LETTER TO HONORABLE FRANK CHURCH FROM STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001800070017-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: November 11, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

o b e- - 7zY~ ~7/
-Executive Registry
the U(rcctor
Central Intdiig nceA`ericy
A, I NOY 197
Honorable Frank Church
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear. Senator Church:
Thank you for your letter of
28 October sending me a copy of your
report on your recent trip to Cuba.
I have read the report with
much interest. I have also sent a
copy to our analysts for their
consideration.
With all best wishes,
STANSFIELD TURNER
cc:
DCI
Acting DDCI
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - OLC Subj,
1 - OLC Chrono
OLC:CM:mlg (Typed 2 Nov 77)
Retyped 8 Nov 77
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 The Director
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Honorable Frank Church
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
1'?7-999W
gecutive Registry
Thank you for your leter of
28 October sending me a copy of your
report on your recent trip to Cuba.
I look forward *to reading the
report with much interest. I have also
sent a copy to our analysts for their
consideration.
With all best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
STANSFIELD TURNER
CC:
DCI
Acting DDCI
ER
Distribution:
Original Add essee
1 OLC Subj
1 OLC Chrono
OL.C:CM:mlg (Typed 2 Nov 77)
OLC: 77-4677/a
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 RO"TING AND RECORD SHE NT
SUBJECT. (OptiornApproved For Release-2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP80MOO165A
Legislative Counsel
George L. Cary
TO: lO?icer designation, room number, and
buildng)
COMMENTS (Nurnber each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each cowmen).)
Attached for your signature
is a letter to Senator Frank
Church thanking him for sending a
copy. of his report, on his.. recent
trip to Cuba.
DDO/LA/Cuba saw. nothing in
J the report which requires
comment from you
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ORPA/LA/Cuba suggested you might
find the following of particular
interest:
1) the descriptions of the
conversations with Castro,. pp. 3
(bottom), 4,6,7,8,9,10.
2) comment on. the possible
release of U.S. citizens in
Cuba, pp. 1,6,7,9.
3) Cas tro' s comment on the
crash. of the Cuban air liner in
early fall 1976; "he thought it
was,. done by terrorists who had
received their training years ago
from the CIA..' I pp.. 7 (bottom:) -8..
It is left open for you to/I-I, BTAT
omment further if you wish
INTERNAL
19400070
 JT NG AND RECORD SHEET
Report on Frank Church's visit to Cuba
I
TO: (Officer, designation, room number, and
building)
2.
Executive Secretary
RECEWED FORWARDED
0_77-9642/2
4 November 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
o whom.. Draw a line across column after each com ,..r:h)
Ben,
Our Cuba peop7.e see nothin ;I
to
M Q. ..
in Senator Church's report
that requires comment from
OFFICER'S
, INITIALS
DCI. Presumably he will -.cant
to thank hira for his interesti_l1
observations.
cc: DDO Registry
DLD
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
TO f ACTION INFO Ti DAI INITIAL
To 2 & 3 Attached provided for your
information and cour,,ents to the DCI
as required.
EXECUTNE,' Y F
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 JOHN SPARXMAN. ALA., CHAIRM.yM
. - , E7RNE PALL 01pprovec CIA-RDP80M00165A00 160070017-1
HUBERT t HUMPHREY, MINN.
DICK CIAHK, IOWA
JO3 U H H. IIIOEN, JR.. DEL.
.BIOHN GU; NN, OHIO
RICHARD (OICK) STONE. FLA.
PAUL S. SARBANES, MD.
CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, MICH.
HOWARD H. DARER. JR., TENN.
NORVII.L JONE3, CHIRP OF STAFF
A13NSW R. KEHORICK, CHIRP CLEW
COMMITTEE ON #'OREtGN RtLxr!ONS
WASHINGiTON, U.C. 2OS10
October 28, 1977
The Honorable Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
visit to Cuba.
With best wishes, I am
Dear Admiral Turner:
I am taking the liberty of sending
you a copy of the report on my recent
-rely,
I rank Church
Enclosure
.Z. xS 'Mjrivt1 *IC,'.dtl 1
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95t1i Congress l
1st Session i
lye}. a tarts: i~~ pit
[,`,.','Nor T 33. 1977
DELUSIONS AND REALITY
THE FUTURE OF
UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS
REPORT
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH
ON A TRIP TO CUBA
AUGUST 8-11, 1977
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-S61 WVASHINGTbN . 1977
AM
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11011. JOHN SPARKMAN,
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., September 27, 1077.
Chair-man., Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, TVash i nrlton, D.C.
DEAR \IR. CHAIRMAN: With the committee's approval and the full.
support of President Carter, I visited Cuba from August 8 to Au-
gust 11, 1977. I hereby transmit a report of that trip.
After my return to Washington, I met with the President to relay a
message from President Castro and to pass on my observations and
policy recommendations.
Sincerely,
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DELUSIONS AND REALITY-THE FUTURE OF UNITED S'rATES-CUBA
RELATIONS
Today, 90 miles off the coast of. Florida lies a hind of mystery to
most Americans, led by a charismatic politician who is a major figure
on the world scene. Amerman citizens regularly obtain more infor-
mation about developments in China, halfway around the globe, than
about events on this island where nearly 10 million people live closer
to our shores than Puerto Rico.
Until recently, from the break in relations with Cuba in January
1961, our policy toward Fidel Castro has been to treat his government
as a political pariah, unfit for membership in the community of
nations. As a consequence, American eyes and ears have been closed
to Cuba. However, today the blinders are being lifted and the earplugs
removed. Our citizens may now travel to Cuba. The flow to us of
first-hand information is increasing.
As a member of the Senate C )oinmittee on Foreign Relations,
charged with the responsibility for weighing matters governing the
course of United States-Cuba relations, 1 have long felt a need to see
Cuba's society and to talk to its leaders on a personal basis. An invita-
tion from Fidel Castro, extended through Cuba's mission to the United
Nations, coupled with. it congressional recess, enabled me to do so from
August S to 11, 1.977.
No visit of 4 clay; to any country qualifies a visitor as an expert.
But there is much wisdom in the old saying that to see something
once is better than to hear about it a hundred times. This report is
neither a travelog on Cuba nor a definitive study of the issues of
concern to our two nations. Rather, it is a summary of what I saw and
heard that I consider pertinent in pondering the future course of U.S.
policy.
In my opinion, the cordial reception extended to. my party was
intended as a clear signal of President Castro's desire for a new era in
United States-Cuban relations. Several factors bear this out. The Air
Force plane, on which. we flew to Havana, was the first U.S. military
aircraft to land at a Cuban airport since 1960, I was told. ("Flown in
legally, that is," President Castro later remarked.) While there, I was
permitted an unprecedented 32 hours with Castro, much of that time
while lie acted as a highly knowledgeable tour guide, journeying by
jeep, car, boat, and helicopter, through the Cuban countryside and
adjacent waters. These signs, coupled with Castro's granting of my
request to allow island-bound American citizens married to Cubans
to return to the United States, together with their families, are all
suggestive of his desire to commence removing the barriers that have
separated our two countries for the last 17 years.
While in Cuba, I had the opportunity to travel widely through
the Havana area and the western end of the island, visiting farms,
ranches, schools, and many other facilities, along with the'Bay of Pigs,
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and President Castro's island retreat. On the basis of my observations,
the conclusion is inescapable that the Castro revolution is no longer
an experiment; it is an established fact. Any new U.S. policy must be
base on that reality.
Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, American policy was built on the
delusion that by economic and political pressures the United States
could isolate Cuba and thus bring Castro to his knees. From diplomatic
arm.-twisting to assassination plots, from. the imposition of trade
embargoes to covert operations designed to sabotage and subvert his
regime, American policy sought to stamp out this Marxist society so
close to our shores. The policy, however, has failed monumentally.
Instead of isolating Cuba from the world at large, we have managed
only to isolate ourselves from Cuba.
11. SOME REALITIES IN CUBA TODAY
Cuba, to begin with, remains a regimented state. Cuban jails harbor
political prisoners, and Cuban politics are dominated by one man, one
party, and one ideology. No organized opposition exists. All public
information is controlled by the Government. Cuban newspapers
resemble Pravda or Izvestia and are just as dull. Restricted to the
dogmatic repetition of the party line, they lack interest, humor or wit.
Freedom, as we know and enjoy it in the United States, is conspic-
uously absent. Furthermore, one wonders whether a totalitarian
society, in which the highest political virtue is solidarity, can ever
evolve into a free society in which solidarity gives way to individual
liberty.
Nevertheless, the evidence of strong popular support for Fidel
Castro and his revolutionary goals is too abundant to be denied. We
Americans know what ails Cuba, but we have precious little knowledge
or understanding of what makes it work.
The perspective with which one views Cuba's society depends on
how time water glass is measured, as half full or half empty. Judged by
American levels, the average Cuban's standard of living leaves much
to be desired. To most Americans, the Cuban's glass is half emp.ty.,.
But, to a Cuban, compared with the remembered privation of the past,
the glass, seems hllf full and filling rapidly. As one old man put it
sim ly: "You should have seen what it was like before ttie revolution."
I or example, there is no evidence on the streets of beggars, drunken-
ness, drug addiction, or the prostitution for which Havana was once
infamous. In contrast with other Communist nations I have visited,
few policemen or soldiers are to be seen. Although there are exhortative
slogans on billboards here and there, no posters of Castro appear in
public places. Construction activity abounds in Havana and through-
out the countryside, much of .it,new Sousing for the expanding popula-
tion, which has increased from 6 million to 9.6 million since Castro
came to power. Housing appears to be adequate and inexpensive. An
apartment costs a worker. 10 percent of his or her salary regardless of
family size. One hundred ;thousand new housing units are being built
this year, we were told.
Self-contained satellite towns are being developed around major
cities. T`; e visited the Alamar complex outside of Havana where
workers at nearby industrial sites also work part time in constructing
new, functional apartment buildings. Nowhere in our travels did we
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see the huge and hideous slums so often in evidence elsewhere in the
developing world, particularly in the major cities of Latin America.
Indeed, the contrast between the average dwelling in Cuba and the
hovels endured by millions in other Latin nations was striking and,
I suspect, instructive as to why Castro enjoys such evident popular
ap proval.
Education and health are now given priority in Cuban development
planning. "Five years ago, the military received the highest priority,"
one Cuban said, "now it is education and health." We were told by
education officials that at the time of the revolution, nearly half the
adult population was illiterate; now illiteracy is less than 4 percent,
consisting essentially of those too old to learn. Schooling is compulsory
to age 12, but young people are encouraged to continue in school
until they are 17. Adult education is stressed with the objective that,
regardless of age, Cubans might always be involved in some type of
study program. Physical work is combined with study at the secondary
levels All education, including higher education, is free.
The countryside is (lotted with boarding schools, all built alike to
save construction costs, where, during weekdays, students combine
study with farming, returning to their homes on weekends. These
work-study schools are a key element in Cuba's plan to put idle rural
land to productive use. We visited, for example, the Empressa Picuara
Genetica do Matanzas, started from scratch 7 years ago, lunching
there on excellent fish raised as a regularly harvested crop in a farm
lake nearby.
Another such school-farm. which we visited was an 190,000-acre
citrus orchard, Plan Especial do Jaguey, being developed on land that
was once rocky and unproductive by students who attend 45 schools
scattered throughout the area. Begun 10 years ago, the development,
which will not Ile completed until 1955- 90, already produces more
citrus fruit than all of Cuba before the revolution. The entire output
is sold to Communist countries.
These were not isolated showplaces. One could see similar develop-
ments 'everywhere while traveling through the countryside. We (lid
visit one showplace, however, the Picadura Valley Granla, a cattle-
farm run by Castro's older brother, Ramon. There, Cuban
breeding
cattle are being crossed with Holsteins to upgrade production of both
beef and milk.
Throughout the rural areas there was electric power, produced by
oil-fired generators, and many water tanks used power, irrigation. It was
said that about 45 percent of Cuba's sugarcane crop is now harvested
by machine, with more than a third grown on irrigated land.
Still, many foodstuffs are rationed, even sugar (4 pounds a month).
But allotments are purported to be ample and designed primarily to
insure fair distribution. Prices of basic commodities are subsidized,
financed in part b~r heavy taxes on luxuries. Consequently, there is no
inflation in basic food prices. A quart of milk costs less than 20 cents,
meat averanes 60 cents per pound, rice 18 cents per pound, oil 26 cents
per ppound,%read 20 cents pier pound-ancl so on. Although Cuba still
produces much rum-10 million liters a year are exported, 6 million
of that to the Soviet Union-little is consumed in Cuba.
Castro's sense of priorities and his intimate knowledge of details are
illustrated by what he related to me about Cuba's lobster production.
Cuba, he said, produces 10,000 tons of lobsters a year, all for export
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markets. "I can buy a ton of powdered milk for $350 and it has 214
times as much protein as it ton of lobsters. And for each ton of lob-
sters we sell, I can buy fifteen tons of powdered milk."
Wages for the average factory worker are said to be 160 pesos per
month, or about $200 at the current exchange rate. There are sig-
nificant differences in wage levels between workers and professionals-
a doctor makes four times as much as a shop or factory worker-but
the system, it is claimed, guarantees a decent standard of living to
the lowest paid. Both parents usually work. Health care, like educa-
tion, is free; medicines are low priced; and public transportation is
cheap-bus fare in Havana is 5 cents. Gasoline is rationed and costs
65 cents per gallon fc:r the rationed amount and S2 per gallon for any
purchased over that-"to soak up money," it was said. Textiles are
also rationed, but new plants are under construction. However, many
young people dress stylishly. Mini skirts abound. American music
dominates on the raclio stations and old American movies are shown
on television.
As to transportation, many 1950's vintage American cars are still
seen on Havana's streets. However, there are large numbers of cars of
more recent vintage as well, including some built in U.S.-owned plants
in Latin America. Buses appear adequate but crowded. Many new
trucks lumber along the streets and highways. Obviously, attention
is being given to improving transportation.
It must be a shared pride in these accomplish cents that accounts
for Fidel Castro's undoubted popularity. Previous Cuban dictators,
such as Batista and Machado, were despised. But criss-crossing the
island with Fidel, as I did, is an experience not to be faked nor easily
forgotten. Ile has more facts and figures in his head, and a greater
curiosity to acquire still more, than nearly anyone I have ever met.
Ranging from an intimate knowledge of Ernest Ilemingwa.y's writ-
ings to the latest experiments in cattle breeding, his grasp of detail is
astounding. Ile takes to the road like an eager campaigner. He obeys
the signal lights, jokes with the pedestrians crossing at the intersec-
tions and waves amiably to the people who call out to him as he
passes by. Wherever he stops there is pandemonium, as crowds gather.
around to ask questions, register complaints, or just talk. The people
react to him more like a father figure than a head of state. In their
faces I could not detect a trace of fear.
One incident will convey something of the flavor of these exchanges.
Stopping beside an outdoor basketball court, Castro began to banter
with the players. Ile spotted a short boy, perhaps 12 years old, and
shouted to him, "You're too short for basketball."
The boy blanched and I watched him elbow his way forward. Just
before we pulled away, the boy gripped Castro's arm, his eyes flashing.
"I may be short," he said, "but ,I can -jump."
The President nodded solemnly, holding back his laughter until we
left. Then he turned to nie and said approvingly, "There's a champion
in the makin-,
Perhaps this easy relationship with the people can be better under-
stood if one takes into account the bitter history of Cuba. It was the
last of the Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere to win inde-
pendlenco, its struggle long and bloody. Before the turn of the century,
Castro told ine, there were 300,000 Spanish troops stationed on the
island-1 soldier for every 3 Cubans. After independence, Cuban
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governments were corrupt and dictatorial. Batista is thouht to have
had $100 million on deposit in foreign banks at the time he, fled Cuba.
Moreover, mammoth foreign ownership of the land left the peasants
destitute, while IIavana became a haven for the M&fia. Now all this
has changed. It is small wonder that, the Cuban people see their glass
as half full today and believe in Castro's promise of a full glass
tomorrow.
III. THE STATE OF UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat
it," Santayana wrote. A:: American policyinakers measure how far
Cuba has come since the Castro revolution, so must they also keep
in mind the earlier history of United States-Cuban relations.
Before Castro's rise to power, we regarded Cuba much like a
colony.. Following American occupation after the Spanish-American
War, the United States wrote the Platt amendment into Cuba's
Constitution, giving the United States the right to intervene in the
island's affairs whenever we saw fit. That amendment stood until 1934.
American capital dominated Cuba's economy. It is estimated that
during the last year of the Batista regime, U.S. interests controlled
80 percent of Cuba's utilities, 90 percent of its mines and practically
all of its oil refining and distribution facilities; 65 percent of its trade
was with the United States, while 85 percent of all foreign investment
was American. As for Cuba's principal crop, sugar, 40 percent of the
sugarcane fields were also American owned. In many ways, the U.S.
ambassador was as important as Cuba's own President.
This subordination to foreign ownership was no small element in the
growth and appeal of Castro's revolution. And after he marched into
growth in 1959, subsequent U.S. policies may well have been a
major-if not the compelling-factor in pushing Castro so far into
t, 11
Soviet hands.
With the expropriation of American-owned properties, the U.S.
Governrrlent took quick reprisal. Starting with our cancellation of the
Cuban sugar quota, we soon obtained, through the Organization of
American States, a quarantine of Cuba, endorsed by most Latin
overn rents. In .April 1961, the United States sponsored the ill-fated
invasion of the Bay of Pigs by Cuban exiles. The dangerous missile
crisis involving the Russians came 18 months later.
To be sure, Castro is now-and was during that time-a grassroots
Communist. But, as Senator Fulbright warned President Kennedy in
arguing against the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Castro regime "is a thorn
in the flesh; but it is not a dagger in the heart." Strangely, we still
seem to find it simpler and more important to maintain trade and
diplomatic relations with,,such CoFn.mupist titans as China and the
U.S.S.R., than to deal with an island less than 10 minutes by air from
Key West.
Beginning in 1974, there have been attempts to break away from
this stubborn, self-defeating policy. In August 1975, President Ford
lifted the embargo on trade ' with Cuba by U.S.-owned corporate
subsidiaries abroad. The results of this policy are evident in the number
of Argentine-made Chevrolets seen today on the streets of Havana.
President Carter has stepped up the momentum by removing the ban
on U.S. travel to Cuba, stopping the overflights of our surveillance
planes and allowing American tourists to purchase $100 semiannually
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in Cuban goods. Both countries have recently entered into fishing
and maritime agreements and opened diplomatic interest sections in
each other's capital. Thus it start has been made toward improved
relations. But many hurdles remain to be surmounted.
Cubans regard the trade embargo (the "blockade," they call it) as
the primary impediment to normalized relations. The origins of the
embargo go back to the early sixties when the United States severed
diplomatic and economic relations in final retaliation against the
expropriation of American-owned property and Castro's growing
friendship with the Soviet Union. At the urging of the United States
(an( later Venezuela), the OAS subsequently helped to legitimatize
our embargo by adopting its own sanctions resolution in 1964. That
resolution remains on the books, but its edge was taken off in July
1975, when the OAS approved a "freedom-of-action" resolution
permitting member nations to reestablish normal ties with the Havana
government. The United States supported this resolution and it
was then, in the aftermath of its passage, that President Ford author-
ized overseas subsidiaries of American corporations to trade with Cuba.
Although earlier this year the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
approved legislation to permit one-way sales of medicine and food
from the United States to Cuba, that provision was deleted from the
parent bill in the full Senate when it became clear that even this
modest step, which could only work to our advantage, would precilpi-
tate an emotional debate with an uncertain outcome. It is generally
estimated that, if the whole embargo were lifted, it would result in a
two-way trade of about $600 million annually. Immediate study
should he given to ways to ease the embargo on a step-by-step basis.
Although Cuba exports about 60. percent of its sugar, 3.5 million
tons per year, to the Soviet Union under a long-term, highly advan-
tageous, sales arrangement which currently brings Cuba 30 cents per
pound, compared with a world price of S cents, and allows the island
to buy oil at half the world price, Cuba is still interested in participat-
ing in an international sugar agTeement. Castro told me that he be-
lieved such an agreement, stabilizing the world price at a level above
world production costs, would benefit all sugar-producing countries
alike, including the United States and Cuba. The positions of our two
countries on an acceptable price range appear to be moving in the
direction of convergence.
According to the Department of State,. there are 751 individuals
in Cuba with valid claims to U.S. citizenship; of these, only 84 are
exclusively Americans. The remaining 667 are dual nationals. The 84 1
have been free to leave Cuba but did not do so because the Cuban
Government would not..Fillow then to take their families with them.
A major objective of my visit was to break the deadlock on this
problem. When I raised the matter with Castro in a late night con-
versation aboard his boat, the Aguarama, he responded immediately
and positively saving, "if there are 50 or 100 or 300-they may leave
with their families and children and uncles and aunts. We have no
problem with that. Just give its a list."
All of the 84 individuals in Cuba with exclusive claims to American
citizenship were later queried by registered letter, sent by the U.S.
interest section in Havana, as to whether they desired to return to the
United States. The first 19, along with 36 of-their relatives, had been
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brought to the United States by the time this report was written. It is
significant that, notwithstanding that 6 of the 55 were of military age,
they were also allowed to leave. All were permitted to take their savings
and personal belongings with them. 'Ibis humanitarian gesture on
Castro's part was intended, as lie put it, to continue the positive
direction of relations" on which both countries have now embarked.
National television covered the arrival of the first plane from
Havana at homestead Air Force Base, Fla. I aln sure that the Ameri-
can people watching the event shared the sentiments of one of Wash-
ington's most distinguished ambassadors, Ardeshir Zaltedi, of Iran,
who wrote to me:
It was a wonderful and hea.r:cning experience to see so many American and
Cuban families reunited after so long a period of separation, and the joy and
happiness that they so clearly manifested was in turn reflected in the hearts of all
of us who had the good fortune to watch their reunion on television.
I also raised the question of Americans in Cuban jails. Of the 23
known Americans in Cuban jails at time time of our visit, including
hijackers, drug smugglers and others, the Department of State
classifies seven as "political prisoners." Although President Castro
said he could not release these prisoners at that time, he told me that
he would review their sentences on a case by case basis.
Shortly after our return to the United States, Cuban authorities
did release one American prisoner, Byron Moore., who was not classified
as "political" but whose release I had requested on humanitarian
grounds. Mr. Moore's boat, the "Nita Sue," had been seized in Cuban
waters with marijuana aboard.
Subsequently, on October 12th, I was informed by the American
Interest Section in Havana that the first American political prisoner
and the only woman among the group, Mrs. Maria del Carmen y
Ruiz, had been released by the Cuban Government and had appeared
at the Interest Section where she spoke briefly with American staff
members. Mrs. Carmen y Ruiz was arrested in 1069 and sentenced to
20 years in prison on espionage charges.
These Fictions, including the first release of an American political
prisoner, indicate that Castro is serious in seeking improved relations.
with the United States.
Perhaps the most complex issue separating us and the Cubans is our
claim for compensation for properties expropriated in the revolution.
'I'lie U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission has approved claims
against the Cuban Government totaling $1.8 billion, of which $1.5
billion are held by 6orporations. With interest, the figure increases to
$3.5 billion, or about one-third of Cuba's GNP. The Castro govern-
ment has indicate(] that, at the appropriate time, it will present a
counterclaim for damages inflicted by the embargo and the Bay of Pigs
invasion. Neither Castro nor I dealt at any- length with the expropri-
ation issue in our conversations. Since it will require extensive negotia-
tions, no good purpose would have been served by doing so.
As the number of hijackings to Cuba increased in the early 1970's,
the United States worked out an antihijacking agreement with
Castro's government, providing for the return of hijackers or their
prosecution by the receiving country. Since the signing of the agree-
ment on February 15, 1973, there have been no hijackings to Cuba.
On October 15, 1976, Castro announced that the hijacking agree-
ment would be allowed to expire in accordance with its 6-month
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termination provision. The turnabout was occasioned by the terrorist
bombing a few weeks before of a Cuban airliner which cost the lives
of all aboard, including members of Cuba's chatnpion fencing team.
The bombing so grieved the Cuban people that over a million attended
the funeral. Even though Castro agreed with me that President Carter,
whom I described as a "good, moral, religious Ivan," would never
countenance CIA participation in such a mass murder, he thought it
was done by terrorists who had received their training years ago from
the CIA. This was also generally believed by the Cuban people, he
said, and made it necessary for him to terminate the treaty. Neverthe-
less, he made it clear that he intended to continue to deal with hijackers
as required by the agreement. There would be no substantive changes
on Cuba's part, lie assured me.
At no time (lid Castro raise the issue of the Guantanamo Naval
Base, although it remains an outstanding problem. The United States
b
continues to send it check to the Cuban Government each year, in
accordance with the 1934 lease in "perpetuity," for an annual payment
of 2,000 gold dollars. These checks have not been cashed.
IV. BUILDING A NEW RELATIONSHIP
The wall the United States tried to build around, Cuba has crumbled.
At last count, the Cuban Government maintained regular commercial
and diplomatic trading relations with 86 nations. It is high time for us
to discard a policy which the world community views, at best, as
unworthy of great nation and, at worst, as petulant and self-defeating.
Cuba's economy slid not collapse under our enibargo, nor did her
people rise up to welcome the American-sponsored invaders at the
Bay of Pigs. Instead of dangling at the end of its rope, the Cuban
economy appears to be thriving. Wherever we traveled, much activity
was evident: new factories, housing, schools, hospitals, and roads.
At home and abroad, Castro has consolidated his position as a
renowned leader. American opposition has catapulted him into a
legendary prominence, as the David who stood off mighty Goliath.
Just as the Bay of Pigs solidified public support for Castro at Borne,
so too (lid our continued harassment of Castro bestow on him an aura
he could never have otherwise acquired. Largely= cccaiise of it blind
and obstinate U.S. policy, Castro's stature and influence in the third
world has grown far beyond, the modest size of the country he governs.
There is a lesson to be learned here, A grand delusion underlaid our
former policy toward Cuba. As the new administration attempts to
steer a different course, it is essential to avoid still another delusion;
namely, that Cuba will pay a heavy price for the restoration of normal
relations with the -United States. Apparently, there are those who feel
that Castro has not shown "proper" appreciation for the steps Presi-
dent Carter has so far taken. In his conversations With me, Castro
observed that it was impossible for hint to respond in kind. Obviously,
Cuba has not engaged in surveillance overflights of the United States,
nor has it imposed a trade embargo against us.
If, in order to trade with the United States, anyone expects Fidel
Castro to change colors; to abandon his role in Africa; to sever his
close ties with the Soviet Union and to pay us in full for our expro-
priated property, that person has simply exchanged one delusion for
another.
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9
To be sure, the restoration of normal relations with Havana,
including the lifting of the American embargo, would give certain
advantages to both countries. The United States could obtain it share
of Cuban purchases of tractors, trucks, farm machinery, rice, medicine
and other commodities. We would also begin to exercise it moderating
influence in Cuban affairs. Castro, on the other hand, night anticipate
selling certain products in the United States, such as nickel, rum and
cigiars, while saving transportation costs on merchandise purchased
and shipped from nearby American ports, as compared, say, to
Japanese.
To obtain these benefits, along, with an attendant restoration of
greater acceptability among the governments of the hemisphere, I
believe Fidel Castro may be willing to snake further concessions,
especially in the field of human rights. He may release, on a case-by-
case basis, those six Americans remaining in Cuban jails whom we
regard as "political prisoners"; lie may consider opening the exit gates
to those residents of dual citizenship, American and Cuban, who wish
to leave and take their families with them; and he may, following a re-
laxation of the embargo, agree to negotiate our claims for compensa-
tion.
Beyond this, I have serious doubts. As for Africa, Castro views his
role there as that of a. liberator. His justification for Cuban interven-
tion in Angola reminded inc of the a.ro'uments I had heard so often
from the lips of Dean Rusk and Henry l Kissinger, back in the Johnson-
Nixon years, defending our own intervention in South Vietnam. Castro
appears to be caught up in the same sort of fervor and I was unable to
convince him that Angola-like Vietnam--would ultimately prove to
be it baited trap. Having found it role on the African stage, Castro
is loathe to forsake it.
By the same token, there is no rational basis for believing that
Castro will break his immensely beneficial connection with the Soviet
Union in order to trade with the United States. His current trading
arrangements with the Russians generate about $1.2 billion in sub-
sidies to Cuba each year, according to our own estimates. Cuba receives
almost four times the world price for the sugar it sells to the Russians
and buys oil from them at $6 per barrel. Under the agreement, if the
price of oil goes up, the price of sugar goes up proportionately. "It
is," Castro said to me, "the best agreement any developing country
could g;et." Although Cuba is obviously interested in acquiring U.S.
technology, its trade wick other indust.ia..m'~ions enables it to obtain
most of what it needs and can afford.
Accordingly, I do not expect that concessions from Castro in the
future are likely to, exceed the marginal gains he can reasonably antic-
ipate from the restoration of nolun.al relations with the United States.
To demand more than this, is to base our evolving policy toward
Cuba on a, new delusion.
For nearly two decades, the fractured relationship between the two
countries has been exacerbated by offenses on both sides. As with any
aggravated wound, the healing process will be gradual. Castro put
it this way :
We are pleased with the development of relations between Cuba and the United
States since President Carter took office. We understand realistically that the
process of improving relations must be a slow process. There cannot be dramatic
changes overnight, but for our part Nye intend to continue the positive direction of
relations so that eventually Cuba and the United States can solve their problems.
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Both President Carter and Fidel Castro have now taken the first
steps toward better relations. Momentum has been created. It should
not be allowed to slacken. By his decision to permit Americans to
leave with their Cuban relatives and possessions, Castro has made a
good-faith gesture to which the United States should respond. I
recommend the following as ste s worth considering:
1. Expand cultural, sports, educational, and scientific exchange.-
There are many opportunities to further mutual interests through
exchanges. In November, an American all-star baseball team will
tour Cuba; in the spring, the Cuban National Ballet will perform in
the United States. There should be more such visits. Medical per-
sonnel and scientists of both countries, for example, have much to
learn from each other.
2. Seek cooperation on, antidrug traac activities.-Smugglers moving
cargoes of drugs from Latin America to the United States by boat
often travel close to Cuban waters and get caught. There is much
common ground here for cooperation in curbing the international
drug traffic.
3. Relax the trade embargo.-Careful study should be given to a
step-by-step approach to relaxation of the trade embargo.
1F. Aggressively pursue antiterrorist acti.zities.-Government agencies
should take aggressive action to insure that terrorist activities against
Cuba, originatin=g in, or controlled from, the United. States, are
stamped out.
5. Reciprocal opening of press ofces.-allow a Cuban press office
(Prensa Latina) to be established in the United States in exchange
for the opening in Havana of press offices of U.S. news organizations.
Such steps, on our part, taken over the next year or two, coupled
with reciprocal action on the part of the Cuban Government, will
move the healing process along.
When Castro was asked what one ingredient was most needed,
he said, "Time."
I agree.
11onday, August 8
2 -.00 p.m. Departed .Andrews Air Force Base for Havana.
4:50 p.m. Arrived at Jose Marti _Lirpoi t, Havana. Met by Raul
Roa, former Foreign Minister and now Vice President of the National
Assembly and member of the Council of State.
5:00 p.m. Press conference in airport lounge.
6:10 p.m. Arrived at Riviera Hotel.
8:30 p.m. Dinner at the La Torre restaurant hosted by Mr. Raul
Roa and his wife.
11:30 p.m. Returned to Riviera Hotel.
Tuesday, August 9
9:40 a.m.'N'Iet with education officials:
1. Dr. Max Figueroa, . Director of the Institute of Teacher
Training Sciences.
2. Dr. Oscar Garcia, Vice 'Minister of Higher Education.
11:30 a.m. Went on walking tour of old Havana.
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12:30 p.m. Lunch hosted by above education officials at the "La.
Bodequita Del. Medio" restaurant, once frequented by Ernest
Hemingway.
4:15-5:45 p.m. Private meeting; with President Castro at the
Presidential office building. V
5:45-6:15 p.m. President Castro and I niet with the press.
6:15--9:30 p.m. Went with President Castro on a riding tour of
Havana suburbs, by jeep, and ended by a visit to Ernest IIenwingway's
home, now it museum.
10:00-11:00 p.m. Discussion with President Castro at our room in
the Riviera Hotel.
11:45 p.m. Met with accompanying American press.
ti -ednesday, August 10
9:00 a.m. Left hotel by jeep driven by President Castro for tour of
the countryside.
a.m. Stopped briefly at Jose Marti Pioneer Canip after driving
through Alanlar suburb--a. new housing development cast of Havana.
a.m. Stopped at Santa Maria del liar beach.
a.m. Stopped at a ruin distillery.
a.m. Stopped at the "Jibacoa Comunidades"-cooperative farming
development.
Noon. Stopped at Picaclura Valley Granja-a cattle breeding
ranch operated by Ramon Castro, President Castro's older brother.
3:00 p.m. Lunch at the "Enipresa Picuara Genetica do Matan-
zas"-boarding high scliool.
p.m. Visited 190,000-acre citrus farm being built by secondary-
school students-"Plan Especial de Jaguey."
p.m. Visited Bay of Pigs---toured museum there.
8:15 p.m. Left .lby boat Aguaraann for President Castro's private
island. Dinner on board boat after arrival. Overnight at guest house
on island. Substantive talks with Castro periodically throughout day
and evening.
Ttvrsday, August 11
8:30 a.m: Breakfast aboard boat at mooring.
9:00 a.m. Left by another boat for snorkling areas in keys.
1:30 p.m. Lunch aboard President Castro's boat-which had been
brought to the snorkling area
2:45 p.m. Left by helicopter Isom a small uninhabited key for
Havana.
3:25 p.m. Arrived a.t Riviera Hotel.
4:00 p.m. Left for the airport.
4 :35 p.m. Joint press conference with President Castro at the airport,
following which he came aboard the waiting U.S. Air Force plane.
5:15 p.m. Departed Havana.
7:50 p.m. Arrived Andrews Air Force Base, Md.
O
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