[ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET TO D/DCI/IC DDCI DCI FROM GEIRGE L. CARY REGARDING SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE SSCI]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A002500060003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 30, 1977
• Content Type: FORM

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George L. Cary
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Legislative Counsel
30 March 1977
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
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to whom. Draw o line across column offer each tommenl.)
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Forwarded herewith (Tab. A)
D/DGI/IC
are suggested answers to
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questions submitted by the SSCI
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Question A. G:[VIL LIBERTIES
1. Currently, one of the important controversies in constitutional
law is the question of how the President's authority to conduct foreign
intelligence activities meshes with the provisions of the first and fourth
amendments. The question has mast frequently arisen in terms of wire-
taps and foreign intelligence cases.
a. Could you explain your views of the nature and extent
of Presidential authority and how it is limited by the first and
fourth amendments?
ANSWER: The Committee appreciates that this question is best and
OGC
most properly put to the President. and his advisors. For myself, I believe
that the President has a constitutional duty to conduct the nation's foreign
inherent
affairs and that he has certain/powers to enable him to fulfill this duty,
including the authority to collect foreign intelligence in order to protect the
national security. This authority, however, does not, in my opinion, exempt
him from the requirements of the first, fourth, or any other amendment to the
constitution. Rather, the exercise of this authority must be accommodated to the
rights of U. S, citizens under these amendments. T do not believe that his power
to collect foreign intelligence, including the use of electronic surveillance, is
incompatible with these rights. The determination of the proper balance between
his power and these constitutional protections has and probably will continue to
be the subject of debate, and is ultimately the responsibility of the courts.
b. I7o you believe the President has the power to conduct
warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans at home ar
abroad far foreign intelligence purposes?
ANSWER: It is my understanding that current judicial decisions permit,
or at least do not prohibit, such warrantless surveillance where the target is a
foreign power or an agent or collaborator of a foreign power. Of course, such
surveillances would be undertaken domestically by the FBI rather than GIA.
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c. Is it your understanding of the law that if Congress
enacts legislation setting standards and conditions for the use
of electronic surveillance in fareign intelligence cases, the
executive branch, including the President, is bound by those
standards and conditions?
ANSWER: It seems to me that the answer to this question may very
well depend an the nature of-the statutory standards. and conditions. If-such
standards and conditions were apparently in conflict with the President's
constitutional powers and duties, I doubt that the President would be bound
in the absence of a judicial decision upholding the constitutionality of the
statute. In any event, I defer to the Attorney General far a more definitive
answer to this question,
A 2. Last summer, this Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee
reported S. 3197, a bill to require warrants for electronic surveillance conducted
in the United States for fareign intelligence purposes.
a. Do you favor such legislation?
ANSWER: Although I have not had a sufficient opportunity to study S. 3197
OGC
in detail, in general I support the concept of such legislation, at least insofar as
it might apply to electronic surveillance directed against U. S. citizens or permanent
resident aliens, so long as the capability of the United States to obtain necessary
foreign intelligence is preserved.
b. Would you favor expanding such legislation to require
warrants for electronic surveillance of Americans abroad, as well
as in the United States?
ANSWER: Section 5 of Executive Order 11905, and implementing procedures
OGC
issued by the Attorney General, .place very stringent restrictions on electronic
surveillance directed against U. S. persons abroad. I am informed that electronic
surveillance conducted in accordance with these procedures is lawful, and inasmuch
as the full implication of an extension of a warrant requirement to overseas activities
is not clear to me at this time, I am not now prepared to indicate my support for
such an enlargement in the scope of the proposed legislation.
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c. Would you favor expanding the praposed electronic
surveillance legislation to require warrants in foreign intel-
ligence cases for other intrusive investigative techniques such
as mail opening and surreptitious entries when directed against
Americans, either at home or abroad?
ANSWER: I would favor expansion of the proposed electronic surveillance
legislation to cover mail opening and surreptitious entry, at least domestically,
as I understand that similar Fourth Amendment considerations are applicable.
d. Do you think that electronic surveillance of Americans
for foreign intelligence purposes at home or abroad should be
limited to those instances where there is substantial evidence
that the American has engaged in criminal activities?
ANSWER: It is my understanding that no such absolute standard or
limitation would have been established by S. 3197 as reported by the Committee
in the last Congress, and the adoption of such an absolute standard or limitation
might well be undesirable in light of the inadequacy of existing criminal laws
as they relate to activities that are of legitimate foreign intelligence interest.
It should be noted with regard to this question that, generally spealcing, the
prevention and prosecution of crime are not the purposes of foreign intelligence
surveillances, whether electronic or other.
e. For the purpose of obtaining a warrant, would you be willing
to report to a Federal judge the facts determining the Agency's belief
that electronic surveillance should be conducted against an American
living abroad?
ANSWER: This question could only be answered in the context of a
particular case and in relation to a particular statutory requirement governing
the scope and detail of the information to be submitted in support of a warrant
application. However, as a general proposition, in a case where the relevant
facts were derived from a foreign source of intelligence, I would be strongly
inclined to forego an electronic surveillance rather than to compromise the
source in order to obtain a warrant.
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t=2uestion 13. LEGAL AUTHORITY
1. In February of 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 on
United States foreign intelligence activities. The Executive Order was issued in
order to "clarify the authority and responsibilities of the intelligence agencies."
Would you tell the Committee your views of the Executive
Order, particularly as it relates to the following issues:
a, Is an Executive Order which can be changed at the will
of the President and which provides no penalties for its violation,
sufficient to define the varying missions of the intelligence agencies
and to fix firm limits on their activities?
ANSWER: The intelligence activities of the United States have been
conducted for thirty years on the basis of Executive Orders and National Security
Council Intelligence Directives, as well as certain statutes. The Executive
Orders have the effect of law in terms of their directive control of intelligence
;activities. Possibly, additional legislative action is needed to define the
:missions of intelligence agencies and fix firm limits on their activities, but
:[ cansider any specific comments by me must necessarily be deferred until I
Ynave more complete knowledge of the manner in which the existing system is
operating.
b. While the DCI is 'to provide guidance on-the relationship-
between tactical and national intelligence, under the Executive Order
the DCI does not have any responsibility for tactical intelligence.
Previous DCIs have had the right to review the allocation of all
intelligence resources, including tactical intelligence. Do you believe
that the Executive Order has an undesirable effect of weakening the
DCI's authority in this area?
ANSWER: Tactical intelligence is an essential and integral element
of the effectiveness of military forces in the field, and should be addressed in
terms of the needs of the military forces. The DCI, an the other hand, is
primarily involved with matters of national intelligence. The line dividing
xxatianal and tactical intelligence is not clear but, on balance, I consider the
I,rovision in Executive Order 11905 is appropriate. The DCI and the NSC Policy
Review Committee (which has assumed the functions of the Committee an Foreign
Intelligence established by E.O. 11905) are charged to provide guidance on the
relationship between tactical and national intelligence, and thus are responsible
far insuring that unnecessary overlap and duplication does not occur and that
all programs are compatible with security and foreign policy. The important
thing is to assure that the potentialities of mutual support between national and
tactical assets ~pprovec~'~'or ~2e~e~ase~Ob'~/~~~z ~f~eF80~'~5~~~0~6~~~3=9
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c. Under the Executive Order, the DGI is to "ensure the
development and the submission of a national intelligence budget."
At the same time, the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, now the
Policy Review Committee (PRC), is to "control budget preparation
of the national intelligence program, " and the Secretary of Defense
has the responsibility to "direct, fund and operate" the NSA. How
can these potentially contradicting charges be resolved?
ANSWER: The manner in which the National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget for FY 1978 was developed provides the answer to this question. The
Intelligence Community Staff was charged in the Executive Order to provide
staff support to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI). The DCI used
his Deputy for the Intelligence Community, who heads the Intelligence ,Community
Staff, to spearhead development of the budget and submit it to the CFI. The CFI
held 20 sessions during which the Community program and budget were examined
in great detail and many issues identified and settled. The Deputy Secretary
of Defense, as a member of the CFI, participated in this review. The agreed-
upon budgets for the intelligence elements of the Department of Defense, including
that for NSA, were included in the DoD budget. The system involved close
working relationships among the Intelligence Community Staff the intelligence
staff of the Secretary of Defense, and the intelligence staff of the Secretary
of Defense, and the intelligence program managers, but what the question
describes as "potentially contradicting charges" did not prove to be such in
actual practice.
d. What changes would you recommend in the present r,xecutive
Order?
ANSWER: The President has directed a complete review of the mission
and structure of American intelligence, including an assessment of the adequacy
of Executive Order 11905, far which I will have a major responsibility. I suggest
it would be appropriate for me to await that review before malting specific proposals
concerning possible changes in the Order.
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B 2. The authority of the GIA. to engage in certain activities, rests
an directives issued by the National Security Council, called National Security
Council Intelligence Directives or NSCIDs. These NSGIDs have in the past
been referred to as the GIA's secret charter and were withheld not only from
the public- but also, until recently, from Congress.
a. If these NSCIDs are revised or new NSCIDs are issued,
will you provide these to the Committee as your predecessor has
done?
ANSWER: The NSCIDs previously provided to the Congress were made
available through the NSC apparatus, .and the DCI has na authority to make such
release on his own. I would be prepared to support a Committee request far
NSCIDs which relate to the Committee's area of responsibility.
b. Da you believe that the oversight committees of Congress
should be consulted during the preparation or revision of these N5CIDs?
ANSWER: The N5CIDs are internal Executive Branch documents
prepared at the behest of the President. Whether, or the extent to which,
oversight committees of the Congress might be consulted concerning such
directives prior to their issuance is a matter for Presidential determination.
Congressional access after the directives have been promulgated would, in
my view, be the better course.
B 3. CIA practices are also affected by directives issued by other
persons, such as the DCI and the Policy Review Committee (PRC).
Will you provide to the Committee all such directives and
modifications of directives, including DCIDs and directives from the PRC?
ANSWER: I will provide the Committee those directives which are
under my control. The DCIDs are xny responsibility, and I will provide them
under appropriate security safeguards.
Since the PRC is an element of the NSC, I believe the NSC would be
the appropriate authority for deciding to release or withhold the PRC directives,
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I3 4. As Director of Central Intelligence, your advice may be sought
on the question of charters for the intelligence agencies. The 1947 National
Security Act, the CIA's statutory charter, has been termed inadquate in a
number of areas. At the present time, the National Security Agency and the
Defense Intelligence Agency have no statutory charters.' The FBI's authority
to engage in domestic intelligence activities has been questioned.
a. ~ Should a new CIA charter explicitly authorize covert action?
b. Should there be specific statutory authority for -the CIA to
collect intelligence?
ANSWER: I am aware of the sentiment-, and the substantial reasons
DDO
for it, that CIA may need more explicit statutory authority to engage in covert
action or collection of intelligence abroad, mtwithstanding the fact that CIA is
the only element of the intelligence community which currently has any statutory
charter.
As I stated at my confirmation hearing, I think that there is roam for
DCI from
improvement in the language of the National Security Act of 1947 by which the transcript
page bl
CIA acts pursuant to NSC directives. We can continue to operate under the
existing language, but I am amenable to reviewing it.
ADDENDUM CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
(To be submitted separately)
I am concerned, however, that any advantages of explicit authorization
DDO
in clarifying ambiguity could be more than offset by the effect of such legislative
action on foreign nations, whose resentment, at least, ar propaganda exploitation
or other countermeasures would seem a likely consequence.
END OF CONFIDENTIAL ADDENDUM
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c. What activities should the CIA be allowed to undertake in
the U. S. ? Should a new charter precisely define those activities?
ANSWER.: CIA must, of course, sport; from installations within the
United States, its mission to collect foreign intelligence. Such support must
include providing security for its installations, activities, information, and
personnel. In order to provide the requisite security, the Agency must conduct
investigations of applicants, employees, -and other persons with similar..associations
with the Agency before classified information may be divulged to them. The Agency
must also provide, domestically, administrative and technical support for its
intelligence operations. This support would include procurement, maintenance and
transport, communications and data processing, recruitment and training,
the provision of personnel, financial and medical services, the development
of essential cover and proprietary arrangements, and the conduct of necessary
research and development efforts. -The Agency must also interact domestically
with other Federal agencies in furtherance of their respective missions. Far
example, in the course of performing its foreign intelligence mission the Agency
obtains information which appropriately may be shared with the FBI in support
of the litter's domestic counterintelligence mission. There are also occasions
when cooperating individuals within the United States have valuable foreign
intelligence information to supply the Agency. Similarly, plans and preparation
must be undertaken in this country for working with intelligence sources abroad.
It is probably not passible to define exhaustively or in detail all activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency that must be performed dorn.estically. Anew
charter, if there is to be one, could more profitably address itself to areas where it
is felt the CIA should not be active. For example, the National Security Act
currently pxovides that "the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement
powers, or internal-security functions." I would not lift thus e restrictions.
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d. Do you favor statutory charters for the National. Security
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency?
ANSWER: As I have already indicated, the President has directed a
IG
comprehensive review of the Intelligence Gornmunity and the adequacy of
.existing legiskation and directives, and I consider it would be premature for me to
comment at this time on what the recommexidations may be that will result from this.
.review. I have not yet, in fact, formed my own opinion as to whether statutory
charters- are necessary, but I am not foreclosing the possibility.
e. Do you agree with Attorney General Bell that the
FBI needs a clear charter ?
ANSWER: The FBI is a part of the Intelligence Gammunity only as
IC
regards its counterintelligence activities. Those activities represent a relatively
small portion of the overall FBI effort, so I am really not in a position to comment
knowledgeably on the FBI as a whole. Since the Attorney General has organizational
responsibility far the FBI, I consider that he is a qualified judge as to whether a
new charter is needed.
f. Should there be statutory limitations on the permissible
activities of all of the intelligence agencies ? Should violations carry
criminal sanctions ?
ANSWER: Limit+~tions on permissible activities are spelled out in
detail far intelligence organizations in Executive Order 11905. I would need to
delve much more deeply into this matter before I could express an opinion as to
any need for criminal sanctions beyond those imposed on employees of any other
branch of the Government.
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C, CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES
1, When you take over as Director of Central Intelligence, you will
inherit the present apparatus of ongoing covet action and clandestine
collection operations.
Will you- pledge to consult with this Coxnrnittee on the
feasibility and wisdom of the various ongoing programs before
making any final determination as to their continuation or
termination?
ANSWER: I believe that the decision to terminate or to continue major
programs deriving from Presidential findings properly resides with the President..
Such programs are reviewed periodically by the Special Coordination Committee,
which is responsible for recommending to the President which. of these programs
should be approved, disapproved or redirected. The decision, however, is the
President's. In the course of this review and approval procedure, I will make
certain that the President is fully aware of any comments by the Committee
concerning these programs. Tn the case of those programs for which I am
responsible, I can assure the Committee that its views will weigh heavily in
xny decision making,
2, CTA. clandestine operations, both covert action and clandestine
collection, comprise a wide variety of activities. In this connection, the
Committee would 1zke to explore your attitude towards two specific kinds of
operations.
a. What are your vietivs with respect to the covert involvement
of the United States, in any manner, in the elections of a foreign country?
ANSWER: As you know, under the Hughes/Ryan amendment the President
DDO,
is required to make a finding on all proposed CIA. covert action programs. These as
revised
programs are considered by appropriate advisors to the President before he makes by
OLC
his finding. Seven committees of the Congress are briefed after he makes his finding.
Under these circumstances, 'it seems highly unlikely that the U. S, Government would
engage in activity such as the question suggests unless there were a broad concensus
within the Executive Branch and the Congress that it was in our national intex?est to
do so.
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b. Under what circumstances would you approve covert
payments to foreign leaders?
c. What are the factors that would most influence your
judgment on the advisability of various types of clandestine
operations, such as the two mentioned above?
ANSWER: As I stated at my confirmation hearing, I think such operations
DCI
should not be undertaken until two standards have been met: First, that there from
transcript
has been a thorough exploration of alternative vrays to accomplish the objective p. 79
in an overt manner; Second, that there has been a careful weighing of the. potential
value of what might result -from the activity as against the risks incurred.
Should such payments be intended for a foreign head of state or major
national figure for cavert action purposes, the operation would require the
approval of the President after review by the Special Coordination Committee,
In this eventuality, the propos~.l would also be reported to the concerned
committees of the Congress under the Hughes/Ryan amendment. Should the
payment be intended solely for intelligence purposes and I judged that the
operation involved a high political or other risk, I would seek the advice of the
Special Coordination Committee, the National Security Advisor to the President
or the President himself, before approving the operation.
C 3. `.Chis Committee is reluctant to request the identity of covert agents
because we recagni~e the extreme sensitivity of such information and because
the need far such information rarely exists.
a. If, in the view of the Committee, the conduct of the over
sight role were to require such information, would you provide it?
b. For example, if the Committee were to investigate an
abuse involving a covert agent whom it would wish to interrogate,
would the agent be made available to us?
ANSWER: The Committee's sensitivity to the great importance of protecting
covert agents and their identities is gratifying to me, as the official charged with
the responsibility far their protection. I consider it central. to the viability of
clandestine operations. I see no difficulty in arranging for the Committee to meet
with employees, under appropriate circumstances and conditions. However, I find
it extremely difficult at present to envision a situation in which the Committee would
need to have such information with respect to a cavert a ent, let alone to feel required
to interrogate- him. I would therefore prefer not to make any such commitment on
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D. INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY
1. You served as NATO's Commander of Allied Forces for Southern
Europe, and previously served as commander of the U. S. Second Fleet in
the Atlantic. In bath positions, you were exposed to a great deal of intelligence,
provided not only through service intelligence agencies and national intelligence
agencies but also through NATO itself.
a. What was the value of the intelligence you received to
long-range military planning and NATO operations?
ANSWER: .Long range military planning could not be done without
adequate knowledge of a potential enemy's military capabilities, political
strengths and weaknesses, and economic viability.
Addendum classified Confidential: to be submitted separately. {See next page)
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Addendum to I71a.
Specifically, in the A11ied Command, Southern Europe, the extant
instabilities in the Greek-Turkish relationship, over Cyprus and surrounding
the Yugoslav succession question, required current-and accurate assessments
to plan far contingencies. Additionally, the crescive Soviet Navy in the
Mediterranean complicated all long-range planning because of NATO's
dependence an open sea lanes to gain flexibility in that widespread and
geographically separated region.
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b. What was the value of this intelligence to your more day-
to~day operational needs and to your requirements for indications
and warning?
./1.NSWER: Day-today operational needs and requirements for indications
-and warnings are highly time. sensitive. Th.e closer intelligence inputs can be
brought to real time, the mare valuable they become to the military commander
because they enhance hi.s capability to make accurate decisions based on fact
.rather than assumption. Intelligence actually received from U. S. sources
during my command of Allied Forces Southern Europe was extremely valuable
to me because often it was the .most complete and up-to-date information
available.
c. Did you perceive any significant gaps in U. S.
intelligence reporting?
ANSWER: Classified Confidential, to be submitted separately. (See fallowing page;
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Dlc. Did you perceive any significant gaps in U. So
intelligence reporting?
ANSWER: Soxx~.e gaps which have been particularly difficult to
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25X1
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d, What ideas for improving the U. S. intelligence
effort have you gained from your experience as a commander
of U, S, Navy and NATO forces?
ANSWER: As indicated in my reply to question d. 1. b. , the closer to
real time a commander can receive tactical intelligence, the -more likely he
is to make the right decision. At sea, force survival in the i.nitiai hours of
an engagement is greatly increased if the force commander can assume. an
alert posture prior to an attack. This does not require much time, but given
-the speed of missiles, the difficulty of detecting them at low altitudes, .and the
routine proximity of the Soviet and U. S. fleets in peacetime, greater speed
in delivering tactical warning indicators at sea is needed. In the area of
national intelligence, again, timeliness is critical. In an era when Naval
presence forces are being used more than ever as a tool of foreign policy,
it is vital that the on-scene commander understand. not just his military options,
but national economic and ~ pplitical options as well, and how these options
affect or influence one another.
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D2. Between 1971 and 1972, you served as chief of the Systems
:Analysis Division of the Office of Naval Operations. In that capacity you
were involved in the Navy's efforts in '.'net assessments."
a. In light of your experience, how much emphasis do
you think the Intelligence Community should put upon net assessments
as opposed to .more traditional estimates?
ANSWER: Net assessments and mare traditional intelligence estimates
IC
are complementary, and both are needed., Many important topics of intelligence
estimates are not subject to a "net assessment" treatment. I consider that, in
the analysis of key military questions, net assessments. can be very important.
Addendum classified Confidential: to be submitted separately.(See next page)
b. What should be the role of the intelligence agencies in net
assessment?
ANSWER: Classified Confidential: to be submitted separately.(See fallowing page;
c. Would you as DCI be adverse to conducting net assessments
in which analysis of U. S. capabilities and intentions would be explicit
or implicit?
ANSWER: As I have already indicated, I am not adverse to conducting net
NIO
assessments essential to the intelligence analytical and estimating process,.
including those in which US capabilities and intentions are explicit or implicit. I
am against intelligence conducting net assessments for the purpose of evaluating
US weapon system options. I am also opposed to assigning intelligence the
responsibility for comprehensive Soviet-US net assessments of the type which
would be regarded as an intrusion by the Intelligence Community into the defense
planning process,
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Addendum to D2a.
Net assessments can talze a number of forms depending on their
comprehensiveness, complexity and purpose. Intelligence has often made
comprehensive net assessments of the relaL-ive capabilities of pairs and
groups of nations such as India. and Pakistan, North Korea and South Korea,
and Middle IJastern countries. These types of net assessments not involving
US forces, have been well received by consumers; however, philosophical
and practical questions .have been raised about the extent to which intelligence
should conduct US-Soviet net assessments.
Intelligence has conducted one-on-one analyses of weapon systems as
part of the process of estimating Soviet capabilities and predicting Soviet
technical requirements. An example is the range at which certain Soviet
surface-to-air missiles could engage a B-52. Intelligence also rnal~es net
technical assessments comparing'. Soviet and US capabilities in a variety of
technologies.
To identify trends and to assess the implications in estirriated Soviet
for~~s, intelligence has conducted Soviet-US force interaction analyses. An
example of this type net assessment is Soviet capabilities to destroy Minuteman
silos.
I believe intelligence should emphasize net assessments involving
individual weapon systems and components of Soviet forces as an essential
part of the analytical and estimating process, as well as net technical
assessments.
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D2b. What should be the role of the intelligence
agencies in net assessment?
ANSWER: The role of intelligence agencies- slxould be to conduct:
---comprehensive net assessments on two or more foreign
nations such as on the Arab-Israeli balance.
--Soviet-US net assessments to estimate the capability of
Soviet weapon systems, to deterrnine Soviet technical requirements
and to identify trends and estimate the implications of Soviet programs.
Intelligence agencies should continue to participate in a variety of US-Soviet
net assessments conducted by the DoD. Beyond that, I believe a national net .
assessment mechanism-..perhaps at the NSC staff level--should be identified.
The role of the Intelligence Community in this mechanism should be to provide
the intelligence data and insights necessary for its operation.
Intelligence organizations should not make comprehensive net assessments
of the US-Soviet military balance; for example, the capabilities of the two sides
to damage each other in a nuclear war now and in the period ten years hence. Such
assessments are highly dependent on scenarios far war initiation, US operational
plans and tactics and the success of future US programs, and would require expertise
and operational data on US farces which intelligence does not now have. Nor should
intelligence conduct comprehensive US-Soviet net assessments of the overall
"correla~:ion of farces," involving all military and non-military aspects of national.
power.
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d. How would you evaluate the net assessments efforts of
.the Defense Department and the Executive Branch?
~1.NSWER: It is difficult to generalize on the net assessment efforts
of the Defense Department and the executive branch over time. They have
always reflected a sincere attempt to provide useful and accurate information
to the decision-maker. .When these efforts were less than excellent, it was
usually the result of compromise made to reach agreement. Compromise
..inherently seeks the lowest common denominator and can preclude the user
from the benefit of a finely etched picture from which his options far action
can be developed, It is my intention to encourage divergent views which,
if well supported by fact and logic, will be assigned confidence levels and will
appear in future net assessments prepared by the IC.
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D3. As Director of Central Intelligence, you will have primary
control over the collection and production activities of the CIA, As part
of its general effort in military intelligence areas. to support the President,
the CIA produces intelligence on naval forces.
a. What is your. opinion of the strengths and weaknesses
of t-he CIA's analyses of naval forces?
_ b. How do their analytical efforts compare with those
of the Navy?
c. How do they compare with the work of DIA.?
ANSWER: I have not had the time. to adequately compare the. CIA's
vs. the Navy's, vs. the DIA's analyses of naval forces except superficially.
As a user, a naval commander does not often receive three separate sets of
intelligence estimate on a given situation which he can lay dawn side by side
and compare. He is sometimes lucky to have either a CTA, or the Navy, or
DIA estimate; seldom alI three. I3owever, I would expect the CIA. to provide
me with naval force analyses of greater breadth and perspective than either
the Navy or DIA as their capability to assess naval farces in Light of the full
spectrum of a nation's assets, is greater than either the Navy or DIA.
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D 4. In the area of intelligence support to policymalcing, one of the
Committee's concerns is the degree to which Congress has not been a
recipient of intelligence analysis that m uld assist the Members in making
important national decisions.
Are you prepared to provide the Congress with intelligence,
even when it may not support the policies of the President, or when
it may embarrass the President?
ANSWER: CIA currently provides finished intelligence support on a
regular basis to the seven Committees of the Congress: -the Armed Services
Committees of both Houses o:# the Congress, the Appropriations Committees
of both Houses, the Senate I~'oreign Relations Committee, the House International
Relations Committee, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, All of
these Committees receive the National Intelligence Daily, and I recently have
instructed that they receive the Weekly Review. In addition, each Committee
receives periadzc briefings on significant intelligence subjects. The Directorate
of Intelligence also provides substantive intelligence briefings to their Subcommittees,
individual members, or Committee Staffs, upon request.
Other Committees, the Joint Economic Committee and the House Committee
on Science and Technology, for example, get annual updated briefings an the economic
situation in the USSR and China and on foreign scientific developments. Since
assuming this office, I have directed the CIA.. to take mare initiative in expaneling
its provision of intelligence support to all Committees of the Congress concerned
with subj~acts to which intelligence can make meaningful contributions.
Same sense of the scope of intelligence support that CIA has provided to
the Congress can be gained from the follotiving: During 1976, we gave 30 informal
briefings to Congressional Committees or Subcommittees. We also provided 85
substantive briefings to individual members of Congress and 104 briefings to
Congressional Staffs. During 1976 we transmitted to the various Committees,
their members, acid staffers over 500 copies of memoranda, biographic reports
and maps.
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I promised at my hearing to provide intelligence even if it might. be DCI
embarrassing to the President. I shall keep that promise, transcript p.. 56
In offering this support, the ,fundamental criterion is that whatever
DDI
intelligence provided be as objective and factual as possible, without regard
to the policy positions or predilections of any recipient.
5. Former DCI William Calby has recently argued that more of the
Intelligence Community's analysis should be made available to the public.
a.
Do you share this view?
ANSWER:
I do.
b.
What advantages do you see in this more open procedure?
What dangers?
IC
ANSWER The advantages are that such a procedure will make reliable
Ic/
information more available to a wider audience, thus contributing to the publics s DDI
appreciation a.f foreign affairs. It also will enable the public to be better aware
of the contributions the U. S. intelligence effort is making to problems of national
concern. It is my intention to continue a vigorous program of publication of
unclassified finished intelligence.
One of my concerns in carrying out such a policy will be to ensure that
DDI
those sources and methods of intelligence which require protection are adequately
protected.
When speaking of the products of axa.alysis, an important consideration is
Asst.
the necessarily privileged nature of information which is being supplied to the to DGI
President as a basis for policy decisions. I see a danger of compromising this
privileged kind of intelligence by making it prematurely available outside the
proper executive channel.
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Question E. THE ROLE OF THE DCI AND HIS. RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE PRESIDENT
1. The role of the Director of Central Intelligence encompasses
three. somewhat conflicting responsibilities: intelligence advisor to the
President, Director of the CIA, and manager of the Intelligence Community.
a. How do you define the Director's role? Which of
these responsibilities will be most central to you?
ANSWER: I must devote major attention to all three of the
responsibilities you list, and I da not see any significant conflict among
them. The fact is, of course, that I have a deputy to assist me with the
management of the CIA and a deputy to assist me in Intelligence Community
matters, but being advisor to the President is a responsibility I must
necessarily bear alone.
b. Do you believe there is a potential conflict between
the need to provide the President with objective intelligence
and a natural tendency to place your trust. in the intelligence
generated by the Agency which you head?
ANSWER? I do not.
2. One aspect of the personal relationship between the DCI and
the President involves the DCI's ability to maintain the delicate balance
between having the absolute trust of, while still being independent of,
the President.
a. What steps will you take to ensure that agencies in the
intelligence community will not overstep the bounds of legality
of propriety because of requests from the White House?
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ANSWER: To me, this is a matter of management. I shall assure
that appropriate guidelines are, or have been, promulgated. Within the
and General Counsel
CLA. I shall maintain a strong Inspector General/capability and shall follow
through with appropriate disciplinary or other appropriate action if there
are any instances of illegal or improper activities.
I shall urge each element of the Intelligence Community to review
:its procedures in this regard and institute safeguards where necessary
to insure that requests for assistance from the White House and other
entities be similarly reviewed and approved so as to insure legality,
propriety and accountability.
However unlikely and improbable, if I am ever ordered by the
President of the United States to take an act which I believe to be illegal
or improper, I would feel obliged to try to have the order retracted. or,
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b. Do you think that your ability to bring intelligence
to bear on policy would be enhanced by making the DCI a
statutory member of the National Security Council?
ANSWER: In my view, the impact of intelligence on policy
deliberations does not really relate to whether he is or is not a statutory
member of the NSC. The lcey factors will be the degree of rapport,
trust and confidence which exist between the DCI and the President
and other NSC participants, and the ability of the DCI to contribute
meaningfully to NSC deliberations.- Moreover, since the NSC is charged
with directing the functions of CIA, it would be inappropriate for the
Director to be a member of the NSC.
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IC/OCC
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3. The DCI's Presidential advisory role overlaps in particular
with those of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.
and the Secretary of State.
a. .Have-you discussed this issue with Mr. Brzezinski
and Mr. Vance? How do you view your respective roles?
ANSWER:
Z have discussed this issue with both Mr. Br,zezinski and Mr. Vance
anal we find no conflict in our roles. We are all advisors to the President in
the area of security, however, our terms of reference differ. The DCI is
charged with coordinating the activities of all the intelligence organizations
in the executive branch and producing intelligence which reflects their combined
judgments. His advice to the President is based on this combined product.
The Department of State is the primary source of political and economic
intelligence. The Secretary of States s advice to the President is usually
couched in that framework. The President's Assistant far National Security
Affairs views security in the context of the entire LT. S. Government. While the
intelligence on which these three advisors views are based should in most cases
be similar, the President is assured at least three different perspectives on a
given security problem.
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F. SELECTION OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR
Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, a DCI
who is an active duty military officer must have a civilian Deputy Director
for the CIA. A second deputy directorship with responsibilities for the
intelligence community was created by Executive Order 11945. No
restriction exists regarding that Deputy's military or civilian status.
Will you choose or request an active duty military
officer for the position of Deputy Director far the .intelligence
Community?
ANSWER: The incumbent is an active duty military officer,. Admiral
Daniel J. Murphy, and his three predecessors were senior xrtilitary officers
on active duty. At such time as it may be necessary to appoint a successor
to Admiral Murphy, it would be my intention to nominate to the President
the best qualified person available, military or civilian.
The position of Deputy for the Intelligence Community involves a
OC,C
substantial amount of interaction with the intelligence elements of the uniformed
services and the perspectives anti experiences of a military officer are important
to the performance of that function. There is na reason to believe that a military
officer will perform the duties o.f that position in a less capable or legal manner
than would a civilian appointee. At the same time, I recognize that the provisions
of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, reflect a concern for the
maintenance of civilian control of the nation's intelligence apparatus. These
considerations must be balanced carefully and an ultimate judgment likely will
be forthcoming as a result of the general review of intelligence authorities and
procedures directed by the President.
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Question G. SECRECY: SOURCES AND METHODS, ESPIONAGE LAW, LEAKS
1. The National Security Act of 1947 provides that the Director of
Central Intelligence "shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure." This language has been under-
stood to authorize, if not require, the Director of Central Intelligence to
take 'action for protection of such information in agencies other than the CIA.
a. Haw would you define "sources and methods"?
ANSWER: The term "intelligence sources and methods," as I
understand it, refers generally to a brand range of information relating to
the operations of foreign intelligence agencies, including as an example the
names of human agents, to the extent that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the disclosure of such information would significantly impair the
capacity of the intelligence agencies to carry out their assigned functions.
b. Does the term include information not presently
prohibited from disclosure by the Federal espionage statute ` or
the Executive Order on classification (E. O. 11652)?
ANSWER: In my view, the term "intelligence sources and methods"
may include information not prohibited from disclosure by the federal
espionage statute ar Executive Order 11652. The espionage statutes
essentially concern national defense inforrnatian; the Executive Order,
information the disclosure of which would damage national security.
While mast if not all sources and methods information warrants classification,
there may be some information deserving of protection which falls outside
that concept,
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c, Does it include i.nfarmation pertaining to illegal
acts by intelligence agencies? For example,. could the DCI
withhold from the Attorney General, the Congress or the press
information pertaining to violations of the CIA's "internal
security" restrictions? Could the DCI withhold a violation of
the Hughes-Ryan amendment requiring Congressional notification
of covert action?
ANSWER: The statutory responsibility of the DCI for protection of
OGC/IG
"intelligence saurces and methods" would not permit the withholding of
information pertaining to acts by intelligence agencies which are illegal
under the laws of the United States.
The DCI may not withhold information pertaining to violations of
OG
CIA!s "internal security" restrictions which is requested in the course of any
properly authorized investigation. Of course, the release of such information
must be conducted with certain safeguards to insure that legitimate intelligence
saurces and methods which could be jeopardized in the process are not
unnecessarily exposed and their usefulness destroyed.
The matter of informing the press on any activity of the CIA can
OG
only be considered in terms of a whale range of issues affecting the national
interest, of which the protection of saurces and methods is only one facet.
The intent of last part of the question, "Could the DCI withhold a
OGC/OLD
violation of the Hughes-Ryan amendment requiring Congressional notification
of covert action?" is unclear to me, Under the terms of the amendment, the
President is required to notify the Congress, in a timely fashion, before funds
are expended by ar on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations
in foreign countries, othex than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary
intelligence. The President may designate the DCI as his agent in making the
required notification. The DCI's responsibility for protecting intelligence sources
and methods should not conflict with such duties.
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d. How would you define the scope of authority
relating to sources and methods in the language of the 1947 Act?
ANSWER: The Act charges the Director with "responsibility" for
pratecting sources and `methods information; the word "authority" does
not appear. In conse~i~,~~.ce, the. reach of that language may not be
entirely clear. In my view, however, that provision; strengthened also
by Executive Order 11905, authorizes the Director to establish Community-
wide. standards and procedures for protecting sources and- methods
information. Further, the courts have ruled that L-his language. authorizes
the withholding of information. from individuals who make requests under
the Freedom a~ Information Act, as well as in other contexts.
e. Does this language only provide the authority to
coordinate the development of uniform comrriunity-wide
standards on protecting vital secrets, the position taken by
former DCI Colby and the Church Committee? Or does it
provide an operational responsibility, e, g. the authority
to investigate "leaks, " including the authority to conduct
surreptitious entries and electronic surveillance in the
U. S, to determine the source of leaks, an authority claimed
by some former DCIs ? .
ANSWER: This language clearly provides the authority to coordinate
the development of uniform community--wide standards on protecting vital
secrets. And, in my view, the language alsa confers authority upon the
Director of Central Intelligence to require that Intelligence Community
arganizatians comply with these standards.
But the language obviously does not authorize the Director of
Central Intelligence to commit ar direct violations of law in the process
of enforcing these standards.
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OG
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G 2. The Ford Administration requested the Congress to
enact amendments to the Federal espionage statute an behalf of the
intelligence community. Some aspects of that legislation are non-
controversial. Other provisions may prompt some concern, especially
those attaching criminal sanctions to the press for printing classified
information, '
a. Do you think it is appropriate to focus the sanction
upon the press as well as the government employee who
leaked the information?
ANSWER: No. OGG
b. Should such a statute authorize Federal investigations
of newspaper reporters who report classified information in
their articles?
ANSWER: Crirrminal investigations are directed to a situation --
an belief that a criminal act may have been committed. In that sense,
individuals as such are not investigated. Any such investigation may
involve a member of the press when the facts warrant.
If Congress is serious about providing for the prosecution of
those who leak classified information, it must be recognized that reporters
may be a source of evidence with respect to such prosecutions and that
their status as a reporter should npt generally exempt them from-the
investigation. This position has been recognized by recent decisions of
the Supreme Court with respect to the disclosure of a reporter's sources
of information during grand jury proceedings.
c. Do you believe that the Espionage Statute of 1917
and the accompanying Presidential executive orders on
classification permit too much secrecy?
ANSWER: Executive Ordex 11652, not the Espionage .A.ct of 1917,
establishes the Government's classification system and the categories and
guidelines upon which classification decisions must be made. It is xny
understanding that EO 11652 is now under study within the executive branch,
and I would prefer to defer my camm.ent until that study has been completed.
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d. In addition to seeking amendments to Federal
law which provide sanctions against legitimate secrets,
will you seek amendments in both the statute and the
orders which will decrease unnecessary secrecy?
ANSWER: As to any amendments to the Order see my preceding
answer. I am not aware of any statutes which cause unnecessary secrecy.
G 3. There has been a great deal of criticism in recent years,
some of it from the executive branch, suggesting that Congress has been
irresponsible with state secrets. However, two of the most serious
breaches of security to occur during this period pertain to secrets in
the exclusive domain of the executive branch. Section 3(d) of Executive
Order 11905 provides that the DCI, among other responsibilities, develop
programs to protect intelligence sources and methods and ensure common
security standards for the community.
Will you, pursuant to Section 3 of the Executive Order,
reexamine these various security procedures? Will you be proposing
changes in the procedures to combat such leaks?
ANSWER: I will be addressing the requirements of that section.
If it appears that changes in procedures will prevent leaks or reduce
their number, I' of course will take the necessary action.
G 4. Vital secrets are leaked in the newspapers. In some such
cases, inforrmation has been leaked which may be vital to the national
security, e. g. a critical clandestine collection program or information which
appears to compromise a particular source. These leaks threaten intelligence
operations because they put the target of the operation in a position to take
effective defensive measures. It would seem logical for the CIA to attempt
to confuse a hostile government about what we had gained from that operation.
In other wards, the Agency could actually engage in "disinformation" by
leaking confusing information to the press.
a. Do you think it is appropriate for the Agency to
respond to such a leak by engaging in such disinformation
programs?
ANSWER: No.
b. I.f so, .should such disinformation or misinformation
programs only be initiated after there has been a damaging leak,
or do you believe that it is appropriate to conduct such. a
program to confuse hostile governments in the absence of such
a leak?
ANSWER: There are and will be no such programs
c. Do journalists knowingly participate in such
disinformation. programs?
ANSWER: There are and will be no such programs.
Asst. to
DCI
Asst to
DCI
Asst. to
DCI
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d. What checks or controls does the Agency have
upon such programs in order to avoid misinformation or
disinformation from being used by the Agency to confuse the
rnedia ar the Congress about illegitimate activity of the CIA?
ANSWER: There are and will be no such programs.
e. Will you provide the Committee with any CIA
assessment of the damage caused by these breaches of
security?
ANSWER: The current practice of the CIA is to report to the
Committee on security matters generally as a reflection of its commitment
to keep the Committee fully and currently informed. I shall continue this
practice. Assessments of damage caused by breaches of security would
be a part of this reporting.
Asst.
DGI
DCI
based e
hearing
transcrip
G 5. At the time that Attorney General Levi and President Ford
were pursuing their wiretap proposal last year, Attorney General Levi took
the position that it was necessary to authorize electronic surveillance
of corporations which export technology to foreign countries. In essence,
he was arguing that our government should monitor the export of technological
processes, even though such processes are not classified or even classifiable,
indeed, even though the export of that technology does not violate any Iaw.
a. Do you agree with that position? Is there information
in the hands of private coxz~.panies which is not directly relevant
to the national defense but which we should prohibit from export
ar disclosure to a foreign power, e. g. computer technology?
ANSWER: I am not aware that Attorney General Levi took such
a position and I am not sure that if he did, this characterization of his
position is correct. I think that electronic surveillance of efforts of
foreign powers to acquire technological information and information
about industrial trade processes should not be foreclosed in appropriate
cases. The capabilities and intentions of foreign powers with respect
to technological and industrial matters could be very important in the
formulation of U. S. foreign policy. Whether the disclosure of specific
information in the hands of private companies should be restricted is a
policy decision for other elements of the executive branch and the Congress
to address.
OGC
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b. Do you believe that such information should be
subject to control through amendments to the Executive Order,
the espionage statute or perhaps some other Federal statute,
such as the Export Administration Act?
ANSWER: In general I do not think that I am qualified to answer
this question as it involves issues beyond the purview of the intelligence
community.
c. Is the real issue with such information that it is vital
to the national defense? Or is the real issue that since American
"know how" may be an important "bargaining chip" in negotiations
with foreign governments such information must be controlled for
foreign policy reasons?
ANSWER: From my perspective, the purpose of obtaining such.
information by electronic surveillance would be to acquire insights into
the capabilities and intentions of foreign powers.
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H. BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES
1. Phis Committee has .responsibility for exercising oversight over
.national intelligence, not only in the constitutional sense but also in the
broader context of ensuring that the long-range development of collection
and production supports the needs of the national policy. Thus it is important
that the Committee understand your objectives and goals for national intelligence.
a. Given your unique perspective as a consumer of
intelligence in the senior ranks of the Defense Department,
what do you think are the most pressing challenges facing
national intelligence in the coming decade?
ANSWER The continuing challenge will be to assure that our Government
has the foreign intelligence it needs when it needs it. This is the key challenge,
ana. all other challenges are linked with it. Important among the other major
challenges are these:
-- To assure the truly effective use of the resources
required to collect, process, analyze and produce
intelligence.
-- To assure that collection capabilities keep pace
with the changing demands for information.
-- To enhance the quality of intelligence estimates.
-- To strengthen the confidence of the President and
his advisors, the Congress, and the American people
in the effectiveness of the U. S. intelligence effort.
-- To devise operating methodologies that will assure
the acquisition of the needed information and at the same
time assure that intelligence activities are being conducted.
in a legal and proper manner, with full recognition of the
rights of U. S. citizens.
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b. In your opinion, what are the strengths and
weaknesses in the way national intelligence is now dealing
with those challenges?
ANSWER.: The strengths of the Intel~.igence Community are quite
encouraging:
-- The collection and analytic capabilities of the
Community are quit? impressive.
-- It has a corps of dedicated, hard-working and
highly skilled personnel, many o:E who~.-n have spent
their entire careers in intelligence.
-- It has access to a pool of research and development
expertise, both in-house and in U. S. industry, that
can be expected to respond as well to future technical
challenges as has been the case in past years.
-- It has strong support at top levels of the Government
on the basis of recognition there of the importance of
dependable intelligence to policymaking and operational
decisions. On the other hand, there are potential
weaknesses:
-- Manpower in some organizations of the Community has
been severely reduced in recent years, and personnel
resources are stretched very thin in many areas.
-- Budgets in most cases have not kept pace with the results
of inflation, and there is particular risk that discouragement
of initiatives because of tight fiscal constraints may have a
deleterious long-range effect.
-- Much still remains to be done to take full advantage of the
potential benefits of new analytic methodologies and to make
~'~?full use of computerized data bases.
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c. Given the vast complexity of intelligence, what type
of management approach will you take in monitoring and directing
the focus of the national, intelligence community in the corning
decade?
ANSWER : The management approach I intend to take during my tenure
as the DCI is straightforward. I will make certain that those persons who
report to me fully understand their responsibilities and what is expected of
them. I will see to it that they get whatever guidance is required. I will
then hold them accountable for proper execution of the taslcs within their
jurisdiction.
I recognize that under present arrangements there are very distinct
limitations on the extent of the management authority of the DCI, and this
puts a premium. on effective coordination and consultation processes. I
expect to make full use of these processes in furthering the Community aspects
of the national intelligence program.
d. Has the President, or any senior-ranking official
provided you with guidance on what they expect the national
intelligence community to achieve in the coming years?
[If so] .What were the principal. themes in that guidance?
[If not] What do you believe are the major management and
policy objectives which should guide your actions during your
tenure as DCI?
ANSWER: As you might expect, the President and I have discussed
what it is he expects fraxn me as DCI. In essence, T consider it my charge to
meet the challenges outlined in response to Question 1, a. above; and, primarily,
that is to see that the United States Government is provided with the timely, high
quality, responsive foreign intelligence that is required by our national interests.
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H2. One of the major arguments against disclosure of the aggregate
intelligence budget figure is that publication will result in demands for mare
detailed information.
What is your response to that argument?
.ANSWER: It is appax?ent enough that the budgets of many, Intelligence
Coxnptral
Community organizations can never be publicly revealed in the depth of detail
that characterizes most normal Federal agencies. Disclosure of detailed
information on many of the Community's activities would elirriinate our ability
to carry out those activities which .Congress and others intended when we were
established. There are basically two reasons for this. First, many individuals
and governments which now cooperate with U. S, intelligence would reassess that
cooperation in light of the possibility that details of their relationship with U, S.
intelligence could become public knowledge. We have seen recent examples of
this. We are tall~irig hex?e in some cases of very sensitive relationships, generally
involving the reputations, means of livelihood, or even the lives of individuals,
and sometixrxes the future stability of governments. Second, revelation of
detailed information would greaL-ly facilitate efforts af',our adversaries to
hinder the effectiveness of our intelligence apparatus either by direct operations
against us or by encouraging other governments to take steps to limit or destroy
our capabilities.
There seems to be little basic disagreement with this view as regards
the details of our intelligence operations. However, many acknowledge these
points but argue that the public has a right to know the overall size of the
intelligence budget and that a decision to reveal only overall size cannot possibly
endanger any specific operations. Thus, the term "open budget" has generally
come to symbolize the desirability of revealing only the Intelligence Community
budget fatal without further detail.
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This argument is often based on the belief that the public will be
better able to make a judgment that the size of the Intelligence Community
budget is appropriate to American needs if the overall size of the budget is
made known. In the last analysis, however, I doubt that wide knowledge of
only a budgetary total will significantly increase the public's ability to reach
a judgment as to whether the overall program is a reasonable one. The
principal reason for this is that, without further detail and understanding of
the various programs which make up the budget, few significant conclusions
can. be drawn about the appropriateness of the funding level or the programs
provided for within it. An illustration helps make this point.
Suppose that the only information publicly available about the U, S.
Defense budget is that it totals $100 billion, without any additional detail as
to the size of our strategic weapons programs, our R&D effort, the size of
our standing military force structure or the military assistance program, or
the portion of the budget which is essentially administrative support as opposed
to a capability for action in an emergency. I doubt there could be much effective
public dzscus lion of the implications of this hypothetical $100 billion budget without
such detail, and this leads to my next point.
Revealing just the budget totals will, in our view, create enormous
pressures to reveal further budget figures which cannot by themselves be
considered to be terribly sensitive (for example, the cost of certain support
activities} but which, when. added together and subtracted from the total budget
figure, will define-with some precision the remaining sensitive operational and
research and development portions of the budget. This is likely in our view
because revealing just the totals will put all of us in the difficult position of
arguing for appropriations without being able to explain why we are supporting
what we are recommending. This seems likely to lead to demands upon us to
declassify those "nonsensitive" portions of the budget which can be discussed.
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A.t this paint, the essential question is "why are we concerned?" In
answerto this, I would like to make one basic point. The details- of many
of our activities cannot be publicly acknowledged if the programs we are
authorized to carry out are to be carried out at all. It is my view that the
more steps we take to reveal aspects of the budget which are relatively non-
sensitive, the harder it will be--both within the Intelligence ,Community and
the rest of the Executive Branch, and. in Congress--to maintain the secrecy
necessary for those programs and activi~Eies which are terribly sensitive.
7n the last analysis, the question always becomes "where do you draw
the lines,?" Natural public curiosity, coupled with great public sensitivity to
any revelations about intelligence activities, and the attendant pressures we
feel would fall upon any Floor manager in Congress who took a bill to the Floor
but had to tell. his colleagues that he could not explain any of the details of his
proposal, alI argue--ta us--that there are enormous dangers inherent in taking
the first step.
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II3. An argument against annual disclosure of the aggregate budget
figure of any element of the intelligence budget is that publication will allow
-our adversaries to determine the program changes in specific U, S. intelligence
capabilities, such as a major allocation for the development of a new technical
collection system.
What is your response to that argument?
ANSWER: While there is no real concern about. disclosure of the aggregate
,_ Comptroller
budget figure to the loyal American public, there is serious concern that
disclosure of the total, or of any element, of the intelligence budget will
provide a direct and significant advantage to adversary intelligence services.
Any advantage we grant freely to adversaries should be weighed carefully
against the contribution free disclosure twill to an informed public opinion.
I__ -
Disclosure will be meaningful only to those who are interested in further analysis; '
who have the inclination and wherewithal to put other information with it. Informed
people know what the inflation rates have been, and they know how much the
legislative pay increases are for Government employe~~. It is relatively simple
to apply this kind of knowledge to increases in budget figures from year to year.
Add to this information some additional data such as knowledge about buildings
occupied, square footage of space in those buildings, numbers of cars in parking
lots, and other similar incidental data, and i:t is not difficult to produce a pretty
fair camput;ation of numbers of people employed. The same kinds of analyses
can identify quite readily and accurrately the amount of the total budget devoted
to other than fixed costs. Access to the financial pages of the daily newspapers
throughout the country and subscriptions to technical journals provide. a vast
store o# information about business activity in all fields of endeavor. Add to
this the presumption of knowledge about which corporate enterprises are working
on classified contracts, and if. is not too difficult to identify where increases in
intelligence budgets are going and what they are being used fox. Concerted efforts
by adversary intelligence services against targets narrowed down through this; general
kind of analytical process can result in the specific identification of new technical
collection systems.
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We doubt, for example, that the U-2 aircraft could have been
developed as an effective collection device if the CIA. budget (or the total
intelligence budget) had-been a matter of public knowledge. Our budget
increased significantly during the development phase o.E that aircraft. Had
that knowledge been supplemented by information from newspapers or
.technical journals that funds were being committed to a major aircraft
manufacturer and to a manufacturer of sophisticated photographic materials,
the correct conclusion would have been relatively easy to draw. The U. S.
manufacturers involved would have become high priority targets, and it is
reasonable to assume that a Soviet capability to destroy high. altitude aircraft
would have been developed earlier than it in fact was. While there is no
similar situation pertaining today, we cannot say with certainty that one will
not arise again in the next few years.
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Question I. CIA INTERNAL INSPECTION AND REGULATIONS
1. Existing procedures require that the CIA's General Counsel
review activities which raise questions of legality. Some potentially
sensitive clandestine activities are reviewed by the GIA's General Gounsel
who is placed in a somewhat contradictory position of both reviewing the
particular activity and facilitating CIA's overall mission.
a. Would you support a requirement that potentially
sensitive clandestine activities. such as those alleged to have
taken place in Micronesia be reviewed for legality by the Attorney
General of the United States ?
b. What threshold would you establish to trigger such a
review ?
ANSWER: I believe the Attorney General generally should be consulted,
but I question the wisdom of a statutory requirement for consultation. Further,
it would be extremely difficult to define the activities which would require a
request for the Attorney General's opinion. Accordingly, I would not favor
a statutory requirement.
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I. 2. At present the General Counsel is required to refer to the Department
of Justice allegations regarding activities by GIA employees that violate
Federal law.
In order to assist the Committee in its oversight role, will you
instruct the General Gounsel to notify the Committee when and if such
referral takes place ?
ANSWER: This question, in subst~.ntially similar form, was asked
by Chairman Inouye during Mr. Knoche's confirmation hearing. Mr. Knoche
agreed at that time to instruct the General Counsel to notify the Committee
of such referrals and later clarified this commitment in a letter to Chairman
Inouye dated 21 Jaxiuary 1977, which states in pertinent part:
With respect to matters reported to the Attorney
General involving possible law violations, the Agency's General
Counsel will prepare and submit to the Committee Staff Director,
quarterly, a written statement indicating the number of
previously reported possible offenses closed out during the
preceding quarter by a Department of Justice decision to
prosecute or not to prosecute, together with a brief description
of the circumstances, without however identifying the potential
violators. These statements would also indicate the number
and type of possible offenses reported for the first time during
the preceding quarter.
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I, 3. Executive Order 11905 directs heads of intelligence agencies
or departments to "ensure that Inspectors General and General Counsels of
their agencies have access to any information necessary to perform their
duties.... " At present, CIA regulations require that the Inspectors General
and General Counsels have access to all information necessary for the
performance of their respective duties, but these regulations can be
withdrawn or modified at any time by the Director.
a. Should the General Counsel and Inspector General
be assured, by statute, of access to all Agency information
necessary for their work?
ANSWER: I do not believe that such statutory provisions are
necessary to ensure that the Inspector General and General Counsel of CIA
have access to~.ll information necessary to perform their duties.
I would like to assure the Committee, however, that both of those
officers now have such access, and it is my firm intention to see that
they continue to have it. You should knave that CIA's Headquarters Regulations
give the General Counsel the access he needs while providing full access far
the Inspector General. These are consistent- with and in implementation of
Executive Order 11905, Section 6(c)(3) which states:
"Heads of intelligence agencies or departments
shall: (3) Ensure that Inspectors General and
General Counsels of their agencies have access
to any information necessary to perform their
duties assigned by paragraph (b) of this Section"
(which descx?ibes the responsibilities of Inspectors
General and General Gounsels).
b. Will you notify this Committee if either of these officers
is denied, on your authority, access to CIA irs~orm.ation?, .:;,.;
ANSWER: As stated above, I have no intention to deny either
officer access to CIA information which he needs.
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I. 4. One of the most effective tools of the Inspector General is the
component survey -- an in-depth study of a particular segment of the CIA,
such as the Office of Current Intelligence.
Wi11 you instruct the Inspector General to notify this Committee of the
schedule of component surveys and to brief the Committee as to the general
findings of each?
ANSWER.: On one hand, I am concerned by the possible implications
and consequences of any commitment on my part to provide the Committee
with all findings of the Inspector General. Such findings, made confidentially
to me, are important management tools which help me carry out my
responsibility to keep CIA an effective organization working within the
bounds of law and propriety. Should the present system be changed to
broaden the closely held disseminations of the Inspector General's
findings, there would be a tendency for Agency personnel to be less forthcoming
with the Inspector General, and there could develop in the long run a tendency
for the style and frankness of the Inspector General's presentations to become
inhibited.
On the other hand, I realize that the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, too, has an important oversight responsibility and must be certain
that CIA is in compliance with law and is observing a standard of propriety
compatible with American values. It is with this in mind that the Agency
reached an agreement with the Committee on a formula which is described
in a letter dated 21 January 1977 from Acting Director E. H. Knoche to the
Chairman, the Honorable Daniel K. Inouye. The key points in this formula are
as follows:
"tiVithin a month after any report has been furnished
to the Intelligence Oversight Board by the Agency's Inspector
General or General. Counsel, these officials, unless the
Agency is instructed to the contrary by the President,
will inform the Committee's Staff Director in writing
as to the general nature of the items reported. To the
extent that the Committee or its Staff Director may be interested
in pursuing further any of these items, the Inspector General
or the General Counsel, as the case may be, will be available
to provide additional detail. With respect to matters reported
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to the Attorney General, involving possible law violations,
the Agency's General Counsel will prepare and submit to
the Committee Staff Director, quarterly, a written statement
indicating the number of previously reported possible offenses
closed aut during the preceding quarter by a Department of
Justice decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, together
with a brief description of the circumstances, without however
identifying the potential violators. These statements would
also indicate the number and type of possible offenses reported
for the first time during the preceding quarters, "
I endorse this agreement and shall make sure it is carried out.
I do not want to do anything which will hamper the Committee in fulfilling
its important responsibilities. But I wish to avoid action which might cause
CIA personnel to lose confidence and trust in the Inspector General and thus
weaken avitally important mechanism on which I must rely to help keep CIA
within the bounds of law and propriety, an objective which I know the Comxriittee
agrees with.
I believe this principle applies also to the product of Inspectors General
of other members of the Intelligence Community where issues of law and
propriety are equally important to the health of our national intelligence effort.
While I do not have the same authority over the Inspectors General of other
members of the Community, I feel that it would not be equitable or consistent
to arrive at any reporting formulas for GIA which are not equally applicable
to the rest of the Community.
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I. 5. Since 1973 the Director of Central Intelligence has regularly
issued a call to CIA employees to report to him any activities which raise questions
of legality and propriety.
Do you think that this call is sufficient to create an incentive structure
that will in practice bring forth reports of questionable activities ? If not,
what measures are you considering to ensure your ability to be apprised of
questionable activities ?
ANSWER: I would like to have time to examine the question as to whether
the incentive structure will in practice bring forth reports of questionable activities.
I have been informed that the response to Director Schlesinger's call for
information on questionable activities in 1973, and subsequent requests., brought
forth voluminous and uninhibited responses. The Inspector General reports that he
has received good cooperation during his compliance surveys. It is also my early
impression that personnel are anxious to avoid activities which might bring further
disapprobation to the Agency. But I know you will understand when I say that I would
like to be in the job somewhat longer before I assess the command and control
situation. If problems exist, I shall expeditiously find solutions to them. As a
person who has long served in coin~:nand capacity, I place high importance on
discipline and compliance with law, regulation and ethical standards.
6. It has been suggested that CIA employees having access to secret
intelligence might misuse that information for personal profit. At present, managerial
level employees must disclose their financial holdings sa that a determination can
be made as to whether ar not there is any conflict of interest. In addition, Section 203
of Executive Order 11222 provides that employees may not "engage in, directly or
indirectly, financial transactions as a result of, or primarily relying upon, information
obtained through their employment. "
a. Will you take steps to ensure that this provision is enforced
vis-a-vis CIA employees?
ANSWER: Yes. There are now in existence regulations within CIA
which aim to control employee activities which ca~uld pace conflict of interest
problems or permit private profit to be xriade on the basis of insights gained on the
jab. Some of these regulations are being strengthened as the result of a recent
Inspector General examination of the problem. Perhaps other steps can be made
if the Agency finds a problem along these lines developing.
b. Will you notify the Committee of what steps you have taken?
ANSWER: Yes .
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