SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATION, 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500030056-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: March 22, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500030056-9
"TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE
TO:
Mr. George Carver
ROOM NO.
6F19
BUILDING
Headquarters
REMARKS:
FROM:
O
GC/Legislative Counsel
ROOM NO.
6d0109
BUILDING
Headquarters
FORM
)A I
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
55.
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500030056-9
 6148
March ~2, 1966
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 1 -a result
whelmjngly for it, because we are in a
situation where Senators must support
their own flesh and blood, those who are
in the war zone.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of
a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFIC9ER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk. proceeded to call
the roll. Mr. President, I
Mr. MANSFIELD.
unanimous ask e resinded. the order for
the quorum call
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered..
EXECUTIVE. SESSION
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Senate
may go into executive session to consider
a nomination
PRESIDING Calendar. Is The there
objection?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider executive business.
EMERGENCY LANNING
research organization that produced this of the bombing or artillery fire.
report and who it was. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I would
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It is MY statement. if
understanding that it was the Rand I were intaavil age that lwas bombed, I
Corp.
Mr. CLARK. Therefore, it is not .a su a that most human beings moment-
react be outraged at the CIA report?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No, it is in the think we have tremendously changed
not a CIA report. It was a report pre-
pared by a researcher for a private cor- tthe he extremeomeasuresliwe useuto imini-
poraion.
Mr. CLARK. My understanding is it mite the suffering of the civilian
Which is in striking
resulted from interrogation of PAVN and popuMr. lation.
Vietcong prisoners.
That is contrast to that used by the North
RUSSELL of Georgia.
Mr. true. They interrogated a large number VcM RUSSELL of Georgia. Absolutely.
ll
of prisoners.
Mr. CLARK. I have been concerned
that these bombing attacks and artillery
barrages, which of necessity we use in
connection with our search and destroy
and clearing operations, might have
caused some adverse reaction to the
Americans among the
Vietnam who would omel under the
bombing attacks or artillery fire, and
also, whether this would result in ad-
verse propaganda reaction abroad be-
cause*f the almost
in the courseeofth inevitable killing i attacks.
i wonder if the Senator or the com-
mittee has any information as to the any
particular E pecivilians riod as killed a e during of the
bombing and artillery fire of our troops?
The legislative clerk read the nomina-
tion
Director of the Office of of Emergency
Planning.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
nomination is confirmed.
th
e
objection,
not believe any witness gave us any _~U?~
Mr. President, I
Mr. MANSFIELD.
ask that the President be notified im- ber. Unquestionably some civilians any in destroying rice or other
mediately of the confirmation of the were in the villages and have been killed the hemice2
nomination. both by air attacks, not only by B-52's
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without but other airplanes, and artillery fire. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No, I am
objection, the President will be notified However, let me add that our com- afraid I cannot answer that question,
forthwith. mending officers in South Vietnam have' I do not know how many acres are
taken steps so that no village will be aff ected. I do not think it is a con-
1 the ple siderable amount when measured against
ATIVE SESSION are nobed-or fired upon unt tified by oudspeakerifrom the air the total rice Production c pabilities of
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I of our purpose and intent in order to South Vietnam.
ask unanimous consent that the Senate give all noncombatants an opportunity The Senar great knows prior torice the war
tar
return to legislative session. to leave the village. Even under those they were a exporte of
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without circumstances probably some of them Asiatic world. But now we are export-
objection, it is so ordered. have been killed. ing rice from Louisiana and Arkansas to
The Senate resumed the considera- As .I stated yesterday, any that we help feed them.
tion of legislative business. killed have been killed accidentally, Mr. CLARK. What does the Senator
whereas we know thousands of these peo- think is the principal cause for the de-
SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENSE pie have been killed with premeditated cline in rice production; the fact that
APPROPRIATION, 1966 brutality by the Vietcong and the North the fields have been constantly fought
over?
, LL of Georgia. I think
The Senate resumed the consideration Vietnamese. . CLARK. I have no doubt about Mr. RUSSE
-_ x__} F1,c+ the man that planted his
mental appruyhha-.. _ ..~.. .
ending June 30, 1966, and for other our, people have taken almost every pre
purposes. caution possible in the effort to mini-
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I wonder mize the deaths of civilians. War is a
if the Senator from Georgia would be cruel thing. You cannot fight a war
without everybody suffering, and the
Mr, o questions-
wiMr. to RUSSELL LL of a Georgia. aseries of
Mr. Presi- people in the area where the war is be-
dent, if I -am able to give any information ing fought will, of course, suffer the most.
that will shed any light on this subject, I I think we have taken about every
shall be pleased to do so. precaution possible to minimize deaths
Mr. CLARK. I refer to page 26 of the of the civilians and the innocent. It is some
because
eff
hearings. In the report w
it. hin satwas ed that ford theft first t mennow the civilians are
there was deep-sea a and to help us
This one of peasants whose would clearly being alienate
hatred Of either the South Vietnamese tion of Vietcong units. ground Americans cart Of the research repbombings. avoid ort that the many ambushes into
have Stumbled, whit which our
was placed in the record by the Secretary the principal causes of battle losses we listed, and I wonder whether the denial
p
of the crops destroyed to the Vietcong
of Defense, have suffered.
I wonder if the Senator from Georgia Mr. CLARK. This would seem to in- is worth the psychological Impact Of
ee o permanent alienating the farmers.
knows whether it APPm F 1 ef4 'et"6 C'. ~`~A-RDP80R01720R000500030056-9
o ec r Release 2004/08/30 :'CIA-RDPSO~2OR000500030056-9
11-
Mr. CLARK. If the Senator wi
to page 128 of the hearings, in view'f
the fact that chemical defoliants have
only limited capability against so-called
double growth,
is it i fairly clear that r we are
using these chemical defoliants largely
for crop destruction, as we see in the
newspapers?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think it
I
has been used for both
recall the testimony- But aspI recall it
we have used them in an effort to locate
the many different prongs of the Ho Chi
Minh Trail, which is a series of connect-
Ing roads. We have on
to prevent the Vietcong from
gathering, rice crops that were about to
ripen. -- - - - a,,.,a+,,,. have
crop saw um -- ---
that he would never be able to gather
it for his own use is the major cause. I
understand on occasion Government
troops have made levies on the rice.
it is difficult to force a man to plant
and gather it crop that he is not going
to be able to eat or sell himself. That,
condition
in the simplest terms, is the
that exists in vast areas of Vietnam.
Mr. CLARK. I agree with the Senator
completely. It occurs to me that using
chemicals to destroy crops might well
...r ,... +h.
 Apover Release 20-04/08/30 :6 1A-FDP80R 20R000500030056-9
6149 e Of
March 22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
wagrain to South ys in which the team B are the matte every coc unt of to restore order when hand.
ntry Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am not export
at- us ng tear gas announced that u were
or that I recall this from the testimony e naturally tha Russiane h the
When the staflroftion GeneralaWestm a ambnd, bs of ut he bgrainined heotpeople havee and
seized on that t and lethal said that the this war.
It-is my have been ien ~ used on anyhrice fields where with. the tstatement iof the Senatorlfrom States was d s gases t United
hav
h
cowas any hope whater that the Georgia concerning how uld be harvested by the South story has been told in various films and been told that into ha e used r and have
rice co only tear
there
Vietnamese. It was used only on areas other media when they have been shown gas. We possess lethal gases, and we
where there wac n possibility of aanyo ntithe to the American have them in large quantities. They
have almost
ARK. Is it not true that in d have destruction ut powers
not sent one
except harvesting of Vietcothe ng rice. benefiting from the man y nst inces the Vietcong prefer to descrii tio . lethal gas out n this t one
ess used it against the Viet-
h
I yield to the Senator from Missouri extort a tax from the people as a condi- try much lof of
arket
[Mr. TON] who has spent some grain, to letting as opposed them to destroying it? their Cong in South Vietnam. The gas we
time in n South South Vietnam.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Much of this in- Mr. SYMINGTOm Georgia yield, to Philadelphia, or here in the city of
of Georgia. I Yield. Washington has available to enable it to
been classified, but I would say to my per it me to :reply?
. RUSSELL friend from Pennsylvania that the pri- maintain order.
mart' interest in this particular defolia- Mr. SYMINGTON. In many places Mr. CLARK. What is the view of the
tion is for clearing the jungles, in order the Vietcong do impose a tax. The tax Senator from Georgia and the Senator
that our people know what they are apparently has been custom. It was one from Missouri the Senator
personnel of with the respect chemical to the effect t
attacking when they attack such targets of Ho Chi Minh's customs, when he from
the o, Chi Minh Trail to prevent am- ard his communism in on which we are using?
munition are f the? they have an
a an
effect on the personnel?
, troops and food from coming Vietnam long ago. It t was as part of the whicMr.h wRe USSELL of Georgia. I nubdown said trail to help the Vietcong in destroy
certa in economicllev lebyimposing imposing whether U has any serious effect on pet
their attacks against us.
B
Based on testimony received, the con- confiscatory tax in North Vietnam and sonnel. If we happen to be fortunate
trol of the use of these defoliants is very South Vietnam. In many places, if any- enough to expose a vehicle on a road or
tight. I believe the Senator would be body argued against the tax, he would, in to pick up a few trucks coming down and
Georgia. deIt recall can knock them out, the defoliant has an
satisfied if he obtained the classified typical Vietcong fashion,
testimony, that there has been relatively Mr. RUSSELL adverse effect on that immediate con-
little of it used for destroying any crops. that many areas the farmers were tingent I doubt of whether troops or the defo truck liant its drivers. But
elf has
The testimony supplied me at this compel elled to abandon their crops to had any lethal effect fo the itself has
moment but member of the staff is In- been thus being toctae it with th and Twer he . As a matter of fact, I think
teresting, but I observe there have been thus g unable to take the oath them. The we have done a great many things in
an n hap- civilian population there withoutt anthe y personnel had aryl Vietnam that have been said to have a
Mr. Many many RUSSELL ons of to Georgia. . I useful.
tre
said that Missouri a means harvestoePd the support, crop. even That has though hathey d ad a ter- had magnified o out of reasonable proportion.
confirm what I have said. mendous effect, but that have been
I said to have the Senator from
tendon CLARK. I the invite the the Sf notor
small proportion of defoliation had been rifle effect on the production of rice in Mr.
bomb-
question our on crops, and only in vesti n o where So Mr Vietnam. To return briefly to the ing and the contemplated bombing of
we knew that the harvesting crops North Vietnam. I am glad the Senator
would d rebound to the benefit t of o the Viet- question of chemical warfare, the Sen-
o Missouri is in the Chamber, because
food. by supplying them with essential ator are awareI know-She senators this from is a subject in which he has inter-
It d himself deeply.
It is very true that our p o s i t i o n t h e have said so-that war is a nasty bush- war and the mistakes we have made e have ness. It no
t always possible to fight -tie do the Senators age 42 the statement of
been photographers all over er the world. The a war according to the marquis of y doe the Se McNamara?
news photoof television net- Queensberry rules. The use e of gas by The quantities of men and the quantities
our have been permitted to accompany our troops n South Vietnam enabled the
into
of materiel involved in the the quantities
our people.. The tragic pictures of little Russians mount a a propaganda offer- South Vietnam one small,
children who have been of sive at at the to e Disarmament Conference in
mothers weeping over their dead, and Geneva last week. They spent the bet-the h
mmunist llies, c tigat- papers~thatnthe tram ofbinfilt ation wof
of those ave been transmitteed all up their wounds ter part over the word two of their day,
For every one of those instances there ing the United States for violating the men from the north was about 4,500 a
have been a dozen instances in which the Geneva Convention in connection with month. On the other hand, the Secre-
Vietcong ha have done ace delntally, but we ha ye not thIt may well be that the u eaof gas is year only aboutt 0 000 gmen infiltrated
had the means to present that to the reasonably humane-at least as humane from the north, with the exception of the
of the hearings,
world. That is one the disadvantages as shooting the bombs on ithem, Itrmaalso said, shown at page 42 of t
of living In an open society. dropping
Frankly, , I think that in some cases the be necessary. But I do point out the nthat he orth oats mlithe infiltration from the
disseminators of news should have been adverse propaganda effect.
more judicious in the showing of some of Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sen- p-Mrr.. RUSSELL of o gia rItaalll de-
these films and In the statements that ac- ator from Pennsylvania well knows that being smallcompanied the films that indicated that the Russians are masters of propaganda. Would the Senator from
our soldiers were careless and were delib- They can seize a little, isolated incident, Mr. CLARK. that uld the month woo
erately killing the civilian Population. take it out of context, and make it ap- be about agree the correct a
Mr. SYMINGTON. I agree complete- pear to be a terrible crime against hu- Mr. RUSSELL c Georgia. I should
ly with the distinguished Senator from manity. That was what I had in mind think that that is a fair estimate of
Georgia. One of the tricks the Viet- when I was discussing the news releases troops coming at is from North mate of
tong has been using is to wait until crops and matters of that kind,
at the present time.
were ready for harvesting, then to . into The fact it that there Is not a coun-
Mr. present The 4,800 has reference
chi fields and cut os the the men, womenn, and try earth that is not using people. this type e of is to personnel.
CLnel. ts own to bri n pieces as they wero working gas against ahaveiused again tleth The
children
to in the grain.
One ne of the chief assns why it has what is referred to as "tear gas." This ? MectRUSSEI'I' of Georgia. That
been necessary for h~lt~Re1E S4 t l i?- bfgff6k0~7ee. 500030056-9
 Apple veer Release 2004/08/30: CIA-R P80R20R000500030056-9
6150,' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Mr. CLARK. I understand, of course,
that they carry supplies at least suffi-
cient to support the personnel.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Not only
for the 4,500, but also to supply the
250,000 Vietcong and North Vietnamese
regulars who are engaged in the war.
Mr. CLARK. I have heard it said that
the amount of tonnage coming down the
Ho Chi Minh trail this year is quite in-
significant. As I recall, the committee
had testimony to that effect. Perhaps
the Senator from Missouri will recall
that testimony before the Committee on
Foreign Relations. Much of the tonnage
came on bicycles.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not
agree that the amount is small or insig-
nificant. That is not my own estimate
of the situation. I have read everything
that has been written on the war be-
? tween Vietminh and the French, and
the amount of materiel of war that those
people were able to move around on their
heads and backs, on bicycles, and in
baskets is absolutely staggering to the
human imagination.
An occidental army could not begin
to exist if it were forced to supply itself
in the manner in .which the North Viet-
namese and the Vietcong are compelled
to do today. I think that they move a
considerable quantity of supplies. I be-
lieve that we have slowed them down
somewhat by this bombing. But we have
not interdicted them completely, and we
never will. That is why I have advo-
cated closing the Haiphong Harbor in
addition to knocking out the two rail-
roads from China.
Mr. President, I yield to my friend, the
Senator from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
this discussion is interesting. I happen
to have a very high regard for the fight-
ing characteristics of the American mili-
tary. They have been sent to South
Vietnam to defend the United States.
They cannot ever expect success on a
man-to-man basis because there are so
many millions of people out there able
to fight in this war. Therefore, they see
quality as their only hope, quality of mu-
nitions, quality of supplies.
It is interesting to watch the develop-
ment of these curious discussions in the
newspapers and on the radio and tele-
vision in the United States, concerning
what we should or should not supply in
the way of quality in our supplies, so as
to help these young men to be success-
ful in what they have been sent out there
to do.
I am in complete agreement with my
colleague from Georgia on the impor-
tance of destroying the docks at Hai-
phong. Nobody knows what and how
much is coming through that harbor.
It is little more than some 150 miles
at the most to Haiphong from Red China.
It is a relatively simple trip, one which
can be taken, and is being taken by
many ships, ships owned by countries
not friendly to the United States, as well
as ships by countries that are friendly
to the United States. But what worries
me most is this slow but steady effort
.to denigrate the qualitative advances
trialized nation
d
hl
i
hi
n
us
y
g
which, as a
, 1 10 1959.
we can offer our forces, Approved For ICE 1 $ '/l / ~"' CIA-RDP80 TT ffl&b6b~30b56-9
Nobody has considered the use of nu-
clear weapons. Nor should they. But
many people apparently are worried
about the amount of bombing we are
doing in Vietnam. They are also worried
about this limited defoliation. They ask
about the use of gas, as the Senator from
Georgia pointed out, a gas that does not
permanently hurt people, one used all
over the United States by policemen,
in carrying out their duties in our cities.
People are worried about the type and
caliber of our airplanes. They wonder
whether these airplanes are too big, or
too fast, Perhaps the words airplane,
bomb, chemical defoliators and other
words expressing our quality will be es-
tablished soon as dirty words. What will
the result be?
I have seen many rifles that were
manufactured in China and Russia.
These rifles are placed in the hands of
the Vietcong and people from the north
who live on a small amount of rice, have
never had a good life and never expect
much change.
We take a college graduate from the
United States and put him in the jungle.
He has a rifle. The Vietcong referred
to has a rifle which is just as good as the
rifle manufactured in the United States.
If the situation continues to develop
as it is developing, soon the only way in
which we will be willing to defend-free-
dom will be by putting our men out with
rifles to fight with their men with a
rifle. It.would then become a numbers
game, a game which, in my opinion, our
position would be hopeless from the
standpoint of success; -and it would also
involve heavy additional casualties.
Mr. President, I have a statement I
would make if the Senator from Georgia
would yield.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I have
the floor.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
understand the Senator from Pennsyl-
vania had the floor for an hour, that he
had asked for an hour.
Mr. CLARK. The Senator is quite
correct.
Mr. SYMINGTON. If the Senator
would yield, I thought the Senator from
Georgia had the floor, was so told by a
member of the staff.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I shall
yield to the Senator from Missouri, but
I should like to have the RECORD show
that, having completed my comments in
something less than an hour, I yielded
the floor. Several other Senators took
the floor.
I came back and asked if the Senator
from Georgia would be willing to answer
a few remaining questions which I had
not had the opportunity to ask him
yesterday. He very graciously said that
he would.
We were in the middle of that colloquy
when the Senator from Missouri came in.
Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, I do
appreciate the Senator yielding to me.
There are only 20 minutes remaining
before the vote.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may yield to
the Senator from Missouri so that he
March 22, 1966
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
thank the able and distinguished Sen-
ator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. President, during recent weeks and
months, there has been much discussion
on this floor of the various Communist
units, political and military, in North
Vietnam and South Vietnam, primarily
the Vietcong and the National Libera-
tion Front; also others.
Many different statements and inter-
pretations of the structure and function-
ing of these units have been made a part
of the RECORD-to the point where,
frankly, I have been somewhat unclear
about the history and the actions of
these various components.
Now, and perhaps for the first time
in summarized fashion, a clear and con-
cise presentation has been made by a
scholar of political theory and Asian af-
fairs, who also has served in Vietnam.
Anyone who wants better understand-
ing of what has been and is going on in
the relationship between the Ho Chi
Minh government of North Vietnam and
the Communists of South Vietnam will
be intensely interested in this article.
Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that
an article "The Faceless Vietcong" by
George A. Carver, Jr., be printed at this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From Foreign Affairs, April 19681
THE FACELESS VIETCONG
(By George A. Carver, Jr.)
"We [the Lao Dong (Communist), Party)
are building socialism in Vietnam, We are
building it, however, only in half of the
country, while in the other half, we must
still bring to a conclusion the democratic-
bourgeois and anti-imperialist revolution.
Actually, our party must now accomplish,
contemporaneously, two different revolu-
tions, in the north and in the south. This
is one of the most characteristic traits of our
struggle."
-Ho CHr MINE, June 19591
The present struggle in South Vietnam
is in essence the third act of a continuous
political drama whose prologue spanned the
1930's, whose first act was played in the
years between 1941 and 1945, and whose
second encompassed the 1946-54 Franco-Viet
Minh war. The scene of major action in this
drama has shifted several times, as have
the identities of the auxiliary players (e.g.
the Chinese Nationalists, the British, the
French, the Chinese Communists and now
the Americans) and the political guises of
some of the principals. Throughout its
course, however, the unifying theme of this
drama has been the unrelenting struggle of
the Vietnamese Communist Party to acquire
political control over all of Vietnam. Its
chief protagonists, furthermore, have always
been and are today the small, dedicated and
doctrinaire group who, under Ho Chi Minh's
guidance and direction, organized and nur-
tured Vietnam's Communist Party during
the 1930's, usurped the nationalist revolu-
tion after World War II and subverted it to
their ends. They are the same men who
1 From a Hanoi interview by two corres-
pondents of the Italian Communist Party
journal Units, published in Units on July 1,
 Approve,
March ,222, 1966
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
run the Communist state already established
in North Vietnam and who who are now
directing the insurgency designed to bring
the southern part of the country under their
domination,
The tern "Vietcong" came into circulation
around 1958 as a means of distinguishing
some of the players in the current act of this
ongoing political drama from the players in
act II. "Vietcong" is a contraction of the
phrase "Vietnam Cong-San," which means,
simply, "Vietnamese Communist(s)." It Ir-
a descriptive term, not necessarily pejorative
except, perhaps, in the sense of "if the shoe
fits. .. It is & useful, precise and, as we
shall see, accurate generic label for the in-
dividuals leading the present insurgent
movement, at all levels, and for the organ-
izational structure through which that in-
surgency is controlled and directed.
Not surprisingly, the reactions of many
whose concern with Vietnam is of recent ori-
gin are analogous to those of theatergoers
who walk into the middle of the third act of
an extremely complex drama ignorant of
what has gone before. To understand the
Vietcong insurgency, its relationship to the
North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi (the
D.R.V.) and to the National Liberation
Front and the People's Revolutionary Party
in South Vietnam (and "their" respective in-
terrelationships), it is essential to appreci-
ate the historical setting within which the
Vietcong movement developed and the ends
it was created to serve.
Throughout their almost four decades of
unremitting struggle for political power, the
Vietnamese communists have demonstrated
great skill in coping with. new problems and
great tactical flexibility in pursuing unwav-
ic objectives. Yet, though skill-
trate
i
,
g
ng s
er
ful in learning from past failures, they have the discerning was considerably attenuated oessful in harassing the French and further-
ing become the victims of previous sue when the same day witnessed the formation the cause of the nationalist revolution,
cesses. For the past quarter-century the e of a new "Association for Marxist Studies." Binh--a former member of the Communists'
Vietnamese Costs have been doc- Complete control over the Vietminh and the most militant nationalist rivals, the
trinally addicted d to to the political device of a subsequent resistance struggle, however, re- VNQDD--was never fully trusted by the
broad front organization, dominated and mained unchanged in essentially the same Communist high command in the north and
controlled from behind the scenes by dis- hands as those which control North Vietnam came to be considered excessively independ-
ed Communist cadres, but espousing and the insurgency below the 17th parallel ant. In 1951 he was replaced by Le Duan, a
general sentiments to which persons of all today.2
the inclinations can subscribe (though By the late spring of 1946, the fact of chartnisiei Party who member is of the now first Indochhineese e C Coofmu-
tu-
the formulation of these sentiments has in- Communist control over the Vietminh (de- Communist Party in North Vietnam and one
variably involved a special lexicon of key ey spite the "nonexistence" of the party) was of the most powerful figures in the Hanoi
terms to which communists and non-com- becoming increasingly apparent, as was the regime. Until 1954, and perhaps even later,
They munists attach radically different meanings). fact that Ho's political maneuvering and Le Duan continued to play a major role in
They have always rigidly subordinated mil- stalling negotiations with the returning dand directing the Vietminh orga-
itary activity to political ends, and employed French were not going to work. In prepara- developing evel nization in the south and in ensuring that it
it not to inflict strategic defeat on enemy tion for the inevitable struggle, Ho endeav- remainded under firm Communist control.
forces in the conventional sense, but as an ored to broaden the Communists' base of na- However, in late 1952 or early 1953 he was
abrasive to wear down their adversaries' will tionalist support. In May 1946 he announced apparently compelled to share his authority
to fight and force their enemies to accept in- the creation of a new "popular national with Le Due Tho, the present head of the
terim political settlements favorable to the front" (Lien-Hiep Quoc Dan Vietnam), North Vietnamese Communist Party's Orga-
objectued pursuit of Communist political known as the Lien Viet, whose announced ob- nization Bureau and also a member of its
objectives. jective was the achievement of "Independ- Politburo.'
Because of this Vietnamese Communist ence and democracy." The Vietminh was The 1949 Communist victory in China had
penchant for repeating political and military merged with, and eventually absorbed by, the
stratagems, a knowledge of recent Vietnam- Lien Viet, though its name remained to serve a profound influence on the course of events
as a generic label for those who participated in Vietnam, particularly after the Vietminh
standing particularly helpful in under-
standing the e present insurgency. Although in the subsequent armed struggle against the offensive in the fall of 195() cleared the
westerners may be largely ignorant of the French. The Communists also brought into French out of the frontier area and gave the
Vietminh a common border with their new
scenario and detailed plot development Of the Lien Viet two other small splinter parties Communist neighbor. The mtltary conse-
the previous acts of of Vietnam's s continuing which by then were under complete Com- of ensuring Chinese Communist sup-
political drama, the Vietnamese most deefd- munist control: the "Democratic Party," de- quences
to the Vietminh cause are fairly well
are not. Virtually all politically minded inded signed to appeal to "bourgeois elements" port
Viet
Vietnamese have spent at least their adult- (i.e. urban trade, business, and professional known. The political consequences, less well
hood, if not their whole lives, during the circles), and the "Radical Socialist Party," known in the West, were of at least equal
Communist struggle for power. Few indeed designed to enlist the sympathies of students significance. With an increasingly powerful
fraternal ally in immediate proximity, the
have not had their lives altered, conditioned
appreciating and intellectuals. Communist leadership of the Vietminh be-
or sh. what te The war with the French broke out on
what t the Viettnanames ese have lived through and and
without recognizing some of the things they
know intimately-often from all-too-flrst- 'Despite the party Communists' ? During the ~ientl2ihad a violent quarrel
hand experience-Westerners cannot hope to claim that their art did not "exist" under Le Due Too apparently rom liv ngssou htof theil7 h parallel toward the 1953,n the fCominform until 1951, on journal noted Aug. ghat to settle. The details of h th is dispute are till
20,000 in 1946 to 5 01,00hin these obscurt twoe, ehas resultanevert ben enmitbetween
y insuenc, the Vieng, the
eration Front and the Communist regime in Communist arty
19?0. dissipated.
Hanoi.
No. 49----3 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500030056-9
it
Under the direction of the man who now
calls himself He Chi Minh, the Indochinese
Community Party was organized in January
1930. For the next decade the Vietnamese
Communists concentrated on perfecting their
organization, Jockeying for Post on within
the rising anti-French nationalist move-
ment and attempting to undercut national-
ist leaders or groups whom they could not
subvert or bring under Communist control,
using any means available, including be-
trayal to the French.
In 1941, the Vietnamese Communists joined
a nationalist organization called the League
for Vietnamese Independence (Vietnam Doc
Lap Dong Minh Hoi-or Vietminh) which
was sponsored by the Chinese Nationalists as
a vehicle for harassing Japanese forces in
Indochina but swiftly subverted by the Viet-
namese Communists to further their own
political objectives. By 1945 the Vietminh
movement was under complete Communist
control, despite the continued presence and
subordinate participation therein of non-
Communist nationalist elements whose
names and talents the Communists were
more than willing to exploit. In the chaotic
aftermath of Japan's precipitate surrender,
the communists used the Vietminh as a
device for seizing power in Hanoi and (on
September 2, 1945) proclaiming the existence
of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam"
under the presidency of He Chi Minh.
On November 11, 1946, in an effort to make
the Vietminh government more palatable to
non-Communist Vietnamese and to the Chi-
nese Nationalist forces then occupying Viet-
nam down to the 16th parallel, Ho formally
"dissolved" the Indochinese Communist
though the impact of this gesture on
Party
December 19, 1946, and its general course
is sufficiently well known to require no re-
hearsal here. The northern part of Viet-
nam constituted the principal theater of
military operations; the struggle in the south,
though intense, was primarily a terrorist
and harassing action designed to keep the
French off balance and prevent them from
concentrating either their attention or their
forces on the war in the north. Though the
Vietminh achieved these objectives, their ef-
forts in South Vietnam were beset with a
continuing series of problems. French con-
trol of the sea, air, and major overland routes
left the Vietminh in the south dependent
for supplies, reinforcements, cadres, and com-
munications on a tortuous set of jungle
tracks running through Laos (along the
western slopes of the Annamite Chain) which
came to be known, collectively, as the "He
Chi Minh trail." Saigon politics were con-
siderably more complex than those of Hanoi,
and non-Communist Vietnamese political
groups were both more numerous and more
powerful in the south than they were in
the north. Furthermore, the Communist
leaders of the Vietminh had a series of com-
mand and control problems with their south-
ern organization which took several years
to resolve.
In 1945, the senior Vietminh representative
in southern Vietnam was a Moscow-educated
disciple of Ho Chi Minh and the Third In-
ternational named Tran Van Giau, whose
blatant ruthlessness and indiscriminate ter-
rorist tactics alienated key groups that the
Vietminh were anxious to bring into their
fold, such as the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and Binh
Xuyen. Giau was accordingly recalled to
Hanoi in January 1946 and his duties as Viet-
minh commander in the south were assumed
 ApproveJor Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000500030056-9
SENATE March 22, 1966
6152 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD miffed and, by implication at least, apologies
, Ho Chi Minh a ain . Truong
dependent on the after accomplishing its purpose a logiea. were tendered. Ho wept ( general of the
came progressively leas Chinh resigned as Secretary-
good will and support of non-Communist made The next phase Of athe Copmmuniisst pro Party (though he remained as member of its one of hi's Vietnamese gram, implemented during 1953 and 1054, Politburo) ; so too did the DRV's vice min-
now be sit be si nationalists. The mask could
labelled "Land Rent later for land reform. General Giap made a
ipped. The fact of Communist was euphemfsttcaily and spe-P ection of the Vietminh no longer speech to the 10th congress of tour arty
concealed, the instruments of Communists cially Reduction." Carefully selected
trained teams of hardcore Communist Central Committee during 02
acknowledged a long list of "errors"
control could be made more effective, the ant went quietly to each and mentioned that 12,000 Party members
ture of that control more rigid and its extent Chinese soadvlsers'hich amost cer1 there- which he
more pervasive. made friends with the poorest had been released from jails to which they
The first major step in this direction was village. oanized them into cells and helped had been unjustly consigned. (HOW many
taken on March S. 1951, when the Into- were imprisoned in the first place was never their more stated.) The apologies and explanations,
chinese Communist Party reappeared asthe them to draw up lists classifying however, provided an overwhelming body of
or Vietnamese prosperous neighbors with respect to wealth,
Deng Lao Dong Vietnam, status, political leanings and rev theionan what had ac-
bong swiftly as- irrefutable evidence regarding process the
ed Workers' a position Party. of The Lao absolute political pri- zeal. Once all was in readiness,
it ,in the macy wtthiri the Lien Viet front, though for reform battalions" came out in the open, ef le as one of transpired
party ( that hout the whole mitted) had
its sp and made it abundantly Dom appearances' sake me i ned above and set kangaroo courts and administered ocratic" eo le's justice" to exploiters" n admitted)
the principle that "it is better
e. The overt enovert above were reconstitution and summary "' peoples P Each land-reform team bad been guided by
"Socialist"
was doubtless a preassigned quota of death sentences and o kill ten innocent people than to let one
in et ins existence. fenence. Parties
kept
a variety Party enemy escape."
of the communist
prompted by of consiprbabl sthe these lquotas were seldom underfu1fl11ed.aIn
which the most important wasp ply addition to calculated and extensive use of in the midst of the events we have so
mer t covert eta a domination of to at a Writ a terror, the Communists marshalled all the described, the 1954 Geneva Confer-
motyetha
very nc a clandestine app pettiness, jealously and vindictiveness of briefly
close and ended the eecondlact o Vietnam
awy existence had inefficient iIt be concealed ne an political ends. The once
awkward and n persuasion ell as pcarried out pextended not only resent political drama. This conference
coercion and, reliance further, as well task punishments stripped of produced a set of four interrelated dock-
(one each known foe Laos, collectively as Cambodia the and e Geneva -
oithin advancing Communist Vietminh t rel. the to stheir essions, turned who out were the homes, p convicted of "crimes" but within those areas under Vietminh elytn&- their means of ba n out l their livelihood men produced
The Vietminh was ostensibly a purely na denied means of obtaining a livelihood and cords. Three were cease-fire agreements
ean unsigned "Final Deciara-
tfo nl movement dedicated to the in goals deprived of the documentation (e.g., became, ration, - and t whose h an status is nal to dis-
of independence and democracy; its stated cards) essential to existence in a Commu- and on, the A. fourth variety df al external pis pe consid-
objective (luring the first phase e of the armed d med nisi-controlled society. They
erations and pressures (including French do-
struggle ch. The was simply to throw out cially, nonpersons" whom it was a crime P
politics) had considerably more -
emergence "new ght forth afneweslogan: vistsuor. e fact at many as and far larger numbs s ooittheirim- mastic
rialist and the antifeudal mediate relatives writ suffered the attendant fluence ec the language of the accords
patty,rhowever brou
fTht anti-imps Vietnam. The problem of extricating France than nce:' What this consequences had taken an active part to the the objective realities of the situation 1n
fights are of equal imports arent during resistance against the French was considered
meant became aingly app raeeiuAy as possible was effectively solved
et
the course of a a systeminitiaatic took b o ilmmune fromlthe judgmentsooietheg'peo0 B d om the her shooting was to as eff Indochinese entang hay sol em
the Communists soon more fundamental questions regarding
years to complete. It was designed to make pie's courts." not even life-long mem er an
vio- min's political future were ignored or swept
the party itself more doctrinally orthodox the Communist Party. at n was under the rug. At the time, the accords'
a he ti
and to restructure too whole society, at least Despite its incredible barber! Y tivel unimportant, since most oY the confer-
of North Vietnam, along lines consonant with lance, the land rent reduction camp ante's participants
ih fl in fi ue dogma. stages, This n cad am was con- but a preliminary-and a mild one by com- crucial lacuna; and mbiguitles , seemed
rf arisen-to the land reform campaign proper Y
"th considered it virtually Communist
ante eg d rds
y iantensive s ensive s pressio o- onsns of p which followed end which lasted from 1954 enco a that all of Vietnam would soon be b thought reform" ht reform" for r both
art and non- until l 1956. Esse eiemploy oye same methods bent and (ie it was thought)
ruled by esteemed " a VieUncle Ho:tminh ' The regime ir headedoo significance did
that p Y they would u, ds
they were about to larger scale (e.B? the universtallyhe
partyexecute cadres to the insure orders to and techniques were emed but mandatory on a quota muc o! Bn
death sentences and imprisonme No one wi 1 not become manliest until several years later.
.
fact
receive. st e, village was Increased fivefold).
launched to s1951 ent was designed to ruin the ever know the exact human cost of these Although the era redecessor attended of the the pres conier-
The first or "economic leveling" a6
,
wealthier peasantry and the urban bntnes- two campslBns, but the number of people ant Saigon government "
men (to the extent that French contrrol of killed was probably on the order of 100,000, once (as the "Associated State of g fro Vietnam
name or assigned it
of the i ntit n The Vietnam s eit
the towns permitted this) through a compll and the number who suffered dire millio ersona n. no neva
a sated system of arbitrary and punitive taxes s hardship was probably hasua helf alf a onof any rights rment or s tus. by Franca general
the was a
a1 ns had a P
patterned w Chinese Communist models a Since North Vietnam h~uivalent to that on French behalf of Union the " Forces in Commander in Indochina" Chief of and Y
as, o indeed, were ail phases of thse V nd stage about 18 micto r ughly camp g
C
was a shor program' The ror l la steed whicl would ldt a felt iA lnif th the the DRV's Vice Minister it National Defense
was a exhort, sharp wave of terroaunched which wo be felt n America if the U.S.
h, a week before Tee, murder oY over a million American citizens. Pe behalf of the "Commander in Chief oft e
nt re parts 53 No Vietnam one Government
eveening ning in Feb ebruary 1953 we r a mil on egg Peopled Army of Vietnam: In discufs deliberately t e
m the
akes a
sustained for pre- The rationale for this politically motivated zones" (art. 14),
ev
cisely fifteen days b The patent objectives of cism of was ro na es the mdogmatic munist leader- olitical eg r aeand ing s (a r administrative meas
In elections wesch
the lunar new year, and r
- the Vietnamese Communist leaders two rgr efp en z n
this terror campaign were to cow the popu rosi
lace, in preparation for what lay ahead, and shipof ship. The fact that only a small percentage P
had gds was sac- a i l bring bout the is in fled in t membership resistan e
final not tio a (which tole
resistate all potential centers as s utti f letarian Or party oor peasant" orig dr a otheme al~pllfled but
ce. When the terror was shut o8 trinally embarrassing and made a p B deadline) . Nowhere was it sp
no large doctrinally madatory. Dogma required that a July 1956 h of various
h Vietnam had virtually the "feudal-landlord" class be eliminated. fle ed to vote onlor how the rights w vario
Though no such class really existed in North P the
businesinesses in the Western sense; Viennameere e
e "capitalists" by trio Lao Do B w yletnam, it had to be created se that 1t elements within the Vietnamese boolypolitic,
termd
generally what we would term small boat- could be destroyed. The object of the axes- were on g to be government protected. obj Not ected formally and
au rlsi par there neasmen
cise was to purge the party, restructure Sai to these vague and earl dicta
thor merchants. ahO n North Viet
inequities !n land ownership i North Vietnamese society, smash all real strenuously these agreements
daam, the Red River Delta had the moat ex- potential opposition, and Impose an iron grip ip concerning Vietnam's future fate, stressing
terk; ound s pattern of private ownership be ever unfortunate, were "necessary:" tonnd o Asia and s were fir- of Communist control. The excesses, how- a that it was Van not a Cht, " party From Coionislism to
f
haty n no large arge "fa eudal" holdingngs o of the kind Once the land rent reduction and land Hoan6 Lyndon: Pall Mall, 1984
? even existed in pig-Co to regio China, h reform campaigns bad accomplished their 213. This
even in the Mekong Delta region of South objectives, the Lao Dong In 1956 opened the co o pa gar, New Fork), P?
Vietnam. rtant traditional final phase of its five-step program. It was ( of the events we have outlined
Tat the most imps to
Vtudy of se scholar and former lin Vietnamese se family and religious holiday. dnown as the "Rectification e Errors" and tailed ie y
Communist version of "normalcy:" The ex- mtnh cadre merits trio easeful attention of
a terror wave just before Tet In designed to restore Nororth h Vietnam tY the by a interested in Vietnamese enaio
Launching
Vietnam 1s like launching one a week before s of a nt ass were ogleiall a - an one
Corlstmsa in the UniAP moved For ReF&A'Se 2'db ~68/ 0 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000500030056-9
 Approve or-Release 2004/08/30: CIA-RDP80R01720R000500030056-9
ECORD - SENATE
6153
March 22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL reaching were Marxist doctrine. bushed and
Article 14(d) of the Vietnam cease-ire P v
A pattern of
and hence could not consider itself bound by agreement promised that civilians could small flit rya units committees organized. Genev referred. The Communists accepted politically motivatthe ed terror
representatives eofethe
Some of Ho's lieutenants felt that the move freely to Whichever "regrouping zone" directed against this provision with a
en" implementation in a Saigon government and conceentratted o rthe
Geneva settlement had cheated them of the they p hindered its imp very bad and the very g ood. full fruits of their victory, but reason on the whole variety Of ways rid eventually. when its ap were liquidated to win favor with the peas-
the communists had no n s die- t variety Of ante; the latter because their effectiveness
in satisfied with the results. The land-reform Y was a bar to the achievement of Communist
and the ntda- placation becam violated itha Despite all embarrass-
was then full cry
, fled objectives. The terror was directed not Only
tion of Communist control over the oe inunst intimidation obstruction and har-
was the task i since its assment, however, some 900,00O people them- against officials but against all whose opera-
was the immediately tand
htions ealth organizedlea political essential societye functioning
south could wait, Particularly _ schoolteachers,
chances of survival as an independent politi- from the north to the south uprooting cultural officials, etc?
selves the Ho Chi Se Minh's order
and cal entity seemed nil at the time. went through living under relative population sizes, n the The Lao Dong leadership equivalent of 9 mil- The scale and scope of this terrorist and in-
llanee with the thismwas they political equi an a sctivity mounted slowly but
the rnotions of overt comp the end of 1958 the participants
provisions of the 'Vietnam cease-fire ok~ agree- riu lion Americans leaving the United States.) steadil . By
merit, though in doing so they oten~ in this incipient insurgency, Whom Saigon
reserve a subversive p AS many as 400,000 more wanted to cle 1, and steadily. termed the "Vietcong:' can-
ber of steps to p but were not permitted by the Communist quite accurately threat to South Vietnam's
no to do so under article 14 political stability' s
stituted ac a serious contin, tial in the south and thus insure themselves were entitled
against unfavorable politicalreementa some authorities to depart. trouble that Viet-
were accordance with the " regrouped in rile 2-Year period from 1954 to 1958 was P and despite the
Vietminh troops Wer re re one of political progress and achievement in Despite the increasing
50,0,00 specified areas below the 17th parallel and South Vietnam that would have been con- . tong bands were causing
specif
taken north, along with 25,000-odd Vietminh sidered impossible at the time of Geneva. Vietcong's initial success in organizational with the
rk, Hanoi was far from and satisfied pth the
rters. The Communists , prevailed In the sum- wo of Vietcong
adherents and adres, whitd protests larly chagrined at the movement's failure to
a were very network of ca~clres careful, however, to leave behind The ter of 1956 situation forced which Hanoi to take stock of its pace political following.
unist prosects. The rather pro for amsln Pg of the win a really significant were instructed members who were
est that He- Several Vietcong cadre
to blend into the scenery, madpe by North Vietnam at the p
affiliation and agitate in favor of the sched- by the subsequently captured have reported that in
uled elections. They also left behind a large Geneva election deadline Bugg
fact that the elections were not held as they late 1958 Le Dean himself was sent on an
number oY weapons caches (3,561 of which noi's rulers were not soperturbed between extensive inspection trip in the south, and
return to Hanoi in early Lty
ecommendations sub-
were discovered between September 1954 and resented a re ti a of r
lethe 17th ss than that upon his Central
June 1959) against the day when their south- politicala life anortri and south disparl
aratus might have to augment politi- P a contrast considerably ted by the Lao Doug
ern app parallel,
cal action with armed forces. The compost- P to their regime. The north was sequentt ?p Resoluttan 15:' These
tion of the units taken north was alsocible juste emorgiring from the throes of the land- Committee and referred to in Vietcong cadre
a recommendations laid out the whole future
fully structured with an eye to possible and was in a state of ece- training sessions as
insurgency, including
future needs. The Communists made sure reform camp political stability and course of southern ha National Liberation
that massy of the persons involved were p ictures of inicreasing l south presented
the Central Com-
young, employing both coercion and imprese- incipient prosperity. the merit to get the kind of people that they recognized that more Front to be controlled by
by a
departed, personnel Hanoi accordingly required if the south mittee of the South Vied amen branch of
supported
wanted. Before they decisive action wou Id be req _ The
designated for r tent were strdere with conducting a
encouraged or, in many many cases, directly ordered was to be brought under its control. In- the Lao Dong
Vietnamese wit armed
alli- structions were transmitted to the Commu- South Charged
ates force,
in South Vietnam. These would stand nisi network to contract local marriages and family behind in the south direct- Front was to be
these cadres to begin agitation and political struggle, backed by ever had to Ing political organization. Partdesi designed to neutralize the ;' south ,a and pave
The Lao Dong
them in good stead if they political
return. the area set up a department of its central committee the way for "Hanoi. Wreunification can be certain
south Of the 17th parallel was in a state of called the Cmade espo sible for Dap matter, domination by
political the aftermath of Geneva, 1959 the Lao Dong
Concerning individuals who had been re- this time, for In May
olitical chaos bordering on anarchy. July 11190 7, which was made rspnsinlethepost been me- , that thiCentral s time, or ieecdeclaredethat "the time
heroically and per,
Dinh Diem, who became of a government, nn ent, no grouped to the north during year has come to struggle
1954. had only the shell of a government, no - The follow Nguyen severingly to smash [the GVNI."
competent civil In additn n to all its tother rust (1 57) a aPAVNfmajora genera named g Y I during the 18
namedichairmanroYpthia The consequences Of there se Hanoi decisions served various -
worthy army. the Franco- became increasingly apparent
posts in the south during months which followed the Central le and
difficultieVan s, the Diem government sable Penh, who had
Com soon faced with an unexp an office he still tutee's May 1959 meeting. The to in
The major myth that magnitude: the refugees Vietminh from was a purely the purerely ly Reunification Department, med intensity of Vietcong activity began holds. Period was unusually complex, intens by quantum jumps. activity Communist mill-
orl the corridor area
Vietnamese movement to whicholitical)ails' The 19156-58 Viet p
Vietnamese freely gave their p the North Vietnamese border and in-
glance , moving glance and that "Uncle down was almost aril- even even for r Vietnam. Diem, in effect, reached tary moves in Laos secured
t' loved and esteemed by his com- his political high-water mark sometime along
, prosoon after around mid-1957. After that, his methods the "Ho Chi ound 3,000 Minh Trail": aafew hundred 10,000
patriots was rudely shattered
in , of patriots by what became, tiiotically ence son rationhis tramilyf character anwith ever 1959, ax n 19: a and huover
ndrin became set one of history's most spectacular cular Poll increasing rigidity along lines which ulti- in 1981.
Despite the un- During 1959 and 1960 further evolution of
motivated migrations. mately led to his downfall. Deeara, his gov- the various stresses within the South Viet-
_ deniable progress of its early y politic occurred. Diem's milt-
dto
the American position was formally ermnent was never successful in giving g ththe teary namese body P establishm ent had been
enunciated by President Eisenhower in a bulk of the South Vietnamese peasantry their per- ' counter the threat of Convedesigned esinsurrec-with July 2.1 , 1954, statement, which part: ositive reasons for identifying 111 suited to cope of ovinvasi n
+ the United State has not said id i not itself been P
administrators Diem posted to the country- tionary warfare. The quality g than bet
or bound by the decisions taken by administrators fortunes with its political hhuse. The and proved
lined, to
party to
the Conference, but it is our hope that it side were often corrupt and seldom native to administrators grew worse to but inclined, In
the areas to which they were assigned, a ter as Diem became increasing Y incloyalty to
His
will lead to the establishment of peace con- al , P
countries with the rights and needs of the fact which caused them to be considered as making key Pointtmentsments to the disastrous
countries concerned. The agreement uon- f foreigners" by the intensely clannish and himself and olicies family particularly ahead
of ability. a taint features which we do not like, b provincial peasantry. Land policies, often agrarian c am ti 1larl the d fresh
program
great deal depends on how they work In admirable in phraseology, were notably weak "agrovillef
in execution and frequently operated to the sources of rural discontent. The Vietcong
were quic
practice,
"The United States is issuing at Geneva a benefit of absentee landlords rather than merit's errors and steadily heightened the
To com-
statement to the effect that it is not pre- those who actually tilled the soil. intensity of their trroristta activity. the
pared to join in the conference declaration. Such factors as these, coupled with the plicate matters further there were rising po-
o say that, in compliance with the still manifest consequences a decade of litical pressures within the non-Communist
as loyal members of the United Nations, generated genuine grievances among camp and a growing feeling ha
we air Diem
iples peasantry which the communists were to be ousted before his methods of govern-
obligations iand prinorce contained in art, war, g mane made a Communist victory
2 a the United Nations Charter, the United the P err their organ
quick to exploit and ex izational1SOrta period, Hanoi's hand
State will not use force to dtetu>Yensthe walaof cadres began imperfectly
ed in Douthern the troubles was
element. We also say that any among the disgruntled and the ill-served.
quite Communist sggrcl3B f learsbe62 /08/3O1:1t1i4- PlfbcdR01720R000500030056-9
vc on
us as a matter ter o of gr
 Apprbvecf rFkelease 2004/08/30: CIA-RDP86R_208000500030056-9
6154 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 22, 1966
concealed. n August ~oice 1958 of the Lradio, bill. January 13, iberation "conference of 1962, Marxist-Leninist announce that Ninh Province In rudent s" Cambodian border, Under this
ing itself as is Central Com-
Front," broadcast instructions to the Viet- had met in South Vietnam "during the last mittee headquarters, the Vietcong divide
ilitary
one to five numbered rmSalgoy
cong armed forces and village cadres direct- days of December 1981," and decided that "to South Vietndam
ing them to adapt themselves to the require- fulfill their historic and glorious duty regions special
South and immediate , is environs. divided into provinces
ments of the South Vietnamese political sit- workers, peasants and laborers
each regions, in iturn nto disivide and each ces;
uation In order to carry out their missions. Vietnam need a vanguard group in Accord- a five
In October 1958, it openly appealed to the thoroughly revolutionary party."
highland tribes to revolt, noting that "the Ingly, the conference had established the trict into villages" The Vietcong's pro-
equivalent administra-
government of our beloved Ho is standing People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), which vic s, districts, and villa gs are
behind you." In September 1959 and again came into official existence on January 1, Y comparable and ly In
But of the boundaries Vietnamese Gov-
in February 1960? Hanoi commented on re- 1962.1 The founders "warmly supported" the area to those
cent Vietcong military forays by terming program of the NLF and "volunteered to join erne, thus complicating Saigon's ad-
our "our attacks" and praising the "skill of its ranks." In point of fact, the PEP im-
es problems in reacting to insurgent ac-
our commander and the good will of our mediumd the historic complete mcontrol Of the ission of playing ront trati
soldiers." h the outlines of the Vietcong's
well etcong's
or a Though th outlines are fairly Vi
In September 1960 an almost open official role of vanguard body to the southern revo- Thoug
rgwas ei cy7 when, Hanoi's plans for southern Con- Hanoi as "the oul" of the NLFf9erred to by k own, the identities of its leaders are not.
Insurgency whoa, at the National d Conad- They are faceless men veteran Communist
that the revolutionaries who have made a lifetime
abundantly documents
arlthe Lao Dong Party, made since made Communist
yhe stated: "The ractice of masking their identities under
a lengthy na which Le Duan
business what rlance various aliases and noms de guerre and who
for the National l Congress gress will define be creation of the PEP Involved
lin the whole party and the whole people the the termed ogn of American a wholly owned subsidiary. take particular pains to stay hidden in the
et revolution The "spin-off"
was and is, in fact, simply the background in order to support the politi-
line for carrying out the e sociallsit
In , the nopeo err the completion
revolution ion lution the southern branch of the Lao Dong. As one cal fiction that the insurgency is directed
n
for th ertinent party directive put it: "The Peo- by the NLF and the Front's ostensible
throughout co democratic
throughout on country, for the struggle i this pie's Revolutionary Party has only the ap- officers.
achieve :national adunification:' hie earance of an independent existence; ac- At the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, a
creation Lo of a "broad de national public lic call united fro' P tually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong member of the North Vietnamese delegation
ie
in the south. . In effect, h he e was making pub- Party of Vietnam (Vietminh Communist inadvertently commented that the published
tic the policy decisions which the Lao Dong Party) unified from north to south under the roster of the Lao Dong Party's Central Com-
Party had made during the preceding direction of the central executive committee mittee did not Include some members whose
months. From the tone and temper of Le of the party, the chief of which is President identities were kept secret because they
Duan's address It was apparent that the Viet- Ho." " The PRP serves as the principal vehi- were "directing military operations in South
cong insurrection was about to move into cle for maintaining Lao Dong-i.e., North Vietnam." One of the four examples he
the stage of open war. Vietnamese- control over the Vietcong In. of~the aliases us d by t ec
rv s the chairman of the
susthe. organizational structure of the Viet- FRF, This Lao Dong Central Committee
A
Toward the end of January 1961, Hanoi ra- cong movement has expanded over the past member, whose true name we do not known,
die announced that "various forces opposing 4 years, its general outlines have become fair- is probably the overall field director of the
the fascist Ngo Dinh Diem regime" had ly well known. In the Insurgency's Initial Vietcong insurgency in South Vietnam. The
formed a "National Front for the Liberation phase (1054-59), the Communists retained overall commander of Vietcong military
of South Vietnam" (NLF) on December 20, the Vietminh's division of what is now forces (who would be a subordinate of Cue's
1960, and that it had Issued a manifesto and South Vietnam Into "interzone V" (French within the Communist command structure)
10-point political program. The language of Annam below the 17th parallel) and the is almost certainly the chairman of the
both, as broadcast by Hanoi, made the "Nambo" (Cochin China), with each area (PRP) Central Committee's Military Com-
Front's political parentage abundantly clear. under Hanoi's direct control. lit late 1960 mittee-a man who uses the name Tran
uall
The program's fourth point, for example, was or early 1961, this arrangement was scrapped Nam Trung but whom several captured Viet-ted "-to carry out land rent heplots cong fid insurgency control veOver 8,11 sted in aspects
ief
a still existing, sin- Lt. g0-ecadre members n. Tran Van, a sD puty tCh
the peasants' right, ? till ll their h present le ts
of land, and redistribute communal l land in gee command headquarters, originally known of Stag of the Notrh Vietnamese Army
preparation for land reform." To knowledge- as the Central Office for South Vietnam (or and an alternate member of the Lao Dong
able Vietnamese, such words as these made it COSVN)-a term still in circulation) but Central Committee. The director of all Viet-
chillingly obvious who was behind the Front now usually referred to by captured Viet- cong activity in Vietcong Military Region 5
and what lay in store for South Vietnam cong as simply the PEP's Central Committee. (the northernmost third of South Vietnam)
should it ever come to power. This command entity, which also contains Is Nguyen Don, a major general in the North
On February 11, 1961, Hahoi devoted a the headquarters of the NLF, is a mobile and Vietnamese Army and another alternate
second broadcast ,to the NLF's manifesto and sometimes peripatetic body, usually located member of the Lao Dong Central Committee,
program, blandly changing the language of in the extreme northwestern tip of Tay who in 1961 was commander of the North
both to tone down the more blatant Cai.nmu.- Vietnamese 305th Division but came south
nisi terminology of the initial version. How- late that year or early In 1962. In short,
ever, even the milder second version (which s The only two of these "delegates" who not only does the PEP control all aspects
became the "official" text) borrowed eaten- have been subsequently identified are Vo of the Vietcong movement, including the
sively from Le Duan's September speech and Chi Chong, now a vice chairman of NLF's NLF, and not only is It a subordinate
left little doubt about -the Front's true spun- presidium and member of the-PRP's execu- echelon of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong
ors aes, tive committee, and Huynh Van Tam, now party, but the PRP's own leaders appear to
ec
Aito r the Hanoi radio announcements, the the NLF's representative in Algiers, where be individuals who themselves occupy rank-
Vietcong Immediately began consolidating he devotes considerable time to cultivating ing positions within the Lao Dong Party
all of its activities-military as well as po- Western newsmen, deceiving some of them hierarchy.
litical--under the NLF banner and conduct- about his own political background and the As indicated above, for the first year of its
existence the NLF was as shadowy and face-
name. intensive organizational activity in its true nature of the organization he repre- 1s today. It
name. A propaganda outlet, the Liberation seats in a manner reminiscent of Chou less e organization "after the ada o PEP
conference of
News Agency, was promptly established and En-lei's similar successes during the mid- was was allegedly legedegedlly representatives created as
ed various forces opposing f ereof
began pouring forth announcements and 1940's.
fascist native to South forces but te
stories (replayed by Hanoi and by d snmu- Pe ple's Revolutionary Party and Its Historic
nisi media throughout t the world) designed P Identities of these representatives or the
in- Mission of Liberating the So th,e article "forces" they represented were never spec!-
di enou the Front as a spontaneous,
ationas s. For of South Vietnamese in the January 1966 issue of f the Lao Don g fled. The myth of the Front was not fleshed
nationalists. Forr the first t year Vir of its alleged Party's theoretical journal Hoc Tap. The out with public organizational substance or
udo
existence, however, the NLF was a shadowy same article notes: 'The experlences
less, unidentified leadership. of the overt leadership until after the PEP was w thing with no definable structure and a face- shoorldand our wn that in order to win the greatest sue- presented as Its vanguard element. The NLF
ni a Front was but one of the two or- cesK, national democratic
The Fr
workers' revolutionary par must > In Vietnam, a "village" Is not a cluster of
et Instruments Hanoi had deemed b be led led a nisi Pasr' revolu volutionanary party" huts but an administrative entity roughly
essential to the successful l pursuit of its i.e. a Communist Party. comp arable to an American township.
in This particular document, dated Dec. e. za p. J. Honey, "North Vietnam's Workers'
political al objectives south of the 17th parallel.
The other- deslgre nedly important 1061, within South its text may y be be found, among g other places, in Party an d South P1 Iflrcn Atfaira1eQuarterly, nary Vietnam itself-was first brought to light in the Department of State's white paper. "Ag- enter 1962r63, p. 383? the North." a Liberation News A lp~rovecUa or ReleasFrom 04/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500030056-9 -
 Approved`Fosr Release 2004/08/30: CIA-RDP80R0'1720R000500030056-9
6155
March ~2, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
now. claims to be a coalition of over 40 who served briefly as Secretary General after dig up roads to harass government forces.
Descr in hres as an 'intellectual an go on purchasing expeditions to nearby gov-
"associated ort aniz reiponesent virtuallyli all NLF blograp before Pas ,intre xnpu of tithe They on ent eo purchasing edits et owns.r nearby govHieu and shvely, pu p< liti- ardent patriot," Kiem has sP
shades and strata . South Vietnamese Po past two decades as a leader In various Corns one participates and ensureses this activity neigh-
Cal
does so as and social life. This coalition in, the munist-front youth groups. Such figures local NLF com-bor "three ratiic c Paland parties": the PRP these are the best the Front hes been able to coordinated and directed by
Democrat Party" the 'Radical Social- come up with to staff its most prominent mittees which where circumstances per-
Party. 1st " (The latter two bear al- public offices. Their organizational and repo- mit, assume the pr rog
most exactly the same names as the two lutionary talents may be impressive, but of local government. pricy emit-
minor parties allowed to exist in North Viet- These and f unctions
by
lay roles.) tit their personal stature and prestige among tees in turn are directed by superior cen-
the ostensibly, itself.
or play f for rm, the South Vietnamese people are not. tons ions, committee capped, at o least
virtually tam and are in their rly presresent nent name to
:in their v The NLF's organizational structure is
antedates the e fo itsundlng of tNLF itself. organizations
Over the past 4 years the Vietcong have paralleled and controlled at each echelon by affiliated many l certainly exist of the pert labored mightily to a complementary PRP structure. Under the
and almost analysis of e h only on ph Viet improve thud to be- general command of its central l committee,
and a careful analysis the NLF's own prop- yond South V m of n borders and tp or enlist a
the PRP is organized on a geographic,
agends, a makes it clear that a goodly number broad spectrum of international support for basis
through the various regions, provinces, and
have identical officers, at. directorates, and staffs. their cause; to develop their oragnizational
, thus districts down to the village level. Each
It were, have structure within South Vietnam, hic echelon has a directing commit-
r the the , fact, cot, as It however,
Some ad these substance organcen aft after ions
strengthening their Internal political post- geO~ap all PRPt-
acquir
and now play important roles in the NLF's facilitate and ac c to effort, to, expand their ei Political goals tee responsible for controlling
facilitate of their political g hence all Vietcong, including NLFalactivities
efforts to organize and control the rural ural
populace. and if possible to generate an aura of invinci- within its area. These committees vary in it is fairly easy to devise an organizational bllty capable of breaking their adversaries' size and organizational complexity, even
equivalent geographic echelons, but
structure capable of doubly verisimilitude will to continue the struggle. ameachong one has a single chairman and several
to a political fiction, doubly so if one is try- The image-building campaign abroad has members or subcommittees with
ing to deceive a foreign audience unversed in been designed to publicize the NLF and In- subordinate
Hate its prestige and reputation. Its goal specific functional responsibilities. The affairs tune local out political with of live, public wn tindividuals uo has been to get the NLF generally accepted number and nomenclature of these func-
v from area
tional area, but they subcommittees also normally varies cover military
occupy posts of Public prominence Is con- as an indigenous south Vietnamese Political to
ly more difficult. attract The Vietcong Sob- outh coalition (admittedly with some sontaneouslt
members) which sprang up spontaneously affairs, economic and financial affairs, and
siderably more
piously hoped to attracto the NLF South to combat the harsh excesses of the U.5.-suP- what the Communists term "front affairs
Vietnamese of personal stature and renown, Ported Diem regime, and and civilian proselytizing." whose chairman
preferably Individuals not immediately sym- peace, democracy andreunification as pro- is responsible for controlling all NLF ac-
prestige as communists or Communist pro- _ vided for in the Geneva agreements. Though tivity in that area. If the PRP organization
pathizers who could enhance the Front's
,
turn will i have developed,
prestige and political attractiveness and pro- moral-and, to some extent perhaps, physi- that echelon
vide estige members
cal-support may be afforded by North Viet-
amore or less innocent facade behcould ind nam and other fraternal socialist states (so of his PRP subcommittee to direct each of
operate which the N secure masters the t basically the local associations affiliated with the NLF.
Vietcong in vcbee obscurity. su date the nc argument runs), the NLF is basa Policy Though Captured
Vetcong have been notably unsuccessful their In and will of dependent its political
own. This caentitymepaitgn hasbeen try to keep the level his regard, though the full measure of trier of overt
pt1RP Vietcong iation below two-fifths of the
failure is far better appreciated within South waged through the propaganda dissemi
Vietnam itself than it is abroad. No Viet- by the Liberation News Agency. replayed and total mth er l-Ap of any given NLF come
rk of
significant ofional structure we orn-
as e what could accurately be described echoed by Communist (and non-Communist) just described
si personal l prestige or profes- media throughout the world; through a
covert PRP cells th rough out the NLF)okeeps (reinforced by a atona standing-not even en one known
to steady now of messages from the (par- Front, ll components of the NLF at every level
leftist t persuasion-has ever been willing g to foreign governments and heads of state te (r- PRP control.
associate himself publicly with the NLF or ticularly of neutralist Afro-Asian nations) ; under The complete
Vietcong's
it the use of his name. by ever increasing attendance at foreign s terrorist and military aP-
The NF's first Central Committee was not conferences and meetings (generally Com- paratus was developed and is directed by
announced until March 1962, well over a year munist or leftist sponsored) by a small this same organizational structure, which
after the Front's supposedly spontaneous handful of indefatigable NLF represents- insures that armed activity at all levels is
creation. Though the committee purportedly tives; and by the establishment of perma- rigidly ? subordinated to political objectives
had 52 members, the NLF was able to come nent NLF "missions" In Havana, Peiping, and kept under tight party control. The
now has
up with only 31 names, most of which were Moscow, Prague, East Berlin, Budapest, Cairo, Vietcong over 90,000 military tlmee s Vietnamese troops (including ug-
virtually unknown even within South Viet- Djakarta, and Algiers. All of this activity has
rofited from the fact that knowledge of the 12,000
reentat) ) The Central 41-mommy second and nounced cur- in realities of political life in South Vietnam mented and supported by so and part-
January 1964, is equally la including over
tion. Committea , errcking in distinc- does not extend much beyond its frontiers; 100,000 paramilitary personnel
tion. all of it has been guided by a keen awareness time guerrillas. This whole force, however,
The Chairman of the NLF's Presidium and of the effectiveness of incessant repetition was built up for political reasons, to serve
in converting myth to assumed reality. political ends. The Vietcong political ap-Huu former Central provincial Committee is lawyer with Nguyen a long The, a record Throughout y aouth Vietnam the Vietcong paratus was at work laying the foundations
r,
of activity in Communist-sponsored ceauses have developed and employed the NLF tap- for insurgency long before there was even
south but of little Vietnamese political bar, who repute or generally c professional paratus in their intensive effort to organize so much as a Vietcong hamlet self-defense
tall the rural popula- squad.
standing among his former colleagues cotethes the en) ) , invollve ites int their Insurgency cam- The director of the military affairs sub-
gorize him iim a ass having been an " "avoc eavocet sans paign and bring it under their poiitical committee (mentioned above) Is frequently
General domination. The detailed application of also the commander of hthe oc Vietcong cechelon. force
(refs," 'The etary G Generaeneral of t ehe "DDemocrat- this effort varies from locality o localitY, attached to that geograp
te Secretary Vil
n Z and the Chairman the NLF's and is materially influenced by such local lags directing committees have village pla-
le party" e
ag da as an strengths inthe the relative The degree e, nhow- tees, on tees,s istrict comba nies; pro inRegional cial commit-
Saigon Ooter) is Huynh
" though NLF propF g
parC iressedect ct; one would be hard aver, always secure total participation
"architect," described in
populati n norderrltohes ablisloltot the mittees 1 regimental size at their nanduthe
to point to any edifices he has total involvement
signed. From member of until 1948 l apparently local control. They endeavor to per- whole Vietcong military establishment is
venpareal to j mpel-- subject to the direction of PRP's Centro
served v a member e the Namb na and as/Vietcong thVietcong join and Committee. he duectio this military enral
Executive Committee in Nampo and the suede-and , if conditions
given
Communists' propaganda chief for their every inhabitant of a
Saigon Special Zone. The First Secre- work actively In some NLF component or- this, the same
1 mm The ernis no tionshi hothingz
Lary General (alslso ,the Secrota retary Gene Bral of ganization. Farmers are enconcouraged raged or toot a and command relationship are uni-
the was Nguyen forced to join the Liberation Peasants' Asso- formly app size indes
"Radical Socialist Party")
Hteu now Its a Its principal Party") traveling repro- elation; women, the Liberation Women's As- a Vietcong military unit any
Probably
senbattve abroad. A former journalist and sociatfon; children, the Liberation Youth As- pendent of the party's political size
tight
teacher (some say of biology, some of maths- sociation. Where Vietcong control is strong, or or free ree from m tight Political of the control. Vietcong forces
third
a
matlcs), inHieu ce herbeen a C no one escapes the net. Physically fit males more than
the PRP con
gandlst. since the late 1940's. The Chairman { n~ot~ sent ~oi,S to some other Vietcong military are party members, but virtue its or-
The Chairman 1itiashad or self- ganizatlonal mechanism
4 same way that
of the NLF's External Fyn 1}/vlPM ' 2i'efWFl e41i e2rt(d19?! I P O ti~ e r Front.
affairs and propaganda) tree a
Buu Kiem, D. Central Committee member men help make bamboo stakes and traps or c
 Approveduor Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R720R000500030056-9
6156 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 22, 1966
An understanding of the Vietcong's orga- twice last fall (on Oct. 15 and Dec. 19) when mechanism which it controls has no serious
nizational, structure enables us to recognize two public calls by the Vietcong for a claim to being considered, as Hanoi insists,
the real significance and function of the "general strike" went totally ;;heeded and the "sole legitimate voice of the South Viet-it ever
accepted more than 60,000 persons infiltrated into produced no visible change ?-?r,atsoever in namese
such, people reorder what has h be
ac en d In
South Vietnam since the Lao Dong Party's the pattern of urban life.
.1959 decision to pursue its objective of PG- Despite its leaders' obvious ..ganizational North Vietnam in the years since 1951 makes
litical conquest by waging Insurgent war. talents and revolutionary skcds, the Viet- it abundantly clear what lies in store for the
Until mid to late 1963 these infiltrators were cong movement is beset with a number of more than 16 million Vietnamese who live
virtually all ethnic southerners drawn from fundamental weaknesses. It has no uni- south of the 17th parallel; especially for those
the pool of regrouped Vietminh forces and versally appealing theme in any way com- who have resolutely fought against the Viet-
supporters taken north in 1964. They were parable to the Vietminh's espousal of anti- tong insurgency from its inception.
not foot soldiers or cannon fodder (at least French nationalism. Persistent propaganda CLARK MY. President, I ask
not until Hanoi began sending in whole efforts to portray the Americans as successor Mrunanim CLconsent that I may yield on
North Vietnamese units in late 1964 or early imperialists to the French have simply never
1965). Instead they were disciplined, trained taken hold. The concept of reunification has the same terms to the distinguished sen-
and indoctrinated cadres and technicians. relatively little appeal for peasants who re- for Senator front Florida.
They became the squad leaders, platoon gard someone from the next province as an The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
leaders, political officers, staff officers, unit alien. The idea of reunification does appeal objection, it is so ordered.
commanders, weapons and communications to politically Minded urban elements, par- Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I shall
specialists who built the Vietcong's military titularly to refugees from the north, but
force into what it is today. They also be- within such circles there is a great reluctance of ted vote bf foor in the a pending pending I bill. I
.
sup-
came the village, district, provincial, and to accept the Vietcong's identification of re- of f CO co 1toe bill the i
regional committee chiefs and key commit- unification with political domination by the PO now.
tee members who built the Vietcong's po- present Hanoi regime. Having lived through Mr. President, the Secretary of Agri-
litical apparatus. the sequence of historical events we have culture, the Honorable Orville L. Free-
The earlier arrivals had had at least 5 days outlined, politically conscious Vietnamese are man, spoke at the Governor's Day lunch
of indoctrination and training in North Viet- not easily deceived by the NLF's pretensions eon of the Florida Citrus Showcase
nam, or elsewhere in the Communist bloc, to independence and freedom from northern sponsored by the Florida Citrus Mutual
before departing on their southern missions; control, particularly since the military side Fla., on Friday, Febru-
some of-,.the later arrivals have had nearly a of the Vietcong insurgency is now being in in 18, Winte1966, r er Haven, javenust, a Week ahis return
decade of such preparation. Until the recent waged with an ever larger number of North frary om Vietnam. His ek after
related a the
sharp rise In Vietcong battlefield casualties, Vietnamese troops.
approximately a third of all the personnel in The current struggle in South Vietnam is main to his observations in Vietnam,
Vietcong military units at and above the die- a historically rooted, political phenomenon " with particular reference to food and the
trict company level were "returnees" trained of infinite complexity, particularly since it agricultural situation there.
in the north. At least half of the member- involves an externally directed Communist I. feel that Secretary Freeman's speech
ship of most PRP district committees, and drive for power interlarded with a genuine throws much light on conditions in Viet-
an even larger proportion at higher echelons, indigenous social revolution. In analyzing nom which are directly related to the
also appear to be "returnees." Without this such a phenomenon, "truth" is often a func- contents of the pending bire I therefore
infiltration from the north, in short, the tion of one's angle of vision, and myth is not
present Vietcong organization could never always easy to distinguish from reality. De- ask unanimous consent to have the Sec-
have been developed. - spite the fact that there are many aspects of retary's speech printed In' the RECORD in
yr the current situation in Vietnam concerning full at this point as a part of my remarks.
The Vietcong insurgency is clearly a mas- which confident assertion is a mark of ig- There being no objection, the speech
norance or disingenuous intent, there are Was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
its ts toeotaX effectiveness i of revoi organization, but certain aspects of the insurgency, and of the as follows:
vs and real political
strength are extremely difficult to assess. The Vietcong structure through which it is being
waged, which are not open to intellectually SECRETARY Or AGRICULTURE ORVILLE L. FREE-
bulk of the Vietcong's organizational efforts honest dispute. MAN'S SPEECH AT THE GOVERNOR'S DAY
have been expended in rural areas and it is There are unquestionably many non-Com- LUNCHEON OF THE FLORIDA CITRUS SHOW-
there that they are strongest. (The govern- CASE, SPONSORED BY THE FLORIDA CITRUS
ment controls all of the cities, major towns, tS heroically serving in various com- MUTUAL IN WINTER HAVEN, FLA., FEBRUARY
and provincial capitals and all but a hand- ponents of the National Liberation Front out 18, 1968
Put of the district seats.) There are indica- of a desire to redress genuine grievances or in
tions, however, that sharply rising Vietcong the honest belief that they are thereby help- Mr. Toastmaster, distinguished officers and
taxation rates, increasingly frequent, resort ing to build a better political structure for leaders of Citrus Mutual, of the Citrus Show-
to impressment to secure troops, and the their native land. As an organization, how- case, the mayor of this lovely community,
Vietcong's manifest Inability to deliver on po- ever, the NLF is a contrived political mech- members of your State cabinet, your State
anism with no Indigenous roots, subject to - treasurer, your-commissioner of agriculture,
litn ical to es of t base years are all begin support. the ultimate control of the Lao Dong Party in members of the State legislature, leaders of rural Ding g the erode a their base of 0,00 refugees Hanoi. the citrus industry, ladies, and gentlemen,
rly 800,000 refgeoe The relationship between the Vietcong and I am delighted to be here. I am flattered
During the past year nearly the vicinity
Ro er d from the hinterland
towns, s the DRV is not that of politically like-minded that you would ask me back again. I was v were fleeing from Some s, some here with you about a year and a half ago
between n a Instead, a it field d command nd essentially and the its parent is s parentnt and enjoyed it thoroughly and am certainly
the ship allies.
from the simple hazards s of of war (though fleeing from natural ar (teohousgh some
uh leased to be here once again.
direction in which persons of this category headquarters. Such relationships are never p
opted to flee is significant), but many were free from elements of tension and discord. I want, today, to talk to you a little bit in
obviously endeavoring to get out'from under Within the Vietcong movement, and even broad terms about agriculture in the world
the Vietcong. Furthermore, in assessing within Its controlling hierarchy, there are in which we live. Agriculture is the key to
Communist claims of control it should be unquestionably varying judgments (at least world peace. Agriculture is the key to the
noted that over half of the rural population privately held ones) about the wisdom of victory in Vietnam.
voted in the May 1965 provincial elections, present tactics and the best course of future First, however, I want to express my most
despite Vietcong orders to boycott. them. action. (There are obvious differences of sincere commendation to you, your organi-
In the cities, the Vietcong have an ob- opinion regarding the struggle in Vietnam zations and to this industry, to the leader-
vious terrorist capability but are politically even within the Lao Dong Party Politburo.) ship, the foresight you have shown, to your
quite weak-a fact of which they are aware Nevertheless, the whole Vietcong organizes- excellent job of marketing. i remember
and which, according to captured documents, tional structure and chain of command has quite vividly about a year ago, when your
causes them considerable embarrassment. been carefully designed to minimize the risks distinguished executive vice president, Bob
They have been unable to turn the urban of insubordination. Though for tactical rea- Rutledge, who serves you so effectively, came
political ferment of the past 3 years to any , eons the overt propaganda outlets and spokes- to my office and reviewed and discussed wait I
obvious Immediate advantage. None of the men of the NLF sometimes take political po- me some of your marketing plans. participants in the genuine social revolution sitions which differ at least in emphasis from listened with special interest because I have
now taking place in the urban areas of those emanating from Hanoi, the chances of been concerned. You had learned how, as
South Vietnam has sought Vietcong support the Vietcong's developing or adopting a gen- our agriculture has generally, to produce
or entertained overtures of political alliance. uinely independent political line in opposi- mightily. Sometimes that really challenges
Though they have undoubtedly penetrated tion to orders received from North Vietnam us in this country.
such groups as the Buddhists and the stu- through the Lao Dong Party apparatus are it is a blessed thing for which we ought
dents, the Vietcong have made no visible slight indeed. to be ,truly thankful, but we haven't always
headway in subverting or bringing them un- Finally, although the Vietcong organiza- learned how to live with that abundance,
der the NLF banner. ~y~,~v {~ Yip ti n is un 1 j factor in the how to market it, and how to effectively oat
and vietcong are in the citey~~, M;1d~'?e o t~r6dddR I ==. Mal d4 rRDl OR?t7OROOM8O3 O5"
4: Mft
 App'I+'bved` %Ir Release 2004/08/30: CIA-RDPSORO 20R00050003005.6-9
March 22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 6157
ditions and at the price where people will
utilize it. And so to note the excellent prog-
ress in your new plant, the fine reception
of the new concentrate, to note some of the
good work you have done In marketing
abroad, I am glad to have the chance as the
Secretary of Agriculture to come here and
say to you, well done.
A week ago today, I was in a little village
in South Vietnam at a training camp called
Vung Tau. I was sitting on a folding chair
beside a canal listening to one of the most
impressive men I have ever heard In my life.
Dressed in a simple, black pajama, he out-
lined for me the course of training of the
rural construction cadres, made up of peasant
boys who volunteered to go back into their
home provinces and villages to hold those
villages, to pacify those villages, after the
military has taken them away from the Viet-
cong.
He was a tremendously impressive fellow.
Some had likened him to a saint. He said
in a very soft voice that these young boys
are looking for some meaning in their lives
which had been wrecked by war. All their
lives had been spent in a nation engaged in
war. They have been pretty cynical, gen-
erally, as to their stake in its future. And
he told a little legend, very simple, about the
beautiful lady and the dragon and how an
accommodation between the lady and the
dragon was developed and sustained. The
spiritual side of life was the beautiful lady,
the materialistic and powerful side of life
was the dragon, and the harmony of the two
was what gave meaning to life.
He went on with some other legends, and
then said in a soft voice, "to the Vietnamese,
this is much more understandable than the
material of communism. The boys who have
gone out of here have learned to be for some-
thing. They go out to secure and to hold
these villages and fight to hold them if neces-
sary."
And then he developed some of the symbol-
ism which was a powerful part of this train-
ing course. I-Ie gave me one of their gradua-
tion pins. It has a T-H symbol on it, some-
what like our owp. 4-H Club symbol. He
drew a hammer and a sickle on the black-
board, and then put the T-H over It. The
hammer and the sickle were obliterated and
he said these boys are obliterating that ham-
mer and sickle everywhere around Vietnam.
We then looked at the rifle range. These
men, he told me, fire more ammunition than
the regular troops that are trained for actual
battle. Then we saw the classrooms where
they get general exposure to health, voca-
tional, and agricultural training.
At the conclusion of their rural construe-
tion training, the night before they grad-
uate, they sit out all night long and make
up their minds whether they want to take
a pledge which is part of the graduation
ceremony next day, and take on the re-
sponsibility for caring for the Ideals which
he outlined; self-discipline, service, honesty,
mercy to the old, the sick and the needy.
This was couched in the traditional Viet-
namese terms rather than ours but the mean-
ing was exactly the same.
He said that during the new year celebra-
tion, the big ceremony of Vietnam, down they call a social revolution in Vietnam. The
the road in a single military camp they had word revolution has -a much more positive And in this same area, I went to the vil-
50 percent AWOL; In a military police train- cast to it, and it is broadly used, to give an lage-where he lived. They had a little self-
ing school they had 25 percent AWOL. But identity, to give a meaning, to give a purpose help program to build a warehouse. The
there wasn't a single man In the rural con- to the lives of those people so that when the material was made available to them by the
struction cadre who left. I was tremend- Vietcong come in, the people will notify the Vietnamese Government with our help. The
ously intrested in this training center, be- authorities so they can be rooted out. If people renting the warehoustoe dry gave,. The
cause they have a workable system and it's they hide the Vietcong, if they protect them, e g space in It based on hard experience that can win If they don't report them, then it is an almost rent was being paid. The village had made
peasant support and ultimately win the war impossible task. So there is a two-front, a little money and they were putting it in
In Vietnam. sharp, clear objective-an objective In which a school and a health clinic.
The military struggle is a bitter, difficult, I think we can feel pride, that we as a nation This was the only place I went In Viet-
complicated one. You don't know who the go out not only to stop the onrush of com- nam where the province chief could travel
enemy is a good share of the time. We munism, but also go on to start and carry at night out in the countryside. Most of
have the power and the resource and the forward the onrush of human and social the time they would go to see the people
fighting capacity to win th h in w r betterment. - during the day. This fellow said to me, "I
But that doesn't do much 1t we iForr se,2OO4/O&i8G.w@I,AA pggRo49120'1 D05" 06''S6" gkin
later the Vietcong infiltrate the area and take
the village all over again. And that's what
is happening. What's got to be done is this:
We've got to win, the hearts and minds of
those poor people who have been promised
and promised and promised and abused and
decimated all these years.
Last year, 1,500 local government officials
were brutally murdered, some of them tor-
tured and captured, simply because they were
doing a good job. The Vietcong Is on an or-
ganized, purposeful program of terror and
destruction. This would be the equivalent in
the United States of 50,000 mayors and coun-
ty commissioners, Now if 50,000 local officials
in this country were murdered in one year-
it's anybody's guess as to what it would
mean. Now these boys who go out of this
camp are to work with the military in areas
being pacified or already pacified. They are
to go into an area in teams of 59 men. They
are highly trained; highly armed. They
know how to use those weapons. They are
highly motivated to help the peasants, but
they are ready to fight. But they don't go
into the countryside to fight, they go there
to build.
And as Gen. Nguyen Due Thang, Minis-
ter of Rural Construction, a very Impressive
young Vietnamese?general, said to me, "we
don't go to hit and run, we go to hit and
stay." And they go to the villages-their
home villages in many cases-and they seek
to get close to where those people live; to let
them know that their government believes in
them, wants to help them, to give them a
stake in life.
I said to the general, "Well, now, I am the
head of a cadre and I'm going into a village
that has just been reclaimed. What's the
first thing I do?" He said to me, "You keep
your mouth shut." I thought that was a
pretty good answer. He said when those
folks want some help, you help them to help
themselves. You don't give them anything;
because if you give them something, it's not
really theirs. If the Vietcong destroy it, it
is not their loss. But if you help them
build something and the Vietcong destroys
it, then it is their loss.
About 20,000 have been trained already,
and their training will be stepped up. The
Vietnamese Government has elected a num-
ber of villages to be pacified with the help
of these cadres. This is a hardheaded, hard-
hitting, systematic job of pacification. And
it is, as I say, a thoroughly planned and pur-
poseful one. It carries within it, I think, the
Now this is the meaning or the spirit of That peasant had a little irrigation sys-
Honolulu. I have just been back a few days tem. He and a dozen others had gone to-
and I have been rather shocked to find a good gether to buy a little gasoline engine pump
bit of cynicism about this in some quarters. for a shallow well. They had put in a little
I have difficulty understanding that because Irrigation works-some shallow ditches. We
in Honolulu the President dramatized for the saw the water flowing out. Onions, garlic
principle of the entire stworld andards the that best this s and other kinds of vegetables were growing
principle has; the best we in built ourselv,s to great profusely. I had a picture taken with him
Nation has; ric we - with a basket of onions and vegetables be-ness with for the e p p serveople. ice, humanitarianism, concern sides, of all things, a bright red motorbike.
for He had made a little money, the first thing
a This is second front of a, two-front war. he wanted was a motorbike. Comparatively,
We have t to win the tough, hard, , difficult ou'd bu a Cadillac. And maybe he will
military part of this war. But of equal im- one day, too. But a motorbike is a desirable
portance has to be the second part, what status symbol; it means transportation. -
be done if agriculture is not in the forefront
in that effort. I said when I returned that
In this war, fertilizer is just as important
as bullets, and so it is. The essentials for
effective agricultural production are -ready,
and we can make striking progress in agri-
culture in Vietnam.
What I found, really, was far beyond my
expectations in light of the hardships under
which those people live. If you ever wanted
to see a justification for some of our dollars
to be spent on helping other people, take a
look at agriculture in Vietnam. It has only
been 10 years and yet those little farmers,
most of them tenants, or landowners with
very small holdings, are using very modern
practices of improved seed, fertilizer, chem-
icals, and pesticides, disease control in ani-
mals, and all the rest, whenever they can get
it. They don't want it free. They want to
buy it. But so far we haven't done as good
a job as we should, in making it available.
But where it has been available, they make
every effort to get it.
I talked to one peasant who walked 15
miles with a basket on his head to buy 50
pounds of fertilizer and get a little package
of seed and walked 15 miles back to his
little hamlet. He knew about fertilizer. He
,knew about improved seed. All he wanted
was a chance to use them, because, when he
does, his yield of rice goes up 50 percent.
And when yields go up 50 percent, he can
buy his kids some clothes, and they have a
little money in the village to build a little
school. They then build a little better home.
Then they have a stake in something. Then -
when the Vietcong come in after it, they are
prepared to fight, and Inform, and resist.
What we need to do is to integrate agricul-
ture effectively in the forefront of the second
front of this two-front war.
Last Sunday, I was on the coast about in
the midlands in Vietnam in an area called
Phan Rang. I stood on a little plot of land
on the coast that was plain sand. It had
been sand dunes. It had been government
land. It had been levelled off. Chinese
technicians from Taiwan were there. They
worked with the Vietnamese farmers on new
techniques in growing vegetables. An onion,
an adaptation of the Granex onion out of
Texas that had been adapted by one of our
plant technicians-took them 4 years to do
it-was being planted on that hectare of
land the peasant had gotten as a part of
the land reform program. He netted on that
2y~ acres 200,000 piastres-that's $2,000 in
American money. Growing rice in the same
 Approved1For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R0 72OR000500030056-9
6158,' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 22, 1966
in the fields by going to see them in the I was impressed with them, with their O I d with ond the the co he Seeee isry, tac-
n, . I go out and see them in the tability he fact that they are smart, tough bunch. it would not presently be useful from our
nightight, when they are available." of view to attack Haiphong
He was able to do do that because his area They had to be to survive. Some of them overall point
was pacified. If the Vietcong move Into that have been wounded six times. They were either Mr. by bombing of or r mining.
That view
area he would be notified. He was a tough fighting in the jungles almost before they Georgia.
soldier but he was very good with these peo- could walk. To survive that and the po- was stated in an indirect fashion by
ple, and It is not a normal mandarin attitude, litical wars, the coups and the rest, they
you know, to say, "I adapt myself to the peo- have to have something on the ball. And General Wheeler, as I recall, in his testi-
ple." Politicians do that in the United they know as sure as day .follows night that mony beall oredtthee come ittee to I must
say,,
States. They do not normally do that in they can't win that was, repel that invasion, with Wheeler-and I r have vgenuine
Asia. But this philosophy was going for- and make Vietnam a free nation unless they Wh l that v t very e opinion e
ward. He could go out at night, because if can earn the support and loyalty of :their respect for hire
anybody infiltrated that area, he got the people. And so for that reason if for no flies in the face of commonsense to say
word. And when he got the word, he got the other reason, they are going about their
lower the e harbor at than Hai-
troops out there and the Vietcong didn't last business, They don't do it always like we that bong the has a closing g of
ai-effectiv berdlong. This was an example of what can as your They C are efficient here bp ombing of the petroleum dumps, the
be done. It isn't easy. petroleum for which has come in through
These peasants have been promised to for example, and your State Treasurer. Not Harbor.
death. They are pretty skeptical; pretty as experienced in government, but they axe Haiphong self -evi-
cynical. They have been terrorized, brutal- tough minded, alert, and determined. It mind it would that it be would be
,zed, murdered, taxed by both sides, run off I went to Vietnam and took with me at dent seems
more seenLS s to ten. a effective lay me to close the stopper be
their land, run back on their land, and they the President's instructions 10 of the best
have been In this war for 20 years. But I agricultural specialists in this country in the a bottle than to pour out the contents als,
livestock,
came back f eing and set the bottle back down to be
irrigam feel, really, that the sense seems hopelessness fields anof crops, d fishing-and
of this that aeesns to permeate
and complacency
some parts of this country is not permanent. positive; not overwhelmingly optimistic, refilled. That is all that would be ac-
There is a base, for real hope; that we can building glowing word pictures, but feeling complished by clearing the petroleum
win this war; that we cgn help these people. that there is a real purpose and that this is dumps, because the next day a tanker
This nation can be a real bastion for freedom not a hopeless morass, that this war can be could come into Haiphong and replenish
if we remember that this is a two-front war, won and that it is vitally important that it these dumps.
that force alone is Ineffective, that to go along should be won. We also felt real pride in our number of ways to close
with it you have to have service, accomplish- own profession of agriculture, because it is Tthhere harbor are a a nu nu than bombing. I am
ment, end build a stake in society. the key. Agriculture is the key In Vietnam, other
A lot of people have asked me, "What as it Is the key around the world In the great not committed altogether to closing the
.about these young generals? Do they mean race taking place between food and people. harbor by bombing. It so happens that
it and will they do it?" It's hard to tell. On February 10, the President sent to the there is a narrow waterway leading into
You can only make a judgment. Congress a great message, a food-for-freedom the harbor. Two dredges work there
I spent 3 hours in an airplane with Gen- message, calling on this Nation to mobilize constantly. Those dredges could be
eral Ky. He is 35 years old. He is the Prime its agricultural resources and to wheel them sunk by naval gunfire to close the harbor
ined,
Minister. He was the commanding general into action to help those nations who would for a Sh01't period. It could be mined,
or a
of their air corps; very colorful, very smart, help themselves so that this race can be won fo it could, if desired, be bombed; m
no particular background in government as and the world will be able to feed itself.
such. I met all the corps commanders and This is the greatest challenge we face down naval blockade could be established with
all the top generals. The ruling group is the road. a half dozen destroyers.
about a dozen. I found them, without ex- All of us who work in this great area, then, But I think it is self-evident that the
ception, bright and alert. They said the work not only to serve our Nation and our closing of the harbor itself would be more
right words, and they said them with feel- communities. We stand right at the heart- injurious to the war effort of the North
ing, beat of the future well-being of mankind. Vietnamese than bombing supplies, even
For example, General Ky said a number of A world that isn't fed, a world plagued and important as a petroleum dump,
times: "It is a military war and a war for dogged by famine and desperation and mal- as which can be immediately a pet r elenished by
the hearts of our people. We cannot will one nutrition, is never going to be a peaceful
without winning the other. But the war for world. So as you skillfully carry forward another tanker coming into that harbor.
the hearts of the people is more than a mili- your work in this great industry, we join in It simply does not make sense to me to
tary tactic. It is a moral principle. We are seeking to use the power that comes with this say that closing the harbor has a much
trying to bring about a true social revolution. great capacity to produce and as a great free lower priority than these petroleum
We are instituting a program for a better Nation to use it effectively, so other people dumps.
society." can have as great a stake in freedom as we Mr. CLARK. So to that extent, the
McNa-
He then went on to say, "I think that the have and there is no stake where there is no Senator disagrees with Secretary extent, the
present government by and large has the con- food. Sena?
fidence of the people. I think it has a greater The challenge down the road is a great one Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Oh, yes,
measure of support than any of the pre- but is one that I think we can meet. I came
vious governments. But that's not enough. back from Vietnam challenged but reassured. . indeed, I disagree flatly with him on that
We must have a government which has been We'll win this one as we have won them point, and also disagree with General
freely elected by the people. Despite the before. Wheeler,
many tasks we have on our hands today, I Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi- I wish to add that at one time all the
which feel we next can to take on winning the one war I more. speak And about, one, dent, will the Senator from Pennsylvania Chiefs of Staff thought that closing the
harbor at Haiphong should have a very
is most important and that is building permit us to have the yeas and nays on harbor iand it is only of late that
democracy in Vietnam." final passage? has been any disagreement among
Prime Minister Ky said extemporaneously The PRESIDING OF'F'ICER. Is there there the Joins Chiefs of Staff.
when the Vice President left Saigon: "I am a sufficient second? There is a sufficient the SYMINGTOta Mr. President,
sure Mr. HUMPHREv, prior to his visit here, second, and the yeas and nays . are will Mr. Senator yield?
was not convinced of the ability of the young ordered. will the CLARK. Gladly. Mr. generals, sometimes called the young Turks, Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, there has
must rule our nation. I'm sure that now he been some discussion in the last couple Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from
than tthe recognize civilians, that and d we are love e more freedom m of minutes about the possible bombing Georgia brought up the point I intended
to bring up, there is disagreement in
more than freemen and desire democracy or mining of Haiphong Harbor. I should
more than you do in the United States." like to call to the attention of the Sen- testimony before the cmcommittee. in-
pion not will be befit -
The Prime Minister grabbed a microphone ators the statement made by Secretary hope formedthe , and information people
In Honolulu at the conclusion of the press McNamara on page 177 of the record is and infomamong the hied.
in
conference and said, "I'm not a war lord. where he testified that since the tonnage There to the importance among
of the th-closing
I'm tired of fighting. I've been shot at all required for the support of enemy troops tarry as harbor at Haiphong.
my life. I risk assassination every day. I in South Vietnam is relatively small, the
want to win. this war and help my people." function of mining the harbor of Hai- Why should they not close that har-
He , "I y sp pr ro r ndon't and have t on I don't have I imagine it would be the bor? Only two railroads come down
an
st as one went on to say that his phong-and
stake was one of service. same result from bombing the harbor of from China. One which we have not'
Only time will tell ~Q 1 affect been hitting since the resumption is the
r~PeR~c i ~ fit' ` . P80RQ' W> Q9o5@a$o l9section of
Live Phew young genera e. rgp
 ApprovedlPor Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R017720R000500030056-9
M L00 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
arc ,
it appears in the hearings that if we duce in any substantial way the contribution
depots in of the North to South Vietnam
Manchuria into Vietnam. The other
railroad comes from west to east. From were to destroy the petroleum Vietnam.
the standpoint of commonsense and North Vietnam, and they got no fuel for Paraphrasing the Senator from Mis-
economy, why would they use that? But their trucks in the south, they-that 1s, souri, he said that if they are getting
we have been hitting that latter rail- the enemy--could move the quantities of their material through Haiphong, it does
road. There are a few roads which in supplies now being moved by animal and not amount to anything, and if North
the main i understand are not in too by manpower. At page 299 of the hear- Vietnam is not contributing anything of
good shape. ings, Admiral McDonald asserted that substance to South Vietnam, meaning to
But nobody could know what is com- the Vietcong in South Vietnam need few the South Vietnamese, the anti-
ing through the Haiphong Harbor. Tes- petroleum items, because they walk Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Viet-
timony before the committee admits, a everywhere. cong.
very large majority of the oil moving into Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Well, that Mr. SCOTT. Yes, the Vietcong, in
North Vietnam comes through the har- is true when one measures their equip- other words-then said the Senator from
bor at Haiphong. Obviously, those ment against the vehicles that are op- Missouri, where are the Vietcong-if I
trucks that go down the Ho Chi Minh erated in modern warfare. can Vietcong rph se him further-where from?
Trail must have that oil to be used. But petroleum is still a very essential the getting their Senator supplies
rom Georgia
would the
Statements have been made that it is element of war. Most of the materiel What say to that?
thought relatively little ammunition that is carried from Haiphong down into say t Georgia. I would
comes through the harbor; but who South Vietnam over the many branches Mr. RUSSELL getting of f from a ould
knows what is in the boxes on the docks of the No Chi Minh trail is carried by say ay that they theyare As I stated fa few rom a great
of that harbor? There is no reason for trucks. We have had the good luck many sources.
m undoubtedly thousands of
anybody to extrapolate what the many once or twice lately to find a truck con- nts des are being made is North
ships going into that harbor have on voy exposed on the roads and attack it hand agogrenades de care foundry, I bnieve, h
them. Anybody who looks at the map from the air, and have destroyed a great Vietnam. knows the Haiphong Harbor is the eas- many of the trucks. located on the on the utskirtstof o Haiphong,
iest, least; expensive, and most effective Those people, however, are resource- could have one iron foundry which
way of getting in the tremendous ful. We had evidence before the com- but
does they be o o make some equipment; but, the
and that they were great bulk of their equipment, all of
Vietnam to killpouretroops iin South Vieth- to carry supplies, were
amounts of nam. if anybody does not think most using large numbers of people, bearers, their sophisticated equipment, such as
of it is coming through the harbor, where who can carry three or four times their 50 caliber machine guns, 55 millimeter
else it is coming from? own weight. recoilless rifles, their burp guns, and
The answer we hear is, "They don't Mr. CLARK. And bicycles. rifles-some of which have telescopic
need very much." But I was down in the Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes; that sights which can be favorably compared
Mekong Delta in recent weeks, and saw they would put on a bicycle 300 or 400 to any weapons we turn out, the great
hundreds of magnificent weapons-made pounds of equipment, and push it along. bulk of them come either from China or
mostly in China, but also quite a few They are very resourceful people. from Russia. Most of those which come
from Soviet Russia-on exhibit in the They have been engaged in a war of this from Russia are actually made at the
center of the town square in Can Tho. nature now for more than 20 years. Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia.
That exhibit showed to my satisfaction Mr. CLARK. -Since the Japanese Mr. SCOTT. Therefore, they have to
where those weapons were coming from. moved in. come down from China, not from Russia.
If they do not come over the railroad Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. They have Earlier testimony indicates that the bulk
we are not attacking, and if they do not had a great deal of experience in it, and of petroleum comes in through Haiphong,
come from the harbor, where are they are probably the most efficient nt guerrilla yet I am tom co ignore that. would coming from? As We know, the Com- fighters on earth today, yet told d to I of a that. It practi-Mr. munists do not have any logistic sup- pare favorably with any in recorded his- tally all SELL L of ecaggh Haiphong.
port the way of air power. tory. Most of the weapons come in through
Mr. . CLARK. I say to my friend, the Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend the Haiphong. That is the reason why I say
Senator from Georgia, I have only one Senator from Georgia, and I yield the that we should close the port at Hai-
or two questions more. The hour is get- floor. rend. It i a natural step fus to take.
ting late; we are almost ready to vote. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi- p hon. SCOTT. I completely for o agree s o I should like, if I can, to finish it up. dent, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
On page. 178, the Secretary of Defense Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the the Senator from Georgia that it should
testified. that the industries in North Senator withhold his request, and yield beenator closed in one of the bseveral ut we a rays s the
Vietnam contribute very little to the sup- to me for a moment? S has mentioned,
Pennsylvania. yield to. sem believe impossibility. Vh
plies used in the south for the prosecu- the Mr. RUSSELL Senator of Georgia. I
tion e are asked to
tieof the war.
He also said that wiping out the en- Mr. SCOTT. I mention to the distin- believe that North Vietnam contributes
tire industry of North Vietnam would guished Senator from Georgia that the nothing to South Vietnam, that anyway
have no measurable effect upon their distinguished Senator from Missouri it does not matter if petroleum does come
economy into Haiphong of North
capability to furnish the supplies they [Mr. SYMINGTON] asked a question which in, although , It that the come
are presently supplying to the Commu- has not been answered, and I would ap- from Russia,
really contributes nothing to
nisi forces in South Vietnam. preciate the help of the Senator in sup- South Vietnam and therefore we should
Does the Senator agree with that? plying answer.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No; I do Mr. RUSSELL SELL of Georgia. I thank not worry about it. Admiral McDonald
not agree with it in toto. I think it.is the Senator for the compliment implied. clarifies the situation matter further by saying
Viet-
that motorized
substantially correct. But I have infor- Mr. SCOTT. I am sure the Senator transportation it o e not
mation and we have had some evidence has information which would be helpful because everyone about in
ex-
ram walks, anyway. He goes on to -
there is an iron foundry in the vi- and useful. plain that last statemen by saying that
cinity of Hanoi, which manufactures The reference made by the junior Sen- they walk from s the nth parallel but
literally millions of hand grenades that ator from Pennsylvania was to page 178,
he
are being used in this . the testimony of Secretary McNamara, use Iiotorizezed dy transportation ed fro from p the
With that exceptiowa n, think that the wherein he stated: ue m m tabor from me observe
statement is approximately The industry in the north is so small that that I frothe very use little mot aboriz north, about motors b but
Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator the north, and I think any of the analysts cants, osolh, yet we are told that while
from Georgia for his patience. I have who beet completely eliminated a d not re- this comes entirely from Russia yet the
one final question.
No. 4B-4 Approved For Release 2004/08/30: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500030056-9
 Approved"r Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000500030056-9
6160 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 22, 1966
contribution from North Vietnam really By the way of explanation, I would GOVERN in the chair). Pursuant to the
amounts to nothing to South Vietnam. like to point out that funds spent, funds unanimous-consent agreement entered
Now, let me say to the Senator from available, and the funds presently in this into Yesterday, the Senate will now pro-
Georgia, the more testimony I read, the bill will make a total appropriation for teed to vote on H.R. 13546. the more confused I get. Can the Senator military construction, southeast Asia, the The
question is andon third readingment the
help me find my way through this morass amounting to $1,656,100,000.
of semantics? In view of the urgency of this con- bill.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I had as- struction money for southeast Asia, the The amendments were ordered to be
sumed that the statement referred to by Military Construction Subcommittee of engrossed and the bill'to be read a third
the Secretary referred mainly to princi- the Appropriations Committee, did not time.
pal weapons which might be manufac- review the many projects in this bill in The bill was read the third time.
tured in North Vietnam. I do not be- our usually thorough manner, meaning The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
lieve that the Secretary would take a that we did not go into a detailed review having been read the third time the ques-
sion the weapons did not
A great deal the yeas andrn ys have been ordered;
because North Vietnam is the ing of extensive hearings. and
only place they could come from. I be- of the information concerning these and the clerk will call the roll.
lieve that he is referring to sources of projects"is classified; however, the De- The legislative clerk proceeded to call
e the ittry the roiLONG of Louisiana. I announce
production more than he is referring to pear men did fD fe
sources of supply., ss ' Mr.
M
Mr. . SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, with classified information as to the 10- that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr.
will the Senator from Georgia yield? cation of projects and the intended scope GOREVIr. M NTOYe ato from New
on oMeia-
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield. of construction.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator will This bill contains language which will business.
recall in one of the hearings that cap- insure that the Congress will be fully in- I also announce that the Senator from
tured North Vietnamese weapons were formed as to how the Department of De- Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from
displayed. as coming from China or tiol expend
appr pria every- Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA], the Senator
I am, sure Rfense
and
Russia. uss ode Is
PASTORE Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sena- ceone in this rning the constituknows tionals responsibility Senatorhfrom Slut Ca olina (Mr.]Rus-
for is correct.
Mr. . SALTONSTALL. Certainly, none of the Congress in matters of defense SELL], and the Senator from Alabama
of them was manufactured in North bpolicy. ill, section e102, subsectionsB,planguage [~Irfurther announce that, f presents and
Vietnam
Mr. RUSSELL RUSSELL of Georgia. But they which reads as follows: voting, the Senator from Indiana [Mr.
had to come in through North Vietnam. (b) Within 30 days after the end of each BAYH], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. all ren- Mr. SCOTT. Well, if the contribution de'.tor't eeC$ommitteesfoneArmedhServices HILL]], the Senator from Michigan [Mr.
words of the IS and Appropriations of the House of Repre- McNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Is-
not worth anything, t to South Vietnam
ta y of sentatives and the Senate, a report with land [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from
Secretary-if etary-if the in the
Secretary-if the Secretary is right- respect to the estimated value by purpose, South Carolina [Mr. RussELL], and the
"it could be completely eliminated, , by country, of support furnished from such [Mr. SPARI{MAN],
vote Alabama ama
referring to the industry of the north, appropriations. Senator ror from
"and not reduce in any substantial way h I wish to point out to my colleagues Mr. DIRKSEN. I announce that the
the contribution on of the North to South of the Senate that part of this construe- Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is
Vi
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes. tion money will be expended on perma- absent on official business.
Mr. RUSSELL facilities both in the United States The Senator from California [Mr.
Mr. SCOTT. He is bypassing the fact and overseas; for example, money will KucHEL] is absent because of illness.
that the North Vietnamese people are re- be spent for construction on bases for The Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER]
ceiving oil and Chinese and Russian Guam, Okinawa, Wake Island, and in is necessarily absent.
weapons; is that not a fact? the United States which I will discuss and voting, the Senator from
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. As I stated, later in this presentation. If New Y[ present Nan Jvoting tSenator from
and the Sena-
I thought the Secretary was referring to A major construction effort is required Now York or a Mr. AVITs], the
sources of production and not sources of to provide the proper logistic base from tor. from Iowa [Mr. HEL], MILLER] and the en
supply. which to project our military operations vote r from
Of course, North Vietnam has a very in South Vietnam. The major portion The result was announced-Yeas 87,
limited industry. They do manufacture of the military construction funds in nays 2, es follows:
some weapons, but the principal weap- this bill amounting to $736,600,000 is for No. 59 Leg.)
ons being utilized against us are made construction in South Vietnam; approxi- J No.
in China or sent from Russia. They are mately $325 million is for facilities out-
the two principal sources of supply. side of South Vietnam to support our Aiken Fua bright lty
They are supplying them with vast quan- logistics and communication bases; and Anderson Hart Murphy
titles of sophisticated, deadly, and lethal $63,421,000 is for construction in the Bartlett Hartke Nelson
-alv to srinnnrt nn ac Hayden Neuberger
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the ap- our Bible
propriation for military construction re- ther examples, we plan to spend approxi- Bible
quested in this supplemental bill mately $36 million in the Republic of Brewster
amounts to $1,238,400,000, distributed the Philippines mainly for supply and Buurdi k
B, Va.
among the services as follows: Depart- operational facilities including hospitals Byrd, W. Va.
ment of the Army, $509,700,000; Depart- and utilities. Thirteen million, six hun- Cannon
ment of the Navy, $254,600,000; Depart- dred and ninety thousand dollars is ear- CCaasreson
laurch
ment of the Air Force, $274,100,000; and marked for Guam for hospitals and med- case
Department of Defense, emergency fund, ical facilities, operational facilities and Clark
troop housing. Cooper
$200 million. would like to close, Mr. President, Cotton
I would like to point out that this is I Curtis
only 'a further increment to military by saying that the effectiveness of our Dirksen
construction funds for southeast Asia. highly trained forces with their modern DDodnick
To date we have already appropriated equipment will be greatly enhanced Douglas
items contained in this mill- Eastland
H0111Lna .1
Hruska Prouty
Inouye Proxmire
Jackson Randolph
Jordan, N.C. Ribicoff
Jordan, Idaho Robertson
Kennedy, Mass. Russell, Ga.
Kennedy, N.Y. Scott
Lausche
Long, Mo. Simpson
Long, La. Smathers
Magnuson Smith
is
Mansfield
McCartan Symington McClellan Talmadge
McGee Thurmond
McGovern Tower
McIntyre Tydings
Metcalf Williams, N.J.
KA-1aie Williams, Del.
700,000, distributed 'as follows: Army, -- k pin -` -?
$162,200,000; Navy,. $117,800,000; Air used. I ( O_ Fannin Mooesn Young. Ohio
Force, $137,900,000. Approved For Reas~'W 9L;I 8`i ~ A-RDF80FRM 720R000500030056-9
 App'r6ved106rRelease 2004/08/30 : CIA-R1 P80RO 20R000500030056-9
March 22, 1966
NAYS-2
Morse
NOT VOTING--11
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 6161
I have watched him in his illness over journ until 12 o'clock noon on Friday
the past several years. I have noticed next.
him come back time after time after The VICE PRESIDENT.
time, always with a cheery smile. He al- objection, it is so ordered.
Gore McNamara Russell, S.O.
Hill Miller Sean
Javita Montoya
So the bill (H.R. 13546) was passed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr.
RUSSELL) again has used his unmatched
military expertise and his strong and
articulate advocacy to obtain the Sen-
ate's overwhelming approval of the
defense supplemental appropriation.
Again, that outstanding statesman has
won for our fighting men, whose vital
needs he knows so well, the decisive sup-
port they deserve so much. All America
is grateful for his deep and abiding devo-
tion. For all America recognizes that
he, more than anyone, has assured the
reality of his avowed objective: To see
that our soldiers are better supplied than
any other fighting men on earth. No
man has worked harder to achieve that
goal.
The success of this vital appropriation
was due also to the efforts of the Senate's
highly able patriarch, the distinguished
chairman of the Appropriations Commit-
tee, the Senator from Arizona [Mr.
HAYDEN] who backed this measure with
the wise advocacy which has character-
ized his many decades of outstanding
service in this body. To the distin-
guished senior senators from Rhode
Island [Mr. PASTORE] and from Missouri
[Mr. SYMINGTON], a debt of gratitude is
owed for their strong and articulate
support.
Additionally, we are indebted as always
to the distinguished senior Senator from
Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] for his
cooperative support. The eloquent plea
for swift and decisive Senate action by
ways did a good job. He was always con-
siderate of others.
It is with deep sadness that I note the
passing of Milt Kelly. Mrs. Mansfield
t
o
and I extend our deepest sympathy
his family. Milt was a good friend and
a good man.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I hope the senator will per-
mit me to associate myself with all he
has said with respect to Milton Kelly.
It has been my pleasure and privilege
to deal with hundreds of members of the
press during my public career, which
has stretched over a number of years,
but I have never known a man I trusted
more completely in discussing matters
that would help him with the story, but
were not for publication, than I did
Milton Kelly. He was indeed a gentle-
man to the manner born, a man of
integrity and courage. We mourn his
passing, and extend our sympathy to his
family.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I, too,
wish to associate myself with the
remarks just made. It was with sadness
that I learned about the passing of Milt
Kelly. I knew him as a fine, searching
newspaperman, a fine reporter, a man of
great integrity and character.
I am saddened to hear the news of his
a
death. I am sure all of us extend to his
family our feelings of deep sadness and through with it. That depends on how
affection. far we get with the bill on Friday.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Sena-
was saddened to learn of the passing of tor insisGNUSONI I would not insist vote?
G. Milton Kelly. Milt Kelly, as he was affectionately known, was a highly re- on a Mr. rollcall vote.
spected and capable journalist whose Mr. MORSE. I think if the Senator
our programs so
an Asso- necessary to rearrange have
friends forhm in his tenure as won
wish to miss
elated Press reporter assigned to the U.S. throea at t l votes may be present.
Senate.
His coverage of some of the most con- I do not understand why we quit on
which took place in the Senate during MaMAGNUSONenThis bill dhs not
his service here was noted for its objec- been reported. We are working on the
tivity and fairness to all sides. Milt will report. I believe it will be filed late
be sorely missed by the Members. of the today. It is doubtful. It may be tomor-
Senate, his many friends, and by his row morning. I would be glad to a000m-
the ranking minority member of the Appropriations Committee helped im-
mensely to assure this great success. the
We appreciate distinguishedsenior Senator given Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] and by the
junior Senators from South Dakota [Mr. McGovERN] and Arkansas [Mr. FUL-
SRIGHT], whose analytical discussions
a
ening. To the distinguished senior Sen- - - ship says we will vote on it at time
ator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] goes high AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE MES- shipain says Monday.
commendation for again applying his SAGES, FILE REPORTS, AND SIGN Mr. MORSE. I am not speaking for
cooperative efforts to assure the prompt
and orderly action of the Senate on this BILLS myself; although I am included in what
important measure. I Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I I say, but I am advised that several
Finally, i personally am grateful to the ask unanimous consent that during the Members of.the Senate plan to be away
po political party affairs-anndhper-
Senate as a efficient action and for giving its un- today's Ll nsessioni the Secretary olofvvthe meanFriday
equivocal backing to those brave fight- Senate be authorized to receive messages haps we could have a vote on Monday
ing men who deserve it so much. from the President of the United States and not have a vote on Friday, in view
and the House of Representatives; that of the fact that there is this long post-
committees be authorized to file reports; ponement from Tuesday until Friday
DEATH OF MILTON KELLY, OF THE and that the vice President or President when we are ready to stay here during ready ASSOCIATED PRESS pro telnpore be authorized to sign duly the week and do business. IiW~ know if
enrolled bills. to stay Friday, oto it
just MANSFIELD. on the ticker d I The VICE PRESIDENT. Without is necessary to cancel my engagement on
Mr.
news i te emt to the hed effect the that AP an t old a old and objection, it is so ordered. Friday to be here to cast my vote.
new Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I would not
good friend, Milton Kelly, Associated say that. We will see what we can do.
Press reporter since 1930, died today in ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL I am certain this can be worked out to
George Washington Hospital after a long FRIDAY the satisfaction of all Senators.
illness.
I have known Milton MANS Mr President, I Mr. MAGNUSON. The Senator from
years. He was a man Of ~~I~3". O~sl?#iddJBat (kI~RIB'SF 6~~ -
He was a fair man. He did his job well. Senate completes its business today it ad- erwise.
TIRE SAFETY
Mr, MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that when S.
2669, the tire safety bill, is reported from
the Committee On Commerce it be made
the pending business.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MORSE. The bill just read is to
be the pending business on Friday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from
Montana expect disposition of that bill
on Friday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not know.
Mr. MAGNUSON. The bill as being
reported by the committee has been
worked over, and practically all of the
committee is unanimous in the reporting
of the bill. Several sections were mods-
fled and amended. I do not expect too
much Opposition to the bill as merely affects uniform reported.
The tire
safety as against another bill on which
we are holding hearings which deals with
automobile safety.
Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator an-
ticipate a rollcall vote on Friday?
Mr. MAGNUSON. I would like to have
rollcall vote on the bill when we are all