CIA/RR GM 60-2, OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 22 JANUARY 1960 (C)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-01006A000100160001-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 18, 2000
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 21, 1960
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01006A000100160001-9.pdf1.52 MB
Body: 
25X1A Approved For Releas 9-c0,011,41r:91#-flPf79-01006A000100160001-9 WU. MEMO A U 0 Chief LCD/CR FROM Chief. /P/Ra SUBJECT 60 CIA/R M 60-2. Overseas Chinese in Souhea Asia, 22 77;;;WITZIZT- REFE CES ?; (a) USIA Memorandum to OCR/CIA, 9 March 1960; (b) LCD/CR Memorandum to St/P /RR 11 March 1960, same subject 1. Thi Officeas no objection the USIA torwardin stbect ndum to USIA posts overseas providin its use is restricted Government personnel. 2. Pie*s inform USIA. that a request of this kind need not be de unless the document is restricted "No Dissemination Abroad.' 3. Attached are eleven copies requested by USIA. Attachments; Copies #1S2 162. GM 60-2 St /P /C x-8622(21 Mar 60) Distribution: 0 & 1 - Addressee - St /P /C 1 - Chrono COP FrIPI Approved For Release Luva/00 1 : -RDr79-01006A000100160001-9 D 25X1A ? Approved For Relea EffRA-RDP79-01006A000100160001-9 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Analysis Branch, DD/CR ATTENTION FROM JECT 23 qa 1980 DD/AB/SS 25X1A Chief? Publications Staff, ORR Mean of CIA/ER OM 60-2, ConfideralaTfolEreign 10 it is requested that the attached coptes of subject report be fo,rwarded as follows: #51 #54 465 036 469 490 - 491 4124 4125 4126 25X1C All ORR resoonsibilities as defined in the DDI memorandum of 13 August 1952, "Procedures for Dissemination of Finishel Intelligence o Foreign Uovernments?" as applicable to this report, have been fulfilled. 25X1A DOCUMERT NO NO - NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO; IS S NEXT REVIEW DATE: coy r Approved For ReleactMEMAA-RDP796e00: -10 Os' 00160001-9 DATE 4 ' REVIEWER. 035377 Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100160001-9 IG7 Copy No GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM CIA/RR GM 60-2 22 January 1960 OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANCED TO: IS $ C NEXT REVIEW DATE' - AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE: 01/04___ REVIEWER: 035377 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100160001-9 C.-64F DE 14 FA L Background The presence of the Overseas Chinese5 in every country of Southeast Asia constitutes a minority problem that is common to the region as a whole. Although the Overseas Chinese represent only about 6 percent of the total population of the region, their influence is far greater than their numbers would imply. In some countries the Chinese have a virtual monopoly over certain key commercial enterprises, which could provide the Communists with a powerful economic tool for subversive activities against the nations of Southeast Asia. Currently, this potential for subversion is probably conditioned by the fact that the Overseas Chinese are generally apolitical. The presence of sizable Chinese communities, however, is in itself a visible reminder to Southeast Asian leaders of geographic realities. To the north is China with a population of about 675 million that is increasing at the rate of 15 million a year and straining against the food resources of the country. Nearby lie large areas in Southeast Asia that are comparatively underpopulated and largely undeveloped. The large expanses of uncleared land throughout Southeast Asia and even the relatively densely populated delta areas of some of the main rivers could support many additional millions of people at Asiatic standards of living. The universal adoption of the Japanese method of rice growing (distinguished by heavy fertilizing) would in itself greatly increase the rice yields. Historically, there has been a continuing flow of emigration from China into Southeast Asia. Since neither ancestry nor citizenship is a realistic criterion as to who is Chinese in the overseas context, it is difficult to give a completely valid enumeration or picture of the distribution of Overseas Chinese throughout the region. Of the estimated total population of 190 million in Southeast Asia, some 11 to 12 million can be considered Chinese. Partially because the vast majority emigrated by way of the sea, the Chinese live chiefly in the delta areas -- the sites of the Southeast Asian ports and great comnercial centers. Chinese are relatively sparse in the border areas, except for the refugees and irregular KNIT soldiers in northeastern Burma, northern Thailand, and northern Laos. The accompanying map and table show the areas in which Chinese are concentrated, the parts of China from which they came, the total number in each country, and its linguistic composition. The immigrants have come almost exclusively from southeastern China -- the provinces of KWantung, Fukien, and Miangsi -- with small numbers from Hainan Island and Vinnan. Five main language groups are represented: Cantonese, Hokkien-Teochi, Hakka, Hainanese, and YUnnanese. Only the Hokkiens and Teochins speak dialects of the same language; the others speak distinctive languages that are not mutually intelligible. Within a Southeast Asian country, a specific dialect group often virtually monopolizes certain occupations. For example, most pepper planters and domestic servants in Cambodia are Hainanese, and the Hakkas dominate the tin industry of Indonesia. Distribution Burma:.. About 60 percent of the Chinese in Burma are concentrated in Rangoon and the surrounding Irrawaddy Delta area and south into Tenasserim. Another 30 percent or more is found in the Kachin and Shan States. Most of the Chinese are engaged in commerce and artisan work -- metal and leather working and carpentry -- but some are employed in fishing and mining. Thailand: Approximately 50 percent of the Chinese in Thailand live in the Bangkok-Chao Phraya Delta region, with a second major concentration in the Kra Isthmus, the center of Thailand's tin and rubber industries. Elsewhere, they tend to live in towns along transportation arteries, such as the railroads in the northeast. Chinese are dominant in finance and industry, operating 80 percent of the rice mills and owning and operating most of the banking, insurance, and export-import firms. Most of the labor force in the rubber and tin industries is also Chinese. o Overseas Chinese may be defined as the China-born Chinese population residing in a foreign country, together with their patrilineal descendants who still regard themselves personally and socially as Chinese. .0 For details of the number and distribution of Overseas Chinese by specific countries, see the map and tables on the reverse side. The figures given for internal administrative units are the latest available, generally from the most recent census, and may be less up to date than the estimates of the total number of Overseas Chinese given in the textual table. CCILIEIDE-14T+Ar CQUERIENILAt Approved For :5eledbe 20 i 0/ ? CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Areas of Origin and Overseas Concentrations CHINA SEA 0 KO A JAPAN 511 Pl."14NE SEA n4 PHILIPPINES INDIAN OCEAN AREAS OF ORIGIN (BY TRIBE) Yunnaruse Nadia M Cantonese Eg Hainenese Hada CYM1er Teochtu-HoliNien OVERSEAS CONCENTRATIONS NE Mcaoir?Centration070'C'grcentration cocos M. .INDO ..ristryas PALAU ; Heleruheu SIA 8, NEW GUINEA PAPLIA AUSTRALIA 28586 160 CONMENTTAl. Laos. The Chinese in Laos live chiefly in the larger towns and are predominantly : CIA-RDP7%0100finKftlecalltegatraroertch-imint_ancondttoileedsa.le firms. OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA a/ Country British Borneo North Borneo Erunei Sarawak Philippines Total Population Number (thousands) Year 19,045 1953 22,800 1957 2,000 1959 4,740 1958 13,797 1958 12,366 1956 6,279 1957 1,515 1950 84,982 1956 1,107 1401 1957 75 1957 631 1956 24,718 1959 Chinese Population Major Dialect Groups hi Number (Percent of Total (thousands) Year Percent Chinese Population) 335 1953 2 3,000 1955 13 30 1958 218 1958 15 0954 703 1956 2,332 1957 1,142 1958 2,500 1955 302 97 1957 15 1957 190 1956 363 1956 2 00 70, 020 HN 40, 0 25, Y 20, 0 8, HA 3 T 60, HA 12, H 12, C 10 2 T 60, HA 20, some C, H, and Y 5 T 60, C 20, HN 7, HA 4, H 4 negl. Mostly Cantonese C 45, T 20, HA 10, BE 8, H 4 ON 29, C 25, HA 21, T 11, H 6 HN 40, C 22, T 22, H 7, HA 5 HN 47, HA 21, C 12, T 8, H 3 6 37 75 3 25 24 20 30 HA 56, C 26, EN 7, T 5, 03 HA 31, 000 28 HN 15, c 10, 1 8, H 3 a. Most of the statistics are from official sources within the countries. b. The percentage estimates of dialect composition are from Skinner's Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia, 1951 (C-Cantonese, H-Hainanese, HA-Hakka, HN-Hokkien, T-Teoehins, Y-Yunnanese, and HOK-Hokchin). c. This figure does not take full account of Chinese immigrants in recent years who have settled in the Shan and Ensile States. The number of Chinese immigrants who have entered these states since 1940 has been estimated at 250,000. -C-GINFIDEIZIAL Cambodia: The majority of the Chinese in Cambodia also are concentrated in urban centers. Of Phnom Penh's total population of 363,800, approximately 110,000 are Chinese. They own over 50 percent of the rice mills, almost monopolize the fish industry and bus transport service, and are active in import-export trade and banking. South Vietnam: About 555,000 of South Vietnam's Chinese population of 700,000 live in the twin cities of Saigon-Cholon -- most of them in Cholon. In Southeast Asia, only Singapore has a larger Chinese urban population than Cholon. The rice trade and most of South Vietnam's other retail and wholesale trade are dominated by the Chinese. North Vietnam: The number of Chinese in North Vietnam is uncertain. In 1954 the total for North Vietnam was estimated at 50,000; nearly half of this number reportedly fled to South Vietnam. The 20,000 to 25,000 remaining are probably concentrated chiefly in Hanoi and Haiphong. Federation of Malaya: In Malaya the Chinese have settled largely in the states along the west coast. The 1957 census indicates that 75 percent of the total Chinese population of 2.3 million is concentrated in the four states of Johore, Selangor, Perak, and Penang. In Penang, over 57 percent of the total population is Chinese and in Selangor and Perak, 45 percent or more. Throughout the Malayan states the Chinese are largely urban. In the three largest cities -- Kuala Lumpur, Georgetown, and Ipoh -- they constitute 62 percent, 73 percent, and 67 percent of the population, respectively. Chinese own and operate most non-British commercial enterprises, rank second to the British in the volume of capital investment, are the chief middlemen and shopkeepers, and generally dominate service industries. They control over 40 percent of the tin production and own many small rubber holdings. The possibility of a future union of Malaya and Singapore presents the Malayan Government with the prospect of a combined Chinese population slightly larger than the total Malay population and much more economically powerful. Singapore: According to the 1957 census, the total population of the Colony of Singapore had increased 54 percent since 1947, the date of the last previous census. During the intercensal decade the Chinese population increased 49.5 percent, but the Malay increased 64 percent. In 1947 the Chinese comprised 77.7 percent of the population and the Malaysians 12.1 percent; 10 years later the corresponding figures were 75.4 and 13.6 percent. In almost every line of commercial and business endeavor, Chinese predominate. Of significance is the fact that half of Singapore's population is under 19 years of age. British Borneo: Although the Chinese in British Borneo live chiefly in urban centers, a substantial number are small farmers. In North Borneo the greatest number are located in the East Coast Residency, where they comprise about 36 percent of the population. In Brunei the concentration of Chinese, by both number and percentage, is greatest in Belait District. In Sarawak the First and Third Divisions have the major Chinese concentrations. The rubber industry, connerce, banking, and bus and taxi services throughout British Borneo are dominated by Chinese. Philippines: As in other parts of Southeast Asia, the vast majority of the Chinese in the Philippines are urban dwellers. It is estimated that 90,000 live in Manila, comprising 7.2 percent of the city's population. Another 30,000, or 18 percent of the total population of Cebu, live within that city and its environs. Only three of the provinces -- Cebu, Cotabato, and Davao -- have Chinese alien registrations amounting to as much as 1 percent of the provincial total. Despite these relatively law percentages for the Philippines as a whole, it is estimated that Chinese conduct over 50 percent of the retail trade and control the rice business. In industry, they rank second only to Americans. Indonesia: The passage of time has largely invalidated the results of the last official census of Indonesia, which was taken in 1930. Current estimates indicate, however, that the Chinese population is probably distributed as follows: 49 percent in Java and Madura, 38 percent in Sumatra, 8 percent in Borneo, 3 percent in Celebes, and 2 percent in the other islands. The Chinese control a large part of the wholesale and retail trade and are active in the export-import trade, industry, and estate agriculture. Recent official Indonesian statistics, which are probably based on a. reported register of EetIMENTTA L 25X6 GENIMEMITAL alien businesses, indicate that 84,000 of the 86,000 foreign retailers in the nation (excluding certain dissident areas) are Chinese. Of the Chinese retailers, some 26,000 are in East Java, 15,000 in East Sumatra, and 14,000 in Greater Djakarta. It is not known how many of these are rural traders; and the register, itself, may well be incomplete. On the other hand, Indonesian Chinese estimate the number of Chinese rural retailers at 60,000 on the basis of one to each of Indonesia's 60,000 villages. During the last decade or more, there has been a pronounced movement of Chinese from rural areas to large cities, particularly in Java. As of 1958, about 10 percent of Djakarta's estimated population of 2 million was Chinese. Recent restrictions closing Djakarta, Bandung, and Medan to further influx of any aliens will stem this urban trend. However, related government decrees forcing the movement of Chinese aliens from rural areas to smaller towns will increase the concentration of Chinese in these secondary centers. Conflicts Throughout Southeast Asia. the Overseas Chinese have maintained close ties with the homeland, accompanied by a definite ethnocentric or Chinese national consciousness. Cash remittances amounting to large sums have been sent to the mainland annually for investment. Thousands of students have gone to China for their education, and adults in large numbers have returned to China for visits. In all the host countries the Chinese have resisted assimilation, but to varying degrees. Wherever permitted, they have maintained their own schools, in which Chinese is commonly the medium of instruction, and their own associations for social and business purposes. Both the Nationalist and Communist Chinese governments have deliberately encouraged this national consciousness, basing their claim to the allegiance of Chinese expatriates on the concept of jus sanguinis. In the implementation of this policy the Communists have made use of such overt organizations as the Bank of China. Some attempts have been made in recent years to soften the policy in the interest of Southeast Asian good will. Overseas Chinese have been encouraged to acquiesce in the national aims of their host countries. Communist Chins has even discouraged Overseas Chinese students from attending mainland schools. To some extent, Nationalist China followed suit in the fall of 1958, when it suggested that Overseas Chinese should become citizens of the countries in which they reside. The basic attitude, however, seems to have remained unchanged. In 1957, after advocating that Overseas Chinese should become good citizens of their host countries and after agreeing (as in the case of Indonesia) that resident Chinese should opt for local or Chinese citizenship, Chou En-Lai stated, "Their racial relations and cultural relations will, of course, remain unchanged." The unchanged attitude is moat recently demonstrated by Communist China's protests over restrictions being felt by Chinese in Indonesia. Anti-Sinicism has increased with the growth of nationalism in Southeast Asia and the corollary desire to place limits on the position of the Overseas Chinese in the national economies. Undoubtedly the fear that Chinese Communism might exploit the latent power of the Overseas Chinese has also contributed to 25X6 anti-Chinese feeling. Southeast Asian governments have imposed economic sanctions on the Chinese and have taken steps to force their increased assim- ilation and the assumption of greater responsibility toward the host government. Many of the restrictions have beet minimized by the Chinese Except for the current governmen restrictions on the inese in n.onesia, the most stringent measures have been taken in Thailand, South Vietnam, and the Philippines, all of which are countries that recognize the Nationalist Government on Taiwan and in which large proportions of the Chinese population are, at least nominally, pro-Nationalist. The situation in these countries probably reflects the protective cover of SEATO agreements and the weakness of the Taiwan Government. The advent of the communes in China and the concomitant breakdown of the Chinese traditions of family and home undoubtedly have introduced another factor that has tempered the sentiments of the Overseas Chinese toward their homeland under its present government. Cash remittances, for example, have declined greatly in recent years. Nevertheless, pride in the successes of Communist China, combined with its emergence as a potentially powerful protector vis a vis the governments of Southeast Asia, will continue to have a definite appeal to many Overseas Chinese. Among this group, large numbers may be more pro-China than pro-Communist. In any case, factors such as self-interest and fear of retaliation by either Communist China or their host country are likely to be the ultimate criteria in determining the allegiance of the pragmatic Chinese businessmen. CCINEIDal114: Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100160001-9 Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100160001-9 51\EI.J.T.-bM. Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100160001-9