HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON PROJECT AQUATONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000100070026-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: May 3, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence 3 May 1957
SUBJECT : High Level Meeting on Project AQUA TONE
1. As explained to you on 2 May, the paper to be handed by you to
the President at the May 6th meeting has been cut down to a brief status
report. A copy is attached hereto and copies have been sent to the Air
Force. (Tab A)
2. It is understood that the following topics which are now excluded
from the formal paper will be raised by you, probably in this order, for
discussion at the meeting:
a. Alternative Lower Priority Targets.
b. The RAINBOW Program.
c. Maintenance of a Non-Military Overflight Capability.
d. Proposed Modification of Operational Concept.
I have drafted a separate paper on these four topics indicating the line I
believe we should take on each. Copies of this paper have gone to the Air
Force who are fully aware of our views. This paper is also attached hereto.
(Tab B)
3. I hardly need remind you that the third of these_ topics is the sensi-
tive one because there is not full agreement between the Air Force and our-
selves on this matter. I have drafted the paragraph on this topic with great
care in an attempt to emphasize that the difference between the Air Force and
ourselves is a difference in our estimate of what our own political authorities
would prefer. I urge you to emphasize that our disagreement is of this
nature, since we have no desire to maintain an overflight capability unless
we stand a better chance than the Air Force of being allowed to use it,while
the Air Force has no desire to stop us if they are convinced that this is the
case. It follows that instead of having a debate with the Air Force about the
views of the political authorities it is simpler to ask what they are.
4. I know that it is difficult to control the course of such a meeting
as the one planned for the 6th but I would urge you to make a major effort
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at least to raise all four of these topics so that we can try to get, if not
clean-cut decisions, at least some feeling for the President's views. I
repeat, the Air Force is well aware that these issues will be raised.
5. I have prepared still a third piece of paper which contains a
number of arguments I hope you will have an opportunity to use in favor
of letting us operate. (Tab C)
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1-DCI
2-DDCI
3 -Pr oj Dir. Chr ono
4-Proj. Dir. Subject
5-Deputy Project Director
6-Proj. Chrono (Hold)
RICHARD M. BISSEIL, 3.
Project Director
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TO /MATOS CT
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3 May 1957
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a. ther conditions generally favorable for aerial
reconnalit anite and most of Siberia from April through October
*o are
and in the Far East are retely good in gammas and at their best diring
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A similar military caps is currently being developed by
the Air Iterce ittbich is equipping a SAO squadron with Aix Torte procured 174
aircraft. This volt will be operationally ready and &Imitable for deployment
by 1 August 1957.
It now appears that the it4 will be relatively safe from inter-
ception** least through the present reconnaiattance season and possibly, under
certain dream co*, considerably longer. Nevertheless, both its margin
of advitulago and the security surrounding this operation are subject to continu.
*us erosion se the AQUATON14 capability mutt be regarded as a wasting asset.
Z. for ?the Current Season: Additional hard intelligence obtain..
able only through aortal reconnaissance is urgently required, especially on
development* and installations having to do with Soviet guided ?Assn**, nuclear
weapons, and hitercontinental bombers. To cover thirty-five ouch targets
WM" have been selected by the Intelligence Community as having the highest
priority should require some twelve to fifteen inumessfut missions, taking
account of normal weather patterns. If permission is granted to conduct these
overflights it is proposed that they be undertaken only as highly favorable
weather materialises so as to obtain maximum coverage with a minimum
number of sorties. This would imply a rate of operation of only one to three
missions per week.
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3. Maintenance of a Non-Military Overflight Capability: The
principal reason for developing the AQUA TONE capability originally within
a CIA framework (but as a joint Air Force/CIA Project) rather than in the
Air Force was to maintain greater security, employ deeper cover, use
civilian pilots, keep the aircraft outside of military control, and therefore,
make possible more plausible denial of U.S. military responsibility in the
face of any Soviet charges. On the other hand, it can be argued that an opera-
tion of this character can be conducted as securely by military units operating
under military cover as by the Clandestine Service, that the distinction
between military and civilian control is irrelevant to the possibility of denial
and therefore that this tool is politically no more useable for overflights in
the hands of the Clandestine Service than in the regular military establishment.
Although this issue could be debated at length between this Agency and the
Air Force, what is really important is the attitude of the political authorities
of our Government. The decisive question is whether they believe (rightly
or wrongly) that the use of U-2 aircraft for overflights by the Clandestine
Service will give rise to lesser risks of embarrassment or counteraction
than their use by a tactical military arm. If this does turn out to be their
view, it would seem to be worthwhile to continue the present joint operation
through 1958, probably with some changes in organization and cover and on
a reduced scale, in order to maintain the capability where it would be most
likely to be used. Meanwhile the parallel Air Force capability would be
developed separately. If, however, the political authorities believe that
the political risks are the same for nonmilitary as for military overflight
operations, then it is proposed that CIA's equipment be transferred to the
Air Force at the end of the current reconnaissance season.
4. Proposed Modification of Operational Concept: If the present
joint project organized within a CIA framework is continued beyond the present
season, consideration will be given to the following modifications of present
operational concepts. Their purpose would be to reduce the political hazards
to which overflights give rise or to be prepared for unfavorable political
developments and thus to render the U-2 capability politically more useable.
a. The use of non-U.S. pilots in order
to heighten the possibility of plausible denial.
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b. The modification of a few of the Agency's aircraft to
permit basing them on an aircraft carrier and thereby to avoid
the exposure of friendly governments to political and diplomatic
pressures.
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3 May 1957
ADDITIONAL BUSINESS CONCERNING PROJECT
AQUATONE/OILSTONE
The paper on AQUATONE prepared for submission to higher authority con-
tains a brief account of the current status of the Project and plans for opera-
tions during the current season. All other issues were excluded in order to
focus attention on the major decision required at this time. It was agreed,
however, in conversations with representatives of the Air Force that the
following additional matters be discussed orally with the political authorities
along the lines indicated under each heading.
1. Alternative Lower Priority Targets: If authority cannot now be
granted to overfly some or all of the highest priority targets in the USSR, it
is important to determine whether:
(a) Overflights of the following lower priority areas (listed
in the order of priority) should now be conducted:
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(b) There is sufficient prospect of receiving at a later date
authority for overflights of the USSR to warrant postponing opera-
tions over lower priority areas.
2. The RAINBOW Program: During the last nine months significant
progress has been achieved through this Project in the development of radar
camouflage. It is believed that the radar reflectivity of the U-2 aircraft can
be so reduced as to create a good chance that a majority of overflight missions
will avoid detection entirely. Nevertheless, it must be anticipated that at
least a certain proportion of them will be detected, although their continuous
tracking should be extremely difficult. Our plan is to equip the U-2 aircraft
with this protection if and as it is operationally developed. If it is effective,
it will reduce not only the likelihood of detection and tracking but also the
possibility of interception even after the Soviets have developed aircraft or
missiles capable of operating at extreme altitudes.
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3 May 1957
AQUATONE MEETING
9:30 a.m. Monday, 6 May 1957
BRIEFING NOTES FOR DCI
The following are points you may wish to make orally in the forth-
coming meeting on AQUATONE.
I. Russian awareness of U.S. overflights, though undoubtedly
a source of irritation, should increase their willingness to consider a
realistic mutual inspection system and in particular an effective version
of the open skies proposals. The knowledge that they cannot altogether
prevent aerial reconnaissance should increase the attractiveness to them
of a plan to control and regularize it.
2. Although overflights can be regarded as provocative, it is
difficult to understand how they could provoke any counter action except
the most vigorous efforts at interception. The Russians know, even if no
overflights are conducted, that our offensive air capability exists. They
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ducted only for reconnaissance purposes. Above all, knowledge that it is
possible for our aircraft to overfly their country beyond the reach of inter-
ception, perhaps carrying high yield weapons, would be a powerful deterent
to overt attack no matter how "provoking".
4. The Pr sidentts Advisory Committee on foreign intelligence
has unanimously re ommended that overflight missions be resumed.
4imsmommii
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