LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
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Publication Date:
October 8, 1975
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NOTES
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Secret
NOFORN
Latin American Trends
Secret
5Y Q
October 8, 1975
No. 0530/75
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NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/OR CON
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 53(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
October 8, 1975
Argentina: Calabro Speaks Out . . . . . . . . 1
Costa Rica: Communist School for
Labor Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Panama: Tightening Media Control . . . . . . . 5
Bolivia: Soviets Trying to Make
Headway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Bolivia: "I must go down to the sea again" 9
Terrorists Active in El Salvador . . . . . . . 11
Kidnaping in Havana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Cuba: Top Military Officers Replaced . . . . . 14
Cuba: One Less Revolutionary . . . . . . . . . 17
Cuban Chronology for September 1975 . . . . . . 19
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Argentina: Calabro Speaks Out
Buenos Aires Province governor Victorio Calabro
has in effect announced his bid for the presidency
in 1977 by issuing a stinging criticism of the admin-
istration. In the process, he sharpened the dispute
with labor leader Lorenzo Miguel and others who cling
to the defense of President Peron's authority.
Calabro, also an important labor leader who has
for some time been identified with the opponents of
Peron's rule, lashed out at virtually every aspect of
the government's performance in recent months. The
President, he declared, has lost all power because of
her successive political defeats. The crisis in the
economy continues, he went on, because "no proper
measures have been introduced." He found fault with
Acting President Luder as well, saying that the polit-
ical stability the country needs cannot be supplied by
"interim presidents." "Unless rapid solutions are
found," he said, "the government will fall."
Calabro, probably the most prominent of the so-
called "anti-verticalistas"--opponents of Peron's
authority--seeks to gauge the extent of support for
his position while the vacationing President is still
on the sidelines. Moreover, he is hoping to steer the
growing debate over her future to the disadvantage of
the President and her supporters. Her return to Buenos
Aires is scheduled for October 17.
By going public with his criticism, Calabro went
a long way toward confirming the widely held belief
that he covets the presidency. Moreover, his action
represents an open break with top labor leader Lorenzo
Miguel, chief among the "verticalistas," who favor the
retention of the President in office.
October 8, 1975
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Presidential aspirations aside, Miguel and his sup-
porters have probably interpreted Calabro's open break
as signalling his intention to wrest from them control
of the labor movement. They have good reason to be
concerned. The Buenos Aires governor's influence is
growing, at a time when Miguel's prestige among labor
has been slipping as discontent over'economic conditions
is encouraging dissatisfaction with his leadership.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
October 8, 1975
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Costa Rica: Communist School for Labor Leaders
Central American communist parties are taking steps
to train future leaders in the labor field. Communist
labor bosses gathered in Costa Rica last month under
the sponsorship of that country's communist labor group-
ing, the General Confederation of Workers (CGT), and
agreed to a three-tiered training regimen.
The delegates decided that basic training will con-
tinue to be done by local unions in each country. The
best prospects will be sent to the Central American
trade union school in San Jose, Costa Rica, for middle-
level training and future indoctrination in communist
labor strategy. Graduates of this school will be per-
mitted to attend the soon-to-open trade union school in
Havana.
The Central American trade union school is run joint-
ly by the CGT and the World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU). Senior CGT officials teach the students and the
WFTU finances the school with money from the Soviets.
The school operates only one month a year, but puts 30
or so students through the course each session. Origi-
nally, the school was run clandestinely and the training
was heavy in conspiratorial doctrine. Since its start
eight years ago, it has come above ground and become
better known in Latin labor circles. This year it suc-
ceeded in getting classroom space at Costa Rica's Na-
tional University. Several important non-communist
leaders have been trained in the school and most re-
portedly have returned home either as convinced commun-
ists or active sympathizers.
The Costa Rican CGT is particularly qualified to run
the school. It is probably the strongest communist labor
union in Central America. Estimated to have about 12,000
October 8, 1975
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members, it has built its greatest strength in the
banana regions of Costa Rica. A number of its leaders
have studied in the Soviet Union and East Europe. It
is usually the first union in Costa Rica to speak out
on national issues affecting the workers. (CONFIDENTIAL/
NOFORN)
October 8, 1975
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Panama: Tightening Media Control
Panama's media, long a hotbed of sensationalistic
and sometimes lurid reportage, have had to readjust
under Torrijos and it appears that the regime is
tightening its already substantial control.
The administration exercised control for a year
or so after it came to power in 1968 by assigning cen-
sors to newspaper and radio offices. It then relaxed
restraints and relied on decrees regulating certain
types of information, and on self-censorship by media
representatives who had learned the rules of the game.
The government also acquired the country's principal
radio network and a publishing house that directly
controls four of Panama's six dailies. Although the
1972 Constitution guarantees freedom of expression,
this has been the exception rather than the rule.
Radio Libertad and its relay stations make up the
domestic service network controlled by the government
and it praises and propagandizes government achieve-
ments. On occasion, it also uses unattributed commen-
tary taken directly from Havana's domestic service.
Other stations generally steer clear of political com-
mentary.
Only a single radio station remains in political
opposition to the government---Radio Impacto, owned by
Alberto Quiros Guardia, a well known political mal-
content and unstinting government critic who is also
the chief commentator. The government has closed the
station several times when his rantings became too
shrill; earlier this year apparently students were
inspired to riot and ransack the station as a further
warning. These actions have generally had only a
short-term dampening effect.
October 8, 1975
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The government, although frequently vexed by
Impacto's commentaries, apparently believes closing
it would cause too much of an uproar. By allowing it
to operate a useful facade of freedom is preserved
that generally can be held within acceptable bounds
while providing a safety value for radical student
diatribes.
One other station, the Radio Mia network, on
isolated occasions cautiously opposes the government
on freedom of the press issues, but it toes the line
on national issues. The country's two TV stations
practice self-censorship and cause no problems.
Newspapers are probably the most important public
medium in the major cities of Panama and Colon and as
such are the objects of the closest government scrutiny.
With direct control over four of the six dailies and
all the major columnists, the government has had few
difficulties. Only LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA, probably the
city's leading daily, and its sister English-language
daily THE STAR AND HERALD preserve some degree of
independence. Owned by a wealthy family from the dis-
placed political elite of the pro-Torrijos period, the
papers have practiced considerable restraint and gen-
erally refrain from criticizing the government.
The government apparently ended the informal system
of self-censorship in September, however. The acting
foreign minister--who is also assistant director of
LA ESTRELLA--informed the editorial staff that material
on foreign affairs and the treaty negotiations must now
have prior written approval from a new review board.
The board would provide a headline and instructions on
treatment and placement in the paper for any approved
article. No reason was given for the change.
October 8, 1975
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The government has recently been pushing two
lines in the media: that the people must stand solidly
behind Torrijos in the negotiations and not fall prey
to provocations to violence; and that the violence-
prone ultraradical students, however pure their na-
tionalistic motives, are a minority deceived by the
oligarchy and used by the imperialists against the
revolution's goals. By controlling the media, Torrijos
is better able to mold public opinion in support of
these stands. (SECRET/NOFORN)
October 8, 1975
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Bolivia: Soviets Trying to Make Headway
The Soviet Union is attempting to exploit Bolivia's
quest for an outlet to the Pacific.
the Soviets be-
lieve President Banzer's negotiations with Chile will
fail and have encouraged him to buy Soviet weapons to
increase pressure on Santiago. They have offered to
sell military equipment at low prices.
The Soviets have tried before to take advantage
of Bolivia's problems with Chile. In 1974, for example,
the USSR reportedly offered to sell tanks at low prices.
To date, President Banzer has rejected all Soviet
military offers in fear of becoming indebted to the USSR.
The Soviets, however, have had more success in the.eco-
nomic arena. They provided the University of San Andres-
with laser equipment in June 1975 and in late September
they signed an agreement to purchase Bolivian tin.
(SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
October 8, 1975
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Bolivia: "I must go down to the sea again"
President Hugo Banxer, who has staked his histor-
ical reputation on securing Bolivia's long-sought
goal of recovering access to the Pacific Ocean, is
pulling out all stops to accomplish this mission.
This week, he is making a special trip to New York to
plead his case before the UN General Assembly.
Although Bolivians currently have the use of the
Chilean port facility of Arica on excellent financial
terms, their desire for a seacoast of their own ranges
beyond the purely practical benefits to a highly emo-
tional and even mystical point. During an interview
published two weeks ago in the Chilean news magazine
Ercilla, Banzer conveyed this perspective in his
response to the question "Why do the Bolivians want
the sea?" He responded by suggesting, "Why don't you
take a Bolivian to the sea shore. You will see that
he will stop in that moment and leave you alone. And
he will gaze at the sea with a look of nostalgia, mixed
with sadness and happiness." "It has happened to me
many times,"he continued," the last time I was in Rio de
Janeiro for two days, I spent the evenings sitting on
the balcony of my hotel. My wife would call me at one,
two, three, and four o'clock in the morning and I kept
sitting there, looking at the sea. I believe that the
sea is part of nature for man. It is like the air."
Behind these romantic remarks is the aim of nation-
alistic Bolivians to regain the coast lost to Chile in
1884 in the War of the Pacific. Every year Bolivia
holds a national celebration on March 23, known as
Abaroa Day, in memory of Eduardo Abaroa--who died re-
fusing to surrender the port of Antofagasta. In his
honor, Bolivian students stage a symbolic annual march
to the sea.
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Since Bolivia reestablished diplomatic relations
with Chile early this year, Banzer has been pressing
junta President Pinochet for a territorial settle-
ment. So far the Chileans have indicated that they
are willing to consider some sort of leasing arrange-
ment, but it would appear that Bolivian irredentists
will be satisfied only with an outright grant of ter-
ritory. (CONFIDENTIAL)
October 8, 1975
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Terrorists Active in El Salvador
Recent terrorist violence, some of it possibly
the work of the government has left already jittery
Salvadorans even more uneasy.
On September 24, a rightist counterterror organi-
zation called the Falange claimed credit for its first
victim, a 22-year-old youth. On September 25, LA
CRONICA, an antigovernment newspaper in the capital,
was sprayed with machinegun fire, presumably by right-
ists. More serious violence erupted the following day
when about a dozen terrorists, possibly members of the
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), attacked a small
national guard outpost and killed four defenders. Two
of the terrorists were later killed. Less than four hours
later, a prominent leftist deputy was machinegunned to
death in San Salvador. The leftist Popular Forces of
Liberation(FPL) reportedly took credit for that slay.--
ing, alleging the deputy was killed because of his
`revisionist` stance.
The attack on the national guard outpost was a
genuine leftist terrorist operation and the two slain
guerrillas have been identified as members of a group
that received training from Guatemalan terrorists in
early September. The other actions, however, could
be the work of the government, despite the FPL and
Falange communiques. The killing of the deputy im
mediately after the attack on the guard outpost cer-
tainly suggests retribution. The guard reportedly
prepared assassination lists this summer for instan-
taneous retaliation in the event any of its members
were killed.
There is little hard evidence concerning the EPL
or Falange and it is possible they are simply being
used as government cover. (SECRET/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT/
ORCON)
October 8, 1975
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Kidnaping in Havana
Relations between Havana and Caracas were badly
strained by a recent episode involving the abduction
of a Cuban couple who had sought asylum in the
Venezuelan embassy in Havana.
In the middle of the night of September 26 a 35-
year-old Cuban, sentenced to a rehabilitation farm
for trying to flee the country through the US naval
base at Guantanamo Bay, and his pregnant wife disap-
peared from the embassy, where they had taken refuge
the previous week.
The apparent kidnaping of the asylees was probably
the scheme of field-level operatives, perhaps from the
Ministry of Interior, and almost certainly was not
sanctioned by the upper echelons of the Castro govern-
ment.
The action provoked a strong response in Caracas,
where President Carlos Andres Perez reportedly even
threatened to break relations unless the situation
was promptly resolved.
Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro responded quick-
ly, however, to terminate the imbroglio with the least
possible damage to bilateral relations. He met with
Venezuelan Ambassador Taylhardat, expressed embar-
rassment over the incident, and agreed to allow the
ambassador to meet privately with the asylees. Later
members of the international media were called to a
press conference, obviously under Cuban control, during
which the asylees explained their decision to remain in
Cuba. In a further effort apparently aimed at placating
the Venezuelans, Castro praised the Perez government in
a major speech on September 28.
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The Perez government was displeased with
Taylhardat's timorous performance in defending
Venezuela's interests. The Ambassador has since
been summoned home for consultation and his tenure
has been called into question.
Castro concern at making the best of a bad situa-
tion should keep the incident from being blown out
of proportion. Nevertheless, when added to other
problems the official Venezuelan community has en-
countered in Havana (see Latin American Trends,
August 6, 1975), it probably will add to the Perez
government's wariness in its relations with Havana.
(SECRET/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT)
October 8, 1975
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Cuba: Top Military Officers Replaced
Two key Cuban military officers--the number two
man in the armed forces ministry and the commander
of one of the ground forces' three armies--were re-
placed recently. Both are "comandantes de brigada,"
a rank held by only thirteen officers. Despite the
obvious importance of the high-level changes, neither
was publicly explained nor has there been any announce-
ment of the new duties of the officers replaced. While
it is possible that the changes--surrounded as they
were by secrecy--were politically motivated, it is more
likely that the normal reshuffling of commands has been
moved up from December to September to avoid interfer-
ing with the First Party Congress at year's end.
Senen Casas Regueiro
Brigade Commander Senen
Casas Regueiro, who had served
as first deputy armed forces
minister and chief of the gen-
eral staff since July 1971, has
been replaced by Brigade Com-
mander Abelardo Colome Ibarra,
according to the September 6
issue of the party newspaper.
Senen and his brother Julio,
who apparently is still deputy
armed forces minister for serv-
ices, are both closely linked
to Armed Forces Minister Raul
Castro; both had served as de-
partment chiefs on his general
staff during the revolution in
1958. Senen's replacement,
Colome Ibarra, is a Central Com-
mittee member who has a back-
ground of service in top mili-
tary commands as well as in intelligence, counterintelli-
gence, and subversion.
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Brigade Commander Raul
Menendez Tomassevich, chief
of the Eastern (First) Army
since 1968, has been re-
placed by First Commander
Eleuterio (Elio) Avila
Trujillo. Like the Casas
brothers, Menendez Tomas-
sevich has had a long as-
sociation with Raul Castro;
he was chief of one of
Raul's six guerrilla col-
umns during the revolution
and is currently a member
of the Central Committee.
Forty-two-year-old Avila
Trujillo, on the other
hand, is a relative un-
known; he was chief of
services of the Eastern
Army immediately before
his recent promotion, and
RauZ Menendez Tomassevich
before that a division commander, but no information is
available on his early military service or his revolu-
tionary bona fides.
Rather than being cashiered, Casas Regueiro and
Menendez Tomassevich may be in line for important new
responsibilities growing out of the First Party Congress.
Cuba's present six provinces, for example, are to be
broken up into 14 at the congress, and the two military
men may be earmarked for appointment as provincial chiefs.
For almost a decade, the Castro regime has used Raul's
armed forces ministry as a source of reliable, trained,
and disciplined candidates for both administrative and
political positions. Moreover, the shifting of other of-
ficers supports the theory that reassignments have been
October 8, 1975
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advanced; First Commander William Galvez, former chief
of an armored division in the Western Army, is now
chief of the armed forces' Military Patriotic Work
Group, and First Commander Cesar Lara Rosello, former
chief of the Camaguey Army Corps, has been named to
head the Holguin Army Corps, according to the weekly
Cuban military journal. (CONFIDENTIAL)
October 8, 1975
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Cuba: One Less Revolutionary
Roque Dalton
Havana has belatedly
acknowledged the death of
Salvadoran poet and pro-
Castro revolutionary Roque
Dalton, murdered by his own
compatriots apparently for
following Havana's shift
away from advocacy of vio-
lent revolution. This helps
to explain why the Cuban gov-
ernment believes it is neces-
sary to be constantly rein-
forcing its revolutionary
credentials.
The Casa de las Ameri-
cas, Cuba's international
cultural organization, indi-
cated in a press release in
August that Dalton and a com-
panion were killed on May 10
by members of a "minuscule
faction" within the People's
Revolutionary Army of El
Salvador, a rebel movement
to which Dalton belonged. The
Cuban announcement alleged
that the leadership of that
revolutionary movement had previously criticized the dis-
sident faction for "militarist deviationism and petty
bourgeois extremism," terminology usually reserved for
those who continue to promote violent revolution in the
face of Havana's adoption of Moscow's "via Pacifica."
Havana further denounced the faction for "the most grave
errors of anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban,and anti-revolutionary
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pseudoleftism," more ideological jargon to describe
advocates of armed struggle who have accused Moscow
and Havana of betraying revolutionary ideals.
Born in 1935, Dalton had in recent years lived
in Cuba. He was a member of El Salvador's delegation to
the First Latin American Solidarity Conference in
Havana in 1967, and his works appeared frequently in
Cuban cultural publications. His most outstanding
political work, "Revolution Within the Revolution?"
and the Criticism of the Right, was published by the
Casa de las Americas in 1970. Written in 1968, it
was an attempt to analyze the faults of Regis Debray's
Revolution Within the Revolution?--a theoretical justi---
fication of violent revolution--in the wake of Che
Guevara's disastrous Bolivian guerrilla escapade that
left Debray, Guevara, and, by implication, Castro and
the Cuban leadership, open to criticism on ideological
grounds. That Dalton's critique was published by
Havana is a tribute to the prestige he enjoyed in the
Cuban capital at a very sensitive time for the Castro
government.
As the Cubans shifted from criticizing to coopera-
ting with the Latin American communist parties, Dalton
shifted with them, and this apparently planted the seeds
of his undoing in an internal ideological dispute in the
People's Revolutionary Army of El Salvador.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
October 8, 1975
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Cuban Chronology for September 1975
September 2 - A delegation representing INRA (Na-
-16 tional Institute for Agrarian Reform)
visits the Soviet Union at the invita-
tion of the Soviet Ministry of Agricul-
ture.
September 4 - Dr. Pelegrin Torras, Deputy Foreign
Minister,arrives in New York, heading
the Cuban delegation to the 7th UN Gen-
eral Assembly.
September 4 - Cuban observes "Week of Solidarity with
-11 the Chilean People."
September 5 - Puerto Rican Solidarity Conference under
-8 the sponsorship of the World Peace Council
held in Havana.
September 8 - A Cuban Communist Party delegation arrives
in Belgrade for an 8-day stay.
September 8 - A delegation representing the Political
Department of the PLO is received by Osmany
Cienfuegos in Havana.
September 10 - Cambodian Foreign Minister Ieng Sary ar-
rives in Havana for official talks.
September 10 - Chemical Industry Minister Antonio Esquivel
-12 is in Mexico City for OLADE meeting.
September 11 - Cuban Party/Government delegation leaves
North Vietnam after attending the 30th
national day festivities. Raul Garcia
Pelaez, member of the PCC secretariat,head-
ed the delegation.
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September 13 - Congolese President Marien Ngouabi ar-
rives in Cuba on state visit. (joint
communique issued September 19, 1975)
September 13 - Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez arrives in Moscow for economic
consultations.
September 14 - Hurricane Eloise damages eastern Cuba.
September 14 - Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
-18 Raul Castro attends Mexican Independence
Celebration.
September 15 - Guyanese Minister for Education and Culture
Shirley Field-Ridley arrives in Havana.
September 16 - A five-year scientific and cultural ex-
change agreement is signed between the
University of Havana and the State Univer-
sity of Guayaquil.
September 17 The Soviet-Cuban Trade Protocol covering
1976 through 1980 is signed in Moscow.
Total Soviet-Cuban bilateral trade is ex-
pected to double during this period.
September 18 - Two Cuban citizens seek political exile
in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana. Their
unauthorized removal by Cuban authorities
causes a temporary strain in Cuban-Venezuelan
relations. At a press conference on Sep-
tember 30 the asylees said they voluntarily
left the embassy.
September 20 - Cuban Ambassador to Lebanon Miguel Brugeras
meets with Yasir Arafat to confirm Cuban
solidarity with the Palestinian cause.
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September 20 - A delegation from the Czechoslovakian
National Assembly arrives in Havana.
Cuba and Italy conclude first meeting
of the Italian-Cuban Commission for
Cultural, Scientific, and Technical Co-
operation.
September 22 - Cuban economic mission arrives in San
Jose, Costa Rica to begin preliminary
talks on reestablishment of commercial
relations.
Seminar on Women's Rights to Education
and Work begins in Havana. Representatives
from 21 countries attend.
September 23 - A group of Ecuadorean newsmen arrive in
Havana at the invitation of the Cuban Jour-
nalists Union.
Talks begin in Budapest on Cuban-Hungarian
Economic and Technical cooperation.
September 24 - Vice Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
arrives in Ottawa for meeting of Cuban-
Canadian Commission on Inter-Governmental
Trade.
September 27 - A Cuban delegation representing the tour-
ism industry arrives in Mexico for a two-
week visit.
Foreign Trade Vice Minister Ricardo
Cabrizas heads Cuban delegation to the
third meeting of Latin American and Carib-
bean Sugar Exporting Countries group.
September 28 - Castro speaks on the 15th anniversary of
the establishment of the Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution.
October 8, 1975
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Approved For Release 2001/08/OeR. W'79T00865A001900170001-4
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01900170001-4
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01900170001-4