VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN DCI BRIEFING BOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000600040001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 31, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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S! December 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller
SUBJECT V. __ zamese Afi,n.irs Staff Items for Inciusion-n
DCI Briefing 33ook
she following matters or topics may be of interest; to the
a d are offered for inclusion in his briefing book.
22 December Session w1-h S: cretary Laird: Laird e .,^ s .a
great appreciation for our help in drafting the strength figure stag 1 _:'
and professed himself very ples`. ed with both the statement itself and Less
reaction: to it. He reiterated he had given firm instructions t ,..t c.L
would not issue any statements on enemy strengths that had not be:~n
previously blessed by the Agency. We d_scussed your letter on t_=e- US
which he said he had found helpful, and the genera' topic of the esi~en~ial
directive to step up anti-morale operations. Laird seemed fair' y _ e .x,ed
on the U issue (but -see para 2 below;. On the anti-morale operati, -1
question, I explained -- and he agreed -- that pin prick operations, v -ile
feasible, really accomplished very little. I also explained, quite =or efully,
that if we were asked to undertake any;h ing larger, such tasks we _ d carry
an inevitable price tag in terms of manpower, money and mater
f wr ermore, any serious continuing operation -- e. g. , work w:.. p,_. ntially
dissident tribal elements in North Vietnam -- would necessitate
acceptance of attendant political risks, since no continuing opera.Len c :
consequence could be carried on without the North Vietnamese, the
press, eventually becoming aware of direct US/agency involve mLa_ d
ld
said he understood all this, was in complete agreement and wou
this case strongly for us if the occasion arose. One minor but i
mbolic point: When I arrived, Lairds secretary expressed
s
y
since Laird had cancelled ..: his 22 December appointments. Of_- C:1-
she discovered Laird's written instructions cancelled all prior
iith:
for that day except our meeting. in closing the sessonw a rec._:ro
exchange of holiday greetings, Laird said how valuable he co---;.,
these weekly sessions and, with every outward sign of sincerity, =
his high regard for the Agency and his appreciation of its splendid su
to :im.
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2. PRU Matters: When finally -held, the 303 session on endorsed the
program but directed the agency and the Defense De:,ar-~ n e_.-
to negotiate the matter of military assignees. "he PRU matter was ? c
opening topic at my 29 December session with Packard, who was Acting
Secretary in Lairds vacation absence. Packard said he had relayce the
303 Committee's deci on to Lair d by ' horse and L air d was lA -Js ct, since he
r:;.trs_
wanted the military out of the program soonest. Laird and Abrams, said
Packard, both shared the same concerns on this topic. I demurred, noting
that while Laird was primarily concerned about the general possibility of
a political flap, Abrams was primarily troubled (after the Green Ber?o=t
affair) by doubts about his ability to discipline, i. e. , court martial, any
military personnel involved in aI then reviewed the atmosphere of
my own conversations with Laird the previous week, the importance of
the program, and the reasonableness of the compromise Mr. Karamessines
had proposed at the 303 meeting (down to 60 military personnel by Mar cif
1970 per present plans and down to 30 by October 1970 with complete phase-
out by June 1971). I also stressed that too rapid a curtailment o -;he advisory
effort would increase the risk o`_ the very kind of flap we were all anxious
to avoid. During our conversation, Packard veered around and at the end
he said he would hold everything on ice in the Pentagon until he, Laird and
I could go over the whole subject together.
3. The Route 65 Proposal: On 29 December, Ambassador Codley
came in with a request to hit Route 65 (in north Laos, above Route 7
within the prohibited ten-mile buffer zone along the North Vietnamese
border. I took a map of the area to the Packard meeting along with a
preliminary OER analysis of the importance of this route segment. and the
heavy volume of traffic now moving over it. Packard and I discussed this
matter for about twenty minutes, reviewing the self-imposed nature of the
buffer zone and the fact that strikes within it might serve as a useful, low
key signal to Hanoi that US patience was not infinite. Packard scribbled
notes furiously during our conversation, said he liked the idea very much,
would get in touch with General Wheeler immediately and wanted to push
the idea. I'Later called Wheeler on the secure line to ensure that he go- a
direct- account of my conversation with Packard from me before Packard's
call to him and before he got a garbled account from someone else. Wheeler
was cordial and grateful, said he had his staff working full bore on the
project and thanked me for the Agency's assistance.
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5. Intelligence Collection: At the 22 December lu~c~
Wi Zaslow, i expressed my serious concern over the fact that we were
missing too many infiltration groups in North Vietnam (over 50%) and not
ac--wally spotting them until they reached south Laos. This made us very 25X1
-rushy in our current analysis of the rate of current input at the top of the
ireline, a matter of great interest to our political masters. 1
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Hence, ., cons i er 'the ice on w i.c we are s cai-g
dangerously thin. I have asked NSA to prepare a detailed study with
proposals for corrective action in the form of augmented coverage and
will pursue this vigorously within the forum of the collection procedures
committee I chair at Kissinger's behest. This is a problem that we will have
to solve for given the President's cur, ent concerns, this barn door must be
locked while the horse is still inside.
6. Kissinger/WSAC-. Paper: On 22 December, Kissinger sent a note
to the Secretaries c State and Defense and the DCI appending a 2 December
(sic) memorandum to him (Kissinger) from Laird on "Planning US Reaction
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o ,-Lc--eased Enemy Activity in Southeast Asia. 11 Kissinger asked for
com-rments on Laird's paper, which he wanted to consider at an earl u
nceting. The 2 December L~airei me-no covered substantially the Sank
?round as the questions Laird gave us 'via on I? Novern:ber,
which we answered in a memo sent to Laird by you on 4 December. After
discussion with General Cushman and Tom Karamessines, 1 secured
Packard's permission for us to send this 4 December memo to Kissinger
and the other WSAG members, a step that will enable us to give Kissinger
a good answer without redoing work already done.
7. "The Thing": We have received a note from Kissinger saying
the President and he both like "the Thing's" new format very much and
want no further changes. This effort seems to be useful and is apparently
very well received.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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