on the fence, now spoke
up for the operation. Rusk, too, said he was
for it, in answer to the President's direct
question, but as would presently be manifest,
he privately had no heart for it. Two other
men among the President's senior foreign-
policy advisers, not present at the meeting,
shared Fulbright's feelings: Under Secretary
of State Chester Bowles, and Adlai Steven-
son, with the United Nations in New York,
who goon came to know in a general way that
something distasteful 'was afoot. In defer-
ence to these views, Kennedy-either at the
meeting or soon afterward-made two sep-
arate rulings that were to contribute to the
fatal dismembermen of the whole plan.
First, U.S. airpower would not be on call at
any time: the obsolescent B-26's flown by
"bur" Cubans would be on their own. Sec-
ond, the B-26's could be used in only two
strikes before the invasion-first on D-
minus-2-days (April 15) and again on the
morning of the landing. Although these
limitations clearly lengthened the risks,
Lemnitzer did not dispute them, nor did
Bissell's own military advisers; they were
confident that if the B--26's missed the
T-33'a on the first go, they would surely
catch them on the second.
During the few remaining days, Kennedy
drew his circle of advisers more tightly
around him. Apart from Bundy and Ros-
tow, the only White House advisers who re-
mained privy to the development of the
operation were the Latin American experts-
Adolf Berle and Schlesinger. Lemnitzer and,
of course, Allen Dulles were in and out of
Kennedy's office. But the doubts of Rusk
and Fuibright and of others were all the
while imperceptibly converging on the Pres-
ident and, bit by bit, an operation that was
marginal to begin with was so truncated
as to guarantee its failure.
The embarkation of the expedition was
,scheduled to start on April 10. This was,
in itself, quite a job. Some half dozen small
steamers were collected for the first move-
ment, together with a number of tactical
landing craft. The takeoff point was a port
on the Caribbean, several hundred miles from
the training area in Guatemala, and the
transfer of the Cuban Brigade was done by
air and at night, through 4 nights, in the
interest of secrecy. The gear aboard the
ships was enough to supply the landing force
through 10 days of battle, and also to equip
the thousands of guerrilas expected to be
recruited after the beachhead was gained.
Only a week before the embarkation, and
indeed only a day or so before the last go-
around at the State Department, another
serious change was made in the invasion
plan. At the insistence of the State Depart-
ment, Trinidad was eliminated as the target
landing area. State's reasons were complex.
Rusk decided that the entire operation had
to be kept "unspectacular" and minimize the
overtness of the U.S. role as much as possible.
That required shifting the attack to a less
populated and less accessible area where
Castro's reaction might be slower and less
effective. Rusk and his own advisers were
also anxious to be rid at all possible speed
of the incubus of responsibility for mount-
ing the operation in Central America, anxi-
ous that the B--26's should be based as rapid-
ly as possible on Cuba. The only vulnerable
airfield capable of taking the planes was one
in poor condition near the Bay of Pigs, on
the Zapata Peninsula, about 100 miles to the
west of Trinidad, Here the countryside was
quite deserted and, to succeed at all, the
invaders had to seize and hold two narrow
causeways leading across a swamp that was
impassable on either side. These actions did
not end the cast-minute curtailments di-
rected by the White House. Even the ar-
rangements for arousing the Cuban populace
and trying to stampede Castro's militia with
leaflet raids and radio broadcasts were struck
from the plan, and again because State was
afraid that they would be too obvious a show-
ing of the U.S. hand. On April 12, while the
convoy was heading north, Kenndy was im-
pelled to announce at a press conference that
the United States would not intervene with
force in Cuba. Rusk made sure the idea got
home by repeating the same guarantee on
the morning of the Invasion. The effect of
this was to serve notice on the Cubans in
Cuba, who were known to be waiting for an
encouraging signal from the United States,
that whatever they might be tempted to try
would be at their own risk.
THk POr.ITICIANS TAKE COMMAND
Clear to the end. Kennedy retained tight
control of the enterprise. As each new
sequence of action came up for his final
approval-the go signal for the embarkation,
then for the preinvasion airstrike on the
morning of April 15, he came to his de-
cisions quickly and firmly. All the way, how-
ever, he reserved the option to stop the
landing short of the beach. He kept asking
how late the enterprise might be reversed
without making it look as if Castro had
called an American bluff. He was told: noon
on Sunday, April 16, when the invasion force
would be 11 hours of steaming from the Bay
of Pigs. The Sunday deadline found Ken-
nedy in the Virginia countryside, at Glen
Ora; only then did he raise his finger from
the hold button. As he did so, he noted
with relief that no other unfavorable factors
had materialized. He was mistaken, At
dawn of the day before, by the timetable,
the B-26's, having flown undetected through
the night from their Central American stag-
ing base, appeared over Cuba and bombed the
three fields on which Castro's ready air was
deployed. (The attack was, on the whole,
highly successful. Half of Castro's B-26's
and Sea Furies, and four of his T-33 jets
were blown up or damaged and so removed
from the imminent battle.) The story was
put out that Castro's own pilots, in the act
of defecting, had attacked their own air-
fields. This was a gloss, to say the least; the
attackers were indeed defectors from Castro,
but they had defected long before. ? Later
that afternoon, at the United Nations, after
the Cuban Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, had
charged that the attack was "a prolog" to
a U.S. Invasion, Adlai Stevenson arose and
swore that the planes were Castro's.
From this hapless moment on Stevenson's
role becomes unclear. There was a subse-
quent published report that he intervened
to block the second strike, Stevenson has
flatly denied, and continues to deny, that he
even knew about the second strike, let along
that he demanded that it be called off. But
there was little doubt about his unhappiness
over the course of events in the Caribbean
and he conveyed these feelings to Washing-
ton. Before Sunday was over Bundy was to
fly to New York, to see Stevenson (Bundy
said) and still wearing, in his haste to be
off, sneakers and sports clothes. This sud-
den errand followed a shattering order that
went out to Bissell.
It was Sunday evening, only some 8 hours
after Kennedy had given the go-ahead.
In the first dark, the expedition was even
then creeping toward the Cuban shore. In
Bissell's office there was a call on the White
House line. It was Bundy, being even crisp-
er than usual: the B-26's were to stand down,
there was to be no air strike in the morning,
this was a Presidential order. Secretary of
State Rusk was now acting for the President
In the situation. If Bissell wished to make a
"reclama" (Federalese for appeal), it could
be done through Rusk.
Bissell was stunned. In Allen Dulles'
absence (he was in Puerto Rico), he put his
problem up to CIA Deputy Director Charles
Cabell, an experienced airman. Together
they went to the State Department to urge
Rusk to reconsider a decision that, in their
judgment, would put the enterprise in ir-
retrievable peril. Cabeli was greatly worried
about the vulnerability to air attak first of
the ships and then of the troops on the
beach. Rusk was not Impressed. The ships,
he suggested, could unload and retire to the
open sea before daylight; as for the troops
ashore being unduly inconvenienced by
Castro's air, it had been his experience as a
colonel in the Burma theater, he told the
visitors, the air attack could be more of a
nuisance than a danger. One fact he made
absolutely clear: military considerations had
overruled the political when the D-minus-2
strike had been laid on; now political
considerations were taking over. While they
were talking, Rusk telephoned the President
at Glen Ora to say that Cabell and Bissell
were at his side, and that they were worried
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170014-11
 1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -APPENDIX
A7691
use or misuse of power, in other words. They House, the military chiefs also relaxed; mill- rillas. Also cranked into the plan were in-
had blamed Ike's apparent inaction on inde- tary concern for the enterprise sank to the genious schemes-a barrage of radiobroad-
cision and plain laziness. Cuba taught them "Indians"-from the four-star level to the casts from nearby islands and showers of
that action, any kind of serious action, is colonels on the Joint Staff who had been ad- pamphlets from airplanes-intended to gal-
hard and certainly no safe business for ama- vising the CIA in such matters as training vanize the anti-Castro Cubans in the cities
teurs." and tactics. Bissell was encouraged, on the and villages into demonstrations as the in-
The idea for the invasion had taken root one hand, to go forward with preparations vaders 'struck. It was never explicitly
during the early summer of 1960. By then, for an invasion, but he was cautioned to be claimed by the CIA that a general uprising
thousands of defectors from Castro's Cuba ready to fall back to the more modest ob- was immediately in the cards; the intention
were In the United States. Many of them jective of simply generating a supply of Was to sow enough chaos during the first
were professional soldiers. The job of organ- reinforcements for the anti-Castro forces in hours to prevent Castro from smashing the
izing and training them was given to the. the mountains. on the .
Central Intelligence Agency, as the Govern- Before Eisenhower was fully rid of his re- was sconsolid ted,ehowevCer,c ande ifefighting
ment's principal mechanism for mounting sponsibility, however, a number of dis- gear went forward steadily to the guerrillas
covert operations of this sort. It became and quieting developments combined to impart elsewhere in Cuba, the planners were con-
remained to the end the specific responsi- to the enterprise an air of emergency. It fident that a mass revolt could be stim-
bility of one of the CIA's top deputies, Rich- was established that Castro was to start re- ulated.
and M. Bissell, a former economist who is ceiving, early in 1961, substantial deliveries Finally, the plan still assumed that U.S.
also a highly practical executive. Among his of Soviet jet fighters, and that pilots to man military help would be on call during the
other first-class accomplishments, Bissell had them were already being trained in Czecho- landing. Castro's air force consisted of not
masterminded the U-2 operation, which was, slovakia. From all indications, these would quite twoscore planes-a dozen or so ob-
until It finally missed, as one day it had to, provide him, by early summer, with an air solete B-26's, plus about the same number
the most economical and comprehensive in- force that would be more than enough to of obsolete British Sea Furies, also slow,
novation in espionage in modern times. extinguish the last chance of a successful propeller-driven airplanes. But in addition
Training camps for the exiles were set up invasion by Cuban exiles; it would be by there were seven or eight T-33 jet trainers,
in a district in western Guatemala offering all odds the most powerful air force in Latin the remnants of an earlier U.S. transaction
some privacy. The original idea was to feed America. Two other developments were with the Batista government, so the force
the recruits back into Cuba, to reinforce the scarcely less worrisome. Castro was making was' not the pushover it appeared at first
several thousand anti-Castro guerrillas al-
ready established in the mountains. Toward progress in his systematic destruction co- wglance. ould Armed with rockets, these jets
the autumn, however, a more ambitious and enemies In the mountains, upon whose the ex be more than a match in a battle for
riskier project came under tentative consid- operation the Invasion counted, and t e there ta the xoes' o. The e scheme was s to o destroy
eration. Castro was organizing large forma- was no save ve by an overt air supply, to them on the he ground of the land-
tions of militia and was obviously bent on stability guns and ammunition to them. The fields; ing, y a series attacks advance
escape Castro's first
crushing the counterrevolutionary sof the exile movement itself was, fielshould the e T-33's escthe he first
meat before the Cuban populace caght move- fire. moreover, coming Into question. Warring surprise blow, there would be ample oppor-
men a view to saying the movement, it was political factions threatened to split their tunity to catch them later on the ground
Wa With to build in an invasion movem t, force big ranks, and men who had trained long and while they were being refueled after an ac-
proposed the Cuban painstakingly were Impatient over the failure tion. In any event a U.S. carrier would be
enough to sand to hold
o
on for the of their American advisers to set a sailing close by, below the horizon, and one or two
shore a to seize eiz a beachhead and to hold proclaim a provisional deep e date.. The feeling took hold of them and of its tactical jets could presumably supply
meat, and so provide a rallying pr vi d eth base for the their American sponsors that it was to be in whatever quick and trifling help might be
ent,an tad. ro e time, too, the rthe the spring or never. required in an emergency.
disco a ed anti-Castro this
Castro air force were i After his election, Kennedy had been It stood to reason that, considering how
meaning nearby. The planer however, wwere briefed fairly frequently on the Cuba situa- small the landing party was, the success of
all ni l armostly propeller-driven B 2ee tion, along with that in Laos. As his hour the operation would hinge on the B-26's
a
twin-e ll obs lgete bombers of World War II B ge of authority approached, the question of controlling the air over the beachhead. And
that had been bombers of from the IAir I vintage what to do about Cuba was increasingly on the margins that the planners accepted were
that had Associated e e fwith rom them was a his mind. The problem had a personal an- narrow to begin with. The B-26's were to
graveyard. souadedn wwhich a small gle. In his fourth television debate with operate from. a staging base in a Central
t detachment of
p atro n with i was training. Richard Nixon, he had sharply blamed the American country more than 500 miles from
During the summer and fall of t Eisen Eisenhower administration for permitting Cuba. The round trip would take better
holder from time to time personally reviewed communism to seize a base there, "only 90 than 6 hours, and that would leave the
the scheme. In late November, the last time miles off the coast of the United States." planes with fuel for only 45 minutes of ac-
it came up for his comprehensive review, an He discussed Cuba, along with Laos, at elan, for bombing and air cover, over Cuba.
length in b
I
o
th
'
o
n contrast, Castro
of his preinaugural talks
perational plan had not yet crystallized; no
s air force could be over
timetable for action had been set. Across with Eisenhower, and by his stipulation, the beachhead and the invaders' ships in a
cross Ike was inclined to rank Cuba below Laos matter of minutes, which would increase his
the Potomac at the Pentagon, Under A
Secre-
tarp of Defense Douglas, who was charged in terms of urgency, but Cuba clearly wor- relative air advantage manifold. Hence the
with ried him. In their second conversation Ike absolute necessity of knocking out Castro's
quasi-military operations under the said: "It's already a bad situation. You air power, or at least reducing it to impo-
noncommittal category of collateral cold war may have to send troops In." tence by the time the ground battle was
activities, was keeping a watchful eye on the joined.
project, and releasing such fu tare on
talent THE FIRST NECESSITY: CONTROL OF THE AIR and gear as the CIA requisitioned. Neither On taking office, Kennedy at onnp n.11-1
This, in general terms, was the plan the
.ill wlun ire project remained informal prospects of the U.S.-fostered operation. Castro uprising not beingpinttheirf jurist c-
at this stage) believed that much good This information was supplied by Allen W. tion, they took these at face value. They
would flow from an attack made by Cubans Dulles, the Director of the CIA, and by Bis- judged the
tactical elements sound and, in-
alone. For one thing, the resources then sell. After
that he had to have heard them out he
available permitted the training of only 300
the Joint deed, they accorded the operation a high
men or so, and the air unit had but a dozen Chiefs of Staff a technical opinion of the probability of success. They were allowed
planes. This was hardly enough to bring feasibility of the project. It is at this point to appraise the training and the equipment
down a tough, well-armed regime, and Doug- that the locus of responsibility begins to be Guatemala. the forces. A team of officers was sent to
las repeatedly
down a counseled more realism in the uncertain, chiefs made several the basis of its report, the
planni Indeed, it was taken for granted The operation was not a Department of again assessment t was but
by Douglas and the others directly concerned Defense responsibility. Only once before, in sham their assessment was favorable.
that a a landing in eo others
could not concerned early January, had the chiefs formally re- Late in January, Kennedy authorized but he
brought off n
unless -
in the couldinot wpos as she be viewed the plan, at Eisenhower's invitation. warto thhaat on he the invasion
call thhe plan, buh-
warned might call the whole operas
herded to the beach by the U.S. Navy (either Now they were asked only for an appre- on off if had
or in disguise), and covered air ciation" of its validity. The enterprise, wisdom. D-day a change timind as to its
power in whatever amount might be neces- moreover, had expanded considerably in wisdom. D-day was tentatively fixed for
openly Scope and aim In the y March 1 but this proved impossible to meet.
sary. Eisenhower, t{~e commander of Nor- more than 100,000 Cupast few ban refugees months. With For one thing, took some time to organize
understood this well enough. in the the quarrelsome e exiles in New York and
mandy, YOU MAY HAVE TO SEND TROOPS IN United States, recruiting had stepped up, Miami into a workable coalition that would
It became obvious toward the end of 1960 at
and the organizers were at a landing force of about h1,000imen. An decided cded the that a battalion of For about t 1,4, it was 400 that Ike would be out of office well before an operational plan for a landing on the south de an men
effective force would be ready. So the deci- coast of Cuba, near the town of Trinidad, was needed to secure a beachhead, and that
sion as to how big the show should be, and was finally beginning to the force, which called itself the Cuban
how conspicuous should be the U.S. share, country was open, wth good lroads leading consequence h beefed up' Bens, the tar-
and I in what role, was no longer his to make, into the Escambray Mountains and the gensequence of these developments, the came
Given the relaxed attitude at the White needed link-up with the indigenous get date kept slipping until it finally came
goer- firm as April 17.
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP64B00346R00020017001471
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170014-1
 Approved
A7690
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX September 23
planners, who were apprehensive that even
a limited military action would wreck the
possibility of some kind of political accom-
modation with Moscow. The policy shapers,
especially in State, hung back from any
sequence of actions that might have com-
mitted U.S. policy on the central issue:
that Laos was worth fighting for. Even the
modest additional support that the Defense
Department tried to extend to Phoumi's
U.S.-equipped battalions in the field dur-
ing the last weeks of the Eisenhower ad-
ministration was diluted by reason of the
conflict between Defense and State. Under
Secretary of Defense James Douglas was
later to say, "By the time a message to the
field had been composed in Washington, It
had ceased to be an operational order and
had become a philosophical essay." And
a vexed Phoumi was to exclaim that the rea-
soning of the American Ambassador, Win-
throp Brown, was beyond his simple Orien-
tal mind. "His Excellency insists that my
troops be rationed to a few rounds of am-
munition per man. He tells me that I must
not start a world war. But the enemy is
at my throat."
After the responsibility passed to Ken-
nedy in January, Phoumi's position was still
not completely hopeless, If he had been
able to get adequate help. But early in
March a sudden Communist descent drove
him off a position commanding the princi-
pal highway in northern Laos. That un-
fortunate action was the turning point in
his part of the war. For the relative ease
with which it was done raised in Washing-
ton the question of whether Phoumi's troops
had the will to fight.
By then Kennedy was, committed to the
Cuba operation. He therefore now had to
reckon with the very real possibility, were
U.S. forces to become involved in Laos, of
having to back off from Cuba.
At this juncture Kennedy's foremost need
was a clear reading of Soviet intentions.
For this he turned to his "demonologists,"
the New Frontier's affectionate term for its
Soviet experts. The most influential among
them-Charles E, Bohlen, State's senior
Sovietologist, and Ambassador Llewellyn
Thompson at Moscow-were agreed that
Khrushchev personally had too much respect
for U.S. power to stir It into action, as Stalin
had carelessly done in Korea. Yet, while
Khrushchev was plainly indulging his pref-
erence for "salami" tactics, it was impossible
to judge how big a slice' he was contemplat-
ing, or whether he was being pushed by Mao
Tse-tung. The only reading available to
Kennedy was, in a word, ambiguous. Maybe
Khrushchev was moving into a vacuum in
Laos just to keep out Mao. If so, then the
least chancy response for the United States
was to assume that Khrushchev would be
satisfied with a thin slice in Laos, and to
maneuver him toward a compromise-a neu-
tral government in which, say, the Pathet
Lao would have some minor representation.
This course was urged by Secretary of
State Dean Rusk and also was being pressed
by Prime Minister Macmillan In London. It
came to be known as Track Two. It was
intended to lead to a cease-fire followed by
negotiation. Oppositely, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff still believed, as they did under Eisen-
hower, that the military challenge demanded
a military showdown: action by the South-
east Asia Treaty Organization, under which
a mixed allied force, including Americans,
would move into Laos and take over the
defense of the important cities, thereby free-
ing the Royal Laotian Army to move into the
field without risk of being sapped by subver-
sion in the rear. This option was labeled
Track One, and it was favored as well by
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and
his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric.
While Kennedy favored Track Two and
supported a conciliatory note that Macmil-
lan sent to Moscow, he decided he also
had to make a show of starting down
Track One, in case the political gamble
failed. He permitted himself a dramatic
gesture. At his televised press conference
on March 23, he addressed himself somberly
to a map of Laos--a country "far away" but
in a world that is "small." Its independ-
ence, he went on, "runs with the safety of
us all," and in language that all but told
Khrushchev that he was in for a fight, he
implied that the United States was preparing
to go to its defense. There was, meanwhile,
a tremendous deployment of U.S. forces in
the Far East, involving the 7th Fleet
.ond Maine combat units on Okinawa. The
Army's strategic-strike units in the United
States were made ready. A belated effort
was made to buck up Phoumi's forges with
an increased flow of fighting gear. U.S. mili-
tary 'advisers" went into the field with his
battalions. Against this background, on
March 26, Kennedy went to Key West and
met Macmillan, who was on a visit to the
West Indies. The Prime Minister made it
clear that Britain considered Laos hardly
worth a war, and wanted no part in a SEATO
action. (De Gaulle, in a separate exchange,
bad told Kennedy flatly that France would
not. light in Laos.)
From that point on, the idea of a military
showdown in Laos looked less and less attrac-
tive to the President. He did issue one
warning to the Russians that might have
been construed as having a military tone.
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
called at the White House and Kennedy
took hint into the rose garden, beyond ear-
shot of his staff, and said, "The United
States does not intend to stand idly by while
,you take over Laos." But that was the last
run along Track One.
By then, Rusk was in Bangkok for a meet-
ing of the SEATO powers, still hoping to ex-
tract from the meeting at least a strong
statement that would condemn the Soviet
intervention in Laos and reassert the deter-
mination of the SEATO powers to defend
the new nations of Southeast Asia. In this
mission Rusk failed. None of the ranking
Democratic Congressmen, or Republican,
spoke up in favor of intervention. More-
over, when Kennedy pressed the military
chiefs for specific recommendations, he got
divided answers. Gen. Thomas White,
then Air Force Chief of Staff, and Adm.
Arleigh Burke, then Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, were both confident that the Commu-
nist penetration could be defeated and Laos
saved. They said that since the Communists
could throw far more manpower into the.
battle, the U.S. war plan would have to in-
clude the possible use of tactical nuclear
weapons on a limited scale. They main-
tained, however, that a clear U.S. resolution
to employ nuclear weapons, if there was a
need, might in itself discourage further
Communist penetration. Gen. Lyman L.
Lemnitzer, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and Gen. George H.
Decker, Army Chief of Staff, had much less
confidence in the U.S. ability to stop the
Communists. Leonitzer expressed the ap-
prehension that U.B. military action in Laos
might be matched by Red China and Russia
in a fast reopening of the war in Korea.
Two such wars, by his calculation, might
require no fewer than 20 U.S. divisions, more
than the Army had in Its entire order of
battle, as well as general mobilization to
support them.
"in effect," Kennedy demanded, "you're
telling me that I can't do anything--witho
starting a nuclear war?" This, he swore,
he'd never do. which by itself was a startling
reversal of a fundamental premise of the
Eisenhower strategy: that U.S. forces would
have recourse to nuclear tactical weapons
on whatever scale the pursuit of U.S. ob-
jectives required. The White House, while
conceding to the Communists the option of
uninhibited escalation, would not tolerate
even a limited escalation on the nuclear
side by our own forces. Any military move
in Laos therefore seemed hopeless.
The fear of the nuclear escalation factor
became the sanction for the policy that was
pursued thereafter. In light of this, the
scene of Kennedy addressing himself to the
map of Laos, In his first appearance as Com-
mander in Chief, is now memorable for its
fleeting revelation of a spirited man who was
eager to present himself as a strong Presi-
dent, but who all too quickly turned unsure
of his principal resource of power.
The chiefs, although they took different
views of the risks of the Laos situation, were
fundamentally agreed on a central point.
And that was that the United States had to
be prepared to employ tactical nuclear weap-
ons. But Kennedy and his civilian strate-
gists, moving away from the nuclear base
of the Eisenhower strategy, read into their
professional differences a bankruptcy of
means and doctrine. The low esteem in
which Kennedy began to hold the military
leaders whom he inherited from the Eisen-
hower administration has not been con-
cealed.
Secretary of Defense McNamara is rewrit-
ing the Eisenhower strategic doctrine, in
collaboration with the political scientists at
the White House and State. The backing
away from nuclear strategy, which ended in
the U.S. retrea in Laos, is now being formal-
ized by McNamara. (His prescription will
call for a conventional base for NATO strat-
egy In the defense of Berlin.) .
So there was, by early April, even as Laos
was slipping farther and farther below Ken-
nedy's horizon, a breakdown of communica-
tion between the political and the military
sides of the Government, and this would con-
tribute largely to the failure of Kennedy's
next venture.
The Cuba affair has been called the Amer-
ican Suez. In the sense that Suez, too, was
an utter fiasco, the bracketing is wryly ac-
curate. There is, however, a clear difference
between the two operations. I11-managed
as It was, the Suez invasion would have suc-
ceeded had not Eisenhower used the in-
fluence of the United States to bring three
Allies-Britain, France, and Israel-to a
humiliating halt. (It should be recorded
that neither Britain, France, nor Israel made
any critical comment on the U.S. excursion
in Cuba.) In Cuba the defeat was wholly
self-inflicted. Even as the expedition was
creeping into the Bay of Pigs, just before
midnight of April 16, the political overseers
back in Washington were in the process of
knocking out of the battle plan the final,
irreducible element needed for victory.
If the U.S. military are without a peer in
any one ,technique of warfare, It is in put-
ting forces ashore across a hostile beach.
For the Bay of Pigs, all the necessary means
were at Kennedy's hand. It was, by the
standards of Gen. David 'M. Shoup's ma-
rines, an elementary amphibious operation
in less than battalion strength. And, indeed,
as a tactical exercise, it was well devised
and daringly and successfully led. But
after the strategists at the White House and
State had finished plucking it apart, it be-
came an operation that would have dis-
graced even the Albanians. When Kennedy
looked around for the blunderer, he found
him everywhere and nowhere. Practically
everybody in his inner group of policy
movers and shakers had been in on the
planning.
Only after the disaster was upon them did
he and his men realize that a venture which
was essentially a military one had been fa-
tally compromised in order to satisfy political
considerations. One not unfriendly official
who also served under Eisenhower was later
to observe: "Cuba was a terrific jolt to this
new crowd because It exposed the fact that
they hadn't really begun to understand the
meaning and consequences of action-the
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170014-1
 Approved For Release 20041
1961 CONGRESS
Commission recommendations for curbing
importer or raising tariffs to protect domestic
producers.
Strong words of warning have come from
Mr. VINSON, one of the administration's
ablest vote-getters among southern Demo-
crats: "Unless quotas are imposed that will
provide the necessary protection to the tex-
tile industry in the United States, I think I
can safely predict that at least some of the
Members who voted to extend the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act in 1958 will have sec-
ond thoughts if a bill to extend the act is
presented on the floor in 1962."
Since he spoke, the United States has
worked out an agreement with 16 nations to
reduce cotton textile imports to this country
and reroute some of the flow to other lands.
How effective it will be in curbing the com-
petition and relaxing congressional pressure
for action remains to be seen.
"This administration has got to recognize
that industries are getting hurt," declares a
key Southern Democrat. "Kennedy can't go
on ignoring Tariff Commission recommenda-
tions as Eisenhower did."
CURBING PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Of 35 recent cases in which relief was
recommended by the Tariff Commission,
Congressman STRATTON of New York relates,
22 were turned down by the White House-
"a sorry percentage," he scoffs. To stop this
sort of thing, protectionists would like to
make Tariff Commission recommendations
mandatory, rather than leaving .final judg-
ment up to the President; such a sharp
change does not seem likely to be adopted
soon, however.
Congress mood is not lost on the admin-
istration, in any case. Indeed, some law-
makers suspect Mr. Kennedy has recently
been careful to avoid a congressional re-
buff on tariffs, He sent back for further
study recent unanimous Tariff Commission
recommendations for relief for domestic in-
dustries against imports of baseball gloves,
ceramic mosaic tile, and certain kinds of
glass, these Congressmen note. A Presiden-
tial "no," they suggest, might have been
overridden by a two-thirds vote of Congress-
a check provided in the 1958 extension of
the trade law. -
In both the substance and presentation
of its 1962 trade proposals, the administra-
tion will strive to anticipate and overcome
congressional objections. A key feature of
its new program is expected to be a broad
new plan to ease the impact of further
tariff cuts. Rather than relying on higher
tariffs or import quotas to protect domestic
industries, the plan would emphasize in-
creased Government help to rehabilitate
companies, industries or communities hard
hit by imports.
Soon Cabinet officials and their top aides
will start beating the drums for the new
trade approach, promises one official. "Once
the President gets into the fight," insists
another, "it will put a whole new perspec-
tive on things." To help cultivate support
for freer-trade plans both in Congress and
in the business world, Mr. Kennedy has al-
ready named a Republican banker, Howard
C. Petersen, as a special White House assist-
ant.
The administration's congressional allies
won't be idle, either. One administration
lieutenant in the House remarks: "I expect
to do a lot of talking on this matter be-
tween sessions," Democratic Representative
BOGGS of Louisiana, a long-time battler for
freer trade, plans public hearings next
month by his Foreign Economic Policy Sub-
committee of the Joint Economic Commit-
tee. He expects the testimony will provide
much ammunition against the protection-
ist attack. Mr. BOGGS has also signed up
former Secretary of State Herter to help
head a study of world economic and trade
problems.
AL RECORD - APPENDIX A7689
Cuba: The Record Set Straight
HON. BOB WILSON
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Saturday, September 23, 1961
Mr. WILSON of California. Mr.
Speaker, much has been written and said
since the ill-fated Cuban invasion as
to where the responsibility should rest
for this tragic failure. It has been most
disconcerting to view the efforts of some
of some critics to fix the total blame on
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and dedicated
people in the CIA.
Many have asked why can't the record
be set straight so that all Americans
can know just who' was responsible for
this debacle that did so much to lower
the prestige of America.
We have such a document now that is
complete in detail. It is an objective
statement of the activities that led up
to the landings at the Bay of Pigs.
A real service has been performed by
Mr. Charles J. V. Murphy who has writ-
ten an article entitled "Cuba: The Rec-
ord Set Straight," published in the 1961
issue of Fortune magazine.
It is plain, Mr. Speaker, that the re-
sponsibility rests with the President of
the United States and with his principal
appointed advisers in the White House,
in the Department of State, and the
United Nations. Let's have no more talk
about the Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or
the CIA being responsible for this fiasco.
Mr. Speaker, the record is clear and
I submit herewith the article by Mr.
Murphy that does in fact set the record
straight. I urge all Americans to read
it and request unanimous consent to
include herewith as a portion of my re-
marks the above-referenced article.
CUBA: THE RECORD SET STRAIGHT
(By Charles J. V. Murphy)
Not long ago, at President Kennedy's daily
staff meeting, the special assistant for na-
tional security affairs, McGeorge Bundy,
opened the proceedings by noting, "Sir, we
have four matters up for discussion this
morning." The President was not in a zest-
ful mood. "Are these problems which I in-
herited?" as asked. "Or are they problems
of our own making?" "A little of both," was
Bundy's tactful answer.
The exchange revealed a new and saving
humility. Some days after this incident,
Kennedy addressed the Nation on the sub-
ject of Berlin. The ebullience, the air of
self-assurance that marked his first month
in office had gone. He spoke earnestly to his
countrymen but his words were also aimed at
Premier Khrushchev,-who up to this point
had appeared not to be listening. This time
Kennedy did get through to Moscow; and
any lingering doubt about the American de-
termination to defend Berlin was dispelled
by the response of the American people.
The President's will to stand firm was clear,
and the Nation was with him.
Nevertheless, in any full review of John
Kennedy's first months in office, there must
be reported a failure in administration that
will continue to inhibit and trouble Ameri-
can foreign policy until it is corrected. This
failure raises a fair question: whether Ken-
nedy has yet mastered the governmental ma-
chinery, whether he is well and effectively
served by some of his close advisers, and
whether they understand the use of power
in world politics. The matter is of vital im-
portance; in the crises that will inevitably
arise around the world-in the Middle East,
in Africa, in the Far East, in Central Eu-
rope-the U.S. Government must be in top
form, and possibly even, as Kennedy himself
suggested, act alone.
Administrative confusions came to light
most vividly in the Cuban disaster. That
story 3s told here for the first time in ex-
plicit detail. It is told against the back-
ground of the U.S. reversal in Laos, which
in itself should not be underestimated:
Laos, once in the way of becoming a buffer
for its non-Communist neighbors, is all but
finished; now, in South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh
Diem, a stout friend of the United States,
is under murderous attack by Communist
guerrillas; the U.S. loss of face is being felt
from the Philippines to Pakistan, and in
the long run the damage may prove to be
even more costly than that caused by Cuba.
Let us turn back then to the train of
events, beginning with Laos, that culmi-
nated in the disaster in the Bay of Pigs.
Fortune is publishing the account for one
purpose-to set therecord straight for con-
cerned Americans.
Kennedy, from the day he took office, was
loath to act in Laos. He was confident that
he understood the place and use of power
in the transactions of the Nation, but he
was baffled by this community of elephants,
parasols, and pagodas. Then, too, he brought
to office a general surmise that our long-
range prospects of holding the new and weak
nations of southeast Asia in the Western
camp were doubtful in the extreme. In
this respect, he was leaning toward the Lipp-
man n-Stevenson-Fulbright view of strat-
egy. This school holds that U.S. power is
overcommitted In southeast Asia, and that
the proper aim for U.S. diplomacy there
should be to reduce local frictions by mold-
ing the new states as true neutrals.
The U.S. position in Laos had become
acute while Dwight Eisenhower was still in
office. Eisenhower must therefore bear a
considerable part of the blame for the U.S.
failure; he let a situation go from bad to
worse, and indeed he apologized to Kennedy
for leaving "a mess," and that it might take
the intervention of U.S. troops to redeem it.
There had been a moment when the strug-
gle in Laos had turned in favor of the pro-
U.S. forces under Gen. Phoumi Nosavan,
the former Defense Minister. In a series of
small but decisive engagements, more by
maneuver than by shooting, Phoumi even-
tually took the capital,. Vientiane, early in
December, but at this point the Russians
intervened openly on the side of the Com-
munist faction, the Pathet. Lao. In con-
cert with a large-scale push by well-trained
troops from North Vietnam, they introduced
a substantial airlift Into northern Laos (an
operation that still is continuing).
The collapse of the Royal Lao Army then
became inevitable unless the United States
came in with at least equal weight on
Phoumi's side. One obvious measure was to
put the airlift out of business. The job
could have been done by "volunteer" pilots
and the challenge would at least have estab-
lished, at not too high an initial risk for the
United States, how far the Russians were
prepared to go. Another measure would have
been to bring SEATO forces into the battle,
as the SEATO treaty provided.
In the end, Eisenhower decided to sheer
away from both measures. The State De-
partment was apposed to stirring up India
and the other Asian neutrals. Secretary of
State Christian Herter agreed in principle
that the independence of Laos had to be
maintained, yet he was unable to bring
to heel his own desk officers and the policy
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170014-1