SITUATION ESTIMATE FOR PROJECT CHALICE FISCAL YEARS 1961 AND 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 14, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Relea 2002/10/15: CIA-RDP33-02415A0004 p380014-3
SIMATION 2ST] dM
P ROTECCT O ZOE
ISCAT, YEARS 1961 and 1962
(T --0914
Loft
). March 1960
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
 Approved For Relee 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A00W0380014-3
CQNrI=
1. Purpose
2. Background and History
II Intelligence Requirements
1. Target Selection
2. Task
3. Targets
4. Corollary Tasks
III Concept of operations
1. Employment
2. Mission and Mission Planning
3. Utilization
4. Primary Mission Capabilities
5. Maintenance and Support
6. Control
7. Sortie Rate
8. Support
IV Relationship to Other Forces
1. Augmentation L.
2. Pre Hostilities
3. Hostilities
25X1X7
1. Life Expectancy of the U-2 for Overflights
2. Utilization of Bases
3. Aircraft and Equipment Assignment
4. Estimated U-2 Flying Hours
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
 =rte.RDP33-02di5A0404 0380014-3
Approved For Rele a 2002/10/15
IN'T'RODUCTION
1. PURPOSE
a) To provide doctrinal guidance for the planning and conduct of.
project operations during the FY 1961-62 time period. Due to current
events the need for timely minor changes is recognized. This document
will be utilized as a common reference and/or departure point for all
concerned consistent with the above.
b) Upon approval of the concept the document may be used as the
basis for justification of the budget. As such it will be reviewed and
revised as necessary and no later t nn 1 June 1961-in order that it
cau again become the basis for budgeting and long range planning for
Fl"1962 and 1963: This to include operational effectiveness the forma-
1 ~on of policy, tactics and techniques, and the determination of
o aerational and R & D requirementis..
c) In addition, revisions will; be made consistent with the latest
technological advancements, the current political and economic situation,
as . new offensive and defensive concepts as pertains to the national
security, in order to provide timely and effective guidance for any
fo:Uow-on program.
EACKGROUm) AND HISTORY
a) At the time the Soviet Union and its satellites denied normal
access to its territory, the need for a method to collect all kinds of
iitelligence became readily apparent and the requirement was of the highest
priority. The rapid technological advances of the Soviet Union indicated,
the need for prompt and aggressive action in order to obtain a capability
Which would satisfy the intelligence requirements.
b) At the request,of the highest executive branch of the Government
various studies were performed by the most capable scientific groups in
the country. All of the studies validated the requirements,' emphasized
the need for prompt and aggressive action, and recoftmended the utilization:
ot, airborne platforms
c) To provide the capability. Pfor relatively safe overflights, the
Lockheed U-2 was developed. in 1955. Built into the U-2 was an altitude
cability of approximately 70,000 feet which, at that time, was considered
almost certain to be in excess of the capability of the USSR to physically
interfere. Initially, it was expected that, although the Soviets could
not intercept the U-2 with manned aircraft or missiles of any type, they
might have a limited capability of tracking the U-2 with radar. This
assumption later proved to be correct except for the overly optimistic
anticipation that Soviet radar capability would be "limited Soviet
ability to detect and track the U-2 on penetration and during virtually
ORAL-0914
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3Cy oi'
 Approved For ReJpase 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415ACM100380014-3
its entire flight in denied-territory was conclusively established early
in the program and has continued to be the case up to the present time
with one notable exception; i.e., penetrations of the USSR in the
vicinity of the Soviet-Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In the period July
1959 to February 1960 three such penetrations were accomplished without,
to our knowledge, detection by the Soviet Air Defense system. On the
basis of this experience, we can at least tentatively conclude that if
penetration can be made without detection, there is an excellent chance
that the entire mission can be completed without recognition by the
air defense system.
It is reasonable to assume that Soviet capability to inter-
cept the U-2 will increase during.. the period under discussion. However,
it is believed that with careful flight planning and target selection,
the use of dispersal and deployment bases for deception, minimum time
on the ground, at pre and post-strike bases, and other tactics designed
to decrease operational hazards, the U-2 will continue t o possess sespara
iod?
significant overflight utility during .at a portion d) Diplomatic protests which the USSR has made as a result of the
AQUATONE operations in the summer of 1956 and again in early 1958 make
it imperative that Project CHALICE. operations be conducted in such a
manner as to reduce the probability of protest. In the original protest
of 1956, the violation of the air space over third countries was consid-
ered to have been the primary motivation for the USSR protest. This
view continues valid despite a Soviet protest in early 1958 concerning a
flight which, although it did not violate a third country, did fly into
its radar screen with the resultant possibility that the third country
had knowledge that a penetration of the USSR had been made. In the
period between the 1956 and. 1958 protests.. a total of 20, penetrations
were made of the USSR and satellite countries without diplomatic protest
from any source. In no instance, however, was the USSR and a satellite
country penetrated on the same mission. Recorded reaction to these
flights indicates that the violated countries were, in most instances,
aware at the very least that a prohibitive flight was being made. It
wag'further assumed that, in at least some cases, the USSR had equal
evidence Yerfll t i~ould besnotedaircraft
tha it P~for testboth
was not~mede~
1958 protesta
*A separate attachment to this report entitled "Life Expectancy of the
U-2 on Overflights" purposely has been omitted from, general distribution
because of its special classification. This attachment is available in
the Intelligence Section on a "need to know" basis.
CHAL-0914
CCtV~2ofd
Approved For Release 2 A000100380'014 60
 Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
public. The resultant implication is that the Soviets lacking the
physical capability to stop such overflights, are forced to use diplo-
matic measures. In both protest cases, high U~ S. political authority
directed that the overflights be stopped immediately. The reaction
to the Soviet diplomatic action will probably continue throughout this
period and will be taken into consideration for planning and when
submitting proposed overflights for political approval.
e) It is felt that the use of dispersal and deployment bases
in combination with the fast move concepts (maximum ground time 3
5 hours) will deprive the Russians of information concerning origin,
termination, etc., and thereby degrade and/or weaken an official,
protest. This would also allow for more plausible U.S. denial.
II INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
1. TARGET SELECTION
Intelligence Requirements for penetration flights by Project
CHALICE have been established by the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee
which is composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Require-
ments encompass the fields of photographic lligence, electronics
intelligence, These requirements 25X1
genes y. onso ge s es s pr or es
reflect the composite views of all the agencies represented on both
committees and, as such, represent the consensus of the 25X1
as a whole. Targets and priorities periodically are
re ewe by the committees and revisions are made based on the most
current intelligence available from all sources.
Basic to the requirement for early warning of the imminence of
a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States is the requirement for
reliable information on the present and future Soviet capabilities
for such an attack. Such information is also critical to our national
defense policy and planning. During the past four years CHALICE
- - - CHAL-0914
. 9f
; C+
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A00010038061443 t
 Approved For Relwe 2002/10/15: CIA-RDP33-02415A00 0380014-3
coverage has been by far the most lucrative source of reliable
information on which we have based our estimates of the Soviet
capabilities for nuclear attack. At the present time, there is an
urgent need for CHALICE coverage of certain objectives and areas
known to be, or suspected to be, associated with the three or
elements (ballistic missile, aircraft, and nuclear capability).
a. The most critical intelligence problem at this time is the
status of the Soviet ICBM program, an inherent threat of overriding
magnitude. Studies over the past two years by the U.S. Intelligence
Comity have concluded that CHALICE provides the only available
means offering reasonable assurance of obtaining on an immediate
basis the required intelligence on the deployment of Soviet ICBMs.
Certain rail lines which lend themselves to rail launch or logistic
support for fixed sites and, test sites are prime search areas for
this information. Increased urgency has been lent to the deploy-
ment question by recent evidence of ICBM series production.
Coverage of the most suspect production facilities may help to
confirm this . e
b. Other requirements (not in order of priority) for CHALICE
coverage which are also critical to national security are set forth
it the following paragraphs.
(1) It is recognized that a part of the Soviet ballistic
missile capability may be launched from submarines, nuclear
powered or conventional. Our need is to determine the
possible modification of existing craft, construction of
new ballistic missile submarines; and esloyment of both.
CHALICE coverage offers the best available means of answering
the questions. on production, characteristics, and employment
of submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles.
(2) The existence of a Soviet IRBM capability is recog-
nized as a fact, although this capability is less critical
to the United States than the ICBM. It constitutes an
iuediate and continuing threat to the West. CHALICE coverage
offers the best known means to answer the question of what
is the deployment concept and should assist with information
on the capability of these weapons as well, as their production.
be Joint Priorities Committee agreed that the most critical question
was guided missiles, though they did not seem to feel it necessary to
distinguish between IRBM and. ICBM. Further, they rate research and
develapnsest and production as such higher than deployment at this time
since evidence on these would permit a judgment of whether there was
Indeed a threat in existence; current thinking does not put deploy-
ment as probable in the case of the ICBM.
CEAL-0914
CY of
1#! 60LY
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
 Approved For Releape 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415AOOW0380014-3
(3) The Soviet heavy bomber force today poses an immediate
nuclear threat. Intelligence derived from sources other than
CHALICE has provided a fairly accurate measurement of the magni-
tude and capability of this threat. Previous CHALICE coverage
has served to confirm and augment this intelligence. However,
.we also have evidence that the. Soviets are developing a follow-
,on bomber aircraft which may replace the present bomber force.
In order to establish the status and magnitude of the ;S.pviet
effort in the heavy bomber, program, to clarify the faster-
relationships of this and other.. Soviet weapons' delivery.systems,
and thus to gain a more accurate measurement of the overall
Soviet nuclear threat, both present and future, it is Also
critical that we cover certginkey Soviet bomber bases,`bonber
production sites, and R & D facilities.
(?+) In addition, to knowledge of Soviet delivery system,
information on the production of fissionable materials .`is
essential to an accurate and positive measurement of the
Soviet nuclear threat.. Althoug extensive coverage of Soviet
Atomic energy installations' already been acquired. through
CHALICE operations, three of ten largest AE sites in the Soviet
Union remain uncovered and are '::highest priority require ents.
Production rates at these sites are a major source of ,uncertainty
in estimates of Soviet. plutonium production. Althoughre;concede
an agability.to launch e. devastating nuclear
attack against the U.S., -v-e--do not have su:Pieiemt information
to gauge whether theSoviets*have, or are producing sufficient
fissionable material in order:`
(a) To provide the required nuclear warheads for air
defense;
(b) To mount a sustained attack;
(c) To arm all or a great portion of their tactical
weapons with nuclear warheads.
(5) The number and pattern of deployment of Soviet surface-
to air missile sites (SA-2) is of critical concern to the
Strategic Air Command.. CHALICE photography has already pin-
pointed appro3d,matGly 50 of these sites including support
facilities. Coverage of additional SAM defended areas remains
a high priority requirement.
CHALICE coverage of one production area has enabled us to make a
reasonably accurate estimate of the plutonium and U-235 production
from this location. Coverage of the remaining key production sites
CHAL-091h-
CyyLof
,14 ch 1960
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
 Approved For Ref se 2002/10/15 CIA-RDP3~-02415AOlyA'100380014-3
-6-
can amply us with information for an estimate of the production of
fissionable material at this time and can also permit a projection of
production for three or more years. Such information has never been
obtained through other collection methods and, in addition to its
critical urgency for estimates of immediate Soviet capability, indi-
cations of a program out of all proportion to our estimate of Soviet
needs would be a most significant indication of possible Soviet
intentions and of inestimable use for political maneuvering, as well
as military planning.
3. TARGETS
Photographic and electronic objectives (targets) to fulfill the
needs outlined above are set forth in separate listings which are
constantly under review and revision by the Ad Hoc Requirements
Conmdttee
4. COROLLARY TASKS
Valuable intelligence by-products also can be anticipated as a
result of the coverage of the primary systems herein discussed.
Route photography can be expected to yield significant details of
other Soviet air installations, transportation systems, industrial
facilities, IM and ICBM installations, and other economic and
military targets which could be of a significance only slightly less
than the information we anticipate on primary objectives. One of
the outstanding bonus effects that we know will be derived from future
exercise of the CHALICE capability will be an increase in our knowledge
of Soviet air defense capabilities. Fairly precise data on the
general deployment and characteristics of Soviet defensive electronic
sites in otherwise inaccessible areas can be obtained through the
capability of CHALICE equipment to detect and record electronic
intelligence data. This increase in knowledge will result in a
firmer base for operational plans that involve employment of our
nuclear strike force. It should also be noted that exercise of the
CHALICE capability over otherwise largely inaccessible areas of the
USSR could reveal installations and activities of a completely
unknown but highly significant nature. As a specific byproduct,
CHALICE photography yields terrain information from which accurate
radar navigation and target charts, and radar prediction plates,
can be constructed. It is also anticipated that this photography
will permit resolution of invaluable precise geodetic data which is
so essential to the successful destruction of enemy targets by
guided missiles.
CEAI,-09111
14 Z3 of LY
60
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000IW0380014-3
-7-
III CONCEPT OF QPERATIONS
25X1A
1. EMPLOYMENT
a) In order to fully exploit the operational capability built
into the airframe of the U-2, considerable support will be maintained
in the form of overseas and ZI bases, highly skilled personnel, and
above all., airborne collection equipment. In order for Project
CgALICE to have maximum capability., permanent overseas bases will be
maintained in Europe at Mn-, aTurkey, and in the Far East at Atsugi,
Japan.
b) In addition, an air base facility within the ZI is necessary
to carry on continuing research and development, and, for further
perfection of equipment and techniques. Due to the fact that a follow-
on aircraft will not be available for approximately 12 to 18 months every
appropriate action will be taken to product-improve the existing capa-
bility as pertains to aircraft performance. Primary mission capabilities
product improvement will be in the form of increased reliability, weight
reduction, quantitative and qualitative improvement relating to the
end product. In order to offset "end product" degradation due to
increased performance, every effort will be made to improve the existing
and/or develop new, primary mission capabilities to the extent that
the end products will be equal to or better than those now obtained.
Therefore, the facilities presently in use at Edwards AFB (north base)
will be maintained throughout the lifetime of the U-2.
c) The support of the facilities at Q will be required
for the entire period. Increased activity due to the follow-on program
and product improvement of CHALICE will have to be provided for.
d) Certain other facilities will be required for periodic stags
and for ferrying of aircraft between the ZI and overseas bases. (Encl2)
2. MISSION AND MISSION PLANNING
a) With reference to CIA's resFonsibilities as pertains to the
National Security, the following primary and secondary missions are
stated:
CSAL-0914
CY L? Of
166L'f
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
 Approved For Relje 2002/10/15 CIA-RDP33-02415A00Srt'00380014-3
_8
1. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial recon-
naissance (Photo and Elint) of the USSR and the USSR satellite
countries in order to obtain adequate and timely intelligence
consistent with the provisions mentioned in Section II
"Intelligence Requirements".
2. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial recon-
naissance (Photo and Elint) on a world-wide basis in order to
obtain adequate and timely intelligence which will uphold and
advance the national policies and interests of the U.S. as
well as safeguard the security of the U.S.
b) To fulfil the above requirements the "Operational Concept"
will take cognizance of the latest political considerations and
intelligence requirements as outlined by the ARC. The concept which
has evolved from experience, and which will be followed during the
period will feature careful selection of highest priority objectives
and prudent application of all planning factors to minimize the probability
of protest. During the period we have programmed a maximum of 35
photo-overflights. (20/1961-15/1962) However, a number which will
actually be accomplished will be dependent upon executive approval.
c) Since it is reasonably sure that the permanent overseas bases
are known by the Russians, and their proximity to Russian territory
allows for radar surveillance, and the fact that operations from these
bases would necessitate penetration of heavily defended areas, extensive
use of' staging bases will be required. In addition, it can be assumed
that these bases are possibly under visual surveillance. All of which
points out the need for greater deception and mobility during this period.
It is planned that future Project CHALICE missions will be directed
against areas in which the Soviets have the least radar tracking
capability and in such a manner as to create mr~xi.~nzm difficulty for positive
tracking. Selection of such areas will be consistent with highest
priority target coverage requir'ments. In addition, every effort will.
be made to avoid the involvenw-A of third countries (specifically, Soviet
Satellite Nations) either by iN=4rflying them on penetration or withdrawal
from the USSR, or by permitting them to become knowledgeable, through
their radar defenses, that such a penetration is being made. In all
operational planning and execution, the safety of the aircraft will be of
primary consideration.
3. UTILIZATION
a) Training should be realistic in that wherever possible the
results obtained will be useful in the event that the bases and/or
areas flown over are denied to the U.S. in the future.
CHAL-0914 /7 of [.
Approved For Release 2 2415A00Ot01~C8
 Approved For ReI se 10'U2/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415AOO@4'bO380014-3
-9-
25X1
b) Training will include the exercise of mobility plans utilizing
airlift to support staging to and from dispersal and deployment bases.
Training exercises will be accomplished on the fast move concept with
minimum U-2 ground time at any of the bases utilized.
c) The U-2 will be used in tactical situations and to acconplish
peripheral electronic and photographic reconnaissance. The advantages
in terms of training, economy, availability of a timely operational
capability, have been demonstrated during the past years in such areas
as the Middle East, Indonesia, Indo-Min and the Baltic. It is felt
that we stand to lose more than we would gain by not doing so. The
relative value of the exercise we give the Russian radars does not
outweigh the relative economic and operational reasons for doing so.
The Russian radar operators are known to be proficient and the quali-
tative technical characteristics of their equipment is such that the
above-mentioned flights - per se - would not induce greater Russian
technological efforts in the radar field. In addition, it is felt
that maximum utilization of the U-2 should be planned tbroug Qut the
estimated operational life of the U-2 rather than wait for primary
mission political approval that may never comae. In addition, it is
felt that knowledge of continued and current successful operations by
higher level would be conducive to obtaining political approval.
4+. PRIMARY MISSION CRAB-1" -'I S
a) In addition to Photographic and electronic collection equip-
ment which would be carried on overflight missions, it will be necessary
tion emdyment for ee of cover; and
3ring periods when
overflights are not in progress. A 115Z o equipment is
attached as Enclosure 3-
5. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT
a) In order to maintain the high reliability of aircraft and
equipment, the concept of contractor maintenance will be continued.
In addition, processing of overflight photography by EK viii be
continued to insure mozdmum intelligence exploitation. (Personnel
strength will remain as stipulated in current TO's, with possibly
minor aaJustmnts. )
6. CONTROL
a) The concept of overflights (and certain other missions) being
controlled by Headquarters will be continued to insure efficient target
coverage and compatibility of operations with national policy.
MALL-0914
4r 6o~
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
 Approved For Relws 02415AO 00380014-3
7. SORTIE RATE
a) Estimated sortie rate and flying hours by type of mission will
be as indicated in Enclosure 4. Approximately 4076 flying hours will
be required to accomplish 1057 sorties in FY 61 and 3800 flying hours
to accomplish 968 sorties in FY 62.
8. SUPPORT
a) Support will be required from the following echelons as
indicated. This support will be in accordance with current directives
and agreements.
1) Headquarters USAF for military personnel, commo logis-
tics, special airlift, and to serve as intermediary on liaison
matters. AFCIG-5 Will be the channel for support to all subor-
dinate headquarters.
2) Theater Commanders for air base facilities, logistic
support, airlift requirements and for special liaison.
3) Strategic Air Command for certain air base facilities,
personnel, logistics support and liaison matters.
4) Airways Air Communications System for communications
support.
5) Headquarters Air Weather Service for weather support.
6) National Security Agency for special intelligence
reaction reports.
7) National Technical Processing Center for ELINT readout.
8) Department of State for negotiation for use rights to
operate from certain foreign countries.
17 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FORCES
CHAL-0914
liii .,rcch 960
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
 Approved For Releaa~ 2002/10/15: CIA-RDP33-02415A000380014-3
25X1
2. Pre-HOSTILITIES PERIOD
a) If international relationships deteriorate to a point where
hostilities are considered imminent, Project CHALICE will conduct
penetration and peripheral photographic and FLINT sorties at a madaatam
rate which available personnel, aircraft and equipment can support.
Although the military services have photographic and ELINT collection
capabilities in the overseas theaters, the U-2's of Project CHALICE
are the only capability in place overseas able to penetrate deeply
and with 1omparative physical immunity.
b) During this period it will be essential that the maadmum
amount of potential enemy territory be photographed so as to provide
the:
1) Most probable time when an enemy attack would be launched.
2) Size of the available enemy attack force.
3) Type and extent of probable enemy attack.
4+) Locations from where attacking forces and/or misfiles
would be launched.
5) Overall capability of the enemy to sustain an attack.
6) Most current target data for friendly attacking forces
to use for retaliation.
c) The need for current electronic intelligence will be very
necessary to make available the frequencies and locations of enemy
radars so that:
1) Friendly attacking forces can employ jamming techniques
most effectively.
CRAL-0914
/-kr 06f 11
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
 Approved For Releas~ 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A0004 D380014-3
2) Weak spots can be located through which attacking
forces can penetrate with the least probability of interception.
3) Radar guidance of enemy interceptors and/or missiles
can be interrupted.
d) During the pre-hostilities period operational control will
remain with Project CHALICE Headquarters. Deployment to prearranged
rear bases may be necessary as dictated by the existing situation
(Encl. 2). Project CHALICE resources will be utilized, on a first
priority basis, to obtain reconnaissance coverage of SAC objectives
as outlined in Appendix 1 to Annex "B" of SAC Operations order #1009.
3. HOSTILITIES
a) When hostilities break out, Project overseas assets will
revert to the operational control of the Strategic Air Command under
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This transfer of control and assignment
will be in accordance with the provisions of a Joint Agreement
(ORAL 0239), dated 19 July 1958, with USAF, DCS/O, concurrence date
24 Sept 1958, and in accordance with the CHALICE EWP Operational Plan,
dated 20 January 1959- Upon execution of the SAC 50 series EWO, SAC
Operationa Order Number 1009, Appendix 2 to Annex "B" contains the
necessary instructions for utilization of CHALICE resources.
b) Military personnel will be effected in accordance with the
arrangements contained in the Personnel Annex of the above-mentioned
transfer agreement.
c) It is planned that civilian personnel will continue to function
until relieved by military personnel.
25X1A
APPROVED:
Enclosures (4)
CHAL-0914
CyIZ7 of /
1k March
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/15 CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
V ENCLOSURES
Enclosure Number 1
Life Expectancy of the U-2 for Overflights
Because of the special classification of the information
contained in this report its contents are being held within
Intelligence Section/DPD-DD/P and it will be distributed o'
"need to know" basis.
CHAL-091+
14 March L960
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
 25X6C Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/10/15 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100380014-3