VIETNAM AND THE NEW ISOLATIONISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000200320038-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: February 23, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

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been met abroad, not just with indiffer-
ence and ingratitude, but even with hos-
tility and contempt.
Its political base seems to be to the left
of center, although it forms as yet a dis-
tinct minority there.
Its scareword is "escalation"; its cure-
all is "neutralization." .
t Its prophets include some of my col-
leagues in the Congress, influential
spokesmen in the press, and leading fig-
ures in the academic world. Some are
new volunteers in this cause of retrench-
ment; they regard themselves as prag-
matists. Others are old hands at Polly-
anna-ism, those unshakable romantics
{ who were disillusioned by Moscow at the
f time of the Hitler-Stalin pact, disillu-
sioned by Mao when they discovered that
he was not really an agrarian reformer,
disillusioned by Castro when they learned
that he was not a cross between Thomas
Jefferson and Robin Hood-and who,
having again dusted themselves off, now
look for new vistas of adventure.
If I may digress, let me say that I have
always admired their durability. The
manner in which they have survived, un-
chastened, a whole series of intellectual
Dunkirks is, if nothing else, a tribute to
man's invincible confidence in himself;
and their adeptness in avoiding discredi-
tation, in the face of repeated catas-
trophes and evacuations, must be ac-
knowledged as one of the marvels of
modern history-a triumph of self -recti-
tude over reason.
The basic premise of the new.isola-
tionism is that the United States is over-
extended in its attempt to resist Com-
munist aggression around the world,
overcommitted to the defense of distant
outposts, and overinvolved in the murky
and unintelligible affairs of remote areas.
The corollaries of the new isolationism
are many. It is contended that we
should deemphasize the cold war and
reverse our national priorities in favor of
domestic improvements; that we should
f withdraw from South Vietnam; that we
1 should cease involvement in the Congo;
that we should relax the so-called ri-
,.gidity of our Berlin policy; that for-
eign aid has outlived its usefulness
and should be severely cut back;
STATINT
FEB 23 1965
VIETNAM AND THE NEW
ISOLATIONISM
THE NEW ISOLATIONISM
Mir. DODD. Mr. President, there has
been developing in this country in recent
years a brand of thinking about foreign
affairs which, I believe, can aptly be de-
scribed as "the new isolationism." This
internal phenomenon is, in my opinion,
potentially more disastrous in terms of
its consequence than the major external
problems that confront.us.
Its background is a growing national
weariness with cold war burdens we have
been so- long carrying, a rising frustra-?
tion with, situations, that are going
against us in many places? a long-sim-
mering indignation over the fact that our
generosity and"eaeriflce. have too often
I worldwide involvement, should be hum-
,'bled and "cut down to size" and stripped
of their influence in foreign policy
questions.
In my judgment all of these proposi-
tions have one thing in common. Each
of them would strike at the heart of our
national effort to preserve our freedom:
and our security; and collectively they
add up to a policy which I can describe
by no other name. than "appeasement,"
subtle appeasement, unintentional ap-
peasement, to be sure, but appeasement
nonetheless.
My purpose, this afternoon then, Is to
oppose these propositions and to enlist
Senators' . opposition against them--for
the new isolationism is as bankrupt as
Irlrst'of all-to tackle the main preim-.
is" reject the assumption that the
03aq_,7
United :'Mates is overextended, or over-
committe::d, or overinvolved.
We are enjoying a spectacular growth
in every Index of national strength.
Our population, our wealth, our indus-
trial capacity, our scientific potential,
our agricultural output, all are enjoying
great upward surges. We were informed
that our gross national product was
again up iri January, and the trend seems
ever upward.
Far front overextending ourselves In
the cold war, we are actually in a period
of declining defense budgets, of steadily
lowered draft calls, of sharply reduced
foreign aid, of one tax cut after another.
Let me emphasize this: In every basic
resource, we have greater capacity today
than during the past 5 years; by every
military or economic standard, we are
stronger; and by every physical measure-
ment, the percentage of our resources
going into the cold war is lower. 'hy
then should we talk of weariness or over.-
commitment?
We are not even straining ourselves.
We are actually pursuing today a policy
not only of both guns and butter, but of
less guns and more butter.
So far as our resources go, we are
capable of indefinite continuation and
even intensification of our present ef-
forts, if need be. It is only our mental,
and perhaps our moral, resources which
seem to be feeling the strain.
We would, of course, prefer to live in a
world in which it were possible for us to
have no commitments, a world in which
we could devote all of our energies to
the task of perfecting our society at
home and enriching the lives of our peo-
ple.
But we must face the world as it is.
And the basic fact of our world is that
Western civilization, itself terribly rent
and divided, both politically and philo-
sophically, has been forced into a twi-
light war of survival by a relentless and
remorseless enemy.
It is incontestable, in terms of peoples
enslaved and nations gobbled up over
the past 20 years, that we have not been
holding our own. And each year, the
world Communist movement is com...
matting more and more of its resources
to the task of subjugating our allies, all
around the perimeter of freedom.
Against this background it is prepos-
terous to maintain that we should reduce
our effort and lessen our commitment to
the great struggle of our century.
Yet, according to Time magazine, it
is the widespread sentiment of the aca-
demic world that we have overreached
ourselves and ought to pull back. Walter
Lippmann, the well-known columnist,
for whom I have great respect, says that
"the American tide will have to recede."
It has been argued that we would be in
a "precarious situation" if we were at-
tacked on several fronts. Of course we.
would, but does anyone believe that we
can solve the problem by abandoning
our, commitments and defensive alli-
ances? Would the loss of these coun-
tries. be any the less disastrous because
they were given up undefended?
On the contrary, if we are not strong
enough to honor, our commitments to-
day, them we should solve the problem?
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 percentage cuts in our defense budget,
cuts not directed to any specific econ-
omy, but rather to a principle-the prin-
ciple that we should be spending less on
defense and more on welfare.
Here, In my judgment, are sure-
fire formulas for defeat.
Where are the victories In the cold
war' that would justify such a reversal
of priorities? In what global trouble
spots are there lessened tensions or im-
proved Postures that would make this
plausible? i can see a lot of Cold war
areas where things are looking worse-
but Very few Where things are getting
bMtls?.
. More effort, more sacrifice-not less-
is the need of our time. And I speak as
one who does not disparage the need or
the importance of domestic improve-
ments. As a credential of this I recom-
mend to Senators my scorecard, com-
piled last year by the ultraconservative
Americans for Constitutional Action,
which asserts that I voted right only 13
percent of the time-one of the worst
records, alas, in the Congress.
But I say to you that if our foreign
affairs are going badly, no aspect of
internal welfare is secure or stable. And
if we cope successfully with the great
problem, the cold war, no internal prob-
lem can long defy solution.
Our first national priority is and must
ever be the survival of our country and
our freedom-and if the 20th century
has taught men anything, it is that sur-
vival and freedom cannot be purchased
on the cheap, in a discount store or a
'bargain basement.
But our situation Is such that we can
meet our needs both at home and
abroad-not as handsomely as we would
prefer, but well enough. This I take to
be the objective of the Johnson adminis-.
tration. The war on poverty and the
struggle against tyranny can go hand in
hand, if our vision be broad.
Twenty-five years ago, our country,
comparatively new and untried among
the great nations of the earth, through
passage of the Lend-Lease Act, described
by Winston Churchill as "the most un-
sordid act of recorded history," em-
barked irrevocably upon the path that
has brought us to our present posture in
history. Through that act, we affirmed
the preservation and expansion of liber-
ty as our highest goal; we acknowledged
that freedom was insecure everywhere so
long as tyranny existed anywhere; and
we assumed the burden, and the glory,
of being the champion and defender of
man's highest aspirations.
Since that embattled hour, when the
light of freedom was but a flicker in the
dark, our journey across the pages of his-
tory has been fantastic and unprece-
dented: tragic, to be sure, in its mistakes
and naivities, but heroic in its Innova-
tions and commitments, prodigious in its
energy and power, gigantic in its gen-
erosity and good will, noble in its re-
straint and patience, and sublime in Its
purpose and in its historic role.
We have not realized the high goals
we set for ourselves in World War II.
But we have preserved freedom and
national independence in more than half
the earth; we have prevented the nu-
clear holocaust; we have restored West-
ern Europe; we have helped friend and
foe to achieve prosperity, freedom and
stability; we have launched a world peace
organization and have kept it alive; we
have offered the hand of friendship and
help to the impoverished and backward
peoples of the World if they will but
take it.
It may be said of our country today,
as of no other in history, that wherever
people are willing to stand up in defense
of their liberty. Americans stand with
them.
We cannot know at this hour whether.
our Journey has Just begun or is nearing
its climax; whether the task ahead is the
work of a generation, or of a century.
President Kennedy said, In his Inaugural
Address, that the conflict would not be
resolved in our lifetime.
The Chief of Staff of the Army recently
told the Congress that it might well take
10 years to decide the issue in Vietnam
alone. And Vietnam is only one symp-
tom of the disease, the epidemic, we are
resisting.
Against this somber background, how
foolish it is to talk of deemphasizing the
cold war, of pulling out of Vietnam, of
abandoning the Congo to Communist
intrigue, of slashing the defense budget
by 10 percent, or of any of the other ir-
responsibilities of the new isolationism.
VIETNAM
It is against this background that I
take up today the question of Vietnam,
which has been the favorite target of
those who urge withdrawal and re-
trenchment.
Over the past several months, a num-
ber of my most respected colleagues have
taken the floor to urge that we get out of
Vietnam or that we enter into negotia-
tions over Vietnam.
The propriety of our presence In Viet-
nam and the validity of our position has
been challenged. It has even been sug-
gested that we are the real aggressors in
Vietnam. The war has been called "Mc-
Nalxiara's War." It has been suggested
that we more or less ignore Asia and
Africa` and concentrate on Europe and
the Americas.
I have listened with growing dismay
to these presentations-anal with all the
more dismay because of the respect and
affection I have for the Senators who
made them.
If I have not risen to reply to my
colleagues before now, It was not be-
caut,e Vietnam was a new subject to me,
but because I felt that their arguments
required the most carefully considered
and most painstakingly prepared reply.
I had visited most of the countries
of southeast Asia in early 1961, and I
have spoken a number of times on the
floor of the Senate on the subject of
Vietnam and Laos and Indonesia since
my return. I have endeavored to keep
up with the situation in that part of the
world as best one can do by reading
the press and official publications. But
I realized that there were important gaps
in my information because the press cov-
erage of Vietnam was, with a few out-
standing exceptions, weak and in some
cases .Completely misleading. , I have,
therefore, sought to fill these gaps by
correspondence with friends in Vietnam,
both Vietnamese and American, and by
conversations with Americans who have
served in Vietnam in various capacities-
some of them for long periods of time.
The senior Senator from Wyoming
[Mr. MCGEE] and the senior Senator
from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONRY] on the
one side, and the distinguished minority
leader, the junior Senator from Illinois
[Mr. IDIRKBEN] and the senior Senator
from ..Massachusetts [Mr., SAL'roJssTALL]
have already spoken eloquently on the
need for.. standing fast In Vietnam..
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not be reducing our commitments, but
by becoming stronger, and by aiding our
allies to become stronger.
The defense of the free world rests on
a very delicate balance. The key ele-
ments in that balance are American
power and American determination. If
we. lack the power to maintain that bal-
ance then certainly all is lost. If we
reveal that we lack the determination, if
we, for instance, allow ourselves to be
pushed out of Vietnam, such a humilia-
tion may indeed be the second shot heard
around the world; and a dozen nations
`might soon throw in the sponge and
make whatever accommodation they
could with an enemy that would then
seem assured of victory.
Fortunately, at the present time we do
not lack the power to carry on the de-
fense of freedom. Our power is at its
peak and we have the capacity to in-
crease it vastly If necessary. It is our
spirit, apparently, that needs shoring up.
Four years ago, after a visit to south-
east Asia, I said on the floor of the
Senate:
If the United States, with its unrivaled
might,'with its unparalleled wealth, with its
dominion over sea and air, with its heritage
as the champion of freedom-if this United
States and its free world allies have so di-
minished in spirit that they can be laid in
the dust by a few thousand primitive guer-
rillas, then we are far down the road from
which there is no return.
In right and in might, we are able to work
our will on this question. Southeast Asia
cannot be lost unless we will it to be lost;
it cannot be saved unless we will- It to be
saved.
This problem, seemingly so remote and
distant, will in fact be, resolved here in the
United States, in the Congress, in the ad-
ministration, and in the minds and hearts
of the American people. I
The passage of 4 years has not dimin-
ished my belief in this course.
If the main premise of the new isola-
tionism is erroneous, then surely the
lesser premises are fraught with terrible
1danger.
It is argued that we should de-
emphasize the cold war and turn more
of our resources to domestic welfare.
The annual congressional revolt
against the foreign aid bill grows more
violent and successful each year, and-the
administration, 'forced to yield, now
sends foreign aid requests 40 percent
below what it solemnly declared 2 years
ago to be the minimum figure tolerable
for free world survival.
And a small but growing band of
Senators have begun offering each year
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3269
A debate has been joined which is
worthy of the best traditions of the
Senate.
I hope that the remarks I make today
will contribute at least in some measure,
to the further unfolding of this debate.
Out of this debate, let us hope, will ulti-
mately emerge the kind of assistance and
guidance that every President must have
in dealing with vital Issues of our for-
eign policy.
'What we say here may help to guide
the President. But in the final analysis
the terrible responsibility of decision is
his and his alone. He must listen to the
exchanges which take place in this
Chamber. He must endure a hundred
conflicting pressures from public sources,
seeking to push him in this direction
or that. He must also endure the im-
patience of those who demand answers
to complex questions today, and who
accuse him of not having made the
American position clear when he has in
fact made our position abundantly clear
on repeated occasions.
And finally, when all the voices have
been heard, when he has examined all
the facts, when he has discussed all as-
pects of the situation with his most
trusted advisers, the President must alone .
decide-for all Americans and for the
entire free world-what to do about
Vietnam.
No President has ever inherited a more
difficult situation on coming to office.
No President has ever been called upon
to make a decision of greater moment.
At stake may be the survival of freedom.
At stake may be the peace of the world.
I believe the United States can count
itself fortunate that it has found a Presi-
dent of the stature of Lyndon B. Johnson
to meet this crisis in its history. I also,
believe that, whatever differences we in
this Chamber may have on the question
of Vietnam, our feelings to a man are
with the President in the ordeal of deci-
sion through which he is now passing.
I have said that I have been dismayed
by the rising clamor for a negotiated
settlement. In the type of war which
the Communists are now waging against
us, I fear that, although those who urge
negotiation would be among the first to
oppose an outright capitulation, their at-
titude may not be construed in this way
by the Communists.
The Vietnamese war, in the Commu-
nist lexicon, is described as a "war of
national liberation." Its strategy Is
based on the concept of what the Coln-
munists call "the long war." This strat-
egy is premised upon the belief that the
free world lacks the patience, the
stamina, the fanatical determination to
persist, which inspires the adherents of
communism. It is based on the convic-
tion that if the Communists keep on at-
tacking and attacking and attacking in
any given situation, they will ultimately
be able to destroy the morale and the will
to resist of those who oppose than in the
name of freedom..
China affords the classic example of
the long war. It took 20 years for Mao
Tse-tung to prevail. There were several
times during this period when his entire
movement seemed on the verge of ool-
lapse. But, even; in his blackest days,
Mao Tse-tung remained confident that,
if he persevered, ultimately his enemies
would crack and he would emerge as
China's undisputed ruler.
There is no more cruel test of courage
and staying power than "the long war"
as it is waged by the Communists. Five
years, 10 years, 20 years, means nothing
to them. And if they detect any sign
that those opposed to them are flagging,
that their patience is growing thin or
that their will to resist has weakened, the
Communists can be relied upon to re-
double their efforts, In the belief that vic-
tory is within their grasp.
I disagree strongly with my colleagues
who have spoken up to urge negotiations.
But If there is any way in which my
voice could reach to Peiping and to Mos-
cow, I would warn the Communist lead-
ers that they should not construe the
debate that Is now taking place in this
Chamber as a sign of weakness; it is,
on the contrary, a testimony to our
strength.
Nor should they believe that those who
speak up in favor of negotiations are the
forerunners of a larger host of Ameri-
cans who are prepared to accept sur-
render. Because there is no one here
who believes in surrender or believes in
capitulation. I believe the senior Sena-
tor from.Idaho made this abundantly
clear in his own presentation, in which
he underscored his complete support for
the retaliatory air strikes against North
Vietnam.
WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM?
I have been amazed by a number of
letters I have received, asking the ques-
tion, "Why are we in- Vietnam?" or
"What is our policy in Vietnam?" I have
been even more amazed to have the same
questions put ? to me by sophisticated
members of the press.
To me the reasons for our presence in
Vietnam are so crystal clear that I find
it difficult to comprehend the confusion
which now appears to exist on this sub-
ject.
We are in Vietnam because our own
security and the security of the entire
free world demands that a firm line be
drawn against the further advance of
Communist imperialism--in Asia, in
Africa, in Latin America, and in Europe.
We are in Vietnam because it is our
national interest to assist every nation,
large and small, which is seeking to de-
fend itself against Communist subver-
sion, infiltration, and aggression. There
is nothing new about this policy; it is a
policy, in fact, to which every admin-
istration has adhered since the procla-
mation of the Truman doctrine.
We are in Vietnam because our as-
sistance was invited by the legitimate
government of that country.
We are in Vietnam because, as the dis-
tinguished majority leader, the Senator
from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], pointed
out in his 1963 report, Chinese Cominu-
'nist hostility to the United States
threatens "the whole structure of our
own security in the Pacific."
We are in Vietnam not merely to help
the 14 million South Vietnamese defend
themselves against communism, but be-
cause what is at stake is, the Independ- '
ence and freedom of 240 million people
in southeast Asia and the future of free-
dom throughout the western Pacific.
These are the reasons why we are in
Vietnam. There is nothing new about
them and nothing very complex. They
have never been obscure. They have
never been concealed.. I cannot, for the
life of me, see why people fail to under-
stand them.
IS THERE A POSSIBILITY Or A NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT?
The senior Senator from Idaho, and
several other Senators who spoke last
Wednesday, repeated the proposal that
we should seek negotiations for the pur-
pose of terminating .the bloodshed in
Vietnam and of avoiding an enlarge-
ment of the war. We are told by some
people that negotiations are the way of
diplomacy and that if we reject negotia-
tions now, we are in effect rejecting
diplomacy.
The proposal that we negotiate now
overlooks the fact that there does exist
a negotiated agreement on Vietnam, ap-
proved by the participants of the Geneva
Conference of 1964. The final declara-
tion of this agreement read, and I think
it R9 worth while reading it for the REC-
oaD and for our own recollection:
Each member * * * undertakes to respect
the sovereignty, the independence, the unity,
and the territorial integrity of the above-
mentioned states and to refrain from any
interference in their internal affairs.
Since there is no point to negotiating
if it simply means reiterating the Gene-
va agreement, I cannot help wondering
whether those who urge negotiations en-
visage rewriting the agreement so that
it does not "guarantee the territorial in-
tegrity of the above-mentioned states."
The history of negotiated agreements
with the Communists underscores the
fact that their promises are worthless
and that only those agreements have
validity which are self-enforcing or
which we have the power to enforce. A
report issued by the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Internal Security---on which I
have the honor to serve-establishes that
the Soviet Union has since its inception
violated more than 1,000 treaties and
agreements. The Communists have re-
peatedly violated the terms of the Ko-
rean armistice, of the Geneva agreement
on Vietnam, and of the Laotian armis-
tice.
Incidentally, I had hoped the Senator
from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] would be pres-
ent. He had hoped to be here. He is
tied. up on another matter, but hopes to
get here later.
The Senator from Idaho has held up
the Laotian armistice as an example of
a rational agreement with the Commu-
nists that has served our interests. He
could not possibly have picked a worse
illustration for his argument.
I can think of no more dramatic proof
than the Laotian armistice that agree-
ments with the Communists are worth-
less, and that every time-we try to escape
from today's unpleasantness by entering
into a new covenant with an implacable
aggressor, we are always ,confronted on,
the "morrow by unpleasantness cm
pounded 10 times over.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 2,
I traveled through southeast Asia just
before the conclusion of the Laotian
armistice.
I talked to many people at that time.
It is true that the armistice was favored
by our Ambassador in Laos, and it ob-
viously must have had the support of
important members of the State Depart-
ment hierarchy. But the personnel of
our Embassies in Saigon and in Bangkok
did not conceal from me their grave ap-
prehensions over the consequences of
such an armistice 'for Vietnam and
southeast Asia.
All of this I reported on confidentially
upon my return.
At that time, the Saigon government
still controlled the situation throughout
most of the countryside, although the
115,000 Vietcong guerrillas were giving it
increasing difficulty. Our Embassy per-
sonnel in Saigon expressed the fear that
the conclusion of the Laotian armistice
would enable the Communists to infil-
trate men and material on a much larger
scale and would result at an early date
in a marked intensification of the Viet-
cong insurgency. Needless to say, the
apprehensions which they expressed to
me have been completely borne out by
subsequent developments.
The Laotian armistice has served Laos
itself as poorly as it has served the cause
of freedom in Vietnam. The Commu-
nists have continued to nibble away at
what is left of free Laos, in one aggres-
sive act after another, so that by now
they firmly control more than half the
country, while their infiltress and guer-
rillas are gnawing relentlessly at govern-
ment authority in the rest of the
country.
In mid-1964, I asked the Library of
Congress to prepare for me a study of
Communist violations of the Laotian
armistice agreement. The study which
they submitted to me listed 14 specific
violations up until that time.
That was last year. There have been
.many more since then.
Mr. President, I plan to insert into the
RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks
a copy of the survey of Communist vio-
lations of the Laotian armistice prepared
for me by the Library of Congress. I
earnestly hope the Senator from Idaho
will take the time to study this before
he once again holds up the Lootian armi-
stice as a model for Vietnam.
I should also like to quote from a
statement made on March 30, 1963, by
Gen. Kong Le, the neutralist military
commander who, as is common knowl-
edge, had favored the conclusion of the
Laotian armistice. Kong Le's statement
is significant because it illustrates how
Communists will deal tomorrow with
non-Communist elements that they are
prepared to accept into coalition gov-
ernments today.
Referring to certain Communist
stooges, Gen. Kong Le said:
Despite their 'continual defeats, however,
'these people learned their lessons from their
Communist Tosses. I * * When the Prime
Minister went abroad, they moved rapidly to
destroy.. the neutralist forces. They used
tricks to provoke the soldiers and people to
overthrgw Colonel 1 etsana. When these did
not succeed, oh February 12 they used an as-
main to murder Ketsana. They also savage-
ly killed or arrested all neutralist party
members, and their bloody hands caused the
death of many people.
This was the statement of Gen.
Kong Le, one of those who had pressed
the hardest for the Laotian armistice
when he saw what the armistice did to
his country.
Finally, I do not believe that the Lao-
tian armistice has served the interests
of the other peoples of southeast Asia.
I have in my possession a map of north-
ern Laos showing areas where the Chi-
nese Communists have been building
roads that would give China direct ac-
cess to the borders of Burma and Thai-
land. The construction of these roads
bodes ill for the future peace of south-
east Asia. That they are intended for
future military use is taken for granted
by everyone in the area.
So much for the example of the Lao-
tian armistice.
All this does not mean to say that we
must not under any circumstances enter
into negotiations with the Communists.
I do not suggest that at all. It simply
means that when we do so, we must do
so with our eyes open and with a clear
understanding of the ingredients re-
quired to enforce compliance with the
agreement about to be entered into.
That is all I have ever urged. .
Moreover; there is a time to negotiate
and a time not to negotiate.
The demand that we negotiate now
over Vietnam is akin to asking Churchill
to negotiate with the Germans at the
time of Dunkirk, or asking Truman to.
negotiate with the Communists when
we stood with our backs to the sea in the
Pusan perimeter in Korea. In either
case, the free world could have negoti-
ated nothing but total capitulation.
The situation in Vietnam is probably
not as desperate and certainly no more
desperate, than Britain's plight at the
time of Dunkirk or our own plight at
the time of Pusan. If we are of good
heart, if we refuse to listen to the coun-
sels of despair, if we again resolve that
'we will never give in"-as Churchill
put it-there is every reason to be con-
fident that a time will arrive when we
can negotiate with honor and for a more
acceptable objective than a diplomatic
surrender.
There are those who say that the
whole of southeast Asia will, whether
we like it or not, go Communist. These
people are at least consistent in urging
negotiations how. But anyone who be-
lieves that we can negotiate now and
not lose Vietnam to communism is de-
luding himself in the worst possible way.
THE CONSEQUENCES OIL' DEFEAT IN VIETNAM
It is human to oppose the cost of stay-
ing on in Vietnam when American boys
are dying in a faraway land about
which we understand very little. I am
conscious of this. I am sensitive to it.
I share the troubled minds of all Sena-
tors. But I am convinced that the great
majority of those who advocate that we
abandon Vietnam to communism, either
by pulling out or by "negotiating" a set-
tlement, have not taken the time to
weigh the consequences of defeat.
In mar opinion, the consequences of an.
American defeat if? Vietnam would be
so catastrophic that we simply cannot
permit ourselves to think of it. This is
truly an "unthinkable thought," to use
an expression coined by the Senator
from Arkansas. He was not applying it
to this problem, I point out, but I find
the words particularly apt in reference
to Vietnam.
GENOCIDE
For the Vietnamese people, the first
consequence would be a bloodletting on
a genocidal scale.
In the Soviet Union and in Red China,
tens of millions of "class enemies" were
eliminated by the victorious Communists.
While it is true that there are some
slightly more moderate Communist re-
gimes in certain countries, Vietnamese
communism is characterized by utter
disregard for human life of Stalinism
and Maoism. What will happen to the
more than 1 million refugees from North
Vietnam? What will happen to the mil-
lions of peasants who resisted or bore
arms against the Vietcong. I shudder
to think of it. The massacre of inno-
cents in Vietnam will be repeated in every
southeast Asian country that falls to
communism in its wake, in a gigantic
bloodletting that will dwarf the agony
and suffering of the war in Vietnam.
Those who urge our withdrawal from
Vietnam in the name of saving human
lives have the duty to consider the rec-
ord of Communist terror in every country
that has fallen under the sway of this
merciless ideology, with its total disre-
gard for human life.
The total number of victims of commu-
nism will probably never be known. Stu-
dents who have followed the Chinese
Communist press closely claim that it can
be demonstrated that Chinese commu-
nism has cost the lives of at least 25
million and more, probably 50 million
people, while students of Soviet commu-
nism put the overall figure for the So-
viet Union at approximately the same
level. They point out that, entirely
apart from the purges and mass killings,
at periodic intervals and the forced star-
vation of 5 million Ukrainian farmers,
the reported death rate in the Soviet
forced labor camps ran approximately
25 percent per annum in bad years, and
15 to 20 percent in good years. If one
accepts the average population of the
slave labor camps as 10 million over the
20 odd years of Stalin's undisputed rule,
this would mean that approximately 2
:million slave laborers died annually in
Stalin's camps, or 40 million for the 20-
year period.
According to the Polish Government
in exile, in London, the Soviets deported
41/2 million Poles to Siberia after they
had occupied eastern Poland in the wake
of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Approxi-
mately 150,000 were returned through
Teheran after the Nazi invasion of Rus-
sia. Another 300,000 drifted back after
the war. More than 1 million never
came back. Such was the mortality in
the Soviet slave labor camps.
All of this seems incredible to the
Western mind.
:t remember, when I was in Nuremburg,
that when I first read the terrible sta-
tistics about the mass killings by the
Naisfe, I could not comprehend them. if
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1 X165 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3271
I suggested to Senators that a train ing for negotiations not be heard to say, Higgins, the distinguished correspondent
wreck had occurred in which 100 persons "but we didn't intend it this way." Be for the Washington Star and other
had lost their lives, or a shipwreck in cause there is today no excuse for igno- papers, points out that Vietcong experts
which 150 had lost their lives, or some rance about communism. have teamed up with experts from Com-
common disaster with hundreds or even (D) THE FURTHER CHOICE: COMPLETE WITH- munist China and the Soviet Union in
thousands of lives lost, we would react, DRAWAL OR MAJOR ESCALATION training Latin Americans for guerrilla
we would feel it. But if I suggested that our withdrawal from Vietnam would operations in the several schools main-
1 million murders had taken place, our immediately confront us with an agoniz- tained by Fidel Castro.
minds would not be able to grasp the ing choice. (D[ WHAT NEW DEFENSE LINE?
enormity of such a crime. If we decide to try to defend what is It has been suggested that if we aban-
Perhaps that is just as well. There left of southeast Asia against the advance don southeast Asia, our seapower would
must be built into our intellectual'mech- of communism, it will require far more make it possible for us to fall back on
anism some kind of governor. Unfortu- money, far more men, and far more Japan and the Philippines and the oth-
nately, while it is probably saving us from ? American blood than we are today in- er Pacific islands, and constitute a more
insanity, the fact that our minds cannot vesting in the defense of Vietnam. What realistic defense line there. This is non-
comprehend the murder of 1 million peo- is more, it would involve a far greater risk sense. American seapower and Ameri-
ple or 40 million people serves as a pro- of the major escalation which we seek can nuclear power have thus far proved
tective asset to the perpetrator of such an to avoid. Impotent to cope with. Communist politi-
evil deed. It does not make the crime If, on the other hand, we decide to cal warfare. Cuba is the best proof of
any less horrible. It simply makes our abandon the whole of southeast Asia to . this.
task that much more difficult. communism, as some of the proponents If we abandon southeast Asia, the
Even after Khrushchev's denunciation of withdrawal have frankly proposed, it Philippines may prove impossible to
of Stalin confirmed all the essential would result in the early disintegration hold against a greatly stepped-up Huk
charges that had been made against the of all our alliances, and in the total insurgency.
Soviet regime, men of good will in the. eclipse of America as a great nation. Japan, even if it remains non-Commu-
Western World refused to believe that Because no nation can remain great when nist, would probably, by force of circum-
the Communist regime could be so evil. its assurances are considered worthless stances, be compelled to come to terms
They refused to believe, because it is dif- even by its friends. with Red China, adding the enormous
fieult for them to conceive of horror and (c) MORE VIETNAMS strength of its economy to Communist
brutality, on such a mass scale. Whether we decide to abandon south- strategic resources.
To those who refuse to believe, I would east Asia or to try to draw another line Okinawa, where our political position
like to read d the eloquent words penned h outside Vietnam, the loss of Vietnam will is already difficult, would become politi-
Dr. aes Julius Margolin, a prominent Jewish result in a dozen more Vietnams in dif- cally impossible to hold.
lscor of thousands of Lithuania, Lithuanians nof de- ferent parts of the world. If we cannot if we fail to draw the line in Viet-
scores of thousands cope with this type of warfare in Viet- vain, in short, we may find ourselves
ported to Soviet slave labor camps after nom, the Chinese Communists will be en- compelled to draw a defense line as far
Wehen he no occupation of his country. couraged in the belief that we cannot back as Seattle and Alaska, with Hawaii
W he was released o af cope with it anywhere else as a solitary outpost in mid-Pacifle.
the camps, Dr. Margolin wrote: years ears in In the Congo, the Chinese Communists (E) THE ECLIPSE OF AMERICAN PRESTIGE
position Until of the benevolent fall of 1939,
neutrality 19 I hadtoward the a have launched their first attempt at ap- To all those who agree that we must
U.S.S.R. * * * The last 7 years have made plying the Vietnamese strategy to Africa. carefully weigh the consequences of
me a convinced and ardent foe of the Soviet In the Philippines, the Huk guerrillas, withdrawal before we commit ourselves
system. I hate this system with all the after being decisively defeated in the to withdrawal, I would refer the recent
strength of my heart and all the power Of early 1950's, have now staged a dramatic words of the well-known Filipino politi-
my mind. Everything I have seen there has comeback. According to the New York cal commentator, Vincente Villamin.
filled me with horror and disgust which will Times, the Huks are now active again in
last until the end of my days. I feel that The abandonment of Vietnam, wrote Mr.
the struggle against this system of slavery, considerable strength, control large areas Villamin, "would be an indelible blemish
terrorism, and cruelty which prevails there of central Luzon, and are assassinating on America's honor. It would reduce
constitutes the primary obligation of every scores of village heads and local admin- America in the estimation of mankind
man in this world. Tolerance or support of istrators on the Vietcong pattern. to a dismal third-rate power, despite her
such an international shame is not permis- In Thailand, Red China has already wealth, her culture and her nuclear ar-
slbie for people who are on this side of the announced the formation of a patriotic senal. It would make every American
Soviet border and who live under normal front to overthrow the Government and
conditions. * * ? ashamed of his Government and would
Millions of men are perishing in the camps eradicate American influence. This al- make every individual American dis-
of the Soviet Union. * * * Since they came most certainly presages the early launch- trusted everywhere on earth."
into being, the soviet camps have swallowed ing of a That Communist insurrection,*his is strong language. But from
more people, have executed more victims, also patterned after the Vietcong. conversations with a number of Asians, I
than all the other camps-Hitler's tn- An article in the Washington Post on know that it is an attitude shared by
eluded-together; and this lethal engine con- January 16, pointed out that the Vene-
tinues to operate full blast. many of our best friends in Asia.
And those who in reply only shrug their zuelan Communists now have 6,000 men VIETNAM AND MUNICH
shoulders and try to dismiss the issue with under arms in the cities and in the The situation in Vietnam today bears
vague and meaningless generalities, I con- countryside, and that the Venezuelan many resemblances to the situation just
sider moral abetters and accomplices of ban-' Communist Party is openly committed to before Munich.
ditty. "the strategy of a long war, as developed
Let those who talk of getting out of in .China, Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam." Chamberlain wanted peace. Churchill
Vietnam for the ostensible purpose of And there are at least half a dozen wanted peace.
saving human lives weigh the words of other Latin American countries where Churchill said that if the free world
Dr. Julius Margolin-a man who, like the Communists are fielding guerrilla failed to draw the line against Hitler at
themselves, refused to believe that com- forces, which may be small today, but an early stage, it would be compelled to
nrunism could be so inhuman until he saw which would be encouraged by a Com- draw the line under much more difficult
its punitive machinery at work with his munist victory in Vietnam to believe that circumstances at a later date.
own eyes. the West has no defense against the Chamberlain held that a confronta-
And' if the administration should ever long war. tion with Hitler might result in war, and
succumb to their pressure and negotiate It Is Interesting to note in this con- that the Interests of peace demanded
the surrender of Vietnam, and if the nection that, according to Cuban re- some concessions to Hitler. Czechoslo-
Vietnamese Communists then embark on ports, a Vietcong delegation which vakia, he said, was a faraway land about
the orgy of bloodletting, which has always came to Havana in 1964 signed a "mu- which we knew very little.
accompanied the establishment of, Com- tual aid pact" with the Venezuelan guer- Chamberlain held that a durable
munist power?let those who are pressur-. ' rilla. forces. In addition, Marguerite agreement could be negotiated with Hit-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE February 23
In a world that was completely national unity and complete independ-
Communist. ence." The Congress also called for the
I take it for granted that everyone creation of a broad national front in
agrees that somewhere, somehow, we South Vietnam directed against the
must draw the line against further United States-Diem clique. Several
Communist expansion, months later the formation of the front
The question that separates us, there- for the liberation of the south was an
fore, is not whether such a line should nounced.
be drawn, but where such a line should I understand that there is an official
be drawn. report, according to which, the U.S. milt-
I believe that we have been right in tary assistants command in Vietnam is
drawing the line in Vietnam and that in possession of reliable evidence indi-
President Johnson is right in trying to eating that probably as many as 34,000
hold the line in Vietnam, despite the Vietcong infiltrators have entered South
setbacks we have suffered over the past Vietnam from the north between Jan-
year. Because, if this line falls, let us uary 1959 and August 1964.
have no illusions about the difficulty of - The report indicates that the majority
drawing a realistic line of defense any- of hard-core Vietcong officers and the
where in the western Pacific. bulk of specialized personnel such as
NEITHER SURRENDER NOR ESCALATION communications and heavy weapons spe-
We have been told in many statements cialists have been provided through in-
and articles that the only alternative to filtration. Infiltrators, moreover, appar-
withdrawal from Vietnam, with or with- ently make up the major part of Vietcong
out negotiations, is a dramatic escala- ; regulars in the northern half of South
tion of the war against the North. And Vietnam.
we have been warned that such an esca- The infiltration from the north sup-
lation might bring in both Red China plies the Vietcong with much of its
and the Soviet Union and might bring leadership, specialist personnel, key sup-
about the thermonuclear holocaust that plies such as heavy ordnance and com-
a one wants. munications equipment, and, in some
ler that would guarantee "peace in our
time."
How I remember those words.
Churchill held that the appeasement
of a compulsive aggressor simply whet-
ted his appetite for, further expansion
and made war more likely.
Chamberlain's policy won out, because
nobody wanted war. When he came back
from Munich, he was hailed not only by
the Tories, but by the Liberals, and the
Labor Party people, including leftwing-
ers like James Maxton and Fenner
Brockway.
Churchill remained a voice crying in
the wilderness.
But who was right-Churchill or
Chamberlain?
Who was the true man of peace?
In Vietnam today, we are again deal-
ing with a faraway land, about which
we know very little.
In Vietnam today, we are again con-
fronted by an incorrigible aggressor,
fanatically committed to the destruc-
tion of the free world, whose agree-
ments are as worthless as Hitler's. In-
deed, even while the Communist propa-
ganda apparatus is pulling out all the
stops to pressure us into a diplomatic
These axe supposed to be the choices
before us.
It is my belief, however, that the tide
of war in Vietnam can be reversed and
without a significant Intensification of
without an Invasion of the North and
itar
our military effort. It Is my belief that
there are many measures we can take
against the Vietcong insurgency.
the transfer of the German-sneaking
of South Vietnamese forces in the
,
primarily in the nonmilitary field
to
-f--e outlining some of the measures
about the situation in Vietnam, because
accepted fallacies and misconceptions
country.
facts about the present situation In that
without first establishing the essential
problem of what to do about Vietnam
one cannot Intelligently approach the
CIVIG WAR
THE FALLACY THAT THE VIETNAMESE WAR IS A
,
I believe can and must be taken,
to deal with a number of widely
and preserve the freedom of the South The belief that the Vietnamese war is iana mines and ammunition for a new
Vietnamese people, If such negotia- a civil war is one of the most widespread tam of rocket launcher used against
tanks. should ever come to pass, I am misconceptions about Vietnam. This Is . A Communist guerrilla who was
certain that the story of Czechoslovakia frequently associated with the charge captured in the action said that the ship
would be repeated. Having deprived that it is the United States, and not six which delivered the weapons had mad-
South Vietnam of the political and mil- North Vietnam or Red China, which is exam to dropping oses along the South Viet-
itary capability to resist, the North Viet- Intervening in South Vietnam. Finallyy, am coast, we would d doff o o well to supplies.
namese, Communists would not tarry consid
The war in South Vietnam is not a ' .the fact that the general offensive
ve
long before they completely communized civil war. It was instigated in the first launched by the Communist forces in
the country. place by the North Vietnamese Commu- Vietnam 2 weeks ago was preceded by an
.And, before very long, those who urge nists, with the material and moral sup-, _ open call by Hanoi radio for assaults
a diplomatic solution for . the sake of ? port of both 13-1n -nd M Th
p
preventing war, may find themselves
c6mpelled to fight the very war that
they were seeking to avoid, , on a bigger
and bloodier, scale, and from a much
more difficult line of defense.
I take it for granted that no one in
this Chamber and no loyal American.
citizen believes that we should stand by
indifferently . while communism takes.
over the rest of. the world.
I take it for granted that every in..
telligent person realizes that America
could not long survive as a free nation
5' oscow. ere throughout the country on Vietnamese
is overwhelming proof that Hanoi has and American positions.
provided the leadership for the Vietcong The public confusion on the nature of
insurrection, that it has supplied. 'them the Vietnamese war sterns in large meas-
massively, and that it has served as the use from the sabotage of the Communist
real command headquarters for the Viet- member of the three-man International
tong. Control Commission set up to supervise
The present insurrection in South the carrying out of the Geneva agree-
Vietnam goes back to the third Commu- intent: By 1961, reports of 1,200 offensive
mist Party Congress in Hanoi in Septem- ' incidents of Communist agents, ranging
ber of 1960. At this Congress it was from. one-man assassinations to large-
decided "to liberate South Vietnam from scale military actions, had been pre-
the ruling yoke of the U.S. Imperialists sen.ted to the Commission. The Commis-
and their henchmen in order to achieve sion, however, took no action because the
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Polish Communist member consistently
refused to investigate reports of North
Vietnamese Intervention in South Viet-
nam. In this way, this entire massive
body of evidence of Hanoi's intervention
in South Vietnam was muted and ren-
dered ineffective.
In order to understand the war in Viet-
nam, we have to get away from tradi-
tional concepts in which armies with
their own insignias cross clearly marked
national demarcation lines after their
governments have duly declared war.
Communist guerrilla warfare is waged
without any declaration of war. In the
case of Vietnam, it is waged from exter-
nal sanctuaries which claim immunity to
attack because the state which harbors
them has not formally declared war.
It blends military cadres who have in-.
filtrated into the country with native
dissidents and conscripts, in a manner
which conceals the foreign instigation of
the! Insurgency, and which enables the
Communists to pretend that it is merely
a civil war.
It is time that we nail the civil war
lie for what it is, It is time that we rec-
ognized' it as a form of aggression as
intolerable as open aggression across
marked frontiers.
Why did Ho Chi Minh decide to launch
the current war for the liberation of
South Vietnam? The answer to this
question is really very simple.
After the Geneva agreement, it had
been the expectation of the Communists
that South Vietnam would collapse in
administrative and political chaos be-
fore many months had passed, and that
it would fall into their hands like an
overripe plum. Indeed, when Ngo Dinh
Diem took office as Premier after the
surrender of North Vietnam to the Com-
munists, 99 percent of the Western press
viewed the situation in South Vietnam
as hopeless and predicted an early take-
over by the Communist guerrillas.
Cut off from the mineral and indus-
trial riches of the north; swamped by
an influx of 1 million refugees; without
an adequate army or administration of
its own; with three major sects, each
with private armies, openly challenging
its authority-confronted with this com-
bination of burdens and handicaps, it
seemed that nothing could save the new
born South Vietnamese Government.
But then there took place something
that has properly come to be called the
Diem miracle; this term was used at
different times by President Kennedy and
Secretary McNamara prior to Diem's
overthrow, which most people, I believe,
now realize was a tragic mistake.
Diem first of all moved to destroy the
power of the infamous Binh Xyuen, a
sect of river pirates who, under the
French, were given a simultaneous mo
nopoly on the metropolitan police force
of Saigon and on the thousands of opium
dens and houses of prostitution and
gambling that flourished there.
73o powerful was the Binh Xyuen and
so weak were the Diem forces at the
time that even the American Ambassa-
dor urged Diem not to attack them. .
Diem, however, did attack them and
drove theft our of Saigon..
Having defeated the military sects
and integrated them into the Armed
Forces' of the republic, Diem within a
few years was able to resettle the 1 mil-
lion refugees and to create a stable uni-
fied state where none had previously ex-
isted. .
I could not help feeling indignant over
an article on Vietnam which appeared
some time ago in the Washington Star.
The author, Prof. Bernard Fall, who
wrote the article in ill-concealed admi-
ration of what the Communists had done
in their area of Vietnam, mentioned the
fact that the Communists had built
schools for the people. What he did not
mention was that from 1955 to 1963
President Diem has doubled the number
of students in elementary schools, while
at the secondary school level the in-
crease has been fivefold.
The remarkable progress in the field
of education was no exception. The en-
tire South Vietnamese society scored re-
markable advances in every field of eco-
nomic and social endeavor, so that in
1963 South Vietnam for the first time
had a sizable rice surplus for export.
There were significant increases in all
sectors of industry and agriculture, and
a 20-percent rise in per capita income.
Meanwhile, in North Vietnam, things
were going from bad to worse. As in
every other Communist country the col-
lectivization of the peasants resulted in
a dramatic. reduction of food output and
in chronic food shortages throughout
the country. The resentment of the
peasants was compounded by the brutal
and indiscriminate punishment of hun-
dreds of thousands of peasant farmers
who were hailed before so-called people's
courts and charged with being bourgeois
elements or exploiting landlords. Dur-
ing the course of 1955 peasant revolts
broke out in several areas. There was
even a revolt in Ho Chi Minh's own vil-
lage. And there was some evidence that
the troops sent to suppress these revolts
sometimes sympathized with the peas-
ants. Shortages increased year by year.
The people became increasingly apa-
thetic,
The contrast between the growing
prosperity of the South and the growing
misery in the North confronted the Viet-
namese Communists with a challenge
they could not tolerate. That is why
they decided that they had to put an
end to freedom in South Vietnam.
While they have scored some sensational
victories in their war of subversion
against the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment, I think it important to point out
that this war has gravely complicated
the already serious internal difficulties
of the North, so that in 1963, for exam-
ple, the per capita output of rice in Com-
munist North Vietnam was 20 percent
lower than in 1960.
And I also consider it Important to
understand the significance of the fact
that the Vietcong insurgency was di-
rected not against a government that
had failed to improve the lot of its peo-
ple but against a government which,
over a short period of time, had scored
some of the most dramatic economic and
social advances recorded anywhere in
Asia,
ESCALATION : FACT AM) FALLACY
There has been a good deal of talk
about the United States escalating the
war in South Vietnam. Several Senators
who spoke last week warned that if we
escalate the war by means of air strikes
against North Vietnam, the escalation
may get out of hand and wind up as a war
with Red China or perhaps even a world
war.
But it is not we who have escalated the
war; it is the Communists. Peiping and
Hanoi have been busy escalating the war
in South Vietnam for several years now.
They have sent in tens of thousands of
soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army;
they have trained additional tens of thou-
sands of dissident South Vietnamese;
they have supplied them with massive
quantities of equipment; and they have
stepped up the tempo of their attacks
against the Vietnamese people.
Now we are told that if we take any ac-
tion against the territory of North Viet-
nam? which has mounted and directed
the entire attack on South Vietnam, it
will entail the risk of world war.
If the Communists are always to be
permitted the privilege of escalating their
attempts to take over new countries,
while we shrink from retaliation for fear
of further escalation, we might as well
throw in the sponge now and tell the
Communists the world is theirs for the
taking.
I find it difficult to conceive of Red
China sending in her armies In response
to air strikes against carefully selected
military targets. After all, if they did
so, they would be risking retaliation
against their highly vulnerable coastal
cities, where most of Red China's indus-
try is concentrated. They would be risk-
ing setting back their economy 10 or 20
years.
Moreover, both the Chinese Commu-
nists and the Hanoi Communists are
aware that the massive introduction of
Chinese troops would create serious pop-
ular resentment because of the tradi-
tional 'Vietnamese suspicion of Chinese
imperialism.
That there will be no invasion of the
North by Vietnamese and American
forces can, I believe, be taken,as axio-
matic. Nor do I believe there will be any
large-scale involvement of American
troops on the Korean model. We will
have to continue to provide the Viet-
namese with logistical support and air
support, as we are doing now. But on
the ground, the fighting can most effec-
tively be done by the Vietnamese armed
forces, supported, I believe, by military
contingents from the other free Asian
countries.
THE FALLACY THAT THE ASIAN PEOPLES DO NOT
XS.NOW THE MEANING OF FREEDOM
It has been stated by the senior Sena-
tor from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and by
other critics of our foreign policy in. Viet-
nam that it is pointless to talk about
fighting for freedom in Asia because the
Asian people historically do not know the
meaning of freedom. It has even been
implied that, because of their ignorance
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
of freedom and their indifference to it,
communism exercises a genuine attrac-
tion for the peoples of Asia.
I am sure that most Asians would con-
sider this analysis condescending and
offensive. I myself would be disposed to
agree with them. It is an analysis which,
in my opinion, is false on almost every
score.
We have grown accustomed to equat-
ing freedom with the full range of free-
doms that we in the United States today
enjoy. But, in the world in which we
line, the word "freedom" has at least
three separate and perhaps equally im-
portant connotations.
First, there is national freedom, or in-
dependence from foreign control.
Second, there is freedom of speech
and press and the other freedoms in-
herent in parliamentary democracy, such
as we enjoy.
And, third, there is the type of natural
freedom that is enjoyed by primitive
peasants and tribesmen in many back-
ward countries, even under political
autocracies.
It is true that most Asian governments
are autocratic; and it is probably true
that the Vietnamese people do not un-
derstand or appreciate freedom in the
sense of parliamentary democracy. But
they certainly understand the meaning
of "freedom" when the word is used to
mean independence from foreign rule.
They are, in fact, a people with a long
and proud history and a strong sense of
national identity. Every Vietnamese
schoolboy knows that his people fought
and triumphed over the hordes of
Genghis Khan in defense of their free-
dom and he also knows that his country
was free for five centuries before the
French occupation. Finally, he knows
and takes pride in the fact that his peo-
ple drove out the French colonialists de-
spite their army of 400,000 men. Do not
tell me that these people know nothing
about freedom.
To the westernized Saigonese intellec-
tuals, freedom of speech and freedom of
the press are certainly very real issues;
and even though they may have not mas-
tered the processes, they would unques-
tionably like to see some kind of parlia-
mentary democracy in their country. It
is completely understandable that they
should have chafed over the political con-
trols that existed under the Diem gov-
ernment, and that have existed, in one
degree or another, under succeeding gov-
ernments. '
But in the countryside, where the great
mass of the people reside, the political
controls that exist in the city are mean-
ingless. The peasant is free to own his
own land, to dispose of his produce, to
worship according to his beliefs, to guide
.the upbringing of his children, and to
'elect his local village officials. To him,
these freedoms that touch on his every-
day life are the freedoms that really'
count, not the abstract and remote free-
doms of constitutional and federal gov-
ernment. "
. And, if on top of granting him these
natural freedoms, the government as-
slats him. by building schools and dis-
pensarieseind by providing seed and fer-
tWzer, , then, from. the standpoint of the
southeast Asian peasant, his life is full
and he is prepared to fight to defend it
against the Communists.
It is, in short, completely untrue that
the Vietnamese people and the other
peoples of Asia do not know the mean-
ing of freedom. And it is equally untrue
that communism is acceptable to. the
Asian peasant because of his indiffer-
ence to freedom.
Communism has never been freely ac-
cepted by any people, anywhere, no mat-
ter how primitive.
It has never been accepted for the
simple reason that even primitive peoples
do not enjoy being pushed around and
brutalized and terrorized, and told what
to do and what not to do, and having
their every activity ordered and super-
vised by political commissars.
This is why communism must govern
by means of ruthless dictatorship wher-
ever it takes power.
This is why the primitive mountain
peoples of both Laos and Vietnam have,
in an overwhelming majority, sided
against the Communists.
This is why there are almost 8 mil-
lion refugees from Communist rule in
Asia today-people who have seen the
reality of the so-called People's Democ-
racy, and who have given up everything
they possessed and frequently risked
their lives to escape from it.
That is why there is barbed wire and
iron curtains surrounding the Commu-
nist countries. The inhabitants of the
Communist countries would all leave if
they could.
There is one final comment I would like
to make while dealing with this sub-
ject. Too often I have heard it said
that the Vietnamese people are not fight-
ing because there is nothing to choose
between communism and the kind of gov-
ernment they now have.
To equate an authoritarian regime like
that in South Vietnam, or Taiwan, or
Thailand with the totalitarian rule of
communism is tantamount to losing all
sense of proportion. Not only have these
regimes never been guilty of the massive
bloodletting and total direction of per-
sonal life which has characterized Com-
munist rule in every country, but, care-
fully examined, it will turn out that these
regimes are a mixture of natural democ-
racy at the bottom with political controls
of varying rigidity at the top.
Even at their worst, the political au-
tocracies that exist in certain free Asian
countries are a thousand times better
than communism from the standpoint of
how they treat their own people. And
at their best, some of these autocracies
have combined control of the press and
political parties with remarkably pro-
gressive social programs.
But perhaps more important from our.
standpoint is that these free autocracies,
for lack of a better term, do not threaten
the peace of their neighbors or of the
world or threaten our own security,
whereas world communism has now be-
come a threat of terrifying dimensions.
THE FALLACY THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE
HAVE NO WILL TO RESIST COMMUNISM
We have been told that the Vietnamese
people are indifferent to.. communism;
that they resist it only halfheartedly.
Some commentators have even sought to
create the impression that America is in
a, position of coercing the South Viet-
namese to fight against communism.
This estimate of the attitude of the
,South Vietnamese people is totally false.
True, Souh Vietnam is suffering from
political instability.
True, the war against the Vietcong is
going badly.
But these things by themselves do not
constitute proof that the Vietnamese
people are indifferent to communism or
that they do not have the will to resist.
The people of South Vietnam are, in
fact, one of the most anti-Communist
peoples in the world. Among them are
more than 1 million refugees who sacri-
flred everything they possessed to flee
from North Vietnam to South Vietnam
after the country was divided by the
Geneva agreement of 1954; and it is esti-
mated that there are another 300,000 in-
ternal refugees who have .fled from Com-
munist-controlled areas in the south.
Among the present population of 14 mil-
lion, in addition, there are several million
peasants and workers and students who
have at one time or another borne arms
against the Communists, some of them
in the Vietnamese Army, the majority in
village self-defense units.
The overwhelming majority of the
people of South Vietnam know what com-
munism means because they have experi-
enced it on their own backs. There are
indeed very few South Vietnamese who
do not have friends or,relatives who have
been the victims of Communist brutality
and terror.
Lot me tell the story of one such act
of Communist terror, because statistics
by themselves tend to be meaningless.
In the village of Phu Hon, there was a
teenage girl by the name of Giau, the
pride of her parents and a born leader of
others. As a member of the Republican
Youth Organization, she organized the
village youth and gave talks. On the
evening of January 15, 1962, she was ab-
ducted from her village by Vietcong sol-
diers. The next morning her mutilated
and decapitated body-I have a photo-
graph of it-was discovered in the road-
way outside the village with a note on
her breast captioned "Death Sentence
for Giau," and signed by the "People's
Front of Liberation."
For a long period of time, assassina-
tions such as this were going on at the
rate of some 500 a month, or 6,000 a
year. The victims were most frequently ,
.active supporters of governlm.ent, local
administrators, village heads, and school-
teachers. The families of village mili-
tiamen were another favorite target.,
The Vietcong would entice the miliVa
away from the village-and when they
returned they would find their wives and
children massacred.
While the facts of these mass assassi-
nations are not generally known in our
country, they are. known in Vietnam.
And this is one of the reasons why the
Vietnamese people hate the Communists,
and why they continue to resist them
despite the chronic politiW Instability
in Saigon and despite the. seeming hope-
lessness of their situation.
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And even last year, when the fortunes
of war turned against the Vietnamese
government, the Vietnamese Army killed
17;000 Vietcong against. a loss of 7,000
men, and took 4,200 Communists captive
against 5,800 captives lost to them.
To those who say that the Vietnamese
Army has not shown the will to resist,
I point out that, over the 3-year period
for which I have presented figures, this
army suffered a total death toll of 17,000
men, which is almost as Leigh as the total
American toll in South Korea. The
enemy's casualties have been much heav-
ier. But the Communists have continued
to attack regardless of losses. And be-
cause it has not been possible to recon-
stitute a stable government since the
overthrow of Diem, and, because no one
knows where guerrillas may strike next,
and because unlimited terror is a dread-
fully effective instrument, the Vietcong,
over the past 15 months, have been able
to make most of the Vietnamese country-
side insecure.
The fact that the Vietcong seem to be
winning and that they have been so
kangaroo courts, and executing and
burying those who were sentenced.
I also remind them of the scenes that
tool, place when the prisoners were
brought before the Communist interro-
gators under the procedures set up by
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Com-
mission. The prisoners had to be dragged
before the interrogators forcibly, their
arms pinned behind their backs by In-
dian soldiers. When the Communist in-
terrogators spoke to them, urging that
they return to their homeland, the pris-
oners spat out their hatred with a vehe-
mence that Western observers found
frightening. So embarrassing were the
interrogations for the Communists that
after a, number of sessions they decided
to call off the whole show.
In the light of this conclusion, how
much significance can one attach to the
seemingly fanatical courage displayed by
the Chinese and North Korean soldiers
in attacking our positions, or to the grim
unity of the Koju prisoners of war in
resisting their American captors?
Before we marvel at the apparently
For some strange reason, the torture
of one Vietcong prisoner aroused far
more indignation in our country than
the assassination of scores of thousands
of innocent civilians by the Vietcong
Communists, including the bombing of a
schoolbus in which a score of children
cited..
But, If the Vietnamese people are anti-
Communist, I have been asked: Why has
the Vietnamese Army put up so poor a
show?
The Vietnamese Army has been handi-
capped by political instability by the fre-
quent shifts of officers, by poor staff
work, by its inadequate use of scouts and
security patrols, and by the many dis-
advantages under which counterguer-
rilla forces must always operate. But,
it is simply not true that the Vietnamese
Army has shown no willingness to fight.
They have fought bravely in thou-
sands of engagements. They have taken
heavy casualties and inflicted much
heavier casualties on the enemy.
The belief that the Vietnamese people
do not have the will to resist the Com-
munists and that the Vietnamese forces
have fought poorly against them, is in
large measure due to the unfortunate
emphasis which the press always places
on disasters and defects.
It probably also springs in part from
the traditional attitude of the American
newspaperman that it is his duty to
mercilessly expose every weakness in
his city government, in his State govern-
ment, in his National Government.
I do not complain about that. I sup-
pose that is the way it has to be.
But whatever the reasons may be, the
emphasis in the press has been so mis-
leading that even knowledgeable mem-
bers of the administration have been con-
fused by it. For example, a member of
the administration who very recently
visited Vietnam informed me that, con-
trary to his impressions from reading the
press he was amazed to learn that in
eight engagements of battalion size and
larger which took place during the
month of January 1965, the Vietnamese
Army got the better of the engagement
in every single case.
I have here the comparative figures
for Vietnamese and Vietcong casualties
-for the 3-year period 1962-64, which
I have received from an official source.
I wish to read them, Mr. President, be-
cause they throw an altogether new light
on the situation in Vietnam. 'I do not
know why these figures were not released
long ago. I hear people complaining
that they do not know what is going on
4n Vietnam. The release of these figures
would have helped them to understand.
In 1962 the Vietnamese Army lost 4,400
killed in action against 21,000 Vietcong
killed, and 1,300 prisoners against 5,500
captives taken from the Vietcong.
Those are pretty good statistics. They
ought to be read and studied by persons
who are saying the South Vietnamese
have no will to fight.
]Listen to these further figures :
In 1963 the figures were 5,700 Vietna-
anese soldiers killed in action against
21,000 Vietcong, and 3,300 missing or
captured . Against 4,000' Vietcong cap=
erattacks, has led some people to believe
that the Vietcong soldier is convinced of
the justice of his cause and that this is
why he fights more grimly,.
The Communists are masters of the
art of imposing iron discipline by means
of unlimited terror.
Senators will recall that during the
Korean war we all marveled at the dis-
cipline of the Chinese Communist sol-
diers who kept on marching without
breaking step while they were being
bombed and strafed by American planes,
or who attacked our positions, wave upon
wave, apparently oblivious to casualties.
I remember people saying, "See the
dedication of these Chinese Communists.
See how they bear themselves against
bullets and bombs. See how fanatically
they believe in their cause." I did not
think, that was the reason, but I did not
have an effective answer until after the
war was over.
Senators will recall the terrible riots
in the Koje prisoner-of-war camp, when
the prisoners seemed so grimly united
against us that for weeks on end Amer-
ican soldiers could not venture into the
POW compound. Again,. the common
assumption was that the prisoners were
all fanatical Communists.
But then the end of the war came-
and it turned out that 20,000 out of 25,000
of the Communist prisoners in our hands
asked for refugee status rather than
return to North Korea or China. And
these were supposed to be the dedicated
Communists who believe so fanatically
in communism.
Of the 5,000 who returned home, there
is reason to believe that the majority
did so with heavy hearts, because of
strong family ties and not because of
any love for communism.
I remind the Senators-because these
things tend to be forgotten-of the evi-
dence which emerged that the Koje pris-
oners- of war had been terrorized by a
tiny minority of Communist. militants
who ran the camp with' an iron hand,
torturing political -opponents, staging
the experience of the Korean war, be-
cause 1'he evidence is overwhelming that
the Vietcong Communists are using ter-
ror on the same scale and in. the same
manner that it was employed on the
Korean battlefront and in the prisoner-
of-wax camps.
That the morale of the Vietcong forces
is not 10 feet tall is demonstrated by the
substantial number of Vietcong prisoners
taken over the past 3 years. It is demon-
strated even more dramatically by the
fact that from' February 1963 through
the end of 1964 there were approxi-
mately :L7,000 Vietcong defections. The
number of defections would be far
larger, I am certain, if a stable,govern-
ment could establish itself in Saigon.
It is interesting to note that, while
most of the defectors have been young
peasants who were conscripted by the
Vietcong, their ranks also include North
Vietnamese officers who were 'told that
they were going south to fight the Amer-
icans and who broke when they dis-
covered that they were fighting their
own people.
Impatient constituents have sometimes
asked me why the Communists have been
able to plan elaborate attacks on. our
airfields and other installations without
advance intelligence reaching 11s from
members of the local population who
must have observed the Communists.
The instrument of terror is also appli-
cable to the control of the civilian popu-
lation. 'Whenever the Communists take
over a village or a town, they systemat-
ically massacre all known anti-Commu-
nist leaders and those who are suspected
of informing. They frequently mutilate
their bodies as an example to the people.
If we could give the Vietnamese 'vil-
lagers a. feeling of greater security, I am
sure that more intelligence would be
3orthcoming. As matters now stand, the
average. Vietnamese peasant fears that
the Communists are going to win the
war, and he knows the terrible punish-
ment that awaits those who inform on
the Communists. This is why our in-
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 I went to New York and saw Ambas-'
sador Vollo. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I
understand you were it member of the
United Nations commission which went
to Vietnam. I should like to ask you
what the facts are." Ambassador Volio
gave me the facts as I have given them to
you here.
Ambassador Pinto, of Dohomey, an-
other member of the U.N. mission, ex-
pressed himself in similar terms in
public.
The entire tragic story suggests that
the free world was made the victim of a
gigantic propaganda hoax, as a result of
which the legitimate government of
President Diem was destroyed and a
chaotic situation created which has in-
evitably played, into the hands of the
Communists.
If Senators have not yet had time to
read the report of the U.N. factfinding
mission to Vietnam, I urge them to do so
because it throws essential light on the
current activities of the militant
Buddhists. I am arranging to have copies
mailed to every Senator, and I hope that
all Senators will read it, because they
will learn a great deal about the present
Buddhist situation from it.
The first fact which needs to be estab-
lished in evaluating the militant Buddhist
movement is that the Buddhists do not
constitute 80 or 85 percent of the popula-
tion, as was widely reported at the time
of the Buddhist crisis. According to Dr.
Mai Tho Truyen, one of the greatest au-
thorities on Vietnam Buddhism, the Viet-
namese Buddhists number approximately
4 million people, or about 30 percent of
the population.
The second point that must be made is
that the militant Buddhists constitute
only a small fraction of the total Bud-
dhist population. The millions of the
Buddhist peasants, in their great ma-
jority, do not approve of the militant
political actions and the government-
toppling intrigues of the Buddhist mili-
tants in Saigon. Their activities, indeed,
run completely counter to the pacific
traditions of the Buddhist religion.
It is questionable whether the Bud-
dhist militants have been able to mobilize
as many as 50,000 active. supporters in
all the demonstrations they have staged
in Saigon and Hue and other cities. But
because political, power resides in the
cities, the several tens of thousands of
Buddhist militants, by their clamor and
their persistent demonstrations and their
clever propaganda, have succeeded in
creating the impression that they speak
for the people of the cities and for the
majority of the people of Vietnam.
What do the Buddhist militants want?
Before the overthrow of President Diem,
Thich Tri Quang told Marguerite Hig-
gins frankly: "We cannot get an arrange-
ment with the north until we get rid Df
Diem and Nhu."
The evidence is clear that Thich Tri
Quang and some of his other militants
are still bent on an agreement with the
north.. Indeed, only last Friday, Quang
called for U.S. negotiations with Ho Chi
Minh.
If there 4s reason to believe that Thich
Tri Quang is a neutralist, there is even
more reason for fearing that some of the
other members of the Buddhist opposi-
tion movement are openly pro-Commu-
nist or that they have become tools of
the rather substantial Communist infil-
tration which is known to exist in the
Buddhist clergy in the various countries
of Asia.
That such an infiltration should exist
Is not surprising because there are no
barriers to it.
A roan who wants to become a Bud-
dhist monk does not have to prepare him-
self for his ministry by engaging in
studies, nor does he have to be ordained,
nor does he take any vow.
He simply shaves his head and dons
the saffron robe and enters a monas-
tery.--and overnight he becomes' one of
the religious elite.
When he wishes to leave the mon-
astery, he sheds his robe and leaves it;
if he wishes to reenter, he dons his robe
again and reenters. That is all there
is to it.
I do not criticize this procedure on
religious grounds.
Buddhism is one of the great religions
of mankind and much can be said for
an arrangement that enables every man
of religious disposition to spend at least
a portion of his life under the 'voluntary
monastic discipline characteristic of
Buddhism.
But, regrettably, it is a procedure that
leaves the door wide open to Co:imnunist
Infiltration.
I remember that when we were digging
into the files of the Nazis at Nuremberg,
we found that Hitler had under consider-
ation a program of infiltrating the
churches by inducing young people to
enter seminaries, so that he could have
them at his disposal.
When I first began to hear of the
Buddhist situation, it occurred to me
that more than likely there was a sim-
ilar infiltration of religion at work.
The militant Buddhists have used the
influence and prestige which accrued to
them from the overthrow of D1em for
the prime purpose of making stable gov-
ernment impossible: in this sense, what-
ever the intent of their leaders, they
.have been serving the desires of the
Communist Vietcong.
They have organized demonstrations,
provoked riots, inflamed passions with
highly publicized fasts and self-irremola-
tions, and subjected the government to
a ceaseless propaganda barrage. They
overthrew the Khanh government.
Then they overthrew the Huong govern-
unent which succeeded it. And they
seem to be intent on making things im-
possible for any government that may
come to power.
It Is, of course, difficult to deal with a
political conspiracy that camouflages it-
self in religious robes. In any case, this
is a matter for the Vietnamese Govern-
ment and not for our own Government.
But it would make matters immeasur-
ably easier for the Vietnamese authori-
ties if the true facts about Buddhism
in Vietnam were given to the American
people and if they could be helped to
understand how little the Buddhist mili-
tants really represent, how nefarious
their politioal!activities have really been,
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telligence has admittedly been inade-
quate--one of the reasons, certainly.
But this is a situation that could change
dramatically if we succeeded in convinc-
ing the Vietnamese people of our deter-
mination to help them retain their free-
dom, and if we succeeded in inflicting. a
number of significant defeats on the
enemy. -
THE BUDDHIST FALLACY
I now wish to discuss the Buddhist sit-
uation, about which we have heard for
several years now.
The myth of Buddhist persecution and
the parallel myth that the Buddhists are
opposed to the Government, have be-
cause of the so-called militant Buddhist
movement, become important political
factors in Vietnam. It is, therefore, im-
portant that we should seek to under-
stand the nature of this movement, the
motivation of its leaders, and the real
degree of influence it exerts over the
Vietnamese people.
It is, indeed, idle to debate the subject
of Vietnam and our policy there and not
understand the so-called Buddhist prob-
lem. There has been much loose talk
about'it, but there has thus far been little
hard, factual information.
The campaign which resulted in the
overthrow of President Diem *as marked
by the charge that he had subjected the
Buddhist religion to inhuman persecu-
tion; and, in protest against this alleged
persecution,'a number of Buddhist monks
went through the horrifying ritual of
self-Immolation.
Week after week, month after month,
the American people and the people of
the world were inundated with stories
supporting the charge that Diem was
persecuting the Buddhist religion. There
were a number of experienced corre-
spondents of national reputation who
challenged the authenticity of these
stories. But their voices were drowned
by, the torrent of charges and allegations
that appeared in some of our major news-
papers, and that were lent further
credence because of repetition of our of
float information agencies.
At the invitation of President Diem, the
U.N. General Assembly decided to send a
factfinding mission to South Vietnam to
look into the situation. I find this rarely
referred to in any discussion of the Bud-
dhist question, but it is a fact that the
United Nations did send a mission over
there.
While the mission was still in the coun-
try, President Diem and his brother,
Ngo Dinh Nhu, were overthrown and
assassinated.
The mission decided that the overthrow
of Diem made it unnecessary to come up
with a formal finding. I believe that
this was most regrettable. But the sum-
mary of the testimony which it had taken
in Vietnam pointed strongly to the con-
elusion that the persecution of the
Buddhists was either nonexistent or
-vastly exaggerated and that the agita-
tion was essentially political. This, in
essence, was what I was told in a per-
? sonal conversation with Ambassador Fer-
mando Volio Jiminez, of Costa Rica, who
',hid introduced the motion calling for, the
setting up of the.U,N. mission and,who
served.." a member of it.'..,. ,
 I1
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1965 GRES IONA ~G(;UKl! -
and how much they have done to under- municating with each other and in sta- fort has been limited, and halting, and
mine the fight against Communists. bilizing the political situation in Saigon. amateurish, and, in fact, sadly ineftec-
No stable government can be created No one person is to blame for this. It tive.
in Vietnam without the participation and is, rather, the system which rotates mill- The prime goal of political warfare, as
support of responsible Buddhist leader- tary officers and AID officials and other it must be waged by freemen, is to win
ship. But this responsible leadership Americans in Vietnam on an annual or men's minds. The prime goal of political
cannot be found among the handful of 2-year basis. warfare, as it is waged by the Connnu-
monks of questionable antecedents who As one American officer pointed out in nists, is to erode and paralyze the will to
have been misdirecting the militant a recent interview, "It takes about 8 resist by means of total error.
Buddhist movement in the cities of Viet- months before you can really get to know An effective political warfare program
nam. the country and the people. And, just requires three major ingredients: First,
It is time to speak bluntly on this issue. about the time you are beginning to a handful of basic slogans which capraul-
THE FALLACY OF THE FRENCH ANALOGY understand something, you are rotated ize popular desires and which are capable
Over and over again in recent months home and that is the end of your utility." of striking responsive chords in the
I believe that something can be done to hearts of the people; second, a propa-
I have heard it said that our position in Improve this situation. ganda apparatus capable of conveying
Vietnam is impossible because the I have met a number of Americans, this program both to those on the Gov-
French, who knew Vietnam so much bet- former soldiers and former AID officials, ernment side and those on the side of the
ter than we do, were compelled to admit who have spent 5 years or more in Viet- insurgents; third, specially trained cad-
defeat after 8 years of war against the. nam, have built up personal friendships res to direct the effort.
Vietminh. A recent half-page adver- with leaders of every sector of the Viet- But the slogans we have are ins.de-
tisement in the New York Times asked: namese community, enjoy the confidence quate. Our propaganda program is dis-
"How can we win in Vietnam with less of the Vietnamese because of their mally weak compared with that of the
than 30,000 advisers, when the French understanding and dedication, and who Communists. And according to my in-
could not win with an army of nearly would jump at the opportunity to return formation, we still have not assisted the
half a million?" to Vietnam for the purpose of helping it Vietnamese to set up an intensive train
Our own position is entirely different in this critical hour. I am told that tag program in Communist cold 'war
from the French position in Indochina. there may be as many as 10 or 12 such methods and how to counter them.
The French were a colonial power, ex- people in this country. An article In the New York Times on
ploiting and imposing their will on the I have proposed in a letter to the August 3, 1064, pointed out that in every
Indochinese people and stubbornly deny President that these Americans be con- area "the basic cutting tool of the Viet-
ing them their freedom. The French stituted into a liaison group and that tong is a squad of about 10 armed rrten
military effort in Indochina was doomed they be dispatched to Saigon imme- and women whose primary function is
because it had against it not only the diately for the purpose of helping the propaganda." The article also said that
Communists but the overwhelming Embassy to establish the broadest and "Most of the experts in psychological
majority of the Indochinese people. It most effective possible liaison with the warfare and propaganda here believe the
was a war fought by Frenchmen against army leaders, with the Buddhists, with Vietcong's agitprop teams have done the
Indochinese. the intellectual community, and with the Saigon government more damage than
The United States, however, does not Vietnamese political leaders. even the tough Vietcong regular batta-
seek to impose its control on Vietnam or I know that there is always a tendency lions." Finally, the article made the
exploit Vietnam. We are not a colonial on the part of World War II officers to point that according to. estimates there
power. We seek only to help the people resent World War I officers, and on the were 320 Vietcong "agitprop" tea:ine
of South Vietnam defend their freedom part of those who are involved in a situa- working in the country, against 20 "in-
against an insurgency that is inspired tion today to resist the assistance of formation teams" for the government
and directed and aided by the North Viet- those who preceded them. There is also side. This gave the Vietcong an edge of
namese Communists. This is understood sometimes a tendency for those who were 16 to 1 in the field of propaganda per-
by the Vietnamese people. And that is there yesterday to believe that they sonnel. And the edge was probably even
why hundreds of thousands of Vietnam- understand things better than those who greater in terms of finesse and effective-.
ese who fought with Ho Chi Minh against are there today. ness.
the French are today fighting for the But this is a situation in which I am Even if we help the South Vietnamese
Saigon government against the Vietcong. confident every American, no matter Government intensify its propaganda :f-
That is why the war against the Viet- what his rank, will seek to rise above his fort, there would still remain the prob-
cong can be won, while the war of French personal prejudices. It is a situation that 1em of basic goals and slogans.
colonialism against the Indochinese inde- demands the utilization of every ounce I have pointed out that the Vietnamese
pendence movement was doomed from of experience and dedication available people have a proud history and a strong
the outset. There is no similarity in to us. sense of national unity. All Vietnamese,
the two situations that has any meaning It is any earnest personal conviction whether they, live in the north or south,
or validity. that the dispatch of such a liaison group would like to see a unified and peaceful
WHAT CAN BE DONE? to Saigon would result in an early im- Vietnam. But as matters now stand, only
I believe the war in Vietnam can be provement in our ability to communicate the Communists are able to hold forth.
won without a significant increase in our with the Vietnamese and in our ability to the prospect of the reunification of Viet-
military effort. There are many things assist them in achieving the political stag., nam. To date we have not given the
that can be done to improve the perform- bility which is essential to the successful South Vietnamese Government the green
ance of our side, and most of them lie prosecution of the war. light to set up a "Committee for the
THE NEED FOR A STEPPED-UP POLITICAL WARFARE Liberation of North Vietnam," as coun-
Let s me set at thforth e some of nonmilitary the field. things EFFORT terpart to the "Liberation Front" which
Ll can be done. many conversations with Viet- the Communists have set up in the south.
that I believe can . namese and with Americans who have This places the South Vietnamese side
THE NEED FOR R IMPROVED LIAISON served in various capacities in Vietnam, at a grave disadvantage.
One of the most obvious and most seri- I am convinced that another one of our There are any number of patriotic
ous weaknesses of the American position major weaknesses lies in the field of po- North Vietnamese refugees who have
in Vietnam is the lack of adequate liaison litical warfare'. been itching for the opportunity to set.
with the leaders of the various sectors of We have, by and large, been trying to up a Liberation Committee for the North.
the Vietnamese community. meet the Communist insurgency by tra- The establishment of such a committee
Because of this lack of communication, ditional military methods or by tradi- could, in my opinion, have an immediate
we have frequently been caught un- tional methods slightly tailored to meet and profound impact on the conduct of
awares by developments; we have re-- . the special requirements of guerrilla war- the war.
malned without serious ability to influ- fare. In the field of political warfare, - But above all, the situation in Vietnam
ence them; and we have not been able to where the Communists have scored their underscores the need for an effective
effectively assist the Vietnamese in corn- most-spectacular triumphs,,our own ef- training prograM,_ in political warfare,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE , February 23
for our own foreign service and military
personnel so that they can help to com-
municate this knowledge to nationals of
other countries who, like the South Viet-
namese, are engaged in a life-and-death
struggle for survival against the most
cunning and most ruthless practitioners
of political warfare history has ever
known.
In this connection, I wish to bring
to the attention of my colleagues the
fact that there has been pending before
Congress for some 6 years a bill calling
for the establishment of a Freedom
Academy. This would be an institu-
tion where Americans and citizens of
other free countries could receive con-
centrated training in Communist tech-
niques and operations, and in tactics and
methods designed to frustrate the Com-
munists at every operational level, from
elections for the control of trade unions
and student organizations, to street riots,
to attempted insurrections.
The Senate Judiciary Committee in
reporting this measure to the floor in
May of 1960, described the bill as "one
of the most important measures ever in-
troduced in the Congress." But, unfor-
tunately, although the bill was passed
by the Senate, the House took no action.
When the bill was reintroduced for the
third time in early 1963, it has the spon-
sorship of the following Senators.
MUNDT, DOUGLAS, CASE, DODD, SMATHERS,
Goldwater; PROXMIRE, FOND, HICKEN-
L~iOOl'ER, MILLER, Keating, LAUSCHE, and
SCOTT.
The distinguished senior Senator from
South Dakota last Friday reintroduced
the measure for the fourth time, and it is
now lying on the table, so that those who
wish to add their names as cosponsors
may do so. It is my earnest hope that
the measure will have the sponsorship
of an even larger bipartisan group of
Senators than it did in 1963. It is my
hope too that there will be no further
delay, no foot dragging, in enacting this
long-overdue measure. It is time, high
time, that we recognize the imperative
need to equip ourselves and our allies
with the knowledge and the trained per-
sonnel required to meet the Communist
onslaught.
CARRYING THE GUERRILLA WAR TO THE NORTH
First of all, I think there is a growing
acceptance of the need for.punishing the
North with hit-and-run raids. It would
be much more effective if these raids
could be carried out in the name of a
North Vietnamese Liberation Front than
in the name of the South Vietnamese
Government.
Second, I have reason for believing
that increasing consideration is being
given to the need for countering the Viet-
cong insurgency in the South with a
guerrilla warfare effort in the North.
In May of 1961, when I returned from
Laos and Vietnam, I made a statement,
which I should like to repeat today:'
The best way for us to stop Communist
guerrilla action in Laos and in South Viet-
nary[ is to send guerrilla forces into North
Vietnam; to equip and supply those patriots
already in the field; to make every Commu-
nist omoiM fear theJust retribution of an
outraged humanity; to.make every Commu-
nist arsenal, government building, conlmq-
nications center and transportation facility
a target for sabotage; to provide a rallying
point for the great masses of oppressed peo-
ple who hate communism because they have
known it. Only when we give the Commu-
nists more trouble than they can handle at
home, will they cease their aggression against
the outposts of freedom.
I believe that every word I said in 1961
is doubly valid today. It is not too late to
embark upon such a program. And if we
do give the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment the green light to embark upon it
on an effective, hard-hitting scale, again
I think it would add significantly to the
psychological impact of the entire pro-
gram if all guerrilla activities were car-
ried out in the name of the "Committee
for the Liberation of the North."
A FEW ML7.ITARY SUGGESTIONS
I do not pretend to be a military ex-
pert. But I have discussed the situation
in Vietnam with a number of military
men of considerable experience in the
area, and I have been encouraged to be..
lieve that the several suggestions which
I have to make in this field are realistic.
I submit them for the consideration
of my colleagues, because I think they
make sense.
My first proposition is that we cannot
regard the war in Vietnam in isolation
from the rest of southeast Asia.
The Communist Party over which Ho
Chi Minh presided for many years was
the Communist Party of Indochina. In-
deed, to this day, there is no such thing
as a Communist Party in Vietnam. Ho
Chi Minh's thinking and strategy are
directed toward the reunification of all
the former territories of French Indo-
china under his personal sway. This
makes it imperative for us to develop a
coordinated strategy for the entire area
if we are to cope effectively with the
Communist strategy.
Proposition No. 2 is that there are
certain dramatic military actions open
to us that do not involve the territory of
North Vietnam.
The hub of the Ho Chi Minh trail is
the town of Tchepone, inside the Lao-
tian frontier, just south of the 17th par-
allel, the dividing line between North
Vietnam and South Vietnam. Through
Tchepone pour most of the reinforce-
ments and equipment from North Viet-
nam. From Tchepone the men and
equipment are infiltrated into South
Vietnam along hundreds of different
jungle trails.
I recall that when I met with Presi-
dent Diem in April of 1961, he urged that
the Americans assist him and the Laotian
Government in preemptive action to
secure three key centers in the Laotian
Panhandle-Tchepone, Saravane, and
Attopeu-in order to prevent the large-
scale infiltration which is today taking
place. I still have a copy of the marked
map which he gave me in outlining his
project. Had Diem's advice been fol-
lowed there would have been no Ho Chi
Minh trail. But this was at the time of
the Laotian armistice and we were not
disposed to take any actions which might
provoke the Laotian 'Communists. So
nothing was done.
The seizure of Tchepone by Laotian
and Vietnamese forces, with American
air support would, I have been assured,
be a feasible military operation and one
that could be carried out with the means
available to us on the spot. It would
do more to put a crimp in the Ho Chi
Minh trail than. any amount of bombing
we could attempt. And it would have
as dramatic an impact on the situation
in Laos as on the situation in Vietnam.
Finally, there is the matter of collec-
tive action by the SEATO nations.
As late as April of 1961, the SEATO na-
tions in the immediate area of the
Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New
Zealand, and Pakistan-all favored com-
mon action against the Communist
menace in Laos. But the British and
French were opposed to such action, and
we ourselves sat on the fence; and the
result was that nothing was done.
The charter of SEATO will have to be
modified so that one, nation cannot veto
collective action by all the other nations.
Britain, I am inclined to believe, would
now be disposed to support collective ac-
tion by SEATO because of the situation
in Malaysia. But, perhaps France should
be invited to leave SEATO, on the
grounds that she has no vital interests in
the area, and her entire attitude toward
Red China is one of appeasement. In
view of the fact that something has to be
done immediately, however, the sensible
course is to encourage collective action
by the free nations in the area, outside
the framework of SEATO, until SEATO
can be reorganized. In a manner that
makes it effective.
In this connection, I am most encour-
aged by the news that South Korea has
decided to send a contingent of several
thousand military engineers to South
Vietnam, and the Philippines have de-
cided to do likewise. It is infinitely bet-
ter from every standpoint to have Asian
troops supporting the Vietnamese forces
against the Vietcong on the ground, than
it is to have American, troops actively in-
volved.
THE NEED FOR UNDEaSCORING OUR
LONG-TERM COMMITMENT
The retaliatory strikes ordered by
President Johnson against the North
have had the effect of reiterating our
commitment in a manner that the Com-
munists understand; and this, in the
.long run, is probably more important
than the damage wrought by these
strikes.
But if the Communists are to be dis-
couraged from continuing this costly
war, we must seek every possible means
of underscoring our determination to
stand by the people of South Vietnam, .
to pay whatever cost may be necessary,
and to take whatever risk may be neces-
sary to prevent the Communists' from
subjugating the Vietnamese people and
other people in the area.
It is important to reiterate our resolve
at every opportunity. And it is even
more important to translate this resolve
into hard political and military actions.
The American Friends of Vietnam
have, suggested another dramatic meas-
ure. They have suggested a commit-
ment to a- massive southeast Asian de-
velopment program based' on the har-
nessing of the Mekong River-a kind of
Tennessee Valley Authority for south-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE 3279
east Asia. Such a plan, they point out,
would offer incredible promise to Laos,
Cambodia, and Thailand as well as to
South Vietnam, and it would offer equal
promise to the people of North Vietnam,
which only the continued belligerence
and noncooperation of their Government
could frustrate.
This, to me, sounds eminently sensi-
ble.
FOR A COMMITMENT TO VICTORY
If we decide to withdraw from Viet-
nam we can certainly find plenty of ex-
cuses to ease our path. We can blame it
on the geography; or on the topography;
or on local apathy; or on political in-
stability; or on religious strife; or even
on anti-Americanism. But that will fool
no one but ourselves. These conditions
make our success there difficult, but only
our own timidity and vacillation can
make it impossible.
It has become obvious that we cannot
go on fighting this undeclared war under
the rules laid down by our enemies. We
have reached the point where we shall
have to make a great decision, a decision
as to whether we are to take the hard
steps necessary to turn the tide in Viet-
nam or whether we are to refrain from
doing so and thus lose inevitably by de-
,fault.
The ultimate outcome of the cold war
depends upon an affirmative decision to
do whatever is necessary to achieve vic-
tory in South Vietnam. The events of
recent weeks demonstrate again that the
administration is not lacking in resolve
and that it is rapidly approaching such a
decision.
Whether that means a larger commit-
ment of forces, or continued retaliatory
nizes in its foreign aid program not only
that the rich are morally obligated to
help the poor, but also that prosperity
cannot permanently endure surrounded
by poverty, and justice cannot conquer
until its conquest is universal.
Let us, above all, encourage and inspire
a national spirit worthy of our history,
worthy of our burgeoning, bursting
strength, in our arms, in our agriculture,
in industry, in science, in finance, a spirit
of confidence, of optimism, of willingness
to accept new risks and exploit new op-
portunities.
And let us remember that providence
has showered upon our people greater
blessings than on any other, and th&t,
great though our works have been, much
greater is expected of us.
In recent days, the free world has paid
tribute to its greatest champion of our
age, Winston Churchill,
It is a curious thing that though
Churchill is acknowledged on all sides
as the preeminent figure of our time
and as the highest embodiment of West-
ern statesmanship, he was, throughout
his life, and remains today, a prophet
unheeded, a statesman whom men ven-
erate but will not emulate,
It may well be that Winston Church-
ill's greatest legacy will prove to be, not
the legacy of his immortal deeds, but
that of his example and his precepts; and
that freemen of the future will pay him
the homage denied by his contempo-
raries, the tribute of imitation and ac-
ceptance of his message.
As we ponder the passing of this he-
roic figure and reflect upon his career
and try to draw from It lessons which
we might apply to the aggressive on-
strikes against the North, or carrying _ slaught that we face today in a hundred
guerrilla warfare to the enemy home- ways on a hundred fronts, we might
land, or completely sealing off South .
Vietnam from Communist aid-I say to
the administration, "Give us the plan
that will do the job, and we will support
you:'
Whether our victory be near or far, can
we, dare we, turn away or begin to turn
away from the task before us, however
frustrating or burdensome it may be?
Here surely is a time for us, to heed
Santayana's maxim "Those who will not
learn from the past are destined to re-
peat it." ,
And so I speak today not merely to urge
that we stand fast in Vietnam, but also
to urge that we meet head on the new
isolationism in its incipient stages, before
the long months and years of discontent,
frustration, and weariness that lie ahead
have swelled the chorus urging disen-
gagement and withdrawal to a deafening
roar.
Let us expound a foreign policy nur-
tured in our constantly growing strength,
not one fed by fear and disillusionment;
a policy which each year is prepared to
expend more, not less, in the cause of
preserving our country and the decencies
of man.
Let us insist upon a defense budget
based upon the dangers we face abroad,
not upon the benefits we seek at home.
Let us embrace a doctrine that refuses
to yield to force, ever; that honors its
commitments because we know that our
good faith is the cement binding the free
world together; _a doctrine that recog-
take to heart this advice which he gave in
the dark days of 1941 to the boys of Har-
row, his old school :
Never give in. Never, never, never, never.
Never yield to force and the apparently over-
whelming might of the enemy. Never yield
in any way, great or small, large or petty,
except to convictions of honor and good
sense.
Let us resolve to nail this message to
the masthead of our ship of state in this
year of decision.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the
following documents: First, a summary
of Communist violations of the Laotian
armistice prepared for me by the Library
of Congress; second, a copy of a state-
ment released yesterday by the American
Friends of Vietnam, under the caption of
"A New Policy for Vietnam"; third, a
copy of a telegram to the President from
the Veterans of Foreign Wars; fourth,
various newspaper clippings bearing on
the situation in Vietnam.
There being no objection, the sundry
documents were ordered to be printed in
.agreement on principles to implement a
truce: forces of each faction will remain in
their previous positions: frontline forces
and military supplies are not to be increased;
and troops of the three factions will not at-
tack each other.
August 22, 1062: Several companies of pro-
Communist Pathet Lao troops attack out-
posts of rightist forces near Sam Neua in
northeastern Laos.
November 27, 1962: U.S. Cr423 cargo plane,
flying rice and other supplies to neutralist
forces, is shot down over the Plaine des
Jarres. Two American airmen are killed and
one wounded. Investigation shows that the
plane was shot down by dissident neutralist
troops tied up with Pathet Lao.
April 4, 1063: Premier Souvanna Phouma
announces that Pathet Liao troops have at-
tacked neutralist troops of Gen. Kong Le in
the Plains des Jarres. On April 8 the U.S.
State Department accuses the Pathet Lao of
a.serious violation of the cease-fire.
April 15, 1983: Following brief cease-fire,
fighting breaks out again on the Plains des
Jarres. The neutralist forces of Gen. Kong
Le are attacked and suffer new setbacks. On
April 16 U.S. Under Secretary of State George
Ball says that the United States does not
rule out the possibility of sending troops
into Laos if the situation should continue to
deteriorate. Warnings are also issued by Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk on April 18 and
President Kennedy on April 19.
May 3, 1963: Pathet Lao troops fire on two
helicopters of the International Control Com-
mission in the Plains des Jarres, destroying
one and wounding four occupants. On May
10, U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger accuses
the Pathet Lao of disrupting the peace and
violating the Geneva accords, and he says
that the United States will never leave Laos
standing alone "to face its enemies from
within and abroad."
May 21, 1983: Premier Souvanna Phouma
issues communique stating that severe fight-
ing has been going on for 2 clays in the
Plains des Jarres between Pathet Lao troops
and neutralist forces. On May 23, the ICC
asks Britain and the Soviet Union to issue
immediate appeal for a cease-fire on the
Plains des Jarres.
June 1, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma
charges that Pathet Lao forces are continu-
ing their attacks, resumed on May 30, against
neutralist positions near the Plains des
Jarres.
September 7, 1983: U.S. C-47 unarmed
cargo plane is shot down by Pathet Lao in
central Laos. The government says they
carry only rice and other relief supplies.
September 9, 1963: Fighting breaks out in
Vientiane between the Pathet Lao and the
rightist police force under Deputy Premier
Phoumi Nosavan.
November 17; 1983: Cease-fire is broken as
flght;l ng resumes in the Plains des Jarres.
Talks between neutralist and Pathet Lao
military leaders subsequently break down
as the Pathet Lao rejects a proposal for the
ICC to police the cease-fire.
January 29, 1964: Neutralist military head-
quarters reports that six Pathet Lao and four
North Vietnamese battalions have launched
an attack In southern Laos, have defeated
neutralist and rightist forces at Na Kay, and
are now heading toward the the strategic
post o4 Thakhek.
April. 19, 1964: Military coup in Vientiane,
organised by rightist army officers, ousts gov-
ernment of Premier Souvanna. Coup lead-
Washington, D.C., May 28, 1964. mier's failure to establish peace In Laos.
To: Hon. THOMAS J. DODD. May 15, 1964: The Laotian Government re-
From: Foreign Affairs Division. ports that Pathet Lao forces have seized Tha
Subject: List of violations by the Commu- Thom, a key town about 90 miles northeast
nist Pathet Lao of the Geneva armistice of Vientiane. It also reports that an attack
of 1961-62. on the defense perimeter of Paksano is Immi-
July 27, 1982: Laotian cease-fire committee nent. On May 16, Pathet Lao forces renew
of the three factions (neutralists, rightists, attacks on neutralist position on the Plains
and pro-Communist Pathet Lao) reaches an des Jarres. A State Department Spokesman
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
calls the new attacks a "flagrant and open
violation" of the Geneva accords of 1961-62.
DAVID E. LoCKWOOD,
Analyst in Far Eastern Afairs.
A NEW PoLTCY FOR VIETNAM
(Statement by the American Friends of Viet-
nam)
THE DILEMMA
If we are to identify wisely our most effec-
tive forward course in Vietnam, it is impor-
tant first to understand the exact nature of
our dilemma there. We know the inherent
generosity, both toward free Vietnam and its
neighboring countries, which has led us to
Involve our substance and our blood. We
know that but for our commitment, free Viet-
nam would long since have fallen into the
political darkness and physical despair which
oppresses Communist North Vietnam. We
know that our presence there is in response
to the wish of most segments of Vietnamese
leadership, however they differ among them-
selves on other matters. We know that our
presence there is earnestly desired by most
neighboring countries of southeast Asia. We
know that our purpose is to assist responsible
a:nd responsive government and to enable
Vietnam and its neighbors to maintain na-
tional independence against external en-
croachment. We know that we have neither
wished to "establish" nor "dominate" a Viet-
namese government nor to seek for ourselves
political, military, or economic advantage.
Our dilemma flows in part from the fact
that this knowledge is not shared by all of
the Vietnamese people, is not accepted by the
members of the Vietcong, is not believed 1n
parts of the less developed world still suf-
fering the scars of recent colonial experience.
Nor, in fact; is this understanding uniformly
shared by our own people.
The dilemma is sharpened further by a
spreading doubt among leadership elements
In independent southeast Asian countries
that the United States has staying power.
Thailand's foreign minister, Thanat Kho-
man, recently warned members of the Over-
seas Press Club: "The Thai Government
knows much better but some people are not-
sure we can depend on outside help-especial-
ly when there is so much talk of quitting and
going home. The Communists have never
spoken that line of quitting. When they go
some place they stay there."
In part, at least, this skepticism is fos-
tered by the doubt among some Americans
that any valid purpose led to our presence
in Vietnam in the first place.
THE ALTERNATIVES
The lack of public understanding flows in
part from inadequate examination of the
alternatives confronting the United States
now. In our opinion there are six choices:
y-' 1. Continue as now. Whether or not the
Vietcong are, in fact, increasing their of
fectlveness there is a growing conviction in
Salgan, in the United States, and in much
of the rest of the world, that this is so.
This alone makes continuation of our present
policy undesirable. The overriding hazard
of the present policy is the undeniable fact
that it has not provided sufficient psycho
logical and political potency to sustain a
Vietnamese Government.
2. Withdraw. This would violate our pledge
not to abandon the Vietnamese people. It
would manifest throughout the world a U.S.
inability to long sustain an effort designed
to frustrate Communist intentions. The lm-
plications would be read as eloquently in
Berlin or In Cuba, as they would be in Viet-
nam, Indonesia, or India. There can be no
question that this alternative would require
the Governments of the Philllppines, Thai-
land, Taiwan, India, Japan, to reassess totally
present policy and to reorient~toward-what
would be the dominating new facts of Asian
life.
("Neutralization" of Vietnam is not sug-
gested here for a simple reason: genuine and
reliable neutralization of Vietnam is not pos-
sible at the present time. What is most often
talked of in this connection is merely a,
rhetorical euphemism designed to make
withdrawal more palatable. On the other
hand, the proposals discussed here are valu-
able to part precisely because they do hold
the promise that they may generate sufficient
free Vietnamese vitality to make true and
assured neutralization possible at some
future time.)
3. Military cordon sanitaire across Viet-
nam and Laos. An estimated military force
of up to 100,000 would be involved in mak-
ing such a cordon truly effective and enemy
penetration genuinely hazardous, Its great-
est contribution would be in providing hard
evidence of new determination to maintain
southeast Asian integrity. Although mili-
tary effect of interdicting the Vietcong's
transport and supply may be limited, it is
nonetheless one useful alternative, espe
cially when employed with other steps out-
lined here.
4. Extend military action to the north.
Until last week, steps taken in this di-
rection were, In our judgment, not suffi-
ciently explicit, either to rekindle Vietnam-
ese faith in our intentions or to inspire con-
fidence in other Asian countries that we are
indeed willing to accept risk as the price
of our commitment to freedom. The in-
creased"external, Communist intervention In
South Vietnam has made it both reasonable
and essential that there be a vigorous anti-
Communist military response. The limited
air strikes in North Vietnam by American
and Vietnamese planes constituted such an
appropriate response.
There are many other forms of stronger
American action and involvement and they
are not mutually exclusive. They include:
(a) Formation of an open, well-publicized
North Vietnam liberation movement spon-
soring major psychological operations pro-
grams, including paramilitary action, against
the North Vietnamese regime.
(b) Establishment of an International
Voluntary Corps dedicated to the mainte-
nance of free nations in the Mekong basin.
This corps should consist primarily of vol-
unteers from Asian countries but may also
contain a liberal admixture of Americans
with military experience. Operating nor-
mally in small units with sufficient air sup-
port, this force-under the sponsorship of
the proposed North Vietnam Liberation
Movement-would, harass the enemy wher-
ever suitable targets exist, including targets
within North Vietnam.
(c) Positioning of U.S. combat forces
within South Vietnam to act as a general
reserve-a sizable firefighting force. Such
a military contingent (perhaps as many as
two brigades) should not be used for routine
combat or security duties, but as an Imme-
diate-reaction fighting force intended to
engage Vietcong troops in fixed positions.
Desirably, combat elements from other na-
tions will be attached to this force.
(d) Continued bombing of selected mili-
tary targets In North Vietnam. In contrast
to the indiscriminate terrorist activity of the
Vietcong in South Vietnam, the free world's
concern for the Vietnamese people in both
halves of the country make it undesirable for
us to conduct warfare upon cities where the
innocent will be hurt. However, those mili-
tary targets in North Vietnam which are vital
to their aggressive capability and which can
be destroyed with our assistance are, in our
view, legitimate targets for stage-by-stage
destruction.
What is the risk involved in such action?
In our judgment the possibility of Chinese
involvement in South Vietnam would be only
slightly increased. The ;possibility of Chi-
nese help thrust upon North Vietnam would
be greater. However, this probability may be
precisely what is needed to make clear to
even the most Communist leaders of North
Vietnam how undesirable such help is to
them in the long run. A heightened aware-
ness .of this danger might, in fact, force
greater restraint upon the Government In
Hanoi than our present policy can achieve.
Frankly, however, the direct military dam-
age inflicted on the Communist regime in
North Vietnam is th.e lesser of our reasons
for suggesting that these steps be under-
taken.. In our opinion, it is urgent that the
people of free Vietnam be assured that Presi-
dent Johnson means what he says-that we
mean to stay and help, no matter what risks
we must incur. It is equally urgent that
these intentions be understood also in
Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia,
the rest of Asia, and the world. Stanch,
long-term American commitment-fully
communicated and understood-would pro-
vide a lift to morale in free Vietnam, inject
new vitality in the Vietnamese Government
and require a new assessment of the United
States among neighboring countries and
among Asian allies elsewhere.
There is one final reason we support this
painful, course of action. Basic require-
ments for victory in Viettia.m are not primar-
fly military. They are psychological, social,
a.nd economic. Below we address ourselves
to instruments which can meet the nonmili-
tary aspects of the undertaking. But neither -
the economic nor political measures we pro-
pose will get off the ground without evidence
o:f the seriousness of our. military intention
Nor will our military commitment produce
the desired results without the companion
economic and psychological supports.
America's experience in. relation to the in-
stability in postwar Europe is clearly rele-
vant. The Marshall plan did not begin to
come to life until the physical security prom-
ised by NATO was added. Nor would NATO
by itself have been meaningful without the
human vision and economic future presented
by the Marshall plan.
#i. Forging a more popular or responsive
government. It is clear that the difficulties
confronting any Vietnamese Government un-
der Communist attack are enormous. We
can but sympathize with those who carry
the burdens of government in circumstances
so frustrating and continuously demanding.
It is possible that 20 years of civil war, co-
lord.al war, and Communist insurrectionary
war, have so debilitated the structure of gov-
errunent as to preclude the immediate pos-
siblity, no matter how desirable, of absolutely
stable government. There are political per-
soriaitiea with nationalist backgrounds who
are deserving of our help and encourage-
ment, We must do what we can to help them
and. bring them forward. At t'he same time,
we must help to diminish the ;present conflict
of personalities that has proved In past years
to be so destructive. In any event, we believe
it is futile to concentrate, as we have in the
past, on personalities, rather than on pur-
poses, ideas, and Institutions.
d. injection of new purpose. If charis-
matlr, leadership is unavailable, charismatic
purpose can be found. One aspect of that
purpose involves the modest extension of
military effort discussed above. It Involves
the clear demonstration that the United
States means to remain committed even at
enlarged risk. And such charismatic pur-
pose must, of necessity, accept as workable
"the best available choices of Vietnamese
Government personnel"-choices made by
the Vietnamese not by us. But our object
would be to harness our\milttary commit-
ment and the Vietnamese effort to an in-
finitely larger objective than has previously
motivated our participation. It would make
crystal clear that the objectives which unite
us with the Vietnamese people, as with our
other allies on southeast Asia, .are construc-
tive and inextricably. linked to the welfare
of all doutheaat Asian peoples.
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We suggest that all of our military, po-
litical, and economic programs in Vietnam be
subordinated to a massive southeast Asian
development program. A Johnsolt plan for
the full, flowering of southeast Asian econom-
ic resources and independence will have as
much potency and promise for success in
that corner of the world ae the Marshall plan
did !n Europe and the Tennessee Valley Au-
thorit,y in the United States.
The: Mekong Basin !s one of the world's
richest and least developed areas. In an
area of the world already food rich there ie an
opportunity to harness the tributaries oP the
Mekong Basin toward an economic flowering
offering infinite promise to Laos, Cambodia,
and Thalland ps well as to South Vietnam,
and offering to the people and the Govern=
ment of North Vietnam economic oppor-
tunity which only their blindness or non-
cooperation can frustrate. To Burma, Malay-
sia, and even India, this would present an op?
portunity" in both economic and political
terms which, especially at this moment, could
not possibly be more desirable. To the
Philippines such a program would provide
the ea.me Inagna~tic opportunity for participa-
tion axs led them generously to create and
man Operation Brotherhood a decade ago.
It would also offer the first possibllitp of
really involving the wealth and energy of the
Japanese Government and people. A John-
son tevelopment plan for southeast Aata
would manifest to the entire world that the
welfare of the people of southeast Asia 1s
our onlq purpose.
The Mekong Baeln development program
will provide for the first' time a' iuture-
orient;ed thrust around which a Vietnamese
resurl;ency program can be made vital and
toward which the efforts of Americana, Ja-
panese, Lao, Thai, Cambodians, and Filipinos
can hopefully ba attracted.
sustain popular support of Vietnamese Gov-
ernment leaders.
2. It will infuse new en.erpp into the Viet-
namese already risking their lives !n daily
defense against the Vietcong.
3. The plan offers concrete reasons for the
cooperative involvement of neighboring
southeast Asian countries as well as a gener-
ous commitment able to ausi,ain emotionally
an international corps of volunteers.
4. It contains an enormous Incentive to
North Vietnam to turn away from its present
fratricidal course.
b. Finally, the Johnson plan constitutes a
pioneering laboratory of hopeful consequence
to other leas developed arena where Commu-
nist insurrectionary warfare presently finds
soil in which to sow the setnal convention,
'supporting whatever action la necessary tai
win in South Vietnam. The text of Com-
mander Jenkins' telegram to .President John-
son follows:
.THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Th0 VetRran$ Oi FOr--
eign Wara wholeheartedly artd without rea-
ervatfon supports your decision in taking
retaliatory armed action against the Com-
munist aggressors in North Vietnam. Your
wise and bold decision in this matter will go
far toward assuring our allies tlu?oughout all
-Asia that the IInited Staters stands by its
commitments and will not be intimidated by
Communist threats and aggressive action.
U.S. action against North Vietnam !s en-
tirely conaiatent with the unanimously
passed resolution of our 1984 VFW national
convention which called for ail action nec-
essary to win in South Vietnam, The VFW,
consisting of 1,800,000 overseas combat vet-
erans fully recognizes that communism has
launched a deliberate attark against all
southeast Asia and, consequently, the inter-
;eat of U.S, security and the cnuae of free-
dom Can be protected, !n the final analysis,.
only by the judicious and willing use of
military power.
THE MISSING LINK
Wil;hin the last 3 years the Communist
nations have revealed their inability to meet
their own most pressing economio needs.
The shortcut to the future has suddenly
proved to be a dead end of economic failure,
recrlrpination, and political embarrassment.
But this has not frustrated the wars of na-
tionail liberation nor prevented the Com-
muntata from mounting insurrectionary war-
tare whether in Congo or Vietnam. Nfltional
governments and native peoples assaulted by
such Communist ? purposes have, at -best,
sought to sustain their own energy through
defensive effort. Virtually unused has been
the enormous potential for hope which can
be found only in the non-Communist, world,
cooperatively employing the resources of the
United Staten and nations friendly to !t
whether !n Asia, the Paciflo, or Western
Europe.
We have offered to the Vietnamese people
our assistance in their struggle for national
: independence. We have Palled, however, to
harness that struggle and our assistance to
an al:l but miraculous future, a flowering of
man, his capab111tiee, his resources, his aspt-
ratiolxs. Ours indeed !s the truly revolu-
~ tionwry opportunity. The Johnson plan '
offers to southeast Asla a genuine oppor-
tunit;y to harness nature, enlarge justice, ex-
tend llife, eradicate the scourges of illness and
illiteracy and enable long-suffering peoples
to reap the fruits of their soil and the"per-
manent benefits of national independence.
Sehlitd this large vision, men throughout the
world. may be led to voluntary associAtian in
Lincoln Brigadss, Oandhi 8rlgadea, Mag-
saysa;y, and Marti 8rlgadea--an international
volunteer corps ftir peace and freedom.
Tht~ Johnson plan for Cher development of
the Nfekong Basin has, in our judgment, the
following potential, essentially unavailable
Sn the present ciI'aumatantxe:
1. It will inject dramatic, viable, and po-
1ltiballly potent new purpose adequate tQ .
JOHN A. JE~.NKINa,
Commander fn ChfeJ, Veterans of For-
eign Wars of the United States.
1. THE CONTINUING RESI,37?ANCE
[From the New York Times, July 91, 1984]
"PLEASANT VALLEY": A VIETNAMESE BUCCESa
f3TORY~~IAIGON'9 FORCES WRF:aT AREA FROM
STRONG RED CONTROL-"f3HOw CONFIDENCE
IN PEOPLE, ' MAJOR SAYS OU-- I;IB METHOD
(By Jack Raymond)
PHavG CHAT, SavTH VIETNAM, July 2Q; In
Vietnamese, Phouc Chai meaner "pretty val-
ley," and that fa just what this collection
of hamlets is. It represents a success story
in South Vietnam's desperate etruggie to de-
feat the Communist insurgency.
Phoua Chai Sa about 46 miles west of
Tamkp, in the northern part ome who had held positions under
the Vietc;nxtg, he gave new asaignmextis?
"i recoX.tunended no executions," Mtijor Tho
added. ".T, wanted to win the confldeitce of
the people. I called the chief vtllal;er. and
asked h11n how he had organized the villages,
and with a Paw changes I let the orga.txlv,,ttian
run the seine old way for the time belttg.
"I wanted to show that we would lm~Stect
the people against the Vietcong, and I pro-
vided apec:lnl guards for those who tonic tlseke
as village Adminfatratom and ItaMlet'ohleis.
Every night I disouesed village problelris With
the chiefs.:"" '
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WEAPONS ARE REDL4TRIRUTED
Then Major Tho collected weapons. He
p~ald for all that were turned in. Most were
rifles and ~rbinea of varied origin. Some
grere American, captured from Government
forces, and others were Russian and Chinese
brought in from North Vietnam.
After collecting all the weapons, the major
added, be redistributed them in the hamlets.
"I wanted to show confidence in the peo-
ple," the major recalled. "I said, 'Hors, take
the weapons, and use them against tho Viet-
cong ii they bother you."'
Major Tho retained one hamlet chief who
had worked for the Vietcong, but he sent him
to higher headquarters for questioning. The
man died while traveling, and Major Tho or-
dered the body brought back for burial. He
arranged a big funerah
GESTURE WITiI A MORAL
"I make propaganda, too," Major Tho ex-
plained with a smile. "I wanted to show that
even those who had served with the Vietcong
a~uld be forgiven and could take a proper
place In our community."
Now 10 Government hamlets flourish in a
valley that was once a Vietcong stronghold.
AB Major Tho accompanied a visitor on a jeep
ride to meet the people, they greeted him
with apparent pleasure and showed o8 a new
s~shool. Pupils on roughhewn benches in a
big shack were writing the alphabet in note-
books.
There have been no incidents in the valley
for more than 4 months, and the Vietcong
have apparently been unable to reestablish
finks with villagers who were once more than
ready to help them.
Yet all around the valley, the Vietcong are
known to patrol in strength.
"They set up ambushes," the major said,
"but they do nat come within 2 or 3 miles
of the valley. We have established good
morale here."
[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 28, 1984]
y.rE!'NAM HAMLET REPrrLSEa REDS-PENTAGON
RELEASEa ACCOUNT OF RECENT CLASH
(By Mark S. Watson)
WASHINGTON, September 2b.-Messages
from the IIS. command in South Vietnam
today permitted the Pentagon to supply in
almost unprecedented detail an account of a
well-conducted defense and counterattack
recently, with the South Vietnam Govern-
aientforces gaining a substantial euccesa over
Vietcong guerrillas.
It was at and near Luong Phu, a little
hamlet of some 76 men, women, and children
~ in the swampy delta of the Mekong River,
southwest of Saigon. This is the region
where the Communist Vietcong has Long
been generally in control, even before 1964
grhen the beaten and discouraged French
grlthdrew from southeast Asia.
LOYAL TO GOVERNMENT
Luong Phu, largely because it remained
loyal to the government has long been sub-
jected to Communist harassment, the dis-
patch from Saigon mentioning b0 incic~enta
tlhus far in 1984, including 16 genuine at-
tacks, of which the latest was the moat
violent.
In the official account of this occasion
there were several aspects so important as
t,~ attract attention.
1. The 40 men composing the hamlot's
own defense, only lightly armed, held off
the attack, with temporary lose of only an
a:nuaunitlon bunker:
2. A group of them had the a Irit to
a~unterattack and regain the bunk~r with-
out loss of its contents, but wltti four of the
loyal force killed.
.RELIEF 1'ORCEa CALLED
8. A;ellef ioroe, summoned by radio; Dame
grithta artlllery range and provided qutok
asstetanae to the defense., ,. .., , .
4. The relief force commander, moving in
by a II.B. landing craft (ono of five Sa the
Mekong Dettn's rivers) was warned by one
of his agents that a Vietcong force was in
ambush near the riverbnnk, awaiting him,
after the familiar guerrilla, practice.
He opena3 fire on the hidden glerrillas
and broke u,p the ambush with large cas'ual-
tlea, his own craft taking only one carious
shot from tho guerrillas' 67-millimeter .rifle.
The relief of Luong Phu was completed, with
40 enemy dead around it and a larger number
1n the ambush party carried away by river
boats.
It was this combination of stout resistance
at the attack point, prompt radio report to
the district command, quick advance of relief
forces, and aleri;ness to the danger of am-
bush, with which the Saigon authorities are
obviously moat pleased.
PATTERN OI' COUNTERINSURGENCY
Thta is the pattern of their countorin-
surgency training, but nobody pretends that
!t is easy to accomplish that operation with
all its four phases perfectly executed. W1:th
any of the four missing, the whale opera-
tion has small chance of success.
The landing craft and patrol boats and
motorized junks on the several rivers and
canals are-save for the helicopters--tile
prime means of. rapid movement of rolri-
iorcing troops and weapons. They make
possible a fairly rapid use of gone and heavy
mortars.
The other artillery application is by'
mounts of single guns in an entrenched posi-
tion (dotted over the countryside) permit-
ting movement of the gun throughout 880"
and prompt laying of fire on any target
within range.
This method presupposes the existence of
excellent maps and prime ability to use them
effectively for fire or an unseen target. A
moat encouraging aspect of the war in soutlx
Vietnam !a that the maps do exist and that
there is inereating skill in their efficient usD.
CONTINUING MYSTERY
There is one continuing mystery- in Viet-
nam, namely the reason for tho Vietcong
guerrillas' strange failure to tako wide ad-
vantage of the South Vietnam Government's
semiparalyais as a result of the most recent
coup. It would have seemed the !deal tlma
for massive assaults.
A growing theory to that the guerrilla
movement has been hurt more than fe gen-
erally realized, and compelled to slow down
for a time in order tc> regather strength for
another strong assault at widely scattered
points.
Such an assault is still thought likely, the
surprise being that 1't was not timed to take
advantage of governmental confusion.
[From-the Evening Star, Nov. 9, 1984]
VIETNAM VILLAGERa FICHT GN
(By Margucorlte Higgins) '
MEKONG DELTA, f30VTH VIETNAM: F'i'Om th0
distance the boom of artillery sounded a
steady reminder that ills irontlines of the
war were at hand.
A few rice paddies away there was the _-
authoritative crackio of small arms fire which
was, as to be expected, harassing the heli-
copter that was whirring down on the dirt
road next to the quaint and charming little
village of thatched roofs that now gave haven
to tho broken bodies of two American
sergeants killed by an electrically detonated
landmine, l
It was a road of bf tier memories, this
muddy, tortured dirt lane surrounded by
emerald green rice paddies and a deceptively
lyrical and limpid stream is which the b1g-
eyed children played, not even .looking up
when the angry machinegun burets got
Close and mere adults looked for cover.
In the summer of 19f33 there had been a
nasty fire--fight on the road, in which several
American reporters lost face but not muck
else when they made a run for it. In Novem-
ber 1969 this reporter revisited the road
and its villages an the day that it claimed.
the lives of twa TJnited Nations agricultural
workers. And new the death of the two ser-
geants.
FAMII;IEa FIGHT REDS
Yet, at the exld of the road 1s a email
village-Van Thien--whose 160 families have
been overrun six times by the Vietcong and
who still fight back. And one reason they
fight back is beraure every day American
advisers and Vietnamese soldiers, American
aid teams and Vietnamese engineers defy
the danger and travel back and forth with
their guns and supplies and medicines to help
Van Thien try to e;uiy free.
And this is the re:nl miracle of South Viet-
nam-this Pact that somehow the war :Is stilt
sought anywhere at all with devotion and
sacrifice and hope despite the selfish joust-
inga of the politicians in Saigon, the power
plays of the military, the riots of the draft-
dodging students and the political poisons
spread by a handfill of power-hungry Bud-
dhiat leaders whose Intrigues are totally dis-
approved by the genuinely religious Bud-
dhiatshere in the countryside.
Indeed, here in tlxis section of the delta,
I found the progress of the war far less de-
pressing than I had expected. Chaos, lack of
direction, arbitrary arrests, and purges have
taken their toll, of course. But in giddy,
gaudy Saigon the spoked intellectuals and
politicians do not knew the Vietcong first-
hand and can indulge their political death
wishes with a garlahl.y gay ignorance of what
would happen to them if the Communists
took over.
VIETCONG .aEPREDATIONa
But in ,Van Thien it to only a short mo-
ment in time since tlxe Vietcong disembow-
eled the wife of the dLvtrict chief and kid-
naped 14 youngsters of the village. so long
ae there is the aightest hope of real and
effective outside help against the Vietcong,
the people will fight to keep them out of the
Van Thiens of the delta.
Mytho is the headquarters for the 7th
Vietnamese Division, wixich guards four key
provinces in the delta. When I first visited
Van Thien 1n the suanmer of 1983, it had
just been liberated for the first time from a
long period of Vietcong rule. And elsewhere
1n the delta, the fight against the Cotnnlu-
nists, while tough and hard, was beginning
to show results. That: summer perhaps 64
;percent of the population !n these key four
provinces were under central Vietnamese
control.
Then came' the coup d'etat o! November
1983, the murder of Diern and Nhu, the die- .,
integration of the entire fabric of Vietnam-
oae governmental structure, ail of which
was taken as a signal by the Vietcong to
really go on the warpath. Ae a consequence,
`t+hen this reporter revisited the 7th Division
provinces SII late Novemhrr 1983, it had been
impossible to even go near :many areas that
had been clean and cl~+ar of Vietcong the
previous summer. By early 1984, the Viet-
namese controlled less i,;llan 26 percent of
these lour provinces.
f NEED TO BTAr/1' OVER
"And so; ? said the American colonel in
Mytho, "we had to start avor. By April, we
got anew and leas ambltiaua paclflcatlon
program. Somehow deap:lte the tumult in
ttue cities the supplies kept coming. F.very-
tlme anew coup d'etat was rumored overy-
tlking ground to a halt, of rourse.
"slowly and painfully {q'e have gone back
into village after village. It has been lseart-
wa;rming to see places where we began with
desorted . marketplscee and burned school-
houses soon- make a comebaok and become
bustling agala..I think we Dan win this war
against the. Vietcong. I am an optimist.
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"There has never been a desertion from
this camp and there will not be;' the Viet-
namese captain said with pride.
"Were hie men hapLry with the new regime'
in Saigon?" I asked.
"Madam," said the Vietnamese captain, "I
am an officer and not even I know the name
of the leader in Saigon. My men do not
fight for Saigon. Thtry fight for their vil-
lage. They fight because the Vietcong takes
their rice and steals their children and kills
their kinfolk, They fight because the Arner-
lcans give them rice slid the American doc-
tor treats their wile and Children. And that
ie how it ie."
Finally, it was 4 o'clock and the sir was
electric with -good news. "Nobody hurt,"
said Mendoza after his curt quick radio ex-
change with the patrol.
When night came and it was time for more
reporters to leave, Mendoza ssw us o8 and
yelling against the noise of -the chopper
blades said something th[-t sounded like, "We
can take care of things up here it they can
just. keep those rioters quiet in Saigon."
It was the same high morale everywhere
at the front. And it made you so mad at the
so-called student and Btlddhlat rioters who
cause chaos back in the soft-living etty.
2. NORTH VIETNAMESE INTF.AVENTION
EIGHTY TONa OF VIETCONG ARMa UNCOVERED,
BID SHIP $VIQK
(By Peter Arnett)
TIIY Hon, VIETNAM,-By Par the biggest
haul of Communist weapons for the Vietcong
was uncovered yesterday, near a remote cove
Where a large mystery vessel was sighted and
sunk earlier in the week. Clfficials estimated.
80 tone of armaments-much of it Russian
and Chinese-had fallen irxto government.
hands.
Tho weapons, ammunltiotx, and medical
supplies, including whole blood, appafently
had been shipped along the Coast from Com-.
monist North Vietnam to equip Red guer-
rillas fighting in the Soutli, United States and
South Vietnamese ofRclals ssld.
"We thought the supply routes were
through Laoa and Cambodia, but look at
this lot," said Col. Theodore Mataxis, of
Seattle, Wash., a senior adviser. "They Could
easily be arming a new dlvlrion to launch
against us up here." '
CANDOVFLAGED aHn' B'DNK
The materiel was found ha the hull of the
sunken vessel and in caches on the beaches
of a cove on Vu1xg Ro Bay hero, 240' miles
northeast of Saigon and about? 80 miles south
of Nha Trang, site of a majcx' U.S. military
installation.
A routine helicopter patrol uncovered the
Cacho Tuesday. Flying over the bay, the
helicopter crew sighted what looked like a
drifting island. Then, heavy fire came up
from the island. It turned Dili to be a well-
camouflaged ship, about 400-feet long.
South Vietnamese fighter-bombers were
called in and sank the vessel.
Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh personally ordered
troops into the area. After heavy fighting,
tixey took over the cove and beach area Fri-
day, when some of the aa~mamenta wore
found.
A captured Communist guerrilla said the
ship had.madel six .trips to bays along Vlet-
nsm's central coast, dropping o8 supplies.
-Then yesterday the South Vietnamese un-
covered .more cac]xes. Cne area, said an
official, was "literally ,covered with weapons,
six deep:'
The haul included 1,000 Russian-made
carbines, several hundred Russian aub-
machineguna and light ma+:hineguna, and
Chinese burp gone. Ali Natl. been wrapped
in waterproof cloth.
Scores of tons of anununltlan were found
for these weapons, some of it .made as re-
centIy as Iasi year is C}iineae faotorlee; ao=
cording to ordaance experts at the scone.
There was also a selection of sophisticated
xntnea and grenades, and an'ununition for a
Ixow type of rocket laua~xcher used against
tanks.
The large supplies of captured medicines
llrcluded many cases of penicillin, antl-
m:alarial drugs, and who1C blood produced In
Japan late last year.
ONE BIG 9IIPPLY FACTORY
Four caches had been found up to late
,yesterday. Troops probini,; through the hills
turder the guns of Comtixttnist snipers ex-
pected to find more.
'''These hills are just orGe big supply fac-
tory," said Mataxls.
'.L'he extent of the Communist supply
depots shocked U.S. advisers.
":Chia is just massive," olxC said.
The Vietcong put up a dltermined fight
tC keep government troops from .the caches.
But they had to pull back. 13everal govern-
ment soldiers have been Ns111ed in isolated
mortar and sniping attacks.
C+crvernment forces intend to stay in the
region as long ae it is n.eressary to clear:
it of supplies.
Tho commander of the 2F.Id Division, Gen.
Luu Lan, said, "What we Nava found here is
of tremendous importance. 'I7io Communist
agN;ressors have been able to confuse people,
so tlxst the truth has been hard to discover.
"13th here we have discovered one lints,
of tlxe massive chain of weapons introduc-
tioxx into South Vietnam. 't'his is one of
the reasons why we and our American
allies. have had to take the a.ctlons we have
taken," the General said.
This was a reference to retaliatory air,
strikes in North Vietnam.
Menxbera of the Internatlanal Control
Commission, the organization created to
police "the Geneva accords bn Indochina,
were shown the arms haul by Khanh.
Tlxe commission is made up of Indian,
Canndlan and Polish delegates. Included
in the Communist medical atipplies were
drugs from Poland.
"You have to see for yourself how deeply
the V'letnameso people tear and hate the
Vletccrng if they think they can oppose them
and not have their throats cut. My team is-
workbag its heart out. -But all this is de-
pendent, of course, on some sort of stable
siren@; governmental direction:'
And, it !s precisely because so many fine,
peoplfr in the countryside are working their
hoartsi out-and giving their lives-that a
visit +to the front lines renews a sense of
fury Ill the intrigues in the city-intrigues
that may mean that all this devotion and.
dedice~tion here at the front will add up to.
nothing.
They war w-11 not be won in Saigon. But
Saigon can prevent it from being won.
[7P'rom the Washington Evening Star,
Dec. 9, 1984]
COIIRAGE AT VIETNAM OUTPOST
(Sy Marguerite Higgins)
PLEB ME, VIETMAN,-The morning had be-
gun a/ith a mine disaster. Literally. It was
a "Jumping Betty" mine-one of those that
? jumpli out of the dirt and explodes In the
sir. And so it had cruelly mangled the
bodies of 18 of the work detail that Capt.
Ronnie Mendoza, of Los Angeles, had sent to
repair' about three and a half miles of the
red flirt jungle road the Vietcong had
severed by digging great, gaping ditches
aGIOSa it.
~ Many of the wounded were only 11 to 14
years of age, children or relatives of the
Vietnamese and Montagnard (non-Mongol
rriountain people) soldiers who, along with
Captain Mendoza's 12-man team, use this
isolated outpost near the Lao border for
patrols and ambushes and other counter-
guerrlllal operations against the Vietcong.
COPTER ARRIVES
Sean the helicopter arrived at Plei Me to
lift out the wounded. The two pilots-
Capt. John Mustard, of Montesand, Wash.,
and C1apt. Chsrlio E. Bryant, of Ocilla, Ga.-
epoke~ feelingly of the courage with which
the big-eyed Vietnamese and Montagnard
children tried to suppress their cries of pain.
Thla is high, spectacular country where
the jungle covered mountains rise, steeply,
T,000 feet high and where air currents in
the intervening valleys can be tricky. The
helicopter bumped and. dipped as it fought
the turbulent currents,
From the air, Plei Me is sn eyesore with
Its barbed wire outer fences, its trenches, its
mortar emplacements and sandbags, its brick
and tin barracks building. It seems an im-
probable and unexpected scar in the green
jungle.
In this part of Vietnam the jungle trails
are prowled not just by the Communist Viet-
cong but by mighty tigers that European
huntrrs once traveled tar to shoot.
And despite the morning tragedy, -Men-.
doze had not been able to keep his mind
oft tYtose jungle trials because 100 men of
his Iipeclai forces, Including 2 American
sergeltnta, were out there on a week long+
patroa, 3 days of which had passed. Their
mission was to try and spot possible infll-,
tratiC~n routes and the supply dumps that
the C;ommunistm always prepare in advance
at poffnts a day's march apart.
Since hie men lxad last ohecked in by radio,
a lot of sniper fire hnd been heard in the
next Valley and Mendoza, a cool and con-
trolled sort, nonetheless was eagerly await-
ing tlxe next radio report which would Dome
at 4 p.m.
The: itinerdry of the ? patrol had been
worked out by Mendoza in consultation with
his Vietname~ counterpart, Capt. Nguyen
Van Thoi who was known all over the valley
as one of the few Vietnamese who could
command the loyalty of the Montagnarda.
I asked him li the morning ~xine casual-'
ties might Nave say e8eoi'on the metals oft
the soldiers.
- COMMUNIST BIIILIr1')P
U.f3. sources Bald the apparent buildup
of Cmxxrnunist arms along tlxe Coast may
coincide with reports that increased num-
bore of guerillas have been infiltrating
from :[forth Vietnam in the r~txst 3 days.
Tho Vietcong .have made . determined
attemp~#s in recent months to take over the
central Vietnamese region. They have
met with considerable success sa far.
Sonxe Americans expressed brlief the
Commun:lsta will use ships morn.. frequently
to supply the Vietcong.
U.S. jot planes have been att,ticking the
Communist supply routes through Com-
munlat~?held .territory in Laos?
[From the Baltimore Sun, Feb, il, 198b]
CONCEP:C OF "INTERNAL REVOLT" IN 130IITH
VIETNAM PIINCTVREU~
(By Mark S. Watson)
WABIIINGTON, February S0.-From the tor-
rent of events in southeast Asta since the
weekend one politically useful foot emerges.
That is tlxe wall-publicized radio order from
Communist Vietcong headquarters in the
north to all Vietcong agents south of -the
border #.o redouble their activities hnmedl-
ately.
The promptness with which the order was
obeyed at; widely separated points shows how
well organized are the Vletcong'ra Controls.
But more important in its long-raxige politi-
cal e8e+;t;r may be this plain proof of a fact
that hi:thorto the Communist leaders have
denied; namely, that the whole interxxtil re-
volt in !"south Vietnam is, and e,lcvays hoe
beon, skillfully engineered from FMOd head-
quarters,.far to-the north.. _ .
WORLD OPINION D16CII88CD''~
The vlatlm of assassination tb not gCeatiy
cancernbd with who kills ]him. But world
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3284. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE February ~3
public opinion, which communism has tried
for years to delude with this "internal revolt"
fiction, now is in better position to know that
even while the Communist powers were
agreeing to the Geneva neutralization pact
the Communist machine in North Vietnam
was already beginning !ta subversion and
assassination program in the south.
In this program of deception a large in-
fluence was the International Control Com-
mission, set up to assure that the pledges of
neutrality were kept. By 1981, reports of
? 1,200 offensive "incidents" by Communist
agents, ranging from one-man assassinations
to fairly large scale military actions, had been
laid before the commission. None was acted
on.
The reason given by an American White
Paper was that the Polish Communist mem-
any charge that might embarrass the Com-
munist Vietcong, and the Indian member re-
fused to start an Snquiry that would em-
barrass his Polish colleague. Opposed by
two, the one remaining member, the Cana-
dian, was powerless.
LEADEAB KNOWN
For some reason, possibly the dift3culty in
remembering the oriental names, the Viet-
cong leaders have, with two exceptions, re-
maflxed largely unknown to the American
public.
There is no mystery about the others, for
captured or defecting Vietcong agents and
officers have divulged almost all details of the
Red machine for which they worked. Full
information about that complex and aur-
prlsingly efficient mechanism and its oper-
ators at all levels now can be reported with-
out endangering security.
Of the two familiar names one fa that oP
Ho Chi Minh, head of the North Vietnam
political government and of 1ta Lao Dong
(Workers) Party, and tirelessly active Sn its
all-important Central Research (Intelligence
and Operations) Agency and other working
elements. Tho other fairly familiar name is
that of Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense Minis-
ter, one of the world's great guerrilla leaders.
The Lao Dong Party follows the pattern of
General, Ho Chi Minh, that of Russia's usual
one-man-in-two-jobs, premier of the nation
and secretary general of the party. The mili-
tary is subordinate to Ho, the political chief,
and all the way down the line and Into the
kindred Lao Dong of South Vietnam at all
levels the political leaders uniformly com-
mand the military. That is one way of as-
suring unity.
FRONT CREATED IN 1980
To provide a cloak of respectability and
conceal in some measure the responsibility
' of the Hanoi organizers with murder and in-
surrection against Saigon, Ho Chf Minh in
1980 created the "Front for Liberation of
South Vietnam:'
It is still guided wholly by Ho Chi Minh's
Central Committee, immediately directing
work in the "South Central" zone (just south
of the 17th parallel border) and in the
"Nambo" region (south and southwest, in-
cluding Saigon and the Mekong Delta) .
For the Central Committee, supervision is
exercised in Hanoi by a "Committee for Su-,
pervasion of the South;' made up of Le Duc
Tho, of the Politburo, Phon Hung, Vice
Premier of North Vietnam, and Brig. Gen. Ng
uney Van Vlnh, chairman of the board for
reunification. Each of the two zones has its
own secretary general, a deputy and a dozen
members; each its -agencies for training,.
propaganda and action.
To this political Leadership the military, as
remarked, 1s subordinate. Its principals era
pa Vinh, who- fs indeed a member of that
Committee of the South but pointedly. a
"junior member"; Brig. pen. Nguyen Don, fn
oharge of military work in the South-Central,
'rioae but directly responsible to Tran Luong,
of the Lao Dong in Hanoi, and Brig. Gen. Van
Muol, similarly responsible to Muol Cua, a
politican.
Tho Central Research Agency, a prime "ac-
tion" unit for subversion, forgery, arming,
radio command, intelligence and military
command, fa actively directed by Ho Chi
Minh and Giap. Its prime center for disorder
in South Vietnam was at Vlnh Linlx, the tar-
get of Sunday's fierce bombing attack. Other
centers handle Cambodian and overseas 1n-
te111gerace, with Gen. Hoang Dao, Col. Le Caa
and Col. Van Trong as principal agents.
This is regarded as the agency chiefly re-
sponsible for conveying Ho Chf Minlx's direc-
tives straight to the guerrilla packets in
South Vietnam, and seeing that tlxe supply
bi men and weapons continues pouring over
the marry branches oP the sa-called Ho Chl
Minh trail Into South Vietnam.
[From tlxe Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1966]
AGGRESSION ADMITTF'D
(By Joseph Alsop)
At last, the administration's pol.lcymakera
are somewhat reluctantly admitting the hn-
portance of the North Vietnamese- troop
movements into South Vietnam and Laos.
Being clandestine, these Communist troop
movements were long and obstinately pooh-
poohed. Now, however, they are an? af6cially
acknowledged fact. While the tact is ad-
mated, it.9 meaning is still being played
down. Even the resulting solid proof of
North Vietnamese aggression has not been
greatly stressed. As for the military lnzplica-
Lions, they have been hardly me~ttioned;
yet they are potentially very great indeed.
hx Laos, to begin with, the whole balance
of the war has bean upset. It is a tiny war.
The non-Communist Laotians, although they
have fought very well against Laotian Com-
munit]t sympathizers, have always faired 111
in their rare engagements with Nortlx Viet-
namese units. Hence the appearance 1n Laos
of several additional North Vietnanxeso bat-
tallona changes the whole local outlook,
Because Lsoe is both a subsidiary wax thea-
ter and a corridor to South Vietnam, it is
not quite certain how the additional bat-
talions are to be used. Some think they are
intended for use in Laos, since they :have
moved into the heart of Ines to the went of
the corridor-region of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
If this is correct, the brliliant Communist
commander, Ge.n. V1 Nguyen Giap, must be
planning a semifinal test of strength in Latos.
Because of the generally misty chara.xter
of every Laotian situation, a prompt Anxeri-
can riposte to such a test of strength will
be extra diilicult. And a major Commurals~t
thrust in Laos will have the gravest rc+per-
cussiona in South Vietnam, unless the Anxeri-
can riposte is both prompt and massive.
It is equally possible, however, that theses
new battalions spotted in Laos care eventually
destined to be axxaved into Soui;h Vletnarn.
For n good many rnonths, organized battal-
ions of the North Vietnamese Army have be+sn
filtering into the South Vietnamese fight-
ing-moving by truck down the Ho Chi Minll
Trail to the Chepnae region, crossing the bor-
der in small bands, and then reforming anal
marching to thelx assigned areas of opera-
tions.
Thoro have long been plenty of signs to
-prove that the North. Vlotnameae had reached
the stage of sendhxg arganizrd battalions
'into the fighting, Instead of mere cadres to
lead their guerrillaxs. As noted, Tor instance,
!n this reporter's recent dispatches from
Saigon, young North Vietnamese army con-
scripts are sow quite often sound among
prisoners of war.
The invasion of. south Vietnam by two,
three, or even four new Communist bat-
talions per month may not sound like muoh
by the standards oP modern war. But this
war la Vietnam 1N ao~ bery' modern. Ara
entire province may bo defended by no :mare
than flue government battalions.
If the Comnxuntsts already have seven bat-
talions, as they do in Quang Nat Prov.tnce,
for instanoe, the addition of two more bat-
talions may cause the Dien Bien Phu-like
disaster that Sa General Giap's obvious aim
In this phase. That is the real meanirag of
the persistent Communist troop movement
into South Vietnam.
For this very reason, Gen. Maxwell Taylor
has repeatedly recommended stronger, nxnre
direct aatiorx against the North Vietnaracae.
He wanted something much more effective
than the brief retaliatory raid after the lrari-
dent in the Gulf of Tonkin. He wanted rr..-
taliation after the attack on the V.S. alrfl~ld
at Bien Hoa. Ho again asked for retaliation
after a V.S. olllcera barracks Sn Saigon waxy
destroyed by aCommunist-planted bomb,
The recommendations of General Taylor
were disapproved by President Johnson in
all three instances. As a leas dangerous sort
of retaliation, the President instead author-
ized bombing of the Ho Chi Minh T.ra11, first
by the Laotian air force, and then by the V.S.
fighter-bombers that recently destroyed a
key bridge at Ban Ban.
The degree of power this deployed against
the inflltratorra mady be gaged from the fact
that one-half the Laotian air force has just
been put out of action by a single accidental
bomb explosiorx 1n an airplane hangar. In ,
any case, mere, air attacks on the Ho Chl
Minh Trail are wildly unlikely to produce
any solid result, even fi made with 10 times
the power,
The truth is? I:1xa war in southeast Asia la:
steadily going from bad to worse. The
enemy fa getting bolder, and he is steadily ',
reinforcing his frontline troops. The rein-
forcement is not being countered. Hence
there is no hope of any counteroffensive, un-
less President Johnson has important sur-
prises up his sleeve.
Perhaps the President has such surprises
in preparation, for ]xe la a man of surprises,
But as of now, we are drifting toward final
defeat
[From the Waslxington Post, Jan. 23, 198b]
RED A6IAN BIITLDVF CONFIRMED
(By Al':uxrey Marder)
V.S. officials confirmed yesterday that there
has been increasefi infiltration of Communist
North Vietnamese tx~oc.>pa into Laos and South
Vietnam. But they called it a cause for
continuing concern, not sudden alarm.
The Communist buildup of forces in both
places during 198~I and continuing into re- '
cent weeks 1s slgxxlflcant in relative terms,
but not, a dramatic or grave turn, officials said.
In both on-the-record and background
comments, admtniatration officials sought to
demonstrate an attitude of skeptical calm-
ness about recently published reports that
the conflicts on the Indochina peninsula may
be approaching a stage of more mass:lve, open
warfare.
Few hard facts or figures were disclosed in
the process. Officials said more details
should be available. early next week after
consultatlona with the i7.S. mission in Saigon,
capital of South Vietnam.
It became lncreardn$ly evident yesterday
that both in South Vietnam and in Wash-
ington there are co.ntilcting interpertationa
about the facts and 'the significance of the
Increased ~Commwxlst infiltration.
Those o8lcfals moa:~t eager to strike more
directly at Communist bases in North Viet-
nam appear to interl.tret the infiltration re-
ports ae evidence to justify that. This
group believes the Comthuniats are inereas-
ingly preparing to shift from guerr111a tac-
tics to direct oliensives,
' But the less-alarmist sohool of thought
fates such a shift in Commualet etI'ategy as
unlikely.. '
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 325
Significantly, It 1e trio totter, less-alnrmist
group that holds the controlling viewpoint
irxslcfe the Johnson adminlstratlon.
The administration has endeavored to con-
vince congressional crttics of US. policy is
southeast Asia that this calmer attitude is
justilfled, and that American policy, heavily
colxumftted physically and psychologically. in.
Laos, and South Vietnam, should continue in
its present framework.
To buttress that position, administration
officiate said that white there has been in-
crea:eed Communist infiltration, North Viet-
nam. has by no means committed all its power
to either the Laotian or South Vietnamese
conflicts.
Perhaps more importantly, these officials
assert, the Chlneae Communists, who give
the North Vietnamese moral and physical
support, continue to demonstrate consider-
able caution about any direct involvement
with the United States.
State Department Press Officer Robert J.
McCloskey Bald yesterday that there have
been indications in recent weeks of North
Vietnamese military movements Into south-
ern and central Laos.
'McCloskey said he could riot state either
the size or objective of the inflltratlon. He
said? in answer to questions, that the troop
movements might or might not be a seasonal
increase coinciding with the ending of the
rainy season, a shifting of forces, or a move-
ment designed primarilq to send rainforce-
menta to South Vietnam.
Many officials here believe that the troops
are 'being funneled through the so-called Ho
Chi Mlnh aetwork of trails in Laos, for use
fa South Vietnam.
McCloskey described the situation as "a
oaus.e for concern but not for alarm." He
said, "We're following the situation closely."
Other authoritative sources said it appears
that. the thousands of South Vietnamese who
were being trained in North Vietnam for use
is the south are about used up, and that the
Communist northerners are now sending
down native-born men from the Red terri-
tory.
Brut white there have been published re-
ports that between 16,000 and 20,000 men
have been filtered into South Vietnam from
the north during IB84, official sources here
yesterday would speak only of "several
thousand" men. In addition, it was said,
thesis numbers have been offset bq an in-
creasing Gallup of South Vietnamese forces
to fight them.
III Lass, officials said that since last Maq,
when U.$. T-28 "reconnaissance" and "ex-
port" planes were sent to to help the royal
Government withstand the. Communist
Patlxet Lao and North Vietnamese, the neu-
trallst central regimes position has improved
considerablq.
What has helped improve it fa what officials
will not admit publicly-the air pounding of
ConunurI~~fat positions by American jet fight-
ers durifxg recent months.
(From the New York Times, June 26, 1984]
HAnfOI IMPROVES $IIPPLT LINE TC $OVTH VIa'I'-
~ NAM-MORE TROOPa CROaB LAOS BT HO CHI
MtNH TRAarANALT6TS FEAR LAR6S FORCE
MCAT OPEN NSW FRONT
(By Hedrick Smith).
Y,~ASHINCTON, Juno 2b.-Recent U.$. re-
connafssance missions have confirmed earlier
reports that Communist forces have been
improving their road network in southern
Laos and have conelderablq stepped up the
peas of their supply convoys there.
has long been one of the prluc:lpal supply
routes from North Vietnam t+a Communist
guerrillas In South Vietnam.
Officials declined to glue precise figures on
the number of trucks recently Been operating
!n the Tchepone region, but Intelligence esti-
mates "indicate that roughly 3,000 North
Vietnamese troops are on more or less perma-
nent duty in southeastern Leas near the
$oxith Vietnamese border.
asAR oa r~Ew MovES xIltS3
This concentration and the increases in
supply convoys during the recent dry season
are reported to have raised fears among
U.$. officials, lnficludtng Ambassador Henry
Cabot Lodge, about North Vietnamese inten-
tions.
Officials have been worried for fear the
Communists might trq to lnflltrattl large
forces across the Laotian border into the
central Vietnamese highlands wl1lle South
Vietnamese Government forces ware largely
concentrating on fighting guerrillas south of
Saigon.
Other officials suspect that the aptivity in
southern Laos may be a prelude to future
offensives against Saravane and Attopeu, two
rightwing strongholds in southern Laos,
Hostile forces nearly surround both .towns
now.
Since neither town !s Sn the Mekong Val-
ley, some analysts here are concerned lest the
Pathet Lao assume they can be attacked
without fear of American intervention. The
United States has often warned that 1te
mantle of protection extends over the
Mekong Valley bordering Thailand,
The stepped-up operations in southern
Laos, officials said, began last fall and have
Increased in tempo this spring since pro-
Communiet Pathet Lao unite gained control
of the Nakay Plateau in January.
These officials consider the southern opera-
tions to be unrelated to recent offensives by
Pathet Lao and North Vietnameao troops
around the Plains des Jarres lxx north-cen-
tral Laos.
That fighting, which
States toward the brink
rise now almost halted.
pushed the United
of a major cnnftict,
Although the ground fighting was con-
fined to the region north of Paksane, Laotian
Air Force T-28 fighter-bombers, supplied by
the United 6tates, have parried out strikes
this month against some Pathet Lao posi-
tions in southern Lnos as well.
Officials hors have also dropped hints that
some plans held Sn readiness would call for
the South Vietnamese Air Force to raid Com-
munist supply rautea in Laos and possibly in
North Vietnam.
So far such raids are considered a fairly
distant possibility. Premier Nguyen I{hanh
has told U.$. otfictale he fe opposed to carry-
ing the war beyond his borders until ho has
developed a more stable base at home.
Tha princlpaf roads from North Vietnam
into southern Laos are Route 8, from the city
of Vlnh through the Nape Pass, and Route
12 through the My Gin Pass, a bit farther
"south.
Since last fail, intelligence reports indi-
cated that the Communists were building up
Route 12-A to connect Route 12 at Nliom-
marnth with the town of Muong Phlne about
80 miles to tlxe south on Route 9.
From there, truck loads of troops and ahip-
menta of ammunition, weapons, fuel, medical
supplies, and other equipment were 'reported
moving east toward Tchepone on Route 9
and also down Route 23 tow:xrd Saravane, 80
.miles to the southwest, to Pathet Lao g?olding up travelers on the Puerto Bar-
rios Highway. Sut it appears avideat sow'
that the movement 1t recelvhas'.ltitntLr !x'ODl
outside source sa wall. '
Sanitized -Approved
BHIPMENT O# rVNDB
Th+r,rc~ has been considerable speculation
over the reported shipment last month of
~lOp,U00 in quetzals from a bank kxe:re'to a
New'.,7ork bank.
The 1~uatemala bank assumed fire caste
of coln.Dtiaelon, insurance and the ~i1xJp-.ping at
the go.ing rate of 1 percent for rile total
tranastr,#ion. There was no indlcatlon here
of rho klrntiflcation of the consigners in New
York. The Guatemala Governmext, while
it eniorrrs dollar control, does net ask for
details of quetzals-for-dollars traraaactlons.
The quetzal is on a par with the d.o.llar.
Thu theory prevalent here fa thrlt the un-
dorground movement is being su;pp:iled by
adheres#a traveling from Mexlna. This
theory, vaguely defined, holds that h #xansac-
tions such as the quetzal-dollar excllange rho
messengers far the guerrilla forces ext:ruggle
in the Fonda from Mexico. The question of
finances arises from the certainty that the
expenses of the underground movrntelit are
mounting and that there is no wf',ry to ac-
- count for ire Punda except from outside
sources.
Marco Antonio Yong Sosa, called "El
Chino" because one of his parents was
Chinese, admitted in an interview v;?1tYx the
leftist Itiioxican magazine writer Vietar Rico
Galan that .a number of the Incursions of
the guerrilla forces he leads have brought
in about x100,000. The principal aoci tribu-
tion was $76,000 paid as ransom fret Jorge
$amayoa, the kidnapped. son of a C~uate-
malaa movie chain operator.
_ REVENUE FROM .RAIDS
Additional revenue has come Iraalt raids
on provincial United Fruit Co. treasurl9 draining off resources lraxn a seriously de-
pressed economy. Apathy oaten charac-
tarizea the civilian attitude.
MOSCOW AEJEC'rION
Last year's North Vietnamese harvest was
at least 20 percent below 1982's middling
harvest. Some starvation. to visible but there
is no general disaster in eight.
Moscow has flatly turned down a direct
Hanoi plea for aid to auppart the war. 'The
North Vietnamtv;e reason that they can't af-
ford to turn their backt+ politically on
Peiping, and that Peiping's gasping economy
Can give them little help in terms of food
or weapons.
Morale among the Co:mraunist Vietcong
troops in the guerrilla war is a continuing
problem for the North Vietnamese Govern-
ment. Analysis have seen ak>solutely no evi-
dence that the dirislon between pro-Peiping'
and pro-Moscow camps, seriously hampers
the war effort, as such. Tlxe major Hanoi
decision to side openly with Peiping was
bound to leave a disappointed minority but
there have been no demotioaxs, no dissident
voices raised.
Hanoi has a healthy, decisive respect for
U.S. military power and aeex the superior
weapons, equipment, and manpower of the
South Vietnamese are still a major obstacle
to victory. The bommunlata fear an escala-
tion of the war, bringing an open U.S. lnva-
slon of North Vietnam, and this has tRnded
up to now to keep the Comtnunlat mtlitary
effort within s limited framework.
While the Vietcong at tim,os has ate guer-
rlllaa at battalion strength, they are in no.
position to coordinate such unite in massive
movements against the South Vietnamese.
One factor Ss the lack of we'll-anchored sup-
ply bases for such operations.
Neutralizatton of North Vietnam 1s con-
sidered to be utterly out of the question in
the minds of the Hanoi regime.
Much of the above analysis comes out of a
careful American study of the most Impor-
tant statement made by tits Hanoi govern-
ment in oeveral years.
PAOTRACPSD TR]'A L9
It was spelled out is two articles 1n the
January and February leaueis i]I Hanoi's prin-
cipal journal, Hoc Tan, anti a third article
in the newspaper Nhan Dan.
This official line laid down by the articles
in Hoc Tan 1s designed to seep down through
'the ranks of the faithful and be Imparted to
South Vietnam and discussed by the fighting
guerrillas, observers here believe.
When the articles speak oY. sew, hard, long,
protracted trials in. the war +txxd use the word
"protracted" over and over again, the signal
is that the Hanoi Communists are not think-
ing In terms of a rapid ternxl.nation of the
mar or the imminent defeat o1 the 6outh
Vietnamese army.
On the contrary, the Communists expect a
mounting military initiative 1n South Viet-
nam and complain that often they will have
to meat modern weapons with rusty. sails
and crossbows.
acoxoMla DaAr.N
Analysts emphasize there is ao widespread
disaffection in North Vfetna.tal. The iarlli
aituatioa is grim but, not beyond hope.
But there is little doubt there !s a solid
body of opinion 1n the.. north `that the 'never
ending wdr la file primary gauge io; the weak-
21ess of theirs eoonottxy.,- . _ ,
The war in South Vietnam la seen here to
ba~dcally an indigenous one, gaining 1n Sts
suirport from within Vietatarn. It is a dirty
wnr and one which has its grim aspects for
the Communists who haves had no spectacu-
lar victories. These magei.;ine articles were
designed to buck up the a.orale of the flght-
lItE1 men.
s. aoxarErrra AND sorraRlAL OPINION
[From the Washington Past, Feb. 23, 1B8b]
NscoTIATIONs
It would be a mistake to allow the world
to trelieve that the people of the United
States have fallen Into an irreconcilable dl-
viaion on the question of wlxether we should
or i=hould not negotiate a settlement in
South Vietnam. There aro tiifferencea of
opl.nion, but they do not relate to the idea of
negotiation; they concern a;ho ]rind of nego-
tlation: Sentiment surely is overwhelming-
ly irx favor of negotiations ghat would end
tho lighting, set up enforceable peace tense,
preserve the rights of our friends in South
Vlet:nam and leave intact the honor and pres-
tige of the United States. Just as certainly,
aentixnent is against negotiations that would
not do this. The choice is not "negotia-
tione+" or "no negotiations." The question
is: "'G7hat kind of negotaatlons7"'
I1~I 1954, the French were driven into ne-
got:fations of a kind we must avo.ld. Mendea
Fraeirn was in desperation. 71'e lied promised
to p:et France out of Indochin:+,. To do !t he
had tc, abandon many of the lreople of North
Viet:nnm to Communist vengeance. He had
to gel; the Soviet Union to intervene with Ho
Chi Manta and by allowing the EDC treaty to
fail i'.n the French chamber her encouraged
that collaboration. But Frexich. power was
being drained away in Indochina. The na-
tion wits literally bleeding to death. History
can farglve a weak power at the end of 1te
resotu'cee for upeotting its allies in Europe,
for doe+erting its comrades in axms in Indo-
china ttetd !or closing its eyes to the conso-
quextees In Asia. France had ao other
cholco.
The United States, however, [a not a small
European power at the end of its military,
econcrrnic, and political resources. It is a
great global power whose rxtlglxt !a undi-
minished. It will be judged by different
standards. It cannot permit .savage re-
prisals to be worked upon anti-Communist
South Vietnamese. Itcannot allow them to
died by battalions in order to a,sve the lives
and property of Americana. It cannot offer
the Sav Vet Union or any other intervenor po-
litical ronceasiona at the expense of Euro-
pean allies. It cannot be indifl'errn.t to the
extenwion of Chinese Communist power in
Asia.
Many feared at the time that the 13b4
negotlationa would not end the fighting. And
indeed they permitted it to continue an terms
advantageous to communism. Tltey did not
provide a settlement that enforced Itself or
one that permitted anyone else to enforce
it.
Can aegotlationa in 1905 do any better?
If the North Vietnamese and their (:hisses
aponscara understand the difference between
a poweriui United States and an exhausted
France they might. But theq must be madb
to und.eratand that difference. If they are
convinced that this country has t:he power
and tYse will to pursue its legitirnate ends
ae long as 1t may be necessary to do so,
negotintlona might be feasible and arrange-
ments of an acceptable peace possible, Until
the posture of the United Staten is txnder-
atood by those with whom negottatfoaa must
be conducted, this country moat look to the
practical military means of better protecting
its position in South Vietnam.
It la perfectly clear that we need grc+atly to
increase the efiectlveness of bur coittitxet of
the war Inside the borders of South Vletnexra.
8everal';linmediate steps are self-evident to
bnllitary authoilty: ?(1) The foutea by which
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3288 CONGRESSIONn.L RECORC) - SIiNATE a ruary 23
North Vietnam is maintaining replacements
and supplies for 36.000 inflltratora must be
more nearly sealed off by the use of more
troops on the border and by a tighter naval
blockade; (2) the rtttio of South Vietnam to
Vietcong forces must be raised from b to 1
? -to at least the 8-to-1 level by which the Brlt-
!sh gained success against Communists in
Malaya; (3) points from which troops are
embarked and material shipped 1n North
Vietnam must- not enjoy immunity from re-
prisal attack; (4) the command structxtre of
the South Vietnam Forces must be stabilized;
(6) the South. Vietnam ~ivllian government
must be strengthened.
There is no time limit in which we must
achieve thesD objectives. The scale of ex-
penditures is not prohlbltivo. We can keep
up operations on an even greater scale, year
after year and decade after decade, if that la
vital to our interests.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged
that nothing is possible without a primary
effort by the South Vietnam people them-
selves. The war agafnat the Vietcong la
their war. And it !a a war which only South
Vietnam forces can win. The struggle for
the loyalty of the people !s the struggle of
Vietnamese leaders. It is conceivable that
the South Vietnamese may fail completely on
these fronts. If that happens, regretfully
and sorrowfully, it will be necessary for u$
to be governed by what we can do and not
by what we would like to do or what we ought
to do.
At the same time that we proceed to the
more effective prosecution of the war and the
more efficient organization of the civilian
Government in South Vietnam, we should
continuously make known the very limited
nature of our objectives. Unlike the French
in 1964, we have no colonial ambitions. We
wish to see an independent South Vietnam,
safe from external aggression, free to choose
in pesos the kind of government its people
wish (even if it Sa a Communist government
in the end), open to normal trade and lnter-
caurse with North Vietnam and other Asian
neighbors with whom it surely must be
closely associated in the future. Such a
South Vietnam would not menace any Asian
neighbor or threaten any legitimate interest
of North Vietnam.
Mare than mere oral assurances are needed
to assure the future of suoh a country. There
are, however, many aorta of satisfactory per-
Yotuiance bonds that could be given by a
.North Vietnam Governmont desiring peace
on these terms.
Surely there is .not much mystery about
'the conditions to settle the war in South
Vietnam. When there fa a isle prospect for
arriving at these conditions, there will be
little difference among Americana as to the
-wisdom or desirability of negotiating.
(From the Washington (D.C.) Evening 6tar,
Feb. 16, 1986 ]
WABHINaTON CLOSE-UP-VIETNAM: Tao
DOMINO THEORY
(By Crosby S. Noyes) 1
With the way things are going in Vietnam
it !s only natural that a certain amount of
thought should be given these days to the
domino theory.
It was President Eisenhower who first used
the metaphor to explain and justify our pres-
ence !n Vietnam. It -our position there
should topple, he thought, a whole series of
non-Communist states !n southeast Asla
.would almost automatically fall under Com-
munist rule.
Tho domino theory 1a a good deal leas
popular in adminiatration circles today than
It once was.. A's the political situation. in
Vietnam deteriorates and the passibility of
?;Co?nmun3st.victory grows, earlous considers-
,tloa-fa being .given to the ways and means
of 1lmltbyg the eatent of a possible defeat
there.
Since adminiatratlon leaders tend to ques- [From the National Observer, Dec. 28, 1984]
lion the validity c>f the domino theory, thug AT A CROSSROADS IN AsaLx~-VIETNAM: FADINO
also tend t0 deny rather emphatically any FRIENDSHIP AND NExv Focve oN DOMINO
total withdrawal of American military power THEORY
from southeast Asia 1n the event of a with- The speaker was no leftist demagog, though
drawal from Vietnam. -The argument some- '
times made by Vietnam bitter-enders, that St-; his attack on U.S. pclicq was full of words
would mean a retreat back to Hawaii and an like Lnterference and c;oloninltsm. The epeak-
end to our presonce in Asla, is rejected.
It can be argued otx the contrary that them:
!s no country In the world harder to defend
against Communist subversion than South
Vietnam. The almost ltnpossiblo task of try-
ing to create a country where none exists in'
the midst of a revohttion that had beon in
progress for a decade before the Americans
arrived would not confront us elsewhere.
Thailand, for exrttn,ple, would provide in-
finitely more favorable ground for resletanca3
to the Chinese Communist thrxtst. There,
at least, there !a a sense of national identity
and a tradition of government authority.
And while the htstaty of the country is not
exactly one of heroic defense of freedom, the
Thai, with encouragement, have shown
themselves quite determined in opposing
Oommunist pressures.
Tlxeso pressures, perhaps, could be ex-
peeled to increaso fi the position in Viet-
nom were lost. But the problems of waging
s subversive war against a country as rela-
tively well organized. as Thailand are enor-
mously different than in Vietnam. There
is no reason to suppose that Mao Tse-lung's
guerrillas would find tttD waters of Thailand's
population very congenial.
Open military pressure through Laos would
involve substantial risks for the Chinese.
Aa a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization, Thailand could call on-and
presumably receive-~-std from Australia,
France, New. Zealand, Pakistan, the Phllip-
pines, Britain, and the United States.
Under the terms ai this treaty, in fact,
the power of the Un.lted States !e already
committed in Thailand, to the enrtent that
!t might be needed to resist either .Com-
munist subversion or outright attack. And
though them is little reason to believe that
our commitment would reach anything like
the proportions in Vietnam, there !s no rea-
son whatever to suppose that it would be
withdrawn.
There are those in Washington today who
deplore this state of nffairs. The advocates
of worldwide .American "disengagement" are
Sncilned to the theory that American power
and prestige should never have been com-
mited in Vietnam in tine first place. And
from here they argue that its commitment in
any of the so-called Bait areas of southeast
Asia-which, presumably, means all of it-
should be avoided at a11. coat.
There are also tho:ae who contend that
any substantial transiel' of American power
to Thailand would simply serve to invite
increase Communist pressures there. The
converse of the domirxo theory is that the
only way to contain the spread of militant
communism in the area is by strict nonin-
volvement and the encouragement of neutra-
list states on the periphery of China.
The trouble with botkt theories is that they
are belied by the evidence. The evidence is.
that strong Communist pressure already is
being brought to bear on neutral states in
southeast Asia. It may lne that these pres-
sures can be resisted by reasonably well
Integrated nations with a reasonable amount
of political- stability a:nd military backing.
It is not to minimize the seriousness of s
defeat in Vietnam to say that 1t would not
necessarily mean defeat everywhere.
It is time to facto up ten the fact that we
are engaged in a contfnufng process of con-
taining or at least ilntiting the throat of
Communist China which threatens all of
southeast Asia. To pretend that this thrust
er was, instead, an American ally In a war
against communlent,. .'rauth Vietnnm's Lt.
Gen. Nguyen Khanh. And his words raised
serious questions nbox.tt the very basis of
American policy in southeast Asia.
It is better, said General Khanh, "to live
poor but proud as frr..c citizens o! an inde-
pendent country ratTtrr than in ease and
shame as sl2vca of th.e foreigners and Com-
munists." South Viet;nnm, he added, should
be prepared to go it alone against the Com-
munist Vietcong and epxtrll further U.S. help.
Washington was atunn.ed by last week's
attack from the wily ex-Premier, once re-
garded ns South Vlei.nam's best hope of
achieving victory over lied guerrillas. And
the question, once aoatn, was being asked
in the Nation's Capital, "What would hap-
pen if the United Staaea pulled out7"
CDRTAILMEN I' O1F AID7
To be sure, no high aciministralion af-
11cia1 went so far as to urge outright with-
clrawal. But Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
expressing the Governtnenf,'s opposition to
Iaat week's Saigon house. cleaning by young
army officers, hinted at g curtailment of pro-
posed U.S, aid. "Obvicntslq," ho said, 'Yi
taxers are problems of un.ity,. there are certain
;binds of assistance that are simply not iea-
aal.ble." And Senate Majority Leader MIxE
IUdANSr?tEr.D revived his proposaxl to transfer the
q,ueation of Vietnam's future from the battle-
tleld to the conference table. "I don't think
neutrality is a bad word," he said.
Indeed, the voices urging a sharp reap-
Frznisal of America's Asian policy received an
additional boost on Christmas Eve. A ter-
roriet bomb exploded in the garage of tho
nxaln V.S. officers' billet in Saigon, killing 2
.Aanericsna and Injuring 110 persons. The
bomb apparently was smuggled into the
heavily guarded building !n a U.S. jeep, an-
at;her indication of lncreasitl~ Vietcong bold-
ness despite the intense U.S. effort in South
Vietnam.
Why doesn't the United States pull out of
V:letnam7 The answer can b? summed up in
'tYu?ee words: The domino theory,
Through tho years, American officials have
argued that if South Vletna,m were ten fall to
i;txcr Communists, the other nations oY south-
east Asia would likewiso topple-liko a row
cxi attacked dominces.
WHAT THE REDS wOD'IJ7 GOBBLE
L:xndlceked Laos, alread jr txvo-thirds in
f7ommuniat hands, would be swiftly gobbled
xtp by the Reds. Thailand, wlxiclx caved in to
Japanese invaders after only a'hours of fight-
ing in December 1941, would sue for some
ar:c:ommodation with Red Cktina in :hope of
preserving a semblance of iGs tang-cherished
independence from foreign rule. Burma,
whc~so government already host cut most of its
ties with the West, would become little more
tkxall a.Chinese province. Cambodia, recently
professing friendship with China, would suc-
ctun~b quickly to Communist domination.
7'1te domino theory extends even further.
F~ea3slmistic proponents of the 1~heory fear
t:h.ai: if the United States is forced out oS
South Vietnam, either by a Cc>xnntuntat con-
gtletst or by the Saigon government, nil o! ,
Afala might be opened to Chincae Communist
poncatration, either through subversion or
otti;r.tght Invasion. At least, they argue,
stroztgly pro-Western nations taxtcll as Japan,
Mailayela, the Philippines, and Formosa could
no longer trust the United Status to fulflA any
a threat to vital? Americatn interests, or that -and . Booth Sores, too, might have second
!t oan be limited bq diplomacy, could well thoughts about alining thetrleelves too
turn defeat into disaster. ? aloaely with the United States,.
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CON(JRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 32$9
A clear-cut Communist victory in South
Vietnam, the domino theorists maintain,
would have worldwide repercusalona. The
Commu.nlats !n Peiping would win the argu-
ment with the Communists in Moscow
over how to spread their ideology. Commu-
nlsta would expand their Chinese-style aub-
versive activities in Africa and South Amer-
ica, confident that the United States would
refuse i;o become involved in another expen-
sive guerrilla war.
LEAV)4 THE WEAPONB HEHIND7 ~
The clomino theory is based, of course, on
the presumption that without U.S, aid South
Vietnam would collapse before the Commu-
nista. But if the United States did withdraw,
most pIobably American weapons and equip-
ment now stored in that country would be
left belxind. The South Vietnamese armed
forces +would certainly not succumb to the
Communnsat guerrillas overnight.
But psychologically, South Vietnam would
be weakened. Tho South Vietnamese mili-
? tary ei'tuation, alter all, has steadily de-
teriorated despite American aid of more than
>a1,600,000 a day and the presence of 22,000
American advisers. Without American sup-
port, tkte best guess fa that the South Viet-
namese would quickty seek a political, rather
than a military, solution to the Red threat.
The Comaiuniats probably would be willing
to negotiate acease-fire, figuring it would be
less expensive t0 diem to subvert the Gov-
ernment from within.
' RATTLE WITH NO FRONTLINEa
The 17nited Staten, even if it pulled out of
South Vietnam, still, would remain the
atrongelst military power in Aaia. The 7th
Fleet now protects Formosa from Com-
monist Chinese lnvnslon and could quickly
hustle troops to any Asian country threat-
ened by' Communsst mititary forces. But, the
domino theorists say, the 7th Fleet has
felled to prevent Red subversion in Laos and
South Vietnam. Although the United States
is the vvorld'a mightiest military power, they
say, nuclear bombs, tanks, and aircraft car-
riers aria of little use against a guerrilla force
fighting; a battle with no front lines.
At a prase conference last week, Secretary
of Statss Dean Ruak ducked a question about
whether the United States still subscribed to
He did say, however, that if South Vfet-
nam were lost to the Communists, "they
would silmply move the problem to the next
country' and the next and the next. And,
as I sa;f, this is not dominoes. This is the
kind oY Marxism that comes out of Peiping."
Mr, Ruak asserted that South Vietnam's
"primax'y requirement" in the fight against
the Communists 1s national unity. "Unity,"
he said? "would be worth many, many divi-
sions." But there was no unity in South
Vietnam last week.
The latest upheaval began in the same way
as moat of the previous coups and attempted
coups~?with the rumbling of trucks filled
with soldiers in the streets of Saigon. The
purge vas carried out speedily. Soldiers,
under oommand of a clique of 9 junior
officers, arrested moat of the members of the
ib-man High National Counoil, the country's
provisional legislature, and several dozen
other political figures.
The officers acted, they said, because the
council .was dominated by "counter-revolu-
tionary elements that wore acting against
thA spirit of national unity." The arrested
council members, the officers said, had been
"conspiring" against the armed torcee in
hope a1 furthering "their own personal
ambitions,"
orrlcEa rACTxoNa rEtm
But more than the perecnal ambitions and
tivalrlexs of the officers seemed to be involved.
military, although in seniority they rank be-
low many officers without field responsibility,
The two officer factions have been feudmg
far months. On December 18 Lhe junior offi-
cers formed an organizatfoxx called the
Armed Forces Council, with no representa-
tion from the senior officers. 71xe council
then drew up an order calling for mandatory
retirement of all officers with at least 26
years' service. This would rehire about 40
officers, including Maj. Cien. Duong Van
Minh, former Premier who is popular with
South Vietnam's Buddhists.
The High National Council refused to ap-
prove the order. So the ]union officers abol-
ished the legislative group. The purge
leaders, Air Commodore Nguyen Cao Ky,
commander of the air force, and Brlg. Gen.
Nguyen Chanh Thi, commander of the let
Army Corps, defended the military's right to
"act as mediator" of disputes within the
Government.
The officers stud their move 'ryas aimed at
eliminating political Interference !n the con-
duct or the antiguerrilla war. Ilttt, although
they disbanded the legislative arm of the
Government, they pledged contl:nued support
to Premier Tran Van Huong and his Cabinet.
The Premier has been under attack by mili-
tant Buddhist organizations almost'slnce he
took office October 30. The purge leaders in-
dicated they believed their move would pave
the way for reconciling the Btxddhlsts and
the Huong government.
MOTIVES CALLED SINCEIRE
The U.B. Embassy in Saigon quickty op-
posed the purge. Conceding that the officers'
motives in attempting to atabilaze the Gov-
ernment were sincere, Embassy officials
said the purge would only further disrupt the
Government. U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D.
Taylor held hurried conaultatiotts with the
]union officers, General Khanh, and Premier
Huong. The officers refused to bstclc down.
General Khanh'a position in the nxaneuyer-
ing was unclear, but there were plenty of
rumors. One said he had been at odds with
the junior officers in recent weeks because of
his refusal to pledge his support to Mr.
Huong, his successor as Premier. '.Iris junior
officers were said to have threatened Decem-
ber 8 to ]ail General Khanh unless ho pub-
licly announced support of the Premier. It
was rumored, too, that General Khanh wsa
quietly conferring with Buddhist leaders, pre-
sumably in hope of capltalizing on a.ny Bud-
dhist-provoked overthrow of the Huong gov-
ernment.
In a radio address niter a meeting with
Ambassador Taglor, General Khanh accepted
Lull responsibility for the purge. Then he
swung into hie attack against the United
States. "We make eacriflces for the coun-
try's independence and the Vietnamese peo-
ple's liberty, but not to carry out the policy
of any foreign country," he said. He defined
the role of the military as "acting as an in-
termediary to settle all disputes and differ-
ences ii they create a situation favorable to
the common enemies: communism and
colonialism in any form:'
CRITICAL Or AMHAaaADOR TAYLCR
In private interviews with American re-
porters, General Khanh case sharply critical
of Ambassador Taylor. If he "does not act
more intelligently, the United States will lose
southeast Aaia and we will lose our freedom,"
said General Khanh. He charged the U.S.
Envoy had acted '(beyond imagination as far
as an ambassador is concerned."
In Washington, the Johnson administra-
tion replied with a message of support for
lta man in Saigon. "Ambassador Taylor,"
$aid the State Department, "has been acting
throughout with the full support of the
U.B. Government; '
Secretary Rusk, at his news conference
the next day, took a more oonaiilstory tone
toward the junior officeta and General
Khanh. The remarks by General Khanh,
he said, "might have been made in t:ho heat
of the ru~ament ~ But Mr. Rusk aut,;gested
that U.S, aid might be curtailed if tits diffi-
culties in E~~igon continued.
The late+:~t'11ttI'e-up came just as plaits were
shaping up for South Vietnamese air strikes
against C~'ontmunist Vietcong auP131,y bases
and infiltration staging areas in Lucca near
the Scnt.th Vietnamese border. Gen.
Phoumi Nctsavan, Deputy Premier of 'Loss,
visited Sesl~an last week, presumably to put
the flnie111ng touches on plans to strike at
the Comxnunlat bases.
THE FLAMES OF WAa
These 1>regaarakions were enough to alarm
the Red Chinese, who threatened to plunge
Indochina into war if the United States
bombs ektpply lines through Laoei. "The
flames o.l 'agar will spread to the whole of
Indochin[r 1f U.S. imperialism succeeds in
its crhnirt.al scheme," warned the Peiping
People's Dttiay.
Whether th,e IInited States would go along
with thesis plane in view of the present tur-
bulence fax t9aigon case uncertain. Far one
thing, it was no longer clear who ao~tttttlly
held power' in the country. U.S. officials
were tlxtstxz~~ whether General Khanh -had
again assumed the role of strong m.an or
whether rte was only acting as the mouth-
piece of th.a ;lunior officers. Nor was F'rernier
Huong's possltlon clear. Despite strong ges-
tures of support from Washington, the Pre-
mier remained in the background, taci'tly', at
least, giving :his approval to the purge, 'I'ha
Suddhiata, too, stayed quiet, awaiting the
military's next move. The United Staten
alone w&a s4a,nding fast publicly against tlha
purge. And the United Stag sudcledly
seemed to have very few friends in South
Vietnam.
[From the blew York Herald Tribune, Dao. 2b,
1984]
MATTER CI:I~ FACT: HOW NOT 'TO DO IT
HOND K'.o:Na.-The political trouble in
Saigon bega~a at almost the moment when,
this reportssr was starting home for ChI?lst;- `
mss. But .even on the road home, with no
opportunity to study detailed developxrtetrtss,
it 1s easy t,a see that we are being given an-
other demontitration of how not to do it.
The Vietnamese generals have no d5ubt
Contributed their share to this demonsstra-
tton, but acx kutve the Americana. To be atxre,
the fault oxx I;lte American aide does net l.ie
with Gen. 'M~~,xwell Taylor. The fault '.tins
with the ixtsi;ructiona that General Taglor
was given, atxti oven.more with the ludicrously
unrealistic ideas and prejudices in which
those inatttxctlons partly originated.
It has been the same old story from fire
period when large numbers of U.B. officl.als,
military office['a and one must add, news-
papermen, were doing everything in t]Iseir
power to undercut the beleaguered Chineeie
Nationalist Gavernment, down to the presselxt
melancholy moment. Almost always, t:h.o,
same two tendenclea have recurrently
marked-and 'too often fatally marred-?--
American deatings with situations like that;
in Vietnam,
In such situations, first of all, a good m,xny
Americana mysteriously tend to be hypara
critical of precisely those allied leaders whose
aims and purposes most closelp coincide with
American into~,t'sta. It is Hover enough, i'or
Americana of `this stripe, that our iuterersta '
are being served.
Whether in China, or Korea, or today i:n ?
Vietnam,' they moat always be designing''
ideal governments; their ideal governmen.ta
generally exolude the local leaders whose aim a '
aolnaide with American intereata. This waif
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3290 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENA'1CE I"ebruary 23
emphatically the case in Vietnam in fife years
of Ngo Dinh Diem, and in s considerable
measure, it is today.
The rights and wrongs of the young gen-
erals' renewed Intervention in Vietnamese
politics cannot be judged from this distance.
But from any distance, it is perfectly clear
that these are the men most deeply com-
mitted to resisting the Communist attack on
South Vietnamti It is also clear that with
the possible exce~xtlon of Prime Minister Tran
Van Huong, thep are the most effective per-
- sonalltiea on the scene.
The motives for their renewed Intervention
may~well have been a great deal more juati-
flable than one might suppose from a brief
perusal of the pompous pronouncements of
the State Department spokesman. Just be-
fore they acted, for example, there were
strong indications that Phan Khac $uu, the
.. nice, bewildered old gentleman who 1s the
official chief of state, was about to make a
dangerously muddled compromise with the
political Buddhists.
Moreover, you need only ask any American
!n Saigon, whether political or military, what
protectl"on wo have against a neutralist gov-
the general deterioration in South Vietnam.
The answer always 1s, "The army leaders will
not permit at." In these very possibly clr-
cumstances, in short, we are actually count-
ing on the army leaders' intervention.
Because of American tendency No. 1, how-
ever, the army leaders are now the targets
of the State Department's righteous indigna-
tion. Aa for tendency No, 2, it is symbolized
by Phan Khac Suu, the chief of state above
mentioned. He has clean hands and sore
feet. And he wonderfully illustrates the
usual results of ideal government designing.
It was a fairly hair raising experience to
go straight from an audience with this ama-
able old man, with his white foot bandages
and obvious feebleness, to along meeting
With one of the ideal government designers.
"Now," this American kept saying, "we've
got a government we cari really work with-
a government with real promise of stability."
And he went on to talk with pious enthusi-
asm about the high national council's prontis-
ing first attempts to prepare a national elec-
tion !n South Vietnam.
In reality, it would be flattering to call
the high national council a basket of eels.
Aa for the notion of holding a general elec-
tion in Vietnam at this juneturo or at any
time in the 'near future, this alone would
almost excuse the dissolution of the high
national council by the young generals. '
Working for sane civilian leadership by
men like Prime Minister Huong is one thing.
Trying to stage a kind of comedy or parody
of normal, duly elected democratic govern-
ment in Saigon at this stage of the war, is "
quite another thing. The purpose of the
parody is clear, of course. It looks nice in
the papers back home, and thus consoles
-the large element in the U.S. Government
that always worries about appearancee.
The time has come to say, however, "To
the devil with appearances. What matters
is averting a shattering defeat."
.[From. the Philadelphia Inquirer, June 17,
1964]
`ON THE SPOT: VIETNAM ERRORS CFFER VITAL
LESSON
(By Marguerite Higgins)
NEw rSCoaxs.-One way for the United States
to better its present chances (perhaps 60-60)
of winning the war !n Vietnam as to face
coldly and honestly the consequences of its
.past mistakes.
Putting aside matters of America's image,
:world opinion, and the like, the greatest; and
possibly disastrous, blunder of the last year
was the decision to signal the overthrow of
,.the Diem regtme?fn .madbattle, Quite apart
Ymm, the resulting chaps and. dleorgaatza-
tion that permitted the Vietcong to take
over 7 million (out of 14 million) Vlet-
nameae in 2 months, the demoralizing ef-
fect of the first and second coup d'etats on
Vietnam's fledgling officer corps has changed
the very nature of the war.
The demoralizatiota is such that many Viet-
namese officers have Uecome de facto hors
de combat even though they are nominally
still at their posts. 'Che morale of many key
officers has been crl.ppled because they do
not know whom to trust. In the wake of the
successive purgings of the "ins" by the "outs"
during the two revolts, who can blame these
officers if they are fearful of taking respon-
sibility and executing orders. After all, their
general or other superior officer may be "!n"
today "out" tomorrow. If they do their duty
today they may be punished tomorrow.
And the United States Ss not without
blame for this unceri;aln atmosphere. If the
American Embassy in. Saigon had spoken out
half as forcefully against the reign of terror
perpetrated. recently (mainly against Cath-
olics) in Vietnam ae: it did during the so-
called Buddhist cratds, there migrit be a
saner atmosphere. The phony trial of the
Catholic Mayor Dang Sy, the war hero (seven
decorations) who wac condemned for having
carried out orders of lxis Buddhist superiors
in Hue last May, la but one example of this
reign of terror. And if Catholics carry signs'
saying "Henry Cabot I,cxige Go Home" !t is
because they think the United States has
stayed strangely sller.[t 1n the face of what
almost everybody on the scene 1n $aigon
considers a mockery of jt~atice-only one
among many.
In any case, the morale- of many Vietna-
mese officers in crucial areas is shot.
Further, this country is going to have to
stop trying to fight this war with its left
hand. It is not serious warfare, to give but
ono example, to send aver military advisers
for 1 year only. -The advisers are the first
to say it. Said Maj. Ulen O'Connor, of Ari-
zona: "It takes about 8 to 8 months to get
to know yottr Vietnamene opposite number
and work smoothly with him. And just as
things are really beginning to mesh, it is
time to go home."
Further, the Commttnasts, who conninced
themselves early in ,1981 that the United
Staten was about to bow out of Asia, must be
put on notice that this, country will do what-
ever is necessary to prevent a Communist
vactorp. This means, iP necessary, the com-
mitment of American troops, .sabotage and
other dirty tricks in Nort]t Vietnam, etc. The
Commttnasts know that the United States
has the power to win 1n southeast Aala.
And if Peking and Hanof are convinced that
the United States is prepared-at last-to
use it, the invocation of this power may not
be necessary.
y. THE HIIDDHIBT MII,ITANTH
[From the Washington Star, Jan, 23, 198b]
ISN'T IT TIME TO FACE TRIITHP
(By Marguerite Higgins)
The spectacle in Saigon of brown-robed
monks egging on delingtxents, both juvenile
and adult, to smash fife windows of our
libraries leads to one insistent question:
Isn't it time the United States told the
American people the truth concerning the
way in which a handful of Buddhist poll- ,
ticians in Vietnam. have used a religious
cover to camouflage a campaign of chaos
-that for the last 18 months has served only
Communist ends?
Is !t embarrassing to admit that the Unit- .
ed States made a mistake in giving asylum
at its $aigon embassy no leas than twice (3
months in 1983, 1 day an 1984) to the in-
tellectual powerhouse of the rock-throwing
clique, the Buddhist Monk, 77xich Tri Quang?
Ie at difficult to acknowledge that perhaps
we should have checked a little further into
Quang's.past, hie two arrenta by the French
for serving with the Comlriunlsts, his state-
xnents that Marxism and Buddhism were
alike, hie furtive meetings with leaders of
the Vietcong National Liberation front?
W111 laces turn red ii' we admit further
that for many months Quang bamboozled
many well-meaning Amrrlcatns into believ-
ing his absurd claim that his particular
clique of Buddhists represented "85 to 90
percent" of the Vietnamesy people when In
point of fact Buddhists ix[ Vietnam may just
possibly constitute 30 perrcnt of the people
(see "Buddhism in Vietnam" by Dr. Mai Tho
Tt?uyen, chairman of the 'Uiet.namcae Associ-
ation of Buddhist Layln.c~n) and further,
Quang's faction is bitterly opposed by truly
religious Buddhists such Ins those at $aigou's
~:a I,o! Pagoda, which is not on speaking
'terms with the Buddhist neuter run by the
.Communist-tinged extremists?
Embarrassing as all this may be, embar-
rrtssment has become, and resoundingly, the
lesser of the evils. The moment of truth fa
aft hand.
The truth is vital because otherwise Amer-
ican opinion is going to fall, just like that,
into the trap so cleverly and deviously pre-
Irau?ed by Quang-the trap of believing that
tl.[e so-called and in fact nonexistent "Bud-
dhist majority" of the Vietnamese people
l:i[tve turned agalust the Uxttteai States.
The truth is, and it needs 'to be repeated
loud and 'clear, that the man behind the per-
sona cradling the rocks that smash our li-
brary Is Quang as well as otxaers who have
been been intriguing with thr. Vlatcong Com-
rsuxniats for a very long-time, as the American
Intelligence record-to its cryciit shows even
tlsough the policymakere hsvr? chosen to dls-
regard the evidence.
But if and when thy majority of the Anteri-
cern people begin to believe that utterly false,
knit so carefully prepared, p1.e:ae of Commu-
rdat-abetted propaganda to t'lay effect that
1;1ne illusory Buddhist majority wants us to go
lxome, then the clamor for A[nerl.cans to give
txp and get out of Vietnam coultl become ir-
ryveraible.
d,11 right, so the IInited Sts;tes made a mis-
ta:ke bank in the summer of 1?133. We can
now see, in retrospect, that the Vietnamese
army, the Vietnamese securF;ty police, and
Vietnamese President Ngo D:Lxth Diem were
co[xt;pletely right when they tx?1ed to tell us
freax[ the very beginning of. the Buddhist
crisis that in Vietnam the 1"o[n:munasts do
not, after all, play cricket, 'kitxt play dirty.
They play real dirty and indufk;y 11t precisely
srI,st powerful Vietnamese figure in
South Vietnam today and that tomorrow he
may be the moat powerful.
It is of aigniflcance therefore that General
Taylor's telegrams on the Buddhist situation
produced so many somber faces around the
Department of State.
For the time being, at any rate, it appears
according to Ambassador Taylor's assessment
that the moderates among Vietnam's nearly
6 milllotn Buddhists (out of a population of
more titan 14 million of which the majority
are ancestor worshippers) are being skillfully
and relentlessly outmaneuvered by the ex-
tremist wing led by the Reverend Tri Quang,
whose flamboyant oratory and calls for direct
action have far more appeal, for example,
to VIetllam'a aitiSed, riot-prone young people
than the pleas for caution issued by the Rev-
erend Talti C1hau. .
flop official who had rrnct General Taylor's the etatemont attributed to the Laotian
telegrams summed filings up this way: Buddhists Association,"' that alleged their
t
B
d
hi
t
"
"A defensible case can be made for the
theory that Tri Quang will sooner or later
seek to undermino any stable anti-Commu-
nist government in Vietnam in the belief
that anarchy will drive the United States to
go home, permitting the emergence of a neu-
tralist or possibly pro-Communist state wl'th
himself at the helm."
He continued: "Ii Tri Quang wants to de-
]iver Vietnam to neutralism or communism
under hla own leadership, it would explain
the mystery of why he raised tlxe false issue
of persecution which is ridiculous in Ilgttt of
all the concessions-Indeed the favorltism-
ahovvn the Buddhists by Khanh's regime.
"But the cry of Buddhist persecution-as
Trl Quang well knows-brings an almost
Pavlovian reaction In the outside world where
most people are too uninformed and too naive
to believe that a Buddhist monk might make
up such accusations out of whole cloth to
gain his own ends:'
The issue now seems less and less whether
the Reverend Trl Quaztg aspires fora neu-
tralist and pro-Communist Vietnam under
his leadership.
It is focusing more slid more on the fact
that his actions are painting !n that dhec-
tton. The question now is whether any-
thing can be dons effectively to stop him as
he operates from within the privileged psy-
chological sanctuary of being a Buddhist
monk.
[From the Baltimore Sun, Nov. 6, 1989]
REDS SEas NSW COUPS OF $UDDHI$T-LED
.TIPS-REPORTED TRSINQ TO SPREAD VItsr-
NAfL RELIGIOUS REVOLT TO LA09
(By Paul W. Ward)
NEw YORK, November 4.-Having seen
Buddhism spearhead a drive that toppled
Vietnam's Diem regime, Comntunlsts now
are trying to organize like otfcnaivea P,lse-
where !n southeast Asia.
So it was learned hero today following an-
nouncement that a Ullitod Nations mission
sent to South Vietnam October 22 to investi-
gate charges that Buddhists were being per-
secuted there has completed its tank and
will reassemble next Mond.aq in New York.
IMMEDIATB TAROE'r
Lava, which lies just roost of Vietnam
and also abuts Communist China, appears
the immediate target of a campaign origi-
nating 1n Peiping. Its aim is to set Buddhist
communities throughout Asia to Elting com-
] monas
ery
d
s
destroyed a [
u
fees had
and acting Buddhists" nt San Ton Nuong !n
:B~ieng Province's back county by a bombard-
ment during the night of October 18-17.
The statement demaltded "that the Phou-
mt Nosavan clique compensate the losses and
immediately stop all moves against the Bud-
dhists." Otherwise, "it wrnlld bear full re-
sponaibllity for the Consequences," it said,
adding:
"All Laotian monks and Buddhists are
urged to strengthen their solidarity, heighten
their vigilance, and resolutely oppose all
schemes of the U.S. imperialists and their
lackeys."
The Communists have been denouncing
the anti-Communist and noutrallat factions
of Laos' coalition government as puppets of
the United States, just as they formerly dc-
naunced South Vietnam's Diem regime and
are currently trying to discredit on Ilke
grounds the military junta that displaced it
Friday.
'Co further what began as a Buddhist cam-
paign against the Diem reglrne, Communist
Clt,ina also staged shortly 1)efore that regime's
fall a 3-day conference ref Buddhist clergy
slid laymen from 11 Asian countries.
field in Peiping's Fayuan Monsatery the
Conference was devoted 1n large part to ora-
tions against "the United E3tates-Ngo Dinh ?
Dunn clique" at Saigon.
MON89 REPORTED :E:r:r:tICADED
Its particlpanta, now touring Communist
Ckxlnn under the aegis of Peiping atheist
regime, includedb
1. The Venerable Thich ".Chien Hao, hated
as president of the Luc Hao :Buddhist Aaso-
cintion of South Vietnam, wlto made a long
speech about atrocities, including behead-
ings and disombowelinga of Buddhist monks,
that he attributed to "the United States-
Diem clique."
2. The Venerable Thepbauary Pramaha
Khamtank, named as president of the Bud-
dhi.st Association of Laos, who charged the
United States 1s trying to tttrn that coun-
try Into a "colony" and demanded that Wash-
ington cease gluing military aid to the Lao-
tian Gavernment, asserting:
AVGUST DENUNCIATION
"We Asian people and Buddhists era the
masters of our own affairs. 'We don't need
any other masters lording it over and ruling'
us."
Maiztland China's Communist rulers, who
in August denounced ae "political agents"
plaints against elements c)f have' coalition of Clxlang Khai-shek a group of Buddhist
Government akin to those they had bean monks from Formosa then vlsl.ting India, also
pressing against the Diem rcy;ime at Saigon brought together in Fayuan h'icnastery Bud-
until it fell last Friday. dhisi; monks and laymen from Cambodia,
The chief indication was provided in broad- Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan,
casts from Hanoi, in. North Vietnam, and Thailand, and North Vletnaln, which, like
Peiping reporting that the ".Lootian Buddhist Cambodia and Thailand, also abuts Laos.
Association [has issued] a statement strongly. Having produced on October 20 a format '
protesting against the bombardment of a appeal 'to Buddhists everywherct to join in the
rnonastery by the Phoumt Nosavan troops anti-Diem campaign, the conferees gave
and reactionaries among Kong Le'e troops." themselves over to a series of :kotea arranged
Gen. Phoumt Nosavan heads the ant!- in their honor by the Peiping rr=,glxne that only
Communist wing of a troika-?iorm govern- a few years ago was charged before the IInit-
ment set up in Laos last year to carry out ed Nations Assembl here with having de-
an agreement to neutralize that southeast etroyed more than~1,000 Buddhist monas-
Asian kingdom worked out at a Geneva con- terlea itt. Tibet.
Terence which included the L1nlted Staten, NORTH v1xrNAloi cuenc:Es
the Soviet Union and Cornntunlat China Theret was no Tibetan particig)ation iu the
among its particlpanta. Buddhist conference at Peiping.
Gen. Kong Le commands the troops of the Nortla Vietnam's Communist regime has
coalition's neutralist factions and enjoyed sent tr) the International (f.e., Polish, Indian,
twowed, support by Peiping and Hanoi until and Cctmitdian) Control Commiasfon for both
the Communists concluded several months parts o:f Vietnam a compllation of "Bud-
" ago that he !a sincerely neutralist and will dhist persecution and atrocity" charges
not help them take over Laos. against the Diem regime that said Sn part:
coxPENSnxroN DanrcANU ''C+en. 'Con That Dinh, military governor of
Siacef,, then, they not -only have been . de- Saigon, personally. directed troops to martyr-
pouncing him but trying to role aver his ize pupils of Vietnamese and ~5ronah mid=
_ subordinate officers to their aide: ' die aahaals" oa l3eptember 7,
`.
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e ruary 2~
TO HEAD NATIONAL POLICE
He currently is slated to be Interior Min-
ister (l.o., chief of police forces) In the new
regime at Saigon, having turned revolution-
tst after being refused the same post 1n the'
Diem regime, according to reports relayed
`from Saigon via Washington.
Today Moscow's radio stations continued
to denounce the military ]unto In Saigon
-Just as they previously had denounced the
Diem regime as an American puppet and
the United Nations mission to Vietnam as a
Washington invention designed to protect
' and preserve the Diem regime.
Meanwhile, it was noted here that in
Burma, homeland of U Thant, United Na-
tions Secretary General, the military regime
in control at Rangoon is under attack from
the venerable U Kaythara, who, at 83, is ,
the ranking Buddhist priest at .Mandalay.
Addressing mass rallies asembled' in deS-
once of the regime and overtly inviting ar-
rest, he tae also been predicting that Gen.
Ne Win, the regime's head, will meet the
same end as Gen. Aung Sau, 8urma'e na-
. tional hero,. who was assassinated in 1947.
In a statement relayed from Saigon and
finding mission that headed back -to New
York yesterday contettded its departure from
Vietnam was not occasioned by the coup
d'etat there, but was "as scheduled," al-
though in statements prior to the coup the
mission' had claimed Inability to estimate
when !t would complete its on-the-spot in-
vestigatton.
Today's statement also said the mission
"had not been able to interview Thich Tri
- $uang [a Buddhist. monk] who was in
asylum at the U.S. Embassy" in Saigon. It
added that "the former government of the
republic had informed the mission that, ac-
cording to the laws of asylum, a person !n
asylum was not allowed to make any con-
tacts whatsoever While in asylum."
HIIRMESE COMPLAINT
Meanwhile, there were these additional
developments at United Nations headquar-
ters:
1. James Barrington, Burma's chief dele-
gate here and its representative in the cur-
rently recessed disarmament conference at
Geneva, complained lrr one of the Assembly's
standing committees about a tendency to-
ward "bilateralism" by Washington. and
Moscow and consequent bypassing of the
lesser powers, including neutralists, in dis-
armament matters.
2. Mrs: Agda Rossel, Sweden's chief dele-
initiate debate On a resolution-sponsored
sUso by Austria, Ceylon, Ecuador, Un[guay,
'-'and Venezuela-that is aimed at getting-all
governments to follow .the example Liechten-
stein set in 1798 by abolishing capital ptYil-
ishment.
During the delivery of Mr. Donna
speech,
Mr. DAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
. Mr. DODD. I yield.
Mr. DAVITS. I believe that my rec-
ord on the scoreboard of -the Americans
for Constitutional. Action is even lower
than the record of the Senator from
-Connecticut.
I share with the Senator from Con-
necticut the feeling that it only demon-
. : strates that we are trying fn new ways.
to have the government use- its powers
for the people Without at the same time
.jeopardising individual freedom. We
can only hope and pray that among the,
"makers of these arbitrary scoreboards
there could be a greater reflection of the
consensus of our own people in our own
States. Then I think the scoreboard
would be vc+ry different for the Senator
from Conncct.lcut and myself.
Mr. DODD. I appreciate the Senator's
making that observation. Tha Senator
is one of the great minds in this body.
He stands out particularly in the area of
which he has spoken. I am happy to
be in his cornpany on that scoreboaxd.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous c[m-
sent that the colloquy in which I have
just engaged with the Senator from New
York be placed at the end of my remarks
so that I may have my speech in con-
tinuity.
The PRESIDING AFFICEIL. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, am
I to understand tht~,t the Senator ir[rm
Connecticut does not wtsh to yield?
Mr. DODD. I" am happy to yield. I
merely wish that whatever yielding I da
may appear at the end of my remarks,
unless there is same reason for it to ala-
pear elsewhere.
Mr. ELLENDER. I have teen Iistexl-
ing to what the Senator has said with
much interest, because I have visited
southeast Asia on many occasions. I
have often described to the Senate-and
I believe my reports will so indicate--?
the situation that was prevalent in south-
east Asia. I am almost certain that my
good friend will agree that were he to go
to South Vietnarn now, he would find
things suite different from what they.
were when he visited that country 4
years ago.
Mr. DODD. I am sure that is true.
Mr. ELLENDER. There is no doubt
about that. On several occasions I made
the statement on the floor of the Senate
that unless we could persuade our allies
to assist us in carrying this load-and I
am sure the Senator agrees that that
ought to be done-and unless a stable
government could be established in South
Vietnam, we woul[i be in serious trouble,
Mr. IIODD. Ye:t. I wholly agree with
those two points. I refer to a speech I
made 4 years ago, in which I made the
same point. I said. I thought it was
absolutely essential that our friends and
allies in that part of the world join us in
the struggle to preserve the freedom of
the South Vietnamese. I pointed out-
and Ishall touch an the issue later to-
day-that there is a basic structural
fault in the SEATO organization which
gives a veto power to any one member;
and, as the Senator knows, that power
has been exercised by France and Britain:.
We must have a st4tble government in
South Vietnam. The Senator is a weli-
informed Member of this body on these.
.problems. I have iYreat respect for his
opinions.
Mr. ELLENDER. The question" I
should like to ask the Senator is as
follows: Should we s;ontinue to intensify
our efforts in that area if we cannot get
our allies to assist us or if a stable gov-
ernment is not established in South
Vietnam? That is the question,
Mr. DODD. The ~9enator's question is
part of a larger question. There are
many things we must. do: Those are two ;
things that we must do..I believe that
we must get our friends and allies in
that part of the world to assist us. We
are getting tileln. Already Korea has
announced that !t is sending men to that
area.
Mr. ELLENIDE~'R. Two thousand men.
Mr. DODD. Two thousand rnen. The
Philippines art. sr;,nding in several thou-
sand men. All this is encouraging. They
are starting, at least. I would Ilke to
see other nations do as much or more,
and I expect t;:xa;t they will. ][ believe
we are underw["y, and that this is no
time to quit, because now we have the
signs and beginl~ings to indicate that our
allies are starting to do what the Sen-
ator from Louisiana and I believe they
should have done long ago.
Mr. ELLENDLR.. I am not suggest-
ing that we quit now.
Mr. DODD. I know the Senator is not.
Mr. ELLENDER. We have gone so
far into it that we na.ay well find ourselves
in over our heads.
What Ifear-and I have said so on
the floor of the Senate and have in-
cluded it in my repal?ts-is that the sit-
uation that now exists in South Vietnam
may laecome simillr to the one that now
exists in South Korea. The Senator
will remember that the South Korean
war was supposed to be a United Nations
affair, in which a,ll the membership of
that great organizal;ion was to join us in
fighting in SoutPl Korea. But what
happened? We teak hold of the situa-
tion there; and as T recall the figures,
96 percent of the [:cost oP that war was
paid by the United States, and about
95 percent of the f[~refgn men who died
3f1 that conflict we1?c Americans.
Mr. DODD. I accept the Senator's
statistics.
Mr. ELLENDER. "That is as I remem-
ber them.
Mr. DODD. They seem to me to be
approximately correct.
Mr. ELLENDER. "Today we are stuck,
ns it were, in South Korea. We are
trying to maintain 1#1 local divisions
there. It is very costly to do that. In
addition, we are maintaining 2 oP our
own divisions there. As the Senator from .
Connecticut knows, we cannot :pay the
expenses of our soldiers there with col-
lar buttons. It is necessary to have the
money and the wherewithal to do .it.
What I have feare[i all along is that
lmless we can persuade our allies to
assist us in South Vietlxarn, and unless
a stable government can be established
there, a condition ma,y develop which
will be worse than tllr, situation that
confronts us in South Korea. That is
what has worried me.
Mr. DODD. I know the Senator from
Louisiana is worried; a,nd so am I. It
is a proper problem to worry about.
There is no question ttlat a stable gov-
ezzurlent must be establ.shed ir1 South
~r.tetnam.
The trouble began, .in my opinion,
with the assassination o:f Diem. Diem
was the best thing we hrtd going for title
free world in that area, and the tragedy
,of. his death still haunts lls.
I hope that at some time the proper
cnmmittee will conduct a formal in-
qu11y. as to his overthrow a:t1d assassina-
tion and what part, if arlyr, officials of the
'[7.t3, Government played in this tragedy.
W e have never been told` atlyth111g,
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except through some newspaper articles. Mr. ELLENDER. I want the Senator
So far as I know, no formal inquiry was Prom Connecticut to know that I have
ever made, although there have been taken partfn debates in the Chamber in
many ugly rumors. But ofiickally, we respect to South Vietnam on many ac-
,do not know why. Diem was overthrown, tateoto~the President what he ougltt~to
or how his death occurred.
That was the beginning of our trouble do.
in South Vietnam. I make this state- Mr. DODL). Neither am I.
ment on1Y for historical reference, so Mr. ELLENDER. We have gone so far
that':I may put my response in better now that I do not know what the whole
? perspective. We have since the death of picture is. I still contend that unless
Diem been plagued with the fall oP one we can persuade our allies to assist us
government after another in South Viet- in that area, and unless we can enable
nom, -There must be a stable Govern- the South Vietnamese to build up to 'the
went, and we can and must try to help ble goverrunentytherehis na telling 1 o~v
the South Vietnamese achieve it.
Mr.. ELLENDER. Suppose we cannot long we shall be in that country, and
accomplish that? there is no telling how many American
i
th
h
t
s
ere
a
.
Mr. I?ODD. I do not think that will lives will kae lost. I doubt t
happen. I think it can be done. any way to win there under present con-
Mr? ELLENDER. The Senator has ditions.
been speaking about Diem. As the Senator may recall, the lztte
It is an "if" question. I President Kennedy said-and I well
DODD
Mr'
.
.
~.do not know that anyone can ever remember when he said it, because I dls-
answer it. The Senator says "suppose." cussed it with }rim in person, following
I could add a hundred other suppositions my last visit to South Vietnam-that if
that would make his question of no victory were to be attained in South Viet-
moment, Suppose we were attacked by nom, the South. Vietnamese would have
. the Soviets tomorrow morning with nu- to achieve it. In my opinion, that catt-
.clear weapons; I do not think we would -not be done unless there 1s a stable Gov-
then be able to do much in Vietnam. ernment there i,hat is willing, with our
But 7C do not believe that will happen. assistance, to fit*ht. Does not the Sen-
I da :not think we get anywhere by such 'ator agree?
suppositions, Mr. DODD. Yes. I am much in agree-
We; -must strive to assist the South ment with the Senator from Louisiana.
' Vietniamese in obtaining a stable govern-? I have great adm:lration for him. I know
ment. I think that with our help, they how hard he has worked on these sub-
can ~?stablish such a government; then jects and` how widely he has traveled.
we shall do better. I am grateful to him for his comment,
Mr. ELLENDER. I should like- to I shall touch on these subjects later.
if the Senator will Mr. President, I reiterate my earlier
speals about Diem
,
permit me to do so. request that this colloquy be placed at
Mr. DODD, Certainly,- the end of mY speech.
I was in South Viet- The PRESIDLNIs OFFICER. Without
ELLENDER
Mr
.
.
nom within a matter of months after objection, it is so ordered.
Dient took oiltce and on several occa- Mr. ELLENDER. I am deeply inter-
sions thereafter. I remember on my ested in what the Senator is saying. If
second visit there discussing with him I do not remain in the Chamber all the
the existence in his country of two pock- time, I shall read his speech in the REC-
' people are Buddhists. this subject. "?"~"?? `~"` """"" ?`"`"" `" ''?'""
l1l- T111T1T\ wT... 4t... L'....... -..... J- ,.. ..r Tax nnTif!r-ec 71/P,. Are.etAnn+ vritT - I know that the "domino theory is
to grow in size. They may have been Senator from Alaska [Mr. GxvErrrrrcl. I Communist?"~ The rel:~ly was almost im-
. - . . ...-- ..? .-.- ._ ______ .~ ._ ___ .___~__ iL_i L_ a- t. -..- i..--..-~ T L. -....
ets or areas, one in the delta and one oan. I should like to have the benefit of
to t:he northwest, of Saigon, that were his statistics concerning the religious as-
infested with Communists. He knew pects of the trouble in South Vietnam.
that. As I recall, we made efforts to Mr. DODD. Yes, I am grateful to
encourage him to take action "to satisfy the Senator from Louisiana.
those people, but we could never get hirn Mr. President, I am pleased to observe
roc. This is a common mistake. Not the Senator yield?
more than 30 percent of the Population Mr. DODD, I am delighted to yield to
are :Buddhists. my distinguished friend the Senator
Mr. ELLENDER. Thirty percent are from Illinois.
Buddhists? Mr. DOUGLAS. I lrad the privilege of
Mr. DODD. Thirty percent, I can . ~ reading overnight the very able address
document my belief. of the Senator from Connecticut. In
M'r. ELLENDER. I wish the Senator. fact I read it over no less than three
vision? ~ ~ mates his speech, the refusal to 4ndulge ~ lbir, DODD. Oh, no.
Mr. DODD. I should like to place that in personalities,- the crediting of high Mr. DOUGLAS. It worild be a power-
infarmation !n the RECORD in an orderly ,motives to those who dicier lrt their'pre- lu1. force dedicated to the- defeat of the
Mr. DODD. If I may interrupt, that
could well haves been learned from the
Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DOUGLAS. I commend the gen- -
eral elevation of attitude and the pow-
erful logic of the speech. This is the.
most puzzling attic dangerous problem
which our country has -faced since Oc-
tober lOG2.
I agree with the' Senator from Con-
necticut that many Americans do not
suiT'iciently appreciate what the loss of
South Vietnam would mean to the free
world and to the anti-Communist forces.
I am not an exprrt on the subject of
this territory, but a study of the map in-
dicates what is involved. The Senator is
completely correct in his statement that
the fall oP South Vietnam, or a with-
drawal from Soutlt Vietnam, unless con-
ditions change, would mean the almost
immediate fall of Cambodia and Laos
into the Communist camp. Laos is al-
ready half there; Cambodia is perhaps
half there.
..Then, iP Senators will look at a map
of the area, they will see that Thailand
would be half encircled. As the Senator
from Connecticut itas pointed out, the
North Vietnamese arinounced a few days
ago that they were setting up a commit-
tee for the national liberation for Thai-
land. -
Mr. DODD. Yes.
Mr. DOUGLAS: With that kind of
power base, with Nortlt Vietnam push-
ing, with China behind North Vietnam,
and wih the United States out of the
area, would not Communist influence
take over Thailand and then spread
north into Burma a,nd south into Ma-
laysia?
Mr. DODD. Most assuredly.
Mr. DOUGLAS. Then to the 650 mil-
lion Chinese would br, added 250 million
Malays. What then would be the posi-
tion of India?
Mr. DODD. Then it would be hope-
less.
Mr. DOUGLAS. T '.remember talking
rnany years ago with an ettiinent Indian,
who was not pro-Western and not pro-
Communist, '~ut rather was a neutralist.
I addressed this question to my Indian
being attacked now as trot being applic-
able;but if these were an absence of force
tit check the Chinese, it would seem to
nnany of us to be almost inevitable that
all of Malaysia and virtu~dly all of India
would go Communist. We would thou
face a combination of 350 million In-
dia,ns, 250 million Malays, and 650 million
i?hinese-1,250 million people. That
would not be merely a change of political
lYll, iJVLL. il,1V 19 C4 4V11f.,1V,i 1:11 V3, a.1 ? /v//? .r ---.~ u?"vv+.. vv..-l.-. -
Such statements are made frequently. mented. e'overnment but the conquest of a doc-
-There is nothing to substantiate the fig- Mr. DOUGLAS. I commend the Sena- txlne bent on world domination which
ure of 90 percent. for for many features- of his address. treats the United States as Its basis
M'r ELLENDER What is the di- First I commend the spirit which ani- enemy.
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Tf the.Senator from Connecticut would
permit me to do so, I should like to
utxderscot?e some of his remarks on neu-
tralization, I suppose that iY there could
be genuine neutralization, that would be
highly desirable.
Mr. DODD. Of course; I should have
:made that point. No ono would be hap-
pier than I if genuine neutralization, as
the Senator puts it, could be achieved.
I was talking abut neutralization in the
sense in which the Communists use it.
'We are too inclined to believe that the
Communists mean genuine neutraliza-
tion, when what they mean, in Pact, is
communization,
Mt:. DOUGLAS. If it were genuine
neutralization, it should certainly apply
Ito North Vietnam as well as to South
'Vietnam.
Mt?. DODD.
neutralization.
veto and thus stymie. any resolution of
the U.N.
As one who has ahvays been a sup-
porter of .the U.N., and who still is, I
observe many signs that the United Na-
tions is being weakened .In the same
fashion that the League of Nations
weakened in the middle and late 1930's.
I hope that this will not happen.
Mr. DpDD. So do I.
Mr. DOUGLAS. We should try to pre-
vent that from happening, but we should
not ignore reality. `
To those who say that there is no
analogy betweetx the cumulative con-
quests of Hitler and Mussollni in the
late 1930's atxd the cumulative develop-
ments of the Chinese in Asia in the
1960?s, I should say that there is grave
danger that they delude themselves. It
would be a terrible thing if we wake up
to find all of Asia Communist.
Mr. DODD. It would be a dreadful
disaster. Earlier I described it as an
"unthinkable tlxought," borrowing my
words from the Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. DOUGLAS. It would have tre-
mendous propaganda influence in Africa,
much greater than the Russians alone
could have, because the Russians, after
all, are members of the white race. But
the members of the. yellow race or the
brown race can make a much greater
appeal to the blacks than the wlxite ~na-
tions can.. .
The Senator from Connecticut has
.performed a real public service in stress-
ing the dangers. It should be noted also
that he cannot be accused of being a war
hawk. He does not advocate the indis-
criminate bombing of North Vietnam or
a bombing attack on China.
Mr. DODD. No.
Mr. DOUGLAS. He suggests the pos-
sibflity of guerrilla warfare iu the north,
which would ]rave to he done by South
Vietnam, rather than. by the United
States.
Mr. DODD. Only because of what
North Vietnam is doing to South Viet-
nam. This seems to me a proper cor-
rective measure only so long as North
.Vietnam pr_rsists in its activities.
What we all hope far,"I need not say
to the Senator, is a settlement of tlxe dif-'
'ferences between countries, so that they
can drop their arms and get on wii;h the
business of improving the lives of their
people.
Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator proposes
political warfare and economic aid 'to be
of real benefit to the people of Sattth
Vietnam; the development of SEA'.CO;
and various" other measures.
I feel certain that the country will
appreciate wlxat the Senator from Co.n-
necticuthas done. I urge that his wat?n-
ings and his suggestions should not be
dismissed summarily.
I can remember how, in the 1930's,
after two trips to Europe, I felt that t:he
combination oP. Hitler and Mussolini urns
moving to take over 'the free world. . I
believe that it was the duty of all wlto
loved fx?eedom to resist that movement.
There is a similar obligation-upon us to-
day tb resist totalitarianism of the left,
as well as totalitarianism of the rig]ht.-
Mr. DOUGLAS. Even if it were ap-
plied to South Vietnam, it would not be
effective in view of Communist philoso-
phy and power, unless there were some
;adequate supervisory body having real
authority to police the agreement.
We have all noticed press reports,
which are authentic, that North Viet-
nam has even expelled the small in-
spection teams which, under the Geneva
Convention of 1954, were placed both
in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, to
see what was taking place and to report.
'T'hey are being expelled and forced out.
So there will be no eyes and no voices-
no eyes to detect and no voices to report
t;he military preparations and movements
t>f North Vietnam.
Mr. DODD. That is correct,
Mr. DOUGLAS. If there were a
strong, effective United Nations, with a
mobile police forre, that force could. be
placed in tktis area to help fill the power
vacuum.
Mr. DODD. There is no doubt about
ghat.
Mr. DOUGLAS, I was in Egypt and
Israel in 1956, shot?tly after the Suez hos-
tilities. I~, was greatly pleased about the
e>xcellent work of the United Nations po-
lice force. The Senator from Connects-
cut and I may have differed somewhat
about the role of a United Nations police
force in the Congo, but to my mind it
represented a healthy principle.
Mr. DODD. I have no difficulty with
'the Senator from Illinois on that point.
I' am sure the Senator would agree that
+we can make mistakes. But the prin-
ciple is correct: A United Nations police
? force should be used wherever this is
feasible.
Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes. Unfortunately,
as we all know, the Russians and, I am
sorry to say, the French also, have vir-
tiually stymied the. creation of such a
force by refusing to contribute to its sup-
port.
Mr. DODD. Yes.
Mr. DOUGLAS. So it will be almost
hnpossible in the Hoar future to finance
and to place a United Nations police
-force in the field.
Another political change is occurring
inside the U.N:; ?namely, a shift of power
from the Assembly to the Security Coun-
c111, where the .Russians can interpose a
Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.
I am glad that the Senator mt~~de that
observation.
Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the :>c~nator.'
Perhalxs crx?tain features of his program,
such as the proposal to capture a staging
area lust inside of Laos may not be the
right thing to do. But, in general, the
pragl'alYx SitggE5ted is modest, maiierate,
and in good temper. I hope his program
will be cozLSidered by the American peo-
ple and that it may serve to offset same
of the :finely motivated but inco.~nplete
suggestions that have been made.
Mr. DODD. I am deeply grate:ftri for
the observations of the Senator:
Mr. DOMINICE~. Mr, President; will
the Sentx.tar yield?
Mr. DGl)D. I yield.
Mr. L~OMINICK. Mr, Presidr..nt, I
congratulate the distinguished Setxat;or
from Camtecticut on making what I
think is a valuable contribution to the
national debate on what we should do
in southeast Asia.
I not only had an opportunity to :read
the statetent before it was delivered,
but I_ also had the pleasut?e of listetxing
to the delivery. There are several paints
that the Senator made which I think
were publicly made for the first time.
The one that T should like to emphasize
at this palm concerns some of tlxe
strategic iml>licatians, gained by looking
at a map, of what might happen if the
'Red Chinese decide to move south.
The implication is rather plain th.ta,t
the Senator .does not think they will do
that. I agree. Among the things tlxa.t
would deter -them from doing that is the
presence in 'T'aiwan of a highly trainer]
air force. The Nationalist Chinese very
much want to So back to the mainland
if they have a,n opporttucity. If the Red
Chinese forces >hrere to lie drawn to the '
south, that would give them the chance
to move, which chance they might not
have again.
The Senator presented figures on what
the Vietcong has done in the way of
murder and terror within the country,
The Senator said that almost 500 a
month, or 6,000 a year, within the village
hamlets have been murdered by the Viet-
cong:
Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.
Mr. DOMINIC7K. I wonder if the Sen-
ator can tell me where the figures origi-
note.
Mr. DODD. I hope the Senator will
be satisfied with my statement. I am
sure they are f.t?om an official source of
the administration..
Mr. DOMINICIf. The reason I asked
Ys that figures have been given to me
which are of a very substantial nature,
but not quite that large. When I have
mentioned the flt?ttt?es from time to time,
in the process o:f meeting with groups
and talking about; the terrorism that has
been inflicted, people had not heard of
this before. They had never understood
what was going an, They had no con-
cept of the problem..
Mr. DODD. I c1a Hat know whether
the Senator was izx tlxe Chamber before,
but when I obtained the figures, I said,
"Why in the world have the figures not
been made public 2'" I -think the figures
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shocald have been made public. I do not
see much sense in classifying this mate-
rial and concealing it. The people do
not know these facts.
Mr. DOMINICK. It is particularly
important with respect to the. arguement
made by those who would like to see us
negotiate and neutralize. The South
Vietnamese villages are not with us. But
!t is very difficult to have them cooperate
with us if they are under the grip of
"terrorism and many people in their
areas are being murdered. Until we
give them the security they need, it is
harts for them to be able to do anything.
Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.
M:r. DOMINICK. Mr. President, one
of the things that has not been made
plain in the overall debate, I feel, is the
fact that there is a contest of willpower
in this area. There is no doubt . in my
mind, from the study that I have made
of~ the overall situation, that the Com-
murrists are using the so-called national
liberalization plan as a test mechanism
? to determine how great the willpower
of tlhe free world is. If this plan should
'be .successful in persuading us to nego-
tiate, or'neutralize, it fs inevitable that
this technique will spread widely
throughout the world, through Africa,
,South America, and Latin America.
It, is already being used. But I be-
lieve it will be accelerated sharply. I
think the Senator brought that point
out very well. I congratulate him on
making a very useful contribution.
Nfr. DODD. I thank the Senator.
N[r. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
N[r. DODD. I yield.
N[r. MUNDT. I congratulate the dis-
tin@;uished Senator from Connecticut
for having presented a most conclusive
and comprehensive statement on this
whole Vietnamese problem. It is the
typo of white paper which I hoped the
State Department would have placed be-
forea the American people long ago.
` I believe it would still be well for them
to clo so. In his analysis of the historic
developanerits of the problems and the
consequences involved in this important
theater of the world, the Senator leaves
littlle doubt as to his accuracy.
While men may disagree among them-
selves as to the various processes to be
used to bring this matter to a successful
culmination, the matters that the Sena-
for has anticipated are the type that
should emanate frown the State Depart-
ment, carrying the full weight of the ad-
ministration and the Government. I am
sure that would convince .many fine
Atraerican citizens, who are beginning to
doubt their own judgments ire these
areas, >ts to what is involved.
I: congratulate the Senator-on a most
corprehensive study. I am happy to
noise the emphasis and the importance.
which the Senator places on a step-up
political warfare in this area.
'.Che distinguished Senator from Con-
nerticut has long tried to establish a
.training institution in .this country so
then we could prepare Americans to eo
overseas for the type of warfare we wish
to ;pursue, with a. stablp,.constituted gov-
er7nment in Vietnam.
I hope that the State Department,
which has shown such a stubborn re-
luctance to provide the type training
required for this type of warfare, will
consider carefully the emphasis that the
Senator places on this particular recom-
mendation for future activity.
The Senator talks about cadres of
trained political leaders and emissaries
from these countries who are equipped
and capable so that they could deliver
the type of guidance and inspiration
needed by our friends in South Vietnam.
Unfortunately, this is always debated in
a vacuum in our? ability to wage a cold
war.
I happen to be one of those who be-
lieve honestly that had the other body
approved in 1960 what the Senate then
did approve, legislation for the creation
of a freedom academy-following a won-
derful report written in large part by
the Senator from Connecticut, e,s a mem-
ber of the Committee on the Judiciary,
emphasizing the need for this adjunct
to our contest against the Cotnrnunists
overseas-we would have had 5 long
years within which not only to train our-
, selves, but also to provide for young gov-
ernmental officials and career people in
the government in Saigon to come here
and learn the full truth about the tech-
niques and devices employed by the Com-
munists. These officials and career peo-
ple would have learned to understand
the maneuvers and manipulations of the
Communist conspiracy, and been trained
to be better able to convince their fel-
low citizens on the free side of t:.e Viet-
namese struggle of the dividends which
accrue to freedom, and the importance
of Communists.
There would not have been the nrelan-
cholic succession of quick changes in the
officialdom of South Vietnaru. We
would have obtained what all ltands
agree is an indispensable requirement in
bringing success to our efforts tlzere-
the creation of a stable government in
South Vietnam which has not orily the
will to win, but also the respect of the
local peaple, so that it in turn would sup-
port the Government and maintain its
stabilfty in office, so that the people there
could get on with the work to be done..
Mr. DODD. The Senator gives me
credit for the idea of the Freedom Acad-
emy. It vaas the idea oP the .Senator
from South Dakota. I was .merely a
minor help in getting it through .the
Senate. The Senatar from South Da-
kota deserves great credit for it.
Mr. TOW1~1Z. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator
from Texas.
Mr. TOWlt'.Pti. I join my distinguished
colleagues from South Dakota anci Colo-
rado in commending the able anil distin-
guished Senator from C'onncctfcut for
his comprehensive contribution to the
dialog on southeast Asia. It must be
made clear to the American people that
we must take stringent action ire sotitlr-
east Asia iP we are to deter and discotar-
age further aggressive adventures by the
Communists. Again I thank the Sen-
stor from Connecticut very much.
Mr. DAVITS, Mr, president, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. Dc?DD. I yield to the Setrs3tor
from New 'York.
Mr. DAVITS. The speech of then Sen-
ator from Connecticut is altogether too
provocative and he has done his lraxaa.e-
work altogether too well for him to be
complimented merely or. a good job. It
is a good job, however, and I should lflte
to join my colleagues from Texas, t_~otrth
Dakota, a,ncl other States who have said
so. Any bane the Senator devote.; :h~ian-
self to tlxis kind of work, it helps the
country.
The Senator from Connecticut lt.as
done a thorough job_in presenting ni':w
ideas. Thfs is the place for them, .f car
we are not inhibited by the admini:,tra-
tion or its policies, especially whin a
Democrat puts forth a good idea.
One lack, as I have said before, is tftat
retaliation lies been pictured as a policy.
It is not a policy. It is a reaction. We
support it. We close ranks behind the
President. We have common interests irr
it and in the losses. The losses breal.
our hearts, but we try to do sametlting
about them. fIowever, it is not a policy.
The Senatar from Connecticut is try-
ing to work out a policy. Whether it be
a good or a bad policy, he is right
in trying to work it out, because he pro-
poses something positive, which takes us
on a road where there is a big lack. That
is what is causing doubts among the
people as to whether this country is goltrg
to pull out of South Vietnam or go fa:r-
ward.
Granting a,11 that I have said, I shottld
like to ask t'he Senator some questions.
In the first place, the Senator does rrot
deal with something that troubles many
of us, and that is the question, "Is there
still a majority in South Vietnam who do
not want communism? Do a majority
of the people want to fight against it?",
We cannot fight a war without soldiers:
That statement goes whether the fight i:r
for an ideology or for freedom. That is
one question we must always determine.
We cannot put our head on other peo-
ple's shoulders and assume they ar, the
is a refined form of democracy. How- Mr. DODD. That is not what is President would do it.
ever, it dust is not true that the Viet- worrying me. I am worrying as to I would put it a little differentlr,~, We
na,mese people sio not know very much whether I know the answer. do not l~rxaw what there is to ne~;ntiate.
about itree~y haveedemonst ated th t ~? DAVITS. It is~importarxt that we ~We already have an agreement. 4'Ve say,
explore each others minds to see We have an agreement which yoax .have
again and again. whether we agree with each other's point violated and which has caused some
There is another kind of freedom, and of view, trouble. All you have to do is to retire
that is freedom Prom foreign domination. As the Prasident has- stated, we are from your aggressions, and cease a,ttac;k-
Tleey know the meaning oP this, too. As ready to negotiate. We are ready to ing your neighbor." If the Communists
I -said before, they defeated Genghis negotiate if negotiations do not retre- are willing to talk about this, then Isup-
Klean, and they threw out fire French. sent a sellout of the people of South pose we sleauld do so.
.That they have the will to resist com- Vietnam or a sellout of the cause of Mr. DAVITS. I have suggeste,t me
? million have fled south. Roughly 5 I should like that formula better, be- say that the Senator has Just made vvhat
million of them have, at one time or an- cause this is a big question in the world: could be an excellent opening statement
other, fought the Communists. "Is the United States in a mood Por un- by the Unfl;ed States in such a nef~ati-
]:f we make allowance for wives and conditional surrender?" The Senator ation. I believe that within that f~~rr??a,me-
Children, that would make a figure of 9 and every newspaper editor in the world work, the Senator and I could agree:
or 10 out of 14 ~rrillion. The percentage know precisely what I mean by that. But let me make one further eom-
ma.y even be higher, What are we saying hero-that some- ment on this sub3ect which is importaart;
Again I repeat that the Vietnamese day, somehow, as in the case of the Berlin ire debate and in Fortifying our own can-
pecxple do have the will to resist. All they ' airlift, or other emergencies which looked science on this issue, we must not forget
want from us is old to counterbalance as though they would never be settled, that we are supposed to have allies in
the' technicians and personnel, and some way will be fotmd out of the sit- the SouttYl~~east ,Asia Treaty Organization, ?
We~pona-that the Communists have been nation? The same thing occurred in in nlutua'1 defense agreements, eve~x in
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that is, that we would force the adman- should fool anyone. I regret very much these incidents of appeasement we shall
ist~ration to ever-increasing military ef- that so many of my -able and distin- miss completely the lessons that must:
forts to keep those people fromi thinking guiahed colleagues in the Senate, who are be drawn from past conduct in order to
that we are going to pull out. in a position to know better, seem to guide ourselves ire the future.
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I wish or gain a position, or gain land, or gain pract ca y an n co p
to associate myself with the remarks of in the conflict. I spent some time in of the guerrillas of North Viei;ncrm
the Senator from Connecticut and to Korea-3 days there. The only reason against the peasants in the haml+''ts fn
commend him for the excellent think- the Ii;orean armistice has worked is the South Vietnam.
ing through which he has done on this fact that we have had military power Mr. DODD. I do not want to be un-
grave problem and for the presentation back of the 38th parallel, in a command- derstood as altogether absolving t;he
of his very important recommendations ing position in the mountains, and have South Vietnamese from any acts of
in this critical situation. I commend got air cover behind that, and. tanks be- terror. Unhappily, these things have
him particularly for the overall posi- hind the air cover to make that line occurred on both sides. However, a be-
tio:n that what we are doing is so much stick. ]ieve that the overwhelming number of
better than two or three of the other Otherwise the armistice agreement act of terror are chargeable directly 'to
alternatives which are available to us, would not have been worth the paper on the Communists. There is no drrubt
among which are pulling out altogether which it had been written, if we had had about that. Terror is a part of their
from South Vietnam or neutralization to depend on the Communists. Then it policy; whereas to some extent it may be
without adequate safeguards, which was the Korean Communists; this time it true of South Vietnam, it is not the
would result in the same end as with- is the Vietnamese Communists. They stated policy.
drawal from South Vietnam and eventual are all of the same breed of cats. They Mr. LAUSCHE. I agree completely
withdrawal from southeast Asia. may differ in their ideologies, as between with the Senator from Connecticut that
][ believe that a general debate on this the Chinese Reds and the Russian Reds, it is their technique to intimidate and
and all other matters of foreign policy but they are both Reds; they are both terrorize the peasants working in the
are of great benefit, and help the people Communists. In 99 percent of Ehe cases, fields and laving serenely in their homes,
of this country establish a general con- agreements are made by them for the descending r:rpon them at night to dr.-
serrsus, which we as public officials have very purpose of breaking them and mis- capitate their leaders and place tlceir
the responsibility not only to discover leading and tricking their opponents, separated .heads on poles, so that file
but also to lead toward. Nevertheless, it -and without any hope of having them peasants will begin to fear that if they
seems to me that we must be careful that honor their written commitments in any take up the position of chieftan or leaner
we do not by our statements indicate to manner, shape, or form. they will likewise suffer the same fate.
the people of southeast Asia, or to those I am surprised that so many Members Mr. DODL?. That is why it is done.
who are our adversaries there, that this of the Senate, with good and peaceful Mr. LAUSCHE. I heard the discus-
country plans any kind of negotiation intentions, invariably are taken in by this sion between the Senator from Connecti-
which would result in our abandonment absolutely phony argument, which. bears cut and the Senator from Illinois about
of the people oP South Vietnam and, by the hallmark of deceit and intent at mis= drawing a lesson from what happens>.d
any such statements, perhaps, accom- representation and the obvious purpose following the violation of treaties gairri;
plash the same results which many fear- of deceiving. I am surprised that it back to 1939. Unless we take a look at
from Connecticut yield to the Senator The Communists could use these so- analogy.
iro:m Oklahoma? called negotiations merely as a stalking- I heard the discussion about terrorism
]1~Ir. DODD. I am glad to yield to the horse to get their apparatus more firmly I would like to hear the Senator';; view
Sexrator from Oklahoma CMr. Hnearsl. at work or to gain time, or to gain place, on whether the terrorism is in the :main
i 11 d i m leteness the Frets
DIN
The PRESI
' MUSKIE in the chair) . Does the Senator ~ time would be folly in the extreme. happened in Korea. Actually there, is no
,
n
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. res e
Senator from Connecticut yield? necticut is convinced, that an attempt to that we, negotiate, and those who make
G OFFICER (Mr arrange a negotiated settlement at this the proposal used the analogy of waist
we :really should make massive demands the Senator from Connecticut yield? r. .1. .
and, keep at it eternally to get help in Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to the Mr. hAUSCHE. Mr. President,, will
this situation, so that Asians may get Senator from Oklahoma. tho Senator yield?
into the. struggle, which is a struggle for Mr. MONRONEY. I should like to loin Mr. ;CiODD. I yield to the Senator
the whole of Asia. my distinguished iunior colleague in from Ohao.
Mr. DODD. I wholly agree with the complimenting the able and distinguished Mr. I_u3USCHE. I am extremely de-
Senator from New York. I have said Senator from Connecticut on his stand lighted to state that my views have in
so many times years ago. and the position he has taken in regard the past r;oincided with the view:; of the
Mr. DAVITS. The Senator is correct. to Vietnam. Senator from Connecticut and coinride
Mr. DODD. When I came back from I had the great good fortune to repre- with them today. It is my recalle+:,i;ion
the trip which I made, I referred to it on sent the Senate in a visit to southeast that in ~~kre Korean negotiations, tlae pro-
the floor of the Senate. I then thought Asia between Thanksgiving and Christ- posal to negotiate was not made by the
it was urgent and necessary. It 1s even mss for 3 days-to make the most of some United States, but by the North Krrr~ans,
more urgent and necessary now. I cum- 3 days by interviewing men who had Does the Senator have a recollectlorr on
pletely agree. served in that theater. Later, I talked to that point?
Mr. DAVITS. I thank the Senator entire Far East theater f ope~ tionsthI Mr. ~ AIiTSCHE.atIsrnmny quite curtain
from Connecticut.
as the Senator from Con- that that is correct. Now ft is proposed
t will the am convinced
P id
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the oiler of the Japanese to mediate. I believe that is the greatest danger in think t:h,~rt because peace is so wonderful
Perhaps, if we could suggest something, the dialog on this subject. a< believe that and so much to be sought after we should
I would most enthusiastically loin the every Senator and other's who have allow t;lac Communists to trick us into
Senator in a plea for vigorous action by spoken have had much to add, but I negotiE~~ti~~:ns, which would be used. to ex-
the administration to enlist the partici- especially wish to commend the Senator ploit u;s i'or their purpose. The tvay to
patron of our allies. If any such vigorous from Connecticut and to associate my- get peace is to try to improve orrr posi-
action is in fact being taken, it is so self with his strong recommnendations, tion, to be able to proceed from astand-
quaet, so submerged, so subdued, that particularly in regard to the intensifies- point of strength, rather than :fa?om a
even we who are extremely sensitive and tion of political warfare in tl:rat troubled standp~:drrt~ of weakness. When we :reach
have; many places where we can get in- sector, and the encouragement of greater that point we shall not be layiaxg our-
formation, have heard nothing about it. collective action by other people of the selves, ol.~+;n to helping them in their ob-
I believe it is in this area that we Asiatic nations. lective to propagandize themselves. and
should push and press. Bringing in our Mr. DODD. I am deeply grateful to the allee'ed position that they have in
allies does not have so many of the con- the Senator from Oklahoma for his Vietnarrx.
notations of negotiations with the other comments. I coma?lament the distinguished Sena-
. sides-that is, with the Communists; but Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, will for on his firm position.
M I)f'DD I thank the Senator
_ _~
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 36
Mr. LAUSCHE. In addition, to that,
a new agreement 'was made in 1962, in
Laos.
Mr. DODD. Yes.
Mr. LAUSCHE. There we followed the
policy of negotiation..
Mr. DODD. Yes. _._I believe it was iri
1ss1.
Mr. LAUSCHE. May I ask whether
the Laotian agreement worked out as it
was anticipated it wonild work out by the
sponsors of it?
Mr. DODD. Not at all. It could not
havA worked out worse than it did. For
the people of Laos and the people of
southeast Asia and for us it has been a
complete farce. It .has been repeatedly '
violated, and it is being violated every ~
day. It is another case of our inability` i
to trust those people.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I commend the Sen-
ator from Connecticut; for his presenta-
tion, because I believe what he has said
and what others have said on this point
will bring home to the minds of the
American people that what is involved
is not merely wanting to be in southeast
Asia, but that our national security is
involved. In my ludg.ment, words to the
contrary, are not at this time helpful to
the achievement of the common ob~ec-
tive that we seek to achieve.
Mr. DODD. I am grateful to the Sen-
ator for his compliment, which Y do not
deserve, but which I enloy.
., Mr. President, I yield the.floor.
~~' ,t
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Mr. D(~DD. That is very true. I do
not offer these analogies because I tY~ink
think they are exact parallels. The ~4en-
ator understands that, I am sure. There
are always some differences. I know
that. However, we learn from what hap-
pened in the past, certainly from what
happened in the near past, and we study
these happenings in order to learn from
them. If others made mistakes, we
should try to learn how to avoid repeat-
did not do what we should have done,
and in that way a terrible war was
brought on.
Mr. LAUSCHE. It has been suggested
that we negotiate the future political
status of South Vietnam. What does'
' that mean? Does it mean that we should.
negotiate a now type of government for'
South Vietnam?
Mr. DODD. I do not know. I do not'
believe that the Senator from New Yorke.
meant it that way. As I understood him,`;
he made a good point. I am sure the:
Senator from Ohio shares my feeling one
that point. As I understood the Senator;
from New York, we do not want to doh
anything that will give the impression
that we are for unconditional surrender
and, on the other hand, we do not want
to give the impression that we will have
nothing to 'do with the Communists.
Hitler to remain in power.
There were those who said, "Oh, no;,
war would result iP we tried to stop Hit-
ler now, and it would be terrible." We
ing them. I drew these ,analogies for
that purpose. There are other examples
in history-these are not the only ones-
but the ones that I drew on are the
latest and perhaps the most pertinent.
Mr. LAUSCHE. There was the Ver-
sailles Treaty and the League of Nations
covenants, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty,
and the Lucarno Treaty. All oP them
contained provisions which were vioL~ted
by the Japanese as early as 1922.
Mr. DODD. Yes.
Mr. LAUSCHE. By Hitler begimiing
about 1932, and by Mussolini at the same
time. In instance after instance it was
thought that if we would give in., it
would be the end of it.
Mr. DODD. That is true. I referred
to Nuremberg and what we discovered
there. One of the thinks we learned was
that at the time Hitler ordered his troops
to occupy the Rhineland, he had given
instructions that 3f they met any op-
position at all they should immediately
retreat. How easy it would have been
for us to stop him cold then. There was
considerable? dissatisfaction -with Hitler,
in his own military circles, and, as we
know, there was an attempt made later
to get rid of him.
We failed in that situation to take the
appropriate steps. Our failure enabled
That is all that the Senator Prom New
York meant, I am sure.
Mr. LAUSCHE. There is now in exist-'
ante a pact by which we have abided ands
by which the South Vietnamese have
abided, but which the North Vietnamese
have violated.
r Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.
' Mr. LAUSCHE. That 1s the Cieneva~
Pact of 1954.
~.~ M,r: DODD. 'The Senator is correct.
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