LAW OF THE SEA COUNTRY STUDY SOUTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01054A000100040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1974
• Content Type: STUDY

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Law of the Sea Country Study
South Korea
Secret
BGI LOS 74-4
April 1974
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 019641
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?53(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
FOREWORD
The Law of the Sea Country Studies are prepared to support
the NSC Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea. The
countries to be included in the series are selected on the
basis of priorities suggested by the chairman of the Task
Force.
Each study has two parts. Part I is an analysis of the
primary geographic, economic, and political factors that
might influence the country's law of the sea policy, the
public and private expressions of that policy,25X113
Part 11
basic data and in orma ion bearing on law ol the sea matters.
This study was prepared by the Office of Basic and
Geographic Intelligence. 25X113
within the Directorateo neligence and with the Depart-
ment of State. Comments and questions may be directed to the
LOS Country Studies Working Group, Code 143, Extension 2257.
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTENTS
Part I - Law of the Sea Analysis
Summary 1
Factors Influencing Policy 1
Law of the Sea Policy 3
Key Policy Makers and LOS Negotiators 6
7
Part II - Background Information
Basic Data 9
Present Ocean Claims 10
Conventions 11
Membership in Organizations related to LOS Interests 12
Maps included: Regional Map
Theoretical Division of the World Seabed
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SOUTH KOREA
Part I - Law of the Sea Analysis
A. SUMMARY
South Korea was neither a participant in the six
preparatory meetings for the LOS Conference nor has
it publicly addressed the issues. Nevertheless, it
is possible to discuss the position that the South
Koreans are likely to take on some of the issues
based on a number of unofficial comments, its
geopolitical/economic situation, and several
incidents that have occurred in its marginal seas.
South Korea is likely to agree to a 12-mile
territorial sea and may support the U.S. position
on unimpeded passage through international straits,
on the condition that its strong interest in restricting passage
through the 13-mile wide Cheju Strait is accommodated. South
Korean officials have stated that the Western Korea Strait would
remain international under a 12-mile territorial sea regime. The
South Koreans will probably favor a 200-mile coastal economic zone;
but considering the hopes held for petroleum wealth beneath their
continental shelf, they will probably be reluctant to support
revenue sharing from within this area. They will, however, be likely
supporters of freedom of navigation and overflight beyond the terri-
torial seas, and they could probably be persuaded to agree to the
U.S. position on freedom of scientific research. As an emerging
distant-water and deepsea fishing state with few historic distant-
water rights, South Korea may seek to minimize coastal state control
over fisheries.
B. FACTORS INFLUENCING LOS POLICY
Special Geographic Features
South Korea is a peninsular state with coasts bordering the
Yellow Sea, the Cheju Strait, the East China Sea, the Western
Korea Strait, and the Sea of Japan. Two international straits lie
off the coast of South Korea -- 1) the 13.3-mile-wide Cheju Strait
between the mainland and Korean island of Cheju-do, and 2) the 22.8-
mile-wide Western Korea Strait between South Korea and the Japanese
island of Tsushima.
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South Korea shares the broad Yellow Sea continental shelf with
the People's Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea, the East China
Sea shelf with the PRC and Japan, and the Western Korea Strait shelf
with Japan. South Korea's shelf in the Sea of Japan is approxi-
mately 10 miles in breadth.
South Korea claims two remote islands in the Sea of Japan,
Ullung-do and the Liancourt Rocks (Dak-do or Take Shima). Its
claim to the former is uncontested, but Japan claims the latter.
The five islands that lie just below the Northern Limit Line (NLL)
in the Yellow Sea, placed under Seoul's administration by the 1953
Korean Armistice, are within a hypothetical North Korean 12-mile
territorial sea. The two easternmost islands of this group,
Yonp'yong-do and U-do, lie within a hypothetical South Korean
straight baseline. U-do, the easternmost of the two, lies north
of the Armistice Line but south of the NLL.
Uses of the Sea
The sea provides the South Korean population with 60-70 percent
of its animal protein. Coastal fisheries have been the primary
source, but deep sea fisheries are increasing in importance. South
Korea's deep sea fishing fleet ranges worldwide, fishing primarily
for tuna and Alaska pollack.
One joint Korean-American and three non-Korean oil companies
are currently exploring for petroleum in concessions granted by
Seoul in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and Western Korea Strait
shelves adjacent to South Korea. The successful exploration of
these offshore concessions is extremely important as South Korea
produces no domestic crude petroleum.
The country's peninsular situation has forced it to rely heavily
on sea transport for both domestic and foreign commerce. Korea's
joint government/private Korea Shipping Corporation maintains
routes to the United States and to eastern and southeastern Asia,
while two privately owned lines engage in worldwide tramp operations.
Political and Other Factors
South Korea has amicable relations with only two of the five
states--Japan and Taiwan--with which it shares its adjacent waters.
The animosity that exists between North and South Korea is reflected
in Seoul's attitude on the straits issue that indicates an intention
in part to deny P'yongyang use of Cheju Strait. Seoul's strong
feelings on this issue were illustrated in mid-1973 by its response
to an incident involving the Soviet delivery through the strait of a
warship to a North Korean Yellow Sea port. The government seriously
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considered declaring the strait internal waters by extending straight
baselines to Cheju-do and increasing South Korea's 3-mile territorial
see to 12 miles. On U.S. advice the idea was shelved pending the
outcome of the LOS Conference or other developments in the area.
Washington's ability to successfully intervene was undoubtedly due
to the existing close U.S.-South Korea ties, a fact that may enable
the United States to influence South Korea's policy on other LOS
issues.
South Korean relations with China and the U.S.S.R., although
cool, may improve. Seoul has publicly offered to discuss with Peking
the equitable division of their common Yellow Sea and East China Sea
shelves, and it has made private overtures to Moscow for closer ties,
reportedly offering the Soviets the use of port facilities on
Cheju-do.
C. LAW OF THE SEA POLICY
Territorial Sea
South Korea will almost certainly agree to a 12-mile territorial
sea. It has considered extending the current 3-mile claim to 12 miles
in response to the Soviet warship incident, and Seoul already has
prepared a plan for establishing a straight baseline system. Cheju-do
and the coastal islands in the Western Korea Strait and Yellow Sea
would be included in the system, Ullung-do and the Liancourt Rocks
would not. Each of the latter would have a 12-mile territorial sea.
Straits
South Korea has indicated that it will probably agree to some
form of unimpeded passage through international straits--most likely
close to the U.S. position so long as Cheju Strait is excepted.
Cheju-do is a separate province of South Korea. It is likely that
Seoul views the strait as part of the country's internal waters and
probably now only tolerates international transit through it. The
volume of traffic is probably low, as the strait is useful only for
transit between the Yellow Sea and the Korea Strait. There are
reports that Seoul plans to put a large oil storage facility on
Cheju-do; it would certainly be more satisfactory to transport the
oil between island and mainland within waters under its sovereignty.
South Korea may support a modified form of Italy's straits proposal.
Italy's proposal is designed to except from a free transit regime
those straits that: 1) are up to six miles wide, 2) are bordered on
both sides by the same state, and 3) have an alternate route.
Although Cheju Strait is wider than six miles, South Korean territory
does lie on both sides, and a 35-mile longer alternate route (south of
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Cheju-do) is available. South Korean officials have stated that the
Western Korea Strait would remain international under a 12-mile
territorial sea regime.
Continental Shelf
South Korea will probably support the 200-mile limit for
continental shelf jurisdiction. It would not conflict with Seoul's
current shelf claims in the shallow waters of the Yellow Sea, East
China Sea, and the estern Korea Strait, and it would give Seoul
international recognition to a claim over a considerable portion of
the shelf and seabed of the Sea of Japan. The government's conti-
nental shelf claim in the Sea of Japan is presently described only
by the rather vague 1952 Rhee Proclamation as being "adjacent to
the.. .coasts of the national territory, no matter how deep it may
be." If an opportunity occurred, South Korea would also support the
establishment of special semienclosed sea regimes that incorporate
division by median lines. When applied to the Sea of Japan, such a
regime would increase Seoul's shelf/seabed jurisdiction approximately
50 miles over the 200-mile limit between the 38th parallel and the
eastern terminus of the demilitarized zone where the sea approaches
500 miles in width.
?The basis of Seoul's shelf claims in the Yellow Sea and the East
China Sea is probably a combination of the "natural prolongation of
land territory" concept (International Court of Justice decision in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969) and the 1945 Truman
Proclamation. The former stresses a state's right to a "just and
equitable share" of the adjacent shelf and the latter, the use of
"equitable principles" when dividing the shelf among bordering
states. Reportedly, the Truman Proclamation still has some influence
on the thinking of South Korean lawyers. Seoul did not sign the
Convention on the Continental Shelf, rejecting the 200-meter limit
as arbitrary and outmoded by technology. Further, a 200-meter limit
would give South Korea only a 10-mile-wide coastal economic zone in
the Sea of Japan.
Coastal State Jurisdiction Beyond the Territorial Sea
Although South Korea favors complete coastal state jurisdiction
over the continental shelf, it is wary of strong comprehensive
coastal state control of the water column above it. As an emerging
deep sea and distant water fishing state, South Korea would want
minimum coastal state control of fisheries. South Korea plans by
1981 to increase fish production by 50 percent and fish exports by
36 percent; virtually all of the catch will have to come from
beyond Korea's exclusive 12-mile coastal fishing zone, which is
currently fished to near the maximum sustainable yield.
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The Rhee proclamation of 1952, like the Truman Proclamation, did
not interfere with freedom of navigation beyond the territorial sea;
there is no reason to believe that Seoul would change its view.
South Korean lawyers question the concept of revenue sharing
within the coastal state economic zone, feeling that it would
discourage commercial exploitation. Should petroleum be discovered
in the coastal zone the government would be reluctant to share the
resulting revenues.
Fisheries
South Korea probably would favor minimal coastal state control
of fisheries in view of its plans to increase its distant water
fishing activities dramatically. As a new distant-fishing state,
South Korea has few historic fishing rights and hence will have
limited access to the unutilized portion of the coastal economic
zone fish stocks. South Korea probably would not refuse to sign a
convention, however, that contained strong coastal state control
over fisheries. Rather, Seoul would seek to fill its increasing
demand for fish through bilateral fishing agreements, such as
those it has with the United States, El Salvador, Japan, Spain, and
Uruguay.
High Seas
Accessible to its trading partners only by the sea, South Korea
is unlikely to support measures that would restrict freedom of
navigation and overflight on the high seas.
Deep Seabed
South Korea will undoubtedly support revenue sharing in the
international deep seabed area.
Land-Locked States, LDC's, Disadvantaged States
South Korean lawyers view their State as a less developed
country (LDC) and envision a possible confrontation with the
developed countries over LOS issues. They believe that the LDC's
should receive preferential treatment and, therefore, may support
measures that are blatantly weighted in favor of the disadvantaged
states. In February 1971, South Korean officials implied that the
"preferential provisions" of Article III (Fisheries) of the current
U.S. LOS proposal should apply only to coastal LDC's rather than to
coastal states as a group.
Seoul has shown concern for land-locked states and will probably
support measures favoring them. In January 1973 at the Asian-African
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Legal Consultative Committee meetings in New Delhi, Seoul supported
the Kenyan proposal for the protection of navigation and overflight
rights for land-locked states.
Scientific Research
The discovery of the petroleum-bearing potential of its continental
shelf has made Seoul aware of the need for freedom of scientific
research. This, coupled with its opposition to broad coastal state
control of the seas, support for freedom of navigation and over-
flight outside the territorial sea, and close ties with the United
States indicate that it is likely Seoul could be persuaded to
support the U.S. position on this issue.
D. KEY POLICY MAKERS
Seoul's delegates to Caracas probably will be limited in their
authority to negotiate their country's LOS policy. Major decisions
will be made in Seoul through normal foreign affairs machinery, but
ultimately by President Pak.
At present there is no information available on the LOS back-
grounds and qualifications of the three attendees at the December
1973 organizational session. The South Korean with perhaps the
greatest LOS expertise is Choon-ho Park. He chose not to partici-
pate officially in Seoul's LOS negotiations, but may exert some
behind-the-scenes influence.
Park has written extensively on Yellow Sea and East China Sea
LOS matters, particularly the current oil exploration activities.
He delivered a paper in November 1973 at the LOS seminar sponsored
by the American Embassy in Seoul. Dr. Park supports a 12-mile
territorial sea provided right of free transit for all ships and
aircraft is secured. He suggested that international safety standards
be applied to straits less than 24 miles wide and that transiting
craft be held liable for damages resulting from violation of traffic
rules. He also called for complete rejection of exclusive economic
and fishery zones and patrimonial seas. It is the Embassy's opinion
that Dr. Park's colleagues considered his views extreme.
Choon-ho Park, is currently a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center
for International Studies in Washington, D.C. Park received a B.A.
from Seoul National University in 1959, a Diploma from Edinburgh
University in 1965, and a Ph. D. from Edinburgh's Faculty of Law in
1971. Most recently he was a Research Fellow, East Asian Legal
Studies, Harvard Law School.
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The Oree South Korean delegates who attended (as observers) the
orgarizational session of the Conference are:
Mr. Tae Hyuk HAM, Counsellor, Permanent Observer to the UN; Mr. Joung
Binn LEE, First Secretary, Permanent Observer to the UN; and H.E. Mr.
Tong Jin PARK, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent
Observer to the UN. (The name and title are as they appear in the latest
UN listing.)
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Part II - Background Information
GEOGRAPHY:
World region: East Asia
Category: coastal
Bordering states: North Korea
Bordering bodies of water: Sea of Japan, Western Korea Strait,
Yellow Sea, East China Sea
Bordering semienclosed sea: Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, East China
Sea
Bordering straits: Western Korea Strait (23.0 n. m.), Cheju Strait
(13.3 n. m.)
Area of continental shelf: 71,300 sq. n. m., shared with China,
North Korea, Japan, Taiwan
Area to 200 n. m. limit: 101,600 sq. n. m., shared with China,
North Korea, Japan
Area to edge of continental margin: 93,300 sq. n. m.
Coastline: 1,500 m.
Land: 38,000 sq. m.
Population: 33,390,000
INDUSTRY AND TRADE:
GNP: $9.8 billion, $300 per capita (1972)
Major industries: textiles and clothing, food processing, chemical
fertilizers, chemicals, plywood, coal
Exports: $1.6 billion (f.o.b., 1972); clothing and textiles, veneer
and plywood, wigs, fish products
Imports: $2.5 billion (c.i.f., 1972), machinery, textiles, electrical
equipment, crude petroleum, wood, pulp, paper, transport equipment
Major trade partners: exports - U.S. 47%, Japan 22%; imports - Japan
39%, U.S. 28% (1972)
Merchant marine: 134 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 906,700 GRT;
85 cargo (including 1 combination cargo-training), 23 tanker, 14
bulk, 12 specialized carrier
MARINE FISHERIES:
Catch: 1,343,000 metric tons, $262 million (1972 est.)
Economic importance: provides 60%-70% of country's animal protein
and 9% of exports; provides employment and food locally
Other fishing areas: Japan, U.S., El Salvador, Uruguay
Species: many coastal species, tuna, Alaska pollack
Other countries fishing off coast: Japan
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PETROLEUM RESOURCES:
No known crude oil or natural gas production or proved recoverable
reserves; potential offshore reserves are estimated roughly at
10-100 billions of 42-gal. bbl. or 1,500-15,000 millions of
metric tons crude oil, and 10-100 trillions of cubic feet or
300-3,000 billions of cubic meters of natural gas
NAVY:
Ships: 10 destroyer-type vessels, 32 coastal and harbor patrol,
12 mine warfare, 95 amphibious ships and craft, 71 auxiliary
and service craft
GOVERNMENT LEADERS:
President Pak Chong-hui; Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil; Minister of
Foreign Affairs Kim Tong-cho
PRESENT OCEAN CLAIMS:
Type
Date Terms Source/Notes
Territorial 1952 President's Proclamation, Jan. 18,
Sea 1952
Created geographic limits of 20-200
in. for state control; provides
that "declaration of sovereignty
over the adjacent seas does not
interfere with the rights of free
navigation on the high seas."
Continental
Shelf
1952 20-200 m. President's Proclamation Jan. 18,
1952
Established "Rhee Line."
1970 Presidential Decree No. 5020, May
30, 1970
Provided for 6 concession blocks
in Yellow Sea, East China Sea,
and Western Korea Strait.
1974 Agreement Between the Republic of
Korea and Japan Concerning the
Establishment of Boundaries in
the Northern Part of the Conti-
nental Shelf Adjacent to the Two
Countries, Jan. 30, 1974
Delimits shelf claim in Western
Korea Strait.
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PRESENT OCEAN CLAIMS (cont'd):
Type
Exclusive
Fishing
Fisheries
Date Terms Source/Notes
1952-54 20-200 m.
Japan-Republic of Korea Fisheries
Agreement, Jun. 22, 1965
Established joint conservation
zone off Korean coast and
recognized each has right to
establish exclusive fishing
zone of 12 m.
1953 Fishery Resources Protection Law,
Conservation Dec. 12, 1953
MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS:
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
Agreement for the Establishment of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries
Council
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water
Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization
Convention on the International Hydrographic Organization
BILATERAL CONVENTIONS:
Japan-Republic of Korea - Agreement on Fisheries
Japan-Republic of Korea - Agreement Between the Republic of Korea
and Japan Concerning the Establishment of Boundaries in the
Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two
Countries
Japan-Republic of Korea - Agreement Between the Republic of Korea
and Japan Concerning the Establishment of Boundaries in the
Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two
Countries
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MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS RELATED TO LOS INTERESTS:
ADB Asian Development Bank
ASPAC Asian and Pacific Council
ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and
the Far East
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank)
ICAO International Civil Aviation
Organization
IDA International Development Association
(IBRD Affiliate)
IFC International Finance Corporation
(IBRD Affiliate)
IHB International Hydrographic Bureau
IMCO Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization
IMF (FUND) International Monetary Fund
INTELSAT International Telecommunications
Satellite Consortium
INTERPOL International Criminal Police
Organization
IPU Inter-Parliamentary Union
ITU International Telecommunication Union
UNESCO United National Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization
WHO World Health Organization
WMO World Meteorological Organization
Asian Parliamentary Union
Colombo Plan
Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the
protection of war victims
U.N. Special Fund
South Korea does not hold U.N.
membership but the government has
a permanent observer in New York,
and South Korea is a member of
most U.N. specialized agencies
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DEPTH OF THE SEABED
O 183* 3658**Meters
? 100 2000 Fathoms
?The continental shelf is conventionally defined
600 12000 Feet
by the 200 meter (656 foot) isobat h.
**The continental margin is approximately defined
by the 4000 meter (13122 foot) isobat h.
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