DISSEMINATION OF AND HANDLING OF SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000100280001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 26, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
SECOM-D-15
26 November 1974
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR. The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Dissemination of and Handling of Sensitive
Intelligence Material
1. As of 19 July 1974 all members of the USIB concurred in
the Security Committee recommendations for "Dissemination of and
Handling of Sensitive Intelligence Material" with the exception of DIA.
2. DIA expressed concern with three of the ten recommendations.
The first two objections relate to the contention that participation of the
NIOs in the domestic and overseas dissemination process of NIEs (as
recommended by the Security Committee and as currently exercised)
is not warranted. NIOs now exercise a simple overview of the total
number of NIEs requested. DIA's third objection is to the recommen-
dation that NIEs no longer be disseminated to military or civilian
training facilities.
3. The D/DCI/NIO reviewed DIA's expressions of concern and
proposed changes. He agreed with DIA that NIOs should not be super-
imposed on the departmental determination of which overseas installa-
tions should receive copies. He recommended that you override DIA's
other two objections.
4. 1 attempted to work out these problems informally with DIA
and the D/DCI/NIO. While the D/DCI/NIO found my compromise pro-
11 November 1974 that he continues to hold to the objections presented
by Adm. de Poix. DIA's proposed changes and my compromise pro-
posals are located on facing pages at the Tabs. I have attached also
Adm, de Poix's original memorandum containing his objections, George
Carver's memorandum to you addressing them and a routing slip re-
flecting the D/DCI/NIO's acceptance of my proposed revisions.
5. Three alternatives are suggested:
Attached is Chairman, Security
Committee handout for USIB
(20 January 1975)
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(A) That the item be scheduled for discussion at
a USIB meeting. George Carver and I believe this is
the best alternative.
(B) That you override the DIA dissent and approve
the Security Committee recommendations as modified by
me and accepted by George Carver.
(C) That you approve the DID. suggested changes.
6. In the case of alternative (A), the USIB Secretariat could
circulate Adm, de Poix's memorandum to the USIB with a note
explaining subsequent actions of the Chairman, Security Committee,
and stating that the subject will be scheduled for USIB consideration
at a Board meeting. If you approve alternative (B), a memorandum
from you to I lexplaining why you elect not to accept
DIA's proposal would be advisable. If you elect alternative (C), a
memorandum to USIB to inform the members of the changes would
be required.
Chairman:
Attachments
APPROVE:..
Alternative (A)
Alternative (B)
Alterna~i(C
7 DEC 1974
W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
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 MEM ANDUM F0 pro FF W6ase
AA -
4/04/01: CIA-R
Re attached memo from USIB Security
mmittee on Dissemination and Handling of
Sensitive Intelligence Material, recommend you
approve Alternative A -o Air opposing views at
a meeting of USIB.
For whatever weight this may have I tend
to go along with DIA on dissemination of selected'
NLE1s to Senior Service Colleges - My experienc
has been that they (the colleges) are much more
careful and circumspect in handling sensitive
documents than those of us who live with
_
classified material d f ery day. 3 .Dec
`:. (DATP
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 101 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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 JAN 1975
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In connection with the disagreement noted by the Director,
DID., the Chairman, Security Comn ittee,proposes that:
a. Recommendation No. 1, which originally read:
That the dissemination of NIEs be considered on a case
by case basis by the appropriate National Intelligence
Officer acting in coordination with USIB Principals or
their designees and that their considerations include
the special needs of senior government officials and
commanders below the NSC policy-making level as
necessary to accomplish their missions and functions
in support of NSC decisions..
be changed to read:
"That departmental needs for NIEs be considered on
a case by case basis by the USIi3 Principals or their
designees in coordination with the appropriate National
Intelligence Officer as to the total number of NIEs
required by the departments and that their considerations
include the special needs of senior government officials
and commanders below the NSC policy-making level as
necessary to accomplish their missions and functions in
support of NSC decisions. "
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b. Recommendation No. 2, which-or! inallread:
"That the appropriate National Intelligence Officer acting
in coordination with USIB Principals evaluate requirements
for dissemination of NIEs overseas to ensure that they are
limited to those which are essential."
be changed to read:
"That the USIB Principals or their designees carefully
evaluate requirements for dissemination of NIEs overseas
to ensure that they are limited to those which are essential. "
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c. Recommendation No. 6, which originally read:
"That the practice of disseminating NIEs to military or
civilian training facilities for reference use by students be
discontinued.
be changed to read:
"That the practice of disseminating NIEs to military or
civilian training facilities for reference use by students be
discontinued. Any exception where use of NIEs is deemed
essential for a special course or for continuing courses at a
military or civilian training facility must be submitted to
for approval. "
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Memorandum for Holders
USIB-D-9. 1/25
12 December 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-D-9. 1 /25
SUBJECT Dissemination of and Handling of
Sensitive Intelligence Materials
REFERENCE USIB-D-9. 1/25, 14 May 1974
1. As of 12 July 1974, all USIB agency members had concurred in
the Security Committee recommendations for Dissemination of and
Handling of Sensitive Intelligence Material with the exception of DIA.
2. The attached memorandum from the Director, DIA, expresses
concern with three of the ten recommendations. The first two objections
relate to the contention that participation of the NIO s in the domestic
and overseas dissemination process of NIEs (as recommended by the
Security Committee and as currently exercised) is not warranted.
DIA's third objection is to the recommendation that NIEs no longer be
disseminated to military or civilian training facilities. These objections
were reviewed by the Chairman, Security CormTdttee, the D/DCI/NIO and
Director, DIA. After further examination, dvises that he
continues to hold to the objections presented by Admiral de Poix.
3.. It is planned to schedule the reference, along with the
Director, DIA' s memorandum, on a USIB agenda for discussion at. an early
date to consider the objections raised by DIA.
J
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Executive Secretary
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USIB-D-9, 1/25
14 May 1974
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT : Dissemination of and Handling of
Sensitive Intelligence Materials
REFERENCES
a. USIB-D- 9. 1/21, 7 September 1973
USIB-M-650, 20 September 1973, Item 4
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1. The enclosed report and reference c. above were prepared for
Board consideration in response to a Chairman, USIB, request that the
Security Committee survey the dissemination and handling of National
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and inputs to National Security Study
Memoranda (NSSM) and examine current practices with respect to the
handling of certain sensitive materials (references a. and b. ).
2. Because of its security classification, the second report
(reference c.) was prepared and circulated separately.
USIB ACTION REQUESTED
3. Board Members are requested to advise the Secretariat by close
of business 24 May of their concurrence in or other views on the Security
Committee recommendations that USIB:
a. Note the attached report and approve the Security
Committee recommendations 1-10 and the Findings which are
contained in pages 7 through 17 of the report.
b. Note reference c. , which is circulated under separate
cover, and approve its findings (paragraph D. , page 6).
25X1
Executive Secretary
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14 May 1974
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT : Dissemination of and Handling of Sensitive
Intelligence Materials
REFERENCE : Memorandum for the Chairman, United
States Intelligence Board, Security Committee,
24 September 1973; Same Subject
1. In accordance with your request as outlined in reference, the
Security Committee has prepared two separate reports of survey.
The attached Report of Survey: The Dissemination and Handling of
National Intelligence Inputs to National Security Study Memoranda
has been approved by the Committee and responds to that portion of
your request contained in paragraph 2a of referent memorandum.
A second Report of Survey dealing with the dissemination and hand-
ling of materials within sensitive and narrowly-held sub-classifications
of the major compartmented systems (IBSEC-T-2-73) is subject to
special security controls and, therefore, is being forwarded under
separate cover.
2. It is recommended that the U. S. Intelligence Board note the
attached report and approve its findings and recommendations.
Acting Chairman
Security Committee, USIB
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14 May 19-4
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
REPORT OF SURVEY:
THE DISSEMINATION AND HANDLING OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND INPUTS
TO NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM
S E C R E T
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This report responds to a request by the Chairman, United
States Intelligence Board, that the Security Committee survey the
dissemination and handling of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)
and inputs to National Security Study MemDranda (NSSM). The
report is divided into two Parts: Part I addresses the matter of
NIEs, and Part II deals with the .matter of inputs to NSSMs. Ten
recommendations are included.
In the conduct of its survey, the Security Committee concen-
trated on the Departments of State and Defense, and the Central
Intelligence Agency, because these proportionately receive the
greatest numbers of copies of such materials.
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IBSEC-T-1-73
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 S E C R E T
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National Intelligence Estimates
A. General
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are constructed to serve
the requirements of those high policy-making individuals and groups
that formulate national security policy: the President and members
of the National Security Council, and various ad hoc interdepart-
mental task forces. Until recently, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence was assisted in the preparation of NIEs by the CIA Office of
National Estimates and a Board of National Estimates. During
October 1973, the DCI appointed a Deputy to the Director of Central
Intelligence for National Intelligence Officers (D/DCI/NIO) and
National Intelligence Officers to replace the ONE and the Board of
National Estimates.
The process of constructing an NIE necessitates examining
relevant intelligence information and arriving at the best judgment
of the intelligence community. This requires considerable research
at the departmental levels; the preparation and coordination of draft
NIEs throughout the community; and the attempt to resolve divergent
S E C R E T
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points of view. According to Mr. Sherman Kent, a former chairman
of the Board of National Estimates, more than a thousand individuals
have been involved in the preparation of a single NIE.
NIEs have been produced at the rate of approximately forty a year
for CYs 1970-72 (32 at the SECRET level, two at the TOP SECRET
level, and six subject to special codeword controls). Of the above
six produced at the codeword level, four were sanitized for non-
codeword dissemination. A number are produced on a regularly
scheduled basis, and thus represent an updating of a prior NIE.
B B. Individual Access to NIE s
It was found that regulatory procedures applicable to the protec-
tion of classified intelligence information and materials, including
compartmented intelligence information and materials, are adequate
to prevent access by individuals not possessing the appropriate
security clearance and/or access approvals; or, in the event of
inadvertent disclosure to unauthorized individuals, to take corrective
action. Consequently, the Security Committee has no recommen-
dations in this area.
The construction of NIEs necessarily involves considerable
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 S E C R E T
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expression of divergent principles and positions which must be
reconciled. It is these divergent viewpoints which the mass
media find of great interest. An example was the 18 June
1969 article appearing in the New York Times titled: "U. S.
Intelligence Doubts Soviet First-Strike Goal. " The article
reported an alleged difference of opinion between the intelligence
community and the Department of Defense over Soviet "first-
strike" capabilities. Although the article was suspected of having
been based upon NIE 11-8-68, subject: Soviet-Strategic Attack Forces,
an analysis of the article's contents by an ONE official suggested
that the article had been based upon a draft version.
The survey found that draft NIEs are controlled at the depart-
mental level by officials serving as focal points for the NIE input
and coordination processes. A sufficient number of copies are
requested to achieve the necessary internal staffing, and the draft
copies are disseminated on a case by case basis consistent with the
need-to-know principle.
D. Dissemination of NIEs
The USIB previously expressed concern about the apparent
broad dissemination of NIEs in October 1969 and again in May 1973.
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S E C R E T
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In response to the Chairman's expression of concern in 1969,
CIA, NSA, and DIA significantly reduced their dissemination.
Since that time, however, dissemination has again reached the
pre-1969 levels.
In 1973 it was suggested that USIB Principals tailor the
distribution of NIEs on a case by ease basis, and DIA and State
were specifically asked to reduce the number of NIE copies they
normally request. DLA reports that it has reduced standard dis-
tribution from 212 SECRET and TOP SECRET NIEs to an average
of 145 copies and that distribution of codeword NIEs is less than
half that number. State advises that it has long considered dis-
semination of NIEs on a case by case basis; therefore, the number
of copies it requests is not in excess of basic departmental needs.
As one basis for its examination of NIE dissemination prac-
tices, the Security Committee used two recent estimative reports:
SNIE 11-4-73 (TOP SECRET codeword) and NIE 11/13/6-73 (classified
SECRET). Beginning with dissemination lists provided by ONE, the
Committee then proceeded to ascertain further dissemination of the
reports made from the departmental levels of the Department of
Defense, State, and CIA. The full dissemination of these NIEs is
provided in two attachments to this report.
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Through the results of this exercise, combined with questioning
of individuals involved in the NIE dissemination process, the Com-
mittee identified four conditions which influence the extent of NIE
dissemination.
1. Intended to assist NSC-level policy-making officials,
NIEs are also serving as an informational vehicle
for officials in policy support activities below the
NSC level.
2. Dissemination below the departmental level is a
departmental decision.
3. Habit has led to considerable reliance upon standard
dissemination list and a dissemination philosophy
which tends to include rather than exclude in cases
of doubt.
4. Internal departmental dissemination is influenced
by internal pressure for broader dissemination.
In the opinion of the Committee, condition (1) results from a
valid requirement for senior government officials and commanders
below the NSC level to have access to certain national intelligence
in order to accomplish their missions and functions in support of
NSC decisions. Despite the fact that the NIE, by definition, is not
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intended for this purpose, the Committee feels that in the dissemina-
tion of NIEs the special needs of such officials and commanders should
continue to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the Committee
believes that the current dissemination of NIEs could be reduced con-
siderably if the topical interests of the prospective recipients were
taken more fully into consideration in each case.
In the further opinion of the Security Committee, the continuation
of conditions (2), (3), and (4) above will perpetuate the erratic dissem-
ination patterns of the past. It is considered desirable to establish a
procedure for review of the dissemination requirements for NIEs.
This procedure should be exercised by the USIB Principals or their
designees and by an external officer associated with the material.
Recommendation No. 1:
That the dissemination, of NIEs be considered on
a case by case basis by the appropriate National
Intelligence Officer acting in coordination with
USIB Principals or their designees, and that
their considerations include the special needs
of senior government officials and commanders
below the NSC policy-making level as necessary
to accomplish their missions and functions in
support of NSC decisions.
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The dissemination of NIEs to U. S. overseas installations consti-
tutes a particular security risk because of the proximity of these
installations to hostile foreign intelligence services. It was found
that, except in cases of certain especially sensitive NIEs, there is
dissemination of NIEs overseas--to U.S. Ambassadors, CIA Station
Chiefs, and U.S. military commands headquartered abroad--whenever
the subject matter appears to be in any manner germane to the
officials' areas of responsibility. The decision to disseminate to
particular U. S. overseas installations is, in practice, left to the
departments concerned. In some cases, departmental dissemination
procedures involve levels of review; however, such reviews fre-
quently result in additions, rather than deletions, to the list. To l
some extent, such overseas dissemination appears to be prompted
by considerations not immediately related to the NSC policy-making
function, and as necessary to support NSC decisions.
Recommendation No. 2:
That the appropriate National Intelligence Officer,
acting in coordination with USIB Principals,
evaluate requirements for dissemination of NIEs
overseas to ensure that they are limited to those
which are essential.
Dissemination of NIEs to foreign governments is a matter con-
sidered by USIB on a case by case basis, and the Committee has
no recommendation concerning this subject.
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E. Copying Practices
Other than as provided for in departmental interpretation of
Executive Order governing the handling of classified information,
there exists no explicit prohibition against reproduction of NIEs.
No evidence was developed that final NIEs are being copied or re-
produced. This may be because it is convenient to request additional
copies. The Security Committee noted that there was no caveat
appearing on the NIE prohibiting reproduction.
Recommendation No. 3:
That security instructions accompanying NIEs
include the statement "NOT TO BE REPRODUCED. "
F. Extracting Information from NIEs
At the 2 October 1969 meeting of the Board, the members con-
curred in the Chairman's request that the Executive Secretary be
informed in advance of any proposal to quote or extract information
from an NIE in any other document or mess age which is to be dis -
seminated, particularly overseas, to an individual who would not
otherwise have access to the basic NIE. The Executive Secretary
was to record and coordinate each request as appropriate, checking
particularly into the possibility of any sensitive problems which
might be involved (USIB-D-2. 1/21, dated 6 October 1969). The Chair-
man stated that the request was not intended to apply to the Secretary
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of State or the Secretary of Defense, if they felt the need was urgent.
He concluded by noting that hard and fast rules were difficult to
apply in this regard and that the rule of reason should prevail.
The Executive Secretary of USIB advises that only four requests
have been received and considered pursuant to this request, the last
being on 6 July 1973. Perhaps in partial explanation of this paucity,
it is noted that DoD and State instructions implementing this request
exempted information extracted from an NIE which was paraphrased,
properly caveated, and not attributed to the NIE.
Recommendation No. 4:
That the United States Intelligence Board reaffirm
the guidance in USIB-D-2. 1/21 (attached as C) and
that each USIB Principal review the implementing
instructions of his department or agency to ensure
that the sense of this guidance is being applied.
G. Library or Reading Room Access
DIA reports that dissemination to and access at library and/or
reading room facilities of NIEs is severely restricted. When dis-
seminated to such facilities, they are not displayed or provided
voluntarily for research. State Department advises that there was
no indication that NIEs are available in any library or reading room
type of operation. ONE reports .that copies of "sensitive" estimates
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are not sent to the Agency's library service, but others are, and
that "need-to-know" is generally presumed based upon a requestor's
interest in seeing the report, provided he possesses the appropriate
security clearance(s) controlling the particular estimate.
Recommendation No. 5:
That controls be established at library and/or
reading rooms where NIEs are maintained to
ensure a need-to-know determination is made
by senior officials prior to providing individual
access.
H. Access at Military Training Facilities and Similar Civilian
Institutions
DIA policy provides for the use of NIEs as reference material
for student theses at the military joint colleges. This policy states
that joint colleges are provided copies of NIEs for background use and
information. When the faculty of the college determines that a U. S.
student has the requisite clearances and need-to-know, he may be
given access to an NIE for background study in the preparation of
a thesis or other study projects. Information may be extracted,
in paraphrased form and without attribution to an NIE, when per-
mitted by the classification and caveats of the NIE. In this connection,
the policy states that all NIEs. shall be treated as NOFORN DISSEM
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and CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION, which would prohibit the
dissemination of any theses containing material derived from an
NIE to any non-governmental activity. State Department official
staff representatives at joint colleges also receive one copy of
NIEs for their information. As demonstrated by the attached
dissemination list, other military training facilities also receive
NIE s .
CIA's Office of Training also receives SECRET and TOP SECRET
NIEs routinely, and by special request, codeword NIEs. In most
instances, these are used only for faculty reference purposes and to
demonstrate a national intelligence product for the benefit of students.
In at least one course, however, the students are assigned study
projects which require working with an NIE and other national intelli-
gence publications.
The Committee believes that the practice of allowing student
access to NIEs at military training facilities and similar civilian
institutions greatly increases the problem of limiting access. While
sympathetic to the needs of such institutions, it, is believed that other
substitute materials should be found.
Recommendation No. 6:
That the practice of disseminating NIEs to military
or civilian training facilities for reference use by
students be discontinued.
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National Security Study Memoranda
A. General
The National Security Study Memoranda process is a system-
atized procedure by which the President directs the attentio i of the
Executive Branch of Government to national security issues.
Topics addressed by NSSMs range from broad ("U. S. Policy Toward
X Country") to narrowly focused studies ("Chilean Debt Renegotiations").
There were 85 NSSMs issued in 1969; 26 in 1970; 32 in 1971; 23 in 1972;
and 23 issued to November 1973. NSSMs issued over the signature of
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs are sent
to members of the Senior Review Group (Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff) and to other entities when the subject matter is appro-
priate. For example, NSSM 149, "U. S. - PRC Trade, " was also sent
to the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Agriculture, and the
Secretary of Commerce.
NSSMs are prepared upon direction of the National Security
Council. Action is assigned to either a National Security Council
Interdepartmental Group or to an Ad Hoc Committee. The response
is submitted to the National Security Council Staff for review and is
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then forwarded to the National Security Council Secretariat for con-
sideration by the Senior Review Group. The Senior Review Group
examines the paper and determines further disposition of the NSSM
response. This disposition may be a request for additional input;
the forwarding of the NSSM response to the NSC; issuance of a
National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) by the President;
or referral to the Under Secretaries Committee for follow-up action.
The Director of Central Intelligence serves as the intelligence
advisor to the National Security Council. In this connection, his
primary role is to provide the National Security Council, its mem-
bers and its supporting mechanisms, with the information and judg-
ments about foreign developments which they need to formulate and
implement national security policy. The DCI is a member of most
of the committees within the NSC structure: the Senior Review Group,
Under Secretaries Committee, 40 Committee, Intelligence Committee,
Defense Programs Review Committee, and the Verification Panels on
SALT and on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction.
The DCI uses the expertise of the Central Intelligence Agency
to provide intelligence inputs to any of the National Security Council
Groups. Because NSSM tasking papers are addressed by the Presi-
dent's Advisor for National Security Affairs to the Secretaries of
S E C R E T
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Sate and Defense in addition to the DCI, the task representatives
from State/INR and DIA are designated by their respective depart-
mental heads. Unlike the NIE process, the intelligence inputs to
NSSMs involve only a limited number of individuals, all working in
the Washington, D.C., area.
B. Findings
The Security Committee found that NSC procedures governing
the tasking and intelligence responses to NSSMs are well documented
and generally adhered to. A major problem, however, exists in the
area of the production of inputs to the NSSM process.
Departmental and agency procedural statements and regulations
governing the production of intelligence inputs to NSSMs are in need
of revision, because they have been outdated by reorganizations and
reassignment of functions. Consequently, the production of intelli-
gence inputs to NSSM has come to be handled more and more on an
ad hoc basis.
This lack of a systematized approach to the production of NSSM
intelligence inputs creates administrative and procedural problems
which spill over into the matter of security. Individuals are fre-
quently given tasks for which they do not possess appropriate
Security Access Approval to handle; individuals are given tasks
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without stated authority to task other elements for inputs, thus
resulting in the involvement of a greater number of individuals
to justify the requirements than would be necessary under a more
regularized, streamlined management approach; and ad hoc proce-
dures of questionable security practice are frequently resorted to,
i. e. , the use of unsecure telephones and the excessive and uncon-
trolled reproduction of draft reports to achieve coordination.
C. Recommendations
Recommendation No. 7:
That USIB Principals effect a revision and updating
of departmental and agency instructions and regula-
tions related to the production of intelligence inputs
to NSSMs, and that such revisions provide for
central authorities responsible for coordinating
NSSM intelligence inputs, vested with authority to
task other such departmental and agency elements
as may be required.
Recommendation No. 8:
That each department and agency participating in the
production of intelligence inputs to NSSMs establish
registries responsible for controlling all draft copies,
with sole authority to duplicate and control reproduction.
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Recommendation No. 9:
That each department and agency participating in
the production of intelligence inputs to NSSMs
maintain a roster of individuals assigned to the
response task or otherwise made privy to the
activity.
Recommendation No. 10:
That telephone discussions related to the production
of intelligence inputs to NSSMs be restricted to
secure voice communications systems or secure
long-distance zerography, and that working groups
be provided secure working environments for their
activities.
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 S E C R E T
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ATTACHMENT A
DISSEMINATION LIST
NIE 11/13/6-73
POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE SINO-
SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
S E C R E T
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OVERALL
EXCLUDING CIA
Copy
I The President
2 Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to President, National Security Affairs
3 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Attn: Mr. Wheaton B. Byers
4 Secretary of State
5 Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs Room
6 Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian & Pacific Affairs
7 Secretary of the Treasury
Attn: Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
8-12 Department of the Treasury
Attn:* Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
13 -17 Secretary of Defense
18-24 National Security Council
1 - Mr. Andrew Marshall
1 - Mr. Robert R. Ratliff
5 - Information Liaison
25 Office of Management and Budget
Attn: Mr. Arnold Donahue
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26 Department of State
Director, Bureau of Intelligence & Research
27-131 Bureau of Intelligence & Research
132-196 DLA ATTN: DS-4C
197-203 Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI)
204-223 Department of the Navy
Naval Intelligence Command (NIC)
224-230 Department of the Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (AF/INA)
231-235 National Security Agency
Director, NSA (CREF/CDE)
236-237 Atomic Energy Commission
Division of International Affairs
238 Federal Bureau of Investigation
Assistant to the Director
239-240 Director, National Indications Center
241-248 Department of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security)
249-250 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis
251-252 Director of Defense Research & Engineering
253-272 Joint Chiefs of Staff
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Copy
273 DCI
274 DDCI
275 O/PPB
276-278 D/DCI/IC
274-280 Special Asst for SAL
281 USIB/S
282-286 DD/I
287 DDI/Special Research Staff
288 DD/O
289 DD/M&S
290 DD/S&T
291 Inspector General
292-315 Office of National Estimates
25X1 316
S E C R E T
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 S E C R E T
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318-320
321-323
324-356
Office of Basic & Geographic Intelligence (OBGI)
2 USIA (awaiting USIB approval)
9 stockpiled
357-359
360-366
367-371
372-373
374-375
376-397
OCI/OPSCEN Attn: Mr. V. Heyman
OER
OSR
DDI/IRS
NPIC/Ref
398-399 DDM&S/Off. of Joint Computer Support
400 Office of Logistics /PS
401 Office of Medical Services
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22
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 E E
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402-409 Office of Training
410 Archives
411 Presidential Library.A-18
412-471 Records Center (Stock copies)
472-474 Office of Weapons Intelligence (OWI)
475 OEL
476 OSA
477-479 OSI
S E C R E T
23
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DISSEMINATION
No. of
Copies
'Secretary of Defense
7
*Assistant Secretary (International Security
Affairs)
8
=Director of Defense Program Analysis and
Evaluation
2
'Deputy Director for Research & Engineering
2
'Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
20
*Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
"Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
,Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
Defense Intelligence Agency
65
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
3
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
1
Chief of Research and Development
1
US Army Material Command
1
JFK Center - Military Assistance
1
US Army Foreign Science & Technology Center
1
US Army Forces Command
1
Continental Army Command Tactical Intell Center
1
US Army Air Defense Command
1
US Army Alaska
1
US Army Pacific
2
US Army Europe (Heidelberg, Germany)
2
US Army Southern Command (Quarry Hts.,
Panama CZ)
1
Army War College
1
"Direct dissemination by CIA.
2.4
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Missile Intelligence Agency 1
SAFEGUARD System Manager 1
Commander in Chief US Navy Europe (London,
England) 1
Commander in Chief US Pacific Fleet 1
Commander Second Fleet (Afloat) I
Commander Seventh Fleet (Afloat) I
Commanding General Fleet Marine Forces Pacific 1
Atlantic Intelligence Center I
Fleet Intelligence Center Europe I
Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific I
Naval War College I
Marine Corps Development & Education Command,
Quantico I
Air. Force Systems Command I
Pacific Air Force 1
US Air Force Europe (Ramstein AFB, Germany) 1
Air Force Security Service I
Foreign Technology Division I
Air University I
Commander in Chief Alaska I
Commander in Chief US European Command
(Heidelberg, Germany) 2
Commander in Chief Continental Air Defense
Command I
Commander,.in Chief Strategic Air Command 2
Defense Nuclear Agency I
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff 1
Armed Forces Staff College I
Industrial College of the Armed Forces I
National War College I
DIA (Deputy Director for Collection & Surveillance) I
DIA (Secretary, External Affairs Division, USIB
& CIA Office) 3
DIA (Deputy Director for Intelligence) 5
DIA (Deputy Director for Estimates) 4
5 (STOCK)
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISSEMINATION
Copy No.
Secretary of State
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and. Research
6
26
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(Intelligence Analysts)
Planning and Coordination Staff
42 to 44
Department Duty Officer, Operations Center
45
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
46 to 47
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
48 to 49
Bureau of European Affairs
50 to 54
Soviet Affairs
NATO and Atlantic Political -Military Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
55 to 57
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
58
Bureau of African Affairs
59
Bureau of International Organization Affairs,
Office of united National Political Affairs
60
Office of the Legal Adviser
61
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
62
Foreign Service Institute
63
Office of the Secretary
64 to 67
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 S E C R E T
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25X1
SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS PROGRAMS
AND DETENTE: WHAT ARE THEY UP
TO?
S E C R E T
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 Approved For Release 2004 0401 cCIA-RbP8TOM01082A000100280001-4
OVERALL
EXCLUDING CIA
Copy
1 The President
VIA: Dr. Kissinger
2 Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs (Dr. Kissinger)
3 The Vice President
VIA: Brig. Gen. J. M. Dunn
4-16 The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board VIA: Mr. Wheaton. B. Byers
17 Office of Management and Budget
18 Mr. Andrew Marshall
National Security Council
154 L. G. Robertson
National Security Council
19 The Secretary of the Treasury
20 The Secretary of State (INR/RCI)
21-25 The Department of State
The Director of Intelligence and Research (INR/RCI)
26-27 United States Arms Control and Disarmament
The Director (INR/RCI)
172 State, for Ambassador Johnson
29
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S E C R E T
28-39 The Secretary of Defense
30-31 The Joint Chief of Staff
32-81 Defense Intelligence Agency
181-190
83-84 National Security Agency
85 Atomic Energy Commission
86 Federal Bureau of Investigation
Assistant Director (via DDI)
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S E C R E T
INTERNAL CIA
Copy
82 Chairman, GMAIC
87 Director, National Indications Center
88
89 -90
91-92
149
93
94-96
97-98
Pentagon
Director, DDI/I.AS
NPIC
Chairman, COMIREX
COMIREX Staff
99 DCI
100 DDCI
101 Inspector General
102-103 D/DCI/IC
171
104-105 DDS&T
106 ODE /DDS& T
107-110 O/WEAPONS INTELLIGENCE
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
111-113 OSI
114-115 O/DDI
116-121 CRS/ADD/SS
122-125 OER
126-142 OSR
152
155
168
173
143 -144 OCI
145-146 DDI/IRS
147 DDI/SRS
148 Chief, PPI3
150 Scientific Intelligence Committee
156 Chairman, JAEIC
157-161 OPS CEN (Attn:
153
162-166 ONE Staff
170
167 ONE/RR Development File
169 Assistant to DCI
151
175-179 ONE Reading Room
S E C R E T
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32
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191-198 Supplementer Distribution to Records Center
199 Pres. Library
200 Archives
33
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 Approved For Release 20&/(4/6: 6IA-DP80M01082A000100280001-4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DISSEMINATION
Copy No.
CINCSOUTH - Panama
58
CINCEUR - Europe
61
CINCREDCOM - Florida
62
CINCLANT - Norfolk
63
CINCALCOM - Alaska
64
CINCPAC - Hawaii
65
CINCONAD - Colorado Springs, Colo
66
CINCSAC - Offut AFB, Neb
67
Army
181-183
Navy
69-76,
60,
28
USAF
184-189
CINCUSNAVEUR - London
68
Foreign Technology Division - Ohio
77
Foreign Science & Technology Center -
Charlottesville, Va.
81
Missile Intelligence Agency - Alabama
80
USAFE - Germany
78
USAREUR ,- Germany
79
AFSC - Andrews AFB
190
SALT - Geneva
55
DoD and DIA ( Internal) (All other copies)
SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
ASD/Intell
ASD/AE
DDR&E
DDPA&E
CJCS
DJS
(29_ thru 54)
J-3
J-5
OSD
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 S E C R E T
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISSEMINATION
20 The Deputy Secretary of State
21 The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Under Secretary for Security Assistance
22 The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
The Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
23 Director Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Deputy Director Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Director Planning and Coordination Staff
Deputy Director Planning and Coordination Staff
24 Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Three Deputy Directors Bureau of Intelligence Research
25 Various Intelligence Analysts in the Office of Current
Intelligence
26 & 27 Sent to U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
for retention
172 Ambassador at Large Johnson
S E C R E T
35
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 ~,-,rr, Attachment C
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USIB--D-2. 1/21
6 October 1969
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT : Dissemination of National Intelligence Estimates
REFERENCE : USIB-D-2. 1/20, 29 August 1969
(Memorandum for USIB Principals)
1. In opening the discussion on this sv.bject during the executive
session at the 2 October Board meeting the Chairman noted that in
August (see reference) he had requested each USIB Principal to
review two questions regarding this subject:
a. The large number of copies of estimates being
disseminated.
b. The practice of quoting or extracting information
from national intelligence estimates in other documents or
messages, particularly those going overseas.
2. In regard to question a. above, the CIA, NSA and DIA Members
reported that they would be able to reduce significantly the number of
copies distributed within or by their respective departments or agencies.
Mr. Helms commented that these reports were most encouraging and
thanked the Board Members for their cooperation. In order to hold down
the distribution of NIEs he requested that each USIB Principal continue
to. give attention to this problem, and that the Board review the situation
periodically.
Subsequent to the meeting Mr. Abbot Smith asked the USIB Secretariat
to transmit his request that each USIB Principal furnish the Secretariat
within a few days their requirements for normal distribution for the
follov=;-ing: (1) SECRET NIEs, (2) SECRET SNIEs, (3) TOP SECRET NIEs,
(4) TOP SECRET SNIEs, (5) ALL SOURCE NIEs and (6) NIPPs.
Mr. Smith noted that special restricted dissemination will continue to
be determined on an ad hoc basis.
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USIB-D-2.1/21
6 October 1969
3. Regarding question 1. b, above the Chairman indicated that
he wished to achieve better coordination and control over this
practice, but that he did not intend that it be prohibited. Specifically,
he requested that each USIB Member department or agency check
with the Office of the DCI in advance, even by telephone if necessary,
regarding any quotations or extracts from NIEs which they proposed
to use in documents or messages to individuals who would not otherwise
have access to these estimates. Mr. Helms explained that this pro-
cedure would be helpful in making it possible to:
a. Know what was being done.
b. Raise the flag if there were any particularly sensitive
problems involved.
He stated that this request was not intended to apply to the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense if they felt the need were urgent.
Mr. Helms concluded his remarks by noting that hard and fast rules were
difficult to apply in this regard and that the rule of reason should prevail
4. The Board then concurred in the Chairman' s request that the
Executive Secretary of USIB should be informed in advance of any
proposal to quote or extract information from a National Intelligence
Estimate in any other document or message which is to be disseminated,
particularly overseas, to an individual who would not otherwise have
access to the basic NIE. The Executive Secretary will record and
coordinate eac . request as appropriate, checking particularly into the
possibility of any sensitive problems which might be involved.
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SECRET