TO ESTIMATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INVISION OF YUGOSLAVIA PRIOR TO MID- 1952,

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000800020002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 18, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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The pages were omitted from DRS contribution to
UM -29/2: TO ESTIMTE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INVASION OF IIIQOSLM1VIA
PRIOR TO MID-'1952, October 18, 19510
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Ileviow of this document by CIA hat
d/termined that
o CIA has no objection to declass
p It contains information of CIA
interest Mat must remain
classified at TS S
o It contains ~ nothing of CIA into str
Bak 4 ~ Reviewer - .5
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Nod,
(4) Local and Regional Problemss
15(a)
Mace: Historically, one of the most vulnerable
areas in Yugoslavia is Macedonia, focal point for the manipulation
of local antagonisms. The Tito regime has shown itself to be acutely
aware of this vulnerability-and has taken political.. economii.c, and
cultural steps to lessen it. In the past two
years Belgrade has
indicated increasing confidence in its ability to successfully corn-
'bat Comin4'orm intrigues as shown by the absence of special security
measures in L;acedonia and Belgrade's anti Bulgarian propaganda
campaign.
At the same time, however, Moscow does possess certain poten-
tialities which it presumably hopes to exploit in Macedonia. These
include (1) continued existence of local petty antagonisms; (2) the
fr esence of elements desiring either an independent Macedonia or
one more closely tied to Bulgaria; and (3) persistent economic
problems.' These possibilities have been enhanced, at least theoretic-
ally, by the current attitude of the peasants towards the Tito regime.
In the flush of the first indigenous nationalist government
in centuries, Macedonia more than any.of the other republics has,
moved, further and more forcefully towards the establishment of Com-
munist methods of production. This is especially ' true with regard
to the creation of agricultural cooperatives* The federal govern.
ment has supported and encouraged this trend in the hope of winning
the loyalty of Macedonian nationalists by assisting their economic
progress. In creating a large socialist agricultural sector Belgrade
has established a_group of young Communist officials dependent upon
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.*./
the continuation of the system. This group may ncrN be wary of the
effects of the current trend towards-liberalization will have on
their personal power, They cannot be expected to view with equanimity
such measures as the announcement made in late September that 50 per-
cent of the members of the Peoples' Committees in Croatia and Serbia
were being dismissed in the interest of greater efficiency.
The temporary shelving of the touchy Aegean Liacedonian issue
does not seem to have worked against the Tito regime despite the fact
that Cominform.propaganda has characterized Tito as the betrayer of
the legitimate rights of the Haeedonian people because of his alleged
indifference to the fate of Greek Macedonians now under "monarrcho-
fascist" rule., Apparently, the lengthy program of assurance under-
taken by the Macedonian Comunist Party for several months prior to
the closing of the Creek-Yugoslav border on August 2, 19h9 has been
effective. The creation of the Society for Aegean Macedonian Refugees,
while ostensibly for social welfare purposes such as housing and
employment, has political implications for the Yugoslav Macedonians
in that it indicates that the Yugoslavs are not insensitive to the
present plight and future disposition of Aegean PMacedonians.
Recent reports from Macedonia indicate continuing efforts
by the Cominforn to win over the people to its cause, particularly
members of the ,_acedonian Communist party. These efforts have ap-
parently included (1) dropping leaflets from aircraft; (2) sending
barges loaded with propaganda leaflets across the border at Strumica;
and (3) lately an attempt to revive the ILTRO organization in Greek
and Yugoslav 1Sacedonia, This is in addition to the incessant anti-
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e SEA
15 (c)
Yugoslav propaganda emanating from Radio Sofia and the Tree Creek
So far all evidence points to the conclusion that Bulgarian
propaganda efforts have not been successful. The recent attention
devoted to the re-activation of TR0 under Communist auspices seems
to be a tacit admission of the failure of these efforts. In a
recent Interview with US Embassy officials a local Macedonian Cabinet
mamber said that the Cominform had actually succeeding in reeving
the old terrorist organization in northern Greece, but only on a
limited scale. He added, however, that the situation would bear
watching because the IMRO tradition was still -strong in the mountains
and that under clever leadership a revival of fl RO could conceivably
occur. Cominform efforts to re-activate the IMRO have soft edeled
the Communist and Bulgarian sponsorship and instead emphasized
Macedonian nationalist aspirations and Yugoslavians alleged betrayal
of the Macedonian cause.
Macedonia continues to be plagued by economic problems,
none of which, however, are any different from those affecting other
areas in Yugoslavia. A major disappointment, according to one
Macedonian official, was the notable lag in the planned rate of
industrialization. Although he readily admitted that this could be
laid directly to the Comuinformystill he indicated the resultant
situation was irritating. Housing is a problem and is complicated
by the flow of Albanian and Bulgarian refugees as v4ell as the
presence in Skoplje and other cities of groups of Aegean Mac?doiiiansr
Macedonian cities are not large enough to accommodate the increased
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15 (d)
urban population caused by even the limited industrialization.
Peasant resistance to the regime seems on the upswing with the govern-
ment in several cases being forced to call out the militia to quell
riotous peasants. The severe-taxes and enforced collections of grain
are not popular with the peasants who still am their own land.
The albanian and Turkish tyoslems are apparently not happy with the
CP'Y's decree abolishing the veil for women and polygamy as.a religious
practice. There is obvious discontent in Macedonia as in other areas
but at the moment it does not appear to be of-'such propor4ions as to
seriously threaten the'Tito regime;
Montenegro: Montenegro represents another area peculiarly
susceptible to Cominform pressure. FIistorically and culturally
oriented towards Russia., it has shown itself still open to Russian
influence. Some of the most prominent Cominform defectors have been
11ontenegrins, including Max Goranovic and Voja Srzenticj The btontenegrin
terrain is suit3d to'guerrilla warfare and for the infiltration of
agents from Albania. One of the main complaints heard in Belgrade
ar~d Zagreb is that the Montenegrins are running the central govern-
ment. Some Slovene and Groat Communists resent the attention given
backward areas like Montenegro instead of their oven more industrially-
advanced areas,? Montenegrin mentality peculiarly lends itself to
police activities and to the traditional Balkan.type espionage
activity. There are some who believe that the predominance of Mona
tenegrins in the secret police (UDBa) and the security troops (KNOJ)
actually represents a serious threat to the security of the regime.
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15 (e)
Another factor which the Cominform could conceivably play upon is
the traditional resentment of primitive. peoples to government con-
trols. Belgrade has catered to Montenegrin economic and cultural
sensibilities but not at the exponse of relying on them entirely,
Yugoslav Army units from other areas of the country are stationed
in Montenegro and any attempted uprising, would be faced with the
prospect of immediate armed retaliation.
The Yugoslav Government is acutely aware of these political
weaknesses and is constantly employing measures, including harass-
ment by the secret-police, to keep them in check. Short of armed
intervention in the country, there appears no reason to believe that
the stability of the Tito regime will be affected by either one or
all.
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