POLITICAL OFFENSIVE PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000600050015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 13, 1970
• Content Type: MF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
13 March 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William H. Sullivan
Deputy- Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
SUBJECT : Political Offensive Paper
1. Attached for your use and information is the final version
of the political offensive paper. With some reluctance, I have dropped
"atrophied disrepair" and substituted a slightly watered down form of
USIA Is lily gilding. I have also incorporated most of the suggestions
offered by our colleagues in the Department.
2. Since this is a paper devoted to objectives, targets and
themes -- explicitly eschewing implementing techniques and programs
I have not said anything about the obvious need for coordinating many
actual programs undertaken with the GVN. Nor have I included an
inventory of current assets and activities since a compendium of these
is already available to the White House in other recent documents.
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Attachment
Geo ge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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13 March 1970
SUBJECT: Themes and Ground Rules for a Political Offensive
Against North Vietnam
1. For several reasons this is an opportune time to review the
bidding on the U. S. Government's propaganda and psychological warfare
efforts against the Vietnamese Communist Party and against the
Party's current policy of using extensive armed force in an effort to
impose its control over South Vietnam. In the aftermath of Ho's death,
the Hanoi leadership picture at the Politburo level is unsettled. There
are some signs of personal rivalries and policy differences among
Ho's former .subordinates, who have not yet agreed on which of their
number will be Ho's successor. There are also some signs of a rise
in war weariness and general fatigue among the population of North
Vietnam and signs of increasingly frayed morale among some segments
of the Communists' military and political apparatus in the south. In
the aggregate, the trends of the past year or so have not been favorable
to Communist interests; and this fact seems to be recognized at the
command levels of the Party's hierarchy.
2. The Party leadership still projects an air of confidence about
"ultimate victory, " but this is probably a concept so theologically rooted
in doctrinal outlook that it is not open to serious debate, certainly not
to public discussion. Despite this public posture of confidence, however,
the Politburo is clearly troubled by many facets of the current situation,
including trends on the ground in South Vietnam, the decline in the
decibel count of opposition to the war within the United States, President
Nixon's policy of "Vietnarnization, " and the firm U. S. negotiating posture
in Paris. At this juncture, the Politburo seems somewhat perplexed
and uncertain about the Party's optimum course of action in the months
ahead. Similar perplexities and uncertainties also seem to be manifest
to some extent at almost every level of the Party hierarchy.
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3. The White House has recently requested a review of all
propaganda and political action activities, both overt and covert,
capable of undermining enemy will and morale in both North and South
Vietnam. We also understand that the President is personally
interested in having such activities increased across the board. Thus
highest level interest as well as the external facts of the Vietnam
situation itself make this the time for a fresh look at this whole subject.
4. Ideas in this field abound and a number of separate activities
are and long have been already in train, under the aegis of several
separate Executive Branch components. The machinery in Washington
and within the U. S. Mission in Vietnam designed to insure coordination
of U. S. propaganda and psychological warfare efforts is being revived
and invigorated to develop an institutional mechanism capable of
initiating and monitoring an integrated propaganda and psychological
warfare program whose component parts are deliberately tailored
to be mutually reinforcing and complementary.
5. A helpful first step in stimulating the kind of effective intensified
effort we believe the President wants would be the adoption or acceptance
by all parties concerned of an agreed basic set of objectives, targets and
authorized themes. Such a set of authorized common guidelines would
provide common benchmarks against which the individual programs of
various U. S. Government components could be measured and to which
they could be tailored. To function properly as constituting authorized
direction, these guidelines should be reviewed and endorsed at at least
the 40 Committee level and preferably at the NSC level. A draft example
of what such a set of guidelines might look like is outlined in the remainder
of this memorandum.
6. Objectives -- The overall objective of the psychological/
propaganda offensive here envisioned is to persuade the Hanoi leader-
ship to abandon its strategy of pursuing its political ambitions through
armed struggle. This is obviously an ideal goal not likely to be achieved
by propaganda or psychological warfare alone. Nonetheless, the offensive
should endeavor by all means possible to persuade the leadership that
the -costs of its present strategy will inevitably far exceed any benefits
-likely to be gained therefrom and, simultaneously, to diminish the
Vietnamese Communist Party's ability to persist in its present strategy.
In more specific terms, this offensive would have the following objectives:
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a. Persuading the top Communist leadership that
its current policies are not working and that continued
reliance on armed struggle can only produce ever more
costly failure.
b. Exacerbating such tensions and rivalries as already
exist within the top echelons of the Vietnamese Communist
Party with the aim of reducing the Politburo's capacity for
effective action as a decision making or control exercising
institution.
c. Increasing doubts, disaffection and splits within
the Party structure in North Vietnam and lowering the
morale of Party cadre in all factions.
d. Driving a wedge between the Communist Party
and the general population of North Vietnam.
e. Increasing disaffection, discouragement and war
weariness among the general population of North Vietnam.
The object here is not to incite revolt, but to make the
population increasingly aware of and disenchanted with
the human and other costs of the Politburo's present
policies, increasingly resentful of bearing continued or
additional burdens, and increasingly reluctant to provide
non-coerced support for the war.
f. Exacerbating whatever tensions and reciprocal
suspicions already exist between Hanoi and its senior field
commands in the south, e. g. , COSVN.
g. Stimulating doubts and concerns among the field
leadership in the south over Hanoi's constancy, its willing-
ness or ability to provide continued support, and the risks
of Hanoi's writing off the sacrifices of the southern apparat
to further parochial North Vietnamese political ends,
h. Exacerbating and compounding already developing
tensions and disharmony between Northerners and Southerners
within the political apparatus in South Vietnam,
i. Increasing defeatism, discouragement and war
weariness at all levels of the Communists' military and
political apparatus in South Vietnam.
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7. Targets and Authorized Themes -- Achieving objectives
such as those outlined above will require concentration on specific
target groups and the use of specific themes appropriate to each such
group. A suggested list of targets is given below with appropriate
major themes grouped under each target.
a. The Hanoi Politburo
(1) The continuing cost of the war is too great for
North Vietnam to accept. Prolongation of the armed
struggle prejudices North Vietnam's future and will
endanger the Communist Party's control over its people.
(2) Continued insistence on "victory" is futile. The
GVN is growing progressively stronger, not weaker, and
domestic pressures are simply not going to force the U. S.
Government to surrender or accept a settlement that is
tantamount to thinly disguised surrender. The U. S.
Government, however, is genuinely interested in finding
a reasonable solution to the conflict.
(3) Where operationally possible, the suspicions
.of the major contenders for power vis-a-vis their
colleagues and putative rivals should be actively
stimulated.
b. The Party Apparatus (Military and Civil) in North Vietnam
(1) In the aftermath of Ho's death, the Lao Dong leadership
has lost its sense of purpose and its competence to lead. The
surviving members of the Politburo are not noble patriots but
ambitious functionaries. They are interested primarily in
personal rivalries, the vindication or concealment of past
errors of policy judgment or decision, and their own selfish
interests. They do not merit continued support. Those
struggling for power are perfectly willing to sell out the
Vietnamese people to the Chinese or the Russians in the interest
of their own personal advancement.
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(2) The Politburo has lied to the Party cadre and
the masses and consistently tried to deceive them about
the true state of the war, the struggle in the south, and
the realities of world politics that affect the war. There
are major splits within the Politburo over policies and
priorities, particularly on the issue of waging war in the
south at the expense of the interests and needs of the people
of North Vietnam.
(3) Those sent from the north to "liberate" the south
have not been and will not be met with open arms by the
South Vietnamese people. Instead they have been and will
be fiercely resisted and will be regarded as alien aggressors
by the people.
(4) The war is going badly in the south and has been
going badly ever since the disastrous lost gamble of the
bloody attacks of Tet Mau Than. The southern government
is getting stronger month by month. The Hanoi Politburo's
answer to two years of failure, however, is to pour more
lives and treasure into the execution of its bankrupt failing
policies. The Politburo wastes the cadre and peoples' lives
because its selfish members would rather see their comrades
die than lose face by admitting their errors.
(5) The American Government is not seriously harassed
by domestic protest over Vietnam. Those who view the American
scene in terms of 1953-1954 France are living in a foolish
world of dreams. The American Government is curtailing
its direct involvement in the struggle and doing so in
cooperative, harmonious coordination with the Saigon
Government. This curtailment is possible because of two
factors the Party's leaders have never dared admit to either
the cadre or the people:
a. The Americans are not imperialist, have no
desire to make Vietnam a neo-colony, and are
anxious to leave as soon as they are sure the South
Vietnamese people can protect themselves from
having their political choices dictated by North
Vietnamese arms.
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b. The South Vietnamese people and their government
are getting progressively stronger and, hence,
have a constantly diminishing need for direct
American assistance.
(6) The cost of the war in terms of lives and in economic
terms is already so great that North Vietnam will require
at least a decade to recover. Prolonged continuation of
the war will postpone North Vietnam's recovery beyond
the lifetime of all cadre who are not killed in the foolish
struggle. But the war and its attendant costs to North
Vietnam could end at once if the Party's leaders would only
abandon their vainglorious ambitions and bring all the
northern cadre home to rebuild their own country rather
than squander them in a futile effort to impose a political
structure the South Vietnamese people do not want and will
fight to the death.
(7) The people of South Vietnam cannot be coerced into
accepting socialism and continued efforts to employ armed
coercion can only prolong the war. The constant drain of
ceaseless armed struggle will blight any hope of real progress
toward socialism in the north. The only hope of convincing
the southerners of the advantages of socialism lies in stopping
armed aggression and allowing the northern cadre to devote
their energies to building a socialist state in their homeland
capable of attracting uncoerced admiration from southern
compatriots.
c. The North Vietnamese People
(1) The Party leadership's greatest political vulnerability
probably lies in the fact that the people of North Vietnam have
already paid an exceptionally heavy price for the Politburo's
pursuit of its political goals in the south and the Politburo,
as yet, has relatively little to show in the way of concrete
returns on this staggering investment of human lives and
economic dislocation. Furthermore, the people of North
Vietnam do not yet realize how great the price they have
collectively paid has actually been. Throughout the length
and breadth of North Vietnam, people in towns, villages and
hamlets are, of course, aware of sons, relatives, neighbors
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and friends who have gone south and not yet returned.
They are not yet aware, however, of how many of these
will never return. Collective popular ignorance in North
Vietnam of the true human (and other) costs of this war
is a time bomb that could blow up in the Politburo's face.
This bomb can be defused only by a victory so dramatic
and clear cut that the Politburo can credibly herald it as
vindication of all the sacrifice that achieving this victory
entailed. Thus propaganda and psychological warfare
targetted against the North Vietnamese people should
concentrate on:
a. Making them aware of the price they have
already paid for the Party leadership's political
ambitions.
b. Convincing them that the kind of victory that could
vindicate even past sacrifices simply cannot be
attained.
c. Persuading them that these horrendous and futile
sacrifices will inevitably continue until the Politburo
and Party can be pressured into stopping the war
and letting the people of North Vietnam get on in
peace with the task of rebuilding their own shattered
land. The fathers, sons and brothers of the North
Vietnamese people should no longer be squandered
in hostile southern jungles. They should be brought
home where they belong to live and work in peace.
d. NVA Troops and Party Cadres En Route to South Vietnam
Infiltrating troops and Party cadres on the move toward South
Vietnam through southern North Vietnam and through Laos
constitutes a special target group susceptible to themes
stressing:
(1) The hazards of the journey.
(2) The fact that the infiltrators have been systematically
lied to about the reception they will receive. Those who survive
the journey will be fiercely resisted by the people of South
Vietnam, not welcomed as liberators.
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(3) Those who survive the trip will soon find out how
badly the war is going. Most of them will die unnoted and
alone and will be left to rot in unmarked, untended graves
unknown to their families and relatives and far from the
tombs of their ancestors.
(4) The only way to survive the holacaust that awaits
them is to desert en route or surrender to the lenient
allies at their first opportunity in South Vietnam.
e. The Officers Who Staff COSVN and the Senior Regional Commands
(1) The Party leadership in Hanoi is weak, rent by strife,
and beset by personal rivalries and jealousies in the after-
math of Ho's death.
(2) The needs and aspirations of the southern organization
will inevitably take a poor second place to the personal
ambitions of those who seek to assume Ho's mantle of power.
(3) The Hanoi leadership is quite prepared to sell the
southern organization down the river and write off all its
past hardships and sacrifices to further narrow North
Vietnamese regional interests. The Politburo did this in
the 1940s and in 1954. It may soon do so again.
(4) Thus further sacrifices in support of the southern
organizations Hanoi masters are vain, futile and pointless.
f. Northerners Fighting in VC/NVA Military Forces or Working
in the Communist Political Structure in South Vietnam
(1) As you can see, the southern cadre are lazy,
cowardly and untrustworthy.
(2) You do not have the support of the South Vietnamese
people, who will continue to resist you as alien invaders,
which is the role your selfish masters are forcing you to
play.
(3) Your own leaders in the north are prepared to
abandon you to your fate in South Vietnam. If you continue
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to fight, you will probably die, will never see your
family or loved ones again and your family and ancestors
will never know what happened to you.
g. Southern VC Military and Political Cadre
(1) The growing use of North Vietnamese Army fillers
in Viet Cong main force units is further evidence that Hanoi
has relegated southern participation in the war to a minor
role. The continued influx of NVA troops will result in
more leadership positions being assumed by northerners.
A northern accent is clearly a prerequisite for positions
of authority.
(2) Increased use of NVA security officers within VC
units to offset southern ralliers to the GVN is clear evidence
that the south no longer has a voice in the conduct of the war.
(3) Continued manipulation of southerners in political
organizations created by Hanoi demonstrates that southern
aspirations are not relevant in Hanoi's eyes in the struggle.
The Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces,
the Peoples Revolutionary Government, Liberation
Committees and the unclear position today of the NLF all
point to an opportunistic Hanoi policy aimed at a settlement --
or a long, protracted war -- as it suits northern interests.
8. Negative Considerations -- There is no intention of mounting a
program directed at the populace in the north that is designed to produce a
coordinated uprising. Nor, given our knowledge of population control in
the DRV, is this even a likely possibility. By bringing the cost of the war
and the prospect of continued sufferings to the individual's consciousness,
we would hope to see a malaise evolve that would mean a personal distaste
for continued prosecution of the war and would complicate the leadership's
ability to carry on the struggle.
9. Political Diplomatic Offensive -- The sympathetic reception
that the Communist propaganda efforts have received worldwide throughout
the war has continued to surround the Paris talks. World public information
media -- and some governments as well -- often seem to have a blurred
vision of the negotiations and seem inclined to portray the U. S. as the
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activist party stimulating combat on the battlefield and the intransigent
party blocking progress at the negotiating table. The GVN has made little --
if any -- progress on the public relations and diplomatic fronts. In the
propaganda and psychological warfare field, particularly in the international
arena, the GVN has taken a drubbing from its Communist adversaries,
who have had considerable success in peddling the line that the GVN is
nothing but a narrow coterie of selfish, U. S. - supported reactionary
generals whose intransigence constitutes the principal obstacle to peace.
In light of the initial success of the Vietnamization program, the blatancy
of North Vietnamese aggression in Laos, and the fact that the long-suffering
Cambodians have recently erupted in spontaneous protest over Hanoi's
cynical, aggressive exploitation of their territory, the climate of world
opinion may be susceptible to change if a vigorous, imaginative program
can be developed by the U. S. and the GVN.
a. The most dramatic story to be told is an unveiling
of the sequence of concessions which the U. S. has made at
Paris. The refrain that the DRV would "know what to do"
if the bombing were halted and the "understanding" on the
shelling of the cities and the subsequent Communist
actions is a telling story. Unfortunately, its sharpness
has been lost in the months of inactivity in the negotiations.
b. In 1966 a large group of Ambassadors, accredited
to Saigon but resident elsewhere in Asia, were given an
extensive tour of South Vietnam. Repetition of this tour
is overdue.
c. The DRV's disporportionate role in the "southern"
war; its callous refusal to admit its presence in the south
by accepting its wounded for repatriation; the stories told
by northerners who have surrendered -- these and numerous
others are valid themes that have suffered from our buckshot
approach to propaganda in support of Vietnam. A concise
indictment, free from special pleading, would lend itself
to White Paper treatment.
d. A continuing program of encouraging visits to
South Vietnam of political leaders and opinion moulders
from around the world could be very useful, particularly
if these guests of the GVN were really permitted to see and
say whatever they wished. The creation of a group of
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reasonably accurate and credible reporters with influence
in their own countries would probably do far more to get
the GVN's story across than any actions Saigon's own
Foreign Service and Information Ministry is likely to take.
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