REPORT TO THE SENATE ON THE WORK OF THE SSCI BY SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE (D., HAWAII), CHAIRMAN, SSCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A000700040013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: December 2, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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OLC 77-5235
2 DEC 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: All Morning Meeting Participants
FROM: George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT: Report to the Senate on the Work of the SSCI
By Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D., Hawaii),
Chairman, SSCI
Attached is a report to the Senate from Senator Daniel K.
Inouye on the work of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
It is not nearly as detailed as the Committee's first Annual
Report, published in May 1977, but does make some interesting
points. Some of the major points are:
a. Intelligence Community abuses in the past were
the result of the direction above, often with the knowledge
of oversight committee Members;
b. The nation owes a great deal to the Intelligence
Community;
c. With the support of the President and under the
firm direction of Admiral Turner, the Community is now on
track again after several years of turmoil;
d. Intelligence is essential to the nation's.security;
e. Senator Inouye has had a rule that all information
conveyed to him will be shared with every Member of the
Committee.
f. The provisions in S. Res. 400 (the Committee's
charter) for handling and disclosure of classified information
are sound, have worked well, and should be extended to all
classified information provided to the Senate;
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g. Development of the new Executive Order on
intelligence has been a unique joint effort between
the Intelligence Community and the Committee. However,
the most important work of the Committee lies ahead in the
development of statutory charters;
h. No intelligence agency should be involved with
working journalists, because the problem of playback
into the United States outweighs possible gains;
i. The statutory charters under development will
contain provisions to enable courts to handle classified
information. The aim of the Committee is to eliminate
the "national security loophole";
j. The greatest need within the Intelligence
Community is for more cogent analysis;
k. Senator Inouye is resigning as Chairman and will
be succeeded by Senator Birch Bayh (D., Ind.). Senator
Inouye will recommend an amendment to S. Res. 400 limiting
the Chairmanship to a two year term.
1. The President, in August of this year, lauded
the Committee for security stating the Committee had a
better security record than any other organization in
the United States Government.
George L. Cary
Attachment:
As Stated
Distribution:
1 - DCI w/att
1 - Acting DDCI w/att
STAT1 w/att
1 - Dr. Bowie w/att
1 - DDO w/att
1 - DDS&T Watt
1 - Acting DDA w/att
1 - Acting D/DCI/IC
1 - General Counsel /a
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1 - IG w/att Approved
1 - Compt. w/att
1 - Mr. Hetu w/att
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REPORT TO THE SENATE ON THE WORK OF THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE BY
SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE, CHAIRMAN,
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
As the first session of the 95th Congress draws to a
close, it is appropriate to report to the Senate on the work
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
I have had the honor to serve as Chairman of the Committee
since it was formed on May 19, 1976. The Senate, in its
Resolution 400, assigned to the Committee a broad range of
duties, all of which were designed to carry out rigorous
oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States
Government. After a period of a year and a half, I am of the
opinion that Senate Resolution 400 provides the necessary scope
and the workable means for exercising vigilant legislative
oversight over the intelligence activities of the United
States.
In recent years the intelligence community, particularly
the CIA and the FBI, have been the targets of suspicion and
abuse. There is no question that a number of abuses of power,
mistakes in judgment and failures by the intelligence agencies,
have harmed the United States. We, of course,-hope that these
abuses are behind us and will not occur again. These events
did not happen in a vacuum. In almost every instance, the
abuses that have been revealed were a result of direction
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from above, including Presidents and Secretaries of State.
Further, in almost every instance, some members of both Houses
of Congress assigned the duty of oversight were knowledgeable
about these activities.
The recent Helms case illustrates this pattern. If
Mr. Helms should be subject to public blame, as some contend,
then others in higher authority in both the Executive branch
and the Congress should also share the blame.
Every organization, whether the Congress, the White House,
the CIA, corporations,. universities or churches, are made up
of men and women with their full share of excellences and
failures. With the exception of a very small number who broke
the law or failed in their trust, we owe a great debt to our
intelligence community. It is made up of men and women of
unusual dedication and ability who serve our country under
the most difficult of circumstances-. We can be proud that
they have come through the trials of the past several years
with a clearer sense of purpose and with a strengthened belief
in the value of.a life of service to our nation.
The intelligence community has been in a turmoil over
the past few years. It has been the subject of a number-of
Congressional inquiries, internal investigations and intense
criticism from the press and the publicith the support of
the President and under the firm direction of Stansfield
Turner, the intelligence community is in the process of
creating a new organizational structure which should lead
to more efficient coordination of its world-wide activities
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and a better overall intelligence product. It is my view
that the intelligence agencies of the United States are now
functioning under strict guidelines set forth by the President
and the National Security Council, which lay out clear missions,
limitations and accountability, as well as rigorous oversight
by both the House and the Senate. While many improvements
and reforms are called for, it-is my evaluation that the present
quality of the work of the United States intelligence community
is good, and shows every sign of becoming better.
I firmly believe that under our constitutional system,
the license for the Executive branch to undertake secret
intelligence activities requires a full awareness of the nature
and detail of these activities by the Legislative branch. The
abuses of power by the intelligence agencies revealed over
the past few years make it clear that the Executive branch
should not be authorized to undertake secret intelligence
activities unless the .Legislative branch,through its appropriate
committees, is fully knowledgeable and concurs in the purpose
of such intelligence activities.
The necessity for a large and extensive secret intelligence
system imposes great demands upon our open democratic consti-
tutional society. Secret intelligence activities, by their
Very nature, require that only a delegated few in the government,
in both the Executive and Legislative branches, have detailed
knowledge of the overall activities of our intelligence agencies.
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I am convinced after my period of first-hand observation
that much of the information produced by our intelligence
system is not only useful but necessary to the nation's
security and well-being.
It is perhaps not surprising that as Chairman of the
Select Committee on IntelligenceI have read my shake of
spy novels and books on the world of intelligence. There is
one passage. written by John Le Carre in an introduction to
a book entitled The Philby Conspiracy that I find of almost
daily pertinence to those of us who serve on the Committee:
no secret service can be more clearheaded than
its government. Everything rests upon a clearcut
statement of requirements by those who formulate the
nation's policy. If the Secret Service is properly
used, it is a fighting arm, an extension of Govern-
ment policy. But in times of dismay and national
corruption it sinks swiftly into intrigue, slovenly
security and inter-departmental rivalry.
The proper balance between-maintaining the secrecy of
information provided to it by the Executive branch, and the
right of the public to know what its government is doing in
its name has not been an easy issue for the Select Committee
on Intelligence. Section 11 of S. Res. 400 gives to the
Select Committee the right to full and complete information
about all intelligence activities. No other legislature in
the world has this right to secret information. The insist-
ence that activities executed in the name of the United States
by the Executive branch shall be known, approved, or modified
by the Legislature, and the courts, as appropriate, has enabled
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the American republic to survive as a vigorous, free society.
In a democratic society some kinds of secret activities may
not be possible because the circle of those who must know of
the activities is relatively large. Our constitutional system
of checks and balances and of shared responsibilities between
the branches demands shared knowledge as well.
One requirement for effective oversight is the certainty
that the Senate as a body has confidence in its delegated
oversight committee. The Committee must reflect the views
of the Senate as a whole and should not favor the policies or
predispositions of those who may be in power at any given time.
The present membership of the Committee reflects the full
spectrum of Senate views from left to right. We are a non-
partisan committee. As Chairman, I have made-it a,rule, which
the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield
Turner, and each-of the Executive branch agencies understand,
that whatever information conveyed to me will be shared with
every member of the Committee. On occasion this sharing process
may have caused some contemplated activities to be dropped.
Such a result is a function of the oversight process.
The obverse of Congress' right to access to information
is its duty to protect the valid secrets of our country, and
to disclose validly classified information only in accord with
an agreed-upon rational process of consultation. The Committee
has made use of the process and thus far it has worked well to
the satisfaction of both the Legislature and Executive that
it is a fair and reasonable procedure.
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In the past, one of the reasons given for not sharing-
sensitive information with the Congress is the fear that the
Congress would not be able to keep confidences given to it.
Without question, unauthorized disclosures have come from -
the Congress in the past and it is reasonable to expect they
will occur in the future.. It is also quite clear that in the
past, most disclosures of sensitive information have come out
of the. Executive branch, including, on occasion, deliberate
leaks from the highest authorities.. Sometimes these leaks
of information were intended as feelers to test public opinion;
or in the worst cases, for narrow political purposes.
I am satisfied that the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence has demonstrated that it has the discipline
necessary to protect the valid secrets of this country entrusted
to it. We have met the challenge of proving that Congress can
and will, with educated awareness of the substance and its
fragility, with proper authority, and through reasonable pro-
cedures,.keep_the valid secrets entrusted to its care. We
have done this in such a way that makes it possible for the most
sensitive information to be made available to each of the one
hundred Senators that make up the Senate.
As the Senate knows, the authorization bill and its report,
which contain some of this couintry's most fragile and precious
secrets, has been available to every Senator under the security
provisions of S. Res. 400. Further, this Committee has made
its reports available to other standing committees and other
individual members as appropriate.
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In view of the demonstrated success of the formula for
the handling of classified material and the process of deter-
mining the disclosure of valid national secgrity information,
I recommend to. the leadership and the Senate as a rahoie that
the formula contained in S. Res. 400 be extended for all
classified information provided to the Senate. I think this
provides the requisite balance between the right of access
and the corresponding duty to. protect our nation's secrets..
The Committee has just completed work on a unique joint
effort with-the Executive branch on an Executive Order which
will serve as an interim measure, as well as a blueprint for
permanent statutes, which we hope will be passed sometime in
the next year. Since July, Committee members and staff have
worked with the Executive branch in the writing of this
Executive Order. This joint effort marks a commitment on the
part of President Carter and the Committee to work as closely
as possible to set forth clearly the principal missions and
purposes of our national intelligence system, and to provide
for its governance under the Constitution and the laws.
I am convinced that the most important work of the
Committee lies ahead -- the passage of statutory charters
,and guidelines which will place all the principal aspects
of intelligence work under the governance of the Constitution
and the law.
The Committee intends to recommend passage of a legis-
lative charter which will contain a number of separate titles.
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The first title is a general charter authorizing the scope of
our national intelligence activities. It focuses responsibility
for national intelligence' activities upon the Director of
our national intelligence system, giving him the authorities
necessary for the effective management and coordination
required by our vast and diverse national intelligence system.
It. authorizes.by'statute (rather than by Executive Order)
intelligence activities for the United States, but unlike the
now-obsolete National Security Act of 1947, it specifically
authorizes the collection of intelligence and covert action.
The bill, however, is not a blank check for the intelligence
community. Detailed procedures are provided for the review of
clandestine activities. Certain forms of covert action are
prohibited. For example,-the employment of members of the
clergy or journalists for intelligence purposes is barred.
By establishing clear responsibility and accountability,
and by defining what the intelligence community can and cannot
do, the first title of the National Act is intended to insure
that intelligence activities are properly and effectively
directed, regulated, coordinated, and administered and that
these activities do not infringe upon individual rights-
protected by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States. In addition to this general charter, there are,
as separate titles, specific entity charters for the National
Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
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and the counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI). Further, there are titles which
deal with the limitations upon intelligence activities which
affect Americans overseas as well as in the United States.
During its work on charters over the last year and a half,
the major issue that has faced the Committee concern the ques-
tion of balancing between detailed specifications of what may
or may not be done, and the need on the part of the intelli-
gence agencies for a degree of flexibility to meet exigent
circumstances.
I am certain that the public hearings held by the Committee
over the next few months on charters will be of considerable
national interest, particularly those hearings which deal with
the relationships between the press and academics and the
intelligence community. I have come to the conclusion that
no intelligence agency should be involved with working journ-
alists. The problem of the flowback of propaganda to the
United States is a far greater danger than any benefits
which might accrue from the services that a journalist 'working
for an intelligence agency might be able to perform. -
It is this kind of balancing question measured against
the practical details of intelligence needs that lies at the
heart of meaningful oversight. One of the limitations that
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our constitutional democratic government imposes upon
intelligence activities is the constraint imposed by the
mores of our own society. We in America value a free and
open press. This deeply held value must be reflected in
.legislation defining the limits upon the use of journalists
by the intelligence community.
The major underlying premise for the Committee's work
is that the most sensitive national security questions
including secret intelligence activities can be resolved by
our constitutional system and through regular constitutional
processes. Full Congressional awareness of the nature, extent
and details of intelligence activities and a process of rigorous
oversight by an intelligence committee in both the House and
the Senate is now a practical reality.
While the Congress has taken significant steps to fulfill
.its constitutional role. and responsibilities to share in the
governance of all activities of the United States Departments
and Agencies including their.secret activities, effective means
have not yet been devised to enable the Courts to meet their
constitutional responsibilities. Recent espionage cases, and
the recent Helms decision underline the difficulties the Justice
Department and the Courts have in the consideration of secret
national security questions. It is clear that our judicial
system must develop a better system of proceedings for
classified intelligence matters or secret national defense
or foreign policy questions. It will not be an easy task.
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The dangers of creating a Star Chamber must be avoided on
the one hand; on the other hand, the vital national secrets
should be protected from unnecessary disclosure.
The Committee intends to include in its statutory charters
for intelligence activities provisions to enable the Courts
to address more effectively cases involving classified information.
In the next few months, hearings will be held calling upon
the best advice that the legal profession can give : from 'the
Justice Department, and other Departments and Agencies, the
Courts, the law schools, from the Bar Associations, and from
interested public groups and individuals. The Courts must
be given the procedural means to do their part in the consti-
tutional process. When this task is completed, we will have
enabled the three branches to fulfill their duties in the
area of secret national security matters and will have largely
removed the "national security loophole" which has so strained
our constitutional system.
Much attention has been focused upon the shadowy, glamorous
and necessary world of secret agents. But by far the most
significant and useful portion of our intelligence community
is in the analyses and estimates they provide to our national
leadership both in the Executive and the Congress and the solid
information they give to our Executive departments and agencies.
It is in this area that the Select Committee on Intelligence,
I believe, will be able to serve the rest of the Senate in the
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future as a conduit to other Committees and individual Senators
to do their assigned tasks. S. Res. 400 already places a duty
upon the Select Committee to provide other Committees, individual
Senators and the Senate as a whole, with information that comes
to it which may also be of benefit to them.
For example, the Committee has been engaged in the past year
on a study of the verification capabilities of the intelligence
community. It is obvious that an authoritative objective study
of our verification capabilities will be of use to the Senate
when it takes up consideration of any future SALT Treaty. The
Committee's study is being prepared with that duty and with
that service in mind.
The intelligence community is now in a state of transition.
The familiar romantic world of spies and counterspies, while
still a vital necessity, is less central to our needs than
our new technological means of collection. Without question,
the United States government now has a vastly larger and more
detailed data base of information with which to understand the
world than a decade or two ago. There has been an information
explosion in the world of intelligence just as there has been
in other sectors of our society and government. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the greatest need for improvement
lies in the area of assuring more cogent analysis of this vast
and burgeoning body of knowledge.
Further, there is a need for more rigorous analysis of
political, economic, and cultural problems. This is not to
say that military questions are less important; rather, it is
only to assert that at the present time, the major problems
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and opportunities that face the United States are increasingly
political, economic and cultural in character. One area that
the Committee has been examining over the past year is the
quality of our forecasts of worldwide crops and other vital
materials and resources such as soil. It is problems of this
kind that the Select Committee on Intelligence has-been pressing
the intelligence 'community to focus its efforts to improve
the quality of its analytic work.
A very good example of the need for this new focus on a
more universal approach to analysis, is in the area of arms
control. I do not intend to diminish the great advances that
have been made in analysis of military weapons intelligence.
We have moved in the past 30 years from information derived
primarily from spies to information gained largely from tech-
nical means: the U-2, satellites, and other technological
marvels. The possibility for far more certainty about military
events and for making more reasonable judgments about nuclear
deployments is now greater than ever before. There is, for
example, a direct correlation between the possibility of arms
control agreements and the degree of verification that agreements
will be observed. Our so-called national technical means of
verification, that is, our satellites, made the SALT I agreement
a reality, and further SALT agreements a real possibility.
Without such means of acquiring accurate reliable military
information, we would still be in an atmosphere dominated by
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fear and uncertainty -- an atmosphere which characterized
the early '50's, preparing for all-out war rather than seeking
ways to reduce unnecessary arms.
But as. we have come to know with more certainty, the
nature and disposition of potential enemy forces, and as the
doubts about the exact nature and quality of weapons capabil-
ities recede, the questions of why military forces are
assembled and for what reasons and purposes they might be
used become more critical. Great advances have been made by
our intelligence agencies in the "hard" areas of quantifiable
information, but the so-called "soft" areas: the politics,
the economics, the behaviour patterns of men and nations,
deserve far more attention and the application of many of the
methods used for hard subjects. Yet, the very fact that we are
coming to grips with these questions, and that our attention
is focused on this area is directly attributable to the
improving quality and sophistication of our intelligence system.
We have moved from a preoccupation with the fearful questions
of mere survival to serious considerations of ways to devise
political or economic means of resolving fundamental differ-
ences between such rivals as the Soviet Union or China. In
this respect, the growth and increased importance of our
intelligence system over the past 30 years has served to
strengthen the possibilities of a continuing peace. And it
has done so even as it has increased its abilities to detect
quickly any movements by potential enemies towards war.
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lieve it'-is important for the Senate and for the intelligence
agencies who are under the charge of the Select Committee
to have overseers who come to the issues as I have come to
them -- with an open,..fresh and relatively objective point
of view, so necessary for the important task of oversight.
An aware, yet detached point of view is necessary because
the world of intelligence activities, as John Le Carre so
cogently observed,
spill over into almost every area of public
life; its viability depends upon our tolerance,
upon our money and to a sizeable extent, upon our
complicity.
I.would like to establish a precedent which would be
reflected in an amendment to S. Res. 400, which would require.
a regular rotation of Chairmanship, as well as a limitation
of the number of years members of the Committee may serve,
which is already in the Senate Resolution. In my view, the
Chairman of the Committee on Intelligence should not serve
more than a two year term. It is my considered opinion
I am doing so because I believe rotation of Chairmanship is
the best way to assure the combination of close detailed
work with the agencies and a vigilant attitude toward their
activities can be maintained. I am resigning because I be-
Although there is no specific rule in S. Res. 400, I -
have chosen to resign at the end of this session as Chairman.
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that this system of. rotation of members and Chairmanship
will serve to create a growing body of better informed
Senators, as well as a legislative constituency that can
speak authoritatively on the needs of the intelligence com-.
munity.
As the first Chairman of the permanent intelligence
oversight committee, I have found the task to be challeng-
ing, demanding, and extremely interesting. I do not give
up this Chairmanship without regrets. But I think it is
vital to ensure that the Chairman be objective and impartial.
I believe one reason for the failure of congressional over-
sight in the past years was that too close a relationship
developed between the intelligence agencies and their over-
seers.
Because the Committee began without any precedents and
in a virtually unknown area, everything the Committee has
done has been a pioneering effort. I think we have
accomplished much-in these first. years.
In summary, for the first time, we have had a full and
complete annual authorization for intelligence activities.
We have examined in detail all of the intelligence activities
of the United States, including a line-by-line review of the
most sensitive activities such as covert action.
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Effective oversight of the intelligence community
requires the regular review of covert, action projects and what
are called sensitive collection programs. The Committee has
devised a pattern of reviews on a quarterly basis, as well
as a case-by-case review of all covert action programs approved
by the President prior to their implementation.
Perhaps the most effective means of oversight is the
authorization process. The power of the purse is the legis-
lative body's most compelling means of working its will. In
covert action, for example, the Committee, in its last auth-
orization, voted on each project, yea or nay. This process
of voting on detailed specific activities was carried out
in every area of intelligence activity.
The Committee has had very heavy responsibilities but has
earned the respect of the Executive branch and the intelli-
gence agencies. In fact, the President, at our meeting with
him at the White House on August 4, commended the Committee
for its record of security saying that it was better than any
other part of the United States Government.
The members have worked hard and I think we now have a
staff of outstanding quality which is-respected for its.abil-
ities and performance throughout.the Government.
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I want to thank my Vice Chairman, Senator Barry Goldwater
for sharing the burden with me in the difficult yet gratify-
ing work of this Committee. We have worked closely together
on every Committee issue and I have gained much from his
counsel and views.
I want to commend the work done by Senator Birch Bayh,
who will be the-next Chairman of this Committee, for the
consistent and careful efforts made to protect the rights
of Americans as they maybe affected by intelligence-
activ-ities. Senators Morgan, Garn, Moynihan, Case and Chafee
have worked with Senator Bayh in this vital area.
Senator Hathaway has performed the very difficult task
of putting together the first annual authorization for
intelligence activities that has ever-been presented to
the Congress. It required months of hearings and an unusual
devotion of time. This first authorization is the result of
the time and effort of Senator Hathaway and his Subcommittee
on Budget Authorization, Senators Wallop, Hart and Mathias.
Senator Dee Huddleston and Senator Charles Mc. Mathias
as Vice Chairman of the Charters and Guidelines Subcommittee
have been working with Senators Bayh, Stevenson, Biden, Garn
and Lugar over the past year and a half, writing the legis-
lation for the governance of the intelligence agencies.
Senators Huddleston and Mathias have worked carefully and
effectively with the Executive branch. It is our expectation
that in most respects the draft statutory charter will have
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the full support of the Executive branch. The 1947 National
Security Act provided an inadequate statutory base for the
intelligence activities of the United States. One reason for
its inadequacies was that the Legislative branch was not
significantly involved in the drafting of those authorities
for intelligence activities. President Carter and Vice President
Mondale have told.the Committee at several meetings that the
best interests of the country will be served by working as
closely as possible in this very difficult area of national
policy.
Senator Stevenson and his Subcommittee on the Quality
of Intelligence have done outstanding analytic work on the
product of our national intelligence system. The Vice Chair-
man of the Quality Subcommittee, Senator Case, and Senators
Hart, Moynihan, Lugar and Wallop have supported this Sub-
committee ably. The Subcommittee laid the foundations for
use by other committees, other individual Senators, and the
Senate as a whole, of intelligence information germane to the
Senate's legislative duties. It is our hope that the work
of this Subcommittee can be expanded with the view in mind
of enabling the Senate as a whole to make the decisions it
must make on the basis of the best possible fact and analysis.
Senator Biden has been working on the difficult question
of secrecy with his Subcommittee, Senator Pearson, as Vice
Chairman, and Senators Hathaway, Huddleston and Chafee. It
is our hope that in the coming year comprehensive legislation
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can be introduced to deal fairly and effectively with the
problems of classification of national security information
which has bedeviled the United States government for decades.
The burdensome task of investigations has been under-
taken by Senator Morgan and his Subcommittee on Special
Investigations, with Senators Goldwater and I serving with
him. Senator Morgan's Subcommittee has established a pattern
of careful, rigorous investigation which has served the Com-
mittee and the Senate well.
TheCommittee as a whole has taken on responsibility
for examining major questions such as the oversight of covert
action. It is my expectation that the Committee will continue
to do so because of the obvious value that comes from the
sharing of views and experience that a broadly-based Committee
such as ours can offer.
I want to-thank the Majority Leader, Senator Robert Byrd,
and the Minority Leader, Senator Howard Baker, for the confidence
and support they have given to me and the Committee while I
have been Chairman.
It has been a privilege and an honor to serve the Senate
as Chairman of this important Committee at the time of its
creation.
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 II
I ? DANIEL K.? INOUYE, HAWAII, CHAIRM:
ADLAI E. STEVENSON, ILL.
WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY. MAINE
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON. KY.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, N.Y.
JAKE BARN. UTAH
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MO.
JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.
JOHN H. CHAFES, R.I.
RICHARD G. LUGAR, IND.
MALCOLM WALLOP. WYO.
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA., EX OFFICIO
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN., EX OFFICIO
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
EARL D. EISENHOWER, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
November 18, 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Executive Registry
OLQ X77-.5a p.3
SSCl
"1".
77- D 7 -1
I would like to share with you my Report
to the Senate on the work of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence during the period of
my Chairmanship.
As I approach the final weeks of service
as Chairman of the Committee on Intelligence,
I wish to thank you once again for your advice,
counsel, cooperation and assistance. The success
that the Committee has had in these crucial
formative years has been aided measurably by
your assistance.
With kind regards,
( E ' m V V E R w t s_ r
'J cuff e$ z1of e : , ena4e
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(PURSUANT TO B. PIES. 400, *4TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON. D.G. 20510
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REPORT TO THE SENATE ON THE WORK OF THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE BY
SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE, CHAIRMAN,
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
As the first session of the 95th Congress draws to a
close, it is appropriate to report to the Senate on the work
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
I have had the honor to serve as Chairman of the Committee
since it was formed on May 19, 1976. The Senate, in its
Resolution 400, assigned to the Committee a broad range of
duties, all of which were designed to carry out rigorous
oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States
Government. After a period of a year and a half, I am of the
opinion that Senate Resolution 400 provides the necessary scope
and the workable means for exercising vigilant legislative
oversight over the intelligence activities of the United
States.
In recent years the intelligence community, particularly
the CIA and the FBI, have been the targets of suspicion and
abuse. There is no question that a number of abuses of power,
mistakes in judgment and failures by the intelligence agencies,
have harmed the United States. We, of course, hope that these
abuses are behind us and will not occur again. These events
did not happen in a vacuum. In almost every instance, the
abuses that have been revealed were a result of direction
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from above, including Presidents and Secretaries of State.
Further, in almost every instance, some members of both Houses
of Congress assigned the duty of oversight were knowledgeable
about these activities.
The recent Helms case illustrates this pattern. If
Mr. Helms should be subject to public blame, as some contend,
then others in higher authority in both the Executive branch
and the Congress should also share the blame.
Every organization, whether the Congress, the White House,
the CIA, corporations, universities or churches, are made up
of men and women with their full share of excellences and
failures. With the exception of a very small number who broke
the law or failed in their trust, we owe a great debt to our
intelligence community. It is made up of men and women of
unusual dedication and ability who serve our country under
the most difficult of circumstances. We can be proud that
they have come through the trials of the past several years
with a clearer sense of purpose and with a strengthened belief
in the value of a life of service to our nation.
The intelligence community has been in a turmoil over
the past few years. It has been the subject of a number of
Congressional inquiries, internal investigations and intense
criticism from the press and the public. With the support of
the President and under the firm direction of Stansfield
Turner, the intelligence community is in the process of
creating a new organizational structure which should lead
to more efficient coordination of its world-wide activities
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and a better overall intelligence product. It is my view
that the intelligence agencies of the United States are now
functioning under strict guidelines set forth by the President
and the National Security Council, which lay out clear missions,
limitations and accountability, as well as rigorous oversight
by both the House and the Senate. While many improvements
and reforms are called for, it is my evaluation that the present
quality of the work of the United States intelligence community
is good, and shows every sign of becoming better.
I firmly believe that under our constitutional system,
the license for the Executive branch to undertake secret
intelligence activities requires a full awareness of the nature
and detail of these activities by the Legislative branch. The
abuses of power by the intelligence agencies revealed over
the past few years make it clear that the Executive branch
should not be authorized to undertake secret intelligence
activities unless the Legislative branch, through its appropriate
committees, is fully knowledgeable and concurs in the purpose
of such intelligence activities.
The necessity for a large and extensive secret intelligence
system imposes great demands upon our open democratic consti-
tutional society. Secret intelligence activities, by their
very nature, require that only a delegated few in the government,
in both the Executive and Legislative branches, have detailed
knowledge of the overall activities of our intelligence agencies.
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I am convinced after my period of first-hand observation
that much of the information produced by our intelligence
system is not only useful but necessary to the nation's
security and well-being.
It is perhaps not surprising that as Chairman of the
Select Committee on Intelligence I have read my share of
spy novels and books on the world of intelligence. There is
one passage written by John Le Carre in an introduction to
a book entitled The Philby Conspiracy that I find of almost
daily pertinence to those of us who serve on the Committee:
. . . no secret service can be more clearheaded than
its government. Everything rests upon a clearcut
statement of requirements by those who formulate the
nation's policy. If the Secret Service is properly
used, it is a fighting arm, an extension of Govern-
ment policy. But in times of dismay and national
corruption it sinks swiftly into intrigue, slovenly
security and inter-departmental rivalry.
The proper balance between maintaining the secrecy of
information provided to it by the Executive branch, and the
right of the public to know what its government is doing in
its name has not been an easy issue for the Select Committee
on Intelligence. Section 11 of S. Res. 400 gives to the
Select Committee the right to full and complete information
about all intelligence activities. No other legislature in
the world has this right to secret information. The insist-
ence that activities executed in the name of the United States
by the Executive branch shall be known, approved, or modified
by the Legislature, and the courts, as appropriate, has enabled
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the American republic to survive as a vigorous, free society.
In a democratic society some kinds of secret activities may
not be possible because the circle of those who must know of
the activities is relatively large. Our constitutional system
of checks and balances and of shared responsibilities between
the branches demands shared knowledge as well.
One requirement for effective oversight is the certainty
that the Senate as a body has confidence in its delegated
oversight committee. The Committee must reflect the views
of the Senate as a whole and should not favor the policies or
predispositions of those who may be in power at any given time.
The present membership of the Committee reflects the full
spectrum of Senate views from left to right. We are a non-
partisan committee. As Chairman, I have made it a rule, which
the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield
Turner, and each of the Executive branch agencies understand,
that whatever information conveyed to me will be shared with
every member of the Committee. On occasion this sharing process
may have caused some contemplated activities to be dropped.
Such a result is a function of the oversight process.
The obverse of Congress' right to access to information
is its duty to protect the valid secrets of our country, and
to disclose validly classified information only in accord with
an agreed-upon rational process of consultation. The Committee
has made use of the process and thus far it has worked well to
the satisfaction of both the Legislature and Executive that
it is a fair and reasonable procedure.
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In the past, one of the reasons given for not sharing
sensitive information with the Congress is the fear that the
Congress would not be able to keep confidences given to it.
Without question, unauthorized disclosures have come from
the Congress in the past and it is reasonable to expect they
will occur in the future. It is also quite clear that in the
past, most disclosures of sensitive information have come out
of the Executive branch, including, on occasion, deliberate
leaks from the highest authorities., Sometimes these leaks
of information were intended as feelers to test public opinion;
or in the worst cases, for narrow political purposes.
I am satisfied that the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence has demonstrated that it has the discipline
necessary to protect the valid secrets of this country entrusted
to it. We have met the challenge of proving that Congress can
and will, with educated awareness of the substance and its
fragility, with proper authority, and through reasonable pro-
cedures, keep the valid secrets entrusted to its care. We
have done this in such a way that makes it possible for the most
sensitive information to be made available to each of the one
hundred Senators that make up the Senate.
As the Senate knows, the authorization bill and its report,
which contain some of this country's most fragile and precious
secrets, has been available to every Senator under the security
provisions of S. Res. 400. Further, this Committee has made
its reports available to other standing committees and other
individual members as appropriate.
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In view of the demonstrated success of the formula for
the handling of classified material and the process of deter-
mining the disclosure of valid national security information,
I recommend to the Leadership and the Senate as a whole that
the formula contained in S. Res. 400 be extended for all
classified information provided to the Senate. I think this
provides the requisite balance between the right of access
and the corresponding duty to protect our nation's secrets.
The Committee has just completed work on a unique joint
effort with the Executive branch on an Executive Order which
will serve as an interim measure, as well as a blueprint for
permanent statutes, which we hope will be passed sometime in
the next year. Since July, Committee members and staff have
worked with the Executive branch in the writing of this
Executive Order. This joint effort marks a commitment on the
part of President Carter and the Committee to work as closely
as possible to set forth clearly the principal missions and
purposes of our national intelligence system, and to provide
for its governance under the Constitution and the laws.
I am convinced that the most important work of the
Committee lies ahead -- the passage of statutory charters
and guidelines which will place all the principal aspects
of intelligence work under the governance of the Constitution
and the law.
The Committee intends to recommend passage of a legis-
lative charter which will contain a number of separate titles.
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The first title is a general charter authorizing the scope of
our national intelligence activities. It focuses responsibility
for national intelligence activities upon the Director of
our national intelligence system, giving him the authorities
necessary for the effective management and coordination
required by our vast and diverse national intelligence system.
It authorizes by statute (rather than by Executive Order)
intelligence activities for the United States, but unlike the
now-obsolete National Security Act of 1947, it specifically
authorizes the collection of intelligence and covert action.
The bill, however, is not a blank check for the intelligence
community. Detailed procedures are provided for the review of
clandestine activities. Certain forms of covert action are
prohibited. For example, the employment of members of the
clergy or journalists for intelligence purposes is barred.
By establishing clear responsibility and accountability,
and by defining what the intelligence community can and cannot
do, the first title of the National Act is intended to insure
that intelligence activities are properly and effectively
directed, regulated, coordinated, and administered and that
these activities do not infringe upon individual rights
protected by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States. In addition to this general charter, there are,
as separate titles, specific entity charters for the National
Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
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and the counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI). Further, there are titles which
deal with the limitations upon intelligence activities which
affect Americans overseas as well as in the United States.
During its work on charters over the last year and a half,
the major issue that has faced the Committee concern the ques-
tion of balancing between detailed specifications of what may
or may not be done, and the need on the part of the intelli-
gence agencies for a degree of flexibility to meet exigent
circumstances.
I am certain that the public hearings held by the Committee
over the next few months on charters will be of considerable
national interest, particularly those hearings which deal with
the relationships between the press and academics and the
intelligence community. I have come to the conclusion that
no intelligence agency should be involved with working journ-
alists. The problem of the flowback of propaganda to the
United States is a far greater danger than any benefits
which might accrue from the services that a journalist working
for an intelligence agency might be able to perform.
It is this kind of balancing question measured against
the practical details of intelligence needs that lies at the
heart of meaningful oversight. One of the limitations that
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our constitutional democratic government imposes upon
intelligence activities is the constraint imposed by the
mores of our own society. We in America value a free and
open press. This deeply held value must be reflected in
legislation defining the limits upon the use of journalists
by the intelligence community.
The major underlying premise for the Committee's work
is that the most sensitive national security questions
including secret intelligence activities can be resolved by
our constitutional system and through regular constitutional
processes. Full Congressional awareness of the nature, extent
and details of intelligence activities and a process of rigorous
oversight by an intelligence committee in both the House and
the Senate is now a practical reality.
While the Congress has taken significant steps to fulfill
its constitutional role and responsibilities to share in the
governance of all activities of the United States Departments
and Agencies including their secret activities, effective means
have not yet been devised to enable the Courts to meet their
constitutional responsibilities. Recent espionage cases, and
the recent Helms decision underline the difficulties the Justice
Department and the Courts have in the consideration of secret
national security questions. It is clear that our judicial
system must develop a better system of proceedings for
classified intelligence matters or secret national defense
or foreign policy questions. It will not be an easy task.
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The dangers of creating a Star Chamber must be avoided on
the one hand; on the other hand, the vital national secrets
should be protected from unnecessary disclosure.
The Committee intends to include in its statutory charters
for intelligence activities provisions to enable the Courts
to address more effectively cases involving classified information.
In the next few months, hearings will be held calling upon
the best advice that the legal profession can give: from the
Justice Department, and other Departments and Agencies, the
Courts, the law schools, from the Bar Associations, and from
interested public groups and individuals. The Courts must
be given the procedural means to do their part in the consti-
tutional process. When this task is completed, we will have
enabled the three branches to fulfill their duties in the
area of secret national security matters and will have largely
removed the "national security loophole" which has so strained
our constitutional syst:rn.
Much attention has been focused upon the shadowy, glamorous
and necessary world of secret agents. But by far the most
significant and useful portion of our intelligence community
is in the analyses and estimates they provide to our national
leadership both in the Executive and the Congress and the solid
information they give to our Executive departments and agencies.
It is in this area that the Select Committee on Intelligence,
I believe, will be able to serve the rest of the Senate in the
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future as a conduit to other Committees and individual Senators
to do their assigned tasks. S. Res. 400 already places a duty
upon the Select Committee to provide other Committees, individual
Senators and the Senate as a whole, with information that comes
to it which may also be of benefit to them.
For example, the Committee has been engaged in the past year
on a study of the verification capabilities of the intelligence
community. It is obvious that an authoritative objective study
of our verification capabilities will be of use to the Senate
when it takes up consideration of any future SALT Treaty. The
Committee's study is being prepared with that duty and with
that service in mind.
The intelligence community is now in a state of transition.
The familiar romantic world of spies and counterspies, while
still a vital necessity, is less central to our needs than
our new technological means of collection. Without question,
the United States government now has a vastly larger and more
detailed data base of information with which to understand the
world than a decade or two ago. There has been an information
explosion in the world of intelligence just as there has been
in other sectors of our society and government. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the greatest need for improvement
lies in the area of assuring more cogent analysis of this vast
and burgeoning body of knowledge.
Further, there is a need for more rigorous analysis of
political, economic, and cultural problems. This is not to
say that military questions are less important; rather, it is
only to assert that at the present time, the major problems
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and opportunities that face the United States are increasingly
political, economic and cultural in character. One area that
the Committee has been examining over the past year is the
quality of our forecasts of worldwide crops and other vital
materials and resources such as soil. It is problems of this
kind that the Select Committee on Intelligence has been pressing
the intelligence community to focus its efforts to improve
the quality of its analytic work.
A very good example of the need for this new focus on a
more universal approach to analysis, is in the area of arms
control. I do not intend to diminish the great advances that
have been made in analysis of military weapons intelligence.
We have moved in the past 30 years from information derived
primarily from spies to information gained largely from tech-
nical means: the U-2, satellites, and other technological
marvels. The possibility for far more certainty about military
events and for making more reasonable judgments about nuclear
deployments is now greater than ever before. There is, for
example, a direct correlation between the possibility of arms
control agreements and the degree of verification that agreements
will be observed. Our so-called national technical means of
verification, that is, our satellites, made the SALT I agreement
a reality, and further SALT agreements a real possibility.
Without such means of acquiring accurate reliable military
information, we would still be in an atmosphere dominated by
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fear and uncertainty -- an atmosphere which characterized
the early '50's, preparing for all-out war rather than seeking
ways to reduce unnecessary arms.
But as we have come to know with more certainty, the
nature and disposition of potential enemy forces, and as the
doubts about the exact nature and quality of weapons capabil-
ities recede, the questions of why military forces are
assembled and for what reasons and purposes they might be
used become more critical. Great advances have been made by
our intelligence agencies in the "hard" areas of quantifiable
information, but the so-called "soft" areas: the politics,
the economics, the behaviour patterns of men and nations,
deserve far more attention and the application of many of the
methods used for hard subjects. Yet, the very fact that we are
coming to grips with these questions, and that our attention
is focused on this area is directly attributable to the
improving quality and sophistication of our intelligence system.
We have moved from a preoccupation with the fearful questions
of mere survival to serious considerations of ways to devise
political or economic means of resolving fundamental differ-
ences between such rivals as the Soviet Union or China. In
this respect, the growth and increased importance of our
intelligence system over the past 30 years has served to
strengthen the possibilities of a continuing peace. And it
has done so even as it has increased its abilities to detect
quickly any movements by potential enemies towards war.
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Although there is no specific rule in S. Res. 400, I
have chosen to resign at the end of this session as Chairman.
I am doing so because I believe rotation of Chairmanship is
the best way to assure the combination of close detailed
work with the agencies and a vigilant attitude toward their
activities can be maintained. I am resigning because I be-
lieve it is important for the Senate and for the intelligence
agencies who are under the charge of the Select Committee
to have overseers who come to the issues as I have come to
them -- with an open, fresh and relatively objective point
of view, so necessary for the important task of oversight.
An aware, yet detached point of view is necessary because
the world of intelligence activities, as John Le Carre so
cogently observed,
. . . spill over into almost every area of public
life; its viability depends upon our tolerance,
upon our money and to a sizeable extent, upon our
complicity.
I would like to establish a precedent which would be
reflected in an amendment to S. Res. 400, which would require
a regular rotation of Chairmanship, as well as a limitation
of the number of years members of the Committee may serve,
which is already in the Senate Resolution. In my view, the
Chairman of the Committee on Intelligence should not serve
more than a two year term. It is my considered opinion
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that this system of. rotation of members and Chairmanship
will serve to create a growing body of better informed
Senators, as well as a legislative constituency that can
speak authoritatively on the needs of the intelligence com-
munity.
As the first Chairman of the permanent intelligence
oversight committee, I have found the task to be challeng-
ing, demanding, and extremely interesting. I do not give
up this Chairmanship without regrets. But I think it is
vital to ensure that the Chairman be objective and impartial.
I believe one reason for the failure of congressional over-
sight in the past years was that too close a relationship
developed between the intelligence agencies and their over-
seers.
Because the Committee began without any precedents and
in a virtually unknown area, everything the Committee has
done has been a pioneering effort. I think we have
accomplished much in these first years.
In summary, for the first time, we have had a full and
complete annual authorization for intelligence activities.
We have examined in detail all of the intelligence activities
of the United States, including a line-by-line review of the
most sensitive activities such as covert action.
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Effective oversight of the intelligence community
requires the regular review of covert action projects and what
are called sensitive collection programs. The Committee has
devised a pattern of reviews on a quarterly basis, as well
as a case-by-case review of all covert action programs approved
by the President prior to their implementation.
Perhaps the most effective means of oversight is the
authorization process. The power of the purse is the legis-
lative body's most compelling means of working its will. In
covert action, for example, the Committee, in its last auth-
orization, voted on each project, yea or nay. This process
of voting on detailed specific activities was carried out
in every area of intelligence activity.
The Committee has had very heavy responsibilities but has
earned the respect of the Executive branch and the intelli-
gence agencies. In fact, the President, at our meeting with
him at the White House on August 4, commended the Committee
for its record of security saying that it was better than any
other part of the United States Government.
The members have worked hard and I think we now have a
staff of outstanding quality which is respected for its abil-
ities and performance throughout the Government.
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I want to thank my Vice Chairman, Senator Barry Goldwater
for sharing the burden with me in the difficult yet gratify-
ing work of this Committee. We have worked closely together
on every Committee issue and I have gained much from his
counsel and views.
I want to commend the work done by Senator Birch Bayh,
who will be the next Chairman of this Committee, for the
consistent and careful efforts made to protect the rights
of Americans as they may be affected by intelligence activ-
ities. Senators Morgan, Garn, Moynihan, Case and Chafee
have worked with Senator Bayh in this vital area.
Senator Hathaway has performed the very difficult task
of putting together the first annual authorization for
intelligence activities that has ever been presented to
the Congress. It required months of hearings and an unusual
devotion of time. This first authorization is the result of
the time and effort of Senator Hathaway and his Subcommittee
on Budget Authorization, Senators Wallop, Hart and Mathias.
Senator Dee Huddleston as Chairman and Senator Charles McC.
Mathias as Vice Chairman of the Charters and Guidelines Subcom-
mittee have been working with Senators Bayh, Stevenson, Biden,
Garn and Lugar over the past year and a half, writing the
legislation for the governance of the intelligence agencies.
Senators Huddleston and Mathias have worked carefully and
effectively with the Executive branch. It is our expectation
that in most respects the draft statutory charter will have
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the full support of the Executive branch. The 1947 National
Security Act provided an inadequate statutory base for the
intelligence activities of the United States. One reason for
its inadequacies was that the Legislative branch was not
significantly involved in the drafting of those authorities
for intelligence activities. President Carter and Vice President
Mondale have told the Committee at several meetings that the
best interests of the country will be served by working as
closely as possible in this very difficult area of national
policy.
Senator Stevenson and his Subcommittee on the Quality
of Intelligence have done outstanding analytic work on the
product of our national intelligence system. The Vice Chair-
man of the Quality Subcommittee, Senator Case, and Senators
Hart, Moynihan, Lugar and Wallop have supported this Sub-
committee ably. The Subcommittee laid the foundations for
use by other committees, other individual Senators, and the
Senate as a whole, of intelligence information germane to the
Senate's legislative duties. It is our hope that the work
of this Subcommittee can be expanded with the view in mind
of enabling the Senate as a whole to make the decisions it
must make on the basis of the best possible fact and analysis.
Senator Biden has been working on the difficult question
of secrecy with his Subcommittee, Senator Pearson, as Vice
Chairman, and Senators Hathaway, Huddleston and Chafee. It
is our hope that in the coming year comprehensive legislation
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can be introduced to deal fairly and effectively with the
problems of classification of national security information
which has bedeviled the United States government for decades.
The burdensome task of investigations has been under-
taken by Senator Morgan and his Subcommittee on Special
Investigations, with Senators Goldwater and I serving with
him. Senator Morgan's Subcommittee has established a pattern
of careful, rigorous investigation which has served the Com-
mittee and the Senate well.
The Committee as a whole has taken on responsibility
for examining major questions such as the oversight of covert
action. It is my expectation that the Committee will continue
to do so because of the obvious value that comes from the
sharing of views and experience that a broadly-based Committee
such as ours can offer.
I want to thank the Majority Leader, Senator Robert Byrd,
and the Minority Leader, Senator Howard Baker, for the confidence
and support they have given to me and the Committee while I
have been Chairman.
It has been a privilege and an honor to serve the Senate
as Chairman of this important Committee at the time of its
creation.
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