CHINESE INFLUENCE OVER NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500060117-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 117
• Publication Date: March 10, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
10 March 1967
MEMORANDUM-FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
25X1 REFERENCES : A.
B.
C. Item #1, Diplomatic Summary, 9 March 1967
1. In confirmation of the comments on the referenced documents
relayed to you by telephone, we do not subscribe to the view that North
Vietnam is so economically dependent on China that Hanoi has no independent
latitude in determining its policies. We believe that North Vietnam's 1966
rice harvest involved a shortfall of about 300, 000 tons. (In recent years,
the average harvest has been on the order of 4 and 1/2 million tons.) We
believe North Vietnam will attempt to make up this shortfall from various
sources, including China, but also including the Soviet Union and the East
European Bloc. North Vietnamese imports of foodstuffs from the Soviet
Union, China and Rumania in the first quarter of 1967 have almost equaled
all foodstuff imports in the calendar year of 1966.
2. Although North Vietnam receives considerable aid from Commu-
nist China, we do not believe it is as dependent on Chinese aid as the three
referenced reports would suggest. By dollar values, China has provided
only 35 percent of the cumulative foreign aid deliveries to North Vietnam;
most of the remainder comes from the Soviet Bloc. Vietnamese imports
of rice from Communist China during 1966 were less than 1 percent of their
domestic production. Hanoi certainly considers Peking's likely reactions
to any policy moves it may desire to make but is not, we believe, rigidly
constrained by Chinese wishes.
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3. With regard to the
speculation is interesting but we have no way of telling whether he has
solid information on which to base these speculations. We do believe a
North Vietnamese delegation went to China approximately twenty-four hours
before Kosygin left London, but are not positive that this visit was related
to British proposals on opening negotiations.
4. In sum, we do not consider that these three reports offer signif-
icant new information influencing our assessment of present North Vietnamese
plans and attitudes.
ILLEGIB
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
2.
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10 Mar 67
,Jr.
Request
peter Jessup called Colby this afternoon
(10 Marohl saying the White House (Rostov)
urgently wanted comments on three pieces of
current traffic. Colby passed to me. I convened
a quick gathering with OCl, OME and CORR
representation. We reviewed the material and reached unan
unanimous conclusions. I then called Rostov
reen phone. He expressed great thanks
__ - - W
and asked for a written note confirming the
arks a nsde over the Phone. Said note is
tached for your inspection prior to transmittal.
. Carve
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